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[PATCH OLK-6.6] bpf: Reject narrower access to pointer ctx fields
by Dong Chenchen 30 Jan '26

30 Jan '26

From: Paul Chaignon <paul.chaignon(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.17-rc1 commit e09299225d5ba3916c91ef70565f7d2187e4cca0 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/12429 CVE: CVE-2025-38591 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- The following BPF program, simplified from a syzkaller repro, causes a kernel warning: r0 = *(u8 *)(r1 + 169); exit; With pointer field sk being at offset 168 in __sk_buff. This access is detected as a narrower read in bpf_skb_is_valid_access because it doesn't match offsetof(struct __sk_buff, sk). It is therefore allowed and later proceeds to bpf_convert_ctx_access. Note that for the "is_narrower_load" case in the convert_ctx_accesses(), the insn->off is aligned, so the cnt may not be 0 because it matches the offsetof(struct __sk_buff, sk) in the bpf_convert_ctx_access. However, the target_size stays 0 and the verifier errors with a kernel warning: verifier bug: error during ctx access conversion(1) This patch fixes that to return a proper "invalid bpf_context access off=X size=Y" error on the load instruction. The same issue affects multiple other fields in context structures that allow narrow access. Some other non-affected fields (for sk_msg, sk_lookup, and sockopt) were also changed to use bpf_ctx_range_ptr for consistency. Note this syzkaller crash was reported in the "Closes" link below, which used to be about a different bug, fixed in commit fce7bd8e385a ("bpf/verifier: Handle BPF_LOAD_ACQ instructions in insn_def_regno()"). Because syzbot somehow confused the two bugs, the new crash and repro didn't get reported to the mailing list. Fixes: f96da09473b52 ("bpf: simplify narrower ctx access") Fixes: 0df1a55afa832 ("bpf: Warn on internal verifier errors") Reported-by: syzbot+0ef84a7bdf5301d4cbec(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=0ef84a7bdf5301d4cbec Signed-off-by: Paul Chaignon <paul.chaignon(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau(a)kernel.org> Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87(a)gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/3b8dcee67ff4296903351a974ddd9c4dca768b64.175319459… Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/bpf/cgroup.c | 8 ++++---- net/core/filter.c | 20 ++++++++++---------- 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/cgroup.c b/kernel/bpf/cgroup.c index 90cc73c762cf..1082f5906967 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/cgroup.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/cgroup.c @@ -2446,22 +2446,22 @@ static bool cg_sockopt_is_valid_access(int off, int size, } switch (off) { - case offsetof(struct bpf_sockopt, sk): + case bpf_ctx_range_ptr(struct bpf_sockopt, sk): if (size != sizeof(__u64)) return false; info->reg_type = PTR_TO_SOCKET; break; - case offsetof(struct bpf_sockopt, optval): + case bpf_ctx_range_ptr(struct bpf_sockopt, optval): if (size != sizeof(__u64)) return false; info->reg_type = PTR_TO_PACKET; break; - case offsetof(struct bpf_sockopt, optval_end): + case bpf_ctx_range_ptr(struct bpf_sockopt, optval_end): if (size != sizeof(__u64)) return false; info->reg_type = PTR_TO_PACKET_END; break; - case offsetof(struct bpf_sockopt, retval): + case bpf_ctx_range(struct bpf_sockopt, retval): if (size != size_default) return false; return prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_GETSOCKOPT; diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c index c9d4910f3f55..b706fc1260b0 100644 --- a/net/core/filter.c +++ b/net/core/filter.c @@ -8678,7 +8678,7 @@ static bool bpf_skb_is_valid_access(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type if (size != sizeof(__u64)) return false; break; - case offsetof(struct __sk_buff, sk): + case bpf_ctx_range_ptr(struct __sk_buff, sk): if (type == BPF_WRITE || size != sizeof(__u64)) return false; info->reg_type = PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL; @@ -9282,7 +9282,7 @@ static bool sock_addr_is_valid_access(int off, int size, return false; } break; - case offsetof(struct bpf_sock_addr, sk): + case bpf_ctx_range_ptr(struct bpf_sock_addr, sk): if (type != BPF_READ) return false; if (size != sizeof(__u64)) @@ -9337,17 +9337,17 @@ static bool sock_ops_is_valid_access(int off, int size, if (size != sizeof(__u64)) return false; break; - case offsetof(struct bpf_sock_ops, sk): + case bpf_ctx_range_ptr(struct bpf_sock_ops, sk): if (size != sizeof(__u64)) return false; info->reg_type = PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL; break; - case offsetof(struct bpf_sock_ops, skb_data): + case bpf_ctx_range_ptr(struct bpf_sock_ops, skb_data): if (size != sizeof(__u64)) return false; info->reg_type = PTR_TO_PACKET; break; - case offsetof(struct bpf_sock_ops, skb_data_end): + case bpf_ctx_range_ptr(struct bpf_sock_ops, skb_data_end): if (size != sizeof(__u64)) return false; info->reg_type = PTR_TO_PACKET_END; @@ -9356,7 +9356,7 @@ static bool sock_ops_is_valid_access(int off, int size, bpf_ctx_record_field_size(info, size_default); return bpf_ctx_narrow_access_ok(off, size, size_default); - case offsetof(struct bpf_sock_ops, skb_hwtstamp): + case bpf_ctx_range(struct bpf_sock_ops, skb_hwtstamp): if (size != sizeof(__u64)) return false; break; @@ -9426,17 +9426,17 @@ static bool sk_msg_is_valid_access(int off, int size, return false; switch (off) { - case offsetof(struct sk_msg_md, data): + case bpf_ctx_range_ptr(struct sk_msg_md, data): info->reg_type = PTR_TO_PACKET; if (size != sizeof(__u64)) return false; break; - case offsetof(struct sk_msg_md, data_end): + case bpf_ctx_range_ptr(struct sk_msg_md, data_end): info->reg_type = PTR_TO_PACKET_END; if (size != sizeof(__u64)) return false; break; - case offsetof(struct sk_msg_md, sk): + case bpf_ctx_range_ptr(struct sk_msg_md, sk): if (size != sizeof(__u64)) return false; info->reg_type = PTR_TO_SOCKET; @@ -11665,7 +11665,7 @@ static bool sk_lookup_is_valid_access(int off, int size, return false; switch (off) { - case offsetof(struct bpf_sk_lookup, sk): + case bpf_ctx_range_ptr(struct bpf_sk_lookup, sk): info->reg_type = PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL; return size == sizeof(__u64); -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] Bluetooth: eir: Fix possible crashes on eir_create_adv_data
by Dong Chenchen 30 Jan '26

30 Jan '26

From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz(a)intel.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.16-rc2 commit 47c03902269aff377f959dc3fd94a9733aa31d6e category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/9488 CVE: CVE-2025-38303 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- eir_create_adv_data may attempt to add EIR_FLAGS and EIR_TX_POWER without checking if that would fit. Link: https://github.com/bluez/bluez/issues/1117#issuecomment-2958244066 Fixes: 01ce70b0a274 ("Bluetooth: eir: Move EIR/Adv Data functions to its own file") Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz(a)intel.com> Conflicts: net/bluetooth/eir.h net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c [commit e77f43d531af and 5f60d5f6bbc1 are not backport] Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- net/bluetooth/eir.c | 7 ++++--- net/bluetooth/eir.h | 2 +- net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c | 5 +++-- 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/bluetooth/eir.c b/net/bluetooth/eir.c index 3e1713673ecc..3f72111ba651 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/eir.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/eir.c @@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ u8 eir_create_per_adv_data(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 instance, u8 *ptr) return ad_len; } -u8 eir_create_adv_data(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 instance, u8 *ptr) +u8 eir_create_adv_data(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 instance, u8 *ptr, u8 size) { struct adv_info *adv = NULL; u8 ad_len = 0, flags = 0; @@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ u8 eir_create_adv_data(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 instance, u8 *ptr) /* If flags would still be empty, then there is no need to * include the "Flags" AD field". */ - if (flags) { + if (flags && (ad_len + eir_precalc_len(1) <= size)) { ptr[0] = 0x02; ptr[1] = EIR_FLAGS; ptr[2] = flags; @@ -316,7 +316,8 @@ u8 eir_create_adv_data(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 instance, u8 *ptr) } /* Provide Tx Power only if we can provide a valid value for it */ - if (adv_tx_power != HCI_TX_POWER_INVALID) { + if (adv_tx_power != HCI_TX_POWER_INVALID && + (ad_len + eir_precalc_len(1) <= size)) { ptr[0] = 0x02; ptr[1] = EIR_TX_POWER; ptr[2] = (u8)adv_tx_power; diff --git a/net/bluetooth/eir.h b/net/bluetooth/eir.h index 0df19f2f4af9..4497f8fd5fef 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/eir.h +++ b/net/bluetooth/eir.h @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ void eir_create(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 *data); -u8 eir_create_adv_data(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 instance, u8 *ptr); +u8 eir_create_adv_data(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 instance, u8 *ptr, u8 size); u8 eir_create_scan_rsp(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 instance, u8 *ptr); u8 eir_create_per_adv_data(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 instance, u8 *ptr); diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c index cdd4e8ac8991..44e15af4410a 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c @@ -1883,7 +1883,8 @@ static int hci_set_ext_adv_data_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 instance) return 0; } - len = eir_create_adv_data(hdev, instance, pdu.data); + len = eir_create_adv_data(hdev, instance, pdu.data, + HCI_MAX_EXT_AD_LENGTH); pdu.cp.length = len; pdu.cp.handle = instance; @@ -1914,7 +1915,7 @@ static int hci_set_adv_data_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 instance) memset(&cp, 0, sizeof(cp)); - len = eir_create_adv_data(hdev, instance, cp.data); + len = eir_create_adv_data(hdev, instance, cp.data, sizeof(cp.data)); /* There's nothing to do if the data hasn't changed */ if (hdev->adv_data_len == len && -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] IB/mlx5: Fix potential deadlock in MR deregistration
by Dong Chenchen 30 Jan '26

30 Jan '26

From: Or Har-Toov <ohartoov(a)nvidia.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.16-rc5 commit 2ed25aa7f7711f508b6120e336f05cd9d49943c0 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/9417 CVE: CVE-2025-38373 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- The issue arises when kzalloc() is invoked while holding umem_mutex or any other lock acquired under umem_mutex. This is problematic because kzalloc() can trigger fs_reclaim_aqcuire(), which may, in turn, invoke mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start(). This function can lead to mlx5_ib_invalidate_range(), which attempts to acquire umem_mutex again, resulting in a deadlock. The problematic flow: CPU0 | CPU1 ---------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------ mlx5_ib_dereg_mr() | → revoke_mr() | → mutex_lock(&umem_odp->umem_mutex) | | mlx5_mkey_cache_init() | → mutex_lock(&dev->cache.rb_lock) | → mlx5r_cache_create_ent_locked() | → kzalloc(GFP_KERNEL) | → fs_reclaim() | → mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start() | → mlx5_ib_invalidate_range() | → mutex_lock(&umem_odp->umem_mutex) → cache_ent_find_and_store() | → mutex_lock(&dev->cache.rb_lock) | Additionally, when kzalloc() is called from within cache_ent_find_and_store(), we encounter the same deadlock due to re-acquisition of umem_mutex. Solve by releasing umem_mutex in dereg_mr() after umr_revoke_mr() and before acquiring rb_lock. This ensures that we don't hold umem_mutex while performing memory allocations that could trigger the reclaim path. This change prevents the deadlock by ensuring proper lock ordering and avoiding holding locks during memory allocation operations that could trigger the reclaim path. The following lockdep warning demonstrates the deadlock: python3/20557 is trying to acquire lock: ffff888387542128 (&umem_odp->umem_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: mlx5_ib_invalidate_range+0x5b/0x550 [mlx5_ib] but task is already holding lock: ffffffff82f6b840 (mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: unmap_vmas+0x7b/0x1a0 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #3 (mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start){+.+.}-{0:0}: fs_reclaim_acquire+0x60/0xd0 mem_cgroup_css_alloc+0x6f/0x9b0 cgroup_init_subsys+0xa4/0x240 cgroup_init+0x1c8/0x510 start_kernel+0x747/0x760 x86_64_start_reservations+0x25/0x30 x86_64_start_kernel+0x73/0x80 common_startup_64+0x129/0x138 -> #2 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}: fs_reclaim_acquire+0x91/0xd0 __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x4d/0x4c0 mlx5r_cache_create_ent_locked+0x75/0x620 [mlx5_ib] mlx5_mkey_cache_init+0x186/0x360 [mlx5_ib] mlx5_ib_stage_post_ib_reg_umr_init+0x3c/0x60 [mlx5_ib] __mlx5_ib_add+0x4b/0x190 [mlx5_ib] mlx5r_probe+0xd9/0x320 [mlx5_ib] auxiliary_bus_probe+0x42/0x70 really_probe+0xdb/0x360 __driver_probe_device+0x8f/0x130 driver_probe_device+0x1f/0xb0 __driver_attach+0xd4/0x1f0 bus_for_each_dev+0x79/0xd0 bus_add_driver+0xf0/0x200 driver_register+0x6e/0xc0 __auxiliary_driver_register+0x6a/0xc0 do_one_initcall+0x5e/0x390 do_init_module+0x88/0x240 init_module_from_file+0x85/0xc0 idempotent_init_module+0x104/0x300 __x64_sys_finit_module+0x68/0xc0 do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 -> #1 (&dev->cache.rb_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: __mutex_lock+0x98/0xf10 __mlx5_ib_dereg_mr+0x6f2/0x890 [mlx5_ib] mlx5_ib_dereg_mr+0x21/0x110 [mlx5_ib] ib_dereg_mr_user+0x85/0x1f0 [ib_core] uverbs_free_mr+0x19/0x30 [ib_uverbs] destroy_hw_idr_uobject+0x21/0x80 [ib_uverbs] uverbs_destroy_uobject+0x60/0x3d0 [ib_uverbs] uobj_destroy+0x57/0xa0 [ib_uverbs] ib_uverbs_cmd_verbs+0x4d5/0x1210 [ib_uverbs] ib_uverbs_ioctl+0x129/0x230 [ib_uverbs] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x596/0xaa0 do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 -> #0 (&umem_odp->umem_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}: __lock_acquire+0x1826/0x2f00 lock_acquire+0xd3/0x2e0 __mutex_lock+0x98/0xf10 mlx5_ib_invalidate_range+0x5b/0x550 [mlx5_ib] __mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start+0x18e/0x1f0 unmap_vmas+0x182/0x1a0 exit_mmap+0xf3/0x4a0 mmput+0x3a/0x100 do_exit+0x2b9/0xa90 do_group_exit+0x32/0xa0 get_signal+0xc32/0xcb0 arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x29/0x1d0 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x105/0x1d0 do_syscall_64+0x79/0x140 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 Chain exists of: &dev->cache.rb_lock --> mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start --> &umem_odp->umem_mutex Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&umem_odp->umem_mutex); lock(mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start); lock(&umem_odp->umem_mutex); lock(&dev->cache.rb_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** Fixes: abb604a1a9c8 ("RDMA/mlx5: Fix a race for an ODP MR which leads to CQE with error") Signed-off-by: Or Har-Toov <ohartoov(a)nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Michael Guralnik <michaelgur(a)nvidia.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/3c8f225a8a9fade647d19b014df1172544643e4a.175006161… Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/mr.c [commit cc668a11e6ac is not backport] Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/mr.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/mr.c b/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/mr.c index 5881d8e69aa4..22aa33550465 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/mr.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/mr.c @@ -1873,18 +1873,35 @@ static int cache_ent_find_and_store(struct mlx5_ib_dev *dev, return ret; } -static int mlx5_revoke_mr(struct mlx5_ib_mr *mr) +static int mlx5_umr_revoke_mr_with_lock(struct mlx5_ib_mr *mr) { - struct mlx5_ib_dev *dev = to_mdev(mr->ibmr.device); - struct mlx5_cache_ent *ent = mr->mmkey.cache_ent; bool is_odp = is_odp_mr(mr); - int ret = 0; + int ret; if (is_odp) mutex_lock(&to_ib_umem_odp(mr->umem)->umem_mutex); - if (mr->mmkey.cacheable && !mlx5r_umr_revoke_mr(mr) && !cache_ent_find_and_store(dev, mr)) - goto out; + ret = mlx5r_umr_revoke_mr(mr); + + if (is_odp) { + if (!ret) + to_ib_umem_odp(mr->umem)->private = NULL; + mutex_unlock(&to_ib_umem_odp(mr->umem)->umem_mutex); + } + + return ret; +} + +static int mlx5r_handle_mkey_cleanup(struct mlx5_ib_mr *mr) +{ + struct mlx5_ib_dev *dev = to_mdev(mr->ibmr.device); + struct mlx5_cache_ent *ent = mr->mmkey.cache_ent; + bool is_odp = is_odp_mr(mr); + int ret; + + if (mr->mmkey.cacheable && !mlx5_umr_revoke_mr_with_lock(mr) && + !cache_ent_find_and_store(dev, mr)) + return 0; if (ent) { xa_lock_irq(&ent->mkeys); @@ -1892,8 +1909,11 @@ static int mlx5_revoke_mr(struct mlx5_ib_mr *mr) mr->mmkey.cache_ent = NULL; xa_unlock_irq(&ent->mkeys); } + + if (is_odp) + mutex_lock(&to_ib_umem_odp(mr->umem)->umem_mutex); + ret = destroy_mkey(dev, mr); -out: if (is_odp) { if (!ret) to_ib_umem_odp(mr->umem)->private = NULL; @@ -1948,7 +1968,7 @@ int mlx5_ib_dereg_mr(struct ib_mr *ibmr, struct ib_udata *udata) } /* Stop DMA */ - rc = mlx5_revoke_mr(mr); + rc = mlx5r_handle_mkey_cleanup(mr); if (rc) return rc; -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6 v3 00/21] net: LTS-6.6 backport
by Dong Chenchen 30 Jan '26

30 Jan '26

net lts patches backport Aakash Kumar S (1): xfrm: Duplicate SPI Handling Bui Quang Minh (1): virtio-net: fix received length check in big packets David Howells (1): rxrpc: Fix recv-recv race of completed call Florian Westphal (1): netfilter: nf_reject: don't leak dst refcount for loopback packets Jakub Kicinski (3): tls: handle data disappearing from under the TLS ULP tls: make sure to abort the stream if headers are bogus page_pool: always add GFP_NOWARN for ATOMIC allocations Jiayuan Chen (1): bpf, ktls: Fix data corruption when using bpf_msg_pop_data() in ktls Kuniyuki Iwashima (1): Bluetooth: hci_core: Fix use-after-free in vhci_flush() Maher Azzouzi (1): net/sched: mqprio: fix stack out-of-bounds write in tc entry parsing Marc Kleine-Budde (4): can: dev: can_restart(): reverse logic to remove need for goto can: dev: can_restart(): move debug message and stats after successful restart can: netlink: can_changelink(): fix NULL pointer deref of struct can_priv::do_set_mode can: netlink: can_changelink(): allow disabling of automatic restart Michal Luczaj (3): vsock: Fix transport_{g2h,h2g} TOCTOU vsock: Fix transport_* TOCTOU vsock: Ignore signal/timeout on connect() if already established Nikolay Aleksandrov (1): net: bridge: fix use-after-free due to MST port state bypass Nishanth Menon (1): net: ethernet: ti: netcp: Standardize knav_dma_open_channel to return NULL on error Sabrina Dubroca (1): xfrm: xfrm_alloc_spi shouldn't use 0 as SPI William Liu (1): net/sched: Return NULL when htb_lookup_leaf encounters an empty rbtree drivers/net/can/dev/dev.c | 31 +++++---- drivers/net/can/dev/netlink.c | 16 ++++- drivers/net/ethernet/ti/netcp_core.c | 10 +-- drivers/net/virtio_net.c | 25 ++++---- drivers/soc/ti/knav_dma.c | 14 ++-- include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h | 1 + include/trace/events/rxrpc.h | 3 + net/bluetooth/hci_core.c | 34 ++++++++-- net/bridge/br_forward.c | 2 +- net/bridge/br_input.c | 4 +- net/bridge/br_private.h | 8 ++- net/core/page_pool.c | 6 ++ net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv4.c | 6 +- net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv6.c | 5 +- net/rxrpc/call_accept.c | 1 + net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c | 19 +++++- net/sched/sch_htb.c | 4 +- net/sched/sch_mqprio.c | 2 +- net/tls/tls.h | 3 +- net/tls/tls_strp.c | 25 +++++--- net/tls/tls_sw.c | 19 +++++- net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c | 95 ++++++++++++++++++++++------ net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c | 75 +++++++++++++--------- 23 files changed, 286 insertions(+), 122 deletions(-) -- 2.25.1

2 22

[PATCH OLK-6.6] vfs: Don't leak disconnected dentries on umount
by Zizhi Wo 30 Jan '26

30 Jan '26

From: Jan Kara <jack(a)suse.cz> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.114 commit cebfbf40056a4d858b2a3ca59a69936d599bd209 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/7768 CVE: CVE-2025-40105 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 56094ad3eaa21e6621396cc33811d8f72847a834 ] When user calls open_by_handle_at() on some inode that is not cached, we will create disconnected dentry for it. If such dentry is a directory, exportfs_decode_fh_raw() will then try to connect this dentry to the dentry tree through reconnect_path(). It may happen for various reasons (such as corrupted fs or race with rename) that the call to lookup_one_unlocked() in reconnect_one() will fail to find the dentry we are trying to reconnect and instead create a new dentry under the parent. Now this dentry will not be marked as disconnected although the parent still may well be disconnected (at least in case this inconsistency happened because the fs is corrupted and .. doesn't point to the real parent directory). This creates inconsistency in disconnected flags but AFAICS it was mostly harmless. At least until commit f1ee616214cb ("VFS: don't keep disconnected dentries on d_anon") which removed adding of most disconnected dentries to sb->s_anon list. Thus after this commit cleanup of disconnected dentries implicitely relies on the fact that dput() will immediately reclaim such dentries. However when some leaf dentry isn't marked as disconnected, as in the scenario described above, the reclaim doesn't happen and the dentries are "leaked". Memory reclaim can eventually reclaim them but otherwise they stay in memory and if umount comes first, we hit infamous "Busy inodes after unmount" bug. Make sure all dentries created under a disconnected parent are marked as disconnected as well. Reported-by: syzbot+1d79ebe5383fc016cf07(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: f1ee616214cb ("VFS: don't keep disconnected dentries on d_anon") CC: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack(a)suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner(a)kernel.org> [ relocated DCACHE_DISCONNECTED propagation from d_alloc_parallel() to d_alloc() ] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Conflicts: fs/dcache.c [Simple context conflicts, adapted directly.] Signed-off-by: Zizhi Wo <wozizhi(a)huawei.com> --- fs/dcache.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/dcache.c b/fs/dcache.c index fe9140b0d0eb..d7a0672d04f7 100644 --- a/fs/dcache.c +++ b/fs/dcache.c @@ -1948,6 +1948,8 @@ struct dentry *d_alloc(struct dentry * parent, const struct qstr *name) __dget_dlock(parent); dentry->d_parent = parent; list_add(&dentry->d_child, &parent->d_subdirs); + if (parent->d_flags & DCACHE_DISCONNECTED) + dentry->d_flags |= DCACHE_DISCONNECTED; spin_unlock(&parent->d_lock); out: return dentry; -- 2.39.2

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[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] *** fix CVE-2025-38062 ***
by Lin Ruifeng 29 Jan '26

29 Jan '26

*** fix CVE-2025-38062 *** Jason Gunthorpe (1): genirq/msi: Store the IOMMU IOVA directly in msi_desc instead of iommu_cookie Lin Ruifeng (1): genirq/msi:: Fix kabi break of struct msi_desc drivers/iommu/dma-iommu.c | 28 +++++++++++++--------------- include/linux/msi.h | 35 +++++++++++++++-------------------- 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-) -- 2.43.0

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[PATCH OLK-5.10] drm/radeon: delete radeon_fence_process in is_signaled, no deadlock
by Lin Ruifeng 29 Jan '26

29 Jan '26

From: Robert McClinton <rbmccav(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.12.60 commit 73bc12d6a547f9571ce4393acfd73c004e2df9e5 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/11558 CVE: CVE-2025-68223 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 9eb00b5f5697bd56baa3222c7a1426fa15bacfb5 upstream. Delete the attempt to progress the queue when checking if fence is signaled. This avoids deadlock. dma-fence_ops::signaled can be called with the fence lock in unknown state. For radeon, the fence lock is also the wait queue lock. This can cause a self deadlock when signaled() tries to make forward progress on the wait queue. But advancing the queue is unneeded because incorrectly returning false from signaled() is perfectly acceptable. Link: https://github.com/brave/brave-browser/issues/49182 Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/amd/-/issues/4641 Cc: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Robert McClinton <rbmccav(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher(a)amd.com> (cherry picked from commit 527ba26e50ec2ca2be9c7c82f3ad42998a75d0db) Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Conflicts: drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_fence.c [Context Conflicts] Signed-off-by: Lin Ruifeng <linruifeng4(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_fence.c | 8 -------- 1 file changed, 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_fence.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_fence.c index 8735bf2bb8b5..b6210460f39b 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_fence.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_fence.c @@ -370,14 +370,6 @@ static bool radeon_fence_is_signaled(struct dma_fence *f) return true; } - if (down_read_trylock(&rdev->exclusive_lock)) { - radeon_fence_process(rdev, ring); - up_read(&rdev->exclusive_lock); - - if (atomic64_read(&rdev->fence_drv[ring].last_seq) >= seq) { - return true; - } - } return false; } -- 2.43.0

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[PATCH OLK-6.6] gfs2: Prevent recursive memory reclaim
by Lin Ruifeng 29 Jan '26

29 Jan '26

From: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba(a)redhat.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.12.63 commit edb2b255618621dc83d0ec23150e16b2c697077f category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/12714 CVE: CVE-2025-68356 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 2c5f4a53476e3cab70adc77b38942c066bd2c17c ] Function new_inode() returns a new inode with inode->i_mapping->gfp_mask set to GFP_HIGHUSER_MOVABLE. This value includes the __GFP_FS flag, so allocations in that address space can recurse into filesystem memory reclaim. We don't want that to happen because it can consume a significant amount of stack memory. Worse than that is that it can also deadlock: for example, in several places, gfs2_unstuff_dinode() is called inside filesystem transactions. This calls filemap_grab_folio(), which can allocate a new folio, which can trigger memory reclaim. If memory reclaim recurses into the filesystem and starts another transaction, a deadlock will ensue. To fix these kinds of problems, prevent memory reclaim from recursing into filesystem code by making sure that the gfp_mask of inode address spaces doesn't include __GFP_FS. The "meta" and resource group address spaces were already using GFP_NOFS as their gfp_mask (which doesn't include __GFP_FS). The default value of GFP_HIGHUSER_MOVABLE is less restrictive than GFP_NOFS, though. To avoid being overly limiting, use the default value and only knock off the __GFP_FS flag. I'm not sure if this will actually make a difference, but it also shouldn't hurt. This patch is loosely based on commit ad22c7a043c2 ("xfs: prevent stack overflows from page cache allocation"). Fixes xfstest generic/273. Fixes: dc0b9435238c ("gfs: Don't use GFP_NOFS in gfs2_unstuff_dinode") Reviewed-by: Andrew Price <anprice(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: fs/gfs2/glock.c fs/gfs2/ops_fstype.c [Context Conflicts] Signed-off-by: Lin Ruifeng <linruifeng4(a)huawei.com> --- fs/gfs2/glock.c | 5 ++++- fs/gfs2/inode.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ fs/gfs2/inode.h | 1 + fs/gfs2/ops_fstype.c | 2 +- 4 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/gfs2/glock.c b/fs/gfs2/glock.c index 7606e983a2ca..8fb9f1bba384 100644 --- a/fs/gfs2/glock.c +++ b/fs/gfs2/glock.c @@ -1254,10 +1254,13 @@ int gfs2_glock_get(struct gfs2_sbd *sdp, u64 number, mapping = gfs2_glock2aspace(gl); if (mapping) { + gfp_t gfp_mask; + mapping->a_ops = &gfs2_meta_aops; mapping->host = s->s_bdev->bd_inode; mapping->flags = 0; - mapping_set_gfp_mask(mapping, GFP_NOFS); + gfp_mask = mapping_gfp_mask(&sdp->sd_aspace); + mapping_set_gfp_mask(mapping, gfp_mask); mapping->private_data = NULL; mapping->writeback_index = 0; } diff --git a/fs/gfs2/inode.c b/fs/gfs2/inode.c index 1cb5ce63fbf6..8627c85c6bf0 100644 --- a/fs/gfs2/inode.c +++ b/fs/gfs2/inode.c @@ -89,6 +89,19 @@ static int iget_set(struct inode *inode, void *opaque) return 0; } +void gfs2_setup_inode(struct inode *inode) +{ + gfp_t gfp_mask; + + /* + * Ensure all page cache allocations are done from GFP_NOFS context to + * prevent direct reclaim recursion back into the filesystem and blowing + * stacks or deadlocking. + */ + gfp_mask = mapping_gfp_mask(inode->i_mapping); + mapping_set_gfp_mask(inode->i_mapping, gfp_mask & ~__GFP_FS); +} + /** * gfs2_inode_lookup - Lookup an inode * @sb: The super block @@ -132,6 +145,7 @@ struct inode *gfs2_inode_lookup(struct super_block *sb, unsigned int type, struct gfs2_glock *io_gl; int extra_flags = 0; + gfs2_setup_inode(inode); error = gfs2_glock_get(sdp, no_addr, &gfs2_inode_glops, CREATE, &ip->i_gl); if (unlikely(error)) @@ -684,6 +698,7 @@ static int gfs2_create_inode(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, error = -ENOMEM; if (!inode) goto fail_gunlock; + gfs2_setup_inode(inode); ip = GFS2_I(inode); error = posix_acl_create(dir, &mode, &default_acl, &acl); diff --git a/fs/gfs2/inode.h b/fs/gfs2/inode.h index ce70cf26b497..6f7c9ec21bbf 100644 --- a/fs/gfs2/inode.h +++ b/fs/gfs2/inode.h @@ -88,6 +88,7 @@ static inline int gfs2_check_internal_file_size(struct inode *inode, return -EIO; } +void gfs2_setup_inode(struct inode *inode); struct inode *gfs2_inode_lookup(struct super_block *sb, unsigned type, u64 no_addr, u64 no_formal_ino, unsigned int blktype); diff --git a/fs/gfs2/ops_fstype.c b/fs/gfs2/ops_fstype.c index f4c066aa24b9..1f6dd91180e0 100644 --- a/fs/gfs2/ops_fstype.c +++ b/fs/gfs2/ops_fstype.c @@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ static struct gfs2_sbd *init_sbd(struct super_block *sb) mapping->a_ops = &gfs2_rgrp_aops; mapping->host = sb->s_bdev->bd_inode; mapping->flags = 0; - mapping_set_gfp_mask(mapping, GFP_NOFS); + gfs2_setup_inode(mapping->host); mapping->private_data = NULL; mapping->writeback_index = 0; -- 2.43.0

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[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] *** fix CVE-2025-38062 ***
by Lin Ruifeng 29 Jan '26

29 Jan '26

*** fix CVE-2025-38062 *** Jason Gunthorpe (1): genirq/msi: Store the IOMMU IOVA directly in msi_desc instead of iommu_cookie Lin Ruifeng (1): genirq/msi:: Fix kabi break of struct msi_desc drivers/iommu/dma-iommu.c | 28 +++++++++++++--------------- include/linux/msi.h | 35 +++++++++++++++-------------------- 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-) -- 2.43.0

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[PATCH OLK-6.6] KVM: SVM: Don't skip unrelated instruction if INT3/INTO is replaced
by Lin Ruifeng 29 Jan '26

29 Jan '26

From: Omar Sandoval <osandov(a)fb.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.12.62 commit 87cc1622c88a4888959d64fa1fc9ba1e264aa3d4 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/11544 CVE: CVE-2025-68259 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 4da3768e1820cf15cced390242d8789aed34f54d upstream. When re-injecting a soft interrupt from an INT3, INT0, or (select) INTn instruction, discard the exception and retry the instruction if the code stream is changed (e.g. by a different vCPU) between when the CPU executes the instruction and when KVM decodes the instruction to get the next RIP. As effectively predicted by commit 6ef88d6e36c2 ("KVM: SVM: Re-inject INT3/INTO instead of retrying the instruction"), failure to verify that the correct INTn instruction was decoded can effectively clobber guest state due to decoding the wrong instruction and thus specifying the wrong next RIP. The bug most often manifests as "Oops: int3" panics on static branch checks in Linux guests. Enabling or disabling a static branch in Linux uses the kernel's "text poke" code patching mechanism. To modify code while other CPUs may be executing that code, Linux (temporarily) replaces the first byte of the original instruction with an int3 (opcode 0xcc), then patches in the new code stream except for the first byte, and finally replaces the int3 with the first byte of the new code stream. If a CPU hits the int3, i.e. executes the code while it's being modified, then the guest kernel must look up the RIP to determine how to handle the #BP, e.g. by emulating the new instruction. If the RIP is incorrect, then this lookup fails and the guest kernel panics. The bug reproduces almost instantly by hacking the guest kernel to repeatedly check a static branch[1] while running a drgn script[2] on the host to constantly swap out the memory containing the guest's TSS. [1]: https://gist.github.com/osandov/44d17c51c28c0ac998ea0334edf90b5a [2]: https://gist.github.com/osandov/10e45e45afa29b11e0c7209247afc00b Fixes: 6ef88d6e36c2 ("KVM: SVM: Re-inject INT3/INTO instead of retrying the instruction") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov(a)fb.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/1cc6dcdf36e3add7ee7c8d90ad58414eeb6c3d34.176227876… Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Conflicts: arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c [Context Conflicts] Signed-off-by: Lin Ruifeng <linruifeng4(a)huawei.com> --- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 9 +++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 24 +++++++++++++----------- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h index 3936da6febce..e54edd378230 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h @@ -1974,6 +1974,11 @@ u64 vcpu_tsc_khz(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); * the gfn, i.e. retrying the instruction will hit a * !PRESENT fault, which results in a new shadow page * and sends KVM back to square one. + * + * EMULTYPE_SKIP_SOFT_INT - Set in combination with EMULTYPE_SKIP to only skip + * an instruction if it could generate a given software + * interrupt, which must be encoded via + * EMULTYPE_SET_SOFT_INT_VECTOR(). */ #define EMULTYPE_NO_DECODE (1 << 0) #define EMULTYPE_TRAP_UD (1 << 1) @@ -1984,6 +1989,10 @@ u64 vcpu_tsc_khz(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); #define EMULTYPE_PF (1 << 6) #define EMULTYPE_COMPLETE_USER_EXIT (1 << 7) #define EMULTYPE_WRITE_PF_TO_SP (1 << 8) +#define EMULTYPE_SKIP_SOFT_INT (1 << 9) + +#define EMULTYPE_SET_SOFT_INT_VECTOR(v) ((u32)((v) & 0xff) << 16) +#define EMULTYPE_GET_SOFT_INT_VECTOR(e) (((e) >> 16) & 0xff) int kvm_emulate_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int emulation_type); int kvm_emulate_instruction_from_buffer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c index dfe7ed5e567f..e6b9118943f1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c @@ -384,6 +384,7 @@ static bool svm_can_emulate_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int emul_type, void *insn, int insn_len); static int __svm_skip_emulated_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, + int emul_type, bool commit_side_effects) { struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu); @@ -413,7 +414,7 @@ static int __svm_skip_emulated_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, if (unlikely(!commit_side_effects)) old_rflags = svm->vmcb->save.rflags; - if (!kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu, EMULTYPE_SKIP)) + if (!kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu, emul_type)) return 0; if (unlikely(!commit_side_effects)) @@ -431,11 +432,13 @@ static int __svm_skip_emulated_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, static int svm_skip_emulated_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { - return __svm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu, true); + return __svm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu, EMULTYPE_SKIP, true); } -static int svm_update_soft_interrupt_rip(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +static int svm_update_soft_interrupt_rip(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector) { + const int emul_type = EMULTYPE_SKIP | EMULTYPE_SKIP_SOFT_INT | + EMULTYPE_SET_SOFT_INT_VECTOR(vector); unsigned long rip, old_rip = kvm_rip_read(vcpu); struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu); @@ -451,7 +454,7 @@ static int svm_update_soft_interrupt_rip(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) * in use, the skip must not commit any side effects such as clearing * the interrupt shadow or RFLAGS.RF. */ - if (!__svm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu, !nrips)) + if (!__svm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu, emul_type, !nrips)) return -EIO; rip = kvm_rip_read(vcpu); @@ -487,7 +490,7 @@ static void svm_inject_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) kvm_deliver_exception_payload(vcpu, ex); if (kvm_exception_is_soft(ex->vector) && - svm_update_soft_interrupt_rip(vcpu)) + svm_update_soft_interrupt_rip(vcpu, ex->vector)) return; svm->vmcb->control.event_inj = ex->vector @@ -3713,11 +3716,12 @@ static bool svm_set_vnmi_pending(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) static void svm_inject_irq(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool reinjected) { + struct kvm_queued_interrupt *intr = &vcpu->arch.interrupt; struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu); u32 type; - if (vcpu->arch.interrupt.soft) { - if (svm_update_soft_interrupt_rip(vcpu)) + if (intr->soft) { + if (svm_update_soft_interrupt_rip(vcpu, intr->nr)) return; type = SVM_EVTINJ_TYPE_SOFT; @@ -3725,12 +3729,10 @@ static void svm_inject_irq(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool reinjected) type = SVM_EVTINJ_TYPE_INTR; } - trace_kvm_inj_virq(vcpu->arch.interrupt.nr, - vcpu->arch.interrupt.soft, reinjected); + trace_kvm_inj_virq(intr->nr, intr->soft, reinjected); ++vcpu->stat.irq_injections; - svm->vmcb->control.event_inj = vcpu->arch.interrupt.nr | - SVM_EVTINJ_VALID | type; + svm->vmcb->control.event_inj = intr->nr | SVM_EVTINJ_VALID | type; } void svm_complete_interrupt_delivery(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int delivery_mode, diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c index 2139f728aecc..8f4911acde42 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -9023,6 +9023,23 @@ static bool is_vmware_backdoor_opcode(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt) return false; } +static bool is_soft_int_instruction(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, + int emulation_type) +{ + u8 vector = EMULTYPE_GET_SOFT_INT_VECTOR(emulation_type); + + switch (ctxt->b) { + case 0xcc: + return vector == BP_VECTOR; + case 0xcd: + return vector == ctxt->src.val; + case 0xce: + return vector == OF_VECTOR; + default: + return false; + } +} + /* * Decode an instruction for emulation. The caller is responsible for handling * code breakpoints. Note, manually detecting code breakpoints is unnecessary @@ -9113,6 +9130,10 @@ int x86_emulate_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa, * injecting single-step #DBs. */ if (emulation_type & EMULTYPE_SKIP) { + if (emulation_type & EMULTYPE_SKIP_SOFT_INT && + !is_soft_int_instruction(ctxt, emulation_type)) + return 0; + if (ctxt->mode != X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64) ctxt->eip = (u32)ctxt->_eip; else -- 2.43.0

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