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[PATCH OLK-6.6 00/14] ext4: fix generic/363 failure in iomap buffered I/O mode
by Yongjian Sun 30 Mar '26

30 Mar '26

Brian Foster (2): iomap: fix handling of dirty folios over unwritten extents iomap: make zero range flush conditional on unwritten mappings Zhang Yi (12): ext4: rename and extend ext4_block_truncate_page() ext4: factor out journalled block zeroing range ext4: rename ext4_block_zero_page_range() to ext4_block_zero_range() ext4: move ordered data handling out of ext4_block_do_zero_range() ext4: remove handle parameters from zero partial block functions ext4: pass allocate range as loff_t to ext4_alloc_file_blocks() ext4: move zero partial block range functions out of active handle ext4: ensure zeroed partial blocks are persisted in SYNC mode ext4: unify SYNC mode checks in fallocate paths ext4: remove ctime/mtime update from ext4_alloc_file_blocks() ext4: move pagecache_isize_extended() out of active handle ext4: zero post EOF partial block before iomap appending write fs/ext4/ext4.h | 5 +- fs/ext4/extents.c | 137 ++++++++++++----------- fs/ext4/file.c | 17 +++ fs/ext4/inode.c | 244 +++++++++++++++++++++++------------------ fs/iomap/buffered-io.c | 63 ++++++++++- fs/xfs/xfs_iops.c | 10 -- 6 files changed, 291 insertions(+), 185 deletions(-) -- 2.39.2

2 15

[PATCH OLK-6.6 v2 0/2] CVE-2026-23319
by Pu Lehui 30 Mar '26

30 Mar '26

Kui-Feng Lee (1): bpf: export bpf_link_inc_not_zero. Lang Xu (1): bpf: Fix a UAF issue in bpf_trampoline_link_cgroup_shim include/linux/bpf.h | 6 ++++++ kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 3 ++- kernel/bpf/trampoline.c | 4 +--- 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 3

[PATCH OLK-6.6] bpf: Fix stack-out-of-bounds write in devmap
by Pu Lehui 30 Mar '26

30 Mar '26

From: Kohei Enju <kohei(a)enjuk.jp> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.130 commit 8a95fb9df1105b1618872c2846a6c01e3ba20b45 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13922 CVE: CVE-2026-23359 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit b7bf516c3ecd9a2aae2dc2635178ab87b734fef1 ] get_upper_ifindexes() iterates over all upper devices and writes their indices into an array without checking bounds. Also the callers assume that the max number of upper devices is MAX_NEST_DEV and allocate excluded_devices[1+MAX_NEST_DEV] on the stack, but that assumption is not correct and the number of upper devices could be larger than MAX_NEST_DEV (e.g., many macvlans), causing a stack-out-of-bounds write. Add a max parameter to get_upper_ifindexes() to avoid the issue. When there are too many upper devices, return -EOVERFLOW and abort the redirect. To reproduce, create more than MAX_NEST_DEV(8) macvlans on a device with an XDP program attached using BPF_F_BROADCAST | BPF_F_EXCLUDE_INGRESS. Then send a packet to the device to trigger the XDP redirect path. Reported-by: syzbot+10cc7f13760b31bd2e61(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/698c4ce3.050a0220.340abe.000b.GAE@google.com/T/ Fixes: aeea1b86f936 ("bpf, devmap: Exclude XDP broadcast to master device") Reviewed-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kohei Enju <kohei(a)enjuk.jp> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260225053506.4738-1-kohei@enjuk.jp Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui <pulehui(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/bpf/devmap.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/devmap.c b/kernel/bpf/devmap.c index 5f2356b47b2d..3bdec239be61 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/devmap.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/devmap.c @@ -577,18 +577,22 @@ static inline bool is_ifindex_excluded(int *excluded, int num_excluded, int ifin } /* Get ifindex of each upper device. 'indexes' must be able to hold at - * least MAX_NEST_DEV elements. - * Returns the number of ifindexes added. + * least 'max' elements. + * Returns the number of ifindexes added, or -EOVERFLOW if there are too + * many upper devices. */ -static int get_upper_ifindexes(struct net_device *dev, int *indexes) +static int get_upper_ifindexes(struct net_device *dev, int *indexes, int max) { struct net_device *upper; struct list_head *iter; int n = 0; netdev_for_each_upper_dev_rcu(dev, upper, iter) { + if (n >= max) + return -EOVERFLOW; indexes[n++] = upper->ifindex; } + return n; } @@ -604,7 +608,11 @@ int dev_map_enqueue_multi(struct xdp_frame *xdpf, struct net_device *dev_rx, int err; if (exclude_ingress) { - num_excluded = get_upper_ifindexes(dev_rx, excluded_devices); + num_excluded = get_upper_ifindexes(dev_rx, excluded_devices, + ARRAY_SIZE(excluded_devices) - 1); + if (num_excluded < 0) + return num_excluded; + excluded_devices[num_excluded++] = dev_rx->ifindex; } @@ -722,7 +730,11 @@ int dev_map_redirect_multi(struct net_device *dev, struct sk_buff *skb, int err; if (exclude_ingress) { - num_excluded = get_upper_ifindexes(dev, excluded_devices); + num_excluded = get_upper_ifindexes(dev, excluded_devices, + ARRAY_SIZE(excluded_devices) - 1); + if (num_excluded < 0) + return num_excluded; + excluded_devices[num_excluded++] = dev->ifindex; } -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] bpf: Fix a UAF issue in bpf_trampoline_link_cgroup_shim
by Pu Lehui 30 Mar '26

30 Mar '26

From: Lang Xu <xulang(a)uniontech.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.130 commit 9b02c5c4147f8af8ed783c8deb5df927a55c3951 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13962 CVE: CVE-2026-23319 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 56145d237385ca0e7ca9ff7b226aaf2eb8ef368b ] The root cause of this bug is that when 'bpf_link_put' reduces the refcount of 'shim_link->link.link' to zero, the resource is considered released but may still be referenced via 'tr->progs_hlist' in 'cgroup_shim_find'. The actual cleanup of 'tr->progs_hlist' in 'bpf_shim_tramp_link_release' is deferred. During this window, another process can cause a use-after-free via 'bpf_trampoline_link_cgroup_shim'. Based on Martin KaFai Lau's suggestions, I have created a simple patch. To fix this: Add an atomic non-zero check in 'bpf_trampoline_link_cgroup_shim'. Only increment the refcount if it is not already zero. Testing: I verified the fix by adding a delay in 'bpf_shim_tramp_link_release' to make the bug easier to trigger: static void bpf_shim_tramp_link_release(struct bpf_link *link) { /* ... */ if (!shim_link->trampoline) return; + msleep(100); WARN_ON_ONCE(bpf_trampoline_unlink_prog(&shim_link->link, shim_link->trampoline, NULL)); bpf_trampoline_put(shim_link->trampoline); } Before the patch, running a PoC easily reproduced the crash(almost 100%) with a call trace similar to KaiyanM's report. After the patch, the bug no longer occurs even after millions of iterations. Fixes: 69fd337a975c ("bpf: per-cgroup lsm flavor") Reported-by: Kaiyan Mei <M202472210(a)hust.edu.cn> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/3c4ebb0b.46ff8.19abab8abe2.Coremail.kaiyanm@hus… Signed-off-by: Lang Xu <xulang(a)uniontech.com> Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau(a)kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/279EEE1BA1DDB49D+20260303095217.34436-1-xulang@uni… Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui <pulehui(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/bpf/trampoline.c | 4 +--- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/trampoline.c b/kernel/bpf/trampoline.c index 08325a65835b..bb842decab0d 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/trampoline.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/trampoline.c @@ -733,10 +733,8 @@ int bpf_trampoline_link_cgroup_shim(struct bpf_prog *prog, mutex_lock(&tr->mutex); shim_link = cgroup_shim_find(tr, bpf_func); - if (shim_link) { + if (shim_link && !IS_ERR(bpf_link_inc_not_zero(&shim_link->link.link))) { /* Reusing existing shim attached by the other program. */ - bpf_link_inc(&shim_link->link.link); - mutex_unlock(&tr->mutex); bpf_trampoline_put(tr); /* bpf_trampoline_get above */ return 0; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] bpf: Release module BTF IDR before module unload
by Pu Lehui 30 Mar '26

30 Mar '26

From: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.0-rc5 commit 146bd2a87a65aa407bb17fac70d8d583d19aba06 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/8835 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Gregory reported in [0] that the global_map_resize test when run in repeatedly ends up failing during program load. This stems from the fact that BTF reference has not dropped to zero after the previous run's module is unloaded, and the older module's BTF is still discoverable and visible. Later, in libbpf, load_module_btfs() will find the ID for this stale BTF, open its fd, and then it will be used during program load where later steps taking module reference using btf_try_get_module() fail since the underlying module for the BTF is gone. Logically, once a module is unloaded, it's associated BTF artifacts should become hidden. The BTF object inside the kernel may still remain alive as long its reference counts are alive, but it should no longer be discoverable. To fix this, let us call btf_free_id() from the MODULE_STATE_GOING case for the module unload to free the BTF associated IDR entry, and disable its discovery once module unload returns to user space. If a race happens during unload, the outcome is non-deterministic anyway. However, user space should be able to rely on the guarantee that once it has synchronously established a successful module unload, no more stale artifacts associated with this module can be obtained subsequently. Note that we must be careful to not invoke btf_free_id() in btf_put() when btf_is_module() is true now. There could be a window where the module unload drops a non-terminal reference, frees the IDR, but the same ID gets reused and the second unconditional btf_free_id() ends up releasing an unrelated entry. To avoid a special case for btf_is_module() case, set btf->id to zero to make btf_free_id() idempotent, such that we can unconditionally invoke it from btf_put(), and also from the MODULE_STATE_GOING case. Since zero is an invalid IDR, the idr_remove() should be a noop. Note that we can be sure that by the time we reach final btf_put() for btf_is_module() case, the btf_free_id() is already done, since the module itself holds the BTF reference, and it will call this function for the BTF before dropping its own reference. [0]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/cover.1773170190.git.grbell@redhat.com Fixes: 36e68442d1af ("bpf: Load and verify kernel module BTFs") Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau(a)kernel.org> Suggested-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau(a)kernel.org> Reported-by: Gregory Bell <grbell(a)redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis <emil(a)etsalapatis.com> Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor(a)gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260312205307.1346991-1-memxor@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui <pulehui(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/bpf/btf.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/btf.c b/kernel/bpf/btf.c index 7c888ee0ccc7..5d1413e95185 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/btf.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/btf.c @@ -1640,7 +1640,16 @@ static void btf_free_id(struct btf *btf) * of the _bh() version. */ spin_lock_irqsave(&btf_idr_lock, flags); - idr_remove(&btf_idr, btf->id); + if (btf->id) { + idr_remove(&btf_idr, btf->id); + /* + * Clear the id here to make this function idempotent, since it will get + * called a couple of times for module BTFs: on module unload, and then + * the final btf_put(). btf_alloc_id() starts IDs with 1, so we can use + * 0 as sentinel value. + */ + WRITE_ONCE(btf->id, 0); + } spin_unlock_irqrestore(&btf_idr_lock, flags); } @@ -7408,7 +7417,7 @@ static void bpf_btf_show_fdinfo(struct seq_file *m, struct file *filp) { const struct btf *btf = filp->private_data; - seq_printf(m, "btf_id:\t%u\n", btf->id); + seq_printf(m, "btf_id:\t%u\n", READ_ONCE(btf->id)); } #endif @@ -7500,7 +7509,7 @@ int btf_get_info_by_fd(const struct btf *btf, if (copy_from_user(&info, uinfo, info_copy)) return -EFAULT; - info.id = btf->id; + info.id = READ_ONCE(btf->id); ubtf = u64_to_user_ptr(info.btf); btf_copy = min_t(u32, btf->data_size, info.btf_size); if (copy_to_user(ubtf, btf->data, btf_copy)) @@ -7563,7 +7572,7 @@ int btf_get_fd_by_id(u32 id) u32 btf_obj_id(const struct btf *btf) { - return btf->id; + return READ_ONCE(btf->id); } bool btf_is_kernel(const struct btf *btf) @@ -7695,6 +7704,13 @@ static int btf_module_notify(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long op, if (btf_mod->module != module) continue; + /* + * For modules, we do the freeing of BTF IDR as soon as + * module goes away to disable BTF discovery, since the + * btf_try_get_module() on such BTFs will fail. This may + * be called again on btf_put(), but it's ok to do so. + */ + btf_free_id(btf_mod->btf); list_del(&btf_mod->list); if (btf_mod->sysfs_attr) sysfs_remove_bin_file(btf_kobj, btf_mod->sysfs_attr); -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] wifi: prevent A-MSDU attacks in mesh networks
by Zhang Yuwei 28 Mar '26

28 Mar '26

From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef(a)kuleuven.be> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.99 commit ec6392061de6681148b63ee6c8744da833498cdd category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/7758 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 737bb912ebbe4571195c56eba557c4d7315b26fb upstream. This patch is a mitigation to prevent the A-MSDU spoofing vulnerability for mesh networks. The initial update to the IEEE 802.11 standard, in response to the FragAttacks, missed this case (CVE-2025-27558). It can be considered a variant of CVE-2020-24588 but for mesh networks. This patch tries to detect if a standard MSDU was turned into an A-MSDU by an adversary. This is done by parsing a received A-MSDU as a standard MSDU, calculating the length of the Mesh Control header, and seeing if the 6 bytes after this header equal the start of an rfc1042 header. If equal, this is a strong indication of an ongoing attack attempt. This defense was tested with mac80211_hwsim against a mesh network that uses an empty Mesh Address Extension field, i.e., when four addresses are used, and when using a 12-byte Mesh Address Extension field, i.e., when six addresses are used. Functionality of normal MSDUs and A-MSDUs was also tested, and confirmed working, when using both an empty and 12-byte Mesh Address Extension field. It was also tested with mac80211_hwsim that A-MSDU attacks in non-mesh networks keep being detected and prevented. Note that the vulnerability being patched, and the defense being implemented, was also discussed in the following paper and in the following IEEE 802.11 presentation: https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/wisec2025.pdf https://mentor.ieee.org/802.11/dcn/25/11-25-0949-00-000m-a-msdu-mesh-spoof-… Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef(a)kuleuven.be> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250616004635.224344-1-Mathy.Vanhoef@kuleuven.be Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Wang Hai <wanghai38(a)huawei.com> --- net/wireless/util.c | 51 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 49 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/wireless/util.c b/net/wireless/util.c index 4e81210e5b24..4af280c1a6d4 100644 --- a/net/wireless/util.c +++ b/net/wireless/util.c @@ -623,6 +623,51 @@ __ieee80211_amsdu_copy(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int hlen, return frame; } +/* + * Detects if an MSDU frame was maliciously converted into an A-MSDU + * frame by an adversary. This is done by parsing the received frame + * as if it were a regular MSDU, even though the A-MSDU flag is set. + * + * For non-mesh interfaces, detection involves checking whether the + * payload, when interpreted as an MSDU, begins with a valid RFC1042 + * header. This is done by comparing the A-MSDU subheader's destination + * address to the start of the RFC1042 header. + * + * For mesh interfaces, the MSDU includes a 6-byte Mesh Control field + * and an optional variable-length Mesh Address Extension field before + * the RFC1042 header. The position of the RFC1042 header must therefore + * be calculated based on the mesh header length. + * + * Since this function intentionally parses an A-MSDU frame as an MSDU, + * it only assumes that the A-MSDU subframe header is present, and + * beyond this it performs its own bounds checks under the assumption + * that the frame is instead parsed as a non-aggregated MSDU. + */ +static bool +is_amsdu_aggregation_attack(struct ethhdr *eth, struct sk_buff *skb, + enum nl80211_iftype iftype) +{ + int offset; + + /* Non-mesh case can be directly compared */ + if (iftype != NL80211_IFTYPE_MESH_POINT) + return ether_addr_equal(eth->h_dest, rfc1042_header); + + offset = __ieee80211_get_mesh_hdrlen(eth->h_dest[0]); + if (offset == 6) { + /* Mesh case with empty address extension field */ + return ether_addr_equal(eth->h_source, rfc1042_header); + } else if (offset + ETH_ALEN <= skb->len) { + /* Mesh case with non-empty address extension field */ + u8 temp[ETH_ALEN]; + + skb_copy_bits(skb, offset, temp, ETH_ALEN); + return ether_addr_equal(temp, rfc1042_header); + } + + return false; +} + void ieee80211_amsdu_to_8023s(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sk_buff_head *list, const u8 *addr, enum nl80211_iftype iftype, const unsigned int extra_headroom, @@ -655,8 +700,10 @@ void ieee80211_amsdu_to_8023s(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sk_buff_head *list, /* the last MSDU has no padding */ if (subframe_len > remaining) goto purge; - /* mitigate A-MSDU aggregation injection attacks */ - if (ether_addr_equal(eth.h_dest, rfc1042_header)) + /* mitigate A-MSDU aggregation injection attacks, to be + * checked when processing first subframe (offset == 0). + */ + if (offset == 0 && is_amsdu_aggregation_attack(&eth, skb, iftype)) goto purge; offset += sizeof(struct ethhdr); -- 2.22.0

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] wifi: prevent A-MSDU attacks in mesh networks
by Zhang Yuwei 28 Mar '26

28 Mar '26

From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef(a)kuleuven.be> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.99 commit ec6392061de6681148b63ee6c8744da833498cdd category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/7758 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 737bb912ebbe4571195c56eba557c4d7315b26fb upstream. This patch is a mitigation to prevent the A-MSDU spoofing vulnerability for mesh networks. The initial update to the IEEE 802.11 standard, in response to the FragAttacks, missed this case (CVE-2025-27558). It can be considered a variant of CVE-2020-24588 but for mesh networks. This patch tries to detect if a standard MSDU was turned into an A-MSDU by an adversary. This is done by parsing a received A-MSDU as a standard MSDU, calculating the length of the Mesh Control header, and seeing if the 6 bytes after this header equal the start of an rfc1042 header. If equal, this is a strong indication of an ongoing attack attempt. This defense was tested with mac80211_hwsim against a mesh network that uses an empty Mesh Address Extension field, i.e., when four addresses are used, and when using a 12-byte Mesh Address Extension field, i.e., when six addresses are used. Functionality of normal MSDUs and A-MSDUs was also tested, and confirmed working, when using both an empty and 12-byte Mesh Address Extension field. It was also tested with mac80211_hwsim that A-MSDU attacks in non-mesh networks keep being detected and prevented. Note that the vulnerability being patched, and the defense being implemented, was also discussed in the following paper and in the following IEEE 802.11 presentation: https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/wisec2025.pdf https://mentor.ieee.org/802.11/dcn/25/11-25-0949-00-000m-a-msdu-mesh-spoof-… Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef(a)kuleuven.be> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250616004635.224344-1-Mathy.Vanhoef@kuleuven.be Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Wang Hai <wanghai38(a)huawei.com> --- net/wireless/util.c | 51 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 49 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/wireless/util.c b/net/wireless/util.c index 4e81210e5b24..dcca1b882455 100644 --- a/net/wireless/util.c +++ b/net/wireless/util.c @@ -623,6 +623,51 @@ __ieee80211_amsdu_copy(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int hlen, return frame; } +/* + * Detects if an MSDU frame was maliciously converted into an A-MSDU + * frame by an adversary. This is done by parsing the received frame + * as if it were a regular MSDU, even though the A-MSDU flag is set. + * + * For non-mesh interfaces, detection involves checking whether the + * payload, when interpreted as an MSDU, begins with a valid RFC1042 + * header. This is done by comparing the A-MSDU subheader's destination + * address to the start of the RFC1042 header. + * + * For mesh interfaces, the MSDU includes a 6-byte Mesh Control field + * and an optional variable-length Mesh Address Extension field before + * the RFC1042 header. The position of the RFC1042 header must therefore + * be calculated based on the mesh header length. + * + * Since this function intentionally parses an A-MSDU frame as an MSDU, + * it only assumes that the A-MSDU subframe header is present, and + * beyond this it performs its own bounds checks under the assumption + * that the frame is instead parsed as a non-aggregated MSDU. + */ +static bool +is_amsdu_aggregation_attack(struct ethhdr *eth, struct sk_buff *skb, + enum nl80211_iftype iftype) +{ + int offset; + + /* Non-mesh case can be directly compared */ + if (iftype != NL80211_IFTYPE_MESH_POINT) + return ether_addr_equal(eth->h_dest, rfc1042_header); + + offset = __ieee80211_get_mesh_hdrlen(eth->h_dest[0]); + if (offset == 6) { + /* Mesh case with empty address extension field */ + return ether_addr_equal(eth->h_source, rfc1042_header); + } else if (offset + ETH_ALEN <= skb->len) { + /* Mesh case with non-empty address extension field */ + u8 temp[ETH_ALEN]; + + skb_copy_bits(skb, offset, temp, ETH_ALEN); + return ether_addr_equal(temp, rfc1042_header); + } + + return false; +} + void ieee80211_amsdu_to_8023s(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sk_buff_head *list, const u8 *addr, enum nl80211_iftype iftype, const unsigned int extra_headroom, @@ -655,8 +700,10 @@ void ieee80211_amsdu_to_8023s(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sk_buff_head *list, /* the last MSDU has no padding */ if (subframe_len > remaining) goto purge; - /* mitigate A-MSDU aggregation injection attacks */ - if (ether_addr_equal(eth.h_dest, rfc1042_header)) + /* mitigate A-MSDU aggregation injection attacks, to be + * checked when processing first subframe (offset == 0). + */ + if (offset == 0 && is_amsdu_aggregation_attack(&hdr.eth, skb, iftype)) goto purge; offset += sizeof(struct ethhdr); -- 2.22.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] RDMA/umad: Reject negative data_len in ib_umad_write
by Liu Kai 28 Mar '26

28 Mar '26

From: YunJe Shin <yjshin0438(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.252 commit 1371ef6b1ecf3676b8942f5dfb3634fb0648128e category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13865 CVE: CVE-2026-23243 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 5551b02fdbfd85a325bb857f3a8f9c9f33397ed2 upstream. ib_umad_write computes data_len from user-controlled count and the MAD header sizes. With a mismatched user MAD header size and RMPP header length, data_len can become negative and reach ib_create_send_mad(). This can make the padding calculation exceed the segment size and trigger an out-of-bounds memset in alloc_send_rmpp_list(). Add an explicit check to reject negative data_len before creating the send buffer. KASAN splat: [ 211.363464] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ib_create_send_mad+0xa01/0x11b0 [ 211.364077] Write of size 220 at addr ffff88800c3fa1f8 by task spray_thread/102 [ 211.365867] ib_create_send_mad+0xa01/0x11b0 [ 211.365887] ib_umad_write+0x853/0x1c80 Fixes: 2be8e3ee8efd ("IB/umad: Add P_Key index support") Signed-off-by: YunJe Shin <ioerts(a)kookmin.ac.kr> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260203100628.1215408-1-ioerts@kookmin.ac.kr Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Liu Kai <liukai284(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c b/drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c index 063707dd4fe3..c8ad6ef39fa5 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c @@ -514,7 +514,8 @@ static ssize_t ib_umad_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *buf, struct rdma_ah_attr ah_attr; struct ib_ah *ah; __be64 *tid; - int ret, data_len, hdr_len, copy_offset, rmpp_active; + int ret, hdr_len, copy_offset, rmpp_active; + size_t data_len; u8 base_version; if (count < hdr_size(file) + IB_MGMT_RMPP_HDR) @@ -588,7 +589,10 @@ static ssize_t ib_umad_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *buf, } base_version = ((struct ib_mad_hdr *)&packet->mad.data)->base_version; - data_len = count - hdr_size(file) - hdr_len; + if (check_sub_overflow(count, hdr_size(file) + hdr_len, &data_len)) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto err_ah; + } packet->msg = ib_create_send_mad(agent, be32_to_cpu(packet->mad.hdr.qpn), packet->mad.hdr.pkey_index, rmpp_active, -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH OLK-6.6] RDMA/umad: Reject negative data_len in ib_umad_write
by Liu Kai 28 Mar '26

28 Mar '26

From: YunJe Shin <yjshin0438(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.128 commit a6a3e4af10993cb9e4b8f0548680aba0ab5f3b0d category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13865 CVE: CVE-2026-23243 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 5551b02fdbfd85a325bb857f3a8f9c9f33397ed2 upstream. ib_umad_write computes data_len from user-controlled count and the MAD header sizes. With a mismatched user MAD header size and RMPP header length, data_len can become negative and reach ib_create_send_mad(). This can make the padding calculation exceed the segment size and trigger an out-of-bounds memset in alloc_send_rmpp_list(). Add an explicit check to reject negative data_len before creating the send buffer. KASAN splat: [ 211.363464] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ib_create_send_mad+0xa01/0x11b0 [ 211.364077] Write of size 220 at addr ffff88800c3fa1f8 by task spray_thread/102 [ 211.365867] ib_create_send_mad+0xa01/0x11b0 [ 211.365887] ib_umad_write+0x853/0x1c80 Fixes: 2be8e3ee8efd ("IB/umad: Add P_Key index support") Signed-off-by: YunJe Shin <ioerts(a)kookmin.ac.kr> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260203100628.1215408-1-ioerts@kookmin.ac.kr Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Liu Kai <liukai284(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c b/drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c index 2ed749f50a29..285f251fc014 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c @@ -514,7 +514,8 @@ static ssize_t ib_umad_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *buf, struct rdma_ah_attr ah_attr; struct ib_ah *ah; __be64 *tid; - int ret, data_len, hdr_len, copy_offset, rmpp_active; + int ret, hdr_len, copy_offset, rmpp_active; + size_t data_len; u8 base_version; if (count < hdr_size(file) + IB_MGMT_RMPP_HDR) @@ -588,7 +589,10 @@ static ssize_t ib_umad_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *buf, } base_version = ((struct ib_mad_hdr *)&packet->mad.data)->base_version; - data_len = count - hdr_size(file) - hdr_len; + if (check_sub_overflow(count, hdr_size(file) + hdr_len, &data_len)) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto err_ah; + } packet->msg = ib_create_send_mad(agent, be32_to_cpu(packet->mad.hdr.qpn), packet->mad.hdr.pkey_index, rmpp_active, -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH OLK-6.6] nvme: fix admin queue leak on controller reset
by Zizhi Wo 28 Mar '26

28 Mar '26

From: Ming Lei <ming.lei(a)redhat.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.12.77 commit 64f87b96de0e645a4c066c7cffd753f334446db6 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13921 CVE: CVE-2026-23360 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit b84bb7bd913d8ca2f976ee6faf4a174f91c02b8d ] When nvme_alloc_admin_tag_set() is called during a controller reset, a previous admin queue may still exist. Release it properly before allocating a new one to avoid orphaning the old queue. This fixes a regression introduced by commit 03b3bcd319b3 ("nvme: fix admin request_queue lifetime"). Cc: Keith Busch <kbusch(a)kernel.org> Fixes: 03b3bcd319b3 ("nvme: fix admin request_queue lifetime"). Reported-and-tested-by: Yi Zhang <yi.zhang(a)redhat.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-block/CAHj4cs9wv3SdPo+N01Fw2SHBYDs9tj2M_e1-Gd… Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: drivers/nvme/host/core.c [Commit 9ac4dd8c47d5 ("block: pass a queue_limits argument to blk_mq_init_queue") replace blk_mq_init_queue by blk_mq_alloc_queue to get admin_q.] Signed-off-by: Zizhi Wo <wozizhi(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/nvme/host/core.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/core.c b/drivers/nvme/host/core.c index 2997d0561c39..50de9e76d07d 100644 --- a/drivers/nvme/host/core.c +++ b/drivers/nvme/host/core.c @@ -4301,10 +4301,17 @@ int nvme_alloc_admin_tag_set(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, struct blk_mq_tag_set *set, set->timeout = NVME_ADMIN_TIMEOUT; ret = blk_mq_alloc_tag_set(set); if (ret) return ret; + /* + * If a previous admin queue exists (e.g., from before a reset), + * put it now before allocating a new one to avoid orphaning it. + */ + if (ctrl->admin_q) + blk_put_queue(ctrl->admin_q); + ctrl->admin_q = blk_mq_init_queue(set); if (IS_ERR(ctrl->admin_q)) { ret = PTR_ERR(ctrl->admin_q); goto out_free_tagset; } -- 2.39.2

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