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[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/1] writeback fix softlockup
by Chen Ridong 16 Apr '24

16 Apr '24

*** BLURB HERE *** Chen Ridong (1): cgroup_writeback: fix softlockup for blkcg->memcg_list mm/backing-dev.c | 15 ++++++++++----- mm/memcontrol.c | 5 ++--- 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

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[openeuler:OLK-6.6 7345/7439] arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c:2209:57: error: 'enable_pseudo_nmi' undeclared; did you mean 'enable_percpu_nmi'?
by kernel test robot 16 Apr '24

16 Apr '24

tree: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel.git OLK-6.6 head: ba2303cacfdaf39c19a78290c541499b23712f54 commit: b8c8255e1d74937638bca666264404952c60395a [7345/7439] arm64: Decouple KVM from CONFIG_ARM64_NMI config: arm64-allnoconfig (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20240416/202404162024.n82VbpYr-lkp@…) compiler: aarch64-linux-gcc (GCC) 13.2.0 reproduce (this is a W=1 build): (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20240416/202404162024.n82VbpYr-lkp@…) If you fix the issue in a separate patch/commit (i.e. not just a new version of the same patch/commit), kindly add following tags | Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp(a)intel.com> | Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202404162024.n82VbpYr-lkp@intel.com/ All errors (new ones prefixed by >>): arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c: In function 'use_nmi': >> arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c:2209:57: error: 'enable_pseudo_nmi' undeclared (first use in this function); did you mean 'enable_percpu_nmi'? 2209 | else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_PSEUDO_NMI) && enable_pseudo_nmi) { | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | enable_percpu_nmi arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c:2209:57: note: each undeclared identifier is reported only once for each function it appears in vim +2209 arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c 2191 2192 static bool use_nmi(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope) 2193 { 2194 if (!has_cpuid_feature(entry, scope)) 2195 return false; 2196 2197 /* 2198 * NMI support was not enabled in the kernel, but can still be 2199 * used by guests. Let the world know. 2200 * 2201 * Having both real and pseudo NMIs enabled simultaneously is 2202 * likely to cause confusion. Since pseudo NMIs must be 2203 * enabled with an explicit command line option, if the user 2204 * has set that option on a system with real NMIs for some 2205 * reason assume they know what they're doing. 2206 */ 2207 if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_NMI)) 2208 pr_info("CONFIG_ARM64_NMI disabled, using NMIs for guests only\n"); > 2209 else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_PSEUDO_NMI) && enable_pseudo_nmi) { 2210 pr_info("Pseudo NMI enabled, not using architected NMI\n"); 2211 return false; 2212 } 2213 2214 return true; 2215 } 2216 -- 0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service https://github.com/intel/lkp-tests/wiki

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[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] fix deadlock in cgroup1_writeback
by Chen Ridong 16 Apr '24

16 Apr '24

*** BLURB HERE *** Chen Ridong (2): Revert "cgroup_writeback: fix deadlock in cgroup1_writeback" cgroup_writeback: fix deadlock in cgroup1_writeback mm/backing-dev.c | 2 ++ mm/memcontrol.c | 24 +++++++++--------------- 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] tee: amdtee: fix use-after-free vulnerability in amdtee_close_session
by Guo Mengqi 16 Apr '24

16 Apr '24

From: Rijo Thomas <Rijo-john.Thomas(a)amd.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.199 commit da7ce52a2f6c468946195b116615297d3d113a27 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I9AWJ5 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit f4384b3e54ea813868bb81a861bf5b2406e15d8f upstream. There is a potential race condition in amdtee_close_session that may cause use-after-free in amdtee_open_session. For instance, if a session has refcount == 1, and one thread tries to free this session via: kref_put(&sess->refcount, destroy_session); the reference count will get decremented, and the next step would be to call destroy_session(). However, if in another thread, amdtee_open_session() is called before destroy_session() has completed execution, alloc_session() may return 'sess' that will be freed up later in destroy_session() leading to use-after-free in amdtee_open_session. To fix this issue, treat decrement of sess->refcount and removal of 'sess' from session list in destroy_session() as a critical section, so that it is executed atomically. Fixes: 757cc3e9ff1d ("tee: add AMD-TEE driver") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Rijo Thomas <Rijo-john.Thomas(a)amd.com> Reviewed-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: sanglipeng <sanglipeng1(a)jd.com> --- drivers/tee/amdtee/core.c | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/tee/amdtee/core.c b/drivers/tee/amdtee/core.c index 297dc62bca29..a890eeabe065 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/amdtee/core.c +++ b/drivers/tee/amdtee/core.c @@ -217,12 +217,12 @@ static int copy_ta_binary(struct tee_context *ctx, void *ptr, void **ta, return rc; } +/* mutex must be held by caller */ static void destroy_session(struct kref *ref) { struct amdtee_session *sess = container_of(ref, struct amdtee_session, refcount); - mutex_lock(&session_list_mutex); list_del(&sess->list_node); mutex_unlock(&session_list_mutex); kfree(sess); @@ -277,7 +277,8 @@ int amdtee_open_session(struct tee_context *ctx, if (i >= TEE_NUM_SESSIONS) { pr_err("reached maximum session count %d\n", TEE_NUM_SESSIONS); handle_unload_ta(ta_handle); - kref_put(&sess->refcount, destroy_session); + kref_put_mutex(&sess->refcount, destroy_session, + &session_list_mutex); rc = -ENOMEM; goto out; } @@ -290,7 +291,8 @@ int amdtee_open_session(struct tee_context *ctx, clear_bit(i, sess->sess_mask); spin_unlock(&sess->lock); handle_unload_ta(ta_handle); - kref_put(&sess->refcount, destroy_session); + kref_put_mutex(&sess->refcount, destroy_session, + &session_list_mutex); goto out; } @@ -332,7 +334,7 @@ int amdtee_close_session(struct tee_context *ctx, u32 session) handle_close_session(ta_handle, session_info); handle_unload_ta(ta_handle); - kref_put(&sess->refcount, destroy_session); + kref_put_mutex(&sess->refcount, destroy_session, &session_list_mutex); return 0; } -- 2.17.1

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[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS] tee: amdtee: fix use-after-free vulnerability in amdtee_close_session
by Guo Mengqi 16 Apr '24

16 Apr '24

From: Rijo Thomas <Rijo-john.Thomas(a)amd.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.199 commit da7ce52a2f6c468946195b116615297d3d113a27 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I9AWJ5 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit f4384b3e54ea813868bb81a861bf5b2406e15d8f upstream. There is a potential race condition in amdtee_close_session that may cause use-after-free in amdtee_open_session. For instance, if a session has refcount == 1, and one thread tries to free this session via: kref_put(&sess->refcount, destroy_session); the reference count will get decremented, and the next step would be to call destroy_session(). However, if in another thread, amdtee_open_session() is called before destroy_session() has completed execution, alloc_session() may return 'sess' that will be freed up later in destroy_session() leading to use-after-free in amdtee_open_session. To fix this issue, treat decrement of sess->refcount and removal of 'sess' from session list in destroy_session() as a critical section, so that it is executed atomically. Fixes: 757cc3e9ff1d ("tee: add AMD-TEE driver") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Rijo Thomas <Rijo-john.Thomas(a)amd.com> Reviewed-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: sanglipeng <sanglipeng1(a)jd.com> --- drivers/tee/amdtee/core.c | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/tee/amdtee/core.c b/drivers/tee/amdtee/core.c index 297dc62bca29..a890eeabe065 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/amdtee/core.c +++ b/drivers/tee/amdtee/core.c @@ -217,12 +217,12 @@ static int copy_ta_binary(struct tee_context *ctx, void *ptr, void **ta, return rc; } +/* mutex must be held by caller */ static void destroy_session(struct kref *ref) { struct amdtee_session *sess = container_of(ref, struct amdtee_session, refcount); - mutex_lock(&session_list_mutex); list_del(&sess->list_node); mutex_unlock(&session_list_mutex); kfree(sess); @@ -277,7 +277,8 @@ int amdtee_open_session(struct tee_context *ctx, if (i >= TEE_NUM_SESSIONS) { pr_err("reached maximum session count %d\n", TEE_NUM_SESSIONS); handle_unload_ta(ta_handle); - kref_put(&sess->refcount, destroy_session); + kref_put_mutex(&sess->refcount, destroy_session, + &session_list_mutex); rc = -ENOMEM; goto out; } @@ -290,7 +291,8 @@ int amdtee_open_session(struct tee_context *ctx, clear_bit(i, sess->sess_mask); spin_unlock(&sess->lock); handle_unload_ta(ta_handle); - kref_put(&sess->refcount, destroy_session); + kref_put_mutex(&sess->refcount, destroy_session, + &session_list_mutex); goto out; } @@ -332,7 +334,7 @@ int amdtee_close_session(struct tee_context *ctx, u32 session) handle_close_session(ta_handle, session_info); handle_unload_ta(ta_handle); - kref_put(&sess->refcount, destroy_session); + kref_put_mutex(&sess->refcount, destroy_session, &session_list_mutex); return 0; } -- 2.17.1

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[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP2] tee: amdtee: fix use-after-free vulnerability in amdtee_close_session
by Guo Mengqi 16 Apr '24

16 Apr '24

From: Rijo Thomas <Rijo-john.Thomas(a)amd.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.199 commit da7ce52a2f6c468946195b116615297d3d113a27 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I9AWJ5 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit f4384b3e54ea813868bb81a861bf5b2406e15d8f upstream. There is a potential race condition in amdtee_close_session that may cause use-after-free in amdtee_open_session. For instance, if a session has refcount == 1, and one thread tries to free this session via: kref_put(&sess->refcount, destroy_session); the reference count will get decremented, and the next step would be to call destroy_session(). However, if in another thread, amdtee_open_session() is called before destroy_session() has completed execution, alloc_session() may return 'sess' that will be freed up later in destroy_session() leading to use-after-free in amdtee_open_session. To fix this issue, treat decrement of sess->refcount and removal of 'sess' from session list in destroy_session() as a critical section, so that it is executed atomically. Fixes: 757cc3e9ff1d ("tee: add AMD-TEE driver") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Rijo Thomas <Rijo-john.Thomas(a)amd.com> Reviewed-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: sanglipeng <sanglipeng1(a)jd.com> --- drivers/tee/amdtee/core.c | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/tee/amdtee/core.c b/drivers/tee/amdtee/core.c index 372d64756ed6..3c15f6a9e91c 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/amdtee/core.c +++ b/drivers/tee/amdtee/core.c @@ -217,12 +217,12 @@ static int copy_ta_binary(struct tee_context *ctx, void *ptr, void **ta, return rc; } +/* mutex must be held by caller */ static void destroy_session(struct kref *ref) { struct amdtee_session *sess = container_of(ref, struct amdtee_session, refcount); - mutex_lock(&session_list_mutex); list_del(&sess->list_node); mutex_unlock(&session_list_mutex); kfree(sess); @@ -272,7 +272,8 @@ int amdtee_open_session(struct tee_context *ctx, if (arg->ret != TEEC_SUCCESS) { pr_err("open_session failed %d\n", arg->ret); handle_unload_ta(ta_handle); - kref_put(&sess->refcount, destroy_session); + kref_put_mutex(&sess->refcount, destroy_session, + &session_list_mutex); goto out; } @@ -290,7 +291,8 @@ int amdtee_open_session(struct tee_context *ctx, pr_err("reached maximum session count %d\n", TEE_NUM_SESSIONS); handle_close_session(ta_handle, session_info); handle_unload_ta(ta_handle); - kref_put(&sess->refcount, destroy_session); + kref_put_mutex(&sess->refcount, destroy_session, + &session_list_mutex); rc = -ENOMEM; goto out; } @@ -331,7 +333,7 @@ int amdtee_close_session(struct tee_context *ctx, u32 session) handle_close_session(ta_handle, session_info); handle_unload_ta(ta_handle); - kref_put(&sess->refcount, destroy_session); + kref_put_mutex(&sess->refcount, destroy_session, &session_list_mutex); return 0; } -- 2.17.1

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[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] tee: amdtee: fix use-after-free vulnerability in amdtee_close_session
by Guo Mengqi 16 Apr '24

16 Apr '24

From: Rijo Thomas <Rijo-john.Thomas(a)amd.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.199 commit da7ce52a2f6c468946195b116615297d3d113a27 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I9AWJ5 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit f4384b3e54ea813868bb81a861bf5b2406e15d8f upstream. There is a potential race condition in amdtee_close_session that may cause use-after-free in amdtee_open_session. For instance, if a session has refcount == 1, and one thread tries to free this session via: kref_put(&sess->refcount, destroy_session); the reference count will get decremented, and the next step would be to call destroy_session(). However, if in another thread, amdtee_open_session() is called before destroy_session() has completed execution, alloc_session() may return 'sess' that will be freed up later in destroy_session() leading to use-after-free in amdtee_open_session. To fix this issue, treat decrement of sess->refcount and removal of 'sess' from session list in destroy_session() as a critical section, so that it is executed atomically. Fixes: 757cc3e9ff1d ("tee: add AMD-TEE driver") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Rijo Thomas <Rijo-john.Thomas(a)amd.com> Reviewed-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: sanglipeng <sanglipeng1(a)jd.com> --- drivers/tee/amdtee/core.c | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/tee/amdtee/core.c b/drivers/tee/amdtee/core.c index 372d64756ed6..3c15f6a9e91c 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/amdtee/core.c +++ b/drivers/tee/amdtee/core.c @@ -217,12 +217,12 @@ static int copy_ta_binary(struct tee_context *ctx, void *ptr, void **ta, return rc; } +/* mutex must be held by caller */ static void destroy_session(struct kref *ref) { struct amdtee_session *sess = container_of(ref, struct amdtee_session, refcount); - mutex_lock(&session_list_mutex); list_del(&sess->list_node); mutex_unlock(&session_list_mutex); kfree(sess); @@ -272,7 +272,8 @@ int amdtee_open_session(struct tee_context *ctx, if (arg->ret != TEEC_SUCCESS) { pr_err("open_session failed %d\n", arg->ret); handle_unload_ta(ta_handle); - kref_put(&sess->refcount, destroy_session); + kref_put_mutex(&sess->refcount, destroy_session, + &session_list_mutex); goto out; } @@ -290,7 +291,8 @@ int amdtee_open_session(struct tee_context *ctx, pr_err("reached maximum session count %d\n", TEE_NUM_SESSIONS); handle_close_session(ta_handle, session_info); handle_unload_ta(ta_handle); - kref_put(&sess->refcount, destroy_session); + kref_put_mutex(&sess->refcount, destroy_session, + &session_list_mutex); rc = -ENOMEM; goto out; } @@ -331,7 +333,7 @@ int amdtee_close_session(struct tee_context *ctx, u32 session) handle_close_session(ta_handle, session_info); handle_unload_ta(ta_handle); - kref_put(&sess->refcount, destroy_session); + kref_put_mutex(&sess->refcount, destroy_session, &session_list_mutex); return 0; } -- 2.17.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS] tee: amdtee: fix use-after-free vulnerability in amdtee_close_session
by Guo Mengqi 16 Apr '24

16 Apr '24

From: Rijo Thomas <Rijo-john.Thomas(a)amd.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.199 commit da7ce52a2f6c468946195b116615297d3d113a27 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I9AWJ5 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit f4384b3e54ea813868bb81a861bf5b2406e15d8f upstream. There is a potential race condition in amdtee_close_session that may cause use-after-free in amdtee_open_session. For instance, if a session has refcount == 1, and one thread tries to free this session via: kref_put(&sess->refcount, destroy_session); the reference count will get decremented, and the next step would be to call destroy_session(). However, if in another thread, amdtee_open_session() is called before destroy_session() has completed execution, alloc_session() may return 'sess' that will be freed up later in destroy_session() leading to use-after-free in amdtee_open_session. To fix this issue, treat decrement of sess->refcount and removal of 'sess' from session list in destroy_session() as a critical section, so that it is executed atomically. Fixes: 757cc3e9ff1d ("tee: add AMD-TEE driver") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Rijo Thomas <Rijo-john.Thomas(a)amd.com> Reviewed-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: sanglipeng <sanglipeng1(a)jd.com> --- drivers/tee/amdtee/core.c | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/tee/amdtee/core.c b/drivers/tee/amdtee/core.c index 372d64756ed6..3c15f6a9e91c 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/amdtee/core.c +++ b/drivers/tee/amdtee/core.c @@ -217,12 +217,12 @@ static int copy_ta_binary(struct tee_context *ctx, void *ptr, void **ta, return rc; } +/* mutex must be held by caller */ static void destroy_session(struct kref *ref) { struct amdtee_session *sess = container_of(ref, struct amdtee_session, refcount); - mutex_lock(&session_list_mutex); list_del(&sess->list_node); mutex_unlock(&session_list_mutex); kfree(sess); @@ -272,7 +272,8 @@ int amdtee_open_session(struct tee_context *ctx, if (arg->ret != TEEC_SUCCESS) { pr_err("open_session failed %d\n", arg->ret); handle_unload_ta(ta_handle); - kref_put(&sess->refcount, destroy_session); + kref_put_mutex(&sess->refcount, destroy_session, + &session_list_mutex); goto out; } @@ -290,7 +291,8 @@ int amdtee_open_session(struct tee_context *ctx, pr_err("reached maximum session count %d\n", TEE_NUM_SESSIONS); handle_close_session(ta_handle, session_info); handle_unload_ta(ta_handle); - kref_put(&sess->refcount, destroy_session); + kref_put_mutex(&sess->refcount, destroy_session, + &session_list_mutex); rc = -ENOMEM; goto out; } @@ -331,7 +333,7 @@ int amdtee_close_session(struct tee_context *ctx, u32 session) handle_close_session(ta_handle, session_info); handle_unload_ta(ta_handle); - kref_put(&sess->refcount, destroy_session); + kref_put_mutex(&sess->refcount, destroy_session, &session_list_mutex); return 0; } -- 2.17.1

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[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP2] serial: 8250_port: Check IRQ data before use
by Yi Yang 16 Apr '24

16 Apr '24

From: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko(a)linux.intel.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.198 commit e14afa4450cb7e4cf93e993a765801203d41d014 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I95ATO CVE: CVE-2023-52567 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit cce7fc8b29961b64fadb1ce398dc5ff32a79643b upstream. In case the leaf driver wants to use IRQ polling (irq = 0) and IIR register shows that an interrupt happened in the 8250 hardware the IRQ data can be NULL. In such a case we need to skip the wake event as we came to this path from the timer interrupt and quite likely system is already awake. Without this fix we have got an Oops: serial8250: ttyS0 at I/O 0x3f8 (irq = 0, base_baud = 115200) is a 16550A ... BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000010 RIP: 0010:serial8250_handle_irq+0x7c/0x240 Call Trace: ? serial8250_handle_irq+0x7c/0x240 ? __pfx_serial8250_timeout+0x10/0x10 Fixes: 0ba9e3a13c6a ("serial: 8250: Add missing wakeup event reporting") Cc: stable <stable(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko(a)linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli <florian.fainelli(a)broadcom.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230831222555.614426-1-andriy.shevchenko@linux.i… Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Yi Yang <yiyang13(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c b/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c index b19908779e3b..6218ebc4427d 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c +++ b/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c @@ -1914,7 +1914,10 @@ int serial8250_handle_irq(struct uart_port *port, unsigned int iir) skip_rx = true; if (status & (UART_LSR_DR | UART_LSR_BI) && !skip_rx) { - if (irqd_is_wakeup_set(irq_get_irq_data(port->irq))) + struct irq_data *d; + + d = irq_get_irq_data(port->irq); + if (d && irqd_is_wakeup_set(d)) pm_wakeup_event(tport->tty->dev, 0); if (!up->dma || handle_rx_dma(up, iir)) status = serial8250_rx_chars(up, status); -- 2.25.1

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[PATCH OLK-5.10] uio_hv_generic: Fix another memory leak in error handling paths
by Guo Mengqi 16 Apr '24

16 Apr '24

From: Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet(a)wanadoo.fr> mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.13-rc3 commit 0b0226be3a52dadd965644bc52a807961c2c26df category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I956G4 CVE: CVE-2021-47070 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Memory allocated by 'vmbus_alloc_ring()' at the beginning of the probe function is never freed in the error handling path. Add the missing 'vmbus_free_ring()' call. Note that it is already freed in the .remove function. Fixes: cdfa835c6e5e ("uio_hv_generic: defer opening vmbus until first use") Cc: stable <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet(a)wanadoo.fr> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/0d86027b8eeed8e6360bc3d52bcdb328ff9bdca1.16205440… Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> conflicts: drivers/uio/uio_hv_generic.c Signed-off-by: Guo Mengqi <guomengqi3(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/uio/uio_hv_generic.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/uio/uio_hv_generic.c b/drivers/uio/uio_hv_generic.c index c31febe90d4e..4abd8e20fb5b 100644 --- a/drivers/uio/uio_hv_generic.c +++ b/drivers/uio/uio_hv_generic.c @@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ hv_uio_probe(struct hv_device *dev, pdata->recv_buf = vzalloc(RECV_BUFFER_SIZE); if (pdata->recv_buf == NULL) { ret = -ENOMEM; - goto fail_close; + goto fail_free_ring; } ret = vmbus_establish_gpadl(channel, pdata->recv_buf, @@ -351,6 +351,8 @@ hv_uio_probe(struct hv_device *dev, fail_close: hv_uio_cleanup(dev, pdata); +fail_free_ring: + vmbus_free_ring(dev->channel); fail: kfree(pdata); -- 2.17.1

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