July 2024 - Kernel - mailweb.openeuler.org

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS v3] ima: Fix use-after-free on a dentry's dname.name
by GONG, Ruiqi 19 Jul '24

19 Jul '24

From: Stefan Berger <stefanb(a)linux.ibm.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.10-rc1 commit be84f32bb2c981ca670922e047cdde1488b233de category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAD0O1 CVE: CVE-2024-39494 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- ->d_name.name can change on rename and the earlier value can be freed; there are conditions sufficient to stabilize it (->d_lock on dentry, ->d_lock on its parent, ->i_rwsem exclusive on the parent's inode, rename_lock), but none of those are met at any of the sites. Take a stable snapshot of the name instead. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240202182732.GE2087318@ZenIV/ Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro(a)zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb(a)linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar(a)linux.ibm.com> Conflicts: security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c [Context conflicts, and changes from `filename.name.name` to `filename.name` since commit 230c6402b1b3 ("ovl_lookup_real_one(): don't bother with strlen()") from v5.2-rc1 is not merged in this branch, and therefore struct name_snapshot doesn't have `struct qstr name` as its member.] Signed-off-by: GONG, Ruiqi <gongruiqi1(a)huawei.com> --- security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 16 ++++++++++++---- security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c | 17 ++++++++++++++--- 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c index a02c5acfd403..dad7136cbd3f 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c @@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, { const char *audit_cause = "failed"; struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); - const char *filename = file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name; + struct name_snapshot filename; int result = 0; int length; void *tmpbuf; @@ -252,9 +252,13 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, if (file->f_flags & O_DIRECT) audit_cause = "failed(directio)"; + take_dentry_name_snapshot(&filename, file->f_path.dentry); + integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode, - filename, "collect_data", audit_cause, - result, 0); + filename.name, "collect_data", + audit_cause, result, 0); + + release_dentry_name_snapshot(&filename); } return result; } @@ -356,6 +360,7 @@ void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, */ const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char **pathbuf, char *namebuf) { + struct name_snapshot filename; char *pathname = NULL; *pathbuf = __getname(); @@ -369,7 +374,10 @@ const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char **pathbuf, char *namebuf) } if (!pathname) { - strlcpy(namebuf, path->dentry->d_name.name, NAME_MAX); + take_dentry_name_snapshot(&filename, path->dentry); + strscpy(namebuf, filename.name, NAME_MAX); + release_dentry_name_snapshot(&filename); + pathname = namebuf; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c index 48c5a1be88ac..37b8fada853f 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c @@ -348,7 +348,10 @@ static int ima_eventname_init_common(struct ima_event_data *event_data, bool size_limit) { const char *cur_filename = NULL; + struct name_snapshot filename; u32 cur_filename_len = 0; + bool snapshot = false; + int ret; BUG_ON(event_data->filename == NULL && event_data->file == NULL); @@ -361,7 +364,10 @@ static int ima_eventname_init_common(struct ima_event_data *event_data, } if (event_data->file) { - cur_filename = event_data->file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name; + take_dentry_name_snapshot(&filename, + event_data->file->f_path.dentry); + snapshot = true; + cur_filename = filename.name; cur_filename_len = strlen(cur_filename); } else /* @@ -370,8 +376,13 @@ static int ima_eventname_init_common(struct ima_event_data *event_data, */ cur_filename_len = IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX; out: - return ima_write_template_field_data(cur_filename, cur_filename_len, - DATA_FMT_STRING, field_data); + ret = ima_write_template_field_data(cur_filename, cur_filename_len, + DATA_FMT_STRING, field_data); + + if (snapshot) + release_dentry_name_snapshot(&filename); + + return ret; } /* -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS v2] ima: Fix use-after-free on a dentry's dname.name
by GONG, Ruiqi 19 Jul '24

19 Jul '24

From: Stefan Berger <stefanb(a)linux.ibm.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.10-rc1 commit be84f32bb2c981ca670922e047cdde1488b233de category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAD0O1 CVE: CVE-2024-39494 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- ->d_name.name can change on rename and the earlier value can be freed; there are conditions sufficient to stabilize it (->d_lock on dentry, ->d_lock on its parent, ->i_rwsem exclusive on the parent's inode, rename_lock), but none of those are met at any of the sites. Take a stable snapshot of the name instead. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240202182732.GE2087318@ZenIV/ Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro(a)zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb(a)linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar(a)linux.ibm.com> Conflicts: security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c [Context conflicts, and changes from `filename.name.name` to `filename.name` since commit 230c6402b1b3 ("ovl_lookup_real_one(): don't bother with strlen()") from v5.2-rc1 is not merged in this branch, and therefore struct name_snapshot doesn't have `struct qstr name` as its member.] Signed-off-by: GONG, Ruiqi <gongruiqi1(a)huawei.com> --- security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 16 ++++++++++++---- security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c | 17 ++++++++++++++--- 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c index a02c5acfd403..dad7136cbd3f 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c @@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, { const char *audit_cause = "failed"; struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); - const char *filename = file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name; + struct name_snapshot filename; int result = 0; int length; void *tmpbuf; @@ -252,9 +252,13 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, if (file->f_flags & O_DIRECT) audit_cause = "failed(directio)"; + take_dentry_name_snapshot(&filename, file->f_path.dentry); + integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode, - filename, "collect_data", audit_cause, - result, 0); + filename.name, "collect_data", + audit_cause, result, 0); + + release_dentry_name_snapshot(&filename); } return result; } @@ -356,6 +360,7 @@ void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, */ const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char **pathbuf, char *namebuf) { + struct name_snapshot filename; char *pathname = NULL; *pathbuf = __getname(); @@ -369,7 +374,10 @@ const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char **pathbuf, char *namebuf) } if (!pathname) { - strlcpy(namebuf, path->dentry->d_name.name, NAME_MAX); + take_dentry_name_snapshot(&filename, path->dentry); + strscpy(namebuf, filename.name, NAME_MAX); + release_dentry_name_snapshot(&filename); + pathname = namebuf; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c index 48c5a1be88ac..d81473e113c8 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c @@ -348,7 +348,10 @@ static int ima_eventname_init_common(struct ima_event_data *event_data, bool size_limit) { const char *cur_filename = NULL; + struct name_snapshot filename; u32 cur_filename_len = 0; + bool snapshot = false; + int ret; BUG_ON(event_data->filename == NULL && event_data->file == NULL); @@ -361,7 +364,10 @@ static int ima_eventname_init_common(struct ima_event_data *event_data, } if (event_data->file) { - cur_filename = event_data->file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name; + take_dentry_name_snapshot(&filename, + event_data->file->f_path.dentry); + snapshot = true; + cur_filename = filename.name.name; cur_filename_len = strlen(cur_filename); } else /* @@ -370,8 +376,13 @@ static int ima_eventname_init_common(struct ima_event_data *event_data, */ cur_filename_len = IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX; out: - return ima_write_template_field_data(cur_filename, cur_filename_len, - DATA_FMT_STRING, field_data); + ret = ima_write_template_field_data(cur_filename, cur_filename_len, + DATA_FMT_STRING, field_data); + + if (snapshot) + release_dentry_name_snapshot(&filename); + + return ret; } /* -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] ima: Fix use-after-free on a dentry's dname.name
by GONG, Ruiqi 19 Jul '24

19 Jul '24

From: Stefan Berger <stefanb(a)linux.ibm.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.10-rc1 commit be84f32bb2c981ca670922e047cdde1488b233de category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAD0O1 CVE: CVE-2024-39494 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- ->d_name.name can change on rename and the earlier value can be freed; there are conditions sufficient to stabilize it (->d_lock on dentry, ->d_lock on its parent, ->i_rwsem exclusive on the parent's inode, rename_lock), but none of those are met at any of the sites. Take a stable snapshot of the name instead. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240202182732.GE2087318@ZenIV/ Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro(a)zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb(a)linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar(a)linux.ibm.com> Conflicts: security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c [Just context conflicts.] Signed-off-by: GONG, Ruiqi <gongruiqi1(a)huawei.com> --- security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 16 ++++++++++++---- security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c | 17 ++++++++++++++--- 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c index a02c5acfd403..77e47bd39e26 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c @@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, { const char *audit_cause = "failed"; struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); - const char *filename = file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name; + struct name_snapshot filename; int result = 0; int length; void *tmpbuf; @@ -252,9 +252,13 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, if (file->f_flags & O_DIRECT) audit_cause = "failed(directio)"; + take_dentry_name_snapshot(&filename, file->f_path.dentry); + integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode, - filename, "collect_data", audit_cause, - result, 0); + filename.name.name, "collect_data", + audit_cause, result, 0); + + release_dentry_name_snapshot(&filename); } return result; } @@ -356,6 +360,7 @@ void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, */ const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char **pathbuf, char *namebuf) { + struct name_snapshot filename; char *pathname = NULL; *pathbuf = __getname(); @@ -369,7 +374,10 @@ const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char **pathbuf, char *namebuf) } if (!pathname) { - strlcpy(namebuf, path->dentry->d_name.name, NAME_MAX); + take_dentry_name_snapshot(&filename, path->dentry); + strscpy(namebuf, filename.name.name, NAME_MAX); + release_dentry_name_snapshot(&filename); + pathname = namebuf; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c index 48c5a1be88ac..d81473e113c8 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c @@ -348,7 +348,10 @@ static int ima_eventname_init_common(struct ima_event_data *event_data, bool size_limit) { const char *cur_filename = NULL; + struct name_snapshot filename; u32 cur_filename_len = 0; + bool snapshot = false; + int ret; BUG_ON(event_data->filename == NULL && event_data->file == NULL); @@ -361,7 +364,10 @@ static int ima_eventname_init_common(struct ima_event_data *event_data, } if (event_data->file) { - cur_filename = event_data->file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name; + take_dentry_name_snapshot(&filename, + event_data->file->f_path.dentry); + snapshot = true; + cur_filename = filename.name.name; cur_filename_len = strlen(cur_filename); } else /* @@ -370,8 +376,13 @@ static int ima_eventname_init_common(struct ima_event_data *event_data, */ cur_filename_len = IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX; out: - return ima_write_template_field_data(cur_filename, cur_filename_len, - DATA_FMT_STRING, field_data); + ret = ima_write_template_field_data(cur_filename, cur_filename_len, + DATA_FMT_STRING, field_data); + + if (snapshot) + release_dentry_name_snapshot(&filename); + + return ret; } /* -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] ima: Fix use-after-free on a dentry's dname.name
by GONG, Ruiqi 18 Jul '24

18 Jul '24

From: Stefan Berger <stefanb(a)linux.ibm.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.10-rc1 commit be84f32bb2c981ca670922e047cdde1488b233de category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAD0O1 CVE: CVE-2024-39494 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- ->d_name.name can change on rename and the earlier value can be freed; there are conditions sufficient to stabilize it (->d_lock on dentry, ->d_lock on its parent, ->i_rwsem exclusive on the parent's inode, rename_lock), but none of those are met at any of the sites. Take a stable snapshot of the name instead. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240202182732.GE2087318@ZenIV/ Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro(a)zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb(a)linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar(a)linux.ibm.com> Conflicts: security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c [Just context conflicts.] Signed-off-by: GONG, Ruiqi <gongruiqi1(a)huawei.com> --- security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 16 ++++++++++++---- security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c | 17 ++++++++++++++--- 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c index bfad63e4f199..d88d7fb9f9a5 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c @@ -252,7 +252,7 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, const char *audit_cause = "failed"; struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); struct inode *real_inode = d_real_inode(file_dentry(file)); - const char *filename = file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name; + struct name_snapshot filename; int result = 0; int length; void *tmpbuf; @@ -315,9 +315,13 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, if (file->f_flags & O_DIRECT) audit_cause = "failed(directio)"; + take_dentry_name_snapshot(&filename, file->f_path.dentry); + integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode, - filename, "collect_data", audit_cause, - result, 0); + filename.name.name, "collect_data", + audit_cause, result, 0); + + release_dentry_name_snapshot(&filename); } return result; } @@ -460,6 +464,7 @@ void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, */ const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char **pathbuf, char *namebuf) { + struct name_snapshot filename; char *pathname = NULL; *pathbuf = __getname(); @@ -473,7 +478,10 @@ const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char **pathbuf, char *namebuf) } if (!pathname) { - strlcpy(namebuf, path->dentry->d_name.name, NAME_MAX); + take_dentry_name_snapshot(&filename, path->dentry); + strscpy(namebuf, filename.name.name, NAME_MAX); + release_dentry_name_snapshot(&filename); + pathname = namebuf; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c index cd6ec561cf8f..622df8ab2bf2 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c @@ -424,7 +424,10 @@ static int ima_eventname_init_common(struct ima_event_data *event_data, bool size_limit) { const char *cur_filename = NULL; + struct name_snapshot filename; u32 cur_filename_len = 0; + bool snapshot = false; + int ret; BUG_ON(event_data->filename == NULL && event_data->file == NULL); @@ -437,7 +440,10 @@ static int ima_eventname_init_common(struct ima_event_data *event_data, } if (event_data->file) { - cur_filename = event_data->file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name; + take_dentry_name_snapshot(&filename, + event_data->file->f_path.dentry); + snapshot = true; + cur_filename = filename.name.name; cur_filename_len = strlen(cur_filename); } else /* @@ -446,8 +452,13 @@ static int ima_eventname_init_common(struct ima_event_data *event_data, */ cur_filename_len = IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX; out: - return ima_write_template_field_data(cur_filename, cur_filename_len, - DATA_FMT_STRING, field_data); + ret = ima_write_template_field_data(cur_filename, cur_filename_len, + DATA_FMT_STRING, field_data); + + if (snapshot) + release_dentry_name_snapshot(&filename); + + return ret; } /* -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] ima: Fix use-after-free on a dentry's dname.name
by GONG, Ruiqi 18 Jul '24

18 Jul '24

From: Stefan Berger <stefanb(a)linux.ibm.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.35 commit dd431c3ac1fc34a9268580dd59ad3e3c76b32a8c category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAD0O1 CVE: CVE-2024-39494 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… --------------------------- commit be84f32bb2c981ca670922e047cdde1488b233de upstream. ->d_name.name can change on rename and the earlier value can be freed; there are conditions sufficient to stabilize it (->d_lock on dentry, ->d_lock on its parent, ->i_rwsem exclusive on the parent's inode, rename_lock), but none of those are met at any of the sites. Take a stable snapshot of the name instead. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240202182732.GE2087318@ZenIV/ Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro(a)zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb(a)linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar(a)linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: GONG, Ruiqi <gongruiqi1(a)huawei.com> --- security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 16 ++++++++++++---- security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c | 17 ++++++++++++++--- 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c index 5f7b8f8a1261..f8b329aeb5d6 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c @@ -278,8 +278,8 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, const char *audit_cause = "failed"; struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); struct inode *real_inode = d_real_inode(file_dentry(file)); - const char *filename = file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name; struct ima_max_digest_data hash; + struct name_snapshot filename; struct kstat stat; int result = 0; int length; @@ -350,9 +350,13 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, if (file->f_flags & O_DIRECT) audit_cause = "failed(directio)"; + take_dentry_name_snapshot(&filename, file->f_path.dentry); + integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode, - filename, "collect_data", audit_cause, - result, 0); + filename.name.name, "collect_data", + audit_cause, result, 0); + + release_dentry_name_snapshot(&filename); } return result; } @@ -486,6 +490,7 @@ void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, */ const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char **pathbuf, char *namebuf) { + struct name_snapshot filename; char *pathname = NULL; *pathbuf = __getname(); @@ -499,7 +504,10 @@ const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char **pathbuf, char *namebuf) } if (!pathname) { - strscpy(namebuf, path->dentry->d_name.name, NAME_MAX); + take_dentry_name_snapshot(&filename, path->dentry); + strscpy(namebuf, filename.name.name, NAME_MAX); + release_dentry_name_snapshot(&filename); + pathname = namebuf; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c index 6cd0add524cd..3b2cb8f1002e 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c @@ -483,7 +483,10 @@ static int ima_eventname_init_common(struct ima_event_data *event_data, bool size_limit) { const char *cur_filename = NULL; + struct name_snapshot filename; u32 cur_filename_len = 0; + bool snapshot = false; + int ret; BUG_ON(event_data->filename == NULL && event_data->file == NULL); @@ -496,7 +499,10 @@ static int ima_eventname_init_common(struct ima_event_data *event_data, } if (event_data->file) { - cur_filename = event_data->file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name; + take_dentry_name_snapshot(&filename, + event_data->file->f_path.dentry); + snapshot = true; + cur_filename = filename.name.name; cur_filename_len = strlen(cur_filename); } else /* @@ -505,8 +511,13 @@ static int ima_eventname_init_common(struct ima_event_data *event_data, */ cur_filename_len = IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX; out: - return ima_write_template_field_data(cur_filename, cur_filename_len, - DATA_FMT_STRING, field_data); + ret = ima_write_template_field_data(cur_filename, cur_filename_len, + DATA_FMT_STRING, field_data); + + if (snapshot) + release_dentry_name_snapshot(&filename); + + return ret; } /* -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/3] Part of "mm: mapcount for large folios + page_mapcount() cleanups"
by Liu Shixin 18 Jul '24

18 Jul '24

Backport three patches from series "mm: mapcount for large folios + page_mapcount() cleanups". David Hildenbrand (3): mm: allow for detecting underflows with page_mapcount() again mm/rmap: always inline anon/file rmap duplication of a single PTE mm/rmap: add fast-path for small folios when adding/removing/duplicating include/linux/mm.h | 2 +- include/linux/rmap.h | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- mm/rmap.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++---------- 3 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) -- 2.25.1

1 3

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/3] Part of "mm: mapcount for large folios + page_mapcount() cleanups"
by Liu Shixin 18 Jul '24

18 Jul '24

Backport three patches from series "mm: mapcount for large folios + page_mapcount() cleanups". David Hildenbrand (3): [Backport] mm: allow for detecting underflows with page_mapcount() again [Backport] mm/rmap: always inline anon/file rmap duplication of a single PTE [Backport] mm/rmap: add fast-path for small folios when adding/removing/duplicating include/linux/mm.h | 2 +- include/linux/rmap.h | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- mm/rmap.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++---------- 3 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) -- 2.25.1

1 0

[PATCH OLK-6.6] f2fs: compress: don't allow unaligned truncation on released compress inode
by Cai Xinchen 18 Jul '24

18 Jul '24

From: Chao Yu <chao(a)kernel.org> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.33 commit 9f9341064a9b5246a32a7fe56b9f80c6f7f3c62d category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/IA74DQ CVE: CVE-2024-33847 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 29ed2b5dd521ce7c5d8466cd70bf0cc9d07afeee ] f2fs image may be corrupted after below testcase: - mkfs.f2fs -O extra_attr,compression -f /dev/vdb - mount /dev/vdb /mnt/f2fs - touch /mnt/f2fs/file - f2fs_io setflags compression /mnt/f2fs/file - dd if=/dev/zero of=/mnt/f2fs/file bs=4k count=4 - f2fs_io release_cblocks /mnt/f2fs/file - truncate -s 8192 /mnt/f2fs/file - umount /mnt/f2fs - fsck.f2fs /dev/vdb [ASSERT] (fsck_chk_inode_blk:1256) --> ino: 0x5 has i_blocks: 0x00000002, but has 0x3 blocks [FSCK] valid_block_count matching with CP [Fail] [0x4, 0x5] [FSCK] other corrupted bugs [Fail] The reason is: partial truncation assume compressed inode has reserved blocks, after partial truncation, valid block count may change w/o .i_blocks and .total_valid_block_count update, result in corruption. This patch only allow cluster size aligned truncation on released compress inode for fixing. Fixes: c61404153eb6 ("f2fs: introduce FI_COMPRESS_RELEASED instead of using IMMUTABLE bit") Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Cai Xinchen <caixinchen1(a)huawei.com> --- fs/f2fs/file.c | 11 ++++++++--- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/f2fs/file.c b/fs/f2fs/file.c index ee5df9adaf77..489ba717a1e9 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/file.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/file.c @@ -931,9 +931,14 @@ int f2fs_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, ATTR_GID | ATTR_TIMES_SET)))) return -EPERM; - if ((attr->ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) && - !f2fs_is_compress_backend_ready(inode)) - return -EOPNOTSUPP; + if ((attr->ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE)) { + if (!f2fs_is_compress_backend_ready(inode)) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + if (is_inode_flag_set(inode, FI_COMPRESS_RELEASED) && + !IS_ALIGNED(attr->ia_size, + F2FS_BLK_TO_BYTES(F2FS_I(inode)->i_cluster_size))) + return -EINVAL; + } err = setattr_prepare(idmap, dentry, attr); if (err) -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] mm/huge_memory: don't unpoison huge_zero_folio
by Kaixiong Yu 18 Jul '24

18 Jul '24

From: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe(a)huawei.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.35 commit 0d73477af964dbd7396163a13817baf13940bca9 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IACT5M CVE: CVE-2024-40914 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit fe6f86f4b40855a130a19aa589f9ba7f650423f4 upstream. When I did memory failure tests recently, below panic occurs: kernel BUG at include/linux/mm.h:1135! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 9 PID: 137 Comm: kswapd1 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc4-00491-gd5ce28f156fe-dirty #14 RIP: 0010:shrink_huge_zero_page_scan+0x168/0x1a0 RSP: 0018:ffff9933c6c57bd0 EFLAGS: 00000246 RAX: 000000000000003e RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff88f61fc5c9c8 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000027 RDI: ffff88f61fc5c9c0 RBP: ffffcd7c446b0000 R08: ffffffff9a9405f0 R09: 0000000000005492 R10: 00000000000030ea R11: ffffffff9a9405f0 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff88e703c4ac00 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88f61fc40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000055f4da6e9878 CR3: 0000000c71048000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: <TASK> do_shrink_slab+0x14f/0x6a0 shrink_slab+0xca/0x8c0 shrink_node+0x2d0/0x7d0 balance_pgdat+0x33a/0x720 kswapd+0x1f3/0x410 kthread+0xd5/0x100 ret_from_fork+0x2f/0x50 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> Modules linked in: mce_inject hwpoison_inject ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- RIP: 0010:shrink_huge_zero_page_scan+0x168/0x1a0 RSP: 0018:ffff9933c6c57bd0 EFLAGS: 00000246 RAX: 000000000000003e RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff88f61fc5c9c8 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000027 RDI: ffff88f61fc5c9c0 RBP: ffffcd7c446b0000 R08: ffffffff9a9405f0 R09: 0000000000005492 R10: 00000000000030ea R11: ffffffff9a9405f0 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff88e703c4ac00 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88f61fc40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000055f4da6e9878 CR3: 0000000c71048000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 The root cause is that HWPoison flag will be set for huge_zero_folio without increasing the folio refcnt. But then unpoison_memory() will decrease the folio refcnt unexpectedly as it appears like a successfully hwpoisoned folio leading to VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(page_ref_count(page) == 0) when releasing huge_zero_folio. Skip unpoisoning huge_zero_folio in unpoison_memory() to fix this issue. We're not prepared to unpoison huge_zero_folio yet. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240516122608.22610-1-linmiaohe@huawei.com Fixes: 478d134e9506 ("mm/huge_memory: do not overkill when splitting huge_zero_page") Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe(a)huawei.com> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Yang Shi <shy828301(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador(a)suse.de> Reviewed-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual(a)arm.com> Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <nao.horiguchi(a)gmail.com> Cc: Xu Yu <xuyu(a)linux.alibaba.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Kaixiong Yu <yukaixiong(a)huawei.com> --- mm/memory-failure.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) diff --git a/mm/memory-failure.c b/mm/memory-failure.c index 0a74d89197b6..81a2faec6807 100644 --- a/mm/memory-failure.c +++ b/mm/memory-failure.c @@ -2525,6 +2525,13 @@ static int __unpoison_memory(unsigned long pfn, bool hw_mf_check) goto unlock_mutex; } + if (is_huge_zero_page(&folio->page)) { + unpoison_pr_info("Unpoison: huge zero page is not supported %#lx\n", + pfn, &unpoison_rs); + ret = -EOPNOTSUPP; + goto unlock_mutex; + } + if (!PageHWPoison(p)) { unpoison_pr_info("Unpoison: Page was already unpoisoned %#lx\n", pfn, &unpoison_rs); -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] f2fs: compress: don't allow unaligned truncation on released compress inode
by Cai Xinchen 18 Jul '24

18 Jul '24

From: Chao Yu <chao(a)kernel.org> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.33 commit 9f9341064a9b5246a32a7fe56b9f80c6f7f3c62d category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/IA74DQ CVE-2024-33847 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 29ed2b5dd521ce7c5d8466cd70bf0cc9d07afeee ] f2fs image may be corrupted after below testcase: - mkfs.f2fs -O extra_attr,compression -f /dev/vdb - mount /dev/vdb /mnt/f2fs - touch /mnt/f2fs/file - f2fs_io setflags compression /mnt/f2fs/file - dd if=/dev/zero of=/mnt/f2fs/file bs=4k count=4 - f2fs_io release_cblocks /mnt/f2fs/file - truncate -s 8192 /mnt/f2fs/file - umount /mnt/f2fs - fsck.f2fs /dev/vdb [ASSERT] (fsck_chk_inode_blk:1256) --> ino: 0x5 has i_blocks: 0x00000002, but has 0x3 blocks [FSCK] valid_block_count matching with CP [Fail] [0x4, 0x5] [FSCK] other corrupted bugs [Fail] The reason is: partial truncation assume compressed inode has reserved blocks, after partial truncation, valid block count may change w/o .i_blocks and .total_valid_block_count update, result in corruption. This patch only allow cluster size aligned truncation on released compress inode for fixing. Fixes: c61404153eb6 ("f2fs: introduce FI_COMPRESS_RELEASED instead of using IMMUTABLE bit") Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Cai Xinchen <caixinchen1(a)huawei.com> --- fs/f2fs/file.c | 11 ++++++++--- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/f2fs/file.c b/fs/f2fs/file.c index ee5df9adaf77..489ba717a1e9 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/file.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/file.c @@ -931,9 +931,14 @@ int f2fs_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, ATTR_GID | ATTR_TIMES_SET)))) return -EPERM; - if ((attr->ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) && - !f2fs_is_compress_backend_ready(inode)) - return -EOPNOTSUPP; + if ((attr->ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE)) { + if (!f2fs_is_compress_backend_ready(inode)) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + if (is_inode_flag_set(inode, FI_COMPRESS_RELEASED) && + !IS_ALIGNED(attr->ia_size, + F2FS_BLK_TO_BYTES(F2FS_I(inode)->i_cluster_size))) + return -EINVAL; + } err = setattr_prepare(idmap, dentry, attr); if (err) -- 2.34.1

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