January 2025 - Kernel - mailweb.openeuler.org

[PATCH OLK-5.10] af_packet: avoid erroring out after sock_init_data() in packet_create()
by Zhang Changzhong 08 Jan '25

08 Jan '25

From: Ignat Korchagin <ignat(a)cloudflare.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.231 commit 1dc1e1db927056cb323296e2294a855cd003dfe7 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IBEANY CVE: CVE-2024-56606 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 46f2a11cb82b657fd15bab1c47821b635e03838b ] After sock_init_data() the allocated sk object is attached to the provided sock object. On error, packet_create() frees the sk object leaving the dangling pointer in the sock object on return. Some other code may try to use this pointer and cause use-after-free. Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Ignat Korchagin <ignat(a)cloudflare.com> Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu(a)amazon.com> Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb(a)google.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241014153808.51894-2-ignat@cloudflare.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Zhang Changzhong <zhangchangzhong(a)huawei.com> --- net/packet/af_packet.c | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/packet/af_packet.c b/net/packet/af_packet.c index 7740ab13..ae57d3e 100644 --- a/net/packet/af_packet.c +++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c @@ -3321,18 +3321,18 @@ static int packet_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol, if (sock->type == SOCK_PACKET) sock->ops = &packet_ops_spkt; + po = pkt_sk(sk); + err = packet_alloc_pending(po); + if (err) + goto out_sk_free; + sock_init_data(sock, sk); - po = pkt_sk(sk); init_completion(&po->skb_completion); sk->sk_family = PF_PACKET; po->num = proto; po->xmit = dev_queue_xmit; - err = packet_alloc_pending(po); - if (err) - goto out2; - packet_cached_dev_reset(po); sk->sk_destruct = packet_sock_destruct; @@ -3367,7 +3367,7 @@ static int packet_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol, preempt_enable(); return 0; -out2: +out_sk_free: sk_free(sk); out: return err; -- 2.9.5

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] media: platform: allegro-dvt: Fix possible memory leak in allocate_buffers_internal()
by Qi Xi 08 Jan '25

08 Jan '25

From: Gaosheng Cui <cuigaosheng1(a)huawei.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.13-rc1 commit 0f514068fbc5d4d189c817adc7c4e32cffdc2e47 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IBEAMP CVE: CVE-2024-56572 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- The buffer in the loop should be released under the exception path, otherwise there may be a memory leak here. To mitigate this, free the buffer when allegro_alloc_buffer fails. Fixes: f20387dfd065 ("media: allegro: add Allegro DVT video IP core driver") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Gaosheng Cui <cuigaosheng1(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco(a)xs4all.nl> Signed-off-by: Qi Xi <xiqi2(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/staging/media/allegro-dvt/allegro-core.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/staging/media/allegro-dvt/allegro-core.c b/drivers/staging/media/allegro-dvt/allegro-core.c index 28b6ba895ccd..84bd3d8649a8 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/media/allegro-dvt/allegro-core.c +++ b/drivers/staging/media/allegro-dvt/allegro-core.c @@ -1208,8 +1208,10 @@ static int allocate_buffers_internal(struct allegro_channel *channel, INIT_LIST_HEAD(&buffer->head); err = allegro_alloc_buffer(dev, buffer, size); - if (err) + if (err) { + kfree(buffer); goto err; + } list_add(&buffer->head, list); } -- 2.33.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/9] CVE-2024-50102
by Qi Xi 08 Jan '25

08 Jan '25

*** BLURB HERE *** David Gow (1): x86/uaccess: Zero the 8-byte get_range case on failure on 32-bit David Laight (1): x86: fix off-by-one in access_ok() Linus Torvalds (5): runtime constants: deal with old decrepit linkers runtime constants: add x86 architecture support x86: fix whitespace in runtime-const assembler output x86/uaccess: Improve the 8-byte getuser() case x86: fix user address masking non-canonical speculation issue Stephen Brennan (1): dcache: keep dentry_hashtable or d_hash_shift even when not used Thomas Gleixner (1): x86/uaccess: Add missing __force to casts in __access_ok() and valid_user_address() arch/x86/include/asm/runtime-const.h | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h | 49 ++++++++++------- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 10 ++++ arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 4 ++ arch/x86/lib/getuser.S | 80 ++++++++++------------------ fs/dcache.c | 9 +++- include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h | 7 +++ 7 files changed, 149 insertions(+), 71 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/runtime-const.h -- 2.33.0

2 10

[PATCH OLK-6.6] [Backport] btrfs: fix use-after-free in btrfs_encoded_read_endio()
by Yongjian Sun 08 Jan '25

08 Jan '25

From: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn(a)wdc.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.12-rc3 commit 05b36b04d74a517d6675bf2f90829ff1ac7e28dc category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IBEAOP CVE: CVE-2024-56582 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Shinichiro reported the following use-after free that sometimes is happening in our CI system when running fstests' btrfs/284 on a TCMU runner device: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in lock_release+0x708/0x780 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888106a83f18 by task kworker/u80:6/219 CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 219 Comm: kworker/u80:6 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc6-kts+ #15 Hardware name: Supermicro Super Server/X11SPi-TF, BIOS 3.3 02/21/2020 Workqueue: btrfs-endio btrfs_end_bio_work [btrfs] Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x6e/0xa0 ? lock_release+0x708/0x780 print_report+0x174/0x505 ? lock_release+0x708/0x780 ? __virt_addr_valid+0x224/0x410 ? lock_release+0x708/0x780 kasan_report+0xda/0x1b0 ? lock_release+0x708/0x780 ? __wake_up+0x44/0x60 lock_release+0x708/0x780 ? __pfx_lock_release+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_do_raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10 ? lock_is_held_type+0x9a/0x110 _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x1f/0x60 __wake_up+0x44/0x60 btrfs_encoded_read_endio+0x14b/0x190 [btrfs] btrfs_check_read_bio+0x8d9/0x1360 [btrfs] ? lock_release+0x1b0/0x780 ? trace_lock_acquire+0x12f/0x1a0 ? __pfx_btrfs_check_read_bio+0x10/0x10 [btrfs] ? process_one_work+0x7e3/0x1460 ? lock_acquire+0x31/0xc0 ? process_one_work+0x7e3/0x1460 process_one_work+0x85c/0x1460 ? __pfx_process_one_work+0x10/0x10 ? assign_work+0x16c/0x240 worker_thread+0x5e6/0xfc0 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0x2c3/0x3a0 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x31/0x70 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> Allocated by task 3661: kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0 btrfs_encoded_read_regular_fill_pages+0x16c/0x6d0 [btrfs] send_extent_data+0xf0f/0x24a0 [btrfs] process_extent+0x48a/0x1830 [btrfs] changed_cb+0x178b/0x2ea0 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl_send+0x3bf9/0x5c20 [btrfs] _btrfs_ioctl_send+0x117/0x330 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl+0x184a/0x60a0 [btrfs] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x12e/0x1a0 do_syscall_64+0x95/0x180 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Freed by task 3661: kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x70 __kasan_slab_free+0x4f/0x70 kfree+0x143/0x490 btrfs_encoded_read_regular_fill_pages+0x531/0x6d0 [btrfs] send_extent_data+0xf0f/0x24a0 [btrfs] process_extent+0x48a/0x1830 [btrfs] changed_cb+0x178b/0x2ea0 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl_send+0x3bf9/0x5c20 [btrfs] _btrfs_ioctl_send+0x117/0x330 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl+0x184a/0x60a0 [btrfs] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x12e/0x1a0 do_syscall_64+0x95/0x180 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888106a83f00 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-rnd-07-96 of size 96 The buggy address is located 24 bytes inside of freed 96-byte region [ffff888106a83f00, ffff888106a83f60) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff888106a83800 pfn:0x106a83 flags: 0x17ffffc0000000(node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff) page_type: f5(slab) raw: 0017ffffc0000000 ffff888100053680 ffffea0004917200 0000000000000004 raw: ffff888106a83800 0000000080200019 00000001f5000000 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888106a83e00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc ffff888106a83e80: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc >ffff888106a83f00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc ^ ffff888106a83f80: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc ffff888106a84000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ================================================================== Further analyzing the trace and the crash dump's vmcore file shows that the wake_up() call in btrfs_encoded_read_endio() is calling wake_up() on the wait_queue that is in the private data passed to the end_io handler. Commit 4ff47df40447 ("btrfs: move priv off stack in btrfs_encoded_read_regular_fill_pages()") moved 'struct btrfs_encoded_read_private' off the stack. Before that commit one can see a corruption of the private data when analyzing the vmcore after a crash: *(struct btrfs_encoded_read_private *)0xffff88815626eec8 = { .wait = (wait_queue_head_t){ .lock = (spinlock_t){ .rlock = (struct raw_spinlock){ .raw_lock = (arch_spinlock_t){ .val = (atomic_t){ .counter = (int)-2005885696, }, .locked = (u8)0, .pending = (u8)157, .locked_pending = (u16)40192, .tail = (u16)34928, }, .magic = (unsigned int)536325682, .owner_cpu = (unsigned int)29, .owner = (void *)__SCT__tp_func_btrfs_transaction_commit+0x0 = 0x0, .dep_map = (struct lockdep_map){ .key = (struct lock_class_key *)0xffff8881575a3b6c, .class_cache = (struct lock_class *[2]){ 0xffff8882a71985c0, 0xffffea00066f5d40 }, .name = (const char *)0xffff88815626f100 = "", .wait_type_outer = (u8)37, .wait_type_inner = (u8)178, .lock_type = (u8)154, }, }, .__padding = (u8 [24]){ 0, 157, 112, 136, 50, 174, 247, 31, 29 }, .dep_map = (struct lockdep_map){ .key = (struct lock_class_key *)0xffff8881575a3b6c, .class_cache = (struct lock_class *[2]){ 0xffff8882a71985c0, 0xffffea00066f5d40 }, .name = (const char *)0xffff88815626f100 = "", .wait_type_outer = (u8)37, .wait_type_inner = (u8)178, .lock_type = (u8)154, }, }, .head = (struct list_head){ .next = (struct list_head *)0x112cca, .prev = (struct list_head *)0x47, }, }, .pending = (atomic_t){ .counter = (int)-1491499288, }, .status = (blk_status_t)130, } Here we can see several indicators of in-memory data corruption, e.g. the large negative atomic values of ->pending or ->wait->lock->rlock->raw_lock->val, as well as the bogus spinlock magic 0x1ff7ae32 (decimal 536325682 above) instead of 0xdead4ead or the bogus pointer values for ->wait->head. To fix this, change atomic_dec_return() to atomic_dec_and_test() to fix the corruption, as atomic_dec_return() is defined as two instructions on x86_64, whereas atomic_dec_and_test() is defined as a single atomic operation. This can lead to a situation where counter value is already decremented but the if statement in btrfs_encoded_read_endio() is not completely processed, i.e. the 0 test has not completed. If another thread continues executing btrfs_encoded_read_regular_fill_pages() the atomic_dec_return() there can see an already updated ->pending counter and continues by freeing the private data. Continuing in the endio handler the test for 0 succeeds and the wait_queue is woken up, resulting in a use-after-free. Reported-by: Shinichiro Kawasaki <shinichiro.kawasaki(a)wdc.com> Suggested-by: Damien Le Moal <Damien.LeMoal(a)wdc.com> Fixes: 1881fba89bd5 ("btrfs: add BTRFS_IOC_ENCODED_READ ioctl") CC: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 6.1+ Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana(a)suse.com> Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu(a)suse.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn(a)wdc.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba(a)suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba(a)suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sun Yongjian <sunyongjian1(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Yongjian Sun <sunyongjian1(a)huawei.com> --- fs/btrfs/inode.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/btrfs/inode.c b/fs/btrfs/inode.c index fae45b8d485e..fb262145f193 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/inode.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/inode.c @@ -9974,7 +9974,7 @@ static void btrfs_encoded_read_endio(struct btrfs_bio *bbio) */ WRITE_ONCE(priv->status, bbio->bio.bi_status); } - if (!atomic_dec_return(&priv->pending)) + if (atomic_dec_and_test(&priv->pending)) wake_up(&priv->wait); bio_put(&bbio->bio); } -- 2.39.2

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] bpf: fix recursive lock when verdict program return SK_PASS
by Liu Jian 08 Jan '25

08 Jan '25

From: Jiayuan Chen <mrpre(a)163.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.64 commit da2bc8a0c8f3ac66fdf980fc59936f851a083561 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IBEDOY CVE: CVE-2024-56694 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… ------------------------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 8ca2a1eeadf09862190b2810697702d803ceef2d ] When the stream_verdict program returns SK_PASS, it places the received skb into its own receive queue, but a recursive lock eventually occurs, leading to an operating system deadlock. This issue has been present since v6.9. ''' sk_psock_strp_data_ready write_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock) strp_data_ready strp_read_sock read_sock -> tcp_read_sock strp_recv cb.rcv_msg -> sk_psock_strp_read # now stream_verdict return SK_PASS without peer sock assign __SK_PASS = sk_psock_map_verd(SK_PASS, NULL) sk_psock_verdict_apply sk_psock_skb_ingress_self sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue sk_psock_data_ready read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock) <= dead lock ''' This topic has been discussed before, but it has not been fixed. Previous discussion: https://lore.kernel.org/all/6684a5864ec86_403d20898@john.notmuch Fixes: 6648e613226e ("bpf, skmsg: Fix NULL pointer dereference in sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue") Reported-by: Vincent Whitchurch <vincent.whitchurch(a)datadoghq.com> Signed-off-by: Jiayuan Chen <mrpre(a)163.com> Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend(a)gmail.com> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau(a)kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241118030910.36230-2-mrpre@163.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Liu Jian <liujian56(a)huawei.com> --- net/core/skmsg.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/core/skmsg.c b/net/core/skmsg.c index 04a98327f81a4..5e77b9344d667 100644 --- a/net/core/skmsg.c +++ b/net/core/skmsg.c @@ -1125,9 +1125,9 @@ static void sk_psock_strp_data_ready(struct sock *sk) if (tls_sw_has_ctx_rx(sk)) { psock->saved_data_ready(sk); } else { - write_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock); + read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock); strp_data_ready(&psock->strp); - write_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock); + read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock); } } rcu_read_unlock(); -- 2.34.1

2 5

[PATCH OLK-5.10] net: hsr: avoid potential out-of-bound access in fill_frame_info()
by Liu Jian 08 Jan '25

08 Jan '25

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.231 commit aa632691c722a123e47ccd05a3afdd5f87a36061 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IBEANV CVE: CVE-2024-56648 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… ------------------------------------------------- [ Upstream commit b9653d19e556c6afd035602927a93d100a0d7644 ] syzbot is able to feed a packet with 14 bytes, pretending it is a vlan one. Since fill_frame_info() is relying on skb->mac_len already, extend the check to cover this case. BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in fill_frame_info net/hsr/hsr_forward.c:709 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in hsr_forward_skb+0x9ee/0x3b10 net/hsr/hsr_forward.c:724 fill_frame_info net/hsr/hsr_forward.c:709 [inline] hsr_forward_skb+0x9ee/0x3b10 net/hsr/hsr_forward.c:724 hsr_dev_xmit+0x2f0/0x350 net/hsr/hsr_device.c:235 __netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:5002 [inline] netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:5011 [inline] xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3590 [inline] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x247/0xa20 net/core/dev.c:3606 __dev_queue_xmit+0x366a/0x57d0 net/core/dev.c:4434 dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3168 [inline] packet_xmit+0x9c/0x6c0 net/packet/af_packet.c:276 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3146 [inline] packet_sendmsg+0x91ae/0xa6f0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3178 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:711 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x30f/0x380 net/socket.c:726 __sys_sendto+0x594/0x750 net/socket.c:2197 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2204 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2200 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0x125/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2200 x64_sys_call+0x346a/0x3c30 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:45 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Uninit was created at: slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:4091 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4134 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc_node_noprof+0x6bf/0xb80 mm/slub.c:4186 kmalloc_reserve+0x13d/0x4a0 net/core/skbuff.c:587 __alloc_skb+0x363/0x7b0 net/core/skbuff.c:678 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1323 [inline] alloc_skb_with_frags+0xc8/0xd00 net/core/skbuff.c:6612 sock_alloc_send_pskb+0xa81/0xbf0 net/core/sock.c:2881 packet_alloc_skb net/packet/af_packet.c:2995 [inline] packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3089 [inline] packet_sendmsg+0x74c6/0xa6f0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3178 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:711 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x30f/0x380 net/socket.c:726 __sys_sendto+0x594/0x750 net/socket.c:2197 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2204 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2200 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0x125/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2200 x64_sys_call+0x346a/0x3c30 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:45 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Fixes: 48b491a5cc74 ("net: hsr: fix mac_len checks") Reported-by: syzbot+671e2853f9851d039551(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/6745dc7f.050a0220.21d33d.0018.GAE@google.com… Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Cc: WingMan Kwok <w-kwok2(a)ti.com> Cc: Murali Karicheri <m-karicheri2(a)ti.com> Cc: MD Danish Anwar <danishanwar(a)ti.com> Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri(a)nvidia.com> Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister(a)gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241126144344.4177332-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Liu Jian <liujian56(a)huawei.com> --- net/hsr/hsr_forward.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/hsr/hsr_forward.c b/net/hsr/hsr_forward.c index 0c115d8ded03c..a58c0be64272b 100644 --- a/net/hsr/hsr_forward.c +++ b/net/hsr/hsr_forward.c @@ -525,6 +525,8 @@ static int fill_frame_info(struct hsr_frame_info *frame, frame->is_vlan = true; if (frame->is_vlan) { + if (skb->mac_len < offsetofend(struct hsr_vlan_ethhdr, vlanhdr)) + return -EINVAL; vlan_hdr = (struct hsr_vlan_ethhdr *)ethhdr; proto = vlan_hdr->vlanhdr.h_vlan_encapsulated_proto; /* FIXME: */ -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6 00/16] net:yt6801: Add Motorcomm yt6801 PCIe driver
by Frank Sae 08 Jan '25

08 Jan '25

This series includes adding Motorcomm YT6801 Gigabit ethernet driver and adding yt6801 ethernet driver entry in MAINTAINERS file. YT6801 integrates a YT8531S phy. Frank Sae (16): motorcomm:yt6801: Add support for a pci table in this module motorcomm:yt6801: Implement pci_driver shutdown motorcomm:yt6801: Implement the fxgmac_drv_probe function motorcomm:yt6801: Implement the .ndo_open function motorcomm:yt6801: Implement the fxgmac_start function motorcomm:yt6801: Implement the poll functions motorcomm:yt6801: Implement the fxgmac_init function motorcomm:yt6801: Implement the fxgmac_read_mac_addr function motorcomm:yt6801: Implement some hw_ops function motorcomm:yt6801: Implement .ndo_start_xmit function motorcomm:yt6801: Implement some net_device_ops function motorcomm:yt6801: Implement .ndo_tx_timeout and .ndo_change_mtu functions motorcomm:yt6801: Implement some ethtool_ops function motorcomm:yt6801: Implement the WOL function of ethtool_ops motorcomm:yt6801: Implement pci_driver suspend and resume motorcomm:yt6801: Update the Makefile, Kconfig and maintainer for yt6801 MAINTAINERS | 8 + arch/arm64/configs/openeuler_defconfig | 4 +- arch/powerpc/configs/openeuler_defconfig | 2 +- arch/riscv/configs/openeuler_defconfig | 4 +- arch/x86/configs/openeuler_defconfig | 4 +- drivers/net/ethernet/Kconfig | 1 + drivers/net/ethernet/Makefile | 1 + drivers/net/ethernet/motorcomm/Kconfig | 27 + drivers/net/ethernet/motorcomm/Makefile | 6 + .../net/ethernet/motorcomm/yt6801/Makefile | 9 + .../net/ethernet/motorcomm/yt6801/yt6801.h | 617 +++ .../ethernet/motorcomm/yt6801/yt6801_desc.c | 635 ++++ .../ethernet/motorcomm/yt6801/yt6801_desc.h | 39 + .../motorcomm/yt6801/yt6801_ethtool.c | 838 ++++ .../net/ethernet/motorcomm/yt6801/yt6801_hw.c | 3383 +++++++++++++++++ .../ethernet/motorcomm/yt6801/yt6801_net.c | 2907 ++++++++++++++ .../ethernet/motorcomm/yt6801/yt6801_net.h | 32 + .../ethernet/motorcomm/yt6801/yt6801_pci.c | 191 + .../ethernet/motorcomm/yt6801/yt6801_type.h | 1398 +++++++ 19 files changed, 10102 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) create mode 100644 drivers/net/ethernet/motorcomm/Kconfig create mode 100644 drivers/net/ethernet/motorcomm/Makefile create mode 100644 drivers/net/ethernet/motorcomm/yt6801/Makefile create mode 100644 drivers/net/ethernet/motorcomm/yt6801/yt6801.h create mode 100644 drivers/net/ethernet/motorcomm/yt6801/yt6801_desc.c create mode 100644 drivers/net/ethernet/motorcomm/yt6801/yt6801_desc.h create mode 100644 drivers/net/ethernet/motorcomm/yt6801/yt6801_ethtool.c create mode 100644 drivers/net/ethernet/motorcomm/yt6801/yt6801_hw.c create mode 100644 drivers/net/ethernet/motorcomm/yt6801/yt6801_net.c create mode 100644 drivers/net/ethernet/motorcomm/yt6801/yt6801_net.h create mode 100644 drivers/net/ethernet/motorcomm/yt6801/yt6801_pci.c create mode 100644 drivers/net/ethernet/motorcomm/yt6801/yt6801_type.h -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/2] CVE-2024-53237
by Guo Mengqi 08 Jan '25

08 Jan '25

CVE-2024-53237 Andy Shevchenko (1): driver core: Introduce device_find_any_child() helper Dmitry Antipov (1): Bluetooth: fix use-after-free in device_for_each_child() drivers/base/core.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/device.h | 2 ++ net/bluetooth/hci_sysfs.c | 15 ++++----------- 3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) -- 2.22.0

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[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1 0/2] CVE-2024-53237
by Guo Mengqi 08 Jan '25

08 Jan '25

CVE-2024-53237 Aaron Lu (1): x86/sgx: Fix deadlock in SGX NUMA node search Weili Qian (1): crypto: hisilicon/qm - inject error before stopping queue -- 2.22.0

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[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1 0/2] CVE-2024-53237
by Guo Mengqi 08 Jan '25

08 Jan '25

CVE-2024-53237 Aaron Lu (1): x86/sgx: Fix deadlock in SGX NUMA node search Weili Qian (1): crypto: hisilicon/qm - inject error before stopping queue -- 2.22.0

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