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[PATCH OLK-6.6] media: uvcvideo: Mark invalid entities with id UVC_INVALID_ENTITY_ID
by Long Li 25 Nov '25

25 Nov '25

From: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo(a)igalia.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.17-rc1 commit 0e2ee70291e64a30fe36960c85294726d34a103e category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/ID2QLY CVE: CVE-2025-40016 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Per UVC 1.1+ specification 3.7.2, units and terminals must have a non-zero unique ID. ``` Each Unit and Terminal within the video function is assigned a unique identification number, the Unit ID (UID) or Terminal ID (TID), contained in the bUnitID or bTerminalID field of the descriptor. The value 0x00 is reserved for undefined ID, ``` If we add a new entity with id 0 or a duplicated ID, it will be marked as UVC_INVALID_ENTITY_ID. In a previous attempt commit 3dd075fe8ebb ("media: uvcvideo: Require entities to have a non-zero unique ID"), we ignored all the invalid units, this broke a lot of non-compatible cameras. Hopefully we are more lucky this time. This also prevents some syzkaller reproducers from triggering warnings due to a chain of entities referring to themselves. In one particular case, an Output Unit is connected to an Input Unit, both with the same ID of 1. But when looking up for the source ID of the Output Unit, that same entity is found instead of the input entity, which leads to such warnings. In another case, a backward chain was considered finished as the source ID was 0. Later on, that entity was found, but its pads were not valid. Here is a sample stack trace for one of those cases. [ 20.650953] usb 1-1: new high-speed USB device number 2 using dummy_hcd [ 20.830206] usb 1-1: Using ep0 maxpacket: 8 [ 20.833501] usb 1-1: config 0 descriptor?? [ 21.038518] usb 1-1: string descriptor 0 read error: -71 [ 21.038893] usb 1-1: Found UVC 0.00 device <unnamed> (2833:0201) [ 21.039299] uvcvideo 1-1:0.0: Entity type for entity Output 1 was not initialized! [ 21.041583] uvcvideo 1-1:0.0: Entity type for entity Input 1 was not initialized! [ 21.042218] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 21.042536] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 9 at drivers/media/mc/mc-entity.c:1147 media_create_pad_link+0x2c4/0x2e0 [ 21.043195] Modules linked in: [ 21.043535] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 9 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc7-00030-g3480e43aeccf #444 [ 21.044101] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 [ 21.044639] Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event [ 21.045100] RIP: 0010:media_create_pad_link+0x2c4/0x2e0 [ 21.045508] Code: fe e8 20 01 00 00 b8 f4 ff ff ff 48 83 c4 30 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 cc cc cc cc 0f 0b eb e9 0f 0b eb 0a 0f 0b eb 06 <0f> 0b eb 02 0f 0b b8 ea ff ff ff eb d4 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 [ 21.046801] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000004b318 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 21.047227] RAX: ffff888004e5d458 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff818fccf1 [ 21.047719] RDX: 000000000000007b RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff888004313290 [ 21.048241] RBP: ffff888004313290 R08: 0001ffffffffffff R09: 0000000000000000 [ 21.048701] R10: 0000000000000013 R11: 0001888004313290 R12: 0000000000000003 [ 21.049138] R13: ffff888004313080 R14: ffff888004313080 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 21.049648] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88803ec00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 21.050271] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 21.050688] CR2: 0000592cc27635b0 CR3: 000000000431c000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0 [ 21.051136] PKRU: 55555554 [ 21.051331] Call Trace: [ 21.051480] <TASK> [ 21.051611] ? __warn+0xc4/0x210 [ 21.051861] ? media_create_pad_link+0x2c4/0x2e0 [ 21.052252] ? report_bug+0x11b/0x1a0 [ 21.052540] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x31/0x40 [ 21.052901] ? handle_bug+0x3d/0x70 [ 21.053197] ? exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x50 [ 21.053511] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 [ 21.053924] ? media_create_pad_link+0x91/0x2e0 [ 21.054364] ? media_create_pad_link+0x2c4/0x2e0 [ 21.054834] ? media_create_pad_link+0x91/0x2e0 [ 21.055131] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x1e/0x40 [ 21.055441] ? __v4l2_device_register_subdev+0x202/0x210 [ 21.055837] uvc_mc_register_entities+0x358/0x400 [ 21.056144] uvc_register_chains+0x1fd/0x290 [ 21.056413] uvc_probe+0x380e/0x3dc0 [ 21.056676] ? __lock_acquire+0x5aa/0x26e0 [ 21.056946] ? find_held_lock+0x33/0xa0 [ 21.057196] ? kernfs_activate+0x70/0x80 [ 21.057533] ? usb_match_dynamic_id+0x1b/0x70 [ 21.057811] ? find_held_lock+0x33/0xa0 [ 21.058047] ? usb_match_dynamic_id+0x55/0x70 [ 21.058330] ? lock_release+0x124/0x260 [ 21.058657] ? usb_match_one_id_intf+0xa2/0x100 [ 21.058997] usb_probe_interface+0x1ba/0x330 [ 21.059399] really_probe+0x1ba/0x4c0 [ 21.059662] __driver_probe_device+0xb2/0x180 [ 21.059944] driver_probe_device+0x5a/0x100 [ 21.060170] __device_attach_driver+0xe9/0x160 [ 21.060427] ? __pfx___device_attach_driver+0x10/0x10 [ 21.060872] bus_for_each_drv+0xa9/0x100 [ 21.061312] __device_attach+0xed/0x190 [ 21.061812] device_initial_probe+0xe/0x20 [ 21.062229] bus_probe_device+0x4d/0xd0 [ 21.062590] device_add+0x308/0x590 [ 21.062912] usb_set_configuration+0x7b6/0xaf0 [ 21.063403] usb_generic_driver_probe+0x36/0x80 [ 21.063714] usb_probe_device+0x7b/0x130 [ 21.063936] really_probe+0x1ba/0x4c0 [ 21.064111] __driver_probe_device+0xb2/0x180 [ 21.064577] driver_probe_device+0x5a/0x100 [ 21.065019] __device_attach_driver+0xe9/0x160 [ 21.065403] ? __pfx___device_attach_driver+0x10/0x10 [ 21.065820] bus_for_each_drv+0xa9/0x100 [ 21.066094] __device_attach+0xed/0x190 [ 21.066535] device_initial_probe+0xe/0x20 [ 21.066992] bus_probe_device+0x4d/0xd0 [ 21.067250] device_add+0x308/0x590 [ 21.067501] usb_new_device+0x347/0x610 [ 21.067817] hub_event+0x156b/0x1e30 [ 21.068060] ? process_scheduled_works+0x48b/0xaf0 [ 21.068337] process_scheduled_works+0x5a3/0xaf0 [ 21.068668] worker_thread+0x3cf/0x560 [ 21.068932] ? kthread+0x109/0x1b0 [ 21.069133] kthread+0x197/0x1b0 [ 21.069343] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 21.069598] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 21.069908] ret_from_fork+0x32/0x40 [ 21.070169] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 21.070424] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 21.070737] </TASK> Reported-by: syzbot+0584f746fde3d52b4675(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=0584f746fde3d52b4675 Reported-by: syzbot+dd320d114deb3f5bb79b(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=dd320d114deb3f5bb79b Reported-by: Youngjun Lee <yjjuny.lee(a)samsung.com> Fixes: a3fbc2e6bb05 ("media: mc-entity.c: use WARN_ON, validate link pads") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo(a)igalia.com> Co-developed-by: Ricardo Ribalda <ribalda(a)chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Ricardo Ribalda <ribalda(a)chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart(a)ideasonboard.com> Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede <hansg(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hansg(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart(a)ideasonboard.com> Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil+cisco(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Long Li <leo.lilong(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_driver.c | 73 +++++++++++++++++++----------- drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvcvideo.h | 2 + 2 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_driver.c b/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_driver.c index f98dff65264d..832590a7767c 100644 --- a/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_driver.c +++ b/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_driver.c @@ -135,6 +135,9 @@ struct uvc_entity *uvc_entity_by_id(struct uvc_device *dev, int id) { struct uvc_entity *entity; + if (id == UVC_INVALID_ENTITY_ID) + return NULL; + list_for_each_entry(entity, &dev->entities, list) { if (entity->id == id) return entity; @@ -778,14 +781,27 @@ static const u8 uvc_media_transport_input_guid[16] = UVC_GUID_UVC_MEDIA_TRANSPORT_INPUT; static const u8 uvc_processing_guid[16] = UVC_GUID_UVC_PROCESSING; -static struct uvc_entity *uvc_alloc_entity(u16 type, u16 id, - unsigned int num_pads, unsigned int extra_size) +static struct uvc_entity *uvc_alloc_new_entity(struct uvc_device *dev, u16 type, + u16 id, unsigned int num_pads, + unsigned int extra_size) { struct uvc_entity *entity; unsigned int num_inputs; unsigned int size; unsigned int i; + /* Per UVC 1.1+ spec 3.7.2, the ID should be non-zero. */ + if (id == 0) { + dev_err(&dev->intf->dev, "Found Unit with invalid ID 0\n"); + id = UVC_INVALID_ENTITY_ID; + } + + /* Per UVC 1.1+ spec 3.7.2, the ID is unique. */ + if (uvc_entity_by_id(dev, id)) { + dev_err(&dev->intf->dev, "Found multiple Units with ID %u\n", id); + id = UVC_INVALID_ENTITY_ID; + } + extra_size = roundup(extra_size, sizeof(*entity->pads)); if (num_pads) num_inputs = type & UVC_TERM_OUTPUT ? num_pads : num_pads - 1; @@ -795,7 +811,7 @@ static struct uvc_entity *uvc_alloc_entity(u16 type, u16 id, + num_inputs; entity = kzalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL); if (entity == NULL) - return NULL; + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); entity->id = id; entity->type = type; @@ -907,10 +923,10 @@ static int uvc_parse_vendor_control(struct uvc_device *dev, break; } - unit = uvc_alloc_entity(UVC_VC_EXTENSION_UNIT, buffer[3], - p + 1, 2*n); - if (unit == NULL) - return -ENOMEM; + unit = uvc_alloc_new_entity(dev, UVC_VC_EXTENSION_UNIT, + buffer[3], p + 1, 2 * n); + if (IS_ERR(unit)) + return PTR_ERR(unit); memcpy(unit->guid, &buffer[4], 16); unit->extension.bNumControls = buffer[20]; @@ -1019,10 +1035,10 @@ static int uvc_parse_standard_control(struct uvc_device *dev, return -EINVAL; } - term = uvc_alloc_entity(type | UVC_TERM_INPUT, buffer[3], - 1, n + p); - if (term == NULL) - return -ENOMEM; + term = uvc_alloc_new_entity(dev, type | UVC_TERM_INPUT, + buffer[3], 1, n + p); + if (IS_ERR(term)) + return PTR_ERR(term); if (UVC_ENTITY_TYPE(term) == UVC_ITT_CAMERA) { term->camera.bControlSize = n; @@ -1078,10 +1094,10 @@ static int uvc_parse_standard_control(struct uvc_device *dev, return 0; } - term = uvc_alloc_entity(type | UVC_TERM_OUTPUT, buffer[3], - 1, 0); - if (term == NULL) - return -ENOMEM; + term = uvc_alloc_new_entity(dev, type | UVC_TERM_OUTPUT, + buffer[3], 1, 0); + if (IS_ERR(term)) + return PTR_ERR(term); memcpy(term->baSourceID, &buffer[7], 1); @@ -1100,9 +1116,10 @@ static int uvc_parse_standard_control(struct uvc_device *dev, return -EINVAL; } - unit = uvc_alloc_entity(buffer[2], buffer[3], p + 1, 0); - if (unit == NULL) - return -ENOMEM; + unit = uvc_alloc_new_entity(dev, buffer[2], buffer[3], + p + 1, 0); + if (IS_ERR(unit)) + return PTR_ERR(unit); memcpy(unit->baSourceID, &buffer[5], p); @@ -1122,9 +1139,9 @@ static int uvc_parse_standard_control(struct uvc_device *dev, return -EINVAL; } - unit = uvc_alloc_entity(buffer[2], buffer[3], 2, n); - if (unit == NULL) - return -ENOMEM; + unit = uvc_alloc_new_entity(dev, buffer[2], buffer[3], 2, n); + if (IS_ERR(unit)) + return PTR_ERR(unit); memcpy(unit->baSourceID, &buffer[4], 1); unit->processing.wMaxMultiplier = @@ -1151,9 +1168,10 @@ static int uvc_parse_standard_control(struct uvc_device *dev, return -EINVAL; } - unit = uvc_alloc_entity(buffer[2], buffer[3], p + 1, n); - if (unit == NULL) - return -ENOMEM; + unit = uvc_alloc_new_entity(dev, buffer[2], buffer[3], + p + 1, n); + if (IS_ERR(unit)) + return PTR_ERR(unit); memcpy(unit->guid, &buffer[4], 16); unit->extension.bNumControls = buffer[20]; @@ -1293,9 +1311,10 @@ static int uvc_gpio_parse(struct uvc_device *dev) return dev_err_probe(&dev->intf->dev, irq, "No IRQ for privacy GPIO\n"); - unit = uvc_alloc_entity(UVC_EXT_GPIO_UNIT, UVC_EXT_GPIO_UNIT_ID, 0, 1); - if (!unit) - return -ENOMEM; + unit = uvc_alloc_new_entity(dev, UVC_EXT_GPIO_UNIT, + UVC_EXT_GPIO_UNIT_ID, 0, 1); + if (IS_ERR(unit)) + return PTR_ERR(unit); unit->gpio.gpio_privacy = gpio_privacy; unit->gpio.irq = irq; diff --git a/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvcvideo.h b/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvcvideo.h index e99bfaa62266..cbb5ce963cd0 100644 --- a/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvcvideo.h +++ b/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvcvideo.h @@ -41,6 +41,8 @@ #define UVC_EXT_GPIO_UNIT 0x7ffe #define UVC_EXT_GPIO_UNIT_ID 0x100 +#define UVC_INVALID_ENTITY_ID 0xffff + /* ------------------------------------------------------------------------ * Driver specific constants. */ -- 2.39.2

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] media: venus: Add a check for packet size after reading from shared memory
by Long Li 25 Nov '25

25 Nov '25

From: Vedang Nagar <quic_vnagar(a)quicinc.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.16-rc1 commit 49befc830daa743e051a65468c05c2ff9e8580e6 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/ICWO23 CVE: CVE-2025-39710 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Add a check to ensure that the packet size does not exceed the number of available words after reading the packet header from shared memory. This ensures that the size provided by the firmware is safe to process and prevent potential out-of-bounds memory access. Fixes: d96d3f30c0f2 ("[media] media: venus: hfi: add Venus HFI files") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Vedang Nagar <quic_vnagar(a)quicinc.com> Co-developed-by: Dikshita Agarwal <quic_dikshita(a)quicinc.com> Signed-off-by: Dikshita Agarwal <quic_dikshita(a)quicinc.com> Reviewed-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bod(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil(a)xs4all.nl> Signed-off-by: Long Li <leo.lilong(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/media/platform/qcom/venus/hfi_venus.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/media/platform/qcom/venus/hfi_venus.c b/drivers/media/platform/qcom/venus/hfi_venus.c index ab93757fff4b..72b7cd72b318 100644 --- a/drivers/media/platform/qcom/venus/hfi_venus.c +++ b/drivers/media/platform/qcom/venus/hfi_venus.c @@ -239,6 +239,7 @@ static int venus_write_queue(struct venus_hfi_device *hdev, static int venus_read_queue(struct venus_hfi_device *hdev, struct iface_queue *queue, void *pkt, u32 *tx_req) { + struct hfi_pkt_hdr *pkt_hdr = NULL; struct hfi_queue_header *qhdr; u32 dwords, new_rd_idx; u32 rd_idx, wr_idx, type, qsize; @@ -304,6 +305,9 @@ static int venus_read_queue(struct venus_hfi_device *hdev, memcpy(pkt, rd_ptr, len); memcpy(pkt + len, queue->qmem.kva, new_rd_idx << 2); } + pkt_hdr = (struct hfi_pkt_hdr *)(pkt); + if ((pkt_hdr->size >> 2) != dwords) + return -EINVAL; } else { /* bad packet received, dropping */ new_rd_idx = qhdr->write_idx; -- 2.39.2

2 1

[openeuler:OLK-6.6 3316/3316] kernel/xsched/core.c:497:12: warning: no previous prototype for 'xsched_sched_init'
by kernel test robot 25 Nov '25

25 Nov '25

tree: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel.git OLK-6.6 head: c1bc27c0f90c1e34d319455cb1e28b2705987616 commit: 832ec54e11a079d968d8f23780ab455b1537b214 [3316/3316] xsched: Add xsched RT class config: x86_64-buildonly-randconfig-002-20251125 (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20251125/202511251921.jfyR52m4-lkp@…) compiler: gcc-14 (Debian 14.2.0-19) 14.2.0 reproduce (this is a W=1 build): (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20251125/202511251921.jfyR52m4-lkp@…) If you fix the issue in a separate patch/commit (i.e. not just a new version of the same patch/commit), kindly add following tags | Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp(a)intel.com> | Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202511251921.jfyR52m4-lkp@intel.com/ All warnings (new ones prefixed by >>): kernel/xsched/core.c:189:5: warning: no previous prototype for 'xsched_xse_set_class' [-Wmissing-prototypes] 189 | int xsched_xse_set_class(struct xsched_entity *xse) | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ >> kernel/xsched/core.c:497:12: warning: no previous prototype for 'xsched_sched_init' [-Wmissing-prototypes] 497 | __init int xsched_sched_init(void) | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -- >> kernel/xsched/rt.c:207:6: warning: no previous prototype for 'rq_init_rt' [-Wmissing-prototypes] 207 | void rq_init_rt(struct xsched_cu *xcu) | ^~~~~~~~~~ >> kernel/xsched/rt.c:218:6: warning: no previous prototype for 'xse_init_rt' [-Wmissing-prototypes] 218 | void xse_init_rt(struct xsched_entity *xse) | ^~~~~~~~~~~ >> kernel/xsched/rt.c:228:6: warning: no previous prototype for 'xse_deinit_rt' [-Wmissing-prototypes] 228 | void xse_deinit_rt(struct xsched_entity *xse) | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~ vim +/xsched_sched_init +497 kernel/xsched/core.c 496 > 497 __init int xsched_sched_init(void) -- 0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service https://github.com/intel/lkp-tests/wiki

1 0

[PATCH OLK-6.6] eventpoll: Fix semi-unbounded recursion
by Long Li 25 Nov '25

25 Nov '25

From: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.16-rc1 commit f2e467a48287c868818085aa35389a224d226732 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/ICU73P CVE: CVE-2025-38614 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Ensure that epoll instances can never form a graph deeper than EP_MAX_NESTS+1 links. Currently, ep_loop_check_proc() ensures that the graph is loop-free and does some recursion depth checks, but those recursion depth checks don't limit the depth of the resulting tree for two reasons: - They don't look upwards in the tree. - If there are multiple downwards paths of different lengths, only one of the paths is actually considered for the depth check since commit 28d82dc1c4ed ("epoll: limit paths"). Essentially, the current recursion depth check in ep_loop_check_proc() just serves to prevent it from recursing too deeply while checking for loops. A more thorough check is done in reverse_path_check() after the new graph edge has already been created; this checks, among other things, that no paths going upwards from any non-epoll file with a length of more than 5 edges exist. However, this check does not apply to non-epoll files. As a result, it is possible to recurse to a depth of at least roughly 500, tested on v6.15. (I am unsure if deeper recursion is possible; and this may have changed with commit 8c44dac8add7 ("eventpoll: Fix priority inversion problem").) To fix it: 1. In ep_loop_check_proc(), note the subtree depth of each visited node, and use subtree depths for the total depth calculation even when a subtree has already been visited. 2. Add ep_get_upwards_depth_proc() for similarly determining the maximum depth of an upwards walk. 3. In ep_loop_check(), use these values to limit the total path length between epoll nodes to EP_MAX_NESTS edges. Fixes: 22bacca48a17 ("epoll: prevent creating circular epoll structures") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250711-epoll-recursion-fix-v1-1-fb2457c33292@goog… Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Long Li <leo.lilong(a)huawei.com> --- fs/eventpoll.c | 60 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 46 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/eventpoll.c b/fs/eventpoll.c index 31b32d9e7bbc..6b2d655c1cef 100644 --- a/fs/eventpoll.c +++ b/fs/eventpoll.c @@ -217,6 +217,7 @@ struct eventpoll { /* used to optimize loop detection check */ u64 gen; struct hlist_head refs; + u8 loop_check_depth; /* * usage count, used together with epitem->dying to @@ -1986,23 +1987,24 @@ static int ep_poll(struct eventpoll *ep, struct epoll_event __user *events, } /** - * ep_loop_check_proc - verify that adding an epoll file inside another - * epoll structure does not violate the constraints, in - * terms of closed loops, or too deep chains (which can - * result in excessive stack usage). + * ep_loop_check_proc - verify that adding an epoll file @ep inside another + * epoll file does not create closed loops, and + * determine the depth of the subtree starting at @ep * * @ep: the &struct eventpoll to be currently checked. * @depth: Current depth of the path being checked. * - * Return: %zero if adding the epoll @file inside current epoll - * structure @ep does not violate the constraints, or %-1 otherwise. + * Return: depth of the subtree, or INT_MAX if we found a loop or went too deep. */ static int ep_loop_check_proc(struct eventpoll *ep, int depth) { - int error = 0; + int result = 0; struct rb_node *rbp; struct epitem *epi; + if (ep->gen == loop_check_gen) + return ep->loop_check_depth; + mutex_lock_nested(&ep->mtx, depth + 1); ep->gen = loop_check_gen; for (rbp = rb_first_cached(&ep->rbr); rbp; rbp = rb_next(rbp)) { @@ -2010,13 +2012,11 @@ static int ep_loop_check_proc(struct eventpoll *ep, int depth) if (unlikely(is_file_epoll(epi->ffd.file))) { struct eventpoll *ep_tovisit; ep_tovisit = epi->ffd.file->private_data; - if (ep_tovisit->gen == loop_check_gen) - continue; if (ep_tovisit == inserting_into || depth > EP_MAX_NESTS) - error = -1; + result = INT_MAX; else - error = ep_loop_check_proc(ep_tovisit, depth + 1); - if (error != 0) + result = max(result, ep_loop_check_proc(ep_tovisit, depth + 1) + 1); + if (result > EP_MAX_NESTS) break; } else { /* @@ -2030,9 +2030,27 @@ static int ep_loop_check_proc(struct eventpoll *ep, int depth) list_file(epi->ffd.file); } } + ep->loop_check_depth = result; mutex_unlock(&ep->mtx); - return error; + return result; +} + +/** + * ep_get_upwards_depth_proc - determine depth of @ep when traversed upwards + */ +static int ep_get_upwards_depth_proc(struct eventpoll *ep, int depth) +{ + int result = 0; + struct epitem *epi; + + if (ep->gen == loop_check_gen) + return ep->loop_check_depth; + hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(epi, &ep->refs, fllink) + result = max(result, ep_get_upwards_depth_proc(epi->ep, depth + 1) + 1); + ep->gen = loop_check_gen; + ep->loop_check_depth = result; + return result; } /** @@ -2048,8 +2066,22 @@ static int ep_loop_check_proc(struct eventpoll *ep, int depth) */ static int ep_loop_check(struct eventpoll *ep, struct eventpoll *to) { + int depth, upwards_depth; + inserting_into = ep; - return ep_loop_check_proc(to, 0); + /* + * Check how deep down we can get from @to, and whether it is possible + * to loop up to @ep. + */ + depth = ep_loop_check_proc(to, 0); + if (depth > EP_MAX_NESTS) + return -1; + /* Check how far up we can go from @ep. */ + rcu_read_lock(); + upwards_depth = ep_get_upwards_depth_proc(ep, 0); + rcu_read_unlock(); + + return (depth+1+upwards_depth > EP_MAX_NESTS) ? -1 : 0; } static void clear_tfile_check_list(void) -- 2.39.2

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] kernfs: Relax constraint in draining guard
by Long Li 25 Nov '25

25 Nov '25

From: Michal Koutný <mkoutny(a)suse.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.15-rc6 commit 071d8e4c2a3b0999a9b822e2eb8854784a350f8a category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/ICLGBQ CVE: CVE-2025-38282 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- The active reference lifecycle provides the break/unbreak mechanism but the active reference is not truly active after unbreak -- callers don't use it afterwards but it's important for proper pairing of kn->active counting. Assuming this mechanism is in place, the WARN check in kernfs_should_drain_open_files() is too sensitive -- it may transiently catch those (rightful) callers between kernfs_unbreak_active_protection() and kernfs_put_active() as found out by Chen Ridong: kernfs_remove_by_name_ns kernfs_get_active // active=1 __kernfs_remove // active=0x80000002 kernfs_drain ... wait_event //waiting (active == 0x80000001) kernfs_break_active_protection // active = 0x80000001 // continue kernfs_unbreak_active_protection // active = 0x80000002 ... kernfs_should_drain_open_files // warning occurs kernfs_put_active To avoid the false positives (mind panic_on_warn) remove the check altogether. (This is meant as quick fix, I think active reference break/unbreak may be simplified with larger rework.) Fixes: bdb2fd7fc56e1 ("kernfs: Skip kernfs_drain_open_files() more aggressively") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/kmmrseckjctb4gxcx2rdminrjnq2b4ipf7562nvfd432ld5v5… Cc: Chen Ridong <chenridong(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Michal Koutný <mkoutny(a)suse.com> Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj(a)kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250505121201.879823-1-mkoutny@suse.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Long Li <leo.lilong(a)huawei.com> --- fs/kernfs/dir.c | 5 +++-- fs/kernfs/file.c | 3 ++- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/kernfs/dir.c b/fs/kernfs/dir.c index 2405aeb39b9a..09328586d60a 100644 --- a/fs/kernfs/dir.c +++ b/fs/kernfs/dir.c @@ -1560,8 +1560,9 @@ void kernfs_break_active_protection(struct kernfs_node *kn) * invoked before finishing the kernfs operation. Note that while this * function restores the active reference, it doesn't and can't actually * restore the active protection - @kn may already or be in the process of - * being removed. Once kernfs_break_active_protection() is invoked, that - * protection is irreversibly gone for the kernfs operation instance. + * being drained and removed. Once kernfs_break_active_protection() is + * invoked, that protection is irreversibly gone for the kernfs operation + * instance. * * While this function may be called at any point after * kernfs_break_active_protection() is invoked, its most useful location diff --git a/fs/kernfs/file.c b/fs/kernfs/file.c index 9107151b6cfa..6846bb46a9b4 100644 --- a/fs/kernfs/file.c +++ b/fs/kernfs/file.c @@ -775,8 +775,9 @@ bool kernfs_should_drain_open_files(struct kernfs_node *kn) /* * @kn being deactivated guarantees that @kn->attr.open can't change * beneath us making the lockless test below safe. + * Callers post kernfs_unbreak_active_protection may be counted in + * kn->active by now, do not WARN_ON because of them. */ - WARN_ON_ONCE(atomic_read(&kn->active) != KN_DEACTIVATED_BIAS); rcu_read_lock(); on = rcu_dereference(kn->attr.open); -- 2.39.2

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] __legitimize_mnt(): check for MNT_SYNC_UMOUNT should be under mount_lock
by Long Li 25 Nov '25

25 Nov '25

From: Al Viro <viro(a)zeniv.linux.org.uk> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.15-rc5 commit 250cf3693060a5f803c5f1ddc082bb06b16112a9 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/ICGANV CVE: CVE-2025-38058 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- ... or we risk stealing final mntput from sync umount - raising mnt_count after umount(2) has verified that victim is not busy, but before it has set MNT_SYNC_UMOUNT; in that case __legitimize_mnt() doesn't see that it's safe to quietly undo mnt_count increment and leaves dropping the reference to caller, where it'll be a full-blown mntput(). Check under mount_lock is needed; leaving the current one done before taking that makes no sense - it's nowhere near common enough to bother with. Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <brauner(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro(a)zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Long Li <leo.lilong(a)huawei.com> --- fs/namespace.c | 6 +----- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c index d3c66c29caad..0f46e218b965 100644 --- a/fs/namespace.c +++ b/fs/namespace.c @@ -628,12 +628,8 @@ int __legitimize_mnt(struct vfsmount *bastard, unsigned seq) smp_mb(); // see mntput_no_expire() if (likely(!read_seqretry(&mount_lock, seq))) return 0; - if (bastard->mnt_flags & MNT_SYNC_UMOUNT) { - mnt_add_count(mnt, -1); - return 1; - } lock_mount_hash(); - if (unlikely(bastard->mnt_flags & MNT_DOOMED)) { + if (unlikely(bastard->mnt_flags & (MNT_SYNC_UMOUNT | MNT_DOOMED))) { mnt_add_count(mnt, -1); unlock_mount_hash(); return 1; -- 2.39.2

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] ksmbd: add bounds check for durable handle context
by Long Li 25 Nov '25

25 Nov '25

From: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon(a)kernel.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.14 commit 542027e123fc0bfd61dd59e21ae0ee4ef2101b29 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IC1QQ8 CVE: CVE-2025-22043 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Add missing bounds check for durable handle context. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Norbert Szetei <norbert(a)doyensec.com> Tested-by: Norbert Szetei <norbert(a)doyensec.com> Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench(a)microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Long Li <leo.lilong(a)huawei.com> --- fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c b/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c index 0471e8a05833..8ff43ddcfc39 100644 --- a/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c +++ b/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c @@ -2700,6 +2700,13 @@ static int parse_durable_handle_context(struct ksmbd_work *work, goto out; } + if (le16_to_cpu(context->DataOffset) + + le32_to_cpu(context->DataLength) < + sizeof(struct create_durable_reconn_v2_req)) { + err = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + recon_v2 = (struct create_durable_reconn_v2_req *)context; persistent_id = recon_v2->Fid.PersistentFileId; dh_info->fp = ksmbd_lookup_durable_fd(persistent_id); @@ -2740,6 +2747,13 @@ static int parse_durable_handle_context(struct ksmbd_work *work, goto out; } + if (le16_to_cpu(context->DataOffset) + + le32_to_cpu(context->DataLength) < + sizeof(struct create_durable_reconn_req)) { + err = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + recon = (struct create_durable_reconn_req *)context; persistent_id = recon->Data.Fid.PersistentFileId; dh_info->fp = ksmbd_lookup_durable_fd(persistent_id); @@ -2772,6 +2786,13 @@ static int parse_durable_handle_context(struct ksmbd_work *work, goto out; } + if (le16_to_cpu(context->DataOffset) + + le32_to_cpu(context->DataLength) < + sizeof(struct create_durable_req_v2)) { + err = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + durable_v2_blob = (struct create_durable_req_v2 *)context; ksmbd_debug(SMB, "Request for durable v2 open\n"); -- 2.39.2

2 1

[openeuler:openEuler-1.0-LTS 1936/1936] drivers/net/ethernet/huawei/bma/kbox_drv/kbox_ram_op.o: warning: objtool: missing symbol for section .text
by kernel test robot 25 Nov '25

25 Nov '25

Hi Naixin, FYI, the error/warning still remains. tree: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel.git openEuler-1.0-LTS head: 4ffe43c9c280969676fa933f022ebf1a8aaebcdb commit: d83c305cb9b2708b835a47c9ddcbcab97cf70c9f [1936/1936] Huawei BMA: Adding Huawei BMA driver: host_kbox_drv config: x86_64-buildonly-randconfig-004-20251125 (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20251125/202511251827.iPD7MiMU-lkp@…) compiler: clang version 22.0.0git (https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project 9e9fe08b16ea2c4d9867fb4974edf2a3776d6ece) reproduce (this is a W=1 build): (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20251125/202511251827.iPD7MiMU-lkp@…) If you fix the issue in a separate patch/commit (i.e. not just a new version of the same patch/commit), kindly add following tags | Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp(a)intel.com> | Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202511251827.iPD7MiMU-lkp@intel.com/ All warnings (new ones prefixed by >>): drivers/net/ethernet/huawei/bma/kbox_drv/kbox_ram_op.c:42:6: warning: no previous prototype for function 'kbox_write_to_pci' [-Wmissing-prototypes] 42 | void kbox_write_to_pci(void __iomem *dest, const void *src, int len, | ^ drivers/net/ethernet/huawei/bma/kbox_drv/kbox_ram_op.c:42:1: note: declare 'static' if the function is not intended to be used outside of this translation unit 42 | void kbox_write_to_pci(void __iomem *dest, const void *src, int len, | ^ | static drivers/net/ethernet/huawei/bma/kbox_drv/kbox_ram_op.c:111:6: warning: no previous prototype for function 'kbox_read_from_pci' [-Wmissing-prototypes] 111 | void kbox_read_from_pci(void *dest, void __iomem *src, int len, | ^ drivers/net/ethernet/huawei/bma/kbox_drv/kbox_ram_op.c:111:1: note: declare 'static' if the function is not intended to be used outside of this translation unit 111 | void kbox_read_from_pci(void *dest, void __iomem *src, int len, | ^ | static drivers/net/ethernet/huawei/bma/kbox_drv/kbox_ram_op.c:172:6: warning: no previous prototype for function 'kbox_memset_pci' [-Wmissing-prototypes] 172 | void kbox_memset_pci(void __iomem *dest, const char set_byte, int len, | ^ drivers/net/ethernet/huawei/bma/kbox_drv/kbox_ram_op.c:172:1: note: declare 'static' if the function is not intended to be used outside of this translation unit 172 | void kbox_memset_pci(void __iomem *dest, const char set_byte, int len, | ^ | static 3 warnings generated. >> drivers/net/ethernet/huawei/bma/kbox_drv/kbox_ram_op.o: warning: objtool: missing symbol for section .text -- drivers/net/ethernet/huawei/bma/kbox_drv/kbox_dump.c:35:19: warning: unused variable 'g_day_in_month' [-Wunused-const-variable] 35 | static const char g_day_in_month[] = { | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 1 warning generated. >> drivers/net/ethernet/huawei/bma/kbox_drv/kbox_dump.o: warning: objtool: missing symbol for section .text -- >> drivers/net/ethernet/huawei/bma/kbox_drv/kbox_panic.o: warning: objtool: missing symbol for section .text -- >> drivers/net/ethernet/huawei/bma/kbox_drv/kbox_ram_image.o: warning: objtool: missing symbol for section .text -- 0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service https://github.com/intel/lkp-tests/wiki

1 0

[openeuler:OLK-6.6 3316/3316] kernel/xsched/core.c:189:5: warning: no previous prototype for 'xsched_xse_set_class'
by kernel test robot 25 Nov '25

25 Nov '25

tree: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel.git OLK-6.6 head: c1bc27c0f90c1e34d319455cb1e28b2705987616 commit: 76c15076abcb100f7c1204bd1ef0ec55128d6546 [3316/3316] xsched: Add basic scheduler core support config: x86_64-buildonly-randconfig-002-20251125 (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20251125/202511251727.cFjVKjQN-lkp@…) compiler: gcc-14 (Debian 14.2.0-19) 14.2.0 reproduce (this is a W=1 build): (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20251125/202511251727.cFjVKjQN-lkp@…) If you fix the issue in a separate patch/commit (i.e. not just a new version of the same patch/commit), kindly add following tags | Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp(a)intel.com> | Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202511251727.cFjVKjQN-lkp@intel.com/ All warnings (new ones prefixed by >>): >> kernel/xsched/core.c:189:5: warning: no previous prototype for 'xsched_xse_set_class' [-Wmissing-prototypes] 189 | int xsched_xse_set_class(struct xsched_entity *xse) | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ vim +/xsched_xse_set_class +189 kernel/xsched/core.c 188 > 189 int xsched_xse_set_class(struct xsched_entity *xse) 190 { 191 struct xsched_class *sched = xsched_first_class; 192 193 xse->class = sched; 194 return 0; 195 } 196 -- 0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service https://github.com/intel/lkp-tests/wiki

1 0

[PATCH OLK-5.10] scsi: ufs: core: Fix handling of lrbp->cmd
by Baokun Li 25 Nov '25

25 Nov '25

From: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche(a)acm.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.5-rc1 commit 549e91a9bbaa0ee480f59357868421a61d369770 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/ID0RFX CVE: CVE-2023-53510 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- ufshcd_queuecommand() may be called two times in a row for a SCSI command before it is completed. Hence make the following changes: - In the functions that submit a command, do not check the old value of lrbp->cmd nor clear lrbp->cmd in error paths. - In ufshcd_release_scsi_cmd(), do not clear lrbp->cmd. See also scsi_send_eh_cmnd(). This commit prevents that the following appears if a command times out: WARNING: at drivers/ufs/core/ufshcd.c:2965 ufshcd_queuecommand+0x6f8/0x9a8 Call trace: ufshcd_queuecommand+0x6f8/0x9a8 scsi_send_eh_cmnd+0x2c0/0x960 scsi_eh_test_devices+0x100/0x314 scsi_eh_ready_devs+0xd90/0x114c scsi_error_handler+0x2b4/0xb70 kthread+0x16c/0x1e0 Fixes: 5a0b0cb9bee7 ("[SCSI] ufs: Add support for sending NOP OUT UPIU") Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche(a)acm.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230524203659.1394307-3-bvanassche@acm.org Acked-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen(a)oracle.com> Conflicts: drivers/ufs/core/ufshcd.c drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c [Context conflicts because there are no commits here: 6ff265fc5ef6 ("scsi: ufs: core: bsg: Add advanced RPMB support in ufs_bsg"), dd11376b9f1b ("scsi: ufs: Split the drivers/scsi/ufs directory")] Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c | 9 +-------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c b/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c index 41eb08b83b2a..ae00892ba44a 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c @@ -2559,8 +2559,6 @@ static int ufshcd_queuecommand(struct Scsi_Host *host, struct scsi_cmnd *cmd) (hba->clk_gating.state != CLKS_ON)); lrbp = &hba->lrb[tag]; - - WARN_ON(lrbp->cmd); lrbp->cmd = cmd; lrbp->sense_bufflen = UFS_SENSE_SIZE; lrbp->sense_buffer = cmd->sense_buffer; @@ -2576,7 +2574,6 @@ static int ufshcd_queuecommand(struct Scsi_Host *host, struct scsi_cmnd *cmd) err = ufshcd_map_sg(hba, lrbp); if (err) { - lrbp->cmd = NULL; ufshcd_release(hba); goto out; } @@ -2789,7 +2786,7 @@ static int ufshcd_exec_dev_cmd(struct ufs_hba *hba, init_completion(&wait); lrbp = &hba->lrb[tag]; - WARN_ON(lrbp->cmd); + lrbp->cmd = NULL; err = ufshcd_compose_dev_cmd(hba, lrbp, cmd_type, tag); if (unlikely(err)) goto out_put_tag; @@ -4969,8 +4966,6 @@ static void __ufshcd_transfer_req_compl(struct ufs_hba *hba, result = ufshcd_transfer_rsp_status(hba, lrbp); scsi_dma_unmap(cmd); cmd->result = result; - /* Mark completed command as NULL in LRB */ - lrbp->cmd = NULL; /* Do not touch lrbp after scsi done */ cmd->scsi_done(cmd); __ufshcd_release(hba); @@ -6381,8 +6376,6 @@ static int ufshcd_issue_devman_upiu_cmd(struct ufs_hba *hba, init_completion(&wait); lrbp = &hba->lrb[tag]; - WARN_ON(lrbp->cmd); - lrbp->cmd = NULL; lrbp->sense_bufflen = 0; lrbp->sense_buffer = NULL; -- 2.46.1

2 1