April 2024 - Kernel - mailweb.openeuler.org

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] tee: amdtee: fix use-after-free vulnerability in amdtee_close_session
by Guo Mengqi 16 Apr '24

16 Apr '24

From: Rijo Thomas <Rijo-john.Thomas(a)amd.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.199 commit da7ce52a2f6c468946195b116615297d3d113a27 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I9AWJ5 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit f4384b3e54ea813868bb81a861bf5b2406e15d8f upstream. There is a potential race condition in amdtee_close_session that may cause use-after-free in amdtee_open_session. For instance, if a session has refcount == 1, and one thread tries to free this session via: kref_put(&sess->refcount, destroy_session); the reference count will get decremented, and the next step would be to call destroy_session(). However, if in another thread, amdtee_open_session() is called before destroy_session() has completed execution, alloc_session() may return 'sess' that will be freed up later in destroy_session() leading to use-after-free in amdtee_open_session. To fix this issue, treat decrement of sess->refcount and removal of 'sess' from session list in destroy_session() as a critical section, so that it is executed atomically. Fixes: 757cc3e9ff1d ("tee: add AMD-TEE driver") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Rijo Thomas <Rijo-john.Thomas(a)amd.com> Reviewed-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: sanglipeng <sanglipeng1(a)jd.com> --- drivers/tee/amdtee/core.c | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/tee/amdtee/core.c b/drivers/tee/amdtee/core.c index 297dc62bca29..a890eeabe065 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/amdtee/core.c +++ b/drivers/tee/amdtee/core.c @@ -217,12 +217,12 @@ static int copy_ta_binary(struct tee_context *ctx, void *ptr, void **ta, return rc; } +/* mutex must be held by caller */ static void destroy_session(struct kref *ref) { struct amdtee_session *sess = container_of(ref, struct amdtee_session, refcount); - mutex_lock(&session_list_mutex); list_del(&sess->list_node); mutex_unlock(&session_list_mutex); kfree(sess); @@ -277,7 +277,8 @@ int amdtee_open_session(struct tee_context *ctx, if (i >= TEE_NUM_SESSIONS) { pr_err("reached maximum session count %d\n", TEE_NUM_SESSIONS); handle_unload_ta(ta_handle); - kref_put(&sess->refcount, destroy_session); + kref_put_mutex(&sess->refcount, destroy_session, + &session_list_mutex); rc = -ENOMEM; goto out; } @@ -290,7 +291,8 @@ int amdtee_open_session(struct tee_context *ctx, clear_bit(i, sess->sess_mask); spin_unlock(&sess->lock); handle_unload_ta(ta_handle); - kref_put(&sess->refcount, destroy_session); + kref_put_mutex(&sess->refcount, destroy_session, + &session_list_mutex); goto out; } @@ -332,7 +334,7 @@ int amdtee_close_session(struct tee_context *ctx, u32 session) handle_close_session(ta_handle, session_info); handle_unload_ta(ta_handle); - kref_put(&sess->refcount, destroy_session); + kref_put_mutex(&sess->refcount, destroy_session, &session_list_mutex); return 0; } -- 2.17.1

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[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS] tee: amdtee: fix use-after-free vulnerability in amdtee_close_session
by Guo Mengqi 16 Apr '24

16 Apr '24

From: Rijo Thomas <Rijo-john.Thomas(a)amd.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.199 commit da7ce52a2f6c468946195b116615297d3d113a27 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I9AWJ5 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit f4384b3e54ea813868bb81a861bf5b2406e15d8f upstream. There is a potential race condition in amdtee_close_session that may cause use-after-free in amdtee_open_session. For instance, if a session has refcount == 1, and one thread tries to free this session via: kref_put(&sess->refcount, destroy_session); the reference count will get decremented, and the next step would be to call destroy_session(). However, if in another thread, amdtee_open_session() is called before destroy_session() has completed execution, alloc_session() may return 'sess' that will be freed up later in destroy_session() leading to use-after-free in amdtee_open_session. To fix this issue, treat decrement of sess->refcount and removal of 'sess' from session list in destroy_session() as a critical section, so that it is executed atomically. Fixes: 757cc3e9ff1d ("tee: add AMD-TEE driver") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Rijo Thomas <Rijo-john.Thomas(a)amd.com> Reviewed-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: sanglipeng <sanglipeng1(a)jd.com> --- drivers/tee/amdtee/core.c | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/tee/amdtee/core.c b/drivers/tee/amdtee/core.c index 297dc62bca29..a890eeabe065 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/amdtee/core.c +++ b/drivers/tee/amdtee/core.c @@ -217,12 +217,12 @@ static int copy_ta_binary(struct tee_context *ctx, void *ptr, void **ta, return rc; } +/* mutex must be held by caller */ static void destroy_session(struct kref *ref) { struct amdtee_session *sess = container_of(ref, struct amdtee_session, refcount); - mutex_lock(&session_list_mutex); list_del(&sess->list_node); mutex_unlock(&session_list_mutex); kfree(sess); @@ -277,7 +277,8 @@ int amdtee_open_session(struct tee_context *ctx, if (i >= TEE_NUM_SESSIONS) { pr_err("reached maximum session count %d\n", TEE_NUM_SESSIONS); handle_unload_ta(ta_handle); - kref_put(&sess->refcount, destroy_session); + kref_put_mutex(&sess->refcount, destroy_session, + &session_list_mutex); rc = -ENOMEM; goto out; } @@ -290,7 +291,8 @@ int amdtee_open_session(struct tee_context *ctx, clear_bit(i, sess->sess_mask); spin_unlock(&sess->lock); handle_unload_ta(ta_handle); - kref_put(&sess->refcount, destroy_session); + kref_put_mutex(&sess->refcount, destroy_session, + &session_list_mutex); goto out; } @@ -332,7 +334,7 @@ int amdtee_close_session(struct tee_context *ctx, u32 session) handle_close_session(ta_handle, session_info); handle_unload_ta(ta_handle); - kref_put(&sess->refcount, destroy_session); + kref_put_mutex(&sess->refcount, destroy_session, &session_list_mutex); return 0; } -- 2.17.1

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[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP2] tee: amdtee: fix use-after-free vulnerability in amdtee_close_session
by Guo Mengqi 16 Apr '24

16 Apr '24

From: Rijo Thomas <Rijo-john.Thomas(a)amd.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.199 commit da7ce52a2f6c468946195b116615297d3d113a27 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I9AWJ5 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit f4384b3e54ea813868bb81a861bf5b2406e15d8f upstream. There is a potential race condition in amdtee_close_session that may cause use-after-free in amdtee_open_session. For instance, if a session has refcount == 1, and one thread tries to free this session via: kref_put(&sess->refcount, destroy_session); the reference count will get decremented, and the next step would be to call destroy_session(). However, if in another thread, amdtee_open_session() is called before destroy_session() has completed execution, alloc_session() may return 'sess' that will be freed up later in destroy_session() leading to use-after-free in amdtee_open_session. To fix this issue, treat decrement of sess->refcount and removal of 'sess' from session list in destroy_session() as a critical section, so that it is executed atomically. Fixes: 757cc3e9ff1d ("tee: add AMD-TEE driver") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Rijo Thomas <Rijo-john.Thomas(a)amd.com> Reviewed-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: sanglipeng <sanglipeng1(a)jd.com> --- drivers/tee/amdtee/core.c | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/tee/amdtee/core.c b/drivers/tee/amdtee/core.c index 372d64756ed6..3c15f6a9e91c 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/amdtee/core.c +++ b/drivers/tee/amdtee/core.c @@ -217,12 +217,12 @@ static int copy_ta_binary(struct tee_context *ctx, void *ptr, void **ta, return rc; } +/* mutex must be held by caller */ static void destroy_session(struct kref *ref) { struct amdtee_session *sess = container_of(ref, struct amdtee_session, refcount); - mutex_lock(&session_list_mutex); list_del(&sess->list_node); mutex_unlock(&session_list_mutex); kfree(sess); @@ -272,7 +272,8 @@ int amdtee_open_session(struct tee_context *ctx, if (arg->ret != TEEC_SUCCESS) { pr_err("open_session failed %d\n", arg->ret); handle_unload_ta(ta_handle); - kref_put(&sess->refcount, destroy_session); + kref_put_mutex(&sess->refcount, destroy_session, + &session_list_mutex); goto out; } @@ -290,7 +291,8 @@ int amdtee_open_session(struct tee_context *ctx, pr_err("reached maximum session count %d\n", TEE_NUM_SESSIONS); handle_close_session(ta_handle, session_info); handle_unload_ta(ta_handle); - kref_put(&sess->refcount, destroy_session); + kref_put_mutex(&sess->refcount, destroy_session, + &session_list_mutex); rc = -ENOMEM; goto out; } @@ -331,7 +333,7 @@ int amdtee_close_session(struct tee_context *ctx, u32 session) handle_close_session(ta_handle, session_info); handle_unload_ta(ta_handle); - kref_put(&sess->refcount, destroy_session); + kref_put_mutex(&sess->refcount, destroy_session, &session_list_mutex); return 0; } -- 2.17.1

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[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] tee: amdtee: fix use-after-free vulnerability in amdtee_close_session
by Guo Mengqi 16 Apr '24

16 Apr '24

From: Rijo Thomas <Rijo-john.Thomas(a)amd.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.199 commit da7ce52a2f6c468946195b116615297d3d113a27 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I9AWJ5 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit f4384b3e54ea813868bb81a861bf5b2406e15d8f upstream. There is a potential race condition in amdtee_close_session that may cause use-after-free in amdtee_open_session. For instance, if a session has refcount == 1, and one thread tries to free this session via: kref_put(&sess->refcount, destroy_session); the reference count will get decremented, and the next step would be to call destroy_session(). However, if in another thread, amdtee_open_session() is called before destroy_session() has completed execution, alloc_session() may return 'sess' that will be freed up later in destroy_session() leading to use-after-free in amdtee_open_session. To fix this issue, treat decrement of sess->refcount and removal of 'sess' from session list in destroy_session() as a critical section, so that it is executed atomically. Fixes: 757cc3e9ff1d ("tee: add AMD-TEE driver") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Rijo Thomas <Rijo-john.Thomas(a)amd.com> Reviewed-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: sanglipeng <sanglipeng1(a)jd.com> --- drivers/tee/amdtee/core.c | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/tee/amdtee/core.c b/drivers/tee/amdtee/core.c index 372d64756ed6..3c15f6a9e91c 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/amdtee/core.c +++ b/drivers/tee/amdtee/core.c @@ -217,12 +217,12 @@ static int copy_ta_binary(struct tee_context *ctx, void *ptr, void **ta, return rc; } +/* mutex must be held by caller */ static void destroy_session(struct kref *ref) { struct amdtee_session *sess = container_of(ref, struct amdtee_session, refcount); - mutex_lock(&session_list_mutex); list_del(&sess->list_node); mutex_unlock(&session_list_mutex); kfree(sess); @@ -272,7 +272,8 @@ int amdtee_open_session(struct tee_context *ctx, if (arg->ret != TEEC_SUCCESS) { pr_err("open_session failed %d\n", arg->ret); handle_unload_ta(ta_handle); - kref_put(&sess->refcount, destroy_session); + kref_put_mutex(&sess->refcount, destroy_session, + &session_list_mutex); goto out; } @@ -290,7 +291,8 @@ int amdtee_open_session(struct tee_context *ctx, pr_err("reached maximum session count %d\n", TEE_NUM_SESSIONS); handle_close_session(ta_handle, session_info); handle_unload_ta(ta_handle); - kref_put(&sess->refcount, destroy_session); + kref_put_mutex(&sess->refcount, destroy_session, + &session_list_mutex); rc = -ENOMEM; goto out; } @@ -331,7 +333,7 @@ int amdtee_close_session(struct tee_context *ctx, u32 session) handle_close_session(ta_handle, session_info); handle_unload_ta(ta_handle); - kref_put(&sess->refcount, destroy_session); + kref_put_mutex(&sess->refcount, destroy_session, &session_list_mutex); return 0; } -- 2.17.1

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[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS] tee: amdtee: fix use-after-free vulnerability in amdtee_close_session
by Guo Mengqi 16 Apr '24

16 Apr '24

From: Rijo Thomas <Rijo-john.Thomas(a)amd.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.199 commit da7ce52a2f6c468946195b116615297d3d113a27 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I9AWJ5 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit f4384b3e54ea813868bb81a861bf5b2406e15d8f upstream. There is a potential race condition in amdtee_close_session that may cause use-after-free in amdtee_open_session. For instance, if a session has refcount == 1, and one thread tries to free this session via: kref_put(&sess->refcount, destroy_session); the reference count will get decremented, and the next step would be to call destroy_session(). However, if in another thread, amdtee_open_session() is called before destroy_session() has completed execution, alloc_session() may return 'sess' that will be freed up later in destroy_session() leading to use-after-free in amdtee_open_session. To fix this issue, treat decrement of sess->refcount and removal of 'sess' from session list in destroy_session() as a critical section, so that it is executed atomically. Fixes: 757cc3e9ff1d ("tee: add AMD-TEE driver") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Rijo Thomas <Rijo-john.Thomas(a)amd.com> Reviewed-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: sanglipeng <sanglipeng1(a)jd.com> --- drivers/tee/amdtee/core.c | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/tee/amdtee/core.c b/drivers/tee/amdtee/core.c index 372d64756ed6..3c15f6a9e91c 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/amdtee/core.c +++ b/drivers/tee/amdtee/core.c @@ -217,12 +217,12 @@ static int copy_ta_binary(struct tee_context *ctx, void *ptr, void **ta, return rc; } +/* mutex must be held by caller */ static void destroy_session(struct kref *ref) { struct amdtee_session *sess = container_of(ref, struct amdtee_session, refcount); - mutex_lock(&session_list_mutex); list_del(&sess->list_node); mutex_unlock(&session_list_mutex); kfree(sess); @@ -272,7 +272,8 @@ int amdtee_open_session(struct tee_context *ctx, if (arg->ret != TEEC_SUCCESS) { pr_err("open_session failed %d\n", arg->ret); handle_unload_ta(ta_handle); - kref_put(&sess->refcount, destroy_session); + kref_put_mutex(&sess->refcount, destroy_session, + &session_list_mutex); goto out; } @@ -290,7 +291,8 @@ int amdtee_open_session(struct tee_context *ctx, pr_err("reached maximum session count %d\n", TEE_NUM_SESSIONS); handle_close_session(ta_handle, session_info); handle_unload_ta(ta_handle); - kref_put(&sess->refcount, destroy_session); + kref_put_mutex(&sess->refcount, destroy_session, + &session_list_mutex); rc = -ENOMEM; goto out; } @@ -331,7 +333,7 @@ int amdtee_close_session(struct tee_context *ctx, u32 session) handle_close_session(ta_handle, session_info); handle_unload_ta(ta_handle); - kref_put(&sess->refcount, destroy_session); + kref_put_mutex(&sess->refcount, destroy_session, &session_list_mutex); return 0; } -- 2.17.1

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[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP2] serial: 8250_port: Check IRQ data before use
by Yi Yang 16 Apr '24

16 Apr '24

From: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko(a)linux.intel.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.198 commit e14afa4450cb7e4cf93e993a765801203d41d014 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I95ATO CVE: CVE-2023-52567 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit cce7fc8b29961b64fadb1ce398dc5ff32a79643b upstream. In case the leaf driver wants to use IRQ polling (irq = 0) and IIR register shows that an interrupt happened in the 8250 hardware the IRQ data can be NULL. In such a case we need to skip the wake event as we came to this path from the timer interrupt and quite likely system is already awake. Without this fix we have got an Oops: serial8250: ttyS0 at I/O 0x3f8 (irq = 0, base_baud = 115200) is a 16550A ... BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000010 RIP: 0010:serial8250_handle_irq+0x7c/0x240 Call Trace: ? serial8250_handle_irq+0x7c/0x240 ? __pfx_serial8250_timeout+0x10/0x10 Fixes: 0ba9e3a13c6a ("serial: 8250: Add missing wakeup event reporting") Cc: stable <stable(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko(a)linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli <florian.fainelli(a)broadcom.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230831222555.614426-1-andriy.shevchenko@linux.i… Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Yi Yang <yiyang13(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c b/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c index b19908779e3b..6218ebc4427d 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c +++ b/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c @@ -1914,7 +1914,10 @@ int serial8250_handle_irq(struct uart_port *port, unsigned int iir) skip_rx = true; if (status & (UART_LSR_DR | UART_LSR_BI) && !skip_rx) { - if (irqd_is_wakeup_set(irq_get_irq_data(port->irq))) + struct irq_data *d; + + d = irq_get_irq_data(port->irq); + if (d && irqd_is_wakeup_set(d)) pm_wakeup_event(tport->tty->dev, 0); if (!up->dma || handle_rx_dma(up, iir)) status = serial8250_rx_chars(up, status); -- 2.25.1

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[PATCH OLK-5.10] uio_hv_generic: Fix another memory leak in error handling paths
by Guo Mengqi 16 Apr '24

16 Apr '24

From: Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet(a)wanadoo.fr> mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.13-rc3 commit 0b0226be3a52dadd965644bc52a807961c2c26df category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I956G4 CVE: CVE-2021-47070 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Memory allocated by 'vmbus_alloc_ring()' at the beginning of the probe function is never freed in the error handling path. Add the missing 'vmbus_free_ring()' call. Note that it is already freed in the .remove function. Fixes: cdfa835c6e5e ("uio_hv_generic: defer opening vmbus until first use") Cc: stable <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet(a)wanadoo.fr> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/0d86027b8eeed8e6360bc3d52bcdb328ff9bdca1.16205440… Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> conflicts: drivers/uio/uio_hv_generic.c Signed-off-by: Guo Mengqi <guomengqi3(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/uio/uio_hv_generic.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/uio/uio_hv_generic.c b/drivers/uio/uio_hv_generic.c index c31febe90d4e..4abd8e20fb5b 100644 --- a/drivers/uio/uio_hv_generic.c +++ b/drivers/uio/uio_hv_generic.c @@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ hv_uio_probe(struct hv_device *dev, pdata->recv_buf = vzalloc(RECV_BUFFER_SIZE); if (pdata->recv_buf == NULL) { ret = -ENOMEM; - goto fail_close; + goto fail_free_ring; } ret = vmbus_establish_gpadl(channel, pdata->recv_buf, @@ -351,6 +351,8 @@ hv_uio_probe(struct hv_device *dev, fail_close: hv_uio_cleanup(dev, pdata); +fail_free_ring: + vmbus_free_ring(dev->channel); fail: kfree(pdata); -- 2.17.1

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[PATCH OLK-5.10] arm64: dts: qcom: sdm845-db845c: Mark cont splash memory region as reserved
by Guo Mengqi 16 Apr '24

16 Apr '24

From: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir(a)linaro.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.6-rc1 commit 110e70fccce4f22b53986ae797d665ffb1950aa6 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I95ATF CVE: CVE-2023-52561 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 110e70fccce4f22b53986ae797d665ffb1950aa6 ] Adding a reserved memory region for the framebuffer memory (the splash memory region set up by the bootloader). It fixes a kernel panic (arm-smmu: Unhandled context fault at this particular memory region) reported on DB845c running v5.10.y. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v5.10+ Reviewed-by: Caleb Connolly <caleb.connolly(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir(a)linaro.org> Acked-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski(a)linaro.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230726132719.2117369-2-amit.pundir@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Bjorn Andersson <andersson(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Guo Mengqi <guomengqi3(a)huawei.com> --- arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/sdm845-db845c.dts | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/sdm845-db845c.dts b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/sdm845-db845c.dts index 1e889ca932e4..67cd869de352 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/sdm845-db845c.dts +++ b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/sdm845-db845c.dts @@ -85,6 +85,14 @@ }; }; + reserved-memory { + /* Cont splash region set up by the bootloader */ + cont_splash_mem: framebuffer@9d400000 { + reg = <0x0 0x9d400000 0x0 0x2400000>; + no-map; + }; + }; + lt9611_1v8: lt9611-vdd18-regulator { compatible = "regulator-fixed"; regulator-name = "LT9611_1V8"; @@ -482,6 +490,7 @@ }; &mdss { + memory-region = <&cont_splash_mem>; status = "okay"; }; -- 2.17.1

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[PATCH 2 0/1] fix deadlock in cgroup1_writeback
by Chen Ridong 16 Apr '24

16 Apr '24

*** BLURB HERE *** Chen Ridong (1): cgroup_writeback: fix deadlock in cgroup1_writeback mm/memcontrol.c | 13 ++++++++----- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH OLK-6.6 00/14] mm: some optimization about hugetlb and thp
by Kefeng Wang 16 Apr '24

16 Apr '24

1. hugetlb: remove hugetlb special casing in filemap.c 2. thp: 1) align larger anonymous mappings on THP 2) batch tlb flush when splitting 3) try madvise huge for file exec Baolin Wang (1): mm: huge_memory: batch tlb flush when splitting a pte-mapped THP Fangrui Song (1): mm: remove VM_EXEC requirement for THP eligibility Kefeng Wang (1): mm: filemap: try to enable THP for exec mapping Lance Yang (2): mm/khugepaged: bypassing unnecessary scans with MMF_DISABLE_THP check mm/khugepaged: keep mm in mm_slot without MMF_DISABLE_THP check Lorenzo Stoakes (1): mm/filemap: clarify filemap_fault() comments for not uptodate case Rik van Riel (1): mm: align larger anonymous mappings on THP boundaries Ryan Roberts (1): mm: thp_get_unmapped_area must honour topdown preference Sidhartha Kumar (3): mm/filemap: remove hugetlb special casing in filemap.c mm/hugetlb: have CONFIG_HUGETLB_PAGE select CONFIG_XARRAY_MULTI fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c: mm/memory-failure.c: fix hugetlbfs hwpoison handling Yang Shi (3): mm: mmap: map MAP_STACK to VM_NOHUGEPAGE mm: huge_memory: don't force huge page alignment on 32 bit mm: mmap: no need to call khugepaged_enter_vma() for stack Documentation/admin-guide/mm/transhuge.rst | 7 ++ fs/Kconfig | 1 + fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c | 37 +++++----- include/linux/huge_mm.h | 2 +- include/linux/hugetlb.h | 12 ++++ include/linux/mman.h | 1 + include/linux/pagemap.h | 32 +-------- mm/filemap.c | 80 ++++++++++++++-------- mm/huge_memory.c | 47 ++++++++++++- mm/hugetlb.c | 32 ++------- mm/khugepaged.c | 16 +++-- mm/memory-failure.c | 2 +- mm/migrate.c | 6 +- mm/mmap.c | 11 +-- 14 files changed, 165 insertions(+), 121 deletions(-) -- 2.27.0

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