From: Hyunwoo Kim <v4bel(a)theori.io>
stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.230
commit 414476c4fb11be070c09ab8f3e75c9ee324a108a
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IB8G1F
CVE: CVE-2024-53103
Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id…
--------------------------------
commit e629295bd60abf4da1db85b82819ca6a4f6c1e79 upstream.
When hvs is released, there is a possibility that vsk->trans may not
be initialized to NULL, which could lead to a dangling pointer.
This issue is resolved by initializing vsk->trans to NULL.
Signed-off-by: Hyunwoo Kim <v4bel(a)theori.io>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare(a)redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst(a)redhat.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/Zys4hCj61V+mQfX2@v4bel-B760M-AORUS-ELITE-AX
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Zhang Changzhong <zhangchangzhong(a)huawei.com>
---
net/vmw_vsock/hyperv_transport.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/net/vmw_vsock/hyperv_transport.c b/net/vmw_vsock/hyperv_transport.c
index cc3bae2..b4871cc 100644
--- a/net/vmw_vsock/hyperv_transport.c
+++ b/net/vmw_vsock/hyperv_transport.c
@@ -538,6 +538,7 @@ static void hvs_destruct(struct vsock_sock *vsk)
vmbus_hvsock_device_unregister(chan);
kfree(hvs);
+ vsk->trans = NULL;
}
static int hvs_dgram_bind(struct vsock_sock *vsk, struct sockaddr_vm *addr)
--
2.9.5
From: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk>
mainline inclusion
from mainline-v6.10-rc2
commit 7eb75ce7527129d7f1fee6951566af409a37a1c4
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IBEAP3
CVE: CVE-2024-56584
Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?…
--------------------------------
syzbot triggered the following WARN_ON:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 16 at io_uring/tctx.c:51 __io_uring_free+0xfa/0x140 io_uring/tctx.c:51
which is the
WARN_ON_ONCE(!xa_empty(&tctx->xa));
sanity check in __io_uring_free() when a io_uring_task is going through
its final put. The syzbot test case includes injecting memory allocation
failures, and it very much looks like xa_store() can fail one of its
memory allocations and end up with ->head being non-NULL even though no
entries exist in the xarray.
Until this issue gets sorted out, work around it by attempting to
iterate entries in our xarray, and WARN_ON_ONCE() if one is found.
Reported-by: syzbot+cc36d44ec9f368e443d3(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/io-uring/673c1643.050a0220.87769.0066.GAE@google.co…
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Long Li <leo.lilong(a)huawei.com>
---
io_uring/tctx.c | 13 ++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/io_uring/tctx.c b/io_uring/tctx.c
index c043fe93a3f2..84f6a8385720 100644
--- a/io_uring/tctx.c
+++ b/io_uring/tctx.c
@@ -47,8 +47,19 @@ static struct io_wq *io_init_wq_offload(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx,
void __io_uring_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
struct io_uring_task *tctx = tsk->io_uring;
+ struct io_tctx_node *node;
+ unsigned long index;
- WARN_ON_ONCE(!xa_empty(&tctx->xa));
+ /*
+ * Fault injection forcing allocation errors in the xa_store() path
+ * can lead to xa_empty() returning false, even though no actual
+ * node is stored in the xarray. Until that gets sorted out, attempt
+ * an iteration here and warn if any entries are found.
+ */
+ xa_for_each(&tctx->xa, index, node) {
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+ break;
+ }
WARN_ON_ONCE(tctx->io_wq);
WARN_ON_ONCE(tctx->cached_refs);
--
2.39.2
From: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk>
mainline inclusion
from mainline-v6.10-rc2
commit 7eb75ce7527129d7f1fee6951566af409a37a1c4
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IBEAP3
CVE: CVE-2024-56584
Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?…
--------------------------------
syzbot triggered the following WARN_ON:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 16 at io_uring/tctx.c:51 __io_uring_free+0xfa/0x140 io_uring/tctx.c:51
which is the
WARN_ON_ONCE(!xa_empty(&tctx->xa));
sanity check in __io_uring_free() when a io_uring_task is going through
its final put. The syzbot test case includes injecting memory allocation
failures, and it very much looks like xa_store() can fail one of its
memory allocations and end up with ->head being non-NULL even though no
entries exist in the xarray.
Until this issue gets sorted out, work around it by attempting to
iterate entries in our xarray, and WARN_ON_ONCE() if one is found.
Reported-by: syzbot+cc36d44ec9f368e443d3(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/io-uring/673c1643.050a0220.87769.0066.GAE@google.co…
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk>
Conflicts:
io_uring/io_uring.c
io_uring/tctx.c
[Conflicts due to __io_uring_free() move to io_uring/tctx.c in mainline]
Signed-off-by: Long Li <leo.lilong(a)huawei.com>
---
io_uring/io_uring.c | 13 ++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/io_uring/io_uring.c b/io_uring/io_uring.c
index 6e5e00a7692c..170b3dbf0750 100644
--- a/io_uring/io_uring.c
+++ b/io_uring/io_uring.c
@@ -8537,8 +8537,19 @@ static int io_uring_alloc_task_context(struct task_struct *task,
void __io_uring_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
struct io_uring_task *tctx = tsk->io_uring;
+ struct io_tctx_node *node;
+ unsigned long index;
- WARN_ON_ONCE(!xa_empty(&tctx->xa));
+ /*
+ * Fault injection forcing allocation errors in the xa_store() path
+ * can lead to xa_empty() returning false, even though no actual
+ * node is stored in the xarray. Until that gets sorted out, attempt
+ * an iteration here and warn if any entries are found.
+ */
+ xa_for_each(&tctx->xa, index, node) {
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+ break;
+ }
WARN_ON_ONCE(tctx->io_wq);
WARN_ON_ONCE(tctx->cached_refs);
--
2.39.2