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kernel@openeuler.org

  • 57 participants
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[PATCH OLK-5.10] apparmor: avoid crash when parsed profile name is empty
by Xiang Yang 05 Mar '24

05 Mar '24
From: Fedor Pchelkin <pchelkin(a)ispras.ru> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.209 commit 5ff00408e5029d3550ee77f62dc15f1e15c47f87 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I932W7 CVE: CVE-2023-52443 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… ----------------------------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 55a8210c9e7d21ff2644809699765796d4bfb200 ] When processing a packed profile in unpack_profile() described like "profile :ns::samba-dcerpcd /usr/lib*/samba/{,samba/}samba-dcerpcd {...}" a string ":samba-dcerpcd" is unpacked as a fully-qualified name and then passed to aa_splitn_fqname(). aa_splitn_fqname() treats ":samba-dcerpcd" as only containing a namespace. Thus it returns NULL for tmpname, meanwhile tmpns is non-NULL. Later aa_alloc_profile() crashes as the new profile name is NULL now. general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] CPU: 6 PID: 1657 Comm: apparmor_parser Not tainted 6.7.0-rc2-dirty #16 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.2-3-gd478f380-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:strlen+0x1e/0xa0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? strlen+0x1e/0xa0 aa_policy_init+0x1bb/0x230 aa_alloc_profile+0xb1/0x480 unpack_profile+0x3bc/0x4960 aa_unpack+0x309/0x15e0 aa_replace_profiles+0x213/0x33c0 policy_update+0x261/0x370 profile_replace+0x20e/0x2a0 vfs_write+0x2af/0xe00 ksys_write+0x126/0x250 do_syscall_64+0x46/0xf0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76 </TASK> ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- RIP: 0010:strlen+0x1e/0xa0 It seems such behaviour of aa_splitn_fqname() is expected and checked in other places where it is called (e.g. aa_remove_profiles). Well, there is an explicit comment "a ns name without a following profile is allowed" inside. AFAICS, nothing can prevent unpacked "name" to be in form like ":samba-dcerpcd" - it is passed from userspace. Deny the whole profile set replacement in such case and inform user with EPROTO and an explaining message. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) Fixes: 04dc715e24d0 ("apparmor: audit policy ns specified in policy load") Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin <pchelkin(a)ispras.ru> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen(a)canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Xiang Yang <xiangyang3(a)huawei.com> --- security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c index 10896d69c442..6c2a536173b5 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c +++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c @@ -696,6 +696,10 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name) tmpname = aa_splitn_fqname(name, strlen(name), &tmpns, &ns_len); if (tmpns) { + if (!tmpname) { + info = "empty profile name"; + goto fail; + } *ns_name = kstrndup(tmpns, ns_len, GFP_KERNEL); if (!*ns_name) { info = "out of memory"; -- 2.34.1
2 1
0 0
[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] perf/x86/lbr: Filter vsyscall addresses
by Luo Gengkun 05 Mar '24

05 Mar '24
From: JP Kobryn <inwardvessel(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.6-rc6 commit e53899771a02f798d436655efbd9d4b46c0f9265 category: bugfix bugzilla: 189601 CVE: CVE-2023-52476 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- We found that a panic can occur when a vsyscall is made while LBR sampling is active. If the vsyscall is interrupted (NMI) for perf sampling, this call sequence can occur (most recent at top): __insn_get_emulate_prefix() insn_get_emulate_prefix() insn_get_prefixes() insn_get_opcode() decode_branch_type() get_branch_type() intel_pmu_lbr_filter() intel_pmu_handle_irq() perf_event_nmi_handler() Within __insn_get_emulate_prefix() at frame 0, a macro is called: peek_nbyte_next(insn_byte_t, insn, i) Within this macro, this dereference occurs: (insn)->next_byte Inspecting registers at this point, the value of the next_byte field is the address of the vsyscall made, for example the location of the vsyscall version of gettimeofday() at 0xffffffffff600000. The access to an address in the vsyscall region will trigger an oops due to an unhandled page fault. To fix the bug, filtering for vsyscalls can be done when determining the branch type. This patch will return a "none" branch if a kernel address if found to lie in the vsyscall region. Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: JP Kobryn <inwardvessel(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Conflicts: arch/x86/events/utils.c Signed-off-by: Luo Gengkun <luogengkun2(a)huawei.com> --- arch/x86/events/intel/lbr.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/lbr.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/lbr.c index a3dc3b5bc78d..1fb1ede03c40 100644 --- a/arch/x86/events/intel/lbr.c +++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/lbr.c @@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ #include <asm/perf_event.h> #include <asm/msr.h> #include <asm/insn.h> +#include <linux/mm.h> #include "../perf_event.h" @@ -894,9 +895,9 @@ static int branch_type(unsigned long from, unsigned long to, int abort) * The LBR logs any address in the IP, even if the IP just * faulted. This means userspace can control the from address. * Ensure we don't blindy read any address by validating it is - * a known text address. + * a known text address and not a vsyscall address. */ - if (kernel_text_address(from)) { + if (kernel_text_address(from) && !in_gate_area_no_mm(from)) { addr = (void *)from; /* * Assume we can get the maximum possible size -- 2.34.1
2 1
0 0
[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] crypto: qat - ADF_STATUS_PF_RUNNING should be set after adf_dev_init
by Cai Xinchen 05 Mar '24

05 Mar '24
From: Tong Zhang <ztong0001(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v4.19.191 commit 09d16cee6285d37cc76311c29add6d97a7e4acda category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I94VOZ CVE: CVE-2021-47056 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 8609f5cfdc872fc3a462efa6a3eca5cb1e2f6446 ] ADF_STATUS_PF_RUNNING is (only) used and checked by adf_vf2pf_shutdown() before calling adf_iov_putmsg()->mutex_lock(vf2pf_lock), however the vf2pf_lock is initialized in adf_dev_init(), which can fail and when it fail, the vf2pf_lock is either not initialized or destroyed, a subsequent use of vf2pf_lock will cause issue. To fix this issue, only set this flag if adf_dev_init() returns 0. [ 7.178404] BUG: KASAN: user-memory-access in __mutex_lock.isra.0+0x1ac/0x7c0 [ 7.180345] Call Trace: [ 7.182576] mutex_lock+0xc9/0xd0 [ 7.183257] adf_iov_putmsg+0x118/0x1a0 [intel_qat] [ 7.183541] adf_vf2pf_shutdown+0x4d/0x7b [intel_qat] [ 7.183834] adf_dev_shutdown+0x172/0x2b0 [intel_qat] [ 7.184127] adf_probe+0x5e9/0x600 [qat_dh895xccvf] Signed-off-by: Tong Zhang <ztong0001(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko(a)gmail.com> Fixes: 25c6ffb249f6 ("crypto: qat - check if PF is running") Acked-by: Giovanni Cabiddu <giovanni.cabiddu(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Cai Xinchen <caixinchen1(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/crypto/qat/qat_c3xxxvf/adf_drv.c | 4 ++-- drivers/crypto/qat/qat_c62xvf/adf_drv.c | 4 ++-- drivers/crypto/qat/qat_dh895xccvf/adf_drv.c | 4 ++-- 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_c3xxxvf/adf_drv.c b/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_c3xxxvf/adf_drv.c index 613c7d5644ce..e87b7c466bdb 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_c3xxxvf/adf_drv.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_c3xxxvf/adf_drv.c @@ -238,12 +238,12 @@ static int adf_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *ent) if (ret) goto out_err_free_reg; - set_bit(ADF_STATUS_PF_RUNNING, &accel_dev->status); - ret = adf_dev_init(accel_dev); if (ret) goto out_err_dev_shutdown; + set_bit(ADF_STATUS_PF_RUNNING, &accel_dev->status); + ret = adf_dev_start(accel_dev); if (ret) goto out_err_dev_stop; diff --git a/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_c62xvf/adf_drv.c b/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_c62xvf/adf_drv.c index 278452b8ef81..a8f3f2ecae70 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_c62xvf/adf_drv.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_c62xvf/adf_drv.c @@ -238,12 +238,12 @@ static int adf_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *ent) if (ret) goto out_err_free_reg; - set_bit(ADF_STATUS_PF_RUNNING, &accel_dev->status); - ret = adf_dev_init(accel_dev); if (ret) goto out_err_dev_shutdown; + set_bit(ADF_STATUS_PF_RUNNING, &accel_dev->status); + ret = adf_dev_start(accel_dev); if (ret) goto out_err_dev_stop; diff --git a/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_dh895xccvf/adf_drv.c b/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_dh895xccvf/adf_drv.c index 3da0f951cb59..1b954abf67fb 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_dh895xccvf/adf_drv.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_dh895xccvf/adf_drv.c @@ -238,12 +238,12 @@ static int adf_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *ent) if (ret) goto out_err_free_reg; - set_bit(ADF_STATUS_PF_RUNNING, &accel_dev->status); - ret = adf_dev_init(accel_dev); if (ret) goto out_err_dev_shutdown; + set_bit(ADF_STATUS_PF_RUNNING, &accel_dev->status); + ret = adf_dev_start(accel_dev); if (ret) goto out_err_dev_stop; -- 2.34.1
2 1
0 0
[PATCH] crypto: qat - ADF_STATUS_PF_RUNNING should be set after adf_dev_init
by Cai Xinchen 05 Mar '24

05 Mar '24
From: Tong Zhang <ztong0001(a)gmail.com> [ Upstream commit 8609f5cfdc872fc3a462efa6a3eca5cb1e2f6446 ] ADF_STATUS_PF_RUNNING is (only) used and checked by adf_vf2pf_shutdown() before calling adf_iov_putmsg()->mutex_lock(vf2pf_lock), however the vf2pf_lock is initialized in adf_dev_init(), which can fail and when it fail, the vf2pf_lock is either not initialized or destroyed, a subsequent use of vf2pf_lock will cause issue. To fix this issue, only set this flag if adf_dev_init() returns 0. [ 7.178404] BUG: KASAN: user-memory-access in __mutex_lock.isra.0+0x1ac/0x7c0 [ 7.180345] Call Trace: [ 7.182576] mutex_lock+0xc9/0xd0 [ 7.183257] adf_iov_putmsg+0x118/0x1a0 [intel_qat] [ 7.183541] adf_vf2pf_shutdown+0x4d/0x7b [intel_qat] [ 7.183834] adf_dev_shutdown+0x172/0x2b0 [intel_qat] [ 7.184127] adf_probe+0x5e9/0x600 [qat_dh895xccvf] Signed-off-by: Tong Zhang <ztong0001(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko(a)gmail.com> Fixes: 25c6ffb249f6 ("crypto: qat - check if PF is running") Acked-by: Giovanni Cabiddu <giovanni.cabiddu(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Cai Xinchen <caixinchen1(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/crypto/qat/qat_c3xxxvf/adf_drv.c | 4 ++-- drivers/crypto/qat/qat_c62xvf/adf_drv.c | 4 ++-- drivers/crypto/qat/qat_dh895xccvf/adf_drv.c | 4 ++-- 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_c3xxxvf/adf_drv.c b/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_c3xxxvf/adf_drv.c index 613c7d5644ce..e87b7c466bdb 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_c3xxxvf/adf_drv.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_c3xxxvf/adf_drv.c @@ -238,12 +238,12 @@ static int adf_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *ent) if (ret) goto out_err_free_reg; - set_bit(ADF_STATUS_PF_RUNNING, &accel_dev->status); - ret = adf_dev_init(accel_dev); if (ret) goto out_err_dev_shutdown; + set_bit(ADF_STATUS_PF_RUNNING, &accel_dev->status); + ret = adf_dev_start(accel_dev); if (ret) goto out_err_dev_stop; diff --git a/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_c62xvf/adf_drv.c b/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_c62xvf/adf_drv.c index 278452b8ef81..a8f3f2ecae70 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_c62xvf/adf_drv.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_c62xvf/adf_drv.c @@ -238,12 +238,12 @@ static int adf_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *ent) if (ret) goto out_err_free_reg; - set_bit(ADF_STATUS_PF_RUNNING, &accel_dev->status); - ret = adf_dev_init(accel_dev); if (ret) goto out_err_dev_shutdown; + set_bit(ADF_STATUS_PF_RUNNING, &accel_dev->status); + ret = adf_dev_start(accel_dev); if (ret) goto out_err_dev_stop; diff --git a/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_dh895xccvf/adf_drv.c b/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_dh895xccvf/adf_drv.c index 3da0f951cb59..1b954abf67fb 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_dh895xccvf/adf_drv.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_dh895xccvf/adf_drv.c @@ -238,12 +238,12 @@ static int adf_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *ent) if (ret) goto out_err_free_reg; - set_bit(ADF_STATUS_PF_RUNNING, &accel_dev->status); - ret = adf_dev_init(accel_dev); if (ret) goto out_err_dev_shutdown; + set_bit(ADF_STATUS_PF_RUNNING, &accel_dev->status); + ret = adf_dev_start(accel_dev); if (ret) goto out_err_dev_stop; -- 2.34.1
1 0
0 0
[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] vsock/virtio: free queued packets when closing socket
by Ziyang Xuan 05 Mar '24

05 Mar '24
From: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare(a)redhat.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.13-rc1 commit 8432b8114957235f42e070a16118a7f750de9d39 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I94J63 CVE: CVE-2021-47024 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- As reported by syzbot [1], there is a memory leak while closing the socket. We partially solved this issue with commit ac03046ece2b ("vsock/virtio: free packets during the socket release"), but we forgot to drain the RX queue when the socket is definitely closed by the scheduled work. To avoid future issues, let's use the new virtio_transport_remove_sock() to drain the RX queue before removing the socket from the af_vsock lists calling vsock_remove_sock(). [1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=24452624fc4c571eedd9 Fixes: ac03046ece2b ("vsock/virtio: free packets during the socket release") Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+24452624fc4c571eedd9(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Conflicts: net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang(a)huawei.com> --- net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c b/net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c index 52242a148c70..f3f0a5714835 100644 --- a/net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c +++ b/net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c @@ -700,6 +700,23 @@ static int virtio_transport_reset_no_sock(struct virtio_vsock_pkt *pkt) return t->send_pkt(reply); } +/* This function should be called with sk_lock held and SOCK_DONE set */ +static void virtio_transport_remove_sock(struct vsock_sock *vsk) +{ + struct virtio_vsock_sock *vvs = vsk->trans; + struct virtio_vsock_pkt *pkt, *tmp; + + /* We don't need to take rx_lock, as the socket is closing and we are + * removing it. + */ + list_for_each_entry_safe(pkt, tmp, &vvs->rx_queue, list) { + list_del(&pkt->list); + virtio_transport_free_pkt(pkt); + } + + vsock_remove_sock(vsk); +} + static void virtio_transport_wait_close(struct sock *sk, long timeout) { if (timeout) { @@ -732,7 +749,7 @@ static void virtio_transport_do_close(struct vsock_sock *vsk, (!cancel_timeout || cancel_delayed_work(&vsk->close_work))) { vsk->close_work_scheduled = false; - vsock_remove_sock(vsk); + virtio_transport_remove_sock(vsk); /* Release refcnt obtained when we scheduled the timeout */ sock_put(sk); @@ -795,8 +812,6 @@ static bool virtio_transport_close(struct vsock_sock *vsk) void virtio_transport_release(struct vsock_sock *vsk) { - struct virtio_vsock_sock *vvs = vsk->trans; - struct virtio_vsock_pkt *pkt, *tmp; struct sock *sk = &vsk->sk; bool remove_sock = true; @@ -804,14 +819,10 @@ void virtio_transport_release(struct vsock_sock *vsk) if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_STREAM) remove_sock = virtio_transport_close(vsk); - list_for_each_entry_safe(pkt, tmp, &vvs->rx_queue, list) { - list_del(&pkt->list); - virtio_transport_free_pkt(pkt); - } release_sock(sk); if (remove_sock) - vsock_remove_sock(vsk); + virtio_transport_remove_sock(vsk); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(virtio_transport_release); -- 2.25.1
2 1
0 0
[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS 0/1] i2c: validate user data in compat ioctl
by Hongbo Li 05 Mar '24

05 Mar '24
Fix CVE-2021-46934 Pavel Skripkin (1): i2c: validate user data in compat ioctl drivers/i2c/i2c-dev.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) -- 2.34.1
2 2
0 0
[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP2] arm64: head.S: always initialize PSTATE
by Li Zetao 05 Mar '24

05 Mar '24
From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland(a)arm.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.11-rc1 commit d87a8e65b5101123a24cddeb7a8a2c7b45f7b60c category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I95U8R Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- As with SCTLR_ELx and other control registers, some PSTATE bits are UNKNOWN out-of-reset, and we may not be able to rely on hardware or firmware to initialize them to our liking prior to entry to the kernel, e.g. in the primary/secondary boot paths and return from idle/suspend. It would be more robust (and easier to reason about) if we consistently initialized PSTATE to a default value, as we do with control registers. This will ensure that the kernel is not adversely affected by bits it is not aware of, e.g. when support for a feature such as PAN/UAO is disabled. This patch ensures that PSTATE is consistently initialized at boot time via an ERET. This is not intended to relax the existing requirements (e.g. DAIF bits must still be set prior to entering the kernel). For features detected dynamically (which may require system-wide support), it is still necessary to subsequently modify PSTATE. As ERET is not always a Context Synchronization Event, an ISB is placed before each exception return to ensure updates to control registers have taken effect. This handles the kernel being entered with SCTLR_ELx.EOS clear (or any future control bits being in an UNKNOWN state). Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland(a)arm.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch(a)lst.de> Cc: James Morse <james.morse(a)arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will(a)kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201113124937.20574-6-mark.rutland@arm.com Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas(a)arm.com> Conflicts: arch/arm64/kernel/head.S Signed-off-by: Li Zetao <lizetao1(a)huawei.com> --- arch/arm64/include/asm/ptrace.h | 5 +++++ arch/arm64/kernel/head.S | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++----------- 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/ptrace.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/ptrace.h index 27fee85c3c2b..e58568f94b5e 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/ptrace.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/ptrace.h @@ -16,6 +16,11 @@ #define CurrentEL_EL1 (1 << 2) #define CurrentEL_EL2 (2 << 2) +#define INIT_PSTATE_EL1 \ + (PSR_D_BIT | PSR_A_BIT | PSR_I_BIT | PSR_F_BIT | PSR_MODE_EL1h) +#define INIT_PSTATE_EL2 \ + (PSR_D_BIT | PSR_A_BIT | PSR_I_BIT | PSR_F_BIT | PSR_MODE_EL2h) + /* * PMR values used to mask/unmask interrupts. * diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/head.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/head.S index b7a9f403ad2d..5fb9255fd5dd 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/head.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/head.S @@ -486,21 +486,29 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(kimage_vaddr) * If we're fortunate enough to boot at EL2, ensure that the world is * sane before dropping to EL1. * + * Since we cannot always rely on ERET synchronizing writes to sysregs (e.g. if + * SCTLR_ELx.EOS is clear), we place an ISB prior to ERET. + * * Returns either BOOT_CPU_MODE_EL1 or BOOT_CPU_MODE_EL2 in w0 if * booted in EL1 or EL2 respectively. */ SYM_FUNC_START(el2_setup) - msr SPsel, #1 // We want to use SP_EL{1,2} mrs x0, CurrentEL cmp x0, #CurrentEL_EL2 - b.eq 1f + b.eq init_el2 + +SYM_INNER_LABEL(init_el1, SYM_L_LOCAL) mov_q x0, INIT_SCTLR_EL1_MMU_OFF msr sctlr_el1, x0 - mov w0, #BOOT_CPU_MODE_EL1 // This cpu booted in EL1 isb - ret + mov_q x0, INIT_PSTATE_EL1 + msr spsr_el1, x0 + msr elr_el1, lr + mov w0, #BOOT_CPU_MODE_EL1 + eret -1: mov_q x0, INIT_SCTLR_EL2_MMU_OFF +SYM_INNER_LABEL(init_el2, SYM_L_LOCAL) + mov_q x0, INIT_SCTLR_EL2_MMU_OFF msr sctlr_el2, x0 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_VHE @@ -609,9 +617,12 @@ set_hcr: cbz x2, install_el2_stub - mov w0, #BOOT_CPU_MODE_EL2 // This CPU booted in EL2 isb - ret + mov_q x0, INIT_PSTATE_EL2 + msr spsr_el2, x0 + msr elr_el2, lr + mov w0, #BOOT_CPU_MODE_EL2 + eret SYM_INNER_LABEL(install_el2_stub, SYM_L_LOCAL) /* @@ -643,12 +654,11 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(install_el2_stub, SYM_L_LOCAL) 7: adr_l x0, __hyp_stub_vectors msr vbar_el2, x0 - /* spsr */ - mov x0, #(PSR_F_BIT | PSR_I_BIT | PSR_A_BIT | PSR_D_BIT |\ - PSR_MODE_EL1h) + isb + mov x0, #INIT_PSTATE_EL1 msr spsr_el2, x0 msr elr_el2, lr - mov w0, #BOOT_CPU_MODE_EL2 // This CPU booted in EL2 + mov w0, #BOOT_CPU_MODE_EL2 eret SYM_FUNC_END(el2_setup) -- 2.34.1
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[PATCH OLK-5.10] scsi: pm80xx: Avoid leaking tags when processing OPC_INB_SET_CONTROLLER_CONFIG command
by Li Lingfeng 05 Mar '24

05 Mar '24
From: Michal Grzedzicki <mge(a)meta.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.6-rc2 commit c13e7331745852d0dd7c35eabbe181cbd5b01172 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I95B2S CVE: CVE-2023-52500 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Tags allocated for OPC_INB_SET_CONTROLLER_CONFIG command need to be freed when we receive the response. Signed-off-by: Michal Grzedzicki <mge(a)meta.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230911170340.699533-2-mge@meta.com Acked-by: Jack Wang <jinpu.wang(a)ionos.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Li Lingfeng <lilingfeng3(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/scsi/pm8001/pm80xx_hwi.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/scsi/pm8001/pm80xx_hwi.c b/drivers/scsi/pm8001/pm80xx_hwi.c index 51345f02383d..bb9cab064375 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/pm8001/pm80xx_hwi.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/pm8001/pm80xx_hwi.c @@ -3731,10 +3731,12 @@ static int mpi_set_controller_config_resp(struct pm8001_hba_info *pm8001_ha, (struct set_ctrl_cfg_resp *)(piomb + 4); u32 status = le32_to_cpu(pPayload->status); u32 err_qlfr_pgcd = le32_to_cpu(pPayload->err_qlfr_pgcd); + u32 tag = le32_to_cpu(pPayload->tag); pm8001_dbg(pm8001_ha, MSG, "SET CONTROLLER RESP: status 0x%x qlfr_pgcd 0x%x\n", status, err_qlfr_pgcd); + pm8001_tag_free(pm8001_ha, tag); return 0; } -- 2.31.1
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[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] phy: ti: phy-omap-usb2: Fix NULL pointer dereference for SRP
by Dong Chenchen 05 Mar '24

05 Mar '24
From: Tony Lindgren <tony(a)atomide.com> stable inclusion from stable-v4.19.306 commit 486218c11e8d1c8f515a3bdd70d62203609d4b6b category: bugfix bugzilla: 189592, https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I93HCX CVE: CVE-2024-26600 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 7104ba0f1958adb250319e68a15eff89ec4fd36d ] If the external phy working together with phy-omap-usb2 does not implement send_srp(), we may still attempt to call it. This can happen on an idle Ethernet gadget triggering a wakeup for example: configfs-gadget.g1 gadget.0: ECM Suspend configfs-gadget.g1 gadget.0: Port suspended. Triggering wakeup ... Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000 when execute ... PC is at 0x0 LR is at musb_gadget_wakeup+0x1d4/0x254 [musb_hdrc] ... musb_gadget_wakeup [musb_hdrc] from usb_gadget_wakeup+0x1c/0x3c [udc_core] usb_gadget_wakeup [udc_core] from eth_start_xmit+0x3b0/0x3d4 [u_ether] eth_start_xmit [u_ether] from dev_hard_start_xmit+0x94/0x24c dev_hard_start_xmit from sch_direct_xmit+0x104/0x2e4 sch_direct_xmit from __dev_queue_xmit+0x334/0xd88 __dev_queue_xmit from arp_solicit+0xf0/0x268 arp_solicit from neigh_probe+0x54/0x7c neigh_probe from __neigh_event_send+0x22c/0x47c __neigh_event_send from neigh_resolve_output+0x14c/0x1c0 neigh_resolve_output from ip_finish_output2+0x1c8/0x628 ip_finish_output2 from ip_send_skb+0x40/0xd8 ip_send_skb from udp_send_skb+0x124/0x340 udp_send_skb from udp_sendmsg+0x780/0x984 udp_sendmsg from __sys_sendto+0xd8/0x158 __sys_sendto from ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x58 Let's fix the issue by checking for send_srp() and set_vbus() before calling them. For USB peripheral only cases these both could be NULL. Fixes: 657b306a7bdf ("usb: phy: add a new driver for omap usb2 phy") Signed-off-by: Tony Lindgren <tony(a)atomide.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240128120556.8848-1-tony@atomide.com Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/phy/ti/phy-omap-usb2.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/phy/ti/phy-omap-usb2.c b/drivers/phy/ti/phy-omap-usb2.c index fe909fd8144f..ae94e1e66bcc 100644 --- a/drivers/phy/ti/phy-omap-usb2.c +++ b/drivers/phy/ti/phy-omap-usb2.c @@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ static int omap_usb_set_vbus(struct usb_otg *otg, bool enabled) { struct omap_usb *phy = phy_to_omapusb(otg->usb_phy); - if (!phy->comparator) + if (!phy->comparator || !phy->comparator->set_vbus) return -ENODEV; return phy->comparator->set_vbus(phy->comparator, enabled); @@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ static int omap_usb_start_srp(struct usb_otg *otg) { struct omap_usb *phy = phy_to_omapusb(otg->usb_phy); - if (!phy->comparator) + if (!phy->comparator || !phy->comparator->start_srp) return -ENODEV; return phy->comparator->start_srp(phy->comparator); -- 2.25.1
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[PATCH OLK-5.10] phy: ti: phy-omap-usb2: Fix NULL pointer dereference for SRP
by Dong Chenchen 05 Mar '24

05 Mar '24
From: Tony Lindgren <tony(a)atomide.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.209 commit be3b82e4871ba00e9b5d0ede92d396d579d7b3b3 category: bugfix bugzilla: 189592, https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I93HCX CVE: CVE-2024-26600 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 7104ba0f1958adb250319e68a15eff89ec4fd36d ] If the external phy working together with phy-omap-usb2 does not implement send_srp(), we may still attempt to call it. This can happen on an idle Ethernet gadget triggering a wakeup for example: configfs-gadget.g1 gadget.0: ECM Suspend configfs-gadget.g1 gadget.0: Port suspended. Triggering wakeup ... Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000 when execute ... PC is at 0x0 LR is at musb_gadget_wakeup+0x1d4/0x254 [musb_hdrc] ... musb_gadget_wakeup [musb_hdrc] from usb_gadget_wakeup+0x1c/0x3c [udc_core] usb_gadget_wakeup [udc_core] from eth_start_xmit+0x3b0/0x3d4 [u_ether] eth_start_xmit [u_ether] from dev_hard_start_xmit+0x94/0x24c dev_hard_start_xmit from sch_direct_xmit+0x104/0x2e4 sch_direct_xmit from __dev_queue_xmit+0x334/0xd88 __dev_queue_xmit from arp_solicit+0xf0/0x268 arp_solicit from neigh_probe+0x54/0x7c neigh_probe from __neigh_event_send+0x22c/0x47c __neigh_event_send from neigh_resolve_output+0x14c/0x1c0 neigh_resolve_output from ip_finish_output2+0x1c8/0x628 ip_finish_output2 from ip_send_skb+0x40/0xd8 ip_send_skb from udp_send_skb+0x124/0x340 udp_send_skb from udp_sendmsg+0x780/0x984 udp_sendmsg from __sys_sendto+0xd8/0x158 __sys_sendto from ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x58 Let's fix the issue by checking for send_srp() and set_vbus() before calling them. For USB peripheral only cases these both could be NULL. Fixes: 657b306a7bdf ("usb: phy: add a new driver for omap usb2 phy") Signed-off-by: Tony Lindgren <tony(a)atomide.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240128120556.8848-1-tony@atomide.com Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/phy/ti/phy-omap-usb2.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/phy/ti/phy-omap-usb2.c b/drivers/phy/ti/phy-omap-usb2.c index f77ac041d836..95e72f7a3199 100644 --- a/drivers/phy/ti/phy-omap-usb2.c +++ b/drivers/phy/ti/phy-omap-usb2.c @@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ static int omap_usb_set_vbus(struct usb_otg *otg, bool enabled) { struct omap_usb *phy = phy_to_omapusb(otg->usb_phy); - if (!phy->comparator) + if (!phy->comparator || !phy->comparator->set_vbus) return -ENODEV; return phy->comparator->set_vbus(phy->comparator, enabled); @@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ static int omap_usb_start_srp(struct usb_otg *otg) { struct omap_usb *phy = phy_to_omapusb(otg->usb_phy); - if (!phy->comparator) + if (!phy->comparator || !phy->comparator->start_srp) return -ENODEV; return phy->comparator->start_srp(phy->comparator); -- 2.25.1
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