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[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] RDMA/rxe: Copy WQE to local buffer in non-SRQ receive path
by Chen Jinghuang 24 Aug '26

24 Aug '26

From: Tristan Madani <tristmd(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.2-rc3 commit d6ab440240a04b8737ee4c7bb21af9182e451733 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/17929 Reference: https://web.git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/comm… -------------------------------- For non-SRQ QPs, the responder reads WQE fields directly from the shared queue buffer mapped into userspace. This allows a malicious user to modify fields like num_sge or sge entries while the kernel is processing the WQE, leading to out-of-bounds reads in rxe_resp_check_length() and copy_data(). Introduce get_recv_wqe() that validates num_sge and copies the WQE to a kernel-local buffer before processing, matching the approach already used for SRQ WQEs in get_srq_wqe(). The srq_wqe buffer is reused since SRQ and non-SRQ paths are mutually exclusive per QP. Fixes: 8700e3e7c485 ("Soft RoCE driver") Link: https://patch.msgid.link/r/20260518215040.1598586-3-tristan@talencesecurity… Signed-off-by: Tristan Madani <tristan(a)talencesecurity.com> Reviewed-by: Zhu Yanjun <yanjun.zhu(a)linux.dev> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg(a)nvidia.com> Conflicts: drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_resp.c [4.19 rxe_queue_head() takes a single argument (no QUEUE_TYPE_FROM_CLIENT) and the rxe_dbg_qp() debug macro does not exist in this tree; adapted to use queue_head(q) and pr_err().] Signed-off-by: Chen Jinghuang <chenjinghuang2(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_resp.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_resp.c b/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_resp.c index 9078cfd3b8bd..ad889e0b860a 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_resp.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_resp.c @@ -359,6 +359,29 @@ static enum resp_states get_srq_wqe(struct rxe_qp *qp) return RESPST_CHK_LENGTH; } +static enum resp_states rxe_get_recv_wqe(struct rxe_qp *qp) +{ + struct rxe_queue *q = qp->rq.queue; + struct rxe_recv_wqe *wqe; + unsigned int num_sge; + size_t size; + + wqe = queue_head(q); + if (!wqe) + return RESPST_ERR_RNR; + + num_sge = wqe->dma.num_sge; + if (unlikely(num_sge > qp->rq.max_sge)) { + pr_err("QP#%d invalid num_sge in recv WQE\n", qp_num(qp)); + return RESPST_ERR_MALFORMED_WQE; + } + size = sizeof(*wqe) + num_sge * sizeof(struct rxe_sge); + memcpy(&qp->resp.srq_wqe, wqe, size); + + qp->resp.wqe = &qp->resp.srq_wqe.wqe; + return RESPST_CHK_LENGTH; +} + static enum resp_states check_resource(struct rxe_qp *qp, struct rxe_pkt_info *pkt) { @@ -396,8 +419,7 @@ static enum resp_states check_resource(struct rxe_qp *qp, if (srq) return get_srq_wqe(qp); - qp->resp.wqe = queue_head(qp->rq.queue); - return (qp->resp.wqe) ? RESPST_CHK_LENGTH : RESPST_ERR_RNR; + return rxe_get_recv_wqe(qp); } return RESPST_CHK_LENGTH; -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] ipv4: validate IPV4_DEVCONF attributes properly
by JiangJieHua 24 Aug '26

24 Aug '26

mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.1-rc1 commit fa8fca88714c3a4a74f972ed37328e2f0bbef9fa category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/9803 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- The IPV4_DEVCONF_MC_FORWARDING counter is maintained by the kernel (vif_add/vif_delete), but inet_set_link_af() wrote it without any validation, allowing user space to set it to INT_MIN via RTM_NEWLINK + IFLA_INET_CONF. A following MRT_DEL_VIF then triggers a signed integer overflow in vif_delete(): UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in net/ipv4/ipmr.c:720 -2147483648 - 1 cannot be represented in type 'int' Backport of upstream commit fa8fca88714c ("ipv4: validate IPV4_DEVCONF attributes properly"), adapted for 4.19 which lacks NLA_REJECT and NLA_POLICY_RANGE. The upstream NLA_REJECT policy for MC_FORWARDING is equivalently implemented by an explicit check in inet_validate_link_af(). Signed-off-by: JiangJieHua <jiangjiehua1(a)huawei.com> --- net/ipv4/devinet.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/ipv4/devinet.c b/net/ipv4/devinet.c index 64f0fa0be370..70cbeacf8257 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/devinet.c +++ b/net/ipv4/devinet.c @@ -1796,6 +1796,9 @@ static int inet_validate_link_af(const struct net_device *dev, if (cfgid <= 0 || cfgid > IPV4_DEVCONF_MAX) return -EINVAL; + + if (cfgid == IPV4_DEVCONF_MC_FORWARDING) + return -EINVAL; } } -- 2.33.8

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[PATCH OLK-5.10] ipv4: validate IPV4_DEVCONF attributes properly
by JiangJieHua 24 Aug '26

24 Aug '26

From: Fernando Fernandez Mancera <fmancera(a)suse.de> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.1-rc1 commit fa8fca88714c3a4a74f972ed37328e2f0bbef9fa category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/9803 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- As the IPV4_DEVCONF netlink attributes are not being validated, it is possible to use netlink to set read-only values like mc_forwarding. In addition, valid ranges are not being validated neither but that is less relevant as they aren't in sysctl. To avoid similar situations in the future, define a NLA policy for IPV4_DEVCONF attributes which are nested in IFLA_INET_CONF. Signed-off-by: Fernando Fernandez Mancera <fmancera(a)suse.de> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260312142637.5704-1-fmancera@suse.de Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: JiangJieHua <jiangjiehua1(a)huawei.com> --- net/ipv4/devinet.c | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 44 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/devinet.c b/net/ipv4/devinet.c index 9ac7d47..6cacc8cc 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/devinet.c +++ b/net/ipv4/devinet.c @@ -1964,11 +1964,48 @@ static int inet_fill_link_af(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct net_device *dev, [IFLA_INET_CONF] = { .type = NLA_NESTED }, }; +static const struct nla_policy inet_devconf_policy[IPV4_DEVCONF_MAX + 1] = { + [IPV4_DEVCONF_FORWARDING] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 1), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_MC_FORWARDING] = { .type = NLA_REJECT }, + [IPV4_DEVCONF_PROXY_ARP] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 1), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_ACCEPT_REDIRECTS] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 1), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_SECURE_REDIRECTS] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 1), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_SEND_REDIRECTS] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 1), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_SHARED_MEDIA] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 1), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_RP_FILTER] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 2), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_ACCEPT_SOURCE_ROUTE] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 1), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_BOOTP_RELAY] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 1), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_LOG_MARTIANS] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 1), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_TAG] = { .type = NLA_U32 }, + [IPV4_DEVCONF_ARPFILTER] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 1), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_MEDIUM_ID] = NLA_POLICY_MIN(NLA_S32, -1), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_NOXFRM] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 1), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_NOPOLICY] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 1), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_FORCE_IGMP_VERSION] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 3), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_ARP_ANNOUNCE] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 2), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_ARP_IGNORE] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 8), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_PROMOTE_SECONDARIES] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 1), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_ARP_ACCEPT] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 2), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_ARP_NOTIFY] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 1), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_ACCEPT_LOCAL] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 1), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_SRC_VMARK] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 1), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_PROXY_ARP_PVLAN] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 1), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_ROUTE_LOCALNET] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 1), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_BC_FORWARDING] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 1), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_IGMPV2_UNSOLICITED_REPORT_INTERVAL] = { .type = NLA_U32 }, + [IPV4_DEVCONF_IGMPV3_UNSOLICITED_REPORT_INTERVAL] = { .type = NLA_U32 }, + [IPV4_DEVCONF_IGNORE_ROUTES_WITH_LINKDOWN] = + NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 1), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_DROP_UNICAST_IN_L2_MULTICAST] = + NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 1), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_DROP_GRATUITOUS_ARP] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 1), +}; + static int inet_validate_link_af(const struct net_device *dev, const struct nlattr *nla) { - struct nlattr *a, *tb[IFLA_INET_MAX+1]; - int err, rem; + struct nlattr *tb[IFLA_INET_MAX + 1], *nested_tb[IPV4_DEVCONF_MAX + 1]; + int err; if (dev && !__in_dev_get_rcu(dev)) return -EAFNOSUPPORT; @@ -1979,15 +2016,12 @@ static int inet_validate_link_af(const struct net_device *dev, return err; if (tb[IFLA_INET_CONF]) { - nla_for_each_nested(a, tb[IFLA_INET_CONF], rem) { - int cfgid = nla_type(a); + err = nla_parse_nested(nested_tb, IPV4_DEVCONF_MAX, + tb[IFLA_INET_CONF], inet_devconf_policy, + NULL); - if (nla_len(a) < 4) - return -EINVAL; - - if (cfgid <= 0 || cfgid > IPV4_DEVCONF_MAX) - return -EINVAL; - } + if (err < 0) + return err; } return 0; -- 1.8.3.1

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[PATCH OLK-5.10] tipc: fix slab-use-after-free Read in tipc_aead_decrypt_done
by Jinjiang Tu 24 Aug '26

24 Aug '26

From: Doruk Tan Ozturk <doruk(a)0sec.ai> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.260 commit 171d31245d11bf84836fad3b394cb465a4d008ec category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/16132 CVE: CVE-2026-63801 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit bda3348872a2ef0d19f2df6aa8cb5025adce2f20 upstream. tipc_aead_decrypt() goes straight from tipc_bearer_hold(b) to crypto_aead_decrypt(req) without taking a reference on the netns, unlike the encrypt path. When crypto_aead_decrypt() is offloaded asynchronously (e.g. the SIMD aead wrapper queuing to cryptd), the cryptd worker runs tipc_aead_decrypt_done() later. If the bearer's netns is torn down in the meantime, cleanup_net() -> tipc_exit_net() -> tipc_crypto_stop() frees the per-netns tipc_crypto, and the completion then reads it: tipc_aead_decrypt_done() dereferences aead->crypto->stats and aead->crypto->net, and tipc_crypto_rcv_complete() dereferences aead->crypto->aead[] and the node table -- reading freed memory. Decoded KASAN splat (v7.1-rc7, CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE + TIPC + TIPC_CRYPTO): BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in tipc_aead_decrypt_done (net/tipc/crypto.c:999) Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881056258a8 by task kworker/u16:2/51 Workqueue: events_unbound Call Trace: tipc_aead_decrypt_done (net/tipc/crypto.c:999) process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3314) worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3397 kernel/workqueue.c:3478) kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436) ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158) ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245) Allocated by task 169: __kasan_kmalloc (mm/kasan/common.c:398 mm/kasan/common.c:415) tipc_crypto_start (net/tipc/crypto.c:1502) tipc_init_net (net/tipc/core.c:72) ops_init (net/core/net_namespace.c:137) setup_net (net/core/net_namespace.c:446) copy_net_ns (net/core/net_namespace.c:579) create_new_namespaces (kernel/nsproxy.c:132) __x64_sys_unshare (kernel/fork.c:3316) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121) Freed by task 8: kfree (mm/slub.c:6566) tipc_exit_net (net/tipc/core.c:119) cleanup_net (net/core/net_namespace.c:704) process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3314) kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436) This is the same class of bug that commit e279024617134 ("net/tipc: fix slab-use-after-free Read in tipc_aead_encrypt_done") fixed for the encrypt side. The encrypt path takes maybe_get_net(aead->crypto->net) before crypto_aead_encrypt() and drops it with put_net() on the synchronous return paths and in tipc_aead_encrypt_done(); the -EINPROGRESS/-EBUSY return keeps the reference for the async callback to release. The decrypt path was left without the equivalent guard. Mirror the encrypt-side fix on the decrypt path: take a net reference before crypto_aead_decrypt() (failing with -ENODEV and the matching bearer put if it cannot be acquired), keep it across the -EINPROGRESS/-EBUSY async return, and drop it with put_net() on the synchronous success/error return and at the end of tipc_aead_decrypt_done(). Reproduced under KASAN on v7.1-rc7: a UDP bearer with a cluster key is flooded with crafted encrypted frames from an unknown peer (driving the cluster-key decrypt path) while the bearer's netns is repeatedly torn down. The completion must run asynchronously to outlive tipc_crypto_stop(); on x86 the stock aesni gcm(aes) now decrypts synchronously, so the async path was exercised via cryptd offload. The unguarded aead->crypto dereference in tipc_aead_decrypt_done() is the unpatched upstream path; tipc_aead_decrypt() still lacks maybe_get_net(aead->crypto->net), so the completion can outlive the free on any config where crypto_aead_decrypt() goes async. Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai) Fixes: fc1b6d6de220 ("tipc: introduce TIPC encryption & authentication") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Doruk Tan Ozturk <doruk(a)0sec.ai> Reviewed-by: Alexander Lobakin <aleksander.lobakin(a)intel.com> Reviewed-by: Tung Nguyen <tung.quang.nguyen(a)est.tech> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms(a)kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260617075818.37431-1-doruk@0sec.ai Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Jinjiang Tu <tujinjiang(a)huawei.com> --- net/tipc/crypto.c | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/tipc/crypto.c b/net/tipc/crypto.c index 86dbc4ddc1dc..5e8dd0693b8b 100644 --- a/net/tipc/crypto.c +++ b/net/tipc/crypto.c @@ -954,12 +954,20 @@ static int tipc_aead_decrypt(struct net *net, struct tipc_aead *aead, goto exit; } + /* Get net to avoid freed tipc_crypto when delete namespace */ + if (!maybe_get_net(net)) { + tipc_bearer_put(b); + rc = -ENODEV; + goto exit; + } + /* Now, do decrypt */ rc = crypto_aead_decrypt(req); if (rc == -EINPROGRESS || rc == -EBUSY) return rc; tipc_bearer_put(b); + put_net(net); exit: kfree(ctx); @@ -997,6 +1005,7 @@ static void tipc_aead_decrypt_done(struct crypto_async_request *base, int err) } tipc_bearer_put(b); + put_net(net); } static inline int tipc_ehdr_size(struct tipc_ehdr *ehdr) -- 2.43.0

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[PATCH OLK-5.10] tipc: fix out-of-bounds read in broadcast Gap ACK blocks
by Jinjiang Tu 24 Aug '26

24 Aug '26

From: Samuel Page <sam(a)bynar.io> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.261 commit 055663d21dc4336f67933ab26bef3c5934be6324 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/16741 CVE: CVE-2026-64450 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 2b66974a1b6134a4bbc3bfed181f7418f688eb54 upstream. A broadcast PROTOCOL/STATE_MSG can carry a Gap ACK blocks record in its data area. tipc_get_gap_ack_blks() only verifies that the record's len field is self-consistent with its ugack_cnt/bgack_cnt counts (sz == struct_size(p, gacks, ugack_cnt + bgack_cnt)); it does not check that the record actually fits in the message data area, msg_data_sz(). The unicast caller tipc_link_proto_rcv() bounds it ("if (glen > dlen) break;"), but the broadcast caller tipc_bcast_sync_rcv() discards the returned size, so tipc_link_advance_transmq() copies the record off the receive skb with an attacker-controlled count: this_ga = kmemdup(ga, struct_size(ga, gacks, ga->bgack_cnt), GFP_ATOMIC); A TIPC neighbour that negotiated TIPC_GAP_ACK_BLOCK triggers it with one ordinary broadcast STATE_MSG (msg_bc_ack_invalid() clear), sized so its data area is short, carrying a Gap ACK record with len = 0x400, bgack_cnt = 0xff and ugack_cnt = 0. len then equals struct_size(p, gacks, 255), so the consistency check passes and ga is non-NULL; kmemdup() reads struct_size(ga, gacks, 255) = 1024 bytes out of the much smaller skb: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kmemdup_noprof+0x48/0x60 Read of size 1024 at addr ffff0000c7030d38 by task poc864/69 Call trace: kmemdup_noprof+0x48/0x60 tipc_link_advance_transmq+0x86c/0xb80 tipc_link_bc_ack_rcv+0x19c/0x1e0 tipc_bcast_sync_rcv+0x1c4/0x2c4 tipc_rcv+0x85c/0x1340 tipc_l2_rcv_msg+0xac/0x104 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff0000c7030d00 which belongs to the cache skbuff_small_head of size 704 The buggy address is located 56 bytes inside of allocated 704-byte region [ffff0000c7030d00, ffff0000c7030fc0) The copied-out bytes are subsequently consumed as gap/ack values, but the read is already out of bounds at the kmemdup() regardless of how they are used. The unicast STATE path drops such a message: "if (glen > dlen) break;" skips the rest of STATE_MSG handling and the skb is freed. Make the broadcast path drop it too. tipc_bcast_sync_rcv() now bounds the record against msg_data_sz() and, when it does not fit, reports it back through tipc_node_bc_sync_rcv() to tipc_rcv() so the skb is discarded rather than processed. ga is not cleared on this path: ga == NULL already means "legacy peer without Selective ACK", a distinct legitimate state. Fixes: d7626b5acff9 ("tipc: introduce Gap ACK blocks for broadcast link") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Samuel Page <sam(a)bynar.io> Reviewed-by: Tung Nguyen <tung.quang.nguyen(a)est.tech> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260625143815.1525412-1-sam@bynar.io Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Jinjiang Tu <tujinjiang(a)huawei.com> --- net/tipc/bcast.c | 22 ++++++++++++++-------- net/tipc/bcast.h | 2 +- net/tipc/node.c | 15 ++++++++++++--- 3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/tipc/bcast.c b/net/tipc/bcast.c index 593846d25214..631b98097dba 100644 --- a/net/tipc/bcast.c +++ b/net/tipc/bcast.c @@ -497,12 +497,13 @@ void tipc_bcast_ack_rcv(struct net *net, struct tipc_link *l, */ int tipc_bcast_sync_rcv(struct net *net, struct tipc_link *l, struct tipc_msg *hdr, - struct sk_buff_head *retrq) + struct sk_buff_head *retrq, bool *valid) { struct sk_buff_head *inputq = &tipc_bc_base(net)->inputq; struct tipc_gap_ack_blks *ga; struct sk_buff_head xmitq; int rc = 0; + u16 glen; __skb_queue_head_init(&xmitq); @@ -510,13 +511,18 @@ int tipc_bcast_sync_rcv(struct net *net, struct tipc_link *l, if (msg_type(hdr) != STATE_MSG) { tipc_link_bc_init_rcv(l, hdr); } else if (!msg_bc_ack_invalid(hdr)) { - tipc_get_gap_ack_blks(&ga, l, hdr, false); - if (!sysctl_tipc_bc_retruni) - retrq = &xmitq; - rc = tipc_link_bc_ack_rcv(l, msg_bcast_ack(hdr), - msg_bc_gap(hdr), ga, &xmitq, - retrq); - rc |= tipc_link_bc_sync_rcv(l, hdr, &xmitq); + glen = tipc_get_gap_ack_blks(&ga, l, hdr, false); + if (glen > msg_data_sz(hdr)) { + /* Malformed Gap ACK blocks; caller drops the msg */ + *valid = false; + } else { + if (!sysctl_tipc_bc_retruni) + retrq = &xmitq; + rc = tipc_link_bc_ack_rcv(l, msg_bcast_ack(hdr), + msg_bc_gap(hdr), ga, &xmitq, + retrq); + rc |= tipc_link_bc_sync_rcv(l, hdr, &xmitq); + } } tipc_bcast_unlock(net); diff --git a/net/tipc/bcast.h b/net/tipc/bcast.h index 2d9352dc7b0e..55d17b5413e1 100644 --- a/net/tipc/bcast.h +++ b/net/tipc/bcast.h @@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ void tipc_bcast_ack_rcv(struct net *net, struct tipc_link *l, struct tipc_msg *hdr); int tipc_bcast_sync_rcv(struct net *net, struct tipc_link *l, struct tipc_msg *hdr, - struct sk_buff_head *retrq); + struct sk_buff_head *retrq, bool *valid); int tipc_nl_add_bc_link(struct net *net, struct tipc_nl_msg *msg, struct tipc_link *bcl); int tipc_nl_bc_link_set(struct net *net, struct nlattr *attrs[]); diff --git a/net/tipc/node.c b/net/tipc/node.c index 5f6866407be5..8e52b2995817 100644 --- a/net/tipc/node.c +++ b/net/tipc/node.c @@ -1804,12 +1804,15 @@ static void tipc_node_mcast_rcv(struct tipc_node *n) } static void tipc_node_bc_sync_rcv(struct tipc_node *n, struct tipc_msg *hdr, - int bearer_id, struct sk_buff_head *xmitq) + int bearer_id, struct sk_buff_head *xmitq, + bool *valid) { struct tipc_link *ucl; int rc; - rc = tipc_bcast_sync_rcv(n->net, n->bc_entry.link, hdr, xmitq); + rc = tipc_bcast_sync_rcv(n->net, n->bc_entry.link, hdr, xmitq, valid); + if (!*valid) + return; if (rc & TIPC_LINK_DOWN_EVT) { tipc_node_reset_links(n); @@ -2111,12 +2114,18 @@ void tipc_rcv(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb, struct tipc_bearer *b) /* Ensure broadcast reception is in synch with peer's send state */ if (unlikely(usr == LINK_PROTOCOL)) { + bool valid = true; + if (unlikely(skb_linearize(skb))) { tipc_node_put(n); goto discard; } hdr = buf_msg(skb); - tipc_node_bc_sync_rcv(n, hdr, bearer_id, &xmitq); + tipc_node_bc_sync_rcv(n, hdr, bearer_id, &xmitq, &valid); + if (!valid) { + tipc_node_put(n); + goto discard; + } } else if (unlikely(tipc_link_acked(n->bc_entry.link) != bc_ack)) { tipc_bcast_ack_rcv(net, n->bc_entry.link, hdr); } -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] sctp: fix race between sctp_wait_for_connect and peeloff
by Jinjiang Tu 24 Aug '26

24 Aug '26

From: Zhenghang Xiao <kipreyyy(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.259 commit 0e0d5bc76fd4267a71334fcc8f1a5fbcf997845d category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/16296 CVE: CVE-2026-63971 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit f14fe6395a8b3d961a61e138ad7b36ba3626dd4e ] sctp_wait_for_connect() drops and re-acquires the socket lock while waiting for the association to reach ESTABLISHED state. During this window, another thread can peeloff the association to a new socket via getsockopt(SCTP_SOCKOPT_PEELOFF), changing asoc->base.sk. After re-acquiring the old socket lock, sctp_wait_for_connect() returns success without noticing the migration — the caller then accesses the association under the wrong lock in sctp_datamsg_from_user(). Add the same sk != asoc->base.sk check that sctp_wait_for_sndbuf() already has, returning an error if the association was migrated while we slept. Fixes: 668c9beb9020 ("sctp: implement assign_number for sctp_stream_interleave") Signed-off-by: Zhenghang Xiao <kipreyyy(a)gmail.com> Acked-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin(a)gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260527032411.60959-1-kipreyyy@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jinjiang Tu <tujinjiang(a)huawei.com> --- net/sctp/socket.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/sctp/socket.c b/net/sctp/socket.c index 8a18aa451e47..0ee6c5616321 100644 --- a/net/sctp/socket.c +++ b/net/sctp/socket.c @@ -9099,6 +9099,8 @@ static int sctp_wait_for_connect(struct sctp_association *asoc, long *timeo_p) release_sock(sk); current_timeo = schedule_timeout(current_timeo); lock_sock(sk); + if (sk != asoc->base.sk) + goto do_error; *timeo_p = current_timeo; } -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] ipv4: validate IPV4_DEVCONF attributes properly
by JiangJieHua 21 Aug '26

21 Aug '26

From: Fernando Fernandez Mancera <fmancera(a)suse.de> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.1-rc1 commit fa8fca88714c3a4a74f972ed37328e2f0bbef9fa category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/9803 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- mainline inclusion from mainline-vundefined commit fa8fca88714c3a4a74f972ed37328e2f0bbef9fa category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/9803 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- As the IPV4_DEVCONF netlink attributes are not being validated, it is possible to use netlink to set read-only values like mc_forwarding. In addition, valid ranges are not being validated neither but that is less relevant as they aren't in sysctl. To avoid similar situations in the future, define a NLA policy for IPV4_DEVCONF attributes which are nested in IFLA_INET_CONF. Signed-off-by: Fernando Fernandez Mancera <fmancera(a)suse.de> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260312142637.5704-1-fmancera@suse.de Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: JiangJieHua <jiangjiehua1(a)huawei.com> --- net/ipv4/devinet.c | 55 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 45 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/devinet.c b/net/ipv4/devinet.c index 798497c..a5111e5 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/devinet.c +++ b/net/ipv4/devinet.c @@ -2004,12 +2004,50 @@ static int inet_fill_link_af(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct net_device *dev, [IFLA_INET_CONF] = { .type = NLA_NESTED }, }; +static const struct nla_policy inet_devconf_policy[IPV4_DEVCONF_MAX + 1] = { + [IPV4_DEVCONF_FORWARDING] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 1), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_MC_FORWARDING] = { .type = NLA_REJECT }, + [IPV4_DEVCONF_PROXY_ARP] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 1), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_ACCEPT_REDIRECTS] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 1), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_SECURE_REDIRECTS] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 1), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_SEND_REDIRECTS] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 1), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_SHARED_MEDIA] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 1), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_RP_FILTER] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 2), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_ACCEPT_SOURCE_ROUTE] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 1), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_BOOTP_RELAY] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 1), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_LOG_MARTIANS] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 1), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_TAG] = { .type = NLA_U32 }, + [IPV4_DEVCONF_ARPFILTER] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 1), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_MEDIUM_ID] = NLA_POLICY_MIN(NLA_S32, -1), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_NOXFRM] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 1), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_NOPOLICY] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 1), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_FORCE_IGMP_VERSION] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 3), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_ARP_ANNOUNCE] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 2), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_ARP_IGNORE] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 8), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_PROMOTE_SECONDARIES] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 1), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_ARP_ACCEPT] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 2), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_ARP_NOTIFY] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 1), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_ACCEPT_LOCAL] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 1), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_SRC_VMARK] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 1), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_PROXY_ARP_PVLAN] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 1), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_ROUTE_LOCALNET] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 1), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_BC_FORWARDING] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 1), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_IGMPV2_UNSOLICITED_REPORT_INTERVAL] = { .type = NLA_U32 }, + [IPV4_DEVCONF_IGMPV3_UNSOLICITED_REPORT_INTERVAL] = { .type = NLA_U32 }, + [IPV4_DEVCONF_IGNORE_ROUTES_WITH_LINKDOWN] = + NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 1), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_DROP_UNICAST_IN_L2_MULTICAST] = + NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 1), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_DROP_GRATUITOUS_ARP] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 1), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_ARP_EVICT_NOCARRIER] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 1), +}; + static int inet_validate_link_af(const struct net_device *dev, const struct nlattr *nla, struct netlink_ext_ack *extack) { - struct nlattr *a, *tb[IFLA_INET_MAX+1]; - int err, rem; + struct nlattr *tb[IFLA_INET_MAX + 1], *nested_tb[IPV4_DEVCONF_MAX + 1]; + int err; if (dev && !__in_dev_get_rtnl(dev)) return -EAFNOSUPPORT; @@ -2020,15 +2058,12 @@ static int inet_validate_link_af(const struct net_device *dev, return err; if (tb[IFLA_INET_CONF]) { - nla_for_each_nested(a, tb[IFLA_INET_CONF], rem) { - int cfgid = nla_type(a); + err = nla_parse_nested(nested_tb, IPV4_DEVCONF_MAX, + tb[IFLA_INET_CONF], inet_devconf_policy, + extack); - if (nla_len(a) < 4) - return -EINVAL; - - if (cfgid <= 0 || cfgid > IPV4_DEVCONF_MAX) - return -EINVAL; - } + if (err < 0) + return err; } return 0; -- 1.8.3.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] RDMA/rxe: Copy WQE to local buffer in non-SRQ receive path
by Chen Jinghuang 21 Aug '26

21 Aug '26

From: Tristan Madani <tristmd(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.2-rc3 commit d6ab440240a04b8737ee4c7bb21af9182e451733 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/17929 Reference: https://web.git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/comm… -------------------------------- For non-SRQ QPs, the responder reads WQE fields directly from the shared queue buffer mapped into userspace. This allows a malicious user to modify fields like num_sge or sge entries while the kernel is processing the WQE, leading to out-of-bounds reads in rxe_resp_check_length() and copy_data(). Introduce get_recv_wqe() that validates num_sge and copies the WQE to a kernel-local buffer before processing, matching the approach already used for SRQ WQEs in get_srq_wqe(). The srq_wqe buffer is reused since SRQ and non-SRQ paths are mutually exclusive per QP. Fixes: 8700e3e7c485 ("Soft RoCE driver") Link: https://patch.msgid.link/r/20260518215040.1598586-3-tristan@talencesecurity… Signed-off-by: Tristan Madani <tristan(a)talencesecurity.com> Reviewed-by: Zhu Yanjun <yanjun.zhu(a)linux.dev> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg(a)nvidia.com> Conflicts: drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_resp.c [context conflict] Signed-off-by: Chen Jinghuang <chenjinghuang2(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_resp.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_resp.c b/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_resp.c index 9078cfd3b8bd..be5510ac9159 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_resp.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_resp.c @@ -359,6 +359,29 @@ static enum resp_states get_srq_wqe(struct rxe_qp *qp) return RESPST_CHK_LENGTH; } +static enum resp_states rxe_get_recv_wqe(struct rxe_qp *qp) +{ + struct rxe_queue *q = qp->rq.queue; + struct rxe_recv_wqe *wqe; + unsigned int num_sge; + size_t size; + + wqe = queue_head(q, QUEUE_TYPE_FROM_CLIENT); + if (!wqe) + return RESPST_ERR_RNR; + + num_sge = wqe->dma.num_sge; + if (unlikely(num_sge > qp->rq.max_sge)) { + rxe_dbg_qp(qp, "invalid num_sge in recv WQE\n"); + return RESPST_ERR_MALFORMED_WQE; + } + size = sizeof(*wqe) + num_sge * sizeof(struct rxe_sge); + memcpy(&qp->resp.srq_wqe, wqe, size); + + qp->resp.wqe = &qp->resp.srq_wqe.wqe; + return RESPST_CHK_LENGTH; +} + static enum resp_states check_resource(struct rxe_qp *qp, struct rxe_pkt_info *pkt) { @@ -396,8 +419,7 @@ static enum resp_states check_resource(struct rxe_qp *qp, if (srq) return get_srq_wqe(qp); - qp->resp.wqe = queue_head(qp->rq.queue); - return (qp->resp.wqe) ? RESPST_CHK_LENGTH : RESPST_ERR_RNR; + return rxe_get_recv_wqe(qp); } return RESPST_CHK_LENGTH; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] tracing/probes: Reject $arg0 in meta argument expansion
by Chen Yuxi 21 Aug '26

21 Aug '26

mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.2-rc6 commit 00a8ce2a2a9fa17674e1feec4d9105c1a5d6a419 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/9801 Reference: https://web.git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/comm… -------------------------------- traceprobe_expand_meta_args() parses $argN with simple_strtoul() and calls sprint_nth_btf_arg(n - 1, ...). For $arg0, n is 0 so the index is -1. Because ctx->nr_params is signed, the "idx >= nr_params" guard in sprint_nth_btf_arg() does not catch the negative index, and ctx->params[-1].name_off is read out of bounds. The normal per-argument path (parse_probe_vars()) already rejects $arg0 via its argument-number check, but meta-argument expansion runs before per-argument parsing and substitutes the value first, bypassing that check. Reject $arg0 explicitly during expansion. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260724054435.146279-1-raushan.jhon@gmail.com/ Fixes: 18b1e870a496 ("tracing/probes: Add $arg* meta argument for all function args") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Raushan Patel <raushan.jhon(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: kernel/trace/trace_probe.c [commit 4af0532a0f4799d5944ea966c10890dcb4390d19 is not backport] Signed-off-by: Chen Yuxi <chenyuxi19(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/trace/trace_probe.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_probe.c b/kernel/trace/trace_probe.c index 7a49f45d41a2..041ae2b454d3 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/trace_probe.c +++ b/kernel/trace/trace_probe.c @@ -1565,7 +1565,12 @@ const char **traceprobe_expand_meta_args(int argc, const char *argv[], ret = -ENOENT; goto error; } - /* Note: $argN starts from $arg1 */ + /* Note: $argN starts from $arg1, so $arg0 is invalid. */ + if (n == 0) { + trace_probe_log_err(0, BAD_ARG_NUM); + ret = -EINVAL; + goto error; + } ret = sprint_nth_btf_arg(n - 1, type, buf + used, bufsize - used, ctx); if (ret < 0) -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] tracing/probes: Reject $arg0 in meta argument expansion
by Chen Yuxi 21 Aug '26

21 Aug '26

mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.2-rc6 commit 00a8ce2a2a9fa17674e1feec4d9105c1a5d6a419 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/9801 Reference: https://web.git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/comm… -------------------------------- traceprobe_expand_meta_args() parses $argN with simple_strtoul() and calls sprint_nth_btf_arg(n - 1, ...). For $arg0, n is 0 so the index is -1. Because ctx->nr_params is signed, the "idx >= nr_params" guard in sprint_nth_btf_arg() does not catch the negative index, and ctx->params[-1].name_off is read out of bounds. The normal per-argument path (parse_probe_vars()) already rejects $arg0 via its argument-number check, but meta-argument expansion runs before per-argument parsing and substitutes the value first, bypassing that check. Reject $arg0 explicitly during expansion. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260724054435.146279-1-raushan.jhon@gmail.com/ Fixes: 18b1e870a496 ("tracing/probes: Add $arg* meta argument for all function args") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Raushan Patel <raushan.jhon(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: kernel/trace/trace_probe.c [commit 4af0532a0f4799d5944ea966c10890dcb4390d19 is not backport] Signed-off-by: Chen Yuxi <chenyuxi19(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/trace/trace_probe.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_probe.c b/kernel/trace/trace_probe.c index 7a49f45d41a2..8980f4ecd020 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/trace_probe.c +++ b/kernel/trace/trace_probe.c @@ -1565,7 +1565,11 @@ const char **traceprobe_expand_meta_args(int argc, const char *argv[], ret = -ENOENT; goto error; } - /* Note: $argN starts from $arg1 */ + /* Note: $argN starts from $arg1, so $arg0 is invalid. */ + if (n == 0) { + trace_probe_log_err(0, BAD_ARG_NUM); + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + } ret = sprint_nth_btf_arg(n - 1, type, buf + used, bufsize - used, ctx); if (ret < 0) -- 2.34.1

2 1