May 2024 - Kernel - mailweb.openeuler.org

[PATCH OLK-5.10] netfilter: nf_tables: Fix potential data-race in __nft_expr_type_get()
by Ziyang Xuan 08 May '24

08 May '24

stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.216 commit 934e66e231cff2b18faa2c8aad0b8cec13957e05 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9L5P0 CVE: CVE-2024-27020 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit f969eb84ce482331a991079ab7a5c4dc3b7f89bf ] nft_unregister_expr() can concurrent with __nft_expr_type_get(), and there is not any protection when iterate over nf_tables_expressions list in __nft_expr_type_get(). Therefore, there is potential data-race of nf_tables_expressions list entry. Use list_for_each_entry_rcu() to iterate over nf_tables_expressions list in __nft_expr_type_get(), and use rcu_read_lock() in the caller nft_expr_type_get() to protect the entire type query process. Fixes: ef1f7df9170d ("netfilter: nf_tables: expression ops overloading") Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang(a)huawei.com> --- net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c index 1cfd98d76060..095d9a527133 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c @@ -2716,7 +2716,7 @@ static const struct nft_expr_type *__nft_expr_type_get(u8 family, { const struct nft_expr_type *type, *candidate = NULL; - list_for_each_entry(type, &nf_tables_expressions, list) { + list_for_each_entry_rcu(type, &nf_tables_expressions, list) { if (!nla_strcmp(nla, type->name)) { if (!type->family && !candidate) candidate = type; @@ -2748,9 +2748,13 @@ static const struct nft_expr_type *nft_expr_type_get(struct net *net, if (nla == NULL) return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + rcu_read_lock(); type = __nft_expr_type_get(family, nla); - if (type != NULL && try_module_get(type->owner)) + if (type != NULL && try_module_get(type->owner)) { + rcu_read_unlock(); return type; + } + rcu_read_unlock(); lockdep_nfnl_nft_mutex_not_held(); #ifdef CONFIG_MODULES -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] sched/fair: Optimize performance by inlining cpu_util_without() and cpu_util()
by Li Zetao 08 May '24

08 May '24

hulk inclusion category: performance bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I9MSNE?from=project-issue CVE: NA -------------------------------- Consider optimizing performance by inlining high-frequency hotspot functions. The test results are as follows: base base+this patch fork_proc 438.5427333ms 420.5897667ms (4.27%) Signed-off-by: Zhang Qiao <zhangqiao22(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Li Zetao <lizetao1(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/sched/fair.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/sched/fair.c b/kernel/sched/fair.c index 8de28b182763..cb56367203aa 100644 --- a/kernel/sched/fair.c +++ b/kernel/sched/fair.c @@ -8448,7 +8448,7 @@ static int select_idle_sibling(struct task_struct *p, int prev, int target) * * Return: (Boosted) (estimated) utilization for the specified CPU. */ -static unsigned long +static inline unsigned long cpu_util(int cpu, struct task_struct *p, int dst_cpu, int boost) { struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq = &cpu_rq(cpu)->cfs; @@ -8536,7 +8536,7 @@ unsigned long cpu_util_cfs_boost(int cpu) * utilization of the specified task, whenever the task is currently * contributing to the CPU utilization. */ -static unsigned long cpu_util_without(int cpu, struct task_struct *p) +static inline unsigned long cpu_util_without(int cpu, struct task_struct *p) { /* Task has no contribution or is new */ if (cpu != task_cpu(p) || !READ_ONCE(p->se.avg.last_update_time)) -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] clk: qcom: mmcc-msm8974: fix terminating of frequency table arrays
by Jinjie Ruan 08 May '24

08 May '24

From: Gabor Juhos <j4g8y7(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.215 commit 3ff4a0f6a8f0ad4b4ee9e908bdfc3cacb7be4060 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9L5N3 CVE: CVE-2024-26965 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit e2c02a85bf53ae86d79b5fccf0a75ac0b78e0c96 ] The frequency table arrays are supposed to be terminated with an empty element. Add such entry to the end of the arrays where it is missing in order to avoid possible out-of-bound access when the table is traversed by functions like qcom_find_freq() or qcom_find_freq_floor(). Only compile tested. Fixes: d8b212014e69 ("clk: qcom: Add support for MSM8974's multimedia clock controller (MMCC)") Signed-off-by: Gabor Juhos <j4g8y7(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Stephen Boyd <sboyd(a)kernel.org> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240229-freq-table-terminator-v1-7-074334f0905c@… Signed-off-by: Bjorn Andersson <andersson(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jinjie Ruan <ruanjinjie(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/clk/qcom/mmcc-msm8974.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/clk/qcom/mmcc-msm8974.c b/drivers/clk/qcom/mmcc-msm8974.c index 015426262d08..dfc377463a7a 100644 --- a/drivers/clk/qcom/mmcc-msm8974.c +++ b/drivers/clk/qcom/mmcc-msm8974.c @@ -283,6 +283,7 @@ static struct freq_tbl ftbl_mmss_axi_clk[] = { F(291750000, P_MMPLL1, 4, 0, 0), F(400000000, P_MMPLL0, 2, 0, 0), F(466800000, P_MMPLL1, 2.5, 0, 0), + { } }; static struct clk_rcg2 mmss_axi_clk_src = { @@ -307,6 +308,7 @@ static struct freq_tbl ftbl_ocmemnoc_clk[] = { F(150000000, P_GPLL0, 4, 0, 0), F(291750000, P_MMPLL1, 4, 0, 0), F(400000000, P_MMPLL0, 2, 0, 0), + { } }; static struct clk_rcg2 ocmemnoc_clk_src = { -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] clk: qcom: mmcc-msm8974: fix terminating of frequency table arrays
by Jinjie Ruan 08 May '24

08 May '24

From: Gabor Juhos <j4g8y7(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.215 commit 3ff4a0f6a8f0ad4b4ee9e908bdfc3cacb7be4060 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9L5N3 CVE: CVE-2024-26965 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit e2c02a85bf53ae86d79b5fccf0a75ac0b78e0c96 ] The frequency table arrays are supposed to be terminated with an empty element. Add such entry to the end of the arrays where it is missing in order to avoid possible out-of-bound access when the table is traversed by functions like qcom_find_freq() or qcom_find_freq_floor(). Only compile tested. Fixes: d8b212014e69 ("clk: qcom: Add support for MSM8974's multimedia clock controller (MMCC)") Signed-off-by: Gabor Juhos <j4g8y7(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Stephen Boyd <sboyd(a)kernel.org> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240229-freq-table-terminator-v1-7-074334f0905c@… Signed-off-by: Bjorn Andersson <andersson(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jinjie Ruan <ruanjinjie(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/clk/qcom/mmcc-msm8974.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/clk/qcom/mmcc-msm8974.c b/drivers/clk/qcom/mmcc-msm8974.c index 91818516c3e0..124d21f19e2c 100644 --- a/drivers/clk/qcom/mmcc-msm8974.c +++ b/drivers/clk/qcom/mmcc-msm8974.c @@ -291,6 +291,7 @@ static struct freq_tbl ftbl_mmss_axi_clk[] = { F(291750000, P_MMPLL1, 4, 0, 0), F(400000000, P_MMPLL0, 2, 0, 0), F(466800000, P_MMPLL1, 2.5, 0, 0), + { } }; static struct clk_rcg2 mmss_axi_clk_src = { @@ -315,6 +316,7 @@ static struct freq_tbl ftbl_ocmemnoc_clk[] = { F(150000000, P_GPLL0, 4, 0, 0), F(291750000, P_MMPLL1, 4, 0, 0), F(400000000, P_MMPLL0, 2, 0, 0), + { } }; static struct clk_rcg2 ocmemnoc_clk_src = { -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] nfs: fix UAF in direct writes
by Long Li 08 May '24

08 May '24

From: Josef Bacik <josef(a)toxicpanda.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.167 commit 4595d90b5d2ea5fa4d318d13f59055aa4bf3e7f5 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I9L5GC CVE: CVE-2024-26958 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?h=… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 17f46b803d4f23c66cacce81db35fef3adb8f2af ] In production we have been hitting the following warning consistently ------------[ cut here ]------------ refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free. WARNING: CPU: 17 PID: 1800359 at lib/refcount.c:28 refcount_warn_saturate+0x9c/0xe0 Workqueue: nfsiod nfs_direct_write_schedule_work [nfs] RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0x9c/0xe0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __warn+0x9f/0x130 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0x9c/0xe0 ? report_bug+0xcc/0x150 ? handle_bug+0x3d/0x70 ? exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x40 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20 ? refcount_warn_saturate+0x9c/0xe0 nfs_direct_write_schedule_work+0x237/0x250 [nfs] process_one_work+0x12f/0x4a0 worker_thread+0x14e/0x3b0 ? ZSTD_getCParams_internal+0x220/0x220 kthread+0xdc/0x120 ? __btf_name_valid+0xa0/0xa0 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 This is because we're completing the nfs_direct_request twice in a row. The source of this is when we have our commit requests to submit, we process them and send them off, and then in the completion path for the commit requests we have if (nfs_commit_end(cinfo.mds)) nfs_direct_write_complete(dreq); However since we're submitting asynchronous requests we sometimes have one that completes before we submit the next one, so we end up calling complete on the nfs_direct_request twice. The only other place we use nfs_generic_commit_list() is in __nfs_commit_inode, which wraps this call in a nfs_commit_begin(); nfs_commit_end(); Which is a common pattern for this style of completion handling, one that is also repeated in the direct code with get_dreq()/put_dreq() calls around where we process events as well as in the completion paths. Fix this by using the same pattern for the commit requests. Before with my 200 node rocksdb stress running this warning would pop every 10ish minutes. With my patch the stress test has been running for several hours without popping. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef(a)toxicpanda.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust(a)hammerspace.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Long Li <leo.lilong(a)huawei.com> --- fs/nfs/direct.c | 11 +++++++++-- fs/nfs/write.c | 2 +- include/linux/nfs_fs.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/nfs/direct.c b/fs/nfs/direct.c index 5d86ffa72cea..499519f0f6ec 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/direct.c +++ b/fs/nfs/direct.c @@ -678,10 +678,17 @@ static void nfs_direct_commit_schedule(struct nfs_direct_req *dreq) LIST_HEAD(mds_list); nfs_init_cinfo_from_dreq(&cinfo, dreq); + nfs_commit_begin(cinfo.mds); nfs_scan_commit(dreq->inode, &mds_list, &cinfo); res = nfs_generic_commit_list(dreq->inode, &mds_list, 0, &cinfo); - if (res < 0) /* res == -ENOMEM */ - nfs_direct_write_reschedule(dreq); + if (res < 0) { /* res == -ENOMEM */ + spin_lock(&dreq->lock); + if (dreq->flags == 0) + dreq->flags = NFS_ODIRECT_RESCHED_WRITES; + spin_unlock(&dreq->lock); + } + if (nfs_commit_end(cinfo.mds)) + nfs_direct_write_complete(dreq); } static void nfs_direct_write_clear_reqs(struct nfs_direct_req *dreq) diff --git a/fs/nfs/write.c b/fs/nfs/write.c index 0bc5c5fd5e10..11a5e1ef9781 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/write.c +++ b/fs/nfs/write.c @@ -1634,7 +1634,7 @@ static int wait_on_commit(struct nfs_mds_commit_info *cinfo) !atomic_read(&cinfo->rpcs_out)); } -static void nfs_commit_begin(struct nfs_mds_commit_info *cinfo) +void nfs_commit_begin(struct nfs_mds_commit_info *cinfo) { atomic_inc(&cinfo->rpcs_out); } diff --git a/include/linux/nfs_fs.h b/include/linux/nfs_fs.h index e39342945a80..7488864589a7 100644 --- a/include/linux/nfs_fs.h +++ b/include/linux/nfs_fs.h @@ -553,6 +553,7 @@ extern int nfs_wb_page_cancel(struct inode *inode, struct page* page); extern int nfs_commit_inode(struct inode *, int); extern struct nfs_commit_data *nfs_commitdata_alloc(void); extern void nfs_commit_free(struct nfs_commit_data *data); +void nfs_commit_begin(struct nfs_mds_commit_info *cinfo); bool nfs_commit_end(struct nfs_mds_commit_info *cinfo); static inline int -- 2.31.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] net/mlx5e: Prevent deadlock while disabling aRFS
by Liu Jian 08 May '24

08 May '24

From: Carolina Jubran <cjubran(a)nvidia.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.9-rc5 commit fef965764cf562f28afb997b626fc7c3cec99693 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9L5LB CVE: CVE-2024-27014 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… When disabling aRFS under the `priv->state_lock`, any scheduled aRFS works are canceled using the `cancel_work_sync` function, which waits for the work to end if it has already started. However, while waiting for the work handler, the handler will try to acquire the `state_lock` which is already acquired. The worker acquires the lock to delete the rules if the state is down, which is not the worker's responsibility since disabling aRFS deletes the rules. Add an aRFS state variable, which indicates whether the aRFS is enabled and prevent adding rules when the aRFS is disabled. Kernel log: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.7.0-rc4_net_next_mlx5_5483eb2 #1 Tainted: G I ------------------------------------------------------ ethtool/386089 is trying to acquire lock: ffff88810f21ce68 ((work_completion)(&rule->arfs_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0x74/0x4e0 but task is already holding lock: ffff8884a1808cc0 (&priv->state_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5e_ethtool_set_channels+0x53/0x200 [mlx5_core] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (&priv->state_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x80/0xc90 arfs_handle_work+0x4b/0x3b0 [mlx5_core] process_one_work+0x1dc/0x4a0 worker_thread+0x1bf/0x3c0 kthread+0xd7/0x100 ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 -> #0 ((work_completion)(&rule->arfs_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x17b4/0x2c80 lock_acquire+0xd0/0x2b0 __flush_work+0x7a/0x4e0 __cancel_work_timer+0x131/0x1c0 arfs_del_rules+0x143/0x1e0 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_arfs_disable+0x1b/0x30 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_ethtool_set_channels+0xcb/0x200 [mlx5_core] ethnl_set_channels+0x28f/0x3b0 ethnl_default_set_doit+0xec/0x240 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xd0/0x120 genl_rcv_msg+0x188/0x2c0 netlink_rcv_skb+0x54/0x100 genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 netlink_unicast+0x1a1/0x270 netlink_sendmsg+0x214/0x460 __sock_sendmsg+0x38/0x60 __sys_sendto+0x113/0x170 __x64_sys_sendto+0x20/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x40/0xe0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&priv->state_lock); lock((work_completion)(&rule->arfs_work)); lock(&priv->state_lock); lock((work_completion)(&rule->arfs_work)); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by ethtool/386089: #0: ffffffff82ea7210 (cb_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: genl_rcv+0x15/0x40 #1: ffffffff82e94c88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ethnl_default_set_doit+0xd3/0x240 #2: ffff8884a1808cc0 (&priv->state_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5e_ethtool_set_channels+0x53/0x200 [mlx5_core] stack backtrace: CPU: 15 PID: 386089 Comm: ethtool Tainted: G I 6.7.0-rc4_net_next_mlx5_5483eb2 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0xa0 check_noncircular+0x144/0x160 __lock_acquire+0x17b4/0x2c80 lock_acquire+0xd0/0x2b0 ? __flush_work+0x74/0x4e0 ? save_trace+0x3e/0x360 ? __flush_work+0x74/0x4e0 __flush_work+0x7a/0x4e0 ? __flush_work+0x74/0x4e0 ? __lock_acquire+0xa78/0x2c80 ? lock_acquire+0xd0/0x2b0 ? mark_held_locks+0x49/0x70 __cancel_work_timer+0x131/0x1c0 ? mark_held_locks+0x49/0x70 arfs_del_rules+0x143/0x1e0 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_arfs_disable+0x1b/0x30 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_ethtool_set_channels+0xcb/0x200 [mlx5_core] ethnl_set_channels+0x28f/0x3b0 ethnl_default_set_doit+0xec/0x240 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xd0/0x120 genl_rcv_msg+0x188/0x2c0 ? ethnl_ops_begin+0xb0/0xb0 ? genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit+0xf0/0xf0 netlink_rcv_skb+0x54/0x100 genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 netlink_unicast+0x1a1/0x270 netlink_sendmsg+0x214/0x460 __sock_sendmsg+0x38/0x60 __sys_sendto+0x113/0x170 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x53f/0x8f0 __x64_sys_sendto+0x20/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x40/0xe0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e </TASK> Fixes: 45bf454ae884 ("net/mlx5e: Enabling aRFS mechanism") Signed-off-by: Carolina Jubran <cjubran(a)nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt(a)nvidia.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240411115444.374475-7-tariqt@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_arfs.c drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/fs.h [Did not backport the commit f6755b80d693 ("net/mlx5e: Dynamic alloc arfs table for netdev when needed"), and commit f52f2faee581 ("net/mlx5e: Introduce flow steering API").] Signed-off-by: Liu Jian <liujian56(a)huawei.com> --- .../net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/fs.h | 1 + .../net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_arfs.c | 26 +++++++++++-------- 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/fs.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/fs.h index 000ca294b0a0..ce2c9daae2c7 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/fs.h +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/fs.h @@ -215,6 +215,7 @@ struct mlx5e_arfs_tables { struct list_head rules; int last_filter_id; struct workqueue_struct *wq; + unsigned long state; }; int mlx5e_arfs_create_tables(struct mlx5e_priv *priv); diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_arfs.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_arfs.c index 39475f6565c7..2e800d730231 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_arfs.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_arfs.c @@ -36,6 +36,10 @@ #include <linux/ipv6.h> #include "en.h" +enum { + MLX5E_ARFS_STATE_ENABLED, +}; + struct arfs_tuple { __be16 etype; u8 ip_proto; @@ -132,6 +136,8 @@ int mlx5e_arfs_enable(struct mlx5e_priv *priv) return err; } } + set_bit(MLX5E_ARFS_STATE_ENABLED, &priv->fs.arfs.state); + return 0; } @@ -387,6 +393,8 @@ static void arfs_del_rules(struct mlx5e_priv *priv) int j; HLIST_HEAD(del_list); + clear_bit(MLX5E_ARFS_STATE_ENABLED, &priv->fs.arfs.state); + spin_lock_bh(&priv->fs.arfs.arfs_lock); mlx5e_for_each_arfs_rule(rule, htmp, priv->fs.arfs.arfs_tables, i, j) { hlist_del_init(&rule->hlist); @@ -552,17 +560,8 @@ static void arfs_handle_work(struct work_struct *work) struct mlx5e_priv *priv = arfs_rule->priv; struct mlx5_flow_handle *rule; - mutex_lock(&priv->state_lock); - if (!test_bit(MLX5E_STATE_OPENED, &priv->state)) { - spin_lock_bh(&priv->fs.arfs.arfs_lock); - hlist_del(&arfs_rule->hlist); - spin_unlock_bh(&priv->fs.arfs.arfs_lock); - - mutex_unlock(&priv->state_lock); - kfree(arfs_rule); - goto out; - } - mutex_unlock(&priv->state_lock); + if (!test_bit(MLX5E_ARFS_STATE_ENABLED, &priv->fs.arfs.state)) + return; if (!arfs_rule->rule) { rule = arfs_add_rule(priv, arfs_rule); @@ -673,6 +672,11 @@ int mlx5e_rx_flow_steer(struct net_device *dev, const struct sk_buff *skb, return -EPROTONOSUPPORT; spin_lock_bh(&arfs->arfs_lock); + if (!test_bit(MLX5E_ARFS_STATE_ENABLED, &arfs->state)) { + spin_unlock_bh(&arfs->arfs_lock); + return -EPERM; + } + arfs_rule = arfs_find_rule(arfs_t, &fk); if (arfs_rule) { if (arfs_rule->rxq == rxq_index) { -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] net/mlx5e: Prevent deadlock while disabling aRFS
by Liu Jian 08 May '24

08 May '24

From: Carolina Jubran <cjubran(a)nvidia.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.9-rc5 commit fef965764cf562f28afb997b626fc7c3cec99693 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9L5LB CVE: CVE-2024-27014 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… When disabling aRFS under the `priv->state_lock`, any scheduled aRFS works are canceled using the `cancel_work_sync` function, which waits for the work to end if it has already started. However, while waiting for the work handler, the handler will try to acquire the `state_lock` which is already acquired. The worker acquires the lock to delete the rules if the state is down, which is not the worker's responsibility since disabling aRFS deletes the rules. Add an aRFS state variable, which indicates whether the aRFS is enabled and prevent adding rules when the aRFS is disabled. Kernel log: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.7.0-rc4_net_next_mlx5_5483eb2 #1 Tainted: G I ------------------------------------------------------ ethtool/386089 is trying to acquire lock: ffff88810f21ce68 ((work_completion)(&rule->arfs_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0x74/0x4e0 but task is already holding lock: ffff8884a1808cc0 (&priv->state_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5e_ethtool_set_channels+0x53/0x200 [mlx5_core] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (&priv->state_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x80/0xc90 arfs_handle_work+0x4b/0x3b0 [mlx5_core] process_one_work+0x1dc/0x4a0 worker_thread+0x1bf/0x3c0 kthread+0xd7/0x100 ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 -> #0 ((work_completion)(&rule->arfs_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x17b4/0x2c80 lock_acquire+0xd0/0x2b0 __flush_work+0x7a/0x4e0 __cancel_work_timer+0x131/0x1c0 arfs_del_rules+0x143/0x1e0 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_arfs_disable+0x1b/0x30 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_ethtool_set_channels+0xcb/0x200 [mlx5_core] ethnl_set_channels+0x28f/0x3b0 ethnl_default_set_doit+0xec/0x240 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xd0/0x120 genl_rcv_msg+0x188/0x2c0 netlink_rcv_skb+0x54/0x100 genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 netlink_unicast+0x1a1/0x270 netlink_sendmsg+0x214/0x460 __sock_sendmsg+0x38/0x60 __sys_sendto+0x113/0x170 __x64_sys_sendto+0x20/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x40/0xe0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&priv->state_lock); lock((work_completion)(&rule->arfs_work)); lock(&priv->state_lock); lock((work_completion)(&rule->arfs_work)); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by ethtool/386089: #0: ffffffff82ea7210 (cb_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: genl_rcv+0x15/0x40 #1: ffffffff82e94c88 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ethnl_default_set_doit+0xd3/0x240 #2: ffff8884a1808cc0 (&priv->state_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5e_ethtool_set_channels+0x53/0x200 [mlx5_core] stack backtrace: CPU: 15 PID: 386089 Comm: ethtool Tainted: G I 6.7.0-rc4_net_next_mlx5_5483eb2 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0xa0 check_noncircular+0x144/0x160 __lock_acquire+0x17b4/0x2c80 lock_acquire+0xd0/0x2b0 ? __flush_work+0x74/0x4e0 ? save_trace+0x3e/0x360 ? __flush_work+0x74/0x4e0 __flush_work+0x7a/0x4e0 ? __flush_work+0x74/0x4e0 ? __lock_acquire+0xa78/0x2c80 ? lock_acquire+0xd0/0x2b0 ? mark_held_locks+0x49/0x70 __cancel_work_timer+0x131/0x1c0 ? mark_held_locks+0x49/0x70 arfs_del_rules+0x143/0x1e0 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_arfs_disable+0x1b/0x30 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_ethtool_set_channels+0xcb/0x200 [mlx5_core] ethnl_set_channels+0x28f/0x3b0 ethnl_default_set_doit+0xec/0x240 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xd0/0x120 genl_rcv_msg+0x188/0x2c0 ? ethnl_ops_begin+0xb0/0xb0 ? genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit+0xf0/0xf0 netlink_rcv_skb+0x54/0x100 genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 netlink_unicast+0x1a1/0x270 netlink_sendmsg+0x214/0x460 __sock_sendmsg+0x38/0x60 __sys_sendto+0x113/0x170 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x53f/0x8f0 __x64_sys_sendto+0x20/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x40/0xe0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e </TASK> Fixes: 45bf454ae884 ("net/mlx5e: Enabling aRFS mechanism") Signed-off-by: Carolina Jubran <cjubran(a)nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt(a)nvidia.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240411115444.374475-7-tariqt@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_arfs.c drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/fs.h [Did not backport the commit f6755b80d693 ("net/mlx5e: Dynamic alloc arfs table for netdev when needed"), and commit f52f2faee581 ("net/mlx5e: Introduce flow steering API").] Signed-off-by: Liu Jian <liujian56(a)huawei.com> --- .../net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/fs.h | 1 + .../net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_arfs.c | 26 +++++++++++-------- 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/fs.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/fs.h index 1431232c9a09..5fc903fa9573 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/fs.h +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/fs.h @@ -149,6 +149,7 @@ struct mlx5e_arfs_tables { struct list_head rules; int last_filter_id; struct workqueue_struct *wq; + unsigned long state; }; int mlx5e_arfs_create_tables(struct mlx5e_priv *priv); diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_arfs.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_arfs.c index a4be04debe67..37dbe2739169 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_arfs.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_arfs.c @@ -36,6 +36,10 @@ #include <linux/ipv6.h> #include "en.h" +enum { + MLX5E_ARFS_STATE_ENABLED, +}; + struct arfs_tuple { __be16 etype; u8 ip_proto; @@ -144,6 +148,8 @@ int mlx5e_arfs_enable(struct mlx5e_priv *priv) return err; } } + set_bit(MLX5E_ARFS_STATE_ENABLED, &priv->fs.arfs.state); + return 0; } @@ -406,6 +412,8 @@ static void arfs_del_rules(struct mlx5e_priv *priv) int j; HLIST_HEAD(del_list); + clear_bit(MLX5E_ARFS_STATE_ENABLED, &priv->fs.arfs.state); + spin_lock_bh(&priv->fs.arfs.arfs_lock); mlx5e_for_each_arfs_rule(rule, htmp, priv->fs.arfs.arfs_tables, i, j) { hlist_del_init(&rule->hlist); @@ -568,17 +576,8 @@ static void arfs_handle_work(struct work_struct *work) struct mlx5e_priv *priv = arfs_rule->priv; struct mlx5_flow_handle *rule; - mutex_lock(&priv->state_lock); - if (!test_bit(MLX5E_STATE_OPENED, &priv->state)) { - spin_lock_bh(&priv->fs.arfs.arfs_lock); - hlist_del(&arfs_rule->hlist); - spin_unlock_bh(&priv->fs.arfs.arfs_lock); - - mutex_unlock(&priv->state_lock); - kfree(arfs_rule); - goto out; - } - mutex_unlock(&priv->state_lock); + if (!test_bit(MLX5E_ARFS_STATE_ENABLED, &priv->fs.arfs.state)) + return; if (!arfs_rule->rule) { rule = arfs_add_rule(priv, arfs_rule); @@ -689,6 +688,11 @@ int mlx5e_rx_flow_steer(struct net_device *dev, const struct sk_buff *skb, return -EPROTONOSUPPORT; spin_lock_bh(&arfs->arfs_lock); + if (!test_bit(MLX5E_ARFS_STATE_ENABLED, &arfs->state)) { + spin_unlock_bh(&arfs->arfs_lock); + return -EPERM; + } + arfs_rule = arfs_find_rule(arfs_t, &fk); if (arfs_rule) { if (arfs_rule->rxq == rxq_index) { -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS] ksmbd: validate payload size in ipc response
by ZhaoLong Wang 08 May '24

08 May '24

From: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon(a)kernel.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.15.157 commit 88b7f1143b15b29cccb8392b4f38e75b7bb3e300 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9EYBG CVE: CVE-2024-26811 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit a677ebd8ca2f2632ccdecbad7b87641274e15aac ] If installing malicious ksmbd-tools, ksmbd.mountd can return invalid ipc response to ksmbd kernel server. ksmbd should validate payload size of ipc response from ksmbd.mountd to avoid memory overrun or slab-out-of-bounds. This patch validate 3 ipc response that has payload. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Chao Ma <machao2019(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench(a)microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: fs/ksmbd/ksmbd_netlink.h Signed-off-by: ZhaoLong Wang <wangzhaolong1(a)huawei.com> --- fs/ksmbd/ksmbd_netlink.h | 3 ++- fs/ksmbd/mgmt/share_config.c | 7 ++++++- fs/ksmbd/transport_ipc.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ksmbd/ksmbd_netlink.h b/fs/ksmbd/ksmbd_netlink.h index 71bfb7de4472..33b909b419f7 100644 --- a/fs/ksmbd/ksmbd_netlink.h +++ b/fs/ksmbd/ksmbd_netlink.h @@ -162,7 +162,8 @@ struct ksmbd_share_config_response { __u16 force_directory_mode; __u16 force_uid; __u16 force_gid; - __u32 reserved[128]; /* Reserved room */ + __u32 reserved[127]; /* Reserved room */ + __u32 payload_sz; __u32 veto_list_sz; __s8 ____payload[]; }; diff --git a/fs/ksmbd/mgmt/share_config.c b/fs/ksmbd/mgmt/share_config.c index 70655af93b44..8550fc5a3a78 100644 --- a/fs/ksmbd/mgmt/share_config.c +++ b/fs/ksmbd/mgmt/share_config.c @@ -139,7 +139,12 @@ static struct ksmbd_share_config *share_config_request(char *name) share->name = kstrdup(name, GFP_KERNEL); if (!test_share_config_flag(share, KSMBD_SHARE_FLAG_PIPE)) { - share->path = kstrdup(ksmbd_share_config_path(resp), + int path_len = PATH_MAX; + + if (resp->payload_sz) + path_len = resp->payload_sz - resp->veto_list_sz; + + share->path = kstrndup(ksmbd_share_config_path(resp), path_len, GFP_KERNEL); if (share->path) share->path_sz = strlen(share->path); diff --git a/fs/ksmbd/transport_ipc.c b/fs/ksmbd/transport_ipc.c index 3ad6881e0f7e..589f3bb2e83c 100644 --- a/fs/ksmbd/transport_ipc.c +++ b/fs/ksmbd/transport_ipc.c @@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ struct ipc_msg_table_entry { struct hlist_node ipc_table_hlist; void *response; + unsigned int msg_sz; }; static struct delayed_work ipc_timer_work; @@ -273,6 +274,7 @@ static int handle_response(int type, void *payload, size_t sz) } memcpy(entry->response, payload, sz); + entry->msg_sz = sz; wake_up_interruptible(&entry->wait); ret = 0; break; @@ -446,6 +448,34 @@ static int ipc_msg_send(struct ksmbd_ipc_msg *msg) return ret; } +static int ipc_validate_msg(struct ipc_msg_table_entry *entry) +{ + unsigned int msg_sz = entry->msg_sz; + + if (entry->type == KSMBD_EVENT_RPC_REQUEST) { + struct ksmbd_rpc_command *resp = entry->response; + + msg_sz = sizeof(struct ksmbd_rpc_command) + resp->payload_sz; + } else if (entry->type == KSMBD_EVENT_SPNEGO_AUTHEN_REQUEST) { + struct ksmbd_spnego_authen_response *resp = entry->response; + + msg_sz = sizeof(struct ksmbd_spnego_authen_response) + + resp->session_key_len + resp->spnego_blob_len; + } else if (entry->type == KSMBD_EVENT_SHARE_CONFIG_REQUEST) { + struct ksmbd_share_config_response *resp = entry->response; + + if (resp->payload_sz) { + if (resp->payload_sz < resp->veto_list_sz) + return -EINVAL; + + msg_sz = sizeof(struct ksmbd_share_config_response) + + resp->payload_sz; + } + } + + return entry->msg_sz != msg_sz ? -EINVAL : 0; +} + static void *ipc_msg_send_request(struct ksmbd_ipc_msg *msg, unsigned int handle) { struct ipc_msg_table_entry entry; @@ -470,6 +500,13 @@ static void *ipc_msg_send_request(struct ksmbd_ipc_msg *msg, unsigned int handle ret = wait_event_interruptible_timeout(entry.wait, entry.response != NULL, IPC_WAIT_TIMEOUT); + if (entry.response) { + ret = ipc_validate_msg(&entry); + if (ret) { + kvfree(entry.response); + entry.response = NULL; + } + } out: down_write(&ipc_msg_table_lock); hash_del(&entry.ipc_table_hlist); -- 2.34.3

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP2] ksmbd: validate payload size in ipc response
by ZhaoLong Wang 08 May '24

08 May '24

From: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon(a)kernel.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.15.157 commit 88b7f1143b15b29cccb8392b4f38e75b7bb3e300 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9EYBG CVE: CVE-2024-26811 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit a677ebd8ca2f2632ccdecbad7b87641274e15aac ] If installing malicious ksmbd-tools, ksmbd.mountd can return invalid ipc response to ksmbd kernel server. ksmbd should validate payload size of ipc response from ksmbd.mountd to avoid memory overrun or slab-out-of-bounds. This patch validate 3 ipc response that has payload. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Chao Ma <machao2019(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench(a)microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: fs/ksmbd/ksmbd_netlink.h Signed-off-by: ZhaoLong Wang <wangzhaolong1(a)huawei.com> --- fs/ksmbd/ksmbd_netlink.h | 3 ++- fs/ksmbd/mgmt/share_config.c | 7 ++++++- fs/ksmbd/transport_ipc.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ksmbd/ksmbd_netlink.h b/fs/ksmbd/ksmbd_netlink.h index 71bfb7de4472..33b909b419f7 100644 --- a/fs/ksmbd/ksmbd_netlink.h +++ b/fs/ksmbd/ksmbd_netlink.h @@ -162,7 +162,8 @@ struct ksmbd_share_config_response { __u16 force_directory_mode; __u16 force_uid; __u16 force_gid; - __u32 reserved[128]; /* Reserved room */ + __u32 reserved[127]; /* Reserved room */ + __u32 payload_sz; __u32 veto_list_sz; __s8 ____payload[]; }; diff --git a/fs/ksmbd/mgmt/share_config.c b/fs/ksmbd/mgmt/share_config.c index 70655af93b44..8550fc5a3a78 100644 --- a/fs/ksmbd/mgmt/share_config.c +++ b/fs/ksmbd/mgmt/share_config.c @@ -139,7 +139,12 @@ static struct ksmbd_share_config *share_config_request(char *name) share->name = kstrdup(name, GFP_KERNEL); if (!test_share_config_flag(share, KSMBD_SHARE_FLAG_PIPE)) { - share->path = kstrdup(ksmbd_share_config_path(resp), + int path_len = PATH_MAX; + + if (resp->payload_sz) + path_len = resp->payload_sz - resp->veto_list_sz; + + share->path = kstrndup(ksmbd_share_config_path(resp), path_len, GFP_KERNEL); if (share->path) share->path_sz = strlen(share->path); diff --git a/fs/ksmbd/transport_ipc.c b/fs/ksmbd/transport_ipc.c index 3ad6881e0f7e..589f3bb2e83c 100644 --- a/fs/ksmbd/transport_ipc.c +++ b/fs/ksmbd/transport_ipc.c @@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ struct ipc_msg_table_entry { struct hlist_node ipc_table_hlist; void *response; + unsigned int msg_sz; }; static struct delayed_work ipc_timer_work; @@ -273,6 +274,7 @@ static int handle_response(int type, void *payload, size_t sz) } memcpy(entry->response, payload, sz); + entry->msg_sz = sz; wake_up_interruptible(&entry->wait); ret = 0; break; @@ -446,6 +448,34 @@ static int ipc_msg_send(struct ksmbd_ipc_msg *msg) return ret; } +static int ipc_validate_msg(struct ipc_msg_table_entry *entry) +{ + unsigned int msg_sz = entry->msg_sz; + + if (entry->type == KSMBD_EVENT_RPC_REQUEST) { + struct ksmbd_rpc_command *resp = entry->response; + + msg_sz = sizeof(struct ksmbd_rpc_command) + resp->payload_sz; + } else if (entry->type == KSMBD_EVENT_SPNEGO_AUTHEN_REQUEST) { + struct ksmbd_spnego_authen_response *resp = entry->response; + + msg_sz = sizeof(struct ksmbd_spnego_authen_response) + + resp->session_key_len + resp->spnego_blob_len; + } else if (entry->type == KSMBD_EVENT_SHARE_CONFIG_REQUEST) { + struct ksmbd_share_config_response *resp = entry->response; + + if (resp->payload_sz) { + if (resp->payload_sz < resp->veto_list_sz) + return -EINVAL; + + msg_sz = sizeof(struct ksmbd_share_config_response) + + resp->payload_sz; + } + } + + return entry->msg_sz != msg_sz ? -EINVAL : 0; +} + static void *ipc_msg_send_request(struct ksmbd_ipc_msg *msg, unsigned int handle) { struct ipc_msg_table_entry entry; @@ -470,6 +500,13 @@ static void *ipc_msg_send_request(struct ksmbd_ipc_msg *msg, unsigned int handle ret = wait_event_interruptible_timeout(entry.wait, entry.response != NULL, IPC_WAIT_TIMEOUT); + if (entry.response) { + ret = ipc_validate_msg(&entry); + if (ret) { + kvfree(entry.response); + entry.response = NULL; + } + } out: down_write(&ipc_msg_table_lock); hash_del(&entry.ipc_table_hlist); -- 2.34.3

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] ksmbd: validate payload size in ipc response
by ZhaoLong Wang 08 May '24

08 May '24

From: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon(a)kernel.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.15.157 commit 88b7f1143b15b29cccb8392b4f38e75b7bb3e300 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9EYBG CVE: CVE-2024-26811 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit a677ebd8ca2f2632ccdecbad7b87641274e15aac ] If installing malicious ksmbd-tools, ksmbd.mountd can return invalid ipc response to ksmbd kernel server. ksmbd should validate payload size of ipc response from ksmbd.mountd to avoid memory overrun or slab-out-of-bounds. This patch validate 3 ipc response that has payload. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Chao Ma <machao2019(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench(a)microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: fs/ksmbd/ksmbd_netlink.h Signed-off-by: ZhaoLong Wang <wangzhaolong1(a)huawei.com> --- fs/ksmbd/ksmbd_netlink.h | 3 ++- fs/ksmbd/mgmt/share_config.c | 7 ++++++- fs/ksmbd/transport_ipc.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ksmbd/ksmbd_netlink.h b/fs/ksmbd/ksmbd_netlink.h index 71bfb7de4472..33b909b419f7 100644 --- a/fs/ksmbd/ksmbd_netlink.h +++ b/fs/ksmbd/ksmbd_netlink.h @@ -162,7 +162,8 @@ struct ksmbd_share_config_response { __u16 force_directory_mode; __u16 force_uid; __u16 force_gid; - __u32 reserved[128]; /* Reserved room */ + __u32 reserved[127]; /* Reserved room */ + __u32 payload_sz; __u32 veto_list_sz; __s8 ____payload[]; }; diff --git a/fs/ksmbd/mgmt/share_config.c b/fs/ksmbd/mgmt/share_config.c index 70655af93b44..8550fc5a3a78 100644 --- a/fs/ksmbd/mgmt/share_config.c +++ b/fs/ksmbd/mgmt/share_config.c @@ -139,7 +139,12 @@ static struct ksmbd_share_config *share_config_request(char *name) share->name = kstrdup(name, GFP_KERNEL); if (!test_share_config_flag(share, KSMBD_SHARE_FLAG_PIPE)) { - share->path = kstrdup(ksmbd_share_config_path(resp), + int path_len = PATH_MAX; + + if (resp->payload_sz) + path_len = resp->payload_sz - resp->veto_list_sz; + + share->path = kstrndup(ksmbd_share_config_path(resp), path_len, GFP_KERNEL); if (share->path) share->path_sz = strlen(share->path); diff --git a/fs/ksmbd/transport_ipc.c b/fs/ksmbd/transport_ipc.c index 3ad6881e0f7e..589f3bb2e83c 100644 --- a/fs/ksmbd/transport_ipc.c +++ b/fs/ksmbd/transport_ipc.c @@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ struct ipc_msg_table_entry { struct hlist_node ipc_table_hlist; void *response; + unsigned int msg_sz; }; static struct delayed_work ipc_timer_work; @@ -273,6 +274,7 @@ static int handle_response(int type, void *payload, size_t sz) } memcpy(entry->response, payload, sz); + entry->msg_sz = sz; wake_up_interruptible(&entry->wait); ret = 0; break; @@ -446,6 +448,34 @@ static int ipc_msg_send(struct ksmbd_ipc_msg *msg) return ret; } +static int ipc_validate_msg(struct ipc_msg_table_entry *entry) +{ + unsigned int msg_sz = entry->msg_sz; + + if (entry->type == KSMBD_EVENT_RPC_REQUEST) { + struct ksmbd_rpc_command *resp = entry->response; + + msg_sz = sizeof(struct ksmbd_rpc_command) + resp->payload_sz; + } else if (entry->type == KSMBD_EVENT_SPNEGO_AUTHEN_REQUEST) { + struct ksmbd_spnego_authen_response *resp = entry->response; + + msg_sz = sizeof(struct ksmbd_spnego_authen_response) + + resp->session_key_len + resp->spnego_blob_len; + } else if (entry->type == KSMBD_EVENT_SHARE_CONFIG_REQUEST) { + struct ksmbd_share_config_response *resp = entry->response; + + if (resp->payload_sz) { + if (resp->payload_sz < resp->veto_list_sz) + return -EINVAL; + + msg_sz = sizeof(struct ksmbd_share_config_response) + + resp->payload_sz; + } + } + + return entry->msg_sz != msg_sz ? -EINVAL : 0; +} + static void *ipc_msg_send_request(struct ksmbd_ipc_msg *msg, unsigned int handle) { struct ipc_msg_table_entry entry; @@ -470,6 +500,13 @@ static void *ipc_msg_send_request(struct ksmbd_ipc_msg *msg, unsigned int handle ret = wait_event_interruptible_timeout(entry.wait, entry.response != NULL, IPC_WAIT_TIMEOUT); + if (entry.response) { + ret = ipc_validate_msg(&entry); + if (ret) { + kvfree(entry.response); + entry.response = NULL; + } + } out: down_write(&ipc_msg_table_lock); hash_del(&entry.ipc_table_hlist); -- 2.34.3

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