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[PATCH OLK-5.10] xfrm: ah: account for ESN high bits in async callbacks
by superdcc97＠163.com 04 Jun '26

04 Jun '26

From: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.1-rc3 commit ec54093e6a8f87e800bb6aa15eb7fc1e33faa524 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15434 CVE: CVE-2026-46193 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- AH allocates its temporary auth/ICV layout differently when ESN is enabled: the async ahash setup appends a 4-byte seqhi slot before the ICV or auth_data area, but the async completion callbacks still reconstruct the temporary layout as if seqhi were absent. With an async AH implementation selected, that makes AH copy or compare the wrong bytes on both the IPv4 and IPv6 paths. In UML repro on IPv4 AH with ESN and forced async hmac(sha1), ping fails with 100% packet loss, and the callback logs show the pre-fix drift: ah4 output_done: esn=1 err=0 icv_off=20 expected_off=24 ah4 input_done: esn=1 auth_off=20 expected_auth_off=24 icv_off=32 expected_icv_off=36 Reconstruct the callback-side layout the same way the setup path built it by skipping the ESN seqhi slot before locating the saved auth_data or ICV. Per RFC 4302, the ESN high-order 32 bits participate in the AH ICV computation, so the async callbacks must account for the seqhi slot. Post-fix, the same IPv4 AH+ESN+forced-async-hmac(sha1) UML repro shows the corrected offset (ah4 output_done: esn=1 err=0 icv_off=24 expected_off=24) and ping succeeds; net/ipv4/ah4.o and net/ipv6/ah6.o build clean at W=1. IPv6 AH+ESN was not exercised at runtime, and the change has not been tested against a real async hardware AH engine. Fixes: d4d573d0334d ("{IPv4,xfrm} Add ESN support for AH egress part") Fixes: d8b2a8600b0e ("{IPv4,xfrm} Add ESN support for AH ingress part") Fixes: 26dd70c3fad3 ("{IPv6,xfrm} Add ESN support for AH egress part") Fixes: 8d6da6f32557 ("{IPv6,xfrm} Add ESN support for AH ingress part") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5-4 Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert(a)secunet.com> Conflicts: net/ipv4/ah4.c net/ipv6/ah6.c [commit ec54093e6a8f and e77f5dd70138 changed function signatures and ah_tmp_icv() parameter count that differ between mainline and OLK-5.10. Adapted to preserve OLK-5.10's struct crypto_async_request *base parameter and 3-arg ah_tmp_icv().] Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- net/ipv4/ah4.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- net/ipv6/ah6.c | 16 +++++++++++++--- 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/ah4.c b/net/ipv4/ah4.c index 36ed85bf2ad5..819e9f5ab3bc 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/ah4.c +++ b/net/ipv4/ah4.c @@ -127,9 +127,14 @@ static void ah_output_done(struct crypto_async_request *base, int err) struct iphdr *top_iph = ip_hdr(skb); struct ip_auth_hdr *ah = ip_auth_hdr(skb); int ihl = ip_hdrlen(skb); + int seqhi_len = 0; + __be32 *seqhi; + if (x->props.flags & XFRM_STATE_ESN) + seqhi_len = sizeof(*seqhi); iph = AH_SKB_CB(skb)->tmp; - icv = ah_tmp_icv(ahp->ahash, iph, ihl); + seqhi = (__be32 *)((char *)iph + ihl); + icv = ah_tmp_icv(ahp->ahash, seqhi, seqhi_len); memcpy(ah->auth_data, icv, ahp->icv_trunc_len); top_iph->tos = iph->tos; @@ -273,12 +278,17 @@ static void ah_input_done(struct crypto_async_request *base, int err) struct ip_auth_hdr *ah = ip_auth_hdr(skb); int ihl = ip_hdrlen(skb); int ah_hlen = (ah->hdrlen + 2) << 2; + int seqhi_len = 0; + __be32 *seqhi; if (err) goto out; + if (x->props.flags & XFRM_STATE_ESN) + seqhi_len = sizeof(*seqhi); work_iph = AH_SKB_CB(skb)->tmp; - auth_data = ah_tmp_auth(work_iph, ihl); + seqhi = (__be32 *)((char *)work_iph + ihl); + auth_data = ah_tmp_auth(seqhi, seqhi_len); icv = ah_tmp_icv(ahp->ahash, auth_data, ahp->icv_trunc_len); err = crypto_memneq(icv, auth_data, ahp->icv_trunc_len) ? -EBADMSG : 0; diff --git a/net/ipv6/ah6.c b/net/ipv6/ah6.c index 080ee7f44c64..28cb2015ef08 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/ah6.c +++ b/net/ipv6/ah6.c @@ -295,14 +295,19 @@ static void ah6_output_done(struct crypto_async_request *base, int err) struct ipv6hdr *top_iph = ipv6_hdr(skb); struct ip_auth_hdr *ah = ip_auth_hdr(skb); struct tmp_ext *iph_ext; + int seqhi_len = 0; + __be32 *seqhi; extlen = skb_network_header_len(skb) - sizeof(struct ipv6hdr); if (extlen) extlen += sizeof(*iph_ext); + if (x->props.flags & XFRM_STATE_ESN) + seqhi_len = sizeof(*seqhi); iph_base = AH_SKB_CB(skb)->tmp; iph_ext = ah_tmp_ext(iph_base); - icv = ah_tmp_icv(ahp->ahash, iph_ext, extlen); + seqhi = (__be32 *)((char *)iph_ext + extlen); + icv = ah_tmp_icv(ahp->ahash, seqhi, seqhi_len); memcpy(ah->auth_data, icv, ahp->icv_trunc_len); memcpy(top_iph, iph_base, IPV6HDR_BASELEN); @@ -465,13 +470,18 @@ static void ah6_input_done(struct crypto_async_request *base, int err) struct ip_auth_hdr *ah = ip_auth_hdr(skb); int hdr_len = skb_network_header_len(skb); int ah_hlen = ipv6_authlen(ah); + int seqhi_len = 0; + __be32 *seqhi; if (err) goto out; + if (x->props.flags & XFRM_STATE_ESN) + seqhi_len = sizeof(*seqhi); work_iph = AH_SKB_CB(skb)->tmp; - auth_data = ah_tmp_auth(work_iph, hdr_len); - icv = ah_tmp_icv(ahp->ahash, auth_data, ahp->icv_trunc_len); + auth_data = ah_tmp_auth((u8 *)work_iph, hdr_len); + seqhi = (__be32 *)(auth_data + ahp->icv_trunc_len); + icv = ah_tmp_icv(ahp->ahash, seqhi, seqhi_len); err = crypto_memneq(icv, auth_data, ahp->icv_trunc_len) ? -EBADMSG : 0; if (err) -- 2.43.0

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[PATCH OLK-5.10] xfrm: fix ip_rt_bug race in icmp_route_lookup reverse path
by superdcc97＠163.com 04 Jun '26

04 Jun '26

From: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen(a)shopee.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.0-rc1 commit 81b84de32bb27ae1ae2eb9acf0420e9d0d14bf00 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15230 CVE: CVE-2026-45905 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- icmp_route_lookup() performs multiple route lookups to find a suitable route for sending ICMP error messages, with special handling for XFRM (IPsec) policies. The lookup sequence is: 1. First, lookup output route for ICMP reply (dst = original src) 2. Pass through xfrm_lookup() for policy check 3. If blocked (-EPERM) or dst is not local, enter "reverse path" 4. In reverse path, call xfrm_decode_session_reverse() to get fl4_dec which reverses the original packet's flow (saddr<->daddr swapped) 5. If fl4_dec.saddr is local (we are the original destination), use __ip_route_output_key() for output route lookup 6. If fl4_dec.saddr is NOT local (we are a forwarding node), use ip_route_input() to simulate the reverse packet's input path 7. Finally, pass rt2 through xfrm_lookup() with XFRM_LOOKUP_ICMP flag The bug occurs in step 6: ip_route_input() is called with fl4_dec.daddr (original packet's source) as destination. If this address becomes local between the initial check and ip_route_input() call (e.g., due to concurrent "ip addr add"), ip_route_input() returns a LOCAL route with dst.output set to ip_rt_bug. This route is then used for ICMP output, causing dst_output() to call ip_rt_bug(), triggering a WARN_ON: ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: net/ipv4/route.c:1275 at ip_rt_bug+0x21/0x30, CPU#1 Call Trace: <TASK> ip_push_pending_frames+0x202/0x240 icmp_push_reply+0x30d/0x430 __icmp_send+0x1149/0x24f0 ip_options_compile+0xa2/0xd0 ip_rcv_finish_core+0x829/0x1950 ip_rcv+0x2d7/0x420 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x185/0x1f0 netif_receive_skb+0x90/0x450 tun_get_user+0x3413/0x3fb0 tun_chr_write_iter+0xe4/0x220 ... Fix this by checking rt2->rt_type after ip_route_input(). If it's RTN_LOCAL, the route cannot be used for output, so treat it as an error. The reproducer requires kernel modification to widen the race window, making it unsuitable as a selftest. It is available at: https://gist.github.com/mrpre/eae853b72ac6a750f5d45d64ddac1e81 Reported-by: syzbot+e738404dcd14b620923c(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/000000000000b1060905eada8881@google.com/T/ Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260128090523.356953-1-jiayuan.chen@linux.dev Fixes: 8b7817f3a959 ("[IPSEC]: Add ICMP host relookup support") Signed-off-by: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen(a)shopee.com> Signed-off-by: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen(a)linux.dev> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260206050220.59642-1-jiayuan.chen@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> Conflicts: net/ipv4/icmp.c [commit e97e6a1830ddb ("net: Switch to skb_dstref_steal/skb_dstref_restore for ip_route_input callers") introduced skb_dstref_steal() / skb_dstref_restore() helpers which are not present in OLK-5.10.] Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- net/ipv4/icmp.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/ipv4/icmp.c b/net/ipv4/icmp.c index 6fdac117fe16..fbae7d556e24 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/icmp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/icmp.c @@ -555,6 +555,21 @@ static struct rtable *icmp_route_lookup(struct net *net, dst_release(&rt2->dst); rt2 = skb_rtable(skb_in); skb_in->_skb_refdst = orefdst; /* restore old refdst */ + + /* + * At this point, fl4_dec.daddr should NOT be local (we + * checked fl4_dec.saddr above). However, a race condition + * may occur if the address is added to the interface + * concurrently. In that case, ip_route_input() returns a + * LOCAL route with dst.output=ip_rt_bug, which must not + * be used for output. + */ + if (!err && rt2 && rt2->rt_type == RTN_LOCAL) { + net_warn_ratelimited("detected local route for %pI4 during ICMP sending, src %pI4\n", + &fl4_dec.daddr, &fl4_dec.saddr); + dst_release(&rt2->dst); + err = -EINVAL; + } } if (err) -- 2.43.0

2 2

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] mm: slab: fix double destroy of kmem_cache
by Jinjiang Tu 04 Jun '26

04 Jun '26

hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/9324 ---------------------------------------- When destroying kmem_cache A races with creating and destroying kmem_cache B which is mergeable with kmem_cache A, kmem_cache A may be destroyed twice, leading to NULL-ptr dereference. The race is as follows. CPU1 CPU2 destroy kmem_cache A create kmem_cache B refcount 1->0 __kmem_cache_alias A refcount 0->1 destroy kmem_cache B refcount 1->0 shutdown_cache shutdown_cache To fix it, check if s->memcg_params.dying is set when dropping refcount to zero, and only destroy the kmem_cache when s->memcg_params.dying isn't set. Fixes: d0ffe36fdd12 ("mm: slab: fix kmem_cache_create failed when sysfs node not destroyed") Signed-off-by: Jinjiang Tu <tujinjiang(a)huawei.com> --- mm/slab_common.c | 14 +++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/slab_common.c b/mm/slab_common.c index 89c2bb08a099..ad5b3a2cf2bb 100644 --- a/mm/slab_common.c +++ b/mm/slab_common.c @@ -837,11 +837,17 @@ static int shutdown_memcg_caches(struct kmem_cache *s) return 0; } -static void memcg_set_kmem_cache_dying(struct kmem_cache *s) +static int memcg_test_and_set_kmem_cache_dying(struct kmem_cache *s) { + int ret; + spin_lock_irq(&memcg_kmem_wq_lock); - s->memcg_params.dying = true; + ret = s->memcg_params.dying; + if (!ret) + s->memcg_params.dying = true; spin_unlock_irq(&memcg_kmem_wq_lock); + + return ret; } static void flush_memcg_workqueue(struct kmem_cache *s) @@ -890,7 +896,9 @@ void kmem_cache_destroy(struct kmem_cache *s) goto out_unlock; #ifdef CONFIG_MEMCG_KMEM - memcg_set_kmem_cache_dying(s); + err = memcg_test_and_set_kmem_cache_dying(s); + if (err) + goto out_unlock; mutex_unlock(&slab_mutex); -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS 0/3] *** fix CVE-2026-31527 ***
by Lin Ruifeng 04 Jun '26

04 Jun '26

*** fix CVE-2026-31527 *** Lin Ruifeng (3): Revert "driver/core: Fix kabi broken of platform_device/device/bus_type" Revert "driver core: platform: use generic driver_override infrastructure" Revert "driver core: generalize driver_override in struct device" drivers/base/bus.c | 49 +-------------------- drivers/base/core.c | 3 -- drivers/base/dd.c | 61 --------------------------- drivers/base/platform.c | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++--- drivers/slimbus/qcom-ngd-ctrl.c | 12 +----- include/linux/device.h | 75 --------------------------------- include/linux/platform_device.h | 7 +-- 7 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 209 deletions(-) -- 2.43.0

2 4

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] Fix CVE-2026-31709
by Zizhi Wo 03 Jun '26

03 Jun '26

Fix CVE-2026-31709 Michael Bommarito (2): smb: client: validate the whole DACL before rewriting it in cifsacl smb: client: scope end_of_dacl to CIFS_DEBUG2 use in parse_dacl fs/smb/client/cifsacl.c | 114 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 84 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-) -- 2.52.0

2 3

[PATCH OLK-6.6] smb: client: validate the whole DACL before rewriting it in cifsacl
by Zizhi Wo 03 Jun '26

03 Jun '26

From: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v7.0.2 commit b78db9bddc84136f6a0bb49e8883cf200dfb87a8 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14459 CVE: CVE-2026-31709 Reference: https://web.git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit… -------------------------------- commit 0a8cf165566ba55a39fd0f4de172119dd646d39a upstream. build_sec_desc() and id_mode_to_cifs_acl() derive a DACL pointer from a server-supplied dacloffset and then use the incoming ACL to rebuild the chmod/chown security descriptor. The original fix only checked that the struct smb_acl header fits before reading dacl_ptr->size or dacl_ptr->num_aces. That avoids the immediate header-field OOB read, but the rewrite helpers still walk ACEs based on pdacl->num_aces with no structural validation of the incoming DACL body. A malicious server can return a truncated DACL that still contains a header, claims one or more ACEs, and then drive replace_sids_and_copy_aces() or set_chmod_dacl() past the validated extent while they compare or copy attacker-controlled ACEs. Factor the DACL structural checks into validate_dacl(), extend them to validate each ACE against the DACL bounds, and use the shared validator before the chmod/chown rebuild paths. parse_dacl() reuses the same validator so the read-side parser and write-side rewrite paths agree on what constitutes a well-formed incoming DACL. Fixes: bc3e9dd9d104 ("cifs: Change SIDs in ACEs while transferring file ownership.") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-6 Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5-4 Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench(a)microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Conflicts: fs/smb/client/cifsacl.c [Because of commit 64e1ae59edaf ("[Backport] smb: client: validate dacloffset before building DACL pointers") merged, introduce dacl_offset_valid(), lead to some context conflicts, not affect this patch.] Signed-off-by: Zizhi Wo <wozizhi(a)huawei.com> --- fs/smb/client/cifsacl.c | 116 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 85 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/smb/client/cifsacl.c b/fs/smb/client/cifsacl.c index 7ec087896cac..4a82d11dfe4b 100644 --- a/fs/smb/client/cifsacl.c +++ b/fs/smb/client/cifsacl.c @@ -756,18 +756,89 @@ static void dump_ace(struct smb_ace *pace, char *end_of_acl) return; } #endif +static int validate_dacl(struct smb_acl *pdacl, char *end_of_acl) +{ + int i, ace_hdr_size, ace_size, min_ace_size; + u16 dacl_size, num_aces; + char *acl_base, *end_of_dacl; + struct smb_ace *pace; + + if (!pdacl) + return 0; + + if (end_of_acl < (char *)pdacl + sizeof(struct smb_acl)) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "ACL too small to parse DACL\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + + dacl_size = le16_to_cpu(pdacl->size); + if (dacl_size < sizeof(struct smb_acl) || + end_of_acl < (char *)pdacl + dacl_size) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "ACL too small to parse DACL\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + + num_aces = le16_to_cpu(pdacl->num_aces); + if (!num_aces) + return 0; + + ace_hdr_size = offsetof(struct smb_ace, sid) + + offsetof(struct smb_sid, sub_auth); + min_ace_size = ace_hdr_size + sizeof(__le32); + if (num_aces > (dacl_size - sizeof(struct smb_acl)) / min_ace_size) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "ACL too small to parse DACL\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + + end_of_dacl = (char *)pdacl + dacl_size; + acl_base = (char *)pdacl; + ace_size = sizeof(struct smb_acl); + + for (i = 0; i < num_aces; ++i) { + if (end_of_dacl - acl_base < ace_size) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "ACL too small to parse ACE\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + + pace = (struct smb_ace *)(acl_base + ace_size); + acl_base = (char *)pace; + + if (end_of_dacl - acl_base < ace_hdr_size || + pace->sid.num_subauth == 0 || + pace->sid.num_subauth > SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "ACL too small to parse ACE\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + + ace_size = ace_hdr_size + sizeof(__le32) * pace->sid.num_subauth; + if (end_of_dacl - acl_base < ace_size || + le16_to_cpu(pace->size) < ace_size) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "ACL too small to parse ACE\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + + ace_size = le16_to_cpu(pace->size); + if (end_of_dacl - acl_base < ace_size) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "ACL too small to parse ACE\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + } + + return 0; +} + static void parse_dacl(struct smb_acl *pdacl, char *end_of_acl, struct smb_sid *pownersid, struct smb_sid *pgrpsid, struct cifs_fattr *fattr, bool mode_from_special_sid) { int i; int num_aces = 0; int acl_size; - char *acl_base; + char *acl_base, *end_of_dacl; struct smb_ace **ppace; /* BB need to add parm so we can store the SID BB */ if (!pdacl) { @@ -775,63 +846,40 @@ static void parse_dacl(struct smb_acl *pdacl, char *end_of_acl, all the permissions for user/group/other */ fattr->cf_mode |= 0777; return; } - /* validate that we do not go past end of acl */ - if (end_of_acl < (char *)pdacl + sizeof(struct smb_acl) || - end_of_acl < (char *)pdacl + le16_to_cpu(pdacl->size)) { - cifs_dbg(VFS, "ACL too small to parse DACL\n"); + if (validate_dacl(pdacl, end_of_acl)) return; - } cifs_dbg(NOISY, "DACL revision %d size %d num aces %d\n", le16_to_cpu(pdacl->revision), le16_to_cpu(pdacl->size), le32_to_cpu(pdacl->num_aces)); /* reset rwx permissions for user/group/other. Also, if num_aces is 0 i.e. DACL has no ACEs, user/group/other have no permissions */ fattr->cf_mode &= ~(0777); + end_of_dacl = (char *)pdacl + le16_to_cpu(pdacl->size); acl_base = (char *)pdacl; acl_size = sizeof(struct smb_acl); num_aces = le32_to_cpu(pdacl->num_aces); if (num_aces > 0) { umode_t denied_mode = 0; - if (num_aces > (le16_to_cpu(pdacl->size) - sizeof(struct smb_acl)) / - (offsetof(struct smb_ace, sid) + - offsetof(struct smb_sid, sub_auth) + sizeof(__le16))) - return; - ppace = kmalloc_array(num_aces, sizeof(struct smb_ace *), GFP_KERNEL); if (!ppace) return; for (i = 0; i < num_aces; ++i) { - if (end_of_acl - acl_base < acl_size) - break; - ppace[i] = (struct smb_ace *) (acl_base + acl_size); - acl_base = (char *)ppace[i]; - acl_size = offsetof(struct smb_ace, sid) + - offsetof(struct smb_sid, sub_auth); - - if (end_of_acl - acl_base < acl_size || - ppace[i]->sid.num_subauth == 0 || - ppace[i]->sid.num_subauth > SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES || - (end_of_acl - acl_base < - acl_size + sizeof(__le32) * ppace[i]->sid.num_subauth) || - (le16_to_cpu(ppace[i]->size) < - acl_size + sizeof(__le32) * ppace[i]->sid.num_subauth)) - break; #ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_DEBUG2 - dump_ace(ppace[i], end_of_acl); + dump_ace(ppace[i], end_of_dacl); #endif if (mode_from_special_sid && (compare_sids(&(ppace[i]->sid), &sid_unix_NFS_mode) == 0)) { /* @@ -869,10 +917,11 @@ static void parse_dacl(struct smb_acl *pdacl, char *end_of_acl, /* memcpy((void *)(&(cifscred->aces[i])), (void *)ppace[i], sizeof(struct smb_ace)); */ + acl_base = (char *)ppace[i]; acl_size = le16_to_cpu(ppace[i]->size); } kfree(ppace); } @@ -1314,14 +1363,13 @@ static int build_sec_desc(struct smb_ntsd *pntsd, struct smb_ntsd *pnntsd, cifs_dbg(VFS, "Server returned illegal DACL offset\n"); return -EINVAL; } dacl_ptr = (struct smb_acl *)((char *)pntsd + dacloffset); - if (end_of_acl < (char *)dacl_ptr + le16_to_cpu(dacl_ptr->size)) { - cifs_dbg(VFS, "Server returned illegal ACL size\n"); - return -EINVAL; - } + rc = validate_dacl(dacl_ptr, end_of_acl); + if (rc) + return rc; } owner_sid_ptr = (struct smb_sid *)((char *)pntsd + le32_to_cpu(pntsd->osidoffset)); group_sid_ptr = (struct smb_sid *)((char *)pntsd + @@ -1694,10 +1742,16 @@ id_mode_to_cifs_acl(struct inode *inode, const char *path, __u64 *pnmode, rc = -EINVAL; goto id_mode_to_cifs_acl_exit; } dacl_ptr = (struct smb_acl *)((char *)pntsd + dacloffset); + rc = validate_dacl(dacl_ptr, (char *)pntsd + secdesclen); + if (rc) { + kfree(pntsd); + cifs_put_tlink(tlink); + return rc; + } if (mode_from_sid) nsecdesclen += le32_to_cpu(dacl_ptr->num_aces) * sizeof(struct smb_ace); else /* cifsacl */ nsecdesclen += le16_to_cpu(dacl_ptr->size); -- 2.52.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] dm-thin: fix metadata refcount underflow
by Zizhi Wo 03 Jun '26

03 Jun '26

From: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka(a)redhat.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.140 commit 12161e03d33afce781f68fa11cc6060538862fad category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15360 CVE: CVE-2026-46107 Reference: https://web.git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit… -------------------------------- commit 09a65adc7d8bbfce06392cb6d375468e2728ead5 upstream. There's a bug in dm-thin in the function rebalance_children. If the internal btree node has one entry, the code tries to copy all btree entries from the node's child to the node itself and then decrement the child's reference count. If the child node is shared (it has reference count > 1), we won't free it, so there would be two pointers to each of the grandchildren nodes. But the reference counts of the grandchildren is not increased, thus the reference count doesn't match the number of pointers that point to the grandchildren. This results in "device mapper: space map common: unable to decrement block" errors. Fix this bug by incrementing reference counts on the grandchildren if the btree node is shared. Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka(a)redhat.com> Fixes: 3241b1d3e0aa ("dm: add persistent data library") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Conflicts: drivers/md/persistent-data/dm-transaction-manager.c drivers/md/persistent-data/dm-transaction-manager.h [This kernel version does not have dm_tm_block_is_shared() function as commit 4eafdb1515a7 ("dm btree: improve btree residency") not merged. So the functionality of this function was implemented manually.] Signed-off-by: Zizhi Wo <wozizhi(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/md/persistent-data/dm-btree-remove.c | 8 ++++++++ drivers/md/persistent-data/dm-transaction-manager.c | 9 +++++++++ drivers/md/persistent-data/dm-transaction-manager.h | 7 +++++++ 3 files changed, 24 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/md/persistent-data/dm-btree-remove.c b/drivers/md/persistent-data/dm-btree-remove.c index 63f2baed3c8a..1cf31861020b 100644 --- a/drivers/md/persistent-data/dm-btree-remove.c +++ b/drivers/md/persistent-data/dm-btree-remove.c @@ -413,16 +413,24 @@ static int rebalance_children(struct shadow_spine *s, n = dm_block_data(shadow_current(s)); if (le32_to_cpu(n->header.nr_entries) == 1) { struct dm_block *child; + int is_shared; dm_block_t b = value64(n, 0); + r = dm_tm_block_is_shared(info->tm, b, &is_shared); + if (r) + return r; + r = dm_tm_read_lock(info->tm, b, &btree_node_validator, &child); if (r) return r; + if (is_shared) + inc_children(info->tm, dm_block_data(child), vt); + memcpy(n, dm_block_data(child), dm_bm_block_size(dm_tm_get_bm(info->tm))); dm_tm_dec(info->tm, dm_block_location(child)); dm_tm_unlock(info->tm, child); diff --git a/drivers/md/persistent-data/dm-transaction-manager.c b/drivers/md/persistent-data/dm-transaction-manager.c index 73f57977b2e3..eda9d7a02008 100644 --- a/drivers/md/persistent-data/dm-transaction-manager.c +++ b/drivers/md/persistent-data/dm-transaction-manager.c @@ -380,10 +380,19 @@ int dm_tm_ref(struct dm_transaction_manager *tm, dm_block_t b, return -EWOULDBLOCK; return dm_sm_get_count(tm->sm, b, result); } +int dm_tm_block_is_shared(struct dm_transaction_manager *tm, dm_block_t b, + int *result) +{ + if (tm->is_clone) + return -EWOULDBLOCK; + + return dm_sm_count_is_more_than_one(tm->sm, b, result); +} + struct dm_block_manager *dm_tm_get_bm(struct dm_transaction_manager *tm) { return tm->bm; } diff --git a/drivers/md/persistent-data/dm-transaction-manager.h b/drivers/md/persistent-data/dm-transaction-manager.h index f3a18be68f30..dbc6e4b13b06 100644 --- a/drivers/md/persistent-data/dm-transaction-manager.h +++ b/drivers/md/persistent-data/dm-transaction-manager.h @@ -104,10 +104,17 @@ void dm_tm_inc(struct dm_transaction_manager *tm, dm_block_t b); void dm_tm_dec(struct dm_transaction_manager *tm, dm_block_t b); int dm_tm_ref(struct dm_transaction_manager *tm, dm_block_t b, uint32_t *result); +/* + * Finds out if a given block is shared (ie. has a reference count higher + * than one). + */ +int dm_tm_block_is_shared(struct dm_transaction_manager *tm, dm_block_t b, + int *result); + struct dm_block_manager *dm_tm_get_bm(struct dm_transaction_manager *tm); /* * If you're using a non-blocking clone the tm will build up a list of * requested blocks that weren't in core. This call will request those -- 2.52.0

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[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS V1] RDMA/rxe: Fix double free in rxe_srq_from_init
by Cheng Yu 03 Jun '26

03 Jun '26

From: Jiasheng Jiang <jiashengjiangcool(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.0-rc1 commit 0beefd0e15d962f497aad750b2d5e9c3570b66d1 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15105 CVE: CVE-2026-45852 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- In rxe_srq_from_init(), the queue pointer 'q' is assigned to 'srq->rq.queue' before copying the SRQ number to user space. If copy_to_user() fails, the function calls rxe_queue_cleanup() to free the queue, but leaves the now-invalid pointer in 'srq->rq.queue'. The caller of rxe_srq_from_init() (rxe_create_srq) eventually calls rxe_srq_cleanup() upon receiving the error, which triggers a second rxe_queue_cleanup() on the same memory, leading to a double free. The call trace looks like this: kmem_cache_free+0x.../0x... rxe_queue_cleanup+0x1a/0x30 [rdma_rxe] rxe_srq_cleanup+0x42/0x60 [rdma_rxe] rxe_elem_release+0x31/0x70 [rdma_rxe] rxe_create_srq+0x12b/0x1a0 [rdma_rxe] ib_create_srq_user+0x9a/0x150 [ib_core] Fix this by moving 'srq->rq.queue = q' after copy_to_user. Fixes: aae0484e15f0 ("IB/rxe: avoid srq memory leak") Signed-off-by: Jiasheng Jiang <jiashengjiangcool(a)gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260112015412.29458-1-jiashengjiangcool@gmail.com Reviewed-by: Zhu Yanjun <yanjun.Zhu(a)linux.dev> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_srq.c [The conflict is caused by not having applied the patch cc28f351155d("RDMA/rxe: Fix rxe_modify_srq"). ] Signed-off-by: Cheng Yu <serein.chengyu(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_srq.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_srq.c b/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_srq.c index c41a5fee81f7..ec564e7010c4 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_srq.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_srq.c @@ -126,8 +126,6 @@ int rxe_srq_from_init(struct rxe_dev *rxe, struct rxe_srq *srq, return -ENOMEM; } - srq->rq.queue = q; - err = do_mmap_info(rxe, uresp ? &uresp->mi : NULL, context, q->buf, q->buf_size, &q->ip); if (err) { @@ -144,6 +142,8 @@ int rxe_srq_from_init(struct rxe_dev *rxe, struct rxe_srq *srq, } } + srq->rq.queue = q; + return 0; } -- 2.25.1

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[PATCH OLK-5.10] fs/ntfs3: Fix slab-out-of-bounds read in DeleteIndexEntryRoot
by Zizhi Wo 03 Jun '26

03 Jun '26

From: Jiasheng Jiang <jiashengjiangcool(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.15.202 commit 36c03f7f177b34d51f1cf1d2304b1074607bf4b0 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15173 CVE: CVE-2026-45935 Reference: https://web.git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit b2bc7c44ed1779fc9eaab9a186db0f0d01439622 ] In the 'DeleteIndexEntryRoot' case of the 'do_action' function, the entry size ('esize') is retrieved from the log record without adequate bounds checking. Specifically, the code calculates the end of the entry ('e2') using: e2 = Add2Ptr(e1, esize); It then calculates the size for memmove using 'PtrOffset(e2, ...)', which subtracts the end pointer from the buffer limit. If 'esize' is maliciously large, 'e2' exceeds the used buffer size. This results in a negative offset which, when cast to size_t for memmove, interprets as a massive unsigned integer, leading to a heap buffer overflow. This commit adds a check to ensure that the entry size ('esize') strictly fits within the remaining used space of the index header before performing memory operations. Fixes: b46acd6a6a62 ("fs/ntfs3: Add NTFS journal") Signed-off-by: Jiasheng Jiang <jiashengjiangcool(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich(a)paragon-software.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Zizhi Wo <wozizhi(a)huawei.com> --- fs/ntfs3/fslog.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/ntfs3/fslog.c b/fs/ntfs3/fslog.c index d1f48ffe846e..ef4e7dbc35cf 100644 --- a/fs/ntfs3/fslog.c +++ b/fs/ntfs3/fslog.c @@ -3435,10 +3435,13 @@ static int do_action(struct ntfs_log *log, struct OPEN_ATTR_ENRTY *oe, goto dirty_vol; } e1 = Add2Ptr(attr, le16_to_cpu(lrh->attr_off)); esize = le16_to_cpu(e1->size); + if (PtrOffset(e1, Add2Ptr(hdr, used)) < esize) + goto dirty_vol; + e2 = Add2Ptr(e1, esize); memmove(e1, e2, PtrOffset(e2, Add2Ptr(hdr, used))); le32_sub_cpu(&attr->res.data_size, esize); -- 2.52.0

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[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/3] CVEs
by Liu Kai 03 Jun '26

03 Jun '26

CVEs Chiara Meiohas (1): RDMA/mlx5: Fix UMR hang in LAG error state unload Jonathan McDowell (1): hwrng: core - Allow runtime disabling of the HW RNG Lianjie Wang (1): hwrng: core - use RCU and work_struct to fix race condition drivers/char/hw_random/core.c | 178 +++++++++++++++++---------- drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/main.c | 75 +++++++++-- drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/mlx5_ib.h | 2 + include/linux/hw_random.h | 2 + 4 files changed, 184 insertions(+), 73 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

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