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[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] libceph: fix multiple unsafe decodes in decode_locker()
by Zhang Qilong 08 Oct '26

08 Oct '26

From: Pavitra Jha <jhapavitra98(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.266 commit 1ed45c8d96498725eb54f740172f9068d8673906 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/18381 CVE: CVE-2026-80561 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 437b6551cfcc235eea1d735a874f9d421f555e17 upstream. decode_locker() in cls_lock_client.c contains three unsafe decode operations that allow a malicious or compromised OSD to trigger slab-out-of-bounds reads: 1. ceph_decode_copy() at the locker_id_t name field has no preceding bounds check. With p == end after ceph_start_decoding() accepts struct_len=0, this reads sizeof(ceph_entity_name) = 9 bytes past the validated buffer boundary. 2. *p += sizeof(struct ceph_timespec) after the locker_info_t header is an unchecked pointer advance. A malicious OSD can position p past end, causing all subsequent _safe checks to pass against a bogus boundary. 3. len = ceph_decode_32(p) has no preceding bounds check, and the immediately following *p += len is uncapped. A malicious OSD can send len=0xffffffff, advancing p gigabytes past end and escaping the decode window entirely. Fix all three by replacing bare operations with their safe variants: ceph_decode_copy -> ceph_decode_copy_safe *p += sizeof(...) -> ceph_decode_skip_n ceph_decode_32(p) -> ceph_decode_32_safe *p += len -> ceph_decode_skip_n A new label is added to return -EINVAL on any bounds violation. -EINVAL is appropriate here: the data received from the OSD is structurally malformed, which is an invalid argument to the decode contract regardless of whether the caller or the wire is at fault. Attacker model: a malicious or compromised OSD in a multi-tenant Ceph deployment can trigger this against any kernel client that issues the lock.get_info class method (e.g. during RBD exclusive lock acquisition) without any further privileges beyond OSD session establishment. [ idryomov: use ceph_decode_skip_string() to skip description, trim changelog ] Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: d4ed4a530562 ("libceph: support for lock.lock_info") Signed-off-by: Pavitra Jha <jhapavitra98(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Conflicts: net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c [Just context conflicts] Signed-off-by: Zhang Qilong <zhangqilong3(a)huawei.com> --- net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c | 15 +++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c b/net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c index 68ca68df66d1..46932f8db596 100644 --- a/net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c +++ b/net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c @@ -250,31 +250,38 @@ static int decode_locker(void **p, void *end, struct ceph_locker *locker) ret = ceph_start_decoding(p, end, 1, "locker_id_t", &struct_v, &len); if (ret) return ret; - ceph_decode_copy(p, &locker->id.name, sizeof(locker->id.name)); + ceph_decode_copy_safe(p, end, &locker->id.name, + sizeof(locker->id.name), bad); s = ceph_extract_encoded_string(p, end, NULL, GFP_NOIO); if (IS_ERR(s)) return PTR_ERR(s); locker->id.cookie = s; ret = ceph_start_decoding(p, end, 1, "locker_info_t", &struct_v, &len); if (ret) return ret; - *p += sizeof(struct ceph_timespec); /* skip expiration */ + /* skip expiration */ + ceph_decode_skip_n(p, end, sizeof(struct ceph_timespec), bad); + ceph_decode_copy(p, &locker->info.addr, sizeof(locker->info.addr)); ceph_decode_addr(&locker->info.addr); - len = ceph_decode_32(p); - *p += len; /* skip description */ + + /* skip description */ + ceph_decode_skip_string(p, end, bad); dout("%s %s%llu cookie %s addr %s\n", __func__, ENTITY_NAME(locker->id.name), locker->id.cookie, ceph_pr_addr(&locker->info.addr.in_addr)); return 0; + +bad: + return -EINVAL; } static int decode_lockers(void **p, void *end, u8 *type, char **tag, struct ceph_locker **lockers, u32 *num_lockers) { -- 2.43.0

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[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS 0/2] xfrm: fix stale skb->prev UAF in validate_xmit_xfrm() for async crypto GSO segments
by superdcc97＠163.com 08 Oct '26

08 Oct '26

From: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> CVE: CVE-2026-68426 Reference: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/17032 This series fixes CVE-2026-68426, a use-after-free in validate_xmit_xfrm(): when async crypto steals GSO segments (->xmit() returns -EINPROGRESS), the returned segment list head keeps skb->prev pointing at a stolen (crypto-owned) segment. validate_xmit_skb_list() later does tail = skb->prev and tail->next = skb, writing through the stale pointer. Patch 1 is a prerequisite backport of upstream d1d17a359ce6 ("esp: remove the skb from the chain when it's enqueued in cryptd_wq", v5.6). It introduces the pskb tracking of the last retained segment and properly unlinks stolen segments from the chain. Without it the CVE fix commit cannot be applied faithfully: its skb->prev repoint logic builds directly on the pskb variable and the unlinking behaviour introduced there. Patch 2 is the mainline fix for CVE-2026-68426, 3f4c3919baf0944ad96580467c302bc6c7758b00 (v7.2-rc4): repoint skb->prev at the last retained segment before returning, so validate_xmit_skb_list() never chains onto a segment now owned by the crypto engine. Both patches are adapted to the 4.19-based openEuler-1.0-LTS code base, which still uses the original do-while loop form of validate_xmit_xfrm() (the upstream skb_list_walk_safe refactor c3b18e0d9254 is a pure refactor and is not backported). The target's "return skb" semantics are kept (upstream's ERR_PTR(-EINPROGRESS) return comes from the unrelated later commit 6860b467f569 and is not needed for this fix). Note: this series is based on f702ec806ef8 and supersedes the incomplete single-commit adaptation 0026e6ba24b0 ("xfrm: fix stale skb->prev after async crypto steals a GSO segment"), which tracked pskb without the prerequisite chain-unlink fix. Petr Wozniak (1): xfrm: fix stale skb->prev after async crypto steals a GSO segment Xin Long (1): esp: remove the skb from the chain when it's enqueued in cryptd_wq net/xfrm/xfrm_device.c | 16 ++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) -- 2.43.0

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[openEuler-1.0-LTS] libceph: fix multiple unsafe decodes in decode_locker()
by Zhang Qilong 08 Oct '26

08 Oct '26

From: Pavitra Jha <jhapavitra98(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.266 commit 1ed45c8d96498725eb54f740172f9068d8673906 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/18381 CVE: CVE-2026-80561 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 437b6551cfcc235eea1d735a874f9d421f555e17 upstream. decode_locker() in cls_lock_client.c contains three unsafe decode operations that allow a malicious or compromised OSD to trigger slab-out-of-bounds reads: 1. ceph_decode_copy() at the locker_id_t name field has no preceding bounds check. With p == end after ceph_start_decoding() accepts struct_len=0, this reads sizeof(ceph_entity_name) = 9 bytes past the validated buffer boundary. 2. *p += sizeof(struct ceph_timespec) after the locker_info_t header is an unchecked pointer advance. A malicious OSD can position p past end, causing all subsequent _safe checks to pass against a bogus boundary. 3. len = ceph_decode_32(p) has no preceding bounds check, and the immediately following *p += len is uncapped. A malicious OSD can send len=0xffffffff, advancing p gigabytes past end and escaping the decode window entirely. Fix all three by replacing bare operations with their safe variants: ceph_decode_copy -> ceph_decode_copy_safe *p += sizeof(...) -> ceph_decode_skip_n ceph_decode_32(p) -> ceph_decode_32_safe *p += len -> ceph_decode_skip_n A new label is added to return -EINVAL on any bounds violation. -EINVAL is appropriate here: the data received from the OSD is structurally malformed, which is an invalid argument to the decode contract regardless of whether the caller or the wire is at fault. Attacker model: a malicious or compromised OSD in a multi-tenant Ceph deployment can trigger this against any kernel client that issues the lock.get_info class method (e.g. during RBD exclusive lock acquisition) without any further privileges beyond OSD session establishment. [ idryomov: use ceph_decode_skip_string() to skip description, trim changelog ] Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: d4ed4a530562 ("libceph: support for lock.lock_info") Signed-off-by: Pavitra Jha <jhapavitra98(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Conflicts: net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c [Just context conflicts] Signed-off-by: Zhang Qilong <zhangqilong3(a)huawei.com> --- net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c | 15 +++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c b/net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c index 68ca68df66d1..46932f8db596 100644 --- a/net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c +++ b/net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c @@ -250,31 +250,38 @@ static int decode_locker(void **p, void *end, struct ceph_locker *locker) ret = ceph_start_decoding(p, end, 1, "locker_id_t", &struct_v, &len); if (ret) return ret; - ceph_decode_copy(p, &locker->id.name, sizeof(locker->id.name)); + ceph_decode_copy_safe(p, end, &locker->id.name, + sizeof(locker->id.name), bad); s = ceph_extract_encoded_string(p, end, NULL, GFP_NOIO); if (IS_ERR(s)) return PTR_ERR(s); locker->id.cookie = s; ret = ceph_start_decoding(p, end, 1, "locker_info_t", &struct_v, &len); if (ret) return ret; - *p += sizeof(struct ceph_timespec); /* skip expiration */ + /* skip expiration */ + ceph_decode_skip_n(p, end, sizeof(struct ceph_timespec), bad); + ceph_decode_copy(p, &locker->info.addr, sizeof(locker->info.addr)); ceph_decode_addr(&locker->info.addr); - len = ceph_decode_32(p); - *p += len; /* skip description */ + + /* skip description */ + ceph_decode_skip_string(p, end, bad); dout("%s %s%llu cookie %s addr %s\n", __func__, ENTITY_NAME(locker->id.name), locker->id.cookie, ceph_pr_addr(&locker->info.addr.in_addr)); return 0; + +bad: + return -EINVAL; } static int decode_lockers(void **p, void *end, u8 *type, char **tag, struct ceph_locker **lockers, u32 *num_lockers) { -- 2.43.0

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[PATCH OLK-6.6] nfsd: reject out-of-range useconds in NFSv2 SETATTR/CREATE
by Lu Jialin 08 Oct '26

08 Oct '26

From: Robbie Ko <robbieko(a)synology.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.157 commit 1db456ffc22e045f49f7b9e62415a26b3f33f200 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/18931 CVE: CVE-2026-89665 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 26709c8ffe73772eb69e68d553ac71d91228dccc upstream. The NFSv2 sattr decoder converts the wire useconds to nanoseconds in svcxdr_decode_sattr(): iap->ia_atime.tv_nsec = tmp2 * NSEC_PER_USEC; tmp2 is a u32 and NSEC_PER_USEC is 1000, so the product is computed in unsigned long. On ILP32 that is 32 bits, and an out-of-range useconds value such as 4294968 wraps to tv_nsec == 704. The corruption therefore happens during decode, before any proc function can inspect the value, and a later range check on tv_nsec would see an in-range result and accept it. Rejecting in the decoder yields an RPC GARBAGE_ARGS reply. NFSv2 defines no NFSERR_INVAL, so there is no NFS-level status to return for a malformed time argument, and the check cannot move to the proc function the way the v3/v4 nsec range checks do. Guard the raw useconds before the multiplication and reject values greater than 1000000. useconds == 1000000 is kept: it is the Sun convention for "set to the current server time", and the in-tree Linux NFSv2 client emits it in both the atime and the mtime field for a plain touch / utimes(file, NULL) (see encode_sattr() and xdr_encode_current_server_time() in fs/nfs/nfs2xdr.c). Rejecting 1000000 would turn that common operation into a hard decode failure for both SETATTR and CREATE. 1000000 * NSEC_PER_USEC is 10^9, which does not wrap on ILP32, so the Sun convention value passes through safely. Only genuinely out-of-range values (> 1000000) are rejected. The atime and mtime guards are therefore symmetric. The decoder only applied the Sun convention in the mtime block, which clears ATTR_ATIME_SET|ATTR_MTIME_SET when mtime useconds == 1000000. If a client puts 1000000 in the atime field but not in the mtime field, the atime block stored an out-of-range tv_nsec (10^9) and left ATTR_ATIME_SET set, so the bogus value reached the filesystem. Apply the convention in the atime block as well, clearing ATTR_ATIME_SET so the server uses its current time and ignores the value. Only ATTR_ATIME_SET is cleared there. The mtime block keeps its existing behavior, where 1000000 means "set both atime and mtime to now". Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Robbie Ko <robbieko(a)synology.com> [ cel: various tweaks, addenda, and clean-ups ] Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260616054027.2360930-1-robbieko@synology.com Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <cel(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lu Jialin <lujialin4(a)huawei.com> --- fs/nfsd/nfsxdr.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfsxdr.c b/fs/nfsd/nfsxdr.c index 5777f40c7353..c7495a6db2c4 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfsxdr.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfsxdr.c @@ -9,6 +9,16 @@ #include "xdr.h" #include "auth.h" +/* + * Sun convention: a sattr time-useconds field of one full second (an + * otherwise out-of-range value) means "set this time to the current + * server time." It's needed to make permissions checks for the "touch" + * program across NFSv2 mounts work correctly. See description of + * sattr in section 6.1 of "NFS Illustrated" by Brent Callaghan, + * Addison-Wesley, ISBN 0-201-32750-5 + */ +#define NFS2_SATTR_SET_TO_SERVER_TIME (1000000) + /* * Mapping of S_IF* types to NFS file types */ @@ -172,27 +182,29 @@ svcxdr_decode_sattr(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct xdr_stream *xdr, tmp1 = be32_to_cpup(p++); tmp2 = be32_to_cpup(p++); if (tmp1 != (u32)-1 && tmp2 != (u32)-1) { + /* + * Range test here to prevent the multiplication from + * wrapping to a valid (but incorrect) value on 32-bit + * platforms. + */ + if (tmp2 > NFS2_SATTR_SET_TO_SERVER_TIME) + return false; iap->ia_valid |= ATTR_ATIME | ATTR_ATIME_SET; iap->ia_atime.tv_sec = tmp1; iap->ia_atime.tv_nsec = tmp2 * NSEC_PER_USEC; + if (tmp2 == NFS2_SATTR_SET_TO_SERVER_TIME) + iap->ia_valid &= ~ATTR_ATIME_SET; } tmp1 = be32_to_cpup(p++); tmp2 = be32_to_cpup(p++); if (tmp1 != (u32)-1 && tmp2 != (u32)-1) { + if (tmp2 > NFS2_SATTR_SET_TO_SERVER_TIME) + return false; iap->ia_valid |= ATTR_MTIME | ATTR_MTIME_SET; iap->ia_mtime.tv_sec = tmp1; iap->ia_mtime.tv_nsec = tmp2 * NSEC_PER_USEC; - /* - * Passing the invalid value useconds=1000000 for mtime - * is a Sun convention for "set both mtime and atime to - * current server time". It's needed to make permissions - * checks for the "touch" program across v2 mounts to - * Solaris and Irix boxes work correctly. See description of - * sattr in section 6.1 of "NFS Illustrated" by - * Brent Callaghan, Addison-Wesley, ISBN 0-201-32750-5 - */ - if (tmp2 == 1000000) + if (tmp2 == NFS2_SATTR_SET_TO_SERVER_TIME) iap->ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_ATIME_SET|ATTR_MTIME_SET); } -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/1] CVE-2026-90148
by Yongqiang Liu 08 Oct '26

08 Oct '26

CVE-2026-90148 Zhansong Gao (1): NFSv4: Fix incorrect argument passed to nfs4_delete_lease() in nfs4_add_lease() fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) -- 2.43.0

2 2

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/1] CVE-2026-90140
by Yongqiang Liu 08 Oct '26

08 Oct '26

Baokun Li (1): cuse: wait for pending RCU callbacks on module exit fs/fuse/cuse.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) -- 2.43.0

2 2

[PATCH OLK-6.6] nfsd: fix XDR padding calculation in ff_encode_getdeviceinfo
by Lu Jialin 08 Oct '26

08 Oct '26

From: Jeff Layton <jlayton(a)kernel.org> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.157 commit 88bce7e326c368d7df15126ccac537e54bebd467 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/18936 CVE: CVE-2026-89673 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 8b989aaec85e1293a871d602590c951fe44b8647 upstream. nfsd4_ff_encode_getdeviceinfo() computes the da_addr_body reservation as 16 + netid_len + addr_len, but the subsequent xdr_encode_opaque() calls emit 8 + round_up(netid_len, 4) + round_up(addr_len, 4) bytes. The mismatch means the declared da_addr_body length exceeds the actual encoded data by 2-8 bytes on every flexfile GETDEVICEINFO reply, leaking stale reply-page content to the client and mis-aligning the subsequent version list decode. Use xdr_align_size() for each string length to match what xdr_encode_opaque() actually writes. Fixes: efcae97fa425 ("NFSD: da_addr_body field missing in some GETDEVICEINFO replies") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: kres:claude-opus-4-6 Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton(a)kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260527-pnfs-fixes-v1-1-784f39dc1eca@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lu Jialin <lujialin4(a)huawei.com> --- fs/nfsd/flexfilelayoutxdr.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/nfsd/flexfilelayoutxdr.c b/fs/nfsd/flexfilelayoutxdr.c index b79608341de0..c05d1d3e2021 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/flexfilelayoutxdr.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/flexfilelayoutxdr.c @@ -99,7 +99,8 @@ nfsd4_ff_encode_getdeviceinfo(struct xdr_stream *xdr, } /* len + padding for two strings */ - addr_len = 16 + da->netaddr.netid_len + da->netaddr.addr_len; + addr_len = 8 + xdr_align_size(da->netaddr.netid_len) + + xdr_align_size(da->netaddr.addr_len); ver_len = 20; len = 4 + ver_len + 4 + addr_len; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] ftrace: Synchronize the initialization of ftrace_ops
by Tengda Wu 08 Oct '26

08 Oct '26

From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt(a)goodmis.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.3-rc2 commit 4617721c502b2ddaa4e324e86da4997edf738fa5 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/10077 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- There's some internal state that ftrace_ops needs to have set, but since it can be declared outside of the ftrace.c code, it calls ftrace_ops_init() on the ops in every global function. The issue is that if two tasks call it on the same ops at the same time it is possible to have the initialization of one corrupt the initialization of the other call. Create a ops_mutex to use to synchronize every initialization of the ftrace_ops. The mutex is taken within checking the ftrace_ops flag that states it was initializied but the flag is checked again after the mutex has been taken. Checking first outside the mutex allows it to shortcut having to take the mutex. But then the check needs to be done again after the mute is taken in case of races. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260902095501.6b59af20@gandalf.local.home Fixes: f04f24fb7e48d ("ftrace, kprobes: Fix a deadlock on ftrace_regex_lock") Reported-by: sashiko-bot(a)kernel.org Close: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260829025528.49A831F000E9@smtp.kernel.org/ Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt(a)goodmis.org> Conflicts: kernel/trace/ftrace.c [Replace guard to pure mutex_lock/unlock.] Signed-off-by: Tengda Wu <wutengda2(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/trace/ftrace.c | 16 ++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/trace/ftrace.c b/kernel/trace/ftrace.c index e4f137ea0cc2..1a4c8db7a688 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/ftrace.c +++ b/kernel/trace/ftrace.c @@ -69,6 +69,8 @@ #define INIT_OPS_HASH(opsname) \ .func_hash = &opsname.local_hash, \ .local_hash.regex_lock = __MUTEX_INITIALIZER(opsname.local_hash.regex_lock), +/* Used only to synchronize the initialization of ftrace_ops */ +static DEFINE_MUTEX(ops_mutex); #else #define INIT_OPS_HASH(opsname) #endif @@ -131,10 +133,20 @@ static void ftrace_ops_no_ops(unsigned long ip, unsigned long parent_ip); static inline void ftrace_ops_init(struct ftrace_ops *ops) { #ifdef CONFIG_DYNAMIC_FTRACE - if (!(ops->flags & FTRACE_OPS_FL_INITIALIZED)) { + unsigned long flags = smp_load_acquire(&ops->flags); + + if (!(flags & FTRACE_OPS_FL_INITIALIZED)) { + mutex_lock(&ops_mutex); + /* Could have been initialized before lock taken */ + if (unlikely(ops->flags & FTRACE_OPS_FL_INITIALIZED)) { + mutex_unlock(&ops_mutex); + return; + } mutex_init(&ops->local_hash.regex_lock); ops->func_hash = &ops->local_hash; - ops->flags |= FTRACE_OPS_FL_INITIALIZED; + flags = ops->flags | FTRACE_OPS_FL_INITIALIZED; + smp_store_release(&ops->flags, flags); + mutex_unlock(&ops_mutex); } #endif } -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH OLK-6.6] ftrace: Synchronize the initialization of ftrace_ops
by Tengda Wu 08 Oct '26

08 Oct '26

From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt(a)goodmis.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.3-rc2 commit 4617721c502b2ddaa4e324e86da4997edf738fa5 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/10077 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- There's some internal state that ftrace_ops needs to have set, but since it can be declared outside of the ftrace.c code, it calls ftrace_ops_init() on the ops in every global function. The issue is that if two tasks call it on the same ops at the same time it is possible to have the initialization of one corrupt the initialization of the other call. Create a ops_mutex to use to synchronize every initialization of the ftrace_ops. The mutex is taken within checking the ftrace_ops flag that states it was initializied but the flag is checked again after the mutex has been taken. Checking first outside the mutex allows it to shortcut having to take the mutex. But then the check needs to be done again after the mute is taken in case of races. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260902095501.6b59af20@gandalf.local.home Fixes: f04f24fb7e48d ("ftrace, kprobes: Fix a deadlock on ftrace_regex_lock") Reported-by: sashiko-bot(a)kernel.org Close: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260829025528.49A831F000E9@smtp.kernel.org/ Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt(a)goodmis.orgi> Conflicts: kernel/trace/ftrace.c [Context conflict] Signed-off-by: Tengda Wu <wutengda2(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/trace/ftrace.c | 13 +++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/trace/ftrace.c b/kernel/trace/ftrace.c index 115f4232d688..ad61bd1cba55 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/ftrace.c +++ b/kernel/trace/ftrace.c @@ -75,6 +75,8 @@ #define INIT_OPS_HASH(opsname) \ .func_hash = &opsname.local_hash, \ .local_hash.regex_lock = __MUTEX_INITIALIZER(opsname.local_hash.regex_lock), +/* Used only to synchronize the initialization of ftrace_ops */ +static DEFINE_MUTEX(ops_mutex); #else #define INIT_OPS_HASH(opsname) #endif @@ -159,10 +161,17 @@ const struct ftrace_ops ftrace_nop_ops = { static inline void ftrace_ops_init(struct ftrace_ops *ops) { #ifdef CONFIG_DYNAMIC_FTRACE - if (!(ops->flags & FTRACE_OPS_FL_INITIALIZED)) { + unsigned long flags = smp_load_acquire(&ops->flags); + + if (!(flags & FTRACE_OPS_FL_INITIALIZED)) { + guard(mutex)(&ops_mutex); + /* Could have been initialized before lock taken */ + if (unlikely(ops->flags & FTRACE_OPS_FL_INITIALIZED)) + return; mutex_init(&ops->local_hash.regex_lock); ops->func_hash = &ops->local_hash; - ops->flags |= FTRACE_OPS_FL_INITIALIZED; + flags = ops->flags | FTRACE_OPS_FL_INITIALIZED; + smp_store_release(&ops->flags, flags); } #endif } -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH OLK-5.10] mmc: via-sdmmc: stop card-detect handling on probe failure
by Gu Bowen 08 Oct '26

08 Oct '26

From: Fan Wu <fanwu01(a)zju.edu.cn> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.270 commit 5bb5327b92aae17e91c7228953c350a6ee3c94e8 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/18835 CVE: CVE-2026-89440 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 088eaa92fcebaa6b957ccf9635afdf39643a577d upstream. request_irq() registers the SD card-detect interrupt and the probe enables it before mmc_add_host() runs. If mmc_add_host() fails, the error path only unmaps the registers and returns: the interrupt stays registered, so the handler keeps running against the host once it is freed. via_sdc_isr() dereferences sdhost and its MMIO base and schedules carddet_work, which via_sdc_card_detect() also runs against freed memory through its container_of() dereference. Add a probe-error path that disables and frees the interrupt and cancels carddet_work before unmapping. carddet_work can re-enable the device interrupt via via_reset_pcictrl(), which restores PCIINTCTRL, so mask it again after cancelling the work. This issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool and confirmed by manual code review. Fixes: e4e46fb61e3b ("mmc: via-sdmmc: fix return value check of mmc_add_host()") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.6 Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <fanwu01(a)zju.edu.cn> Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <ulfh(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Gu Bowen <gubowen5(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/mmc/host/via-sdmmc.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/mmc/host/via-sdmmc.c b/drivers/mmc/host/via-sdmmc.c index f6b525fb5c0e..6ec1e94c9f14 100644 --- a/drivers/mmc/host/via-sdmmc.c +++ b/drivers/mmc/host/via-sdmmc.c @@ -1156,10 +1156,16 @@ static int via_sd_probe(struct pci_dev *pcidev, ret = mmc_add_host(mmc); if (ret) - goto unmap; + goto free_irq; return 0; +free_irq: + writeb(0x0, sdhost->pcictrl_mmiobase + VIA_CRDR_PCIINTCTRL); + free_irq(pcidev->irq, sdhost); + cancel_work_sync(&sdhost->carddet_work); + /* carddet_work may re-enable the interrupt via via_reset_pcictrl(). */ + writeb(0x0, sdhost->pcictrl_mmiobase + VIA_CRDR_PCIINTCTRL); unmap: iounmap(sdhost->mmiobase); free_mmc_host: -- 2.43.0

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