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[openEuler-1.0-LTS 0/2] *** Fix CVE-2023-53454 ***
by Lin Ruifeng 03 Nov '25

03 Nov '25

*** Fix CVE-2023-53454 *** Charles Han (1): HID: multitouch: Add NULL check in mt_input_configured Rahul Rameshbabu (1): HID: multitouch: Correct devm device reference for hidinput input_dev name drivers/hid/hid-multitouch.c | 12 ++++-------- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) -- 2.22.0

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[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] CVE-2025-38501
by Yongjian Sun 03 Nov '25

03 Nov '25

Namjae Jeon (2): ksmbd: limit repeated connections from clients with the same IP ksmbd: extend the connection limiting mechanism to support IPv6 fs/smb/server/connection.h | 6 ++++++ fs/smb/server/transport_tcp.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 43 insertions(+) -- 2.39.2

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[openEuler-1.0-LTS 0/2] *** Fix CVE-2023-53454 ***
by Lin Ruifeng 03 Nov '25

03 Nov '25

*** Fix CVE-2023-53454 *** Charles Han (1): HID: multitouch: Add NULL check in mt_input_configured Rahul Rameshbabu (1): HID: multitouch: Correct devm device reference for hidinput input_dev name drivers/hid/hid-multitouch.c | 12 ++++-------- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) -- 2.22.0

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[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] wifi: brcmfmac: cfg80211: Pass the PMK in binary instead of hex
by Jiacheng Yu 03 Nov '25

03 Nov '25

From: Hector Martin <marcan(a)marcan.st> stable inclusion from stable-v4.19.284 commit 2bc34facb90ceeff6f8c17d2006575a6d07c3825 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/ID33EM CVE: CVE-2023-53715 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 89b89e52153fda2733562776c7c9d9d3ebf8dd6d ] Apparently the hex passphrase mechanism does not work on newer chips/firmware (e.g. BCM4387). It seems there was a simple way of passing it in binary all along, so use that and avoid the hexification. OpenBSD has been doing it like this from the beginning, so this should work on all chips. Also clear the structure before setting the PMK. This was leaking uninitialized stack contents to the device. Reviewed-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij(a)linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Arend van Spriel <arend.vanspriel(a)broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: Hector Martin <marcan(a)marcan.st> Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo(a)kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230214092423.15175-6-marcan@marcan.st Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jiacheng Yu <yujiacheng3(a)huawei.com> --- .../wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/cfg80211.c | 13 +++++++------ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/cfg80211.c b/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/cfg80211.c index e6ff4c64738e..454312ef960a 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/cfg80211.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/cfg80211.c @@ -1240,13 +1240,14 @@ static u16 brcmf_map_fw_linkdown_reason(const struct brcmf_event_msg *e) static int brcmf_set_pmk(struct brcmf_if *ifp, const u8 *pmk_data, u16 pmk_len) { struct brcmf_wsec_pmk_le pmk; - int i, err; + int err; + + memset(&pmk, 0, sizeof(pmk)); - /* convert to firmware key format */ - pmk.key_len = cpu_to_le16(pmk_len << 1); - pmk.flags = cpu_to_le16(BRCMF_WSEC_PASSPHRASE); - for (i = 0; i < pmk_len; i++) - snprintf(&pmk.key[2 * i], 3, "%02x", pmk_data[i]); + /* pass pmk directly */ + pmk.key_len = cpu_to_le16(pmk_len); + pmk.flags = cpu_to_le16(0); + memcpy(pmk.key, pmk_data, pmk_len); /* store psk in firmware */ err = brcmf_fil_cmd_data_set(ifp, BRCMF_C_SET_WSEC_PMK, -- 2.43.0

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[openEuler-1.0-LTS 0/2] *** Fix CVE-2023-53454 ***
by Lin Ruifeng 03 Nov '25

03 Nov '25

*** Fix CVE-2023-53454 *** Charles Han (1): HID: multitouch: Add NULL check in mt_input_configured Rahul Rameshbabu (1): HID: multitouch: Correct devm device reference for hidinput input_dev name drivers/hid/hid-multitouch.c | 12 ++++-------- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) -- 2.22.0

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[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/5] mainline patch backport
by Xinyu Zheng 03 Nov '25

03 Nov '25

Daniel Tang (1): ACPI: TAD: Add missing sysfs_remove_group() for ACPI_TAD_RT Huisong Li (1): ACPI: processor: idle: Fix memory leak when register cpuidle device failed Rafael J. Wysocki (1): PM: sleep: core: Clear power.must_resume in noirq suspend error path Sean Christopherson (2): x86/umip: Check that the instruction opcode is at least two bytes x86/umip: Fix decoding of register forms of 0F 01 (SGDT and SIDT aliases) arch/x86/kernel/umip.c | 15 +++++++++++++-- drivers/acpi/acpi_tad.c | 3 +++ drivers/acpi/processor_idle.c | 3 +++ drivers/base/power/main.c | 14 +++++++++++++- 4 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH] [Backport] ext4: factor out ext4_fc_get_tl()
by Yongjian Sun 03 Nov '25

03 Nov '25

From: Ye Bin <yebin10(a)huawei.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.1-rc1 commit dcc5827484d6e53ccda12334f8bbfafcc593ceda category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/ICY4BC CVE: CVE-2022-50306 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Factor out ext4_fc_get_tl() to fill 'tl' with host byte order. Signed-off-by: Ye Bin <yebin10(a)huawei.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220924075233.2315259-3-yebin10@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso(a)mit.edu> Conflicts: fs/ext4/fast_commit.c [4978c659e7b5 not applied] Signed-off-by: Yongjian Sun <sunyongjian1(a)huawei.com> --- fs/ext4/fast_commit.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------- 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/fast_commit.c b/fs/ext4/fast_commit.c index affa7a19ea61..c33482c65ebe 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/fast_commit.c +++ b/fs/ext4/fast_commit.c @@ -1256,7 +1256,7 @@ struct dentry_info_args { }; static inline void tl_to_darg(struct dentry_info_args *darg, - struct ext4_fc_tl *tl, u8 *val) + struct ext4_fc_tl *tl, u8 *val) { struct ext4_fc_dentry_info fcd; @@ -1265,8 +1265,14 @@ static inline void tl_to_darg(struct dentry_info_args *darg, darg->parent_ino = le32_to_cpu(fcd.fc_parent_ino); darg->ino = le32_to_cpu(fcd.fc_ino); darg->dname = val + offsetof(struct ext4_fc_dentry_info, fc_dname); - darg->dname_len = le16_to_cpu(tl->fc_len) - - sizeof(struct ext4_fc_dentry_info); + darg->dname_len = tl->fc_len - sizeof(struct ext4_fc_dentry_info); +} + +static inline void ext4_fc_get_tl(struct ext4_fc_tl *tl, u8 *val) +{ + memcpy(tl, val, EXT4_FC_TAG_BASE_LEN); + tl->fc_len = le16_to_cpu(tl->fc_len); + tl->fc_tag = le16_to_cpu(tl->fc_tag); } /* Unlink replay function */ @@ -1431,7 +1437,7 @@ static int ext4_fc_replay_inode(struct super_block *sb, struct ext4_fc_tl *tl, struct ext4_inode *raw_fc_inode; struct inode *inode = NULL; struct ext4_iloc iloc; - int inode_len, ino, ret, tag = le16_to_cpu(tl->fc_tag); + int inode_len, ino, ret, tag = tl->fc_tag; struct ext4_extent_header *eh; memcpy(&fc_inode, val, sizeof(fc_inode)); @@ -1456,7 +1462,7 @@ static int ext4_fc_replay_inode(struct super_block *sb, struct ext4_fc_tl *tl, if (ret) goto out; - inode_len = le16_to_cpu(tl->fc_len) - sizeof(struct ext4_fc_inode); + inode_len = tl->fc_len - sizeof(struct ext4_fc_inode); raw_inode = ext4_raw_inode(&iloc); memcpy(raw_inode, raw_fc_inode, offsetof(struct ext4_inode, i_block)); @@ -1969,12 +1975,12 @@ static int ext4_fc_replay_scan(journal_t *journal, state->fc_replay_expected_off++; for (cur = start; cur < end; - cur = cur + EXT4_FC_TAG_BASE_LEN + le16_to_cpu(tl.fc_len)) { - memcpy(&tl, cur, EXT4_FC_TAG_BASE_LEN); + cur = cur + EXT4_FC_TAG_BASE_LEN + tl.fc_len) { + ext4_fc_get_tl(&tl, cur); val = cur + EXT4_FC_TAG_BASE_LEN; jbd_debug(3, "Scan phase, tag:%s, blk %lld\n", - tag2str(le16_to_cpu(tl.fc_tag)), bh->b_blocknr); - switch (le16_to_cpu(tl.fc_tag)) { + tag2str(tl.fc_tag), bh->b_blocknr); + switch (tl.fc_tag) { case EXT4_FC_TAG_ADD_RANGE: memcpy(&ext, val, sizeof(ext)); ex = (struct ext4_extent *)&ext.fc_ex; @@ -1994,7 +2000,7 @@ static int ext4_fc_replay_scan(journal_t *journal, case EXT4_FC_TAG_PAD: state->fc_cur_tag++; state->fc_crc = ext4_chksum(sbi, state->fc_crc, cur, - EXT4_FC_TAG_BASE_LEN + le16_to_cpu(tl.fc_len)); + EXT4_FC_TAG_BASE_LEN + tl.fc_len); break; case EXT4_FC_TAG_TAIL: state->fc_cur_tag++; @@ -2027,7 +2033,7 @@ static int ext4_fc_replay_scan(journal_t *journal, } state->fc_cur_tag++; state->fc_crc = ext4_chksum(sbi, state->fc_crc, cur, - EXT4_FC_TAG_BASE_LEN + le16_to_cpu(tl.fc_len)); + EXT4_FC_TAG_BASE_LEN + tl.fc_len); break; default: ret = state->fc_replay_num_tags ? @@ -2083,8 +2089,8 @@ static int ext4_fc_replay(journal_t *journal, struct buffer_head *bh, end = (__u8 *)bh->b_data + journal->j_blocksize - 1; for (cur = start; cur < end; - cur = cur + EXT4_FC_TAG_BASE_LEN + le16_to_cpu(tl.fc_len)) { - memcpy(&tl, cur, EXT4_FC_TAG_BASE_LEN); + cur = cur + EXT4_FC_TAG_BASE_LEN + tl.fc_len) { + ext4_fc_get_tl(&tl, cur); val = cur + EXT4_FC_TAG_BASE_LEN; if (state->fc_replay_num_tags == 0) { @@ -2092,10 +2098,9 @@ static int ext4_fc_replay(journal_t *journal, struct buffer_head *bh, ext4_fc_set_bitmaps_and_counters(sb); break; } - jbd_debug(3, "Replay phase, tag:%s\n", - tag2str(le16_to_cpu(tl.fc_tag))); + ext4_debug("Replay phase, tag:%s\n", tag2str(tl.fc_tag)); state->fc_replay_num_tags--; - switch (le16_to_cpu(tl.fc_tag)) { + switch (tl.fc_tag) { case EXT4_FC_TAG_LINK: ret = ext4_fc_replay_link(sb, &tl, val); break; @@ -2116,19 +2121,18 @@ static int ext4_fc_replay(journal_t *journal, struct buffer_head *bh, break; case EXT4_FC_TAG_PAD: trace_ext4_fc_replay(sb, EXT4_FC_TAG_PAD, 0, - le16_to_cpu(tl.fc_len), 0); + tl.fc_len, 0); break; case EXT4_FC_TAG_TAIL: - trace_ext4_fc_replay(sb, EXT4_FC_TAG_TAIL, 0, - le16_to_cpu(tl.fc_len), 0); + trace_ext4_fc_replay(sb, EXT4_FC_TAG_TAIL, + 0, tl.fc_len, 0); memcpy(&tail, val, sizeof(tail)); WARN_ON(le32_to_cpu(tail.fc_tid) != expected_tid); break; case EXT4_FC_TAG_HEAD: break; default: - trace_ext4_fc_replay(sb, le16_to_cpu(tl.fc_tag), 0, - le16_to_cpu(tl.fc_len), 0); + trace_ext4_fc_replay(sb, tl.fc_tag, 0, tl.fc_len, 0); ret = -ECANCELED; break; } -- 2.39.2

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[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/5] *** Mainline PATCH backport ***
by Xinyu Zheng 03 Nov '25

03 Nov '25

Daniel Tang (1): ACPI: TAD: Add missing sysfs_remove_group() for ACPI_TAD_RT Huisong Li (1): ACPI: processor: idle: Fix memory leak when register cpuidle device failed Rafael J. Wysocki (1): PM: sleep: core: Clear power.must_resume in noirq suspend error path Sean Christopherson (2): x86/umip: Check that the instruction opcode is at least two bytes x86/umip: Fix decoding of register forms of 0F 01 (SGDT and SIDT aliases) arch/x86/kernel/umip.c | 15 +++++++++++++-- drivers/acpi/acpi_tad.c | 3 +++ drivers/acpi/processor_idle.c | 3 +++ drivers/base/power/main.c | 14 +++++++++++++- 4 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH openEuler-1.0] tty: vt: Fix vc_origin buffer copy overflow in fbcon_prepare_logo()
by Chen Jun 03 Nov '25

03 Nov '25

From: Wang ShaoBo <bobo.shaobowang(a)huawei.com> Offering: HULK hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: NA CVE: NA ---------------------------------------------------------------------- I got some KASAN report as below: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in fbcon_prepare_logo+0x61e/0xc90 Read of size 14 at addr ffff88812c9a4c38 by task syz.0.3549/19016 CPU: 0 PID: 19016 Comm: syz.0.3549 Not tainted 6.6.0+ #80 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x72/0xa0 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x6b/0x3d0 ? fbcon_prepare_logo+0x61e/0xc90 print_report+0xba/0x280 ? fbcon_prepare_logo+0x61e/0xc90 ? kasan_addr_to_slab+0xd/0xa0 ? fbcon_prepare_logo+0x61e/0xc90 kasan_report+0xaf/0xe0 ? fbcon_prepare_logo+0x61e/0xc90 kasan_check_range+0x100/0x1c0 __asan_memcpy+0x23/0x60 fbcon_prepare_logo+0x61e/0xc90 fbcon_init+0xeb9/0x1db0 ? __pfx_drm_fb_helper_set_par+0x10/0x10 visual_init+0x310/0x5c0 do_bind_con_driver.isra.0+0x627/0xbd0 store_bind+0x60b/0x710 ? __pfx_store_bind+0x10/0x10 dev_attr_store+0x5a/0x90 ? __pfx_dev_attr_store+0x10/0x10 sysfs_kf_write+0x145/0x1b0 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x367/0x580 ? __pfx_sysfs_kf_write+0x10/0x10 new_sync_write+0x1b1/0x2d0 ? __pfx_new_sync_write+0x10/0x10 ? rb_commit+0x121/0x910 ? avc_policy_seqno+0xe/0x20 ? selinux_file_permission+0x129/0x5d0 ? security_file_permission+0xa8/0x700 vfs_write+0x71a/0x960 ksys_write+0x12e/0x260 fbcon_init() -> vc_resize() //success resize vc_origin buffer size=224=7(cols)*2*16(rows) -> bcon_prepare_logo(vc, info, old_cols, old_rows, new_cols, new_rows) //old_cols=256，old_rows=4，new_cols=7，new_rows=16 There happened to be a vc_origin buffer copy overflow error in fbcon_prepare_logo(), scrolling screen down when using old cols after vc resize would trigger out of lower bound of vc_origin buffer. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Wang ShaoBo <bobo.shaobowang(a)huawei.com> Acked-by: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann(a)suse.de> --- drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c index f5178eefec64..83a4949e2497 100644 --- a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c +++ b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c @@ -592,6 +592,8 @@ static void fbcon_prepare_logo(struct vc_data *vc, struct fb_info *info, /* We can scroll screen down */ r = q - step - cols; for (cnt = rows - logo_lines; cnt > 0; cnt--) { + if (r < (unsigned short *) vc->vc_origin) + break; scr_memcpyw(r + step, r, vc->vc_size_row); r -= cols; } -- 2.22.0

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[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] *** SUBJECT HERE ***
by Zhao Yipeng 03 Nov '25

03 Nov '25

*** BLURB HERE *** Michael Chan (1): bnxt_en: Fix possible crash after creating sw mqprio TCs Sreekanth Reddy (1): bnxt_en: Fix memory corruption when FW resources change during ifdown drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c | 32 +++++++++++++------ drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.h | 1 + drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_dcb.c | 2 +- .../net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_ethtool.c | 4 +-- drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_xdp.c | 2 +- 5 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

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