From: Filipe Manana <fdmanana(a)suse.com>
stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.227
commit 70b60c8d9b42763d6629e44f448aa5d8ae477d61
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAYRA9
CVE: CVE-2024-49867
Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id…
--------------------------------
commit 41fd1e94066a815a7ab0a7025359e9b40e4b3576 upstream.
During unmount, at close_ctree(), we have the following steps in this order:
1) Park the cleaner kthread - this doesn't destroy the kthread, it basically
halts its execution (wake ups against it work but do nothing);
2) We stop the cleaner kthread - this results in freeing the respective
struct task_struct;
3) We call btrfs_stop_all_workers() which waits for any jobs running in all
the work queues and then free the work queues.
Syzbot reported a case where a fixup worker resulted in a crash when doing
a delayed iput on its inode while attempting to wake up the cleaner at
btrfs_add_delayed_iput(), because the task_struct of the cleaner kthread
was already freed. This can happen during unmount because we don't wait
for any fixup workers still running before we call kthread_stop() against
the cleaner kthread, which stops and free all its resources.
Fix this by waiting for any fixup workers at close_ctree() before we call
kthread_stop() against the cleaner and run pending delayed iputs.
The stack traces reported by syzbot were the following:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __lock_acquire+0x77/0x2050 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5065
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880272a8a18 by task kworker/u8:3/52
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 52 Comm: kworker/u8:3 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc1-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024
Workqueue: btrfs-fixup btrfs_work_helper
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline]
print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:488
kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:601
__lock_acquire+0x77/0x2050 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5065
lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5825
__raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:110 [inline]
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xd5/0x120 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:162
class_raw_spinlock_irqsave_constructor include/linux/spinlock.h:551 [inline]
try_to_wake_up+0xb0/0x1480 kernel/sched/core.c:4154
btrfs_writepage_fixup_worker+0xc16/0xdf0 fs/btrfs/inode.c:2842
btrfs_work_helper+0x390/0xc50 fs/btrfs/async-thread.c:314
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0xa63/0x1850 kernel/workqueue.c:3310
worker_thread+0x870/0xd30 kernel/workqueue.c:3391
kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:389
ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244
</TASK>
Allocated by task 2:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68
unpoison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:319 [inline]
__kasan_slab_alloc+0x66/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:345
kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:247 [inline]
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:4086 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4135 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc_node_noprof+0x16b/0x320 mm/slub.c:4187
alloc_task_struct_node kernel/fork.c:180 [inline]
dup_task_struct+0x57/0x8c0 kernel/fork.c:1107
copy_process+0x5d1/0x3d50 kernel/fork.c:2206
kernel_clone+0x223/0x880 kernel/fork.c:2787
kernel_thread+0x1bc/0x240 kernel/fork.c:2849
create_kthread kernel/kthread.c:412 [inline]
kthreadd+0x60d/0x810 kernel/kthread.c:765
ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244
Freed by task 61:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68
kasan_save_free_info+0x40/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:579
poison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:247 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free+0x59/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:264
kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:230 [inline]
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2343 [inline]
slab_free mm/slub.c:4580 [inline]
kmem_cache_free+0x1a2/0x420 mm/slub.c:4682
put_task_struct include/linux/sched/task.h:144 [inline]
delayed_put_task_struct+0x125/0x300 kernel/exit.c:228
rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2567 [inline]
rcu_core+0xaaa/0x17a0 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2823
handle_softirqs+0x2c5/0x980 kernel/softirq.c:554
__do_softirq kernel/softirq.c:588 [inline]
invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:428 [inline]
__irq_exit_rcu+0xf4/0x1c0 kernel/softirq.c:637
irq_exit_rcu+0x9/0x30 kernel/softirq.c:649
instr_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1037 [inline]
sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0xa6/0xc0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1037
asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:702
Last potentially related work creation:
kasan_save_stack+0x3f/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:47
__kasan_record_aux_stack+0xac/0xc0 mm/kasan/generic.c:541
__call_rcu_common kernel/rcu/tree.c:3086 [inline]
call_rcu+0x167/0xa70 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3190
context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:5318 [inline]
__schedule+0x184b/0x4ae0 kernel/sched/core.c:6675
schedule_idle+0x56/0x90 kernel/sched/core.c:6793
do_idle+0x56a/0x5d0 kernel/sched/idle.c:354
cpu_startup_entry+0x42/0x60 kernel/sched/idle.c:424
start_secondary+0x102/0x110 arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c:314
common_startup_64+0x13e/0x147
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8880272a8000
which belongs to the cache task_struct of size 7424
The buggy address is located 2584 bytes inside of
freed 7424-byte region [ffff8880272a8000, ffff8880272a9d00)
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x272a8
head: order:3 mapcount:0 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0
flags: 0xfff00000000040(head|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
page_type: f5(slab)
raw: 00fff00000000040 ffff88801bafa500 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080040004 00000001f5000000 0000000000000000
head: 00fff00000000040 ffff88801bafa500 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
head: 0000000000000000 0000000080040004 00000001f5000000 0000000000000000
head: 00fff00000000003 ffffea00009caa01 ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000000
head: 0000000000000008 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
page_owner tracks the page as allocated
page last allocated via order 3, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0xd20c0(__GFP_IO|__GFP_FS|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY|__GFP_COMP|__GFP_NOMEMALLOC), pid 2, tgid 2 (kthreadd), ts 71247381401, free_ts 71214998153
set_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:32 [inline]
post_alloc_hook+0x1f3/0x230 mm/page_alloc.c:1537
prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:1545 [inline]
get_page_from_freelist+0x3039/0x3180 mm/page_alloc.c:3457
__alloc_pages_noprof+0x256/0x6c0 mm/page_alloc.c:4733
alloc_pages_mpol_noprof+0x3e8/0x680 mm/mempolicy.c:2265
alloc_slab_page+0x6a/0x120 mm/slub.c:2413
allocate_slab+0x5a/0x2f0 mm/slub.c:2579
new_slab mm/slub.c:2632 [inline]
___slab_alloc+0xcd1/0x14b0 mm/slub.c:3819
__slab_alloc+0x58/0xa0 mm/slub.c:3909
__slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3962 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4123 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc_node_noprof+0x1fe/0x320 mm/slub.c:4187
alloc_task_struct_node kernel/fork.c:180 [inline]
dup_task_struct+0x57/0x8c0 kernel/fork.c:1107
copy_process+0x5d1/0x3d50 kernel/fork.c:2206
kernel_clone+0x223/0x880 kernel/fork.c:2787
kernel_thread+0x1bc/0x240 kernel/fork.c:2849
create_kthread kernel/kthread.c:412 [inline]
kthreadd+0x60d/0x810 kernel/kthread.c:765
ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244
page last free pid 5230 tgid 5230 stack trace:
reset_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:25 [inline]
free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1108 [inline]
free_unref_page+0xcd0/0xf00 mm/page_alloc.c:2638
discard_slab mm/slub.c:2678 [inline]
__put_partials+0xeb/0x130 mm/slub.c:3146
put_cpu_partial+0x17c/0x250 mm/slub.c:3221
__slab_free+0x2ea/0x3d0 mm/slub.c:4450
qlink_free mm/kasan/quarantine.c:163 [inline]
qlist_free_all+0x9a/0x140 mm/kasan/quarantine.c:179
kasan_quarantine_reduce+0x14f/0x170 mm/kasan/quarantine.c:286
__kasan_slab_alloc+0x23/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:329
kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:247 [inline]
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:4086 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4135 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x135/0x2a0 mm/slub.c:4142
getname_flags+0xb7/0x540 fs/namei.c:139
do_sys_openat2+0xd2/0x1d0 fs/open.c:1409
do_sys_open fs/open.c:1430 [inline]
__do_sys_openat fs/open.c:1446 [inline]
__se_sys_openat fs/open.c:1441 [inline]
__x64_sys_openat+0x247/0x2a0 fs/open.c:1441
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff8880272a8900: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8880272a8980: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff8880272a8a00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff8880272a8a80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8880272a8b00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
==================================================================
Reported-by: syzbot+8aaf2df2ef0164ffe1fb(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/66fb36b1.050a0220.aab67.003b.GAE@google…
CC: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 4.19+
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu(a)suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn(a)wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba(a)suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana(a)suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba(a)suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba(a)suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Yifan Qiao <qiaoyifan4(a)huawei.com>
---
fs/btrfs/disk-io.c | 11 +++++++++++
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c b/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c
index 05bc52003e19..d0e520d57bdf 100644
--- a/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c
@@ -4124,6 +4124,17 @@ void __cold close_ctree(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info)
/* clear out the rbtree of defraggable inodes */
btrfs_cleanup_defrag_inodes(fs_info);
+ /*
+ * Wait for any fixup workers to complete.
+ * If we don't wait for them here and they are still running by the time
+ * we call kthread_stop() against the cleaner kthread further below, we
+ * get an use-after-free on the cleaner because the fixup worker adds an
+ * inode to the list of delayed iputs and then attempts to wakeup the
+ * cleaner kthread, which was already stopped and destroyed. We parked
+ * already the cleaner, but below we run all pending delayed iputs.
+ */
+ btrfs_flush_workqueue(fs_info->fixup_workers);
+
/*
* After we parked the cleaner kthread, ordered extents may have
* completed and created new delayed iputs. If one of the async reclaim
--
2.39.2
From: Qu Wenruo <wqu(a)suse.com>
stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.227
commit d73d48acf36f57362df7e4f9d76568168bf5e944
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAYRC7
CVE: CVE-2024-49868
Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id…
--------------------------------
commit c3b47f49e83197e8dffd023ec568403bcdbb774b upstream.
[BUG]
Syzbot reported a NULL pointer dereference with the following crash:
FAULT_INJECTION: forcing a failure.
start_transaction+0x830/0x1670 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:676
prepare_to_relocate+0x31f/0x4c0 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:3642
relocate_block_group+0x169/0xd20 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:3678
...
BTRFS info (device loop0): balance: ended with status: -12
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc00000000cc: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000660-0x0000000000000667]
RIP: 0010:btrfs_update_reloc_root+0x362/0xa80 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:926
Call Trace:
<TASK>
commit_fs_roots+0x2ee/0x720 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:1496
btrfs_commit_transaction+0xfaf/0x3740 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:2430
del_balance_item fs/btrfs/volumes.c:3678 [inline]
reset_balance_state+0x25e/0x3c0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:3742
btrfs_balance+0xead/0x10c0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4574
btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x493/0x7c0 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:3673
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:907 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl+0xf9/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:893
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[CAUSE]
The allocation failure happens at the start_transaction() inside
prepare_to_relocate(), and during the error handling we call
unset_reloc_control(), which makes fs_info->balance_ctl to be NULL.
Then we continue the error path cleanup in btrfs_balance() by calling
reset_balance_state() which will call del_balance_item() to fully delete
the balance item in the root tree.
However during the small window between set_reloc_contrl() and
unset_reloc_control(), we can have a subvolume tree update and created a
reloc_root for that subvolume.
Then we go into the final btrfs_commit_transaction() of
del_balance_item(), and into btrfs_update_reloc_root() inside
commit_fs_roots().
That function checks if fs_info->reloc_ctl is in the merge_reloc_tree
stage, but since fs_info->reloc_ctl is NULL, it results a NULL pointer
dereference.
[FIX]
Just add extra check on fs_info->reloc_ctl inside
btrfs_update_reloc_root(), before checking
fs_info->reloc_ctl->merge_reloc_tree.
That DEAD_RELOC_TREE handling is to prevent further modification to the
reloc tree during merge stage, but since there is no reloc_ctl at all,
we do not need to bother that.
Reported-by: syzbot+283673dbc38527ef9f3d(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/66f6bfa7.050a0220.38ace9.0019.GAE@googl…
CC: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 4.19+
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef(a)toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu(a)suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba(a)suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba(a)suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Yifan Qiao <qiaoyifan4(a)huawei.com>
---
fs/btrfs/relocation.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/fs/btrfs/relocation.c b/fs/btrfs/relocation.c
index cf7a8fcea4d6..6712d082023e 100644
--- a/fs/btrfs/relocation.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/relocation.c
@@ -910,7 +910,7 @@ int btrfs_update_reloc_root(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
btrfs_grab_root(reloc_root);
/* root->reloc_root will stay until current relocation finished */
- if (fs_info->reloc_ctl->merge_reloc_tree &&
+ if (fs_info->reloc_ctl && fs_info->reloc_ctl->merge_reloc_tree &&
btrfs_root_refs(root_item) == 0) {
set_bit(BTRFS_ROOT_DEAD_RELOC_TREE, &root->state);
/*
--
2.39.2
From: VanGiang Nguyen <vangiang.nguyen(a)rohde-schwarz.com>
stable inclusion
from stable-v6.6.54
commit 1b8cf11b3ca593a8802a51802cd0c28c38501428
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAYQSB
CVE: CVE-2024-47739
Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id…
--------------------------------
commit 9a22b2812393d93d84358a760c347c21939029a6 upstream.
When submitting more than 2^32 padata objects to padata_do_serial, the
current sorting implementation incorrectly sorts padata objects with
overflowed seq_nr, causing them to be placed before existing objects in
the reorder list. This leads to a deadlock in the serialization process
as padata_find_next cannot match padata->seq_nr and pd->processed
because the padata instance with overflowed seq_nr will be selected
next.
To fix this, we use an unsigned integer wrap around to correctly sort
padata objects in scenarios with integer overflow.
Fixes: bfde23ce200e ("padata: unbind parallel jobs from specific CPUs")
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Co-developed-by: Christian Gafert <christian.gafert(a)rohde-schwarz.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Gafert <christian.gafert(a)rohde-schwarz.com>
Co-developed-by: Max Ferger <max.ferger(a)rohde-schwarz.com>
Signed-off-by: Max Ferger <max.ferger(a)rohde-schwarz.com>
Signed-off-by: Van Giang Nguyen <vangiang.nguyen(a)rohde-schwarz.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Jordan <daniel.m.jordan(a)oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Cheng Yu <serein.chengyu(a)huawei.com>
---
kernel/padata.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/kernel/padata.c b/kernel/padata.c
index 29545dd6dd53..8f0af2c09e17 100644
--- a/kernel/padata.c
+++ b/kernel/padata.c
@@ -404,7 +404,8 @@ void padata_do_serial(struct padata_priv *padata)
/* Sort in ascending order of sequence number. */
list_for_each_prev(pos, &reorder->list) {
cur = list_entry(pos, struct padata_priv, list);
- if (cur->seq_nr < padata->seq_nr)
+ /* Compare by difference to consider integer wrap around */
+ if ((signed int)(cur->seq_nr - padata->seq_nr) < 0)
break;
}
list_add(&padata->list, pos);
--
2.25.1
From: VanGiang Nguyen <vangiang.nguyen(a)rohde-schwarz.com>
stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.227
commit 46c4079460f4dcaf445860679558eedef4e1bc91
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAYQSB
CVE: CVE-2024-47739
Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id…
--------------------------------
commit 9a22b2812393d93d84358a760c347c21939029a6 upstream.
When submitting more than 2^32 padata objects to padata_do_serial, the
current sorting implementation incorrectly sorts padata objects with
overflowed seq_nr, causing them to be placed before existing objects in
the reorder list. This leads to a deadlock in the serialization process
as padata_find_next cannot match padata->seq_nr and pd->processed
because the padata instance with overflowed seq_nr will be selected
next.
To fix this, we use an unsigned integer wrap around to correctly sort
padata objects in scenarios with integer overflow.
Fixes: bfde23ce200e ("padata: unbind parallel jobs from specific CPUs")
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Co-developed-by: Christian Gafert <christian.gafert(a)rohde-schwarz.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Gafert <christian.gafert(a)rohde-schwarz.com>
Co-developed-by: Max Ferger <max.ferger(a)rohde-schwarz.com>
Signed-off-by: Max Ferger <max.ferger(a)rohde-schwarz.com>
Signed-off-by: Van Giang Nguyen <vangiang.nguyen(a)rohde-schwarz.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Jordan <daniel.m.jordan(a)oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
Conflicts:
kernel/padata.c
[Conflicts due to 7033f87927d5 ("padata: Fix list iterator in
padata_do_serial()") not merged.]
Signed-off-by: Cheng Yu <serein.chengyu(a)huawei.com>
---
kernel/padata.c | 6 ++++--
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/padata.c b/kernel/padata.c
index 915945c932db..09e6207048aa 100644
--- a/kernel/padata.c
+++ b/kernel/padata.c
@@ -404,9 +404,11 @@ void padata_do_serial(struct padata_priv *padata)
spin_lock(&reorder->lock);
/* Sort in ascending order of sequence number. */
- list_for_each_entry_reverse(cur, &reorder->list, list)
- if (cur->seq_nr < padata->seq_nr)
+ list_for_each_entry_reverse(cur, &reorder->list, list) {
+ /* Compare by difference to consider integer wrap around */
+ if ((signed int)(cur->seq_nr - padata->seq_nr) < 0)
break;
+ }
list_add(&padata->list, &cur->list);
spin_unlock(&reorder->lock);
--
2.25.1
From: VanGiang Nguyen <vangiang.nguyen(a)rohde-schwarz.com>
stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.227
commit 46c4079460f4dcaf445860679558eedef4e1bc91
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAYQSB
CVE: CVE-2024-47739
Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id…
--------------------------------
commit 9a22b2812393d93d84358a760c347c21939029a6 upstream.
When submitting more than 2^32 padata objects to padata_do_serial, the
current sorting implementation incorrectly sorts padata objects with
overflowed seq_nr, causing them to be placed before existing objects in
the reorder list. This leads to a deadlock in the serialization process
as padata_find_next cannot match padata->seq_nr and pd->processed
because the padata instance with overflowed seq_nr will be selected
next.
To fix this, we use an unsigned integer wrap around to correctly sort
padata objects in scenarios with integer overflow.
Fixes: bfde23ce200e ("padata: unbind parallel jobs from specific CPUs")
Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org>
Co-developed-by: Christian Gafert <christian.gafert(a)rohde-schwarz.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Gafert <christian.gafert(a)rohde-schwarz.com>
Co-developed-by: Max Ferger <max.ferger(a)rohde-schwarz.com>
Signed-off-by: Max Ferger <max.ferger(a)rohde-schwarz.com>
Signed-off-by: Van Giang Nguyen <vangiang.nguyen(a)rohde-schwarz.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Jordan <daniel.m.jordan(a)oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Cheng Yu <serein.chengyu(a)huawei.com>
---
kernel/padata.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/kernel/padata.c b/kernel/padata.c
index 7b8d92f44b16..e24244c9c2cc 100644
--- a/kernel/padata.c
+++ b/kernel/padata.c
@@ -409,7 +409,8 @@ void padata_do_serial(struct padata_priv *padata)
/* Sort in ascending order of sequence number. */
list_for_each_prev(pos, &reorder->list) {
cur = list_entry(pos, struct padata_priv, list);
- if (cur->seq_nr < padata->seq_nr)
+ /* Compare by difference to consider integer wrap around */
+ if ((signed int)(cur->seq_nr - padata->seq_nr) < 0)
break;
}
list_add(&padata->list, pos);
--
2.25.1
Hi Yang,
FYI, the error/warning still remains.
tree: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel.git openEuler-1.0-LTS
head: fc5b1a61061cb6d640f3336024fb616182ef2614
commit: e63b4759933f6a5c5ce6cdc1d11c7bf2201d0612 [15045/23857] arm64: arch_timer: only do cntvct workaround on VDSO path on D05
config: arm64-randconfig-004-20241024 (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20241025/202410250213.xpJhjcfg-lkp@…)
compiler: aarch64-linux-gcc (GCC) 14.1.0
reproduce (this is a W=1 build): (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20241025/202410250213.xpJhjcfg-lkp@…)
If you fix the issue in a separate patch/commit (i.e. not just a new version of
the same patch/commit), kindly add following tags
| Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp(a)intel.com>
| Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202410250213.xpJhjcfg-lkp@intel.com/
All errors (new ones prefixed by >>):
drivers/clocksource/arm_arch_timer.c: In function 'arch_timer_enable_workaround':
>> drivers/clocksource/arm_arch_timer.c:554:44: error: 'hisi_161010101_read_cntvct_el0' undeclared (first use in this function)
554 | if (wa->read_cntvct_el0 == hisi_161010101_read_cntvct_el0) {
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
drivers/clocksource/arm_arch_timer.c:554:44: note: each undeclared identifier is reported only once for each function it appears in
vim +/hisi_161010101_read_cntvct_el0 +554 drivers/clocksource/arm_arch_timer.c
527
528 static
529 void arch_timer_enable_workaround(const struct arch_timer_erratum_workaround *wa,
530 bool local)
531 {
532 int i;
533
534 if (local) {
535 __this_cpu_write(timer_unstable_counter_workaround, wa);
536 } else {
537 for_each_possible_cpu(i)
538 per_cpu(timer_unstable_counter_workaround, i) = wa;
539 }
540
541 /*
542 * Use the locked version, as we're called from the CPU
543 * hotplug framework. Otherwise, we end-up in deadlock-land.
544 */
545 static_branch_enable_cpuslocked(&arch_timer_read_ool_enabled);
546
547 /*
548 * Don't use the vdso fastpath if errata require using the
549 * out-of-line counter accessor. We may change our mind pretty
550 * late in the game (with a per-CPU erratum, for example), so
551 * change both the default value and the vdso itself.
552 */
553 if (wa->read_cntvct_el0) {
> 554 if (wa->read_cntvct_el0 == hisi_161010101_read_cntvct_el0) {
555 clocksource_counter.archdata.vdso_direct = true;
556 vdso_default = true;
557 vdso_fix = true;
558 } else {
559 clocksource_counter.archdata.vdso_direct = false;
560 vdso_default = false;
561 }
562 }
563 }
564
--
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service
https://github.com/intel/lkp-tests/wiki