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[PATCH] ext4: validate readdir offset before accessing dirent
by Yao Kai 14 Jul '26

14 Jul '26

hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/9553 CVE: NA ------------------------ A corrupted directory can trigger the following KASAN report when ext4_readdir() resumes from an invalid position: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __ext4_check_dir_entry+0x5ef/0x820 Read of size 2 at addr ffff88810a646000 by task repro_linear/509 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x53/0x70 print_report+0xd0/0x630 kasan_report+0xce/0x100 __ext4_check_dir_entry+0x5ef/0x820 ext4_readdir+0xcde/0x2b70 iterate_dir+0x1a1/0x520 __x64_sys_getdents64+0x12b/0x220 do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x540 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f </TASK> KASAN reports use-after-free because the out-of-bounds access lands in an adjacent freed page. The directory buffer itself is still referenced. ext4_dir_llseek() invalidates the directory cookie so that ext4_readdir() rescans directory entries from the start of the block. The rescan checks only the lower bound of rec_len before advancing. A corrupted rec_len can therefore place the offset where the block has insufficient space for a complete directory entry. The rescan itself may dereference that truncated entry, or the main loop may pass it to __ext4_check_dir_entry(). The latter reads de->rec_len before validating the range. For example: block offset 0 4092 4096 |---- de1.rec_len = 4092 -----|----| de2.inode | de2.rec_len ^ OOB, reported as UAF de2 starts at offset 4092 in this 4 KiB block. Its four-byte inode fits in the block, but its rec_len starts at offset 4096 and crosses the boundary. The minimum safe length is inode-dependent. Encrypted and casefolded directory entries need eight additional hash bytes, while a valid metadata checksum tail is only 12 bytes. Cache the metadata checksum feature state and derive the minimum directory entry length from the on-disk format. Use it to bound both the rescan and the offset passed to the main loop. Report an offset in a truncated block tail and skip the remainder of the block, while continuing to accept an offset exactly at the block boundary. Reported-by: syzbot+5322c5c260eb44d209ed(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=5322c5c260eb44d209ed Fixes: ac27a0ec112a ("[PATCH] ext4: initial copy of files from ext3") Signed-off-by: Yao Kai <yaokai34(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack(a)suse.cz> Reviewed-by: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang(a)huawei.com> --- fs/ext4/dir.c | 15 ++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/dir.c b/fs/ext4/dir.c index 513360234b14..c2e0b7c9562e 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/dir.c +++ b/fs/ext4/dir.c @@ -219,7 +219,9 @@ static int ext4_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) * dirent right now. Scan from the start of the block * to make sure. */ if (!inode_eq_iversion(inode, file->f_version)) { - for (i = 0; i < sb->s_blocksize && i < offset; ) { + for (i = 0; + i <= sb->s_blocksize - EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(1) && + i < offset;) { de = (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *) (bh->b_data + i); /* It's too expensive to do a full @@ -240,6 +242,16 @@ static int ext4_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) file->f_version = inode_query_iversion(inode); } + if (unlikely(offset < sb->s_blocksize && + offset > sb->s_blocksize - EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(1))) { + EXT4_ERROR_FILE(file, bh->b_blocknr, + "bad entry in directory: %s - offset=%u, size=%lu", + "directory entry too close to block end", + offset, sb->s_blocksize); + ctx->pos = round_up(ctx->pos, sb->s_blocksize); + goto next_block; + } + while (ctx->pos < inode->i_size && offset < sb->s_blocksize) { de = (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *) (bh->b_data + offset); @@ -285,6 +297,7 @@ static int ext4_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) ctx->pos += ext4_rec_len_from_disk(de->rec_len, sb->s_blocksize); } +next_block: if ((ctx->pos < inode->i_size) && !dir_relax_shared(inode)) goto done; brelse(bh); -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] fix CVE-2026-53132
by Jinjiang Tu 14 Jul '26

14 Jul '26

Eric Dumazet (1): vsock/virtio: fix potential unbounded skb queue Stefano Garzarella (1): vsock/virtio: fix skb overhead accounting to preserve full buf_alloc net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c | 11 ++++++++++- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) -- 2.43.0

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[PATCH] ext4: validate readdir offset before accessing dirent
by Yao Kai 14 Jul '26

14 Jul '26

hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/9553 CVE: NA ------------------------ A corrupted directory can trigger the following KASAN report when ext4_readdir() resumes from an invalid position: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __ext4_check_dir_entry+0x5ef/0x820 Read of size 2 at addr ffff88810a646000 by task repro_linear/509 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x53/0x70 print_report+0xd0/0x630 kasan_report+0xce/0x100 __ext4_check_dir_entry+0x5ef/0x820 ext4_readdir+0xcde/0x2b70 iterate_dir+0x1a1/0x520 __x64_sys_getdents64+0x12b/0x220 do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x540 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f </TASK> KASAN reports use-after-free because the out-of-bounds access lands in an adjacent freed page. The directory buffer itself is still referenced. ext4_dir_llseek() invalidates the directory cookie so that ext4_readdir() rescans directory entries from the start of the block. The rescan checks only the lower bound of rec_len before advancing. A corrupted rec_len can therefore place the offset where the block has insufficient space for a complete directory entry. The rescan itself may dereference that truncated entry, or the main loop may pass it to __ext4_check_dir_entry(). The latter reads de->rec_len before validating the range. For example: block offset 0 4092 4096 |---- de1.rec_len = 4092 -----|----| de2.inode | de2.rec_len ^ OOB, reported as UAF de2 starts at offset 4092 in this 4 KiB block. Its four-byte inode fits in the block, but its rec_len starts at offset 4096 and crosses the boundary. The minimum safe length is inode-dependent. Encrypted and casefolded directory entries need eight additional hash bytes, while a valid metadata checksum tail is only 12 bytes. Cache the metadata checksum feature state and derive the minimum directory entry length from the on-disk format. Use it to bound both the rescan and the offset passed to the main loop. Report an offset in a truncated block tail and skip the remainder of the block, while continuing to accept an offset exactly at the block boundary. Reported-by: syzbot+5322c5c260eb44d209ed(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=5322c5c260eb44d209ed Fixes: ac27a0ec112a ("[PATCH] ext4: initial copy of files from ext3") Signed-off-by: Yao Kai <yaokai34(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack(a)suse.cz> Reviewed-by: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang(a)huawei.com> --- fs/ext4/dir.c | 15 ++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/dir.c b/fs/ext4/dir.c index 5def57966807..9c5ff45bfd6b 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/dir.c +++ b/fs/ext4/dir.c @@ -216,7 +216,9 @@ static int ext4_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) * dirent right now. Scan from the start of the block * to make sure. */ if (!inode_eq_iversion(inode, file->f_version)) { - for (i = 0; i < sb->s_blocksize && i < offset; ) { + for (i = 0; + i <= sb->s_blocksize - EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(1) && + i < offset;) { de = (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *) (bh->b_data + i); /* It's too expensive to do a full @@ -237,6 +239,16 @@ static int ext4_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) file->f_version = inode_query_iversion(inode); } + if (unlikely(offset < sb->s_blocksize && + offset > sb->s_blocksize - EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(1))) { + EXT4_ERROR_FILE(file, bh->b_blocknr, + "bad entry in directory: %s - offset=%u, size=%lu", + "directory entry too close to block end", + offset, sb->s_blocksize); + ctx->pos = round_up(ctx->pos, sb->s_blocksize); + goto next_block; + } + while (ctx->pos < inode->i_size && offset < sb->s_blocksize) { de = (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *) (bh->b_data + offset); @@ -282,6 +294,7 @@ static int ext4_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) ctx->pos += ext4_rec_len_from_disk(de->rec_len, sb->s_blocksize); } +next_block: if ((ctx->pos < inode->i_size) && !dir_relax_shared(inode)) goto done; brelse(bh); -- 2.34.1

1 0

[PATCH OLK-6.6] zram: fix use-after-free in zram_bvec_write_partial()
by Jinjiang Tu 14 Jul '26

14 Jul '26

From: Cunlong Li <shenxiaogll(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.143 commit 0c2821665ff71be3f4b07ecece384669f2877f6a category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15870 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 732fd9f0b9c1cdc6dfd77162ded60df005182cc0 upstream. zram_read_page() picks the sync or async backing device read path based on whether the parent bio is NULL. zram_bvec_write_partial() passes its parent bio down, so for ZRAM_WB slots the read is dispatched asynchronously and zram_read_page() returns 0 while the bio is still in flight. The caller then runs memcpy_from_bvec(), zram_write_page() and __free_page() on the buffer, leaving the async read to write into a freed page. zram_bvec_read_partial() was switched to NULL in commit 4e3c87b9421d ("zram: fix synchronous reads") for the same reason; the write_partial counterpart was missed. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260528-zram-v3-1-cab86eef8764@gmail.com Fixes: 8e654f8fbff5 ("zram: read page from backing device") Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch(a)lst.de> Reviewed-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <senozhatsky(a)chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Cunlong Li <shenxiaogll(a)gmail.com> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk> Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan(a)kernel.org> Cc: Yisheng Xie <xieyisheng1(a)huawei.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Jinjiang Tu <tujinjiang(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/block/zram/zram_drv.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/block/zram/zram_drv.c b/drivers/block/zram/zram_drv.c index 8a0815b1e654..f048b5198df0 100644 --- a/drivers/block/zram/zram_drv.c +++ b/drivers/block/zram/zram_drv.c @@ -1554,7 +1554,7 @@ static int zram_bvec_write_partial(struct zram *zram, struct bio_vec *bvec, if (!page) return -ENOMEM; - ret = zram_read_page(zram, page, index, bio); + ret = zram_read_page(zram, page, index, NULL); if (!ret) { memcpy_from_bvec(page_address(page) + offset, bvec); ret = zram_write_page(zram, page, index); -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/2] Fix livepatch activation failure
by Tengda Wu 14 Jul '26

14 Jul '26

During KO compilation, the absence of the elfutils-devel package in the build environment results in the KO missing the ORC section. Consequently, after the KO is loaded, any resident kernel threads spawned by it cannot reliably unwind the stack, causing livepatch activation to fail. This is resolved by backporting the mainline patch [1]. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20210512065201.35268-1-masahiroy@kernel.org/ Masahiro Yamada (2): kbuild: hide tools/ build targets from external module builds kbuild: remove libelf checks from top Makefile Makefile | 104 +++++++++++++++-------------------------- scripts/Makefile.build | 2 - 2 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 68 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 3

[OLK-5.10 0/2] Avoid unreliable stack during activating livepatch
by Tengda Wu 13 Jul '26

13 Jul '26

Avoid unreliable stack during activating livepatch. Masahiro Yamada (2): kbuild: hide tools/ build targets from external module builds kbuild: remove libelf checks from top Makefile Makefile | 104 +++++++++++++++-------------------------- scripts/Makefile.build | 2 - 2 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 68 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

1 2

[PATCH OLK-6.6] perf/x86/amd/core: Avoid enabling BRS from the SVM reload path
by Luo Gengkun 13 Jul '26

13 Jul '26

From: Sandipan Das <sandipan.das(a)amd.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.2-rc3 commit 07c60dda9c059c09f83d42a3ebda2e7cc1cf3bc2 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/16080 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Branch Sampling (BRS) and Last Branch Record (LBR) are mutually exclusive hardware features, and users of both are tracked via cpuc->lbr_users. When SVM is toggled on a CPU, the host perf events are reprogrammed to update the HostOnly filter bit (set when virtualization is enabled, cleared when it is disabled). On PerfMonV2-capable processors, this reprogramming is performed by calling amd_pmu_enable_all() to rewrite the event selectors. However, amd_pmu_enable_all() also calls amd_brs_enable_all(), which enables BRS whenever cpuc->lbr_users > 0. Having active LBR events satisfies this gating on processors that have LBR but not BRS. The kernel then tries to set the BRS enable bit in DebugExtnCfg (MSR 0xc000010f). Since that bit is deprecated on such hardware, the write results in a #GP: Call Trace: <IRQ> amd_pmu_enable_all+0x1d/0x90 amd_pmu_disable_virt+0x62/0xb0 kvm_arch_disable_virtualization_cpu+0xa/0x40 [kvm] hardware_disable_nolock+0x1a/0x30 [kvm] __flush_smp_call_function_queue+0x9b/0x410 __sysvec_call_function+0x18/0xc0 sysvec_call_function+0x69/0x90 </IRQ> <TASK> asm_sysvec_call_function+0x16/0x20 RIP: 0010:cpuidle_enter_state+0xc4/0x450 ? cpuidle_enter_state+0xb7/0x450 cpuidle_enter+0x29/0x40 cpuidle_idle_call+0xf5/0x160 do_idle+0x7b/0xe0 cpu_startup_entry+0x26/0x30 start_secondary+0x115/0x140 secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0x194/0x19b </TASK> Fix this by ensuring that BRS is not enabled from the event selector reprogramming path even when cpuc->lbr_users > 0. Fixes: bae19fdd7e9e ("perf/x86/amd/core: Fix reloading events for SVM") Signed-off-by: Sandipan Das <sandipan.das(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/702fa204d574b03d14e3664c7d4b201db048bbfd.178350652… Signed-off-by: Luo Gengkun <luogengkun2(a)huawei.com> --- arch/x86/events/amd/core.c | 12 ++++++++---- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/events/amd/core.c b/arch/x86/events/amd/core.c index 5c93241b4262..5fbe0241a6eb 100644 --- a/arch/x86/events/amd/core.c +++ b/arch/x86/events/amd/core.c @@ -751,13 +751,11 @@ static void amd_pmu_enable_event(struct perf_event *event) x86_pmu_enable_event(event); } -static void amd_pmu_enable_all(int added) +static void __amd_pmu_enable_all(void) { struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc = this_cpu_ptr(&cpu_hw_events); int idx; - amd_brs_enable_all(); - for_each_set_bit(idx, x86_pmu.cntr_mask, X86_PMC_IDX_MAX) { /* only activate events which are marked as active */ if (!test_bit(idx, cpuc->active_mask)) @@ -772,6 +770,12 @@ static void amd_pmu_enable_all(int added) } } +static void amd_pmu_enable_all(int added) +{ + amd_brs_enable_all(); + __amd_pmu_enable_all(); +} + static void amd_pmu_v2_enable_event(struct perf_event *event) { struct hw_perf_event *hwc = &event->hw; @@ -1522,7 +1526,7 @@ static inline void amd_pmu_reload_virt(void) * set global enable bits once again */ amd_pmu_v2_disable_all(); - amd_pmu_enable_all(0); + __amd_pmu_enable_all(); amd_pmu_v2_enable_all(0); return; } -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] perf/x86/amd/core: Avoid enabling BRS from the SVM reload path
by Luo Gengkun 13 Jul '26

13 Jul '26

From: Sandipan Das <sandipan.das(a)amd.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.2-rc3 commit 07c60dda9c059c09f83d42a3ebda2e7cc1cf3bc2 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/ Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Branch Sampling (BRS) and Last Branch Record (LBR) are mutually exclusive hardware features, and users of both are tracked via cpuc->lbr_users. When SVM is toggled on a CPU, the host perf events are reprogrammed to update the HostOnly filter bit (set when virtualization is enabled, cleared when it is disabled). On PerfMonV2-capable processors, this reprogramming is performed by calling amd_pmu_enable_all() to rewrite the event selectors. However, amd_pmu_enable_all() also calls amd_brs_enable_all(), which enables BRS whenever cpuc->lbr_users > 0. Having active LBR events satisfies this gating on processors that have LBR but not BRS. The kernel then tries to set the BRS enable bit in DebugExtnCfg (MSR 0xc000010f). Since that bit is deprecated on such hardware, the write results in a #GP: Call Trace: <IRQ> amd_pmu_enable_all+0x1d/0x90 amd_pmu_disable_virt+0x62/0xb0 kvm_arch_disable_virtualization_cpu+0xa/0x40 [kvm] hardware_disable_nolock+0x1a/0x30 [kvm] __flush_smp_call_function_queue+0x9b/0x410 __sysvec_call_function+0x18/0xc0 sysvec_call_function+0x69/0x90 </IRQ> <TASK> asm_sysvec_call_function+0x16/0x20 RIP: 0010:cpuidle_enter_state+0xc4/0x450 ? cpuidle_enter_state+0xb7/0x450 cpuidle_enter+0x29/0x40 cpuidle_idle_call+0xf5/0x160 do_idle+0x7b/0xe0 cpu_startup_entry+0x26/0x30 start_secondary+0x115/0x140 secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0x194/0x19b </TASK> Fix this by ensuring that BRS is not enabled from the event selector reprogramming path even when cpuc->lbr_users > 0. Fixes: bae19fdd7e9e ("perf/x86/amd/core: Fix reloading events for SVM") Signed-off-by: Sandipan Das <sandipan.das(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/702fa204d574b03d14e3664c7d4b201db048bbfd.178350652… Signed-off-by: Luo Gengkun <luogengkun2(a)huawei.com> --- arch/x86/events/amd/core.c | 12 ++++++++---- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/events/amd/core.c b/arch/x86/events/amd/core.c index 5c93241b4262..5fbe0241a6eb 100644 --- a/arch/x86/events/amd/core.c +++ b/arch/x86/events/amd/core.c @@ -751,13 +751,11 @@ static void amd_pmu_enable_event(struct perf_event *event) x86_pmu_enable_event(event); } -static void amd_pmu_enable_all(int added) +static void __amd_pmu_enable_all(void) { struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc = this_cpu_ptr(&cpu_hw_events); int idx; - amd_brs_enable_all(); - for_each_set_bit(idx, x86_pmu.cntr_mask, X86_PMC_IDX_MAX) { /* only activate events which are marked as active */ if (!test_bit(idx, cpuc->active_mask)) @@ -772,6 +770,12 @@ static void amd_pmu_enable_all(int added) } } +static void amd_pmu_enable_all(int added) +{ + amd_brs_enable_all(); + __amd_pmu_enable_all(); +} + static void amd_pmu_v2_enable_event(struct perf_event *event) { struct hw_perf_event *hwc = &event->hw; @@ -1522,7 +1526,7 @@ static inline void amd_pmu_reload_virt(void) * set global enable bits once again */ amd_pmu_v2_disable_all(); - amd_pmu_enable_all(0); + __amd_pmu_enable_all(); amd_pmu_v2_enable_all(0); return; } -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] bpf, arm64: Fix off-by-one in check_imm signed range check
by Pan Taixi 12 Jul '26

12 Jul '26

From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.1-rc1 commit 1dd8be4ec722ce54e4cace59f3a4ba658111b3ec category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15738 CVE: CVE-2026-53036 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- check_imm(bits, imm) is used in the arm64 BPF JIT to verify that a branch displacement (in arm64 instruction units) fits into the signed N-bit immediate field of a B, B.cond or CBZ/CBNZ encoding before it is handed to the encoder. The macro currently tests for (imm > 0 && imm >> bits) || (imm < 0 && ~imm >> bits) which admits values in [-2^N, 2^N) — effectively a signed (N+1)-bit range. A signed N-bit field only holds [-2^(N-1), 2^(N-1)), so the check admits one extra bit of range on each side. In particular, for check_imm19(), values in [2^18, 2^19) slip past the check but do not fit into the 19-bit signed imm19 field of B.cond. aarch64_insn_encode_immediate() then masks the raw value into the 19-bit field, setting bit 18 (the sign bit) and flipping a forward branch into a backward one. Same class of issue exists for check_imm26() and the B/BL encoding. Shift by (bits - 1) instead of bits so the actual signed N-bit range is enforced. Fixes: e54bcde3d69d ("arm64: eBPF JIT compiler") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay(a)kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260415121403.639619-2-daniel@iogearbox.net Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c [ctx conflicts] Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui <pulehui(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Pan Taixi <pantaixi1(a)huawei.com> --- arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c index bb4c246aea96..2a6e0b80cae7 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +++ b/arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c @@ -595,12 +595,12 @@ static int build_insn(const struct bpf_insn *insn, struct jit_ctx *ctx, u8 dst_adj; int off_adj; int ret; #define check_imm(bits, imm) do { \ - if ((((imm) > 0) && ((imm) >> (bits))) || \ - (((imm) < 0) && (~(imm) >> (bits)))) { \ + if ((((imm) > 0) && ((imm) >> ((bits) - 1))) || \ + (((imm) < 0) && (~(imm) >> ((bits) - 1)))) { \ pr_info("[%2d] imm=%d(0x%x) out of range\n", \ i, imm, imm); \ return -EINVAL; \ } \ } while (0) -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10 00/14] CVE-2026-46054
by Cai Xinchen 10 Jul '26

10 Jul '26

ovl_open_realfile reletion code feature patch ("ovl: pass layer mnt to ovl_open_realfile: ovl_open_realfile reletion.") init_file code refactoring patch ("fs: move kmem_cache_zalloc() into alloc_empty_file*() helpers") backing_file structure and backing_file_open function reletion features: patch ("fs: use backing_file container for internal files with "fake" f_path") patch ("fs: move cleanup from init_file() into its callers") bpf_fd_pass const warning fix patch ("lsm: constify the 'file' parameter in security_binder_transfer_file()") code refactoring: store real path instead of fake path in backing file f_path patch ("fs: get mnt_writers count for an open backing file's real path") patch ("fs: create helper file_user_path() for user displayed mapped file path") patch ("fs: store real path instead of fake path in backing file f_path") patch ("ovl: Fix nested backing file paths") patch ("perf/core: Fix MMAP event path names with backing files") backing_file const warning fix patch ("fs: constify file ptr in backing_file accessor helpers") SELinux overlay backing_file mmap/mprotect check prepare for lsm function: patch ("fs: prepare for adding LSM blob to backing_file") patch ("lsm: add backing_file LSM hooks") CVE-2026-46054 fix: Add SELinux lsm hooks for backing_file mmap/mprotect patch ("selinux: fix overlayfs mmap() and mprotect() access checks") Adrian Hunter (1): perf/core: Fix MMAP event path names with backing files Amir Goldstein (9): [Backport] ovl: pass layer mnt to ovl_open_realfile() fs: move kmem_cache_zalloc() into alloc_empty_file*() helpers fs: use backing_file container for internal files with "fake" f_path fs: move cleanup from init_file() into its callers fs: get mnt_writers count for an open backing file's real path fs: create helper file_user_path() for user displayed mapped file path fs: store real path instead of fake path in backing file f_path fs: constify file ptr in backing_file accessor helpers fs: prepare for adding LSM blob to backing_file André Almeida (1): ovl: Fix nested backing file paths Khadija Kamran (1): lsm: constify the 'file' parameter in security_binder_transfer_file() Paul Moore (2): lsm: add backing_file LSM hooks selinux: fix overlayfs mmap() and mprotect() access checks arch/arc/kernel/troubleshoot.c | 6 +- fs/file_table.c | 139 ++++++++++++++--- fs/internal.h | 18 ++- fs/open.c | 76 ++++++--- fs/overlayfs/file.c | 34 ++-- fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h | 1 + fs/overlayfs/super.c | 16 +- fs/overlayfs/util.c | 14 ++ fs/proc/base.c | 2 +- fs/proc/nommu.c | 2 +- fs/proc/task_mmu.c | 4 +- fs/proc/task_nommu.c | 2 +- include/linux/fs.h | 44 +++++- include/linux/lsm_audit.h | 2 +- include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 7 +- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 1 + include/linux/security.h | 26 +++- kernel/events/core.c | 2 +- kernel/trace/trace_output.c | 2 +- security/security.c | 112 ++++++++++++- security/selinux/hooks.c | 250 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------- security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 11 ++ 22 files changed, 631 insertions(+), 140 deletions(-) -- 2.18.0.huawei.25

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