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[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] CVE-2026-90247
by Pu Lehui 24 Sep '26

24 Sep '26

Ihor Solodrai (1): bpf: Factor out stack_map build ID helpers Sanghyun Park (1): bpf: Fix mmap_lock leak in irq_work path kernel/bpf/mmap_unlock_work.h | 51 ++++++++++++---------- kernel/bpf/stackmap.c | 79 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- kernel/bpf/task_iter.c | 14 +++++-- 3 files changed, 93 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] sctp: validate cookie AUTH state before use
by Jinjiang Tu 24 Sep '26

24 Sep '26

From: Jérémy Jean <Jeremy.Jean(a)oss.cyber.gouv.fr> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.2 commit 3dbb44d88b1e94dd31fe43588af7437b34b44d56 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/18398 CVE: CVE-2026-74752 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- When cookie authentication is disabled, COOKIE_ECHO restores fixed-size AUTH fields directly from peer-controlled cookie bytes. A forged RANDOM length, HMAC list, or CHUNKS list can then reach association consumers with lengths or identifiers that were never validated against the local backing arrays. A forged RANDOM length can cause out-of-bounds reads during key-vector construction. A forged HMAC identifier also caused a 32-byte write past a zero-length AUTH chunk, providing a primitive for a local privilege escalation chain. Validate the cookie's RANDOM, HMACS, and CHUNKS parameters at the cookie trust boundary before copying them into the association. Reject invalid types, malformed lengths, unsupported HMAC identifiers, HMAC lists without SHA1, and forbidden chunk ids. Fixes: bbd0d59809f9 ("[SCTP]: Implement the receive and verification of AUTH chunk") Fixes: 1f485649f529 ("[SCTP]: Implement SCTP-AUTH internals") Signed-off-by: Jérémy Jean <Jeremy.Jean(a)oss.cyber.gouv.fr> Acked-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin(a)gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260804200042.2412009-1-Jeremy.Jean@oss.cyber.gou… Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: include/net/sctp/auth.h net/sctp/auth.c [Backport of upstream 3dbb44d88b1e adding sctp_auth_verify_cookie_params() to validate the cookie's RANDOM/HMACS/CHUNKS parameters before they are restored into an association. Two helpers used by the new function are provided by later mainline refactors absent on this tree and are replaced with in-tree equivalents: - sctp_sk(ep->base.sk)->cookie_auth_enable (from 2f3dd6ec901f2, which replaces sp->hmac with a bool) becomes sctp_sk(ep->base.sk)->hmac, whose non-NULL value keeps the same "cookie HMAC auth enabled" meaning already used by sctp_pack_cookie()/sctp_unpack_cookie(); - sctp_hmac_supported(hmac_id) (from bf40785fa437c) becomes the equivalent "hmac_id >= SCTP_AUTH_NUM_HMACS || !sctp_hmac_list[hmac_id].hmac_name" check matching auth.c style. In auth.h the new declaration and the struct sctp_cookie forward declaration are added while the downstream crypto_shash, init_hmacs, destroy_hmacs declarations and the non-const sctp_auth_get_hmac()/ sctp_auth_asoc_get_hmac() signatures (predating the const qualifiers of the upstream refactors) are preserved. The full validation logic is retained and is semantically equivalent to upstream.] Signed-off-by: Hulk Robot <hulkrobot(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zhang Xiaoxu <zhangxiaoxu5(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jinjiang Tu <tujinjiang(a)huawei.com> --- include/net/sctp/auth.h | 3 ++ net/sctp/auth.c | 76 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c | 3 ++ 3 files changed, 82 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/net/sctp/auth.h b/include/net/sctp/auth.h index 687e7f80037d..3c375bf0050b 100644 --- a/include/net/sctp/auth.h +++ b/include/net/sctp/auth.h @@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ struct sctp_association; struct sctp_authkey; struct sctp_hmacalgo; struct crypto_shash; +struct sctp_cookie; /* * Define a generic struct that will hold all the info @@ -92,6 +93,8 @@ struct sctp_shared_key *sctp_auth_get_shkey( int sctp_auth_asoc_copy_shkeys(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sctp_association *asoc, gfp_t gfp); +bool sctp_auth_verify_cookie_params(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep, + const struct sctp_cookie *cookie); int sctp_auth_init_hmacs(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, gfp_t gfp); void sctp_auth_destroy_hmacs(struct crypto_shash *auth_hmacs[]); struct sctp_hmac *sctp_auth_get_hmac(__u16 hmac_id); diff --git a/net/sctp/auth.c b/net/sctp/auth.c index 9cf61a18098a..a5e9eee937e0 100644 --- a/net/sctp/auth.c +++ b/net/sctp/auth.c @@ -391,6 +391,82 @@ int sctp_auth_asoc_copy_shkeys(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep, return -ENOMEM; } +static bool sctp_auth_chunk_id_forbidden(__u8 chunk_id) +{ + switch (chunk_id) { + case SCTP_CID_INIT: + case SCTP_CID_INIT_ACK: + case SCTP_CID_SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE: + case SCTP_CID_AUTH: + return true; + default: + return false; + } +} + +/* Verify AUTH parameters copied from a state cookie before they are restored + * into an association. When cookie authentication is disabled these fields + * are peer-controlled, so they must satisfy the same constraints as locally + * generated AUTH parameters. + */ +bool sctp_auth_verify_cookie_params(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep, + const struct sctp_cookie *cookie) +{ + const struct sctp_paramhdr *random; + const struct sctp_hmac_algo_param *hmacs; + const struct sctp_chunks_param *chunks; + u16 hmacs_len, chunks_len; + u16 n_hmacs, n_chunks, i; + bool has_sha1 = false; + + if (sctp_sk(ep->base.sk)->hmac || !ep->auth_enable) + return true; + + random = (const struct sctp_paramhdr *)cookie->auth_random; + if (random->type != SCTP_PARAM_RANDOM || + ntohs(random->length) != sizeof(*random) + SCTP_AUTH_RANDOM_LENGTH) + return false; + + hmacs = (const struct sctp_hmac_algo_param *)cookie->auth_hmacs; + hmacs_len = ntohs(hmacs->param_hdr.length); + if (hmacs->param_hdr.type != SCTP_PARAM_HMAC_ALGO || + hmacs_len < sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr) + + sizeof(hmacs->hmac_ids[0]) || + hmacs_len > sizeof(cookie->auth_hmacs) || + (hmacs_len - sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr)) % + sizeof(hmacs->hmac_ids[0])) + return false; + + n_hmacs = (hmacs_len - sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr)) / + sizeof(hmacs->hmac_ids[0]); + for (i = 0; i < n_hmacs; i++) { + u16 hmac_id = ntohs(hmacs->hmac_ids[i]); + + if (hmac_id >= SCTP_AUTH_NUM_HMACS || + !sctp_hmac_list[hmac_id].hmac_name) + return false; + if (hmac_id == SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1) + has_sha1 = true; + } + if (!has_sha1) + return false; + + chunks = (const struct sctp_chunks_param *)cookie->auth_chunks; + chunks_len = ntohs(chunks->param_hdr.length); + if (chunks->param_hdr.type != SCTP_PARAM_CHUNKS || + chunks_len < sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr) || + chunks_len > sizeof(cookie->auth_chunks)) + return false; + + n_chunks = chunks_len - sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr); + for (i = 0; i < n_chunks; i++) { + if (sctp_auth_chunk_id_forbidden(chunks->chunks[i])) + return false; + } + + return true; +} + /* Public interface to create the association shared key. * See code above for the algorithm. diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c index caa41c90e537..0ed35b2a62f4 100644 --- a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c +++ b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c @@ -1849,6 +1849,9 @@ struct sctp_association *sctp_unpack_cookie( /* Set up our peer's port number. */ retval->peer.port = ntohs(chunk->sctp_hdr->source); + if (!sctp_auth_verify_cookie_params(ep, bear_cookie)) + goto malformed; + /* Populate the association from the cookie. */ memcpy(&retval->c, bear_cookie, sizeof(*bear_cookie)); -- 2.43.0

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[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/3] bpf backport
by Pu Lehui 23 Sep '26

23 Sep '26

Daniel Borkmann (1): bpf: Reject a store through a fault prone pointer Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi (2): bpf: Mark sched_process_wait argument as nullable bpf: Mark signal tracepoint siginfo arguments as scalar include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 10 ++++++++++ kernel/bpf/btf.c | 7 +++++++ kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] bpf mainline about tp
by Pu Lehui 23 Sep '26

23 Sep '26

Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi (2): bpf: Mark sched_process_wait argument as nullable bpf: Mark signal tracepoint siginfo arguments as scalar kernel/bpf/btf.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH OLK-5.10 v2] lockd: pin next file across nlm_inspect_file lock-drop
by Pu Lehui 23 Sep '26

23 Sep '26

From: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.3-rc1 commit 526c49cff3f72c3ec74752016380c7567040581b category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/18850 CVE: CVE-2026-89485 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- nlm_traverse_files() pins the current file with f_count++ across a mutex_unlock for nlm_inspect_file(), but nothing pins the saved next pointer. A concurrent nlm_release_file() can kfree the next file during the unlock window, and the iterator dereferences freed memory on the next loop step. Pin both current and next before the lock-drop. Advance by swapping the pinned cursors at the end of each iteration so next is always held alive across the unlock. Always call nlm_file_release() after dropping the iteration pin, regardless of whether the file matched the predicate. Use nlm_file_inuse(), which does a live walk of the inode lock list, rather than the cached f_locks field, so skipped files that never ran nlm_inspect_file() are evaluated correctly. Because every file in a hash bucket is now pinned and released, files skipped by the is_failover_file predicate that have no locks, blocks, shares, or external references are deleted during traversal. The old code never evaluated skipped files for cleanup. The new behavior is intentional: such files are stale and should not persist in the table. Fixes: 01df9c5e918a ("LOCKD: Fix a deadlock in nlm_traverse_files()") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito(a)gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260524115527.1734251-1-michael.bommarito@gmail.c… Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever(a)oracle.com> Conflicts: fs/lockd/svcsubs.c [Downstream tree has no standalone nlm_close_files() helper; the teardown was inlined inside nlm_traverse_files(). Add nlm_file_release() (as upstream does) and rewrite the traversal loop to the new pinned-cursor form.] Co-authored-by: BackportAgent@deepseek-v4-flash Signed-off-by: Hulk Robot <hulkrobot(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui <pulehui(a)huawei.com> --- fs/lockd/svcsubs.c | 52 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------- 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/lockd/svcsubs.c b/fs/lockd/svcsubs.c index 028fc152da22..23fd515b2185 100644 --- a/fs/lockd/svcsubs.c +++ b/fs/lockd/svcsubs.c @@ -246,6 +246,11 @@ nlm_file_inuse(struct nlm_file *file) return 0; } +static void nlm_file_release(struct nlm_file *file) +{ + if (!nlm_file_inuse(file)) + nlm_delete_file(file); +} /* * Loop over all files in the file table. */ @@ -253,32 +258,41 @@ static int nlm_traverse_files(void *data, nlm_host_match_fn_t match, int (*is_failover_file)(void *data, struct nlm_file *file)) { - struct hlist_node *next; - struct nlm_file *file; + struct nlm_file *file, *next; int i, ret = 0; mutex_lock(&nlm_file_mutex); for (i = 0; i < FILE_NRHASH; i++) { - hlist_for_each_entry_safe(file, next, &nlm_files[i], f_list) { - if (is_failover_file && !is_failover_file(data, file)) - continue; + file = hlist_entry_safe(nlm_files[i].first, + struct nlm_file, f_list); + if (file) file->f_count++; - mutex_unlock(&nlm_file_mutex); - - /* Traverse locks, blocks and shares of this file - * and update file->f_locks count */ - if (nlm_inspect_file(data, file, match)) - ret = 1; + while (file) { + /* + * Pin the next neighbour before we drop the mutex + * for nlm_inspect_file(); a concurrent + * nlm_release_file() under the same mutex would + * otherwise be free to unlink and kfree it during + * the unlock window, leaving us to dereference a + * freed slab when we walked to next afterwards. + */ + next = hlist_entry_safe(file->f_list.next, + struct nlm_file, f_list); + if (next) + next->f_count++; + + if (!is_failover_file || is_failover_file(data, file)) { + mutex_unlock(&nlm_file_mutex); + + if (nlm_inspect_file(data, file, match)) + ret = 1; + + mutex_lock(&nlm_file_mutex); + } - mutex_lock(&nlm_file_mutex); file->f_count--; - /* No more references to this file. Let go of it. */ - if (list_empty(&file->f_blocks) && !file->f_locks - && !file->f_shares && !file->f_count) { - hlist_del(&file->f_list); - nlmsvc_ops->fclose(file->f_file); - kfree(file); - } + nlm_file_release(file); + file = next; } } mutex_unlock(&nlm_file_mutex); -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] CVE-2026-90247
by Pu Lehui 23 Sep '26

23 Sep '26

Ihor Solodrai (1): bpf: Factor out stack_map build ID helpers Sanghyun Park (1): bpf: Fix mmap_lock leak in irq_work path kernel/bpf/mmap_unlock_work.h | 51 ++++++++++++---------- kernel/bpf/stackmap.c | 79 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- kernel/bpf/task_iter.c | 14 +++++-- 3 files changed, 93 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH OLK-6.6] [Backport] Bluetooth: hci_sync: free the advertising instance on the failure and cancel paths
by Tang Hui 23 Sep '26

23 Sep '26

From: Linmao Li <lilinmao(a)kylinos.cn> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.157 commit 193182c6467f508a8a61d5db506d796ffed6eee6 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/19456 CVE: CVE-2026-90254 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 120d8dc042e3d45073bb6e50ee7b058a0b182627 ] adv_timeout_expire() hands a kmalloc()ed instance byte to hci_cmd_sync_queue() with a NULL destroy callback, and only adv_timeout_expire_sync() frees it. That leaks on two paths: - the return value is not checked, and hci_cmd_sync_queue() does not take ownership when it fails (-ENETDOWN, -ENODEV, -ENOMEM); - a cancelled entry is not released, as _hci_cmd_sync_cancel_entry() does not free entry->data when there is no destroy callback. hci_cmd_sync_clear() cancels every pending entry when the controller is unregistered. Free the buffer from a destroy callback, and in the caller when the entry could not be queued at all. Fixes: c249ea9b4309 ("Bluetooth: Move Adv Instance timer to hci_sync") Signed-off-by: Linmao Li <lilinmao(a)kylinos.cn> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Co-authored-by: BackportAgent(a)deepseek-v4.1-flash Signed-off-by: Hulk Robot <hulkrobot(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Tang Hui <tanghui20(a)huawei.com> --- net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c | 12 +++++++++--- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c index e086f2947c5fc..10f97eaa417dd 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c @@ -605,8 +605,6 @@ static int adv_timeout_expire_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data) { u8 instance = *(u8 *)data; - kfree(data); - hci_clear_adv_instance_sync(hdev, NULL, instance, false); if (list_empty(&hdev->adv_instances)) @@ -615,6 +613,12 @@ static int adv_timeout_expire_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data) return 0; } +static void adv_timeout_expire_destroy(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data, + int err) +{ + kfree(data); +} + static void adv_timeout_expire(struct work_struct *work) { u8 *inst_ptr; @@ -635,7 +639,9 @@ static void adv_timeout_expire(struct work_struct *work) goto unlock; *inst_ptr = hdev->cur_adv_instance; - hci_cmd_sync_queue(hdev, adv_timeout_expire_sync, inst_ptr, NULL); + if (hci_cmd_sync_queue(hdev, adv_timeout_expire_sync, inst_ptr, + adv_timeout_expire_destroy) < 0) + kfree(inst_ptr); unlock: hci_dev_unlock(hdev); -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH OLK-6.6] [Backport] Bluetooth: hci_conn: fix the SCO setup context lifetime
by Tang Hui 23 Sep '26

23 Sep '26

From: Linmao Li <lilinmao(a)kylinos.cn> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.157 commit 9a2ba69cebe3fc5a3d4fa8eaaad3c42862723c27 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/19457 CVE: CVE-2026-90255 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 42de40abe25db9211107af8896d0fd741f10648d ] hci_setup_sync() queues a conn_handle_t with a NULL destroy callback, so the context is only freed if hci_enhanced_setup_sync() actually runs. An entry that is cancelled instead is leaked, as _hci_cmd_sync_cancel_entry() does not release entry->data when there is no destroy callback, and hci_cmd_sync_clear() cancels every pending entry when the controller is unregistered. The context also stores a bare hci_conn pointer, so the connection can be freed while the work is queued. The dequeue in hci_conn_del() does not cover it either, as it matches on entry->data == conn and entry->data is the wrapper here. Same problem as commit 2f5d635ad590 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: hold conn in hci_connect_acl/le_sync() callbacks"). Hold the connection and release both from a destroy callback. The submission failure path drops both, since hci_cmd_sync_submit() does not call the destroy callback when it fails to queue. Fixes: e07a06b4eb41 ("Bluetooth: Convert SCO configure_datapath to hci_sync") Signed-off-by: Linmao Li <lilinmao(a)kylinos.cn> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Co-authored-by: BackportAgent(a)deepseek-v4.1-flash Signed-off-by: Hulk Robot <hulkrobot(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Tang Hui <tanghui20(a)huawei.com> --- net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c | 20 +++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c index b24fdd40a97ed..56ec03878355f 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c @@ -288,8 +288,6 @@ static int hci_enhanced_setup_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data) struct hci_cp_enhanced_setup_sync_conn cp; const struct sco_param *param; - kfree(conn_handle); - if (!hci_conn_valid(hdev, conn)) return -ECANCELED; @@ -457,6 +455,15 @@ static bool hci_setup_sync_conn(struct hci_conn *conn, __u16 handle) return true; } +static void hci_enhanced_setup_sync_destroy(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data, + int err) +{ + struct conn_handle_t *conn_handle = data; + + hci_conn_put(conn_handle->conn); + kfree(conn_handle); +} + bool hci_setup_sync(struct hci_conn *conn, __u16 handle) { int result; @@ -468,12 +475,15 @@ bool hci_setup_sync(struct hci_conn *conn, __u16 handle) if (!conn_handle) return false; - conn_handle->conn = conn; + conn_handle->conn = hci_conn_get(conn); conn_handle->handle = handle; result = hci_cmd_sync_queue(conn->hdev, hci_enhanced_setup_sync, - conn_handle, NULL); - if (result < 0) + conn_handle, + hci_enhanced_setup_sync_destroy); + if (result < 0) { + hci_conn_put(conn); kfree(conn_handle); + } return result == 0; } -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH OLK-6.6] [Backport] Bluetooth: MGMT: free the mesh send cancel command when it is cancelled
by Tang Hui 23 Sep '26

23 Sep '26

From: Linmao Li <lilinmao(a)kylinos.cn> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.157 commit 416fabca9b7237b76aa9cafcf8c497b8ac00d88c category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/19455 CVE: CVE-2026-90253 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 3c742feda8fcabf741a17bcf668b63c8f606f9c5 ] mesh_send_cancel() queues the pending command with a NULL destroy callback, so it is only freed if send_cancel() runs. A cancelled entry is leaked, as _hci_cmd_sync_cancel_entry() does not release entry->data when there is no destroy callback, and hci_cmd_sync_clear() cancels every pending entry when the controller is unregistered. Nothing else reclaims it either: mgmt_pending_new() does not put the command on hdev->mgmt_pending. The leak also pins the socket reference taken by mgmt_pending_new(), so the mgmt socket is never released. Free the command from a destroy callback. Fixes: b338d91703fa ("Bluetooth: Implement support for Mesh") Signed-off-by: Linmao Li <lilinmao(a)kylinos.cn> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Co-authored-by: BackportAgent(a)deepseek-v4.1-flash Signed-off-by: Hulk Robot <hulkrobot(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Tang Hui <tanghui20(a)huawei.com> --- net/bluetooth/mgmt.c | 9 +++++++-- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c b/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c index 205aadf01513b..bcfa7d3300976 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c @@ -2322,11 +2322,15 @@ static int send_cancel(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data) mgmt_cmd_complete(cmd->sk, hdev->id, MGMT_OP_MESH_SEND_CANCEL, 0, NULL, 0); - mgmt_pending_free(cmd); return 0; } +static void send_cancel_destroy(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data, int err) +{ + mgmt_pending_free(data); +} + static int mesh_send_cancel(struct sock *sk, struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data, u16 len) { @@ -2347,7 +2351,8 @@ static int mesh_send_cancel(struct sock *sk, struct hci_dev *hdev, if (!cmd) err = -ENOMEM; else - err = hci_cmd_sync_queue(hdev, send_cancel, cmd, NULL); + err = hci_cmd_sync_queue(hdev, send_cancel, cmd, + send_cancel_destroy); if (err < 0) { err = mgmt_cmd_status(sk, hdev->id, MGMT_OP_MESH_SEND_CANCEL, -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/2] Backport tracing mainline patches
by Tengda Wu 23 Sep '26

23 Sep '26

Backport tracing mainline patches. Steven Rostedt (1): tracing: Take trace_array reference when opening a tracer options file Tengda Wu (1): tracing: tracing: Fix KABI breakage from trace_options nr_topts field kernel/trace/trace.c | 52 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- kernel/trace/trace.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) -- 2.34.1

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