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[PATCH OLK-6.6] mm/vmalloc: fix data race in show_numa_info()
by Zhang Qilong 06 Feb '26

06 Feb '26

From: Jeongjun Park <aha310510(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.16-rc1 commit 5c5f0468d172ddec2e333d738d2a1f85402cf0bc category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/9408 CVE: CVE-2025-38383 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- The following data-race was found in show_numa_info(): ================================================================== BUG: KCSAN: data-race in vmalloc_info_show / vmalloc_info_show read to 0xffff88800971fe30 of 4 bytes by task 8289 on cpu 0: show_numa_info mm/vmalloc.c:4936 [inline] vmalloc_info_show+0x5a8/0x7e0 mm/vmalloc.c:5016 seq_read_iter+0x373/0xb40 fs/seq_file.c:230 proc_reg_read_iter+0x11e/0x170 fs/proc/inode.c:299 .... write to 0xffff88800971fe30 of 4 bytes by task 8287 on cpu 1: show_numa_info mm/vmalloc.c:4934 [inline] vmalloc_info_show+0x38f/0x7e0 mm/vmalloc.c:5016 seq_read_iter+0x373/0xb40 fs/seq_file.c:230 proc_reg_read_iter+0x11e/0x170 fs/proc/inode.c:299 .... value changed: 0x0000008f -> 0x00000000 ================================================================== According to this report,there is a read/write data-race because m->private is accessible to multiple CPUs. To fix this, instead of allocating the heap in proc_vmalloc_init() and passing the heap address to m->private, vmalloc_info_show() should allocate the heap. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250508165620.15321-1-aha310510@gmail.com Fixes: 8e1d743f2c26 ("mm: vmalloc: support multiple nodes in vmallocinfo") Signed-off-by: Jeongjun Park <aha310510(a)gmail.com> Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Suggested-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> Reviewed-by: "Uladzislau Rezki (Sony)" <urezki(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> Conflicts: mm/vmalloc.c [conflicts due to merge 8e63c98d86f61 ("mm: vmalloc: support multiple nodes in vmallocinfo")] Signed-off-by: Zhang Qilong <zhangqilong3(a)huawei.com> --- mm/vmalloc.c | 63 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------- 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/vmalloc.c b/mm/vmalloc.c index 375b0782353f..1455393eec23 100644 --- a/mm/vmalloc.c +++ b/mm/vmalloc.c @@ -3094,11 +3094,11 @@ void __init vm_area_register_early(struct vm_struct *vm, size_t align) static void clear_vm_uninitialized_flag(struct vm_struct *vm) { /* * Before removing VM_UNINITIALIZED, * we should make sure that vm has proper values. - * Pair with smp_rmb() in show_numa_info(). + * Pair with smp_rmb() in vread_iter() and vmalloc_info_show(). */ smp_wmb(); vm->flags &= ~VM_UNINITIALIZED; } @@ -5049,32 +5049,33 @@ int remap_vmalloc_hugepage_range(struct vm_area_struct *vma, void *addr, } EXPORT_SYMBOL(remap_vmalloc_hugepage_range); #endif #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS -static void show_numa_info(struct seq_file *m, struct vm_struct *v) -{ - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NUMA)) { - unsigned int nr, *counters = m->private; - unsigned int step = 1U << vm_area_page_order(v); - if (!counters) - return; +/* + * Print number of pages allocated on each memory node. + * + * This function can only be called if CONFIG_NUMA is enabled + * and VM_UNINITIALIZED bit in v->flags is disabled. + */ +static void show_numa_info(struct seq_file *m, struct vm_struct *v, + unsigned int *counters) +{ + unsigned int nr; + unsigned int step = 1U << vm_area_page_order(v); - if (v->flags & VM_UNINITIALIZED) - return; - /* Pair with smp_wmb() in clear_vm_uninitialized_flag() */ - smp_rmb(); + if (!counters) + return; - memset(counters, 0, nr_node_ids * sizeof(unsigned int)); + memset(counters, 0, nr_node_ids * sizeof(unsigned int)); - for (nr = 0; nr < v->nr_pages; nr += step) - counters[page_to_nid(v->pages[nr])] += step; - for_each_node_state(nr, N_HIGH_MEMORY) - if (counters[nr]) - seq_printf(m, " N%u=%u", nr, counters[nr]); - } + for (nr = 0; nr < v->nr_pages; nr += step) + counters[page_to_nid(v->pages[nr])] += step; + for_each_node_state(nr, N_HIGH_MEMORY) + if (counters[nr]) + seq_printf(m, " N%u=%u", nr, counters[nr]); } static void show_purge_info(struct seq_file *m) { struct vmap_node *vn; @@ -5098,10 +5099,14 @@ static int vmalloc_info_show(struct seq_file *m, void *p) { struct vmap_node *vn; struct vmap_area *va; struct vm_struct *v; int i; + unsigned int *counters; + + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NUMA)) + counters = kmalloc(nr_node_ids * sizeof(unsigned int), GFP_KERNEL); for (i = 0; i < nr_vmap_nodes; i++) { vn = &vmap_nodes[i]; spin_lock(&vn->busy.lock); @@ -5114,10 +5119,15 @@ static int vmalloc_info_show(struct seq_file *m, void *p) continue; } v = va->vm; + if (v->flags & VM_UNINITIALIZED) + continue; + + /* Pair with smp_wmb() in clear_vm_uninitialized_flag() */ + smp_rmb(); seq_printf(m, "0x%pK-0x%pK %7ld", v->addr, v->addr + v->size, v->size); if (v->caller) @@ -5148,33 +5158,30 @@ static int vmalloc_info_show(struct seq_file *m, void *p) seq_puts(m, " dma-coherent"); if (is_vmalloc_addr(v->pages)) seq_puts(m, " vpages"); - show_numa_info(m, v); + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NUMA)) + show_numa_info(m, v, counters); + seq_putc(m, '\n'); } spin_unlock(&vn->busy.lock); } /* * As a final step, dump "unpurged" areas. */ show_purge_info(m); + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NUMA)) + kfree(counters); return 0; } static int __init proc_vmalloc_init(void) { - void *priv_data = NULL; - - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NUMA)) - priv_data = kmalloc(nr_node_ids * sizeof(unsigned int), GFP_KERNEL); - - proc_create_single_data("vmallocinfo", - 0400, NULL, vmalloc_info_show, priv_data); - + proc_create_single("vmallocinfo", 0400, NULL, vmalloc_info_show); return 0; } module_init(proc_vmalloc_init); #endif -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] scsi: qla4xxx: Prevent a potential error pointer dereference
by Zhang Qilong 06 Feb '26

06 Feb '26

From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter(a)linaro.org> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.103 commit f5ad0819f902b4b33591791b92a0350fb3692a6b category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/9005 CVE: CVE-2025-39676 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 9dcf111dd3e7ed5fce82bb108e3a3fc001c07225 ] The qla4xxx_get_ep_fwdb() function is supposed to return NULL on error, but qla4xxx_ep_connect() returns error pointers. Propagating the error pointers will lead to an Oops in the caller, so change the error pointers to NULL. Fixes: 13483730a13b ("[SCSI] qla4xxx: fix flash/ddb support") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter(a)linaro.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/aJwnVKS9tHsw1tEu@stanley.mountain Reviewed-by: Chris Leech <cleech(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Wang Hai <wanghai38(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zhang Qilong <zhangqilong3(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/scsi/qla4xxx/ql4_os.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/scsi/qla4xxx/ql4_os.c b/drivers/scsi/qla4xxx/ql4_os.c index 675332e49a7b..4cbeeaab63d7 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/qla4xxx/ql4_os.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/qla4xxx/ql4_os.c @@ -6602,10 +6602,12 @@ static struct iscsi_endpoint *qla4xxx_get_ep_fwdb(struct scsi_qla_host *ha, addr->sin_port = htons(le16_to_cpu(fw_ddb_entry->port)); } ep = qla4xxx_ep_connect(ha->host, (struct sockaddr *)dst_addr, 0); vfree(dst_addr); + if (IS_ERR(ep)) + return NULL; return ep; } static int qla4xxx_verify_boot_idx(struct scsi_qla_host *ha, uint16_t idx) { -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] mm/slub: avoid accessing metadata when pointer is invalid in object_err()
by Zhang Qilong 06 Feb '26

06 Feb '26

From: Li Qiong <liqiong(a)nfschina.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.105 commit 0ef7058b4dc6fcef622ac23b45225db57f17b83f category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/8393 CVE: CVE-2025-39902 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit b4efccec8d06ceb10a7d34d7b1c449c569d53770 ] object_err() reports details of an object for further debugging, such as the freelist pointer, redzone, etc. However, if the pointer is invalid, attempting to access object metadata can lead to a crash since it does not point to a valid object. One known path to the crash is when alloc_consistency_checks() determines the pointer to the allocated object is invalid because of a freelist corruption, and calls object_err() to report it. The debug code should report and handle the corruption gracefully and not crash in the process. In case the pointer is NULL or check_valid_pointer() returns false for the pointer, only print the pointer value and skip accessing metadata. Fixes: 81819f0fc828 ("SLUB core") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Li Qiong <liqiong(a)nfschina.com> Reviewed-by: Harry Yoo <harry.yoo(a)oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy(a)infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka(a)suse.cz> [ Adjust context ] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Zhang Qilong <zhangqilong3(a)huawei.com> --- mm/slub.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c index 25516a5cbf04..fc1636d1be03 100644 --- a/mm/slub.c +++ b/mm/slub.c @@ -1001,11 +1001,16 @@ static void object_err(struct kmem_cache *s, struct slab *slab, { if (slab_add_kunit_errors()) return; slab_bug(s, "%s", reason); - print_trailer(s, slab, object); + if (!object || !check_valid_pointer(s, slab, object)) { + print_slab_info(slab); + pr_err("Invalid pointer 0x%p\n", object); + } else { + print_trailer(s, slab, object); + } add_taint(TAINT_BAD_PAGE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); } static bool freelist_corrupted(struct kmem_cache *s, struct slab *slab, void **freelist, void *nextfree) -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/4] fix cve-2025-40300
by Bowen You 06 Feb '26

06 Feb '26

*** BLURB HERE *** Bowen You (1): config: enable CONFIG_MITIGATION_VMESCAPE by default on x86 Pawan Gupta (3): x86/vmscape: Add conditional IBPB mitigation x86/vmscape: Enumerate VMSCAPE bug x86/vmscape: Enable the mitigation .../ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu | 1 + .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 11 +++ arch/x86/Kconfig | 9 ++ arch/x86/configs/openeuler_defconfig | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 + arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h | 7 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 2 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 85 +++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 58 +++++++++---- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 9 ++ drivers/base/cpu.c | 3 + include/linux/cpu.h | 1 + 12 files changed, 171 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 5

[PATCH OLK-6.6] drm/sched: Fix deadlock in drm_sched_entity_kill_jobs_cb
by Zhang Qilong 06 Feb '26

06 Feb '26

From: Pierre-Eric Pelloux-Prayer <pierre-eric.pelloux-prayer(a)amd.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.117 commit 70150b9443dddf02157d821c68abf438f55a2e8e category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/11434 CVE: CVE-2025-40329 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 487df8b698345dd5a91346335f05170ed5f29d4e upstream. The Mesa issue referenced below pointed out a possible deadlock: [ 1231.611031] Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario: [ 1231.611033] CPU0 CPU1 [ 1231.611034] ---- ---- [ 1231.611035] lock(&xa->xa_lock#17); [ 1231.611038] local_irq_disable(); [ 1231.611039] lock(&fence->lock); [ 1231.611041] lock(&xa->xa_lock#17); [ 1231.611044] <Interrupt> [ 1231.611045] lock(&fence->lock); [ 1231.611047] *** DEADLOCK *** In this example, CPU0 would be any function accessing job->dependencies through the xa_* functions that don't disable interrupts (eg: drm_sched_job_add_dependency(), drm_sched_entity_kill_jobs_cb()). CPU1 is executing drm_sched_entity_kill_jobs_cb() as a fence signalling callback so in an interrupt context. It will deadlock when trying to grab the xa_lock which is already held by CPU0. Replacing all xa_* usage by their xa_*_irq counterparts would fix this issue, but Christian pointed out another issue: dma_fence_signal takes fence.lock and so does dma_fence_add_callback. dma_fence_signal() // locks f1.lock -> drm_sched_entity_kill_jobs_cb() -> foreach dependencies -> dma_fence_add_callback() // locks f2.lock This will deadlock if f1 and f2 share the same spinlock. To fix both issues, the code iterating on dependencies and re-arming them is moved out to drm_sched_entity_kill_jobs_work(). Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v6.2+ Fixes: 2fdb8a8f07c2 ("drm/scheduler: rework entity flush, kill and fini") Link: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/mesa/mesa/-/issues/13908 Reported-by: Mikhail Gavrilov <mikhail.v.gavrilov(a)gmail.com> Suggested-by: Christian König <christian.koenig(a)amd.com> Reviewed-by: Christian König <christian.koenig(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Pierre-Eric Pelloux-Prayer <pierre-eric.pelloux-prayer(a)amd.com> [phasta: commit message nits] Signed-off-by: Philipp Stanner <phasta(a)kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251104095358.15092-1-pierre-eric.pelloux-prayer@… Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Wang Hai <wanghai38(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zhang Qilong <zhangqilong3(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_entity.c | 34 +++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_entity.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_entity.c index eed3b8bed9e4..01de4f072b68 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_entity.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_entity.c @@ -161,30 +161,19 @@ int drm_sched_entity_error(struct drm_sched_entity *entity) return r; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(drm_sched_entity_error); +static void drm_sched_entity_kill_jobs_cb(struct dma_fence *f, + struct dma_fence_cb *cb); + static void drm_sched_entity_kill_jobs_work(struct work_struct *wrk) { struct drm_sched_job *job = container_of(wrk, typeof(*job), work); - - drm_sched_fence_scheduled(job->s_fence, NULL); - drm_sched_fence_finished(job->s_fence, -ESRCH); - WARN_ON(job->s_fence->parent); - job->sched->ops->free_job(job); -} - -/* Signal the scheduler finished fence when the entity in question is killed. */ -static void drm_sched_entity_kill_jobs_cb(struct dma_fence *f, - struct dma_fence_cb *cb) -{ - struct drm_sched_job *job = container_of(cb, struct drm_sched_job, - finish_cb); + struct dma_fence *f; unsigned long index; - dma_fence_put(f); - /* Wait for all dependencies to avoid data corruptions */ xa_for_each(&job->dependencies, index, f) { struct drm_sched_fence *s_fence = to_drm_sched_fence(f); if (s_fence && f == &s_fence->scheduled) { @@ -208,10 +197,25 @@ static void drm_sched_entity_kill_jobs_cb(struct dma_fence *f, return; dma_fence_put(f); } + drm_sched_fence_scheduled(job->s_fence, NULL); + drm_sched_fence_finished(job->s_fence, -ESRCH); + WARN_ON(job->s_fence->parent); + job->sched->ops->free_job(job); +} + +/* Signal the scheduler finished fence when the entity in question is killed. */ +static void drm_sched_entity_kill_jobs_cb(struct dma_fence *f, + struct dma_fence_cb *cb) +{ + struct drm_sched_job *job = container_of(cb, struct drm_sched_job, + finish_cb); + + dma_fence_put(f); + INIT_WORK(&job->work, drm_sched_entity_kill_jobs_work); schedule_work(&job->work); } /* Remove the entity from the scheduler and kill all pending jobs */ -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] parse_longname(): strrchr() expects NUL-terminated string
by Quanmin Yan 06 Feb '26

06 Feb '26

From: Al Viro <viro(a)zeniv.linux.org.uk> stable inclusion from stable-v6.12.42 commit bb80f7618832d26f7e395f52f82b1dac76223e5f category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/9111 CVE: CVE-2025-38660 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… ------------------ [ Upstream commit 101841c38346f4ca41dc1802c867da990ffb32eb ] ... and parse_longname() is not guaranteed that. That's the reason why it uses kmemdup_nul() to build the argument for kstrtou64(); the problem is, kstrtou64() is not the only thing that need it. Just get a NUL-terminated copy of the entire thing and be done with that... Fixes: dd66df0053ef ("ceph: add support for encrypted snapshot names") Tested-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <Slava.Dubeyko(a)ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <Slava.Dubeyko(a)ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro(a)zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Quanmin Yan <yanquanmin1(a)huawei.com> --- fs/ceph/crypto.c | 31 ++++++++++++------------------- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ceph/crypto.c b/fs/ceph/crypto.c index 08c385610731..fa2aaf1d30f8 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/crypto.c +++ b/fs/ceph/crypto.c @@ -213,35 +213,31 @@ static struct inode *parse_longname(const struct inode *parent, { struct inode *dir = NULL; struct ceph_vino vino = { .snap = CEPH_NOSNAP }; - char *inode_number; - char *name_end; - int orig_len = *name_len; + char *name_end, *inode_number; int ret = -EIO; - + /* NUL-terminate */ + char *str __free(kfree) = kmemdup_nul(name, *name_len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!str) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); /* Skip initial '_' */ - name++; - name_end = strrchr(name, '_'); + str++; + name_end = strrchr(str, '_'); if (!name_end) { - dout("Failed to parse long snapshot name: %s\n", name); + dout("Failed to parse long snapshot name: %s\n", str); return ERR_PTR(-EIO); } - *name_len = (name_end - name); + *name_len = (name_end - str); if (*name_len <= 0) { pr_err("Failed to parse long snapshot name\n"); return ERR_PTR(-EIO); } /* Get the inode number */ - inode_number = kmemdup_nul(name_end + 1, - orig_len - *name_len - 2, - GFP_KERNEL); - if (!inode_number) - return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + inode_number = name_end + 1; ret = kstrtou64(inode_number, 10, &vino.ino); if (ret) { - dout("Failed to parse inode number: %s\n", name); - dir = ERR_PTR(ret); - goto out; + dout("Failed to parse inode number: %s\n", str); + return ERR_PTR(ret); } /* And finally the inode */ @@ -252,9 +248,6 @@ static struct inode *parse_longname(const struct inode *parent, if (IS_ERR(dir)) dout("Can't find inode %s (%s)\n", inode_number, name); } - -out: - kfree(inode_number); return dir; } -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] media: imon: make send_packet() more robust
by Quanmin Yan 06 Feb '26

06 Feb '26

From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel(a)I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.117 commit 8231e80118463be5598daaf266c1c83650f1948b category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/11614 CVE: CVE-2025-68194 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit eecd203ada43a4693ce6fdd3a58ae10c7819252c ] syzbot is reporting that imon has three problems which result in hung tasks due to forever holding device lock [1]. First problem is that when usb_rx_callback_intf0() once got -EPROTO error after ictx->dev_present_intf0 became true, usb_rx_callback_intf0() resubmits urb after printk(), and resubmitted urb causes usb_rx_callback_intf0() to again get -EPROTO error. This results in printk() flooding (RCU stalls). Alan Stern commented [2] that In theory it's okay to resubmit _if_ the driver has a robust error-recovery scheme (such as giving up after some fixed limit on the number of errors or after some fixed time has elapsed, perhaps with a time delay to prevent a flood of errors). Most drivers don't bother to do this; they simply give up right away. This makes them more vulnerable to short-term noise interference during USB transfers, but in reality such interference is quite rare. There's nothing really wrong with giving up right away. but imon has a poor error-recovery scheme which just retries forever; this behavior should be fixed. Since I'm not sure whether it is safe for imon users to give up upon any error code, this patch takes care of only union of error codes chosen from modules in drivers/media/rc/ directory which handle -EPROTO error (i.e. ir_toy, mceusb and igorplugusb). Second problem is that when usb_rx_callback_intf0() once got -EPROTO error before ictx->dev_present_intf0 becomes true, usb_rx_callback_intf0() always resubmits urb due to commit 8791d63af0cf ("[media] imon: don't wedge hardware after early callbacks"). Move the ictx->dev_present_intf0 test introduced by commit 6f6b90c9231a ("[media] imon: don't parse scancodes until intf configured") to immediately before imon_incoming_packet(), or the first problem explained above happens without printk() flooding (i.e. hung task). Third problem is that when usb_rx_callback_intf0() is not called for some reason (e.g. flaky hardware; the reproducer for this problem sometimes prevents usb_rx_callback_intf0() from being called), wait_for_completion_interruptible() in send_packet() never returns (i.e. hung task). As a workaround for such situation, change send_packet() to wait for completion with timeout of 10 seconds. Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=592e2ab8775dbe0bf09a [1] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/d6da6709-d799-4be3-a695-850bddd6eb24@rowland.harv… [2] Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel(a)I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Sean Young <sean(a)mess.org> Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil+cisco(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Quanmin Yan <yanquanmin1(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/media/rc/imon.c | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/media/rc/imon.c b/drivers/media/rc/imon.c index f4deca8894e0..bb4aabb08c06 100644 --- a/drivers/media/rc/imon.c +++ b/drivers/media/rc/imon.c @@ -650,12 +650,15 @@ static int send_packet(struct imon_context *ictx) smp_rmb(); /* ensure later readers know we're not busy */ pr_err_ratelimited("error submitting urb(%d)\n", retval); } else { - /* Wait for transmission to complete (or abort) */ - retval = wait_for_completion_interruptible( - &ictx->tx.finished); - if (retval) { + /* Wait for transmission to complete (or abort or timeout) */ + retval = wait_for_completion_interruptible_timeout(&ictx->tx.finished, 10 * HZ); + if (retval <= 0) { usb_kill_urb(ictx->tx_urb); pr_err_ratelimited("task interrupted\n"); + if (retval < 0) + ictx->tx.status = retval; + else + ictx->tx.status = -ETIMEDOUT; } ictx->tx.busy = false; @@ -1754,14 +1757,6 @@ static void usb_rx_callback_intf0(struct urb *urb) if (!ictx) return; - /* - * if we get a callback before we're done configuring the hardware, we - * can't yet process the data, as there's nowhere to send it, but we - * still need to submit a new rx URB to avoid wedging the hardware - */ - if (!ictx->dev_present_intf0) - goto out; - switch (urb->status) { case -ENOENT: /* usbcore unlink successful! */ return; @@ -1770,16 +1765,29 @@ static void usb_rx_callback_intf0(struct urb *urb) break; case 0: - imon_incoming_packet(ictx, urb, intfnum); + /* + * if we get a callback before we're done configuring the hardware, we + * can't yet process the data, as there's nowhere to send it, but we + * still need to submit a new rx URB to avoid wedging the hardware + */ + if (ictx->dev_present_intf0) + imon_incoming_packet(ictx, urb, intfnum); break; + case -ECONNRESET: + case -EILSEQ: + case -EPROTO: + case -EPIPE: + dev_warn(ictx->dev, "imon %s: status(%d)\n", + __func__, urb->status); + return; + default: dev_warn(ictx->dev, "imon %s: status(%d): ignored\n", __func__, urb->status); break; } -out: usb_submit_urb(ictx->rx_urb_intf0, GFP_ATOMIC); } @@ -1795,14 +1803,6 @@ static void usb_rx_callback_intf1(struct urb *urb) if (!ictx) return; - /* - * if we get a callback before we're done configuring the hardware, we - * can't yet process the data, as there's nowhere to send it, but we - * still need to submit a new rx URB to avoid wedging the hardware - */ - if (!ictx->dev_present_intf1) - goto out; - switch (urb->status) { case -ENOENT: /* usbcore unlink successful! */ return; @@ -1811,16 +1811,29 @@ static void usb_rx_callback_intf1(struct urb *urb) break; case 0: - imon_incoming_packet(ictx, urb, intfnum); + /* + * if we get a callback before we're done configuring the hardware, we + * can't yet process the data, as there's nowhere to send it, but we + * still need to submit a new rx URB to avoid wedging the hardware + */ + if (ictx->dev_present_intf1) + imon_incoming_packet(ictx, urb, intfnum); break; + case -ECONNRESET: + case -EILSEQ: + case -EPROTO: + case -EPIPE: + dev_warn(ictx->dev, "imon %s: status(%d)\n", + __func__, urb->status); + return; + default: dev_warn(ictx->dev, "imon %s: status(%d): ignored\n", __func__, urb->status); break; } -out: usb_submit_urb(ictx->rx_urb_intf1, GFP_ATOMIC); } -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] ksm: use range-walk function to jump over holes in scan_get_next_rmap_item
by Quanmin Yan 06 Feb '26

06 Feb '26

From: Pedro Demarchi Gomes <pedrodemargomes(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.121 commit 9c2f8a9b68024e5ebb4813665845ec0a95f2eac3 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/11569 CVE: CVE-2025-68211 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit f5548c318d6520d4fa3c5ed6003eeb710763cbc5 upstream. Currently, scan_get_next_rmap_item() walks every page address in a VMA to locate mergeable pages. This becomes highly inefficient when scanning large virtual memory areas that contain mostly unmapped regions, causing ksmd to use large amount of cpu without deduplicating much pages. This patch replaces the per-address lookup with a range walk using walk_page_range(). The range walker allows KSM to skip over entire unmapped holes in a VMA, avoiding unnecessary lookups. This problem was previously discussed in [1]. Consider the following test program which creates a 32 TiB mapping in the virtual address space but only populates a single page: /* 32 TiB */ const size_t size = 32ul * 1024 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024; int main() { char *area = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_NORESERVE | MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANON, -1, 0); if (area == MAP_FAILED) { perror("mmap() failed\n"); return -1; } /* Populate a single page such that we get an anon_vma. */ *area = 0; /* Enable KSM. */ madvise(area, size, MADV_MERGEABLE); pause(); return 0; } $ ./ksm-sparse & $ echo 1 > /sys/kernel/mm/ksm/run Without this patch ksmd uses 100% of the cpu for a long time (more then 1 hour in my test machine) scanning all the 32 TiB virtual address space that contain only one mapped page. This makes ksmd essentially deadlocked not able to deduplicate anything of value. With this patch ksmd walks only the one mapped page and skips the rest of the 32 TiB virtual address space, making the scan fast using little cpu. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251023035841.41406-1-pedrodemargomes@gmail.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251022153059.22763-1-pedrodemargomes@gmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/423de7a3-1c62-4e72-8e79-19a6413e420c@redha… [1] Fixes: 31dbd01f3143 ("ksm: Kernel SamePage Merging") Signed-off-by: Pedro Demarchi Gomes <pedrodemargomes(a)gmail.com> Co-developed-by: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com> Reported-by: craftfever <craftfever(a)airmail.cc> Closes: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/020cf8de6e773bb78ba7614ef250129f11a63781@murena.io Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com> Cc: Chengming Zhou <chengming.zhou(a)linux.dev> Cc: xu xin <xu.xin16(a)zte.com.cn> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> [ change page to folios ] Signed-off-by: Pedro Demarchi Gomes <pedrodemargomes(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Quanmin Yan <yanquanmin1(a)huawei.com> --- mm/ksm.c | 126 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 113 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/ksm.c b/mm/ksm.c index eca4c3078383..0cf19d0647b4 100644 --- a/mm/ksm.c +++ b/mm/ksm.c @@ -2310,6 +2310,95 @@ static struct ksm_rmap_item *get_next_rmap_item(struct ksm_mm_slot *mm_slot, return rmap_item; } +struct ksm_next_page_arg { + struct folio *folio; + struct page *page; + unsigned long addr; +}; + +static int ksm_next_page_pmd_entry(pmd_t *pmdp, unsigned long addr, unsigned long end, + struct mm_walk *walk) +{ + struct ksm_next_page_arg *private = walk->private; + struct vm_area_struct *vma = walk->vma; + pte_t *start_ptep = NULL, *ptep, pte; + struct mm_struct *mm = walk->mm; + struct folio *folio; + struct page *page; + spinlock_t *ptl; + pmd_t pmd; + + if (ksm_test_exit(mm)) + return 0; + + cond_resched(); + + pmd = pmdp_get_lockless(pmdp); + if (!pmd_present(pmd)) + return 0; + + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE) && pmd_leaf(pmd)) { + ptl = pmd_lock(mm, pmdp); + pmd = pmdp_get(pmdp); + + if (!pmd_present(pmd)) { + goto not_found_unlock; + } else if (pmd_leaf(pmd)) { + page = vm_normal_page_pmd(vma, addr, pmd); + if (!page) + goto not_found_unlock; + folio = page_folio(page); + + if (folio_is_zone_device(folio) || !folio_test_anon(folio)) + goto not_found_unlock; + + page += ((addr & (PMD_SIZE - 1)) >> PAGE_SHIFT); + goto found_unlock; + } + spin_unlock(ptl); + } + + start_ptep = pte_offset_map_lock(mm, pmdp, addr, &ptl); + if (!start_ptep) + return 0; + + for (ptep = start_ptep; addr < end; ptep++, addr += PAGE_SIZE) { + pte = ptep_get(ptep); + + if (!pte_present(pte)) + continue; + + page = vm_normal_page(vma, addr, pte); + if (!page) + continue; + folio = page_folio(page); + + if (folio_is_zone_device(folio) || !folio_test_anon(folio)) + continue; + goto found_unlock; + } + +not_found_unlock: + spin_unlock(ptl); + if (start_ptep) + pte_unmap(start_ptep); + return 0; +found_unlock: + folio_get(folio); + spin_unlock(ptl); + if (start_ptep) + pte_unmap(start_ptep); + private->page = page; + private->folio = folio; + private->addr = addr; + return 1; +} + +static struct mm_walk_ops ksm_next_page_ops = { + .pmd_entry = ksm_next_page_pmd_entry, + .walk_lock = PGWALK_RDLOCK, +}; + static struct ksm_rmap_item *scan_get_next_rmap_item(struct page **page) { struct mm_struct *mm; @@ -2396,32 +2485,43 @@ static struct ksm_rmap_item *scan_get_next_rmap_item(struct page **page) ksm_scan.address = vma->vm_end; while (ksm_scan.address < vma->vm_end) { + struct ksm_next_page_arg ksm_next_page_arg; + struct page *tmp_page = NULL; + struct folio *folio; + if (ksm_test_exit(mm)) break; - *page = follow_page(vma, ksm_scan.address, FOLL_GET); - if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(*page)) { - ksm_scan.address += PAGE_SIZE; - cond_resched(); - continue; + + int found; + + found = walk_page_range_vma(vma, ksm_scan.address, + vma->vm_end, + &ksm_next_page_ops, + &ksm_next_page_arg); + + if (found > 0) { + folio = ksm_next_page_arg.folio; + tmp_page = ksm_next_page_arg.page; + ksm_scan.address = ksm_next_page_arg.addr; + } else { + VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(found < 0); + ksm_scan.address = vma->vm_end - PAGE_SIZE; } - if (is_zone_device_page(*page)) - goto next_page; - if (PageAnon(*page)) { - flush_anon_page(vma, *page, ksm_scan.address); - flush_dcache_page(*page); + if (tmp_page) { + flush_anon_page(vma, tmp_page, ksm_scan.address); + flush_dcache_page(tmp_page); rmap_item = get_next_rmap_item(mm_slot, ksm_scan.rmap_list, ksm_scan.address); if (rmap_item) { ksm_scan.rmap_list = &rmap_item->rmap_list; ksm_scan.address += PAGE_SIZE; + *page = tmp_page; } else - put_page(*page); + folio_put(folio); mmap_read_unlock(mm); return rmap_item; } -next_page: - put_page(*page); ksm_scan.address += PAGE_SIZE; cond_resched(); } -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] fbcon: Set fb_display[i]->mode to NULL when the mode is released
by Quanmin Yan 06 Feb '26

06 Feb '26

stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.117 commit 468f78276a37f4c6499385a4ce28f4f57be6655d category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/11306 CVE: CVE-2025-40323 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit a1f3058930745d2b938b6b4f5bd9630dc74b26b7 upstream. Recently, we discovered the following issue through syzkaller: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in fb_mode_is_equal+0x285/0x2f0 Read of size 4 at addr ff11000001b3c69c by task syz.xxx ... Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0xab/0xe0 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x390 print_report+0xb9/0x280 kasan_report+0xb8/0xf0 fb_mode_is_equal+0x285/0x2f0 fbcon_mode_deleted+0x129/0x180 fb_set_var+0xe7f/0x11d0 do_fb_ioctl+0x6a0/0x750 fb_ioctl+0xe0/0x140 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x193/0x210 do_syscall_64+0x5f/0x9c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Based on experimentation and analysis, during framebuffer unregistration, only the memory of fb_info->modelist is freed, without setting the corresponding fb_display[i]->mode to NULL for the freed modes. This leads to UAF issues during subsequent accesses. Here's an example of reproduction steps: 1. With /dev/fb0 already registered in the system, load a kernel module to register a new device /dev/fb1; 2. Set fb1's mode to the global fb_display[] array (via FBIOPUT_CON2FBMAP); 3. Switch console from fb to VGA (to allow normal rmmod of the ko); 4. Unload the kernel module, at this point fb1's modelist is freed, leaving a wild pointer in fb_display[]; 5. Trigger the bug via system calls through fb0 attempting to delete a mode from fb0. Add a check in do_unregister_framebuffer(): if the mode to be freed exists in fb_display[], set the corresponding mode pointer to NULL. Signed-off-by: Quanmin Yan <yanquanmin1(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann(a)suse.de> Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller(a)gmx.de> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c | 1 + include/linux/fbcon.h | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 22 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c index 9757276e8182..fc9df4accd47 100644 --- a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c +++ b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c @@ -2825,6 +2825,25 @@ int fbcon_mode_deleted(struct fb_info *info, return found; } +static void fbcon_delete_mode(struct fb_videomode *m) +{ + struct fbcon_display *p; + + for (int i = first_fb_vc; i <= last_fb_vc; i++) { + p = &fb_display[i]; + if (p->mode == m) + p->mode = NULL; + } +} + +void fbcon_delete_modelist(struct list_head *head) +{ + struct fb_modelist *modelist; + + list_for_each_entry(modelist, head, list) + fbcon_delete_mode(&modelist->mode); +} + #ifdef CONFIG_VT_HW_CONSOLE_BINDING static void fbcon_unbind(void) { diff --git a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c index 515a9ab711ec..aad127738272 100644 --- a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c +++ b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c @@ -1027,6 +1027,7 @@ static void do_unregister_framebuffer(struct fb_info *fb_info) fb_info->pixmap.addr = NULL; } + fbcon_delete_modelist(&fb_info->modelist); fb_destroy_modelist(&fb_info->modelist); registered_fb[fb_info->node] = NULL; num_registered_fb--; diff --git a/include/linux/fbcon.h b/include/linux/fbcon.h index 2382dec6d6ab..fb0fc2736b80 100644 --- a/include/linux/fbcon.h +++ b/include/linux/fbcon.h @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ void fbcon_suspended(struct fb_info *info); void fbcon_resumed(struct fb_info *info); int fbcon_mode_deleted(struct fb_info *info, struct fb_videomode *mode); +void fbcon_delete_modelist(struct list_head *head); void fbcon_new_modelist(struct fb_info *info); void fbcon_get_requirement(struct fb_info *info, struct fb_blit_caps *caps); @@ -31,6 +32,7 @@ static inline void fbcon_suspended(struct fb_info *info) {} static inline void fbcon_resumed(struct fb_info *info) {} static inline int fbcon_mode_deleted(struct fb_info *info, struct fb_videomode *mode) { return 0; } +static inline void fbcon_delete_modelist(struct list_head *head) {} static inline void fbcon_new_modelist(struct fb_info *info) {} static inline void fbcon_get_requirement(struct fb_info *info, struct fb_blit_caps *caps) {} -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/1] CVE-2025-39957
by Yongqiang Liu 06 Feb '26

06 Feb '26

Lachlan Hodges (1): wifi: mac80211: increase scan_ies_len for S1G net/mac80211/main.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) -- 2.43.0

2 2