From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb(a)kernel.org>
mainline inclusion
from mainline-v6.12-rc1
commit 77d48d39e99170b528e4f2e9fc5d1d64cdedd386
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAYQSJ
CVE: CVE-2024-49858
Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?…
--------------------------------
The TPM event log table is a Linux specific construct, where the data
produced by the GetEventLog() boot service is cached in memory, and
passed on to the OS using an EFI configuration table.
The use of EFI_LOADER_DATA here results in the region being left
unreserved in the E820 memory map constructed by the EFI stub, and this
is the memory description that is passed on to the incoming kernel by
kexec, which is therefore unaware that the region should be reserved.
Even though the utility of the TPM2 event log after a kexec is
questionable, any corruption might send the parsing code off into the
weeds and crash the kernel. So let's use EFI_ACPI_RECLAIM_MEMORY
instead, which is always treated as reserved by the E820 conversion
logic.
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Breno Leitao <leitao(a)debian.org>
Tested-by: Usama Arif <usamaarif642(a)gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Ilias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodimas(a)linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Qi Xi <xiqi2(a)huawei.com>
---
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/tpm.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/tpm.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/tpm.c
index df3182f2e63a..1fd6823248ab 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/tpm.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/tpm.c
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ static void efi_retrieve_tcg2_eventlog(int version, efi_physical_addr_t log_loca
}
/* Allocate space for the logs and copy them. */
- status = efi_bs_call(allocate_pool, EFI_LOADER_DATA,
+ status = efi_bs_call(allocate_pool, EFI_ACPI_RECLAIM_MEMORY,
sizeof(*log_tbl) + log_size, (void **)&log_tbl);
if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
--
2.33.0
From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb(a)kernel.org>
mainline inclusion
from mainline-v6.12-rc1
commit 77d48d39e99170b528e4f2e9fc5d1d64cdedd386
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAYQSJ
CVE: CVE-2024-49858
Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?…
--------------------------------
The TPM event log table is a Linux specific construct, where the data
produced by the GetEventLog() boot service is cached in memory, and
passed on to the OS using an EFI configuration table.
The use of EFI_LOADER_DATA here results in the region being left
unreserved in the E820 memory map constructed by the EFI stub, and this
is the memory description that is passed on to the incoming kernel by
kexec, which is therefore unaware that the region should be reserved.
Even though the utility of the TPM2 event log after a kexec is
questionable, any corruption might send the parsing code off into the
weeds and crash the kernel. So let's use EFI_ACPI_RECLAIM_MEMORY
instead, which is always treated as reserved by the E820 conversion
logic.
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Breno Leitao <leitao(a)debian.org>
Tested-by: Usama Arif <usamaarif642(a)gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Ilias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodimas(a)linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Qi Xi <xiqi2(a)huawei.com>
---
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/tpm.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/tpm.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/tpm.c
index df3182f2e63a..1fd6823248ab 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/tpm.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/tpm.c
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ static void efi_retrieve_tcg2_eventlog(int version, efi_physical_addr_t log_loca
}
/* Allocate space for the logs and copy them. */
- status = efi_bs_call(allocate_pool, EFI_LOADER_DATA,
+ status = efi_bs_call(allocate_pool, EFI_ACPI_RECLAIM_MEMORY,
sizeof(*log_tbl) + log_size, (void **)&log_tbl);
if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
--
2.33.0
From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de>
stable inclusion
from stable-v6.1.113
commit b566c7d8a2de403ccc9d8a06195e19bbb386d0e4
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issue/IAYR8E
CVE: CVE-2024-50002
Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id…
--------------------------------
[ Upstream commit 4b30051c4864234ec57290c3d142db7c88f10d8a ]
Module insertion invokes static_call_add_module() to initialize the static
calls in a module. static_call_add_module() invokes __static_call_init(),
which allocates a struct static_call_mod to either encapsulate the built-in
static call sites of the associated key into it so further modules can be
added or to append the module to the module chain.
If that allocation fails the function returns with an error code and the
module core invokes static_call_del_module() to clean up eventually added
static_call_mod entries.
This works correctly, when all keys used by the module were converted over
to a module chain before the failure. If not then static_call_del_module()
causes a #GP as it blindly assumes that key::mods points to a valid struct
static_call_mod.
The problem is that key::mods is not a individual struct member of struct
static_call_key, it's part of a union to save space:
union {
/* bit 0: 0 = mods, 1 = sites */
unsigned long type;
struct static_call_mod *mods;
struct static_call_site *sites;
};
key::sites is a pointer to the list of built-in usage sites of the static
call. The type of the pointer is differentiated by bit 0. A mods pointer
has the bit clear, the sites pointer has the bit set.
As static_call_del_module() blidly assumes that the pointer is a valid
static_call_mod type, it fails to check for this failure case and
dereferences the pointer to the list of built-in call sites, which is
obviously bogus.
Cure it by checking whether the key has a sites or a mods pointer.
If it's a sites pointer then the key is not to be touched. As the sites are
walked in the same order as in __static_call_init() the site walk can be
terminated because all subsequent sites have not been touched by the init
code due to the error exit.
If it was converted before the allocation fail, then the inner loop which
searches for a module match will find nothing.
A fail in the second allocation in __static_call_init() is harmless and
does not require special treatment. The first allocation succeeded and
converted the key to a module chain. That first entry has mod::mod == NULL
and mod::next == NULL, so the inner loop of static_call_del_module() will
neither find a module match nor a module chain. The next site in the walk
was either already converted, but can't match the module, or it will exit
the outer loop because it has a static_call_site pointer and not a
static_call_mod pointer.
Fixes: 9183c3f9ed71 ("static_call: Add inline static call infrastructure")
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230915082126.4187913-1-ruanjinjie@huawei.com
Reported-by: Jinjie Ruan <ruanjinjie(a)huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz(a)infradead.org>
Tested-by: Jinjie Ruan <ruanjinjie(a)huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/87zfon6b0s.ffs@tglx
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Gu Bowen <gubowen5(a)huawei.com>
---
kernel/static_call_inline.c | 11 +++++++++++
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
diff --git a/kernel/static_call_inline.c b/kernel/static_call_inline.c
index b80a507c1263..0e5794cdf56c 100644
--- a/kernel/static_call_inline.c
+++ b/kernel/static_call_inline.c
@@ -405,6 +405,17 @@ static void static_call_del_module(struct module *mod)
for (site = start; site < stop; site++) {
key = static_call_key(site);
+
+ /*
+ * If the key was not updated due to a memory allocation
+ * failure in __static_call_init() then treating key::sites
+ * as key::mods in the code below would cause random memory
+ * access and #GP. In that case all subsequent sites have
+ * not been touched either, so stop iterating.
+ */
+ if (!static_call_key_has_mods(key))
+ break;
+
if (key == prev_key)
continue;
--
2.25.1
hulk inclusion
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/IB10SX
--------------------------------
This reverts commit 09996a7c8dc8bd525e05d29985f9d68a30b65188.
The reverted commit modified differently from the original stable due to a
bug in git am.
The original patch has been merged by CVE-2024-38552.
So revert this buggy patch.
Fixes: 09996a7c8dc8 ("drm/amd/display: Fix potential index out of bounds in color transformation function")
Signed-off-by: Wang Hai <wanghai38(a)huawei.com>
---
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dcn10/dcn10_cm_common.c | 5 -----
1 file changed, 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dcn10/dcn10_cm_common.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dcn10/dcn10_cm_common.c
index c970cea26592..c0372aa4ec83 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dcn10/dcn10_cm_common.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dcn10/dcn10_cm_common.c
@@ -571,11 +571,6 @@ bool cm_helper_translate_curve_to_degamma_hw_format(
i += increment) {
if (j == hw_points - 1)
break;
- if (i >= TRANSFER_FUNC_POINTS) {
- DC_LOG_ERROR("Index out of bounds: i=%d, TRANSFER_FUNC_POINTS=%d\n",
- i, TRANSFER_FUNC_POINTS);
- return false;
- }
rgb_resulted[j].red = output_tf->tf_pts.red[i];
rgb_resulted[j].green = output_tf->tf_pts.green[i];
rgb_resulted[j].blue = output_tf->tf_pts.blue[i];
--
2.17.1