- Kernel - mailweb.openeuler.org

[PATCH kernel-4.19 17/19] init/Kconfig: make COMPILE_TEST depend on !S390
by Yang Yingliang 15 Apr '21

15 Apr '21

From: Heiko Carstens <hca(a)linux.ibm.com> commit 334ef6ed06fa1a54e35296b77b693bcf6d63ee9e upstream. While allmodconfig and allyesconfig build for s390 there are also various bots running compile tests with randconfig, where PCI is disabled. This reveals that a lot of drivers should actually depend on HAS_IOMEM. Adding this to each device driver would be a never ending story, therefore just disable COMPILE_TEST for s390. The reasoning is more or less the same as described in commit bc083a64b6c0 ("init/Kconfig: make COMPILE_TEST depend on !UML"). Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp(a)intel.com> Suggested-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca(a)linux.ibm.com> Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux(a)roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- init/Kconfig | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig index 71b09d9984135..5682a3300ff2e 100644 --- a/init/Kconfig +++ b/init/Kconfig @@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ config INIT_ENV_ARG_LIMIT config COMPILE_TEST bool "Compile also drivers which will not load" - depends on !UML + depends on !UML && !S390 default n help Some drivers can be compiled on a different platform than they are -- 2.25.1

1 0

[PATCH kernel-4.19 15/19] bpf, x86: Validate computation of branch displacements for x86-64
by Yang Yingliang 15 Apr '21

15 Apr '21

From: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras(a)gmail.com> commit e4d4d456436bfb2fe412ee2cd489f7658449b098 upstream. The branch displacement logic in the BPF JIT compilers for x86 assumes that, for any generated branch instruction, the distance cannot increase between optimization passes. But this assumption can be violated due to how the distances are computed. Specifically, whenever a backward branch is processed in do_jit(), the distance is computed by subtracting the positions in the machine code from different optimization passes. This is because part of addrs[] is already updated for the current optimization pass, before the branch instruction is visited. And so the optimizer can expand blocks of machine code in some cases. This can confuse the optimizer logic, where it assumes that a fixed point has been reached for all machine code blocks once the total program size stops changing. And then the JIT compiler can output abnormal machine code containing incorrect branch displacements. To mitigate this issue, we assert that a fixed point is reached while populating the output image. This rejects any problematic programs. The issue affects both x86-32 and x86-64. We mitigate separately to ease backporting. Signed-off-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 11 ++++++++++- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c index 46ab928312517..924ca27a6139b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +++ b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c @@ -1019,7 +1019,16 @@ xadd: if (is_imm8(insn->off)) } if (image) { - if (unlikely(proglen + ilen > oldproglen)) { + /* + * When populating the image, assert that: + * + * i) We do not write beyond the allocated space, and + * ii) addrs[i] did not change from the prior run, in order + * to validate assumptions made for computing branch + * displacements. + */ + if (unlikely(proglen + ilen > oldproglen || + proglen + ilen != addrs[i])) { pr_err("bpf_jit: fatal error\n"); return -EFAULT; } -- 2.25.1

1 0

[PATCH kernel-4.19 14/19] cifs: Silently ignore unknown oplock break handle
by Yang Yingliang 15 Apr '21

15 Apr '21

From: Vincent Whitchurch <vincent.whitchurch(a)axis.com> [ Upstream commit 219481a8f90ec3a5eed9638fb35609e4b1aeece7 ] Make SMB2 not print out an error when an oplock break is received for an unknown handle, similar to SMB1. The debug message which is printed for these unknown handles may also be misleading, so fix that too. The SMB2 lease break path is not affected by this patch. Without this, a program which writes to a file from one thread, and opens, reads, and writes the same file from another thread triggers the below errors several times a minute when run against a Samba server configured with "smb2 leases = no". CIFS: VFS: \\192.168.0.1 No task to wake, unknown frame received! NumMids 2 00000000: 424d53fe 00000040 00000000 00000012 .SMB@........... 00000010: 00000001 00000000 ffffffff ffffffff ................ 00000020: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 ................ 00000030: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 ................ Signed-off-by: Vincent Whitchurch <vincent.whitchurch(a)axis.com> Reviewed-by: Tom Talpey <tom(a)talpey.com> Reviewed-by: Paulo Alcantara (SUSE) <pc(a)cjr.nz> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench(a)microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> --- fs/cifs/smb2misc.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/cifs/smb2misc.c b/fs/cifs/smb2misc.c index 7d875a47d0226..7177720e822e1 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/smb2misc.c +++ b/fs/cifs/smb2misc.c @@ -738,8 +738,8 @@ smb2_is_valid_oplock_break(char *buffer, struct TCP_Server_Info *server) } } spin_unlock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock); - cifs_dbg(FYI, "Can not process oplock break for non-existent connection\n"); - return false; + cifs_dbg(FYI, "No file id matched, oplock break ignored\n"); + return true; } void -- 2.25.1

1 0

[PATCH kernel-4.19 13/19] cifs: revalidate mapping when we open files for SMB1 POSIX
by Yang Yingliang 15 Apr '21

15 Apr '21

From: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber(a)redhat.com> [ Upstream commit cee8f4f6fcabfdf229542926128e9874d19016d5 ] RHBZ: 1933527 Under SMB1 + POSIX, if an inode is reused on a server after we have read and cached a part of a file, when we then open the new file with the re-cycled inode there is a chance that we may serve the old data out of cache to the application. This only happens for SMB1 (deprecated) and when posix are used. The simplest solution to avoid this race is to force a revalidate on smb1-posix open. Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber(a)redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Paulo Alcantara (SUSE) <pc(a)cjr.nz> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench(a)microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> --- fs/cifs/file.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/fs/cifs/file.c b/fs/cifs/file.c index efaf54ce6b5fe..ed9e67f976189 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/file.c +++ b/fs/cifs/file.c @@ -163,6 +163,7 @@ int cifs_posix_open(char *full_path, struct inode **pinode, goto posix_open_ret; } } else { + cifs_revalidate_mapping(*pinode); cifs_fattr_to_inode(*pinode, &fattr); } -- 2.25.1

1 0

[PATCH kernel-4.19 12/19] ia64: fix format strings for err_inject
by Yang Yingliang 15 Apr '21

15 Apr '21

From: Sergei Trofimovich <slyfox(a)gentoo.org> [ Upstream commit 95d44a470a6814207d52dd6312203b0f4ef12710 ] Fix warning with %lx / u64 mismatch: arch/ia64/kernel/err_inject.c: In function 'show_resources': arch/ia64/kernel/err_inject.c:62:22: warning: format '%lx' expects argument of type 'long unsigned int', but argument 3 has type 'u64' {aka 'long long unsigned int'} 62 | return sprintf(buf, "%lx", name[cpu]); \ | ^~~~~~~ Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210313104312.1548232-1-slyfox@gentoo.org Signed-off-by: Sergei Trofimovich <slyfox(a)gentoo.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> --- arch/ia64/kernel/err_inject.c | 22 +++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/ia64/kernel/err_inject.c b/arch/ia64/kernel/err_inject.c index 8b5b8e6bc9d9a..dd5bfed52031d 100644 --- a/arch/ia64/kernel/err_inject.c +++ b/arch/ia64/kernel/err_inject.c @@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ show_##name(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, \ char *buf) \ { \ u32 cpu=dev->id; \ - return sprintf(buf, "%lx\n", name[cpu]); \ + return sprintf(buf, "%llx\n", name[cpu]); \ } #define store(name) \ @@ -86,9 +86,9 @@ store_call_start(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, #ifdef ERR_INJ_DEBUG printk(KERN_DEBUG "pal_mc_err_inject for cpu%d:\n", cpu); - printk(KERN_DEBUG "err_type_info=%lx,\n", err_type_info[cpu]); - printk(KERN_DEBUG "err_struct_info=%lx,\n", err_struct_info[cpu]); - printk(KERN_DEBUG "err_data_buffer=%lx, %lx, %lx.\n", + printk(KERN_DEBUG "err_type_info=%llx,\n", err_type_info[cpu]); + printk(KERN_DEBUG "err_struct_info=%llx,\n", err_struct_info[cpu]); + printk(KERN_DEBUG "err_data_buffer=%llx, %llx, %llx.\n", err_data_buffer[cpu].data1, err_data_buffer[cpu].data2, err_data_buffer[cpu].data3); @@ -117,8 +117,8 @@ store_call_start(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, #ifdef ERR_INJ_DEBUG printk(KERN_DEBUG "Returns: status=%d,\n", (int)status[cpu]); - printk(KERN_DEBUG "capabilities=%lx,\n", capabilities[cpu]); - printk(KERN_DEBUG "resources=%lx\n", resources[cpu]); + printk(KERN_DEBUG "capabilities=%llx,\n", capabilities[cpu]); + printk(KERN_DEBUG "resources=%llx\n", resources[cpu]); #endif return size; } @@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ show_virtual_to_phys(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) { unsigned int cpu=dev->id; - return sprintf(buf, "%lx\n", phys_addr[cpu]); + return sprintf(buf, "%llx\n", phys_addr[cpu]); } static ssize_t @@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ store_virtual_to_phys(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, ret = get_user_pages_fast(virt_addr, 1, FOLL_WRITE, NULL); if (ret<=0) { #ifdef ERR_INJ_DEBUG - printk("Virtual address %lx is not existing.\n",virt_addr); + printk("Virtual address %llx is not existing.\n", virt_addr); #endif return -EINVAL; } @@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ show_err_data_buffer(struct device *dev, { unsigned int cpu=dev->id; - return sprintf(buf, "%lx, %lx, %lx\n", + return sprintf(buf, "%llx, %llx, %llx\n", err_data_buffer[cpu].data1, err_data_buffer[cpu].data2, err_data_buffer[cpu].data3); @@ -178,13 +178,13 @@ store_err_data_buffer(struct device *dev, int ret; #ifdef ERR_INJ_DEBUG - printk("write err_data_buffer=[%lx,%lx,%lx] on cpu%d\n", + printk("write err_data_buffer=[%llx,%llx,%llx] on cpu%d\n", err_data_buffer[cpu].data1, err_data_buffer[cpu].data2, err_data_buffer[cpu].data3, cpu); #endif - ret=sscanf(buf, "%lx, %lx, %lx", + ret = sscanf(buf, "%llx, %llx, %llx", &err_data_buffer[cpu].data1, &err_data_buffer[cpu].data2, &err_data_buffer[cpu].data3); -- 2.25.1

1 0

[PATCH kernel-4.19 11/19] ia64: mca: allocate early mca with GFP_ATOMIC
by Yang Yingliang 15 Apr '21

15 Apr '21

From: Sergei Trofimovich <slyfox(a)gentoo.org> [ Upstream commit f2a419cf495f95cac49ea289318b833477e1a0e2 ] The sleep warning happens at early boot right at secondary CPU activation bootup: smp: Bringing up secondary CPUs ... BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at mm/page_alloc.c:4942 in_atomic(): 0, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 0, name: swapper/1 CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc2-00007-g79e228d0b611-dirty #99 .. Call Trace: show_stack+0x90/0xc0 dump_stack+0x150/0x1c0 ___might_sleep+0x1c0/0x2a0 __might_sleep+0xa0/0x160 __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x1a0/0x600 alloc_page_interleave+0x30/0x1c0 alloc_pages_current+0x2c0/0x340 __get_free_pages+0x30/0xa0 ia64_mca_cpu_init+0x2d0/0x3a0 cpu_init+0x8b0/0x1440 start_secondary+0x60/0x700 start_ap+0x750/0x780 Fixed BSP b0 value from CPU 1 As I understand interrupts are not enabled yet and system has a lot of memory. There is little chance to sleep and switch to GFP_ATOMIC should be a no-op. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210315085045.204414-1-slyfox@gentoo.org Signed-off-by: Sergei Trofimovich <slyfox(a)gentoo.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> --- arch/ia64/kernel/mca.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/ia64/kernel/mca.c b/arch/ia64/kernel/mca.c index 6115464d5f03d..d7400b2844f1c 100644 --- a/arch/ia64/kernel/mca.c +++ b/arch/ia64/kernel/mca.c @@ -1860,7 +1860,7 @@ ia64_mca_cpu_init(void *cpu_data) data = mca_bootmem(); first_time = 0; } else - data = (void *)__get_free_pages(GFP_KERNEL, + data = (void *)__get_free_pages(GFP_ATOMIC, get_order(sz)); if (!data) panic("Could not allocate MCA memory for cpu %d\n", -- 2.25.1

1 0

[PATCH kernel-4.19 10/19] scsi: target: pscsi: Clean up after failure in pscsi_map_sg()
by Yang Yingliang 15 Apr '21

15 Apr '21

From: Martin Wilck <mwilck(a)suse.com> [ Upstream commit 36fa766faa0c822c860e636fe82b1affcd022974 ] If pscsi_map_sg() fails, make sure to drop references to already allocated bios. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210323212431.15306-2-mwilck@suse.com Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch(a)lst.de> Reviewed-by: Lee Duncan <lduncan(a)suse.com> Signed-off-by: Martin Wilck <mwilck(a)suse.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> --- drivers/target/target_core_pscsi.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/target/target_core_pscsi.c b/drivers/target/target_core_pscsi.c index 47d76c8620147..02c4e3beb2640 100644 --- a/drivers/target/target_core_pscsi.c +++ b/drivers/target/target_core_pscsi.c @@ -970,6 +970,14 @@ pscsi_map_sg(struct se_cmd *cmd, struct scatterlist *sgl, u32 sgl_nents, return 0; fail: + if (bio) + bio_put(bio); + while (req->bio) { + bio = req->bio; + req->bio = bio->bi_next; + bio_put(bio); + } + req->biotail = NULL; return TCM_LOGICAL_UNIT_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE; } -- 2.25.1

1 0

[PATCH kernel-4.19 09/19] x86/build: Turn off -fcf-protection for realmode targets
by Yang Yingliang 15 Apr '21

15 Apr '21

From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd(a)arndb.de> [ Upstream commit 9fcb51c14da2953de585c5c6e50697b8a6e91a7b ] The new Ubuntu GCC packages turn on -fcf-protection globally, which causes a build failure in the x86 realmode code: cc1: error: ‘-fcf-protection’ is not compatible with this target Turn it off explicitly on compilers that understand this option. Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd(a)arndb.de> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210323124846.1584944-1-arnd@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> --- arch/x86/Makefile | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/Makefile b/arch/x86/Makefile index 75200b421f29b..6ebdbad21fb2a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/Makefile @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ M16_CFLAGS := $(call cc-option, -m16, $(CODE16GCC_CFLAGS)) REALMODE_CFLAGS := $(M16_CFLAGS) -g -Os -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING \ -Wall -Wstrict-prototypes -march=i386 -mregparm=3 \ -fno-strict-aliasing -fomit-frame-pointer -fno-pic \ - -mno-mmx -mno-sse + -mno-mmx -mno-sse $(call cc-option,-fcf-protection=none) REALMODE_CFLAGS += $(call __cc-option, $(CC), $(REALMODE_CFLAGS), -ffreestanding) REALMODE_CFLAGS += $(call __cc-option, $(CC), $(REALMODE_CFLAGS), -fno-stack-protector) -- 2.25.1

1 0

[PATCH kernel-4.19 08/19] platform/x86: thinkpad_acpi: Allow the FnLock LED to change state
by Yang Yingliang 15 Apr '21

15 Apr '21

From: Esteve Varela Colominas <esteve.varela(a)gmail.com> [ Upstream commit 3d677f12ea3a2097a16ded570623567403dea959 ] On many recent ThinkPad laptops, there's a new LED next to the ESC key, that indicates the FnLock status. When the Fn+ESC combo is pressed, FnLock is toggled, which causes the Media Key functionality to change, making it so that the media keys either perform their media key function, or function as an F-key by default. The Fn key can be used the access the alternate function at any time. With the current linux kernel, the LED doens't change state if you press the Fn+ESC key combo. However, the media key functionality *does* change. This is annoying, since the LED will stay on if it was on during bootup, and it makes it hard to keep track what the current state of the FnLock is. This patch calls an ACPI function, that gets the current media key state, when the Fn+ESC key combo is pressed. Through testing it was discovered that this function causes the LED to update correctly to reflect the current state when this function is called. The relevant ACPI calls are the following: \_SB_.PCI0.LPC0.EC0_.HKEY.GMKS: Get media key state, returns 0x603 if the FnLock mode is enabled, and 0x602 if it's disabled. \_SB_.PCI0.LPC0.EC0_.HKEY.SMKS: Set media key state, sending a 1 will enable FnLock mode, and a 0 will disable it. Relevant discussion: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=207841 https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/linux/+bug/1881015 Signed-off-by: Esteve Varela Colominas <esteve.varela(a)gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210315195823.23212-1-esteve.varela@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> --- drivers/platform/x86/thinkpad_acpi.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/thinkpad_acpi.c b/drivers/platform/x86/thinkpad_acpi.c index a6e69f2495d23..559698640fe29 100644 --- a/drivers/platform/x86/thinkpad_acpi.c +++ b/drivers/platform/x86/thinkpad_acpi.c @@ -4102,13 +4102,19 @@ static bool hotkey_notify_6xxx(const u32 hkey, case TP_HKEY_EV_KEY_NUMLOCK: case TP_HKEY_EV_KEY_FN: - case TP_HKEY_EV_KEY_FN_ESC: /* key press events, we just ignore them as long as the EC * is still reporting them in the normal keyboard stream */ *send_acpi_ev = false; *ignore_acpi_ev = true; return true; + case TP_HKEY_EV_KEY_FN_ESC: + /* Get the media key status to foce the status LED to update */ + acpi_evalf(hkey_handle, NULL, "GMKS", "v"); + *send_acpi_ev = false; + *ignore_acpi_ev = true; + return true; + case TP_HKEY_EV_TABLET_CHANGED: tpacpi_input_send_tabletsw(); hotkey_tablet_mode_notify_change(); -- 2.25.1

1 0

[PATCH kernel-4.19 07/19] drm/msm: Ratelimit invalid-fence message
by Yang Yingliang 15 Apr '21

15 Apr '21

From: Rob Clark <robdclark(a)chromium.org> [ Upstream commit 7ad48d27a2846bfda29214fb454d001c3e02b9e7 ] We have seen a couple cases where low memory situations cause something bad to happen, followed by a flood of these messages obscuring the root cause. Lets ratelimit the dmesg spam so that next time it happens we don't lose the kernel traces leading up to this. Signed-off-by: Rob Clark <robdclark(a)chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders(a)chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> --- drivers/gpu/drm/msm/msm_fence.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/msm_fence.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/msm_fence.c index 349c12f670eb8..6c11be79574e5 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/msm_fence.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/msm_fence.c @@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ int msm_wait_fence(struct msm_fence_context *fctx, uint32_t fence, int ret; if (fence > fctx->last_fence) { - DRM_ERROR("%s: waiting on invalid fence: %u (of %u)\n", + DRM_ERROR_RATELIMITED("%s: waiting on invalid fence: %u (of %u)\n", fctx->name, fence, fctx->last_fence); return -EINVAL; } -- 2.25.1

1 0

2025

2024

2023

2022

2021

2020

2019

Kernel