August 2024 - Kernel - mailweb.openeuler.org

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] wifi: cfg80211: wext: add extra SIOCSIWSCAN data check
by Liu Jian 03 Aug '24

03 Aug '24

From: Dmitry Antipov <dmantipov(a)yandex.ru> stable inclusion from stable-v4.19.319 commit b02ba9a0b55b762bd04743a22f3d9f9645005e79 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAGELZ CVE: CVE-2024-41072 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… --------------------------- [ Upstream commit 6ef09cdc5ba0f93826c09d810c141a8d103a80fc ] In 'cfg80211_wext_siwscan()', add extra check whether number of channels passed via 'ioctl(sock, SIOCSIWSCAN, ...)' doesn't exceed IW_MAX_FREQUENCIES and reject invalid request with -EINVAL otherwise. Reported-by: syzbot+253cd2d2491df77c93ac(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=253cd2d2491df77c93ac Signed-off-by: Dmitry Antipov <dmantipov(a)yandex.ru> Link: https://msgid.link/20240531032010.451295-1-dmantipov@yandex.ru Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Liu Jian <liujian56(a)huawei.com> --- net/wireless/scan.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/wireless/scan.c b/net/wireless/scan.c index e5d61ba837ad..1ff1c12c2e81 100644 --- a/net/wireless/scan.c +++ b/net/wireless/scan.c @@ -1401,10 +1401,14 @@ int cfg80211_wext_siwscan(struct net_device *dev, wiphy = &rdev->wiphy; /* Determine number of channels, needed to allocate creq */ - if (wreq && wreq->num_channels) + if (wreq && wreq->num_channels) { + /* Passed from userspace so should be checked */ + if (unlikely(wreq->num_channels > IW_MAX_FREQUENCIES)) + return -EINVAL; n_channels = wreq->num_channels; - else + } else { n_channels = ieee80211_get_num_supported_channels(wiphy); + } creq = kzalloc(sizeof(*creq) + sizeof(struct cfg80211_ssid) + n_channels * sizeof(void *), -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS 0/2] CVE-2024-41044
by Liu Jian 03 Aug '24

03 Aug '24

CVE-2024-41044 Dmitry Antipov (1): ppp: reject claimed-as-LCP but actually malformed packets Eric Dumazet (1): ppp: ensure minimum packet size in ppp_write() drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] sched/deadline: Fix task_struct reference leak
by Zheng Zucheng 03 Aug '24

03 Aug '24

From: Wander Lairson Costa <wander(a)redhat.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.10-rc5 commit b58652db66c910c2245f5bee7deca41c12d707b9 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAGEN4 CVE: CVE-2024-41023 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- During the execution of the following stress test with linux-rt: stress-ng --cyclic 30 --timeout 30 --minimize --quiet kmemleak frequently reported a memory leak concerning the task_struct: unreferenced object 0xffff8881305b8000 (size 16136): comm "stress-ng", pid 614, jiffies 4294883961 (age 286.412s) object hex dump (first 32 bytes): 02 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .@.............. 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ debug hex dump (first 16 bytes): 53 09 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 S............... backtrace: [<00000000046b6790>] dup_task_struct+0x30/0x540 [<00000000c5ca0f0b>] copy_process+0x3d9/0x50e0 [<00000000ced59777>] kernel_clone+0xb0/0x770 [<00000000a50befdc>] __do_sys_clone+0xb6/0xf0 [<000000001dbf2008>] do_syscall_64+0x5d/0xf0 [<00000000552900ff>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76 The issue occurs in start_dl_timer(), which increments the task_struct reference count and sets a timer. The timer callback, dl_task_timer, is supposed to decrement the reference count upon expiration. However, if enqueue_task_dl() is called before the timer expires and cancels it, the reference count is not decremented, leading to the leak. This patch fixes the reference leak by ensuring the task_struct reference count is properly decremented when the timer is canceled. Fixes: feff2e65efd8 ("sched/deadline: Unthrottle PI boosted threads while enqueuing") Signed-off-by: Wander Lairson Costa <wander(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz(a)infradead.org> Acked-by: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli(a)redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240620125618.11419-1-wander@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Zheng Zucheng <zhengzucheng(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/sched/deadline.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/sched/deadline.c b/kernel/sched/deadline.c index 71b55d9de2d9..e35a951a62b7 100644 --- a/kernel/sched/deadline.c +++ b/kernel/sched/deadline.c @@ -1528,8 +1528,13 @@ static void enqueue_task_dl(struct rq *rq, struct task_struct *p, int flags) * The replenish timer needs to be canceled. No * problem if it fires concurrently: boosted threads * are ignored in dl_task_timer(). + * + * If the timer callback was running (hrtimer_try_to_cancel == -1), + * it will eventually call put_task_struct(). */ - hrtimer_try_to_cancel(&p->dl.dl_timer); + if (hrtimer_try_to_cancel(&p->dl.dl_timer) == 1 && + !dl_server(&p->dl)) + put_task_struct(p); p->dl.dl_throttled = 0; } } else if (!dl_prio(p->normal_prio)) { -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] sched/deadline: Fix task_struct reference leak
by Zheng Zucheng 03 Aug '24

03 Aug '24

From: Wander Lairson Costa <wander(a)redhat.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.10-rc5 commit b58652db66c910c2245f5bee7deca41c12d707b9 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAGEN4 CVE: CVE-2024-41023 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- During the execution of the following stress test with linux-rt: stress-ng --cyclic 30 --timeout 30 --minimize --quiet kmemleak frequently reported a memory leak concerning the task_struct: unreferenced object 0xffff8881305b8000 (size 16136): comm "stress-ng", pid 614, jiffies 4294883961 (age 286.412s) object hex dump (first 32 bytes): 02 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .@.............. 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ debug hex dump (first 16 bytes): 53 09 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 S............... backtrace: [<00000000046b6790>] dup_task_struct+0x30/0x540 [<00000000c5ca0f0b>] copy_process+0x3d9/0x50e0 [<00000000ced59777>] kernel_clone+0xb0/0x770 [<00000000a50befdc>] __do_sys_clone+0xb6/0xf0 [<000000001dbf2008>] do_syscall_64+0x5d/0xf0 [<00000000552900ff>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76 The issue occurs in start_dl_timer(), which increments the task_struct reference count and sets a timer. The timer callback, dl_task_timer, is supposed to decrement the reference count upon expiration. However, if enqueue_task_dl() is called before the timer expires and cancels it, the reference count is not decremented, leading to the leak. This patch fixes the reference leak by ensuring the task_struct reference count is properly decremented when the timer is canceled. Fixes: feff2e65efd8 ("sched/deadline: Unthrottle PI boosted threads while enqueuing") Signed-off-by: Wander Lairson Costa <wander(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz(a)infradead.org> Acked-by: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli(a)redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240620125618.11419-1-wander@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Zheng Zucheng <zhengzucheng(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/sched/deadline.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/sched/deadline.c b/kernel/sched/deadline.c index 71b55d9de2d9..e35a951a62b7 100644 --- a/kernel/sched/deadline.c +++ b/kernel/sched/deadline.c @@ -1528,8 +1528,13 @@ static void enqueue_task_dl(struct rq *rq, struct task_struct *p, int flags) * The replenish timer needs to be canceled. No * problem if it fires concurrently: boosted threads * are ignored in dl_task_timer(). + * + * If the timer callback was running (hrtimer_try_to_cancel == -1), + * it will eventually call put_task_struct(). */ - hrtimer_try_to_cancel(&p->dl.dl_timer); + if (hrtimer_try_to_cancel(&p->dl.dl_timer) == 1 && + !dl_server(&p->dl)) + put_task_struct(p); p->dl.dl_throttled = 0; } } else if (!dl_prio(p->normal_prio)) { -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] sched/deadline: Fix task_struct reference leak
by Zheng Zucheng 03 Aug '24

03 Aug '24

From: Wander Lairson Costa <wander(a)redhat.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.10-rc5 commit b58652db66c910c2245f5bee7deca41c12d707b9 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAGEN4 CVE: CVE-2024-41023 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- During the execution of the following stress test with linux-rt: stress-ng --cyclic 30 --timeout 30 --minimize --quiet kmemleak frequently reported a memory leak concerning the task_struct: unreferenced object 0xffff8881305b8000 (size 16136): comm "stress-ng", pid 614, jiffies 4294883961 (age 286.412s) object hex dump (first 32 bytes): 02 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .@.............. 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ debug hex dump (first 16 bytes): 53 09 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 S............... backtrace: [<00000000046b6790>] dup_task_struct+0x30/0x540 [<00000000c5ca0f0b>] copy_process+0x3d9/0x50e0 [<00000000ced59777>] kernel_clone+0xb0/0x770 [<00000000a50befdc>] __do_sys_clone+0xb6/0xf0 [<000000001dbf2008>] do_syscall_64+0x5d/0xf0 [<00000000552900ff>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76 The issue occurs in start_dl_timer(), which increments the task_struct reference count and sets a timer. The timer callback, dl_task_timer, is supposed to decrement the reference count upon expiration. However, if enqueue_task_dl() is called before the timer expires and cancels it, the reference count is not decremented, leading to the leak. This patch fixes the reference leak by ensuring the task_struct reference count is properly decremented when the timer is canceled. Fixes: feff2e65efd8 ("sched/deadline: Unthrottle PI boosted threads while enqueuing") Signed-off-by: Wander Lairson Costa <wander(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz(a)infradead.org> Acked-by: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli(a)redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240620125618.11419-1-wander@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Zheng Zucheng <zhengzucheng(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/sched/deadline.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/sched/deadline.c b/kernel/sched/deadline.c index 71b55d9de2d9..e35a951a62b7 100644 --- a/kernel/sched/deadline.c +++ b/kernel/sched/deadline.c @@ -1528,8 +1528,13 @@ static void enqueue_task_dl(struct rq *rq, struct task_struct *p, int flags) * The replenish timer needs to be canceled. No * problem if it fires concurrently: boosted threads * are ignored in dl_task_timer(). + * + * If the timer callback was running (hrtimer_try_to_cancel == -1), + * it will eventually call put_task_struct(). */ - hrtimer_try_to_cancel(&p->dl.dl_timer); + if (hrtimer_try_to_cancel(&p->dl.dl_timer) == 1 && + !dl_server(&p->dl)) + put_task_struct(p); p->dl.dl_throttled = 0; } } else if (!dl_prio(p->normal_prio)) { -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] IB/core: Implement a limit on UMAD receive List
by Zhang Changzhong 03 Aug '24

03 Aug '24

From: Michael Guralnik <michaelgur(a)nvidia.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.222 commit 62349fbf86b5e13b02721bdadf98c29afd1e7b5f category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAGSPA CVE: CVE-2024-42145 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit ca0b44e20a6f3032224599f02e7c8fb49525c894 ] The existing behavior of ib_umad, which maintains received MAD packets in an unbounded list, poses a risk of uncontrolled growth. As user-space applications extract packets from this list, the rate of extraction may not match the rate of incoming packets, leading to potential list overflow. To address this, we introduce a limit to the size of the list. After considering typical scenarios, such as OpenSM processing, which can handle approximately 100k packets per second, and the 1-second retry timeout for most packets, we set the list size limit to 200k. Packets received beyond this limit are dropped, assuming they are likely timed out by the time they are handled by user-space. Notably, packets queued on the receive list due to reasons like timed-out sends are preserved even when the list is full. Signed-off-by: Michael Guralnik <michaelgur(a)nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Mark Zhang <markzhang(a)nvidia.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/7197cb58a7d9e78399008f25036205ceab07fbd5.17132688… Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Zhang Changzhong <zhangchangzhong(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c | 21 +++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c b/drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c index 4688a66..e21abd1 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c @@ -63,6 +63,8 @@ MODULE_AUTHOR("Roland Dreier"); MODULE_DESCRIPTION("InfiniBand userspace MAD packet access"); MODULE_LICENSE("Dual BSD/GPL"); +#define MAX_UMAD_RECV_LIST_SIZE 200000 + enum { IB_UMAD_MAX_PORTS = RDMA_MAX_PORTS, IB_UMAD_MAX_AGENTS = 32, @@ -113,6 +115,7 @@ struct ib_umad_file { struct mutex mutex; struct ib_umad_port *port; struct list_head recv_list; + atomic_t recv_list_size; struct list_head send_list; struct list_head port_list; spinlock_t send_lock; @@ -175,24 +178,28 @@ static struct ib_mad_agent *__get_agent(struct ib_umad_file *file, int id) return file->agents_dead ? NULL : file->agent[id]; } -static int queue_packet(struct ib_umad_file *file, - struct ib_mad_agent *agent, - struct ib_umad_packet *packet) +static int queue_packet(struct ib_umad_file *file, struct ib_mad_agent *agent, + struct ib_umad_packet *packet, bool is_recv_mad) { int ret = 1; mutex_lock(&file->mutex); + if (is_recv_mad && + atomic_read(&file->recv_list_size) > MAX_UMAD_RECV_LIST_SIZE) + goto unlock; + for (packet->mad.hdr.id = 0; packet->mad.hdr.id < IB_UMAD_MAX_AGENTS; packet->mad.hdr.id++) if (agent == __get_agent(file, packet->mad.hdr.id)) { list_add_tail(&packet->list, &file->recv_list); + atomic_inc(&file->recv_list_size); wake_up_interruptible(&file->recv_wait); ret = 0; break; } - +unlock: mutex_unlock(&file->mutex); return ret; @@ -219,7 +226,7 @@ static void send_handler(struct ib_mad_agent *agent, if (send_wc->status == IB_WC_RESP_TIMEOUT_ERR) { packet->length = IB_MGMT_MAD_HDR; packet->mad.hdr.status = ETIMEDOUT; - if (!queue_packet(file, agent, packet)) + if (!queue_packet(file, agent, packet, false)) return; } kfree(packet); @@ -279,7 +286,7 @@ static void recv_handler(struct ib_mad_agent *agent, rdma_destroy_ah_attr(&ah_attr); } - if (queue_packet(file, agent, packet)) + if (queue_packet(file, agent, packet, true)) goto err2; return; @@ -404,6 +411,7 @@ static ssize_t ib_umad_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, packet = list_entry(file->recv_list.next, struct ib_umad_packet, list); list_del(&packet->list); + atomic_dec(&file->recv_list_size); mutex_unlock(&file->mutex); @@ -416,6 +424,7 @@ static ssize_t ib_umad_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, /* Requeue packet */ mutex_lock(&file->mutex); list_add(&packet->list, &file->recv_list); + atomic_inc(&file->recv_list_size); mutex_unlock(&file->mutex); } else { if (packet->recv_wc) -- 2.9.5

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] IB/core: Implement a limit on UMAD receive List
by Zhang Changzhong 03 Aug '24

03 Aug '24

From: Michael Guralnik <michaelgur(a)nvidia.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.222 commit 62349fbf86b5e13b02721bdadf98c29afd1e7b5f category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAGSPA CVE: CVE-2024-42145 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit ca0b44e20a6f3032224599f02e7c8fb49525c894 ] The existing behavior of ib_umad, which maintains received MAD packets in an unbounded list, poses a risk of uncontrolled growth. As user-space applications extract packets from this list, the rate of extraction may not match the rate of incoming packets, leading to potential list overflow. To address this, we introduce a limit to the size of the list. After considering typical scenarios, such as OpenSM processing, which can handle approximately 100k packets per second, and the 1-second retry timeout for most packets, we set the list size limit to 200k. Packets received beyond this limit are dropped, assuming they are likely timed out by the time they are handled by user-space. Notably, packets queued on the receive list due to reasons like timed-out sends are preserved even when the list is full. Signed-off-by: Michael Guralnik <michaelgur(a)nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Mark Zhang <markzhang(a)nvidia.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/7197cb58a7d9e78399008f25036205ceab07fbd5.17132688… Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Zhang Changzhong <zhangchangzhong(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c | 21 +++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c b/drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c index 3bd0dcd..063707d 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c @@ -63,6 +63,8 @@ MODULE_AUTHOR("Roland Dreier"); MODULE_DESCRIPTION("InfiniBand userspace MAD packet access"); MODULE_LICENSE("Dual BSD/GPL"); +#define MAX_UMAD_RECV_LIST_SIZE 200000 + enum { IB_UMAD_MAX_PORTS = RDMA_MAX_PORTS, IB_UMAD_MAX_AGENTS = 32, @@ -113,6 +115,7 @@ struct ib_umad_file { struct mutex mutex; struct ib_umad_port *port; struct list_head recv_list; + atomic_t recv_list_size; struct list_head send_list; struct list_head port_list; spinlock_t send_lock; @@ -180,24 +183,28 @@ static struct ib_mad_agent *__get_agent(struct ib_umad_file *file, int id) return file->agents_dead ? NULL : file->agent[id]; } -static int queue_packet(struct ib_umad_file *file, - struct ib_mad_agent *agent, - struct ib_umad_packet *packet) +static int queue_packet(struct ib_umad_file *file, struct ib_mad_agent *agent, + struct ib_umad_packet *packet, bool is_recv_mad) { int ret = 1; mutex_lock(&file->mutex); + if (is_recv_mad && + atomic_read(&file->recv_list_size) > MAX_UMAD_RECV_LIST_SIZE) + goto unlock; + for (packet->mad.hdr.id = 0; packet->mad.hdr.id < IB_UMAD_MAX_AGENTS; packet->mad.hdr.id++) if (agent == __get_agent(file, packet->mad.hdr.id)) { list_add_tail(&packet->list, &file->recv_list); + atomic_inc(&file->recv_list_size); wake_up_interruptible(&file->recv_wait); ret = 0; break; } - +unlock: mutex_unlock(&file->mutex); return ret; @@ -224,7 +231,7 @@ static void send_handler(struct ib_mad_agent *agent, if (send_wc->status == IB_WC_RESP_TIMEOUT_ERR) { packet->length = IB_MGMT_MAD_HDR; packet->mad.hdr.status = ETIMEDOUT; - if (!queue_packet(file, agent, packet)) + if (!queue_packet(file, agent, packet, false)) return; } kfree(packet); @@ -284,7 +291,7 @@ static void recv_handler(struct ib_mad_agent *agent, rdma_destroy_ah_attr(&ah_attr); } - if (queue_packet(file, agent, packet)) + if (queue_packet(file, agent, packet, true)) goto err2; return; @@ -409,6 +416,7 @@ static ssize_t ib_umad_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, packet = list_entry(file->recv_list.next, struct ib_umad_packet, list); list_del(&packet->list); + atomic_dec(&file->recv_list_size); mutex_unlock(&file->mutex); @@ -421,6 +429,7 @@ static ssize_t ib_umad_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, /* Requeue packet */ mutex_lock(&file->mutex); list_add(&packet->list, &file->recv_list); + atomic_inc(&file->recv_list_size); mutex_unlock(&file->mutex); } else { if (packet->recv_wc) -- 2.9.5

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] ppp: reject claimed-as-LCP but actually malformed packets
by Liu Jian 03 Aug '24

03 Aug '24

From: Dmitry Antipov <dmantipov(a)yandex.ru> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.222 commit 3ba12c2afd933fc1bf800f6d3f6c7ec8f602ce56 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAGEN2 CVE: CVE-2024-41044 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… --------------------------- [ Upstream commit f2aeb7306a898e1cbd03963d376f4b6656ca2b55 ] Since 'ppp_async_encode()' assumes valid LCP packets (with code from 1 to 7 inclusive), add 'ppp_check_packet()' to ensure that LCP packet has an actual body beyond PPP_LCP header bytes, and reject claimed-as-LCP but actually malformed data otherwise. Reported-by: syzbot+ec0723ba9605678b14bf(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=ec0723ba9605678b14bf Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Dmitry Antipov <dmantipov(a)yandex.ru> Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Liu Jian <liujian56(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c b/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c index b825c6a9b6dd..e2bca6fa0822 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c +++ b/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c @@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ #define MPHDRLEN_SSN 4 /* ditto with short sequence numbers */ #define PPP_PROTO_LEN 2 +#define PPP_LCP_HDRLEN 4 /* * An instance of /dev/ppp can be associated with either a ppp @@ -489,6 +490,15 @@ static ssize_t ppp_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, return ret; } +static bool ppp_check_packet(struct sk_buff *skb, size_t count) +{ + /* LCP packets must include LCP header which 4 bytes long: + * 1-byte code, 1-byte identifier, and 2-byte length. + */ + return get_unaligned_be16(skb->data) != PPP_LCP || + count >= PPP_PROTO_LEN + PPP_LCP_HDRLEN; +} + static ssize_t ppp_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { @@ -511,6 +521,11 @@ static ssize_t ppp_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, kfree_skb(skb); goto out; } + ret = -EINVAL; + if (unlikely(!ppp_check_packet(skb, count))) { + kfree_skb(skb); + goto out; + } switch (pf->kind) { case INTERFACE: -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] IB/core: Implement a limit on UMAD receive List
by Zhang Changzhong 03 Aug '24

03 Aug '24

From: Michael Guralnik <michaelgur(a)nvidia.com> stable inclusion from stable-v4.19.318 commit 1288cf1cceb0e6df276e182f5412370fb4169bcb category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAGSPA CVE: CVE-2024-42145 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit ca0b44e20a6f3032224599f02e7c8fb49525c894 ] The existing behavior of ib_umad, which maintains received MAD packets in an unbounded list, poses a risk of uncontrolled growth. As user-space applications extract packets from this list, the rate of extraction may not match the rate of incoming packets, leading to potential list overflow. To address this, we introduce a limit to the size of the list. After considering typical scenarios, such as OpenSM processing, which can handle approximately 100k packets per second, and the 1-second retry timeout for most packets, we set the list size limit to 200k. Packets received beyond this limit are dropped, assuming they are likely timed out by the time they are handled by user-space. Notably, packets queued on the receive list due to reasons like timed-out sends are preserved even when the list is full. Signed-off-by: Michael Guralnik <michaelgur(a)nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Mark Zhang <markzhang(a)nvidia.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/7197cb58a7d9e78399008f25036205ceab07fbd5.17132688… Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Zhang Changzhong <zhangchangzhong(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c | 21 +++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c b/drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c index 4359eda..b37aada 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c @@ -62,6 +62,8 @@ MODULE_AUTHOR("Roland Dreier"); MODULE_DESCRIPTION("InfiniBand userspace MAD packet access"); MODULE_LICENSE("Dual BSD/GPL"); +#define MAX_UMAD_RECV_LIST_SIZE 200000 + enum { IB_UMAD_MAX_PORTS = RDMA_MAX_PORTS, IB_UMAD_MAX_AGENTS = 32, @@ -113,6 +115,7 @@ struct ib_umad_file { struct mutex mutex; struct ib_umad_port *port; struct list_head recv_list; + atomic_t recv_list_size; struct list_head send_list; struct list_head port_list; spinlock_t send_lock; @@ -168,24 +171,28 @@ static struct ib_mad_agent *__get_agent(struct ib_umad_file *file, int id) return file->agents_dead ? NULL : file->agent[id]; } -static int queue_packet(struct ib_umad_file *file, - struct ib_mad_agent *agent, - struct ib_umad_packet *packet) +static int queue_packet(struct ib_umad_file *file, struct ib_mad_agent *agent, + struct ib_umad_packet *packet, bool is_recv_mad) { int ret = 1; mutex_lock(&file->mutex); + if (is_recv_mad && + atomic_read(&file->recv_list_size) > MAX_UMAD_RECV_LIST_SIZE) + goto unlock; + for (packet->mad.hdr.id = 0; packet->mad.hdr.id < IB_UMAD_MAX_AGENTS; packet->mad.hdr.id++) if (agent == __get_agent(file, packet->mad.hdr.id)) { list_add_tail(&packet->list, &file->recv_list); + atomic_inc(&file->recv_list_size); wake_up_interruptible(&file->recv_wait); ret = 0; break; } - +unlock: mutex_unlock(&file->mutex); return ret; @@ -212,7 +219,7 @@ static void send_handler(struct ib_mad_agent *agent, if (send_wc->status == IB_WC_RESP_TIMEOUT_ERR) { packet->length = IB_MGMT_MAD_HDR; packet->mad.hdr.status = ETIMEDOUT; - if (!queue_packet(file, agent, packet)) + if (!queue_packet(file, agent, packet, false)) return; } kfree(packet); @@ -272,7 +279,7 @@ static void recv_handler(struct ib_mad_agent *agent, rdma_destroy_ah_attr(&ah_attr); } - if (queue_packet(file, agent, packet)) + if (queue_packet(file, agent, packet, true)) goto err2; return; @@ -381,6 +388,7 @@ static ssize_t ib_umad_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, packet = list_entry(file->recv_list.next, struct ib_umad_packet, list); list_del(&packet->list); + atomic_dec(&file->recv_list_size); mutex_unlock(&file->mutex); @@ -393,6 +401,7 @@ static ssize_t ib_umad_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, /* Requeue packet */ mutex_lock(&file->mutex); list_add(&packet->list, &file->recv_list); + atomic_inc(&file->recv_list_size); mutex_unlock(&file->mutex); } else { if (packet->recv_wc) -- 2.9.5

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[PATCH OLK-5.10] ppp: reject claimed-as-LCP but actually malformed packets
by Liu Jian 03 Aug '24

03 Aug '24

From: Dmitry Antipov <dmantipov(a)yandex.ru> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.222 commit 3ba12c2afd933fc1bf800f6d3f6c7ec8f602ce56 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAGEN2 CVE: CVE-2024-41044 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… --------------------------- [ Upstream commit f2aeb7306a898e1cbd03963d376f4b6656ca2b55 ] Since 'ppp_async_encode()' assumes valid LCP packets (with code from 1 to 7 inclusive), add 'ppp_check_packet()' to ensure that LCP packet has an actual body beyond PPP_LCP header bytes, and reject claimed-as-LCP but actually malformed data otherwise. Reported-by: syzbot+ec0723ba9605678b14bf(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=ec0723ba9605678b14bf Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Dmitry Antipov <dmantipov(a)yandex.ru> Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Liu Jian <liujian56(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c b/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c index b825c6a9b6dd..e2bca6fa0822 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c +++ b/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c @@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ #define MPHDRLEN_SSN 4 /* ditto with short sequence numbers */ #define PPP_PROTO_LEN 2 +#define PPP_LCP_HDRLEN 4 /* * An instance of /dev/ppp can be associated with either a ppp @@ -489,6 +490,15 @@ static ssize_t ppp_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, return ret; } +static bool ppp_check_packet(struct sk_buff *skb, size_t count) +{ + /* LCP packets must include LCP header which 4 bytes long: + * 1-byte code, 1-byte identifier, and 2-byte length. + */ + return get_unaligned_be16(skb->data) != PPP_LCP || + count >= PPP_PROTO_LEN + PPP_LCP_HDRLEN; +} + static ssize_t ppp_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { @@ -511,6 +521,11 @@ static ssize_t ppp_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, kfree_skb(skb); goto out; } + ret = -EINVAL; + if (unlikely(!ppp_check_packet(skb, count))) { + kfree_skb(skb); + goto out; + } switch (pf->kind) { case INTERFACE: -- 2.34.1

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