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[PATCH OLK-5.10] apparmor: fix race on rawdata dereference
by Yi Yang 08 Apr '26

08 Apr '26

From: John Johansen <john.johansen(a)canonical.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.0-rc4 commit a0b7091c4de45a7325c8780e6934a894f92ac86b category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14041 CVE: CVE-2026-23410 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- There is a race condition that leads to a use-after-free situation: because the rawdata inodes are not refcounted, an attacker can start open()ing one of the rawdata files, and at the same time remove the last reference to this rawdata (by removing the corresponding profile, for example), which frees its struct aa_loaddata; as a result, when seq_rawdata_open() is reached, i_private is a dangling pointer and freed memory is accessed. The rawdata inodes weren't refcounted to avoid a circular refcount and were supposed to be held by the profile rawdata reference. However during profile removal there is a window where the vfs and profile destruction race, resulting in the use after free. Fix this by moving to a double refcount scheme. Where the profile refcount on rawdata is used to break the circular dependency. Allowing for freeing of the rawdata once all inode references to the rawdata are put. Fixes: 5d5182cae401 ("apparmor: move to per loaddata files, instead of replicating in profiles") Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa(a)qualys.com> Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia(a)canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Maxime Bélair <maxime.belair(a)canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can <cengiz.can(a)canonical.com> Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil(a)debian.org> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen(a)canonical.com> Conflicts: security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c [Commit d61c57fde819 ("apparmor: make export of raw binary profile to userspace optional") was not merged. Context conflicts.] security/apparmor/include/policy_unpack.h [Commit b11e51dd7094 ("apparmor: test: make static symbols visible during i kunit testing") was not merged. Context conflicts.] security/apparmor/policy.c [Commit d61c57fde819 ("apparmor: make export of raw binary profile to userspace optional") was not merged. Context conflicts.] Signed-off-by: Yi Yang <yiyang13(a)huawei.com> --- security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c | 35 +++++++----- security/apparmor/include/policy_unpack.h | 70 ++++++++++++++--------- security/apparmor/policy.c | 12 ++-- security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c | 32 ++++++++--- 4 files changed, 92 insertions(+), 57 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c index 0900fd07def7..e034d3346f82 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c +++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c @@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ static void rawdata_f_data_free(struct rawdata_f_data *private) if (!private) return; - aa_put_loaddata(private->loaddata); + aa_put_i_loaddata(private->loaddata); kvfree(private); } @@ -401,7 +401,8 @@ static struct aa_loaddata *aa_simple_write_to_buffer(const char __user *userbuf, data->size = copy_size; if (copy_from_user(data->data, userbuf, copy_size)) { - aa_put_loaddata(data); + /* trigger free - don't need to put pcount */ + aa_put_i_loaddata(data); return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT); } @@ -429,7 +430,10 @@ static ssize_t policy_update(u32 mask, const char __user *buf, size_t size, error = PTR_ERR(data); if (!IS_ERR(data)) { error = aa_replace_profiles(ns, label, mask, data); - aa_put_loaddata(data); + /* put pcount, which will put count and free if no + * profiles referencing it. + */ + aa_put_profile_loaddata(data); } end_section: end_current_label_crit_section(label); @@ -500,7 +504,7 @@ static ssize_t profile_remove(struct file *f, const char __user *buf, if (!IS_ERR(data)) { data->data[size] = 0; error = aa_remove_profiles(ns, label, data->data, size); - aa_put_loaddata(data); + aa_put_profile_loaddata(data); } out: end_current_label_crit_section(label); @@ -1225,18 +1229,17 @@ static const struct file_operations seq_rawdata_ ##NAME ##_fops = { \ static int seq_rawdata_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file, int (*show)(struct seq_file *, void *)) { - struct aa_loaddata *data = __aa_get_loaddata(inode->i_private); + struct aa_loaddata *data = aa_get_i_loaddata(inode->i_private); int error; if (!data) - /* lost race this ent is being reaped */ return -ENOENT; error = single_open(file, show, data); if (error) { AA_BUG(file->private_data && ((struct seq_file *)file->private_data)->private); - aa_put_loaddata(data); + aa_put_i_loaddata(data); } return error; @@ -1247,7 +1250,7 @@ static int seq_rawdata_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) struct seq_file *seq = (struct seq_file *) file->private_data; if (seq) - aa_put_loaddata(seq->private); + aa_put_i_loaddata(seq->private); return single_release(inode, file); } @@ -1366,9 +1369,8 @@ static int rawdata_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) if (!policy_view_capable(NULL)) return -EACCES; - loaddata = __aa_get_loaddata(inode->i_private); + loaddata = aa_get_i_loaddata(inode->i_private); if (!loaddata) - /* lost race: this entry is being reaped */ return -ENOENT; private = rawdata_f_data_alloc(loaddata->size); @@ -1393,7 +1395,7 @@ static int rawdata_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) return error; fail_private_alloc: - aa_put_loaddata(loaddata); + aa_put_i_loaddata(loaddata); return error; } @@ -1410,9 +1412,9 @@ static void remove_rawdata_dents(struct aa_loaddata *rawdata) for (i = 0; i < AAFS_LOADDATA_NDENTS; i++) { if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(rawdata->dents[i])) { - /* no refcounts on i_private */ aafs_remove(rawdata->dents[i]); rawdata->dents[i] = NULL; + aa_put_i_loaddata(rawdata); } } } @@ -1451,18 +1453,21 @@ int __aa_fs_create_rawdata(struct aa_ns *ns, struct aa_loaddata *rawdata) if (IS_ERR(dir)) /* ->name freed when rawdata freed */ return PTR_ERR(dir); + aa_get_i_loaddata(rawdata); rawdata->dents[AAFS_LOADDATA_DIR] = dir; dent = aafs_create_file("abi", S_IFREG | 0444, dir, rawdata, &seq_rawdata_abi_fops); if (IS_ERR(dent)) goto fail; + aa_get_i_loaddata(rawdata); rawdata->dents[AAFS_LOADDATA_ABI] = dent; dent = aafs_create_file("revision", S_IFREG | 0444, dir, rawdata, &seq_rawdata_revision_fops); if (IS_ERR(dent)) goto fail; + aa_get_i_loaddata(rawdata); rawdata->dents[AAFS_LOADDATA_REVISION] = dent; if (aa_g_hash_policy) { @@ -1470,6 +1475,7 @@ int __aa_fs_create_rawdata(struct aa_ns *ns, struct aa_loaddata *rawdata) rawdata, &seq_rawdata_hash_fops); if (IS_ERR(dent)) goto fail; + aa_get_i_loaddata(rawdata); rawdata->dents[AAFS_LOADDATA_HASH] = dent; } @@ -1478,24 +1484,25 @@ int __aa_fs_create_rawdata(struct aa_ns *ns, struct aa_loaddata *rawdata) &seq_rawdata_compressed_size_fops); if (IS_ERR(dent)) goto fail; + aa_get_i_loaddata(rawdata); rawdata->dents[AAFS_LOADDATA_COMPRESSED_SIZE] = dent; dent = aafs_create_file("raw_data", S_IFREG | 0444, dir, rawdata, &rawdata_fops); if (IS_ERR(dent)) goto fail; + aa_get_i_loaddata(rawdata); rawdata->dents[AAFS_LOADDATA_DATA] = dent; d_inode(dent)->i_size = rawdata->size; rawdata->ns = aa_get_ns(ns); list_add(&rawdata->list, &ns->rawdata_list); - /* no refcount on inode rawdata */ return 0; fail: remove_rawdata_dents(rawdata); - + aa_put_i_loaddata(rawdata); return PTR_ERR(dent); } diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy_unpack.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy_unpack.h index e0e1ca7ebc38..ff122fd156de 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/policy_unpack.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy_unpack.h @@ -46,17 +46,29 @@ enum { AAFS_LOADDATA_NDENTS /* count of entries */ }; -/* - * struct aa_loaddata - buffer of policy raw_data set +/* struct aa_loaddata - buffer of policy raw_data set + * @count: inode/filesystem refcount - use aa_get_i_loaddata() + * @pcount: profile refcount - use aa_get_profile_loaddata() + * @list: list the loaddata is on + * @work: used to do a delayed cleanup + * @dents: refs to dents created in aafs + * @ns: the namespace this loaddata was loaded into + * @name: + * @size: the size of the data that was loaded + * @compressed_size: the size of the data when it is compressed + * @revision: unique revision count that this data was loaded as + * @abi: the abi number the loaddata uses + * @hash: a hash of the loaddata, used to help dedup data * - * there is no loaddata ref for being on ns list, nor a ref from - * d_inode(@dentry) when grab a ref from these, @ns->lock must be held - * && __aa_get_loaddata() needs to be used, and the return value - * checked, if NULL the loaddata is already being reaped and should be - * considered dead. + * There is no loaddata ref for being on ns->rawdata_list, so + * @ns->lock must be held when walking the list. Dentries and + * inode opens hold refs on @count; profiles hold refs on @pcount. + * When the last @pcount drops, do_ploaddata_rmfs() removes the + * fs entries and drops the associated @count ref. */ struct aa_loaddata { struct kref count; + struct kref pcount; struct list_head list; struct work_struct work; struct dentry *dents[AAFS_LOADDATA_NDENTS]; @@ -78,50 +90,52 @@ struct aa_loaddata { int aa_unpack(struct aa_loaddata *udata, struct list_head *lh, const char **ns); /** - * __aa_get_loaddata - get a reference count to uncounted data reference + * aa_get_loaddata - get a reference count from a counted data reference * @data: reference to get a count on * - * Returns: pointer to reference OR NULL if race is lost and reference is - * being repeated. - * Requires: @data->ns->lock held, and the return code MUST be checked - * - * Use only from inode->i_private and @data->list found references + * Returns: pointer to reference + * Requires: @data to have a valid reference count on it. It is a bug + * if the race to reap can be encountered when it is used. */ static inline struct aa_loaddata * -__aa_get_loaddata(struct aa_loaddata *data) +aa_get_i_loaddata(struct aa_loaddata *data) { - if (data && kref_get_unless_zero(&(data->count))) - return data; - return NULL; + if (data) + kref_get(&(data->count)); + return data; } /** - * aa_get_loaddata - get a reference count from a counted data reference + * aa_get_profile_loaddata - get a profile reference count on loaddata * @data: reference to get a count on * - * Returns: point to reference - * Requires: @data to have a valid reference count on it. It is a bug - * if the race to reap can be encountered when it is used. + * Returns: pointer to reference + * Requires: @data to have a valid reference count on it. */ static inline struct aa_loaddata * -aa_get_loaddata(struct aa_loaddata *data) +aa_get_profile_loaddata(struct aa_loaddata *data) { - struct aa_loaddata *tmp = __aa_get_loaddata(data); - - AA_BUG(data && !tmp); - - return tmp; + if (data) + kref_get(&(data->pcount)); + return data; } void __aa_loaddata_update(struct aa_loaddata *data, long revision); bool aa_rawdata_eq(struct aa_loaddata *l, struct aa_loaddata *r); void aa_loaddata_kref(struct kref *kref); +void aa_ploaddata_kref(struct kref *kref); struct aa_loaddata *aa_loaddata_alloc(size_t size); -static inline void aa_put_loaddata(struct aa_loaddata *data) +static inline void aa_put_i_loaddata(struct aa_loaddata *data) { if (data) kref_put(&data->count, aa_loaddata_kref); } +static inline void aa_put_profile_loaddata(struct aa_loaddata *data) +{ + if (data) + kref_put(&data->pcount, aa_ploaddata_kref); +} + #endif /* __POLICY_INTERFACE_H */ diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c index e5f501f89803..3175094aa42b 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/policy.c +++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c @@ -241,7 +241,7 @@ void aa_free_profile(struct aa_profile *profile) } kfree_sensitive(profile->hash); - aa_put_loaddata(profile->rawdata); + aa_put_profile_loaddata(profile->rawdata); aa_label_destroy(&profile->label); kfree_sensitive(profile); @@ -899,7 +899,7 @@ ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(struct aa_ns *policy_ns, struct aa_label *label, LIST_HEAD(lh); op = mask & AA_MAY_REPLACE_POLICY ? OP_PROF_REPL : OP_PROF_LOAD; - aa_get_loaddata(udata); + aa_get_profile_loaddata(udata); /* released below */ error = aa_unpack(udata, &lh, &ns_name); if (error) @@ -949,10 +949,10 @@ ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(struct aa_ns *policy_ns, struct aa_label *label, if (aa_rawdata_eq(rawdata_ent, udata)) { struct aa_loaddata *tmp; - tmp = __aa_get_loaddata(rawdata_ent); + tmp = aa_get_profile_loaddata(rawdata_ent); /* check we didn't fail the race */ if (tmp) { - aa_put_loaddata(udata); + aa_put_profile_loaddata(udata); udata = tmp; break; } @@ -962,7 +962,7 @@ ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(struct aa_ns *policy_ns, struct aa_label *label, list_for_each_entry(ent, &lh, list) { struct aa_policy *policy; - ent->new->rawdata = aa_get_loaddata(udata); + ent->new->rawdata = aa_get_profile_loaddata(udata); error = __lookup_replace(ns, ent->new->base.hname, !(mask & AA_MAY_REPLACE_POLICY), &ent->old, &info); @@ -1076,7 +1076,7 @@ ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(struct aa_ns *policy_ns, struct aa_label *label, out: aa_put_ns(ns); - aa_put_loaddata(udata); + aa_put_profile_loaddata(udata); kfree(ns_name); if (error) diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c index 6c2a536173b5..33f5eabd47f1 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c +++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c @@ -147,34 +147,47 @@ bool aa_rawdata_eq(struct aa_loaddata *l, struct aa_loaddata *r) return memcmp(l->data, r->data, r->compressed_size ?: r->size) == 0; } +static void do_loaddata_free(struct aa_loaddata *d) +{ + kfree_sensitive(d->hash); + kfree_sensitive(d->name); + kvfree(d->data); + kfree_sensitive(d); +} + +void aa_loaddata_kref(struct kref *kref) +{ + struct aa_loaddata *d = container_of(kref, struct aa_loaddata, count); + + do_loaddata_free(d); +} + /* * need to take the ns mutex lock which is NOT safe most places that * put_loaddata is called, so we have to delay freeing it */ -static void do_loaddata_free(struct work_struct *work) +static void do_ploaddata_rmfs(struct work_struct *work) { struct aa_loaddata *d = container_of(work, struct aa_loaddata, work); struct aa_ns *ns = aa_get_ns(d->ns); if (ns) { mutex_lock_nested(&ns->lock, ns->level); + /* remove fs ref to loaddata */ __aa_fs_remove_rawdata(d); mutex_unlock(&ns->lock); aa_put_ns(ns); } - - kfree_sensitive(d->hash); - kfree_sensitive(d->name); - kvfree(d->data); - kfree_sensitive(d); + /* called by dropping last pcount, so drop its associated icount */ + aa_put_i_loaddata(d); } -void aa_loaddata_kref(struct kref *kref) +void aa_ploaddata_kref(struct kref *kref) { - struct aa_loaddata *d = container_of(kref, struct aa_loaddata, count); + struct aa_loaddata *d = container_of(kref, struct aa_loaddata, pcount); if (d) { - INIT_WORK(&d->work, do_loaddata_free); + INIT_WORK(&d->work, do_ploaddata_rmfs); schedule_work(&d->work); } } @@ -192,6 +205,7 @@ struct aa_loaddata *aa_loaddata_alloc(size_t size) return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); } kref_init(&d->count); + kref_init(&d->pcount); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&d->list); return d; -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] PM: runtime: Fix a race condition related to device removal
by Lin Ruifeng 08 Apr '26

08 Apr '26

From: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche(a)acm.org> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.130 commit 39f2d86f2ddde8d1beda05732f30c7cd945e0b5a category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14092 CVE: CVE-2026-23452 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 29ab768277617452d88c0607c9299cdc63b6e9ff ] The following code in pm_runtime_work() may dereference the dev->parent pointer after the parent device has been freed: /* Maybe the parent is now able to suspend. */ if (parent && !parent->power.ignore_children) { spin_unlock(&dev->power.lock); spin_lock(&parent->power.lock); rpm_idle(parent, RPM_ASYNC); spin_unlock(&parent->power.lock); spin_lock(&dev->power.lock); } Fix this by inserting a flush_work() call in pm_runtime_remove(). Without this patch blktest block/001 triggers the following complaint sporadically: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in lock_acquire+0x70/0x160 Read of size 1 at addr ffff88812bef7198 by task kworker/u553:1/3081 Workqueue: pm pm_runtime_work Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x61/0x80 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x8b/0x310 print_report+0xfd/0x1d7 kasan_report+0xd8/0x1d0 __kasan_check_byte+0x42/0x60 lock_acquire.part.0+0x38/0x230 lock_acquire+0x70/0x160 _raw_spin_lock+0x36/0x50 rpm_suspend+0xc6a/0xfe0 rpm_idle+0x578/0x770 pm_runtime_work+0xee/0x120 process_one_work+0xde3/0x1410 worker_thread+0x5eb/0xfe0 kthread+0x37b/0x480 ret_from_fork+0x6cb/0x920 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 </TASK> Allocated by task 4314: kasan_save_stack+0x2a/0x50 kasan_save_track+0x18/0x40 kasan_save_alloc_info+0x3d/0x50 __kasan_kmalloc+0xa0/0xb0 __kmalloc_noprof+0x311/0x990 scsi_alloc_target+0x122/0xb60 [scsi_mod] __scsi_scan_target+0x101/0x460 [scsi_mod] scsi_scan_channel+0x179/0x1c0 [scsi_mod] scsi_scan_host_selected+0x259/0x2d0 [scsi_mod] store_scan+0x2d2/0x390 [scsi_mod] dev_attr_store+0x43/0x80 sysfs_kf_write+0xde/0x140 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x3ef/0x670 vfs_write+0x506/0x1470 ksys_write+0xfd/0x230 __x64_sys_write+0x76/0xc0 x64_sys_call+0x213/0x1810 do_syscall_64+0xee/0xfc0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 Freed by task 4314: kasan_save_stack+0x2a/0x50 kasan_save_track+0x18/0x40 kasan_save_free_info+0x3f/0x50 __kasan_slab_free+0x67/0x80 kfree+0x225/0x6c0 scsi_target_dev_release+0x3d/0x60 [scsi_mod] device_release+0xa3/0x220 kobject_cleanup+0x105/0x3a0 kobject_put+0x72/0xd0 put_device+0x17/0x20 scsi_device_dev_release+0xacf/0x12c0 [scsi_mod] device_release+0xa3/0x220 kobject_cleanup+0x105/0x3a0 kobject_put+0x72/0xd0 put_device+0x17/0x20 scsi_device_put+0x7f/0xc0 [scsi_mod] sdev_store_delete+0xa5/0x120 [scsi_mod] dev_attr_store+0x43/0x80 sysfs_kf_write+0xde/0x140 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x3ef/0x670 vfs_write+0x506/0x1470 ksys_write+0xfd/0x230 __x64_sys_write+0x76/0xc0 x64_sys_call+0x213/0x1810 Reported-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei(a)redhat.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZxdNvLNI8QaOfD2d@fedora/ Reported-by: syzbot+6c905ab800f20cf4086c(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/68c13942.050a0220.2ff435.000b.GAE@google.com/ Fixes: 5e928f77a09a ("PM: Introduce core framework for run-time PM of I/O devices (rev. 17)") Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche(a)acm.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260312182720.2776083-1-bvanassche@acm.org Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Ruifeng <linruifeng4(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/base/power/runtime.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/base/power/runtime.c b/drivers/base/power/runtime.c index f5c9e6629f0c..a174ca364680 100644 --- a/drivers/base/power/runtime.c +++ b/drivers/base/power/runtime.c @@ -1725,6 +1725,7 @@ void pm_runtime_reinit(struct device *dev) void pm_runtime_remove(struct device *dev) { __pm_runtime_disable(dev, false); + flush_work(&dev->power.work); pm_runtime_reinit(dev); } -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] PM: runtime: Fix a race condition related to device removal
by Lin Ruifeng 08 Apr '26

08 Apr '26

From: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche(a)acm.org> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.130 commit 39f2d86f2ddde8d1beda05732f30c7cd945e0b5a category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14092 CVE: CVE-2026-23452 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 29ab768277617452d88c0607c9299cdc63b6e9ff ] The following code in pm_runtime_work() may dereference the dev->parent pointer after the parent device has been freed: /* Maybe the parent is now able to suspend. */ if (parent && !parent->power.ignore_children) { spin_unlock(&dev->power.lock); spin_lock(&parent->power.lock); rpm_idle(parent, RPM_ASYNC); spin_unlock(&parent->power.lock); spin_lock(&dev->power.lock); } Fix this by inserting a flush_work() call in pm_runtime_remove(). Without this patch blktest block/001 triggers the following complaint sporadically: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in lock_acquire+0x70/0x160 Read of size 1 at addr ffff88812bef7198 by task kworker/u553:1/3081 Workqueue: pm pm_runtime_work Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x61/0x80 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x8b/0x310 print_report+0xfd/0x1d7 kasan_report+0xd8/0x1d0 __kasan_check_byte+0x42/0x60 lock_acquire.part.0+0x38/0x230 lock_acquire+0x70/0x160 _raw_spin_lock+0x36/0x50 rpm_suspend+0xc6a/0xfe0 rpm_idle+0x578/0x770 pm_runtime_work+0xee/0x120 process_one_work+0xde3/0x1410 worker_thread+0x5eb/0xfe0 kthread+0x37b/0x480 ret_from_fork+0x6cb/0x920 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 </TASK> Allocated by task 4314: kasan_save_stack+0x2a/0x50 kasan_save_track+0x18/0x40 kasan_save_alloc_info+0x3d/0x50 __kasan_kmalloc+0xa0/0xb0 __kmalloc_noprof+0x311/0x990 scsi_alloc_target+0x122/0xb60 [scsi_mod] __scsi_scan_target+0x101/0x460 [scsi_mod] scsi_scan_channel+0x179/0x1c0 [scsi_mod] scsi_scan_host_selected+0x259/0x2d0 [scsi_mod] store_scan+0x2d2/0x390 [scsi_mod] dev_attr_store+0x43/0x80 sysfs_kf_write+0xde/0x140 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x3ef/0x670 vfs_write+0x506/0x1470 ksys_write+0xfd/0x230 __x64_sys_write+0x76/0xc0 x64_sys_call+0x213/0x1810 do_syscall_64+0xee/0xfc0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 Freed by task 4314: kasan_save_stack+0x2a/0x50 kasan_save_track+0x18/0x40 kasan_save_free_info+0x3f/0x50 __kasan_slab_free+0x67/0x80 kfree+0x225/0x6c0 scsi_target_dev_release+0x3d/0x60 [scsi_mod] device_release+0xa3/0x220 kobject_cleanup+0x105/0x3a0 kobject_put+0x72/0xd0 put_device+0x17/0x20 scsi_device_dev_release+0xacf/0x12c0 [scsi_mod] device_release+0xa3/0x220 kobject_cleanup+0x105/0x3a0 kobject_put+0x72/0xd0 put_device+0x17/0x20 scsi_device_put+0x7f/0xc0 [scsi_mod] sdev_store_delete+0xa5/0x120 [scsi_mod] dev_attr_store+0x43/0x80 sysfs_kf_write+0xde/0x140 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x3ef/0x670 vfs_write+0x506/0x1470 ksys_write+0xfd/0x230 __x64_sys_write+0x76/0xc0 x64_sys_call+0x213/0x1810 Reported-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei(a)redhat.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZxdNvLNI8QaOfD2d@fedora/ Reported-by: syzbot+6c905ab800f20cf4086c(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/68c13942.050a0220.2ff435.000b.GAE@google.com/ Fixes: 5e928f77a09a ("PM: Introduce core framework for run-time PM of I/O devices (rev. 17)") Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche(a)acm.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260312182720.2776083-1-bvanassche@acm.org Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Ruifeng <linruifeng4(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/base/power/runtime.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/base/power/runtime.c b/drivers/base/power/runtime.c index b28fb11cd6db..2766bdc9158a 100644 --- a/drivers/base/power/runtime.c +++ b/drivers/base/power/runtime.c @@ -1854,6 +1854,7 @@ void pm_runtime_reinit(struct device *dev) void pm_runtime_remove(struct device *dev) { __pm_runtime_disable(dev, false); + flush_work(&dev->power.work); pm_runtime_reinit(dev); } -- 2.43.0

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[PATCH OLK-6.6] spi: fix use-after-free on controller registration failure
by Lin Ruifeng 08 Apr '26

08 Apr '26

From: Johan Hovold <johan(a)kernel.org> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.130 commit 6bbd385b30c7fb6c7ee0669e9ada91490938c051 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14115 CVE: CVE-2026-31389 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 8634e05b08ead636e926022f4a98416e13440df9 upstream. Make sure to deregister from driver core also in the unlikely event that per-cpu statistics allocation fails during controller registration to avoid use-after-free (of driver resources) and unclocked register accesses. Fixes: 6598b91b5ac3 ("spi: spi.c: Convert statistics to per-cpu u64_stats_t") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 6.0 Cc: David Jander <david(a)protonic.nl> Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan(a)kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260312151817.32100-2-johan@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Ruifeng <linruifeng4(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/spi/spi.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/spi/spi.c b/drivers/spi/spi.c index cd6edfa92101..66f694457a8b 100644 --- a/drivers/spi/spi.c +++ b/drivers/spi/spi.c @@ -3209,10 +3209,8 @@ int spi_register_controller(struct spi_controller *ctlr) dev_info(dev, "controller is unqueued, this is deprecated\n"); } else if (ctlr->transfer_one || ctlr->transfer_one_message) { status = spi_controller_initialize_queue(ctlr); - if (status) { - device_del(&ctlr->dev); - goto free_bus_id; - } + if (status) + goto del_ctrl; } /* Add statistics */ ctlr->pcpu_statistics = spi_alloc_pcpu_stats(dev); @@ -3235,6 +3233,8 @@ int spi_register_controller(struct spi_controller *ctlr) destroy_queue: spi_destroy_queue(ctlr); +del_ctrl: + device_del(&ctlr->dev); free_bus_id: mutex_lock(&board_lock); idr_remove(&spi_master_idr, ctlr->bus_num); -- 2.43.0

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[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/2] CVE-2025-39955
by Zhang Changzhong 08 Apr '26

08 Apr '26

Kuniyuki Iwashima (2): tcp: Clear tcp_sk(sk)->fastopen_rsk in tcp_disconnect(). tcp: Don't call reqsk_fastopen_remove() in tcp_conn_request(). net/ipv4/tcp.c | 5 +++++ net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 1 - 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) -- 2.9.5

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[PATCH OLK-6.6] icmp: fix NULL pointer dereference in icmp_tag_validation()
by Zhang Changzhong 08 Apr '26

08 Apr '26

From: Weiming Shi <bestswngs(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.0-rc5 commit 614aefe56af8e13331e50220c936fc0689cf5675 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14029 CVE: CVE-2026-23398 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- icmp_tag_validation() unconditionally dereferences the result of rcu_dereference(inet_protos[proto]) without checking for NULL. The inet_protos[] array is sparse -- only about 15 of 256 protocol numbers have registered handlers. When ip_no_pmtu_disc is set to 3 (hardened PMTU mode) and the kernel receives an ICMP Fragmentation Needed error with a quoted inner IP header containing an unregistered protocol number, the NULL dereference causes a kernel panic in softirq context. Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000002: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000010-0x0000000000000017] RIP: 0010:icmp_unreach (net/ipv4/icmp.c:1085 net/ipv4/icmp.c:1143) Call Trace: <IRQ> icmp_rcv (net/ipv4/icmp.c:1527) ip_protocol_deliver_rcu (net/ipv4/ip_input.c:207) ip_local_deliver_finish (net/ipv4/ip_input.c:242) ip_local_deliver (net/ipv4/ip_input.c:262) ip_rcv (net/ipv4/ip_input.c:573) __netif_receive_skb_one_core (net/core/dev.c:6164) process_backlog (net/core/dev.c:6628) handle_softirqs (kernel/softirq.c:561) </IRQ> Add a NULL check before accessing icmp_strict_tag_validation. If the protocol has no registered handler, return false since it cannot perform strict tag validation. Fixes: 8ed1dc44d3e9 ("ipv4: introduce hardened ip_no_pmtu_disc mode") Reported-by: Xiang Mei <xmei5(a)asu.edu> Signed-off-by: Weiming Shi <bestswngs(a)gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260318130558.1050247-4-bestswngs@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: net/ipv4/icmp.c [context conflicts] Signed-off-by: Zhang Changzhong <zhangchangzhong(a)huawei.com> --- net/ipv4/icmp.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/icmp.c b/net/ipv4/icmp.c index aed99f8..ca4e926 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/icmp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/icmp.c @@ -855,10 +855,12 @@ static void icmp_socket_deliver(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 info) static bool icmp_tag_validation(int proto) { + const struct net_protocol *ipprot; bool ok; rcu_read_lock(); - ok = rcu_dereference(inet_protos[proto])->icmp_strict_tag_validation; + ipprot = rcu_dereference(inet_protos[proto]); + ok = ipprot ? ipprot->icmp_strict_tag_validation : false; rcu_read_unlock(); return ok; } -- 2.9.5

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[PATCH OLK-6.6] bpf: Fix regsafe() for pointers to packet
by Pu Lehui 08 Apr '26

08 Apr '26

From: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.0-rc7 commit a8502a79e832b861e99218cbd2d8f4312d62e225 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/8900 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- In case rold->reg->range == BEYOND_PKT_END && rcur->reg->range == N regsafe() may return true which may lead to current state with valid packet range not being explored. Fix the bug. Fixes: 6d94e741a8ff ("bpf: Support for pointers beyond pkt_end.") Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Amery Hung <ameryhung(a)gmail.com> Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87(a)gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260331204228.26726-1-alexei.starovoitov@gmail… Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui <pulehui(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 9ff0704cef3d..e63d63ac8a36 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -16307,8 +16307,13 @@ static bool regsafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *rold, * since someone could have accessed through (ptr - k), or * even done ptr -= k in a register, to get a safe access. */ - if (rold->range > rcur->range) + if (rold->range < 0 || rcur->range < 0) { + /* special case for [BEYOND|AT]_PKT_END */ + if (rold->range != rcur->range) + return false; + } else if (rold->range > rcur->range) { return false; + } /* If the offsets don't match, we can't trust our alignment; * nor can we be sure that we won't fall out of range. */ -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH OLK-6.6 v7 0/2] kvm: arm64: Transition from CPU Type to MIDR Register for Virtualization Feature Detection
by liqiqi 08 Apr '26

08 Apr '26

Currently, there are two methods for determining whether a chip supports specific virtualization features: 1. Reading the chip's CPU type from BIOS 2. Reading the value of the MIDR register The issue with the first method is that each time a new chip is introduced, the new CPU type must be defined, which leads to poor code portability and maintainability. Therefore, the second method has been adopted to replace the first. This approach eliminates the dependency on CPU type by using the MIDR register. liqiqi (2): kvm: arm64: Add MIDR definitions and use MIDR to determine whether features are supported kvm: arm64: Remove cpu_type definition and it's related interfaces arch/arm64/include/asm/cache.h | 2 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h | 8 +- arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c | 4 +- arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 2 +- arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c | 4 +- arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c | 1 - arch/arm64/kvm/hisilicon/hisi_virt.c | 110 +++-------------------- arch/arm64/kvm/hisilicon/hisi_virt.h | 12 --- drivers/perf/hisilicon/hisi_uncore_pmu.c | 2 +- tools/arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h | 4 +- 10 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 124 deletions(-) -- 2.43.0

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[PATCH OLK-6.6 v2 0/2] net/sched: Fix CVE-2026-23378
by Dong Chenchen 07 Apr '26

07 Apr '26

Fix CVE-2026-23378 Eric Dumazet (1): net/sched: act_ife: avoid possible NULL deref Jamal Hadi Salim (1): net/sched: act_ife: Fix metalist update behavior include/net/tc_act/tc_ife.h | 4 +- net/sched/act_ife.c | 99 ++++++++++++++++++------------------- 2 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-) -- 2.25.1

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[PATCH OLK-6.6] media: dvb-net: fix OOB access in ULE extension header tables
by Liu Kai 07 Apr '26

07 Apr '26

From: Ariel Silver <arielsilver77(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.130 commit 1a6da3dbb9985d00743073a1cc1f96e59f5abc30 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14132 CVE: CVE-2026-31405 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 24d87712727a5017ad142d63940589a36cd25647 upstream. The ule_mandatory_ext_handlers[] and ule_optional_ext_handlers[] tables in handle_one_ule_extension() are declared with 255 elements (valid indices 0-254), but the index htype is derived from network-controlled data as (ule_sndu_type & 0x00FF), giving a range of 0-255. When htype equals 255, an out-of-bounds read occurs on the function pointer table, and the OOB value may be called as a function pointer. Add a bounds check on htype against the array size before either table is accessed. Out-of-range values now cause the SNDU to be discarded. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-by: Ariel Silver <arielsilver77(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Ariel Silver <arielsilver77(a)gmail.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Liu Kai <liukai284(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_net.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_net.c b/drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_net.c index 8bb8dd34c223..a2159b2bc176 100644 --- a/drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_net.c +++ b/drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_net.c @@ -228,6 +228,9 @@ static int handle_one_ule_extension( struct dvb_net_priv *p ) unsigned char hlen = (p->ule_sndu_type & 0x0700) >> 8; unsigned char htype = p->ule_sndu_type & 0x00FF; + if (htype >= ARRAY_SIZE(ule_mandatory_ext_handlers)) + return -1; + /* Discriminate mandatory and optional extension headers. */ if (hlen == 0) { /* Mandatory extension header */ -- 2.34.1

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