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[PATCH OLK-6.6] [Backport] ALSA: 6fire: Release resources at card release
by Lin Ruifeng 06 Jan '25

06 Jan '25

From: Takashi Iwai <tiwai(a)suse.de> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.64 commit b754e831a94f82f2593af806741392903f359168 bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IBEAEC CVE: CVE-2024-53239 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit a0810c3d6dd2d29a9b92604d682eacd2902ce947 ] The current 6fire code tries to release the resources right after the call of usb6fire_chip_abort(). But at this moment, the card object might be still in use (as we're calling snd_card_free_when_closed()). For avoid potential UAFs, move the release of resources to the card's private_free instead of the manual call of usb6fire_chip_destroy() at the USB disconnect callback. Fixes: c6d43ba816d1 ("ALSA: usb/6fire - Driver for TerraTec DMX 6Fire USB") Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai(a)suse.de> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241113111042.15058-6-tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Ruifeng <linruifeng4(a)huawei.com> --- sound/usb/6fire/chip.c | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/usb/6fire/chip.c b/sound/usb/6fire/chip.c index 33e962178c93..d562a30b087f 100644 --- a/sound/usb/6fire/chip.c +++ b/sound/usb/6fire/chip.c @@ -61,8 +61,10 @@ static void usb6fire_chip_abort(struct sfire_chip *chip) } } -static void usb6fire_chip_destroy(struct sfire_chip *chip) +static void usb6fire_card_free(struct snd_card *card) { + struct sfire_chip *chip = card->private_data; + if (chip) { if (chip->pcm) usb6fire_pcm_destroy(chip); @@ -72,8 +74,6 @@ static void usb6fire_chip_destroy(struct sfire_chip *chip) usb6fire_comm_destroy(chip); if (chip->control) usb6fire_control_destroy(chip); - if (chip->card) - snd_card_free(chip->card); } } @@ -136,6 +136,7 @@ static int usb6fire_chip_probe(struct usb_interface *intf, chip->regidx = regidx; chip->intf_count = 1; chip->card = card; + card->private_free = usb6fire_card_free; ret = usb6fire_comm_init(chip); if (ret < 0) @@ -162,7 +163,7 @@ static int usb6fire_chip_probe(struct usb_interface *intf, return 0; destroy_chip: - usb6fire_chip_destroy(chip); + snd_card_free(card); return ret; } @@ -181,7 +182,6 @@ static void usb6fire_chip_disconnect(struct usb_interface *intf) chip->shutdown = true; usb6fire_chip_abort(chip); - usb6fire_chip_destroy(chip); } } } -- 2.22.0

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[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] BEAEC[Backport] ALSA: 6fire: Release resources at card release
by Lin Ruifeng 06 Jan '25

06 Jan '25

From: Takashi Iwai <tiwai(a)suse.de> stable inclusion from stable-v4.19.325 commit 74357d0b5cd3ef544752bc9f21cbeee4902fae6c bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IBEAEC CVE: CVE-2024-53239 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit a0810c3d6dd2d29a9b92604d682eacd2902ce947 ] The current 6fire code tries to release the resources right after the call of usb6fire_chip_abort(). But at this moment, the card object might be still in use (as we're calling snd_card_free_when_closed()). For avoid potential UAFs, move the release of resources to the card's private_free instead of the manual call of usb6fire_chip_destroy() at the USB disconnect callback. Fixes: c6d43ba816d1 ("ALSA: usb/6fire - Driver for TerraTec DMX 6Fire USB") Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai(a)suse.de> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241113111042.15058-6-tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Ruifeng <linruifeng4(a)huawei.com> --- sound/usb/6fire/chip.c | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/usb/6fire/chip.c b/sound/usb/6fire/chip.c index 17d5e3ee6d73..f5a9b7a0b585 100644 --- a/sound/usb/6fire/chip.c +++ b/sound/usb/6fire/chip.c @@ -66,8 +66,10 @@ static void usb6fire_chip_abort(struct sfire_chip *chip) } } -static void usb6fire_chip_destroy(struct sfire_chip *chip) +static void usb6fire_card_free(struct snd_card *card) { + struct sfire_chip *chip = card->private_data; + if (chip) { if (chip->pcm) usb6fire_pcm_destroy(chip); @@ -77,8 +79,6 @@ static void usb6fire_chip_destroy(struct sfire_chip *chip) usb6fire_comm_destroy(chip); if (chip->control) usb6fire_control_destroy(chip); - if (chip->card) - snd_card_free(chip->card); } } @@ -141,6 +141,7 @@ static int usb6fire_chip_probe(struct usb_interface *intf, chip->regidx = regidx; chip->intf_count = 1; chip->card = card; + card->private_free = usb6fire_card_free; ret = usb6fire_comm_init(chip); if (ret < 0) @@ -167,7 +168,7 @@ static int usb6fire_chip_probe(struct usb_interface *intf, return 0; destroy_chip: - usb6fire_chip_destroy(chip); + snd_card_free(card); return ret; } @@ -186,7 +187,6 @@ static void usb6fire_chip_disconnect(struct usb_interface *intf) chip->shutdown = true; usb6fire_chip_abort(chip); - usb6fire_chip_destroy(chip); } } } -- 2.22.0

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[PATCH OLK-6.6] [Backport] Bluetooth: L2CAP: do not leave dangling sk pointer on error in l2cap_sock_create()
by Lin Ruifeng 06 Jan '25

06 Jan '25

From: Ignat Korchagin <ignat(a)cloudflare.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.66 commit 8ad09ddc63ace3950ac43db6fbfe25b40f589dd6 bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IBEANO CVE: CVE-2024-56605 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 7c4f78cdb8e7501e9f92d291a7d956591bf73be9 ] bt_sock_alloc() allocates the sk object and attaches it to the provided sock object. On error l2cap_sock_alloc() frees the sk object, but the dangling pointer is still attached to the sock object, which may create use-after-free in other code. Signed-off-by: Ignat Korchagin <ignat(a)cloudflare.com> Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu(a)amazon.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241014153808.51894-3-ignat@cloudflare.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Ruifeng <linruifeng4(a)huawei.com> --- net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c index f04ce8426798..379ca86c41cd 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c @@ -1885,6 +1885,7 @@ static struct sock *l2cap_sock_alloc(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, chan = l2cap_chan_create(); if (!chan) { sk_free(sk); + sock->sk = NULL; return NULL; } -- 2.22.0

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[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] [Backport] Bluetooth: L2CAP: do not leave dangling sk pointer on error in l2cap_sock_create()
by Lin Ruifeng 06 Jan '25

06 Jan '25

From: Ignat Korchagin <ignat(a)cloudflare.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.231 commit daa13175a6dea312a76099066cb4cbd4fc959a84 bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IBEANO CVE: CVE-2024-56605 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 7c4f78cdb8e7501e9f92d291a7d956591bf73be9 ] bt_sock_alloc() allocates the sk object and attaches it to the provided sock object. On error l2cap_sock_alloc() frees the sk object, but the dangling pointer is still attached to the sock object, which may create use-after-free in other code. Signed-off-by: Ignat Korchagin <ignat(a)cloudflare.com> Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu(a)amazon.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241014153808.51894-3-ignat@cloudflare.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Ruifeng <linruifeng4(a)huawei.com> --- net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c index 51927765473b..87be9d294773 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c @@ -1863,6 +1863,7 @@ static struct sock *l2cap_sock_alloc(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, chan = l2cap_chan_create(); if (!chan) { sk_free(sk); + sock->sk = NULL; return NULL; } -- 2.22.0

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[PATCH OLK-5.10] [Backport] Bluetooth: L2CAP: do not leave dangling sk pointer on error in l2cap_sock_create()
by Lin Ruifeng 06 Jan '25

06 Jan '25

From: Ignat Korchagin <ignat(a)cloudflare.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.231 commit daa13175a6dea312a76099066cb4cbd4fc959a84 bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IBEANO CVE: CVE-2024-56605 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 7c4f78cdb8e7501e9f92d291a7d956591bf73be9 ] bt_sock_alloc() allocates the sk object and attaches it to the provided sock object. On error l2cap_sock_alloc() frees the sk object, but the dangling pointer is still attached to the sock object, which may create use-after-free in other code. Signed-off-by: Ignat Korchagin <ignat(a)cloudflare.com> Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu(a)amazon.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241014153808.51894-3-ignat@cloudflare.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Ruifeng <linruifeng4(a)huawei.com> --- net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c index f7240442bde6..27223e43aff2 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c @@ -1872,6 +1872,7 @@ static struct sock *l2cap_sock_alloc(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, chan = l2cap_chan_create(); if (!chan) { sk_free(sk); + sock->sk = NULL; return NULL; } -- 2.22.0

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[PATCH OLK-6.6] sched: fix warning in sched_setaffinity
by Zicheng Qu 06 Jan '25

06 Jan '25

From: Josh Don <joshdon(a)google.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-6.13-rc3 commit 70ee7947a29029736a1a06c73a48ff37674a851b category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/IBD13G Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git/commit/?id=70ee… -------------------------------- Commit 8f9ea86fdf99b added some logic to sched_setaffinity that included a WARN when a per-task affinity assignment races with a cpuset update. Specifically, we can have a race where a cpuset update results in the task affinity no longer being a subset of the cpuset. That's fine; we have a fallback to instead use the cpuset mask. However, we have a WARN set up that will trigger if the cpuset mask has no overlap at all with the requested task affinity. This shouldn't be a warning condition; its trivial to create this condition. Reproduced the warning by the following setup: - $PID inside a cpuset cgroup - another thread repeatedly switching the cpuset cpus from 1-2 to just 1 - another thread repeatedly setting the $PID affinity (via taskset) to 2 Fixes: 8f9ea86fdf99b ("sched: Always preserve the user requested cpumask") Signed-off-by: Josh Don <joshdon(a)google.com> Acked-and-tested-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz(a)infradead.org> Acked-by: Waiman Long <longman(a)redhat.com> Tested-by: Madadi Vineeth Reddy <vineethr(a)linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241111182738.1832953-1-joshdon@google.com Conflicts: kernel/sched/core.c kernel/sched/syscalls.c [The linux stable 6.6 lacks this commit 70ee7947a290 ("sched: fix warning in sched_setaffinity"), so pick from linux mainline, this function "__sched_setaffinity" has been moved from core to syscall in mainline.] Signed-off-by: Zicheng Qu <quzicheng(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/sched/core.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/sched/core.c b/kernel/sched/core.c index 7a9aff1dbb3c..5569c89bbaf3 100644 --- a/kernel/sched/core.c +++ b/kernel/sched/core.c @@ -8415,7 +8415,7 @@ __sched_setaffinity(struct task_struct *p, struct affinity_context *ctx) bool empty = !cpumask_and(new_mask, new_mask, ctx->user_mask); - if (WARN_ON_ONCE(empty)) + if (empty) cpumask_copy(new_mask, cpus_allowed); } __set_cpus_allowed_ptr(p, ctx); -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH OLK-6.6] [Backport] Bluetooth: btmtk: avoid UAF in btmtk_process_coredump
by Lin Ruifeng 06 Jan '25

06 Jan '25

From: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo(a)igalia.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.67 commit ecdcaea0e4057171ea4c3783e1cc1c900ad99125 bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IBEAOV CVE: CVE-2024-56653 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit b548f5e9456c568155499d9ebac675c0d7a296e8 ] hci_devcd_append may lead to the release of the skb, so it cannot be accessed once it is called. ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in btmtk_process_coredump+0x2a7/0x2d0 [btmtk] Read of size 4 at addr ffff888033cfabb0 by task kworker/0:3/82 CPU: 0 PID: 82 Comm: kworker/0:3 Tainted: G U 6.6.40-lockdep-03464-g1d8b4eb3060e #1 b0b3c1cc0c842735643fb411799d97921d1f688c Hardware name: Google Yaviks_Ufs/Yaviks_Ufs, BIOS Google_Yaviks_Ufs.15217.552.0 05/07/2024 Workqueue: events btusb_rx_work [btusb] Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0xfd/0x150 print_report+0x131/0x780 kasan_report+0x177/0x1c0 btmtk_process_coredump+0x2a7/0x2d0 [btmtk 03edd567dd71a65958807c95a65db31d433e1d01] btusb_recv_acl_mtk+0x11c/0x1a0 [btusb 675430d1e87c4f24d0c1f80efe600757a0f32bec] btusb_rx_work+0x9e/0xe0 [btusb 675430d1e87c4f24d0c1f80efe600757a0f32bec] worker_thread+0xe44/0x2cc0 kthread+0x2ff/0x3a0 ret_from_fork+0x51/0x80 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 </TASK> Allocated by task 82: stack_trace_save+0xdc/0x190 kasan_set_track+0x4e/0x80 __kasan_slab_alloc+0x4e/0x60 kmem_cache_alloc+0x19f/0x360 skb_clone+0x132/0xf70 btusb_recv_acl_mtk+0x104/0x1a0 [btusb] btusb_rx_work+0x9e/0xe0 [btusb] worker_thread+0xe44/0x2cc0 kthread+0x2ff/0x3a0 ret_from_fork+0x51/0x80 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 Freed by task 1733: stack_trace_save+0xdc/0x190 kasan_set_track+0x4e/0x80 kasan_save_free_info+0x28/0xb0 ____kasan_slab_free+0xfd/0x170 kmem_cache_free+0x183/0x3f0 hci_devcd_rx+0x91a/0x2060 [bluetooth] worker_thread+0xe44/0x2cc0 kthread+0x2ff/0x3a0 ret_from_fork+0x51/0x80 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888033cfab40 which belongs to the cache skbuff_head_cache of size 232 The buggy address is located 112 bytes inside of freed 232-byte region [ffff888033cfab40, ffff888033cfac28) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:00000000a174ba93 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x33cfa head:00000000a174ba93 order:1 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0 anon flags: 0x4000000000000840(slab|head|zone=1) page_type: 0xffffffff() raw: 4000000000000840 ffff888100848a00 0000000000000000 0000000000000001 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080190019 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888033cfaa80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc ffff888033cfab00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb >ffff888033cfab80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff888033cfac00: fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff888033cfac80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ================================================================== Check if we need to call hci_devcd_complete before calling hci_devcd_append. That requires that we check data->cd_info.cnt >= MTK_COREDUMP_NUM instead of data->cd_info.cnt > MTK_COREDUMP_NUM, as we increment data->cd_info.cnt only once the call to hci_devcd_append succeeds. Fixes: 0b7015132878 ("Bluetooth: btusb: mediatek: add MediaTek devcoredump support") Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo(a)igalia.com> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Ruifeng <linruifeng4(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/bluetooth/btmtk.c | 20 ++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/bluetooth/btmtk.c b/drivers/bluetooth/btmtk.c index 812fd2a8f853..4c53ab22d09b 100644 --- a/drivers/bluetooth/btmtk.c +++ b/drivers/bluetooth/btmtk.c @@ -371,6 +371,7 @@ int btmtk_process_coredump(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb) { struct btmediatek_data *data = hci_get_priv(hdev); int err; + bool complete = false; if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEV_COREDUMP)) { kfree_skb(skb); @@ -392,19 +393,22 @@ int btmtk_process_coredump(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb) fallthrough; case HCI_DEVCOREDUMP_ACTIVE: default: + /* Mediatek coredump data would be more than MTK_COREDUMP_NUM */ + if (data->cd_info.cnt >= MTK_COREDUMP_NUM && + skb->len > MTK_COREDUMP_END_LEN) + if (!memcmp((char *)&skb->data[skb->len - MTK_COREDUMP_END_LEN], + MTK_COREDUMP_END, MTK_COREDUMP_END_LEN - 1)) + complete = true; + err = hci_devcd_append(hdev, skb); if (err < 0) break; data->cd_info.cnt++; - /* Mediatek coredump data would be more than MTK_COREDUMP_NUM */ - if (data->cd_info.cnt > MTK_COREDUMP_NUM && - skb->len > MTK_COREDUMP_END_LEN) - if (!memcmp((char *)&skb->data[skb->len - MTK_COREDUMP_END_LEN], - MTK_COREDUMP_END, MTK_COREDUMP_END_LEN - 1)) { - bt_dev_info(hdev, "Mediatek coredump end"); - hci_devcd_complete(hdev); - } + if (complete) { + bt_dev_info(hdev, "Mediatek coredump end"); + hci_devcd_complete(hdev); + } break; } -- 2.22.0

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[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] [Backport] ALSA: 6fire: Release resources at card release
by Lin Ruifeng 06 Jan '25

06 Jan '25

From: Takashi Iwai <tiwai(a)suse.de> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.231 commit f2d06d4e129e2508e356136f99bb20a332ff1a00 bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IBEAEC CVE: CVE-2024-53239 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit a0810c3d6dd2d29a9b92604d682eacd2902ce947 ] The current 6fire code tries to release the resources right after the call of usb6fire_chip_abort(). But at this moment, the card object might be still in use (as we're calling snd_card_free_when_closed()). For avoid potential UAFs, move the release of resources to the card's private_free instead of the manual call of usb6fire_chip_destroy() at the USB disconnect callback. Fixes: c6d43ba816d1 ("ALSA: usb/6fire - Driver for TerraTec DMX 6Fire USB") Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai(a)suse.de> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241113111042.15058-6-tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Ruifeng <linruifeng4(a)huawei.com> --- sound/usb/6fire/chip.c | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/usb/6fire/chip.c b/sound/usb/6fire/chip.c index 08c6e6a52eb9..ad6f89845a5c 100644 --- a/sound/usb/6fire/chip.c +++ b/sound/usb/6fire/chip.c @@ -62,8 +62,10 @@ static void usb6fire_chip_abort(struct sfire_chip *chip) } } -static void usb6fire_chip_destroy(struct sfire_chip *chip) +static void usb6fire_card_free(struct snd_card *card) { + struct sfire_chip *chip = card->private_data; + if (chip) { if (chip->pcm) usb6fire_pcm_destroy(chip); @@ -73,8 +75,6 @@ static void usb6fire_chip_destroy(struct sfire_chip *chip) usb6fire_comm_destroy(chip); if (chip->control) usb6fire_control_destroy(chip); - if (chip->card) - snd_card_free(chip->card); } } @@ -137,6 +137,7 @@ static int usb6fire_chip_probe(struct usb_interface *intf, chip->regidx = regidx; chip->intf_count = 1; chip->card = card; + card->private_free = usb6fire_card_free; ret = usb6fire_comm_init(chip); if (ret < 0) @@ -163,7 +164,7 @@ static int usb6fire_chip_probe(struct usb_interface *intf, return 0; destroy_chip: - usb6fire_chip_destroy(chip); + snd_card_free(card); return ret; } @@ -182,7 +183,6 @@ static void usb6fire_chip_disconnect(struct usb_interface *intf) chip->shutdown = true; usb6fire_chip_abort(chip); - usb6fire_chip_destroy(chip); } } } -- 2.22.0

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[PATCH OLK-6.6 v2 0/2] CVE-2024-53224
by Pu Lehui 06 Jan '25

06 Jan '25

Jianbo Liu (1): IB/mlx5: Allocate resources just before first QP/SRQ is created Patrisious Haddad (1): RDMA/mlx5: Move events notifier registration to be after device registration drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/main.c | 185 ++++++++++++++++++--------- drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/mlx5_ib.h | 6 +- drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/qp.c | 4 + drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/srq.c | 4 + 4 files changed, 136 insertions(+), 63 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH OLK-5.10] xsk: Add generic xdp multi-buffer send support
by Yue Haibing 06 Jan '25

06 Jan '25

hulk inclusion category: feature bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/IAOZOH ---------------------------------------------- This is partialy backport from mainline xdp multi-buffer send support for generic xsk. Signed-off-by: Yue Haibing <yuehaibing(a)huawei.com> --- net/xdp/xsk.c | 237 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ net/xdp/xsk_queue.h | 14 +++ 2 files changed, 251 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/xdp/xsk.c b/net/xdp/xsk.c index 34d210a08393..eca562d20ddc 100644 --- a/net/xdp/xsk.c +++ b/net/xdp/xsk.c @@ -528,6 +528,231 @@ static void xsk_destruct_skb(struct sk_buff *skb) sock_wfree(skb); } +#ifdef CONFIG_XSK_MULTI_BUF +static int xsk_cq_reserve_addr_locked(struct xdp_sock *xs, u64 addr) +{ + unsigned long flags; + int ret; + + spin_lock_irqsave(&xs->pool->cq_lock, flags); + ret = xskq_prod_reserve_addr(xs->pool->cq, addr); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&xs->pool->cq_lock, flags); + + return ret; +} + +static void xsk_cq_submit_locked(struct xdp_sock *xs, u32 n) +{ + unsigned long flags; + + spin_lock_irqsave(&xs->pool->cq_lock, flags); + xskq_prod_submit_n(xs->pool->cq, n); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&xs->pool->cq_lock, flags); +} + +static void xsk_cq_cancel_locked(struct xdp_sock *xs, u32 n) +{ + unsigned long flags; + + spin_lock_irqsave(&xs->pool->cq_lock, flags); + xskq_prod_cancel_n(xs->pool->cq, n); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&xs->pool->cq_lock, flags); +} + +static u32 xsk_get_num_desc(struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + return skb ? (long)skb_shinfo(skb)->destructor_arg : 0; +} + +static void xsk_destruct_skb_multi(struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + xsk_cq_submit_locked(xdp_sk(skb->sk), xsk_get_num_desc(skb)); + sock_wfree(skb); +} + +static void xsk_set_destructor_arg(struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + long num = xsk_get_num_desc(xdp_sk(skb->sk)->skb) + 1; + + skb_shinfo(skb)->destructor_arg = (void *)num; +} + +static void xsk_consume_skb(struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + struct xdp_sock *xs = xdp_sk(skb->sk); + + skb->destructor = sock_wfree; + xsk_cq_cancel_locked(xs, xsk_get_num_desc(skb)); + /* Free skb without triggering the perf drop trace */ + consume_skb(skb); + xs->skb = NULL; +} + +static void xsk_drop_skb(struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + xdp_sk(skb->sk)->tx->invalid_descs += xsk_get_num_desc(skb); + xsk_consume_skb(skb); +} + +static struct sk_buff *xsk_build_skb(struct xdp_sock *xs, + struct xdp_desc *desc) +{ + struct net_device *dev = xs->dev; + struct sk_buff *skb = xs->skb; + int err; + + if (dev->priv_flags & IFF_TX_SKB_NO_LINEAR) { + err = -EOPNOTSUPP; + goto free_err; + } else { + u32 hr, tr, len; + void *buffer; + + buffer = xsk_buff_raw_get_data(xs->pool, desc->addr); + len = desc->len; + + if (!skb) { + hr = max(NET_SKB_PAD, L1_CACHE_ALIGN(dev->needed_headroom)); + tr = dev->needed_tailroom; + skb = sock_alloc_send_skb(&xs->sk, hr + len + tr, 1, &err); + if (unlikely(!skb)) + goto free_err; + + skb_reserve(skb, hr); + skb_put(skb, len); + + err = skb_store_bits(skb, 0, buffer, len); + if (unlikely(err)) { + kfree_skb(skb); + goto free_err; + } + } else { + int nr_frags = skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags; + struct page *page; + u8 *vaddr; + + if (unlikely(nr_frags == (MAX_SKB_FRAGS - 1) && xp_mb_desc(desc))) { + err = -EOVERFLOW; + goto free_err; + } + + page = alloc_page(xs->sk.sk_allocation); + if (unlikely(!page)) { + err = -EAGAIN; + goto free_err; + } + + vaddr = kmap(page); + memcpy(vaddr, buffer, len); + kunmap(page); + + skb_add_rx_frag(skb, nr_frags, page, 0, len, PAGE_SIZE); + refcount_add(PAGE_SIZE, &xs->sk.sk_wmem_alloc); + } + } + + skb->dev = dev; + skb->priority = xs->sk.sk_priority; + skb->mark = xs->sk.sk_mark; + skb->destructor = xsk_destruct_skb_multi; + xsk_set_destructor_arg(skb); + + return skb; +free_err: + if (err == -EOVERFLOW) { + /* Drop the packet */ + xsk_set_destructor_arg(xs->skb); + xsk_drop_skb(xs->skb); + xskq_cons_release(xs->tx); + } else { + /* Let application retry */ + xsk_cq_cancel_locked(xs, 1); + } + + return ERR_PTR(err); +} + +static int xsk_generic_xmit_multi(struct sock *sk) +{ + struct xdp_sock *xs = xdp_sk(sk); + u32 max_batch = TX_BATCH_SIZE; + bool sent_frame = false; + struct xdp_desc desc; + struct sk_buff *skb; + int err = 0; + + mutex_lock(&xs->mutex); + + if (xs->queue_id >= xs->dev->real_num_tx_queues) + goto out; + + while (xskq_cons_peek_desc(xs->tx, &desc, xs->pool)) { + if (max_batch-- == 0) { + err = -EAGAIN; + goto out; + } + + /* This is the backpressure mechanism for the Tx path. + * Reserve space in the completion queue and only proceed + * if there is space in it. This avoids having to implement + * any buffering in the Tx path. + */ + if (xsk_cq_reserve_addr_locked(xs, desc.addr)) + goto out; + + skb = xsk_build_skb(xs, &desc); + if (IS_ERR(skb)) { + err = PTR_ERR(skb); + if (err != -EOVERFLOW) + goto out; + err = 0; + continue; + } + + xskq_cons_release(xs->tx); + + if (xp_mb_desc(&desc)) { + xs->skb = skb; + continue; + } + + err = __dev_direct_xmit(skb, xs->queue_id); + if (err == NETDEV_TX_BUSY) { + /* Tell user-space to retry the send */ + xskq_cons_cancel_n(xs->tx, xsk_get_num_desc(skb)); + xsk_consume_skb(skb); + err = -EAGAIN; + goto out; + } + + /* Ignore NET_XMIT_CN as packet might have been sent */ + if (err == NET_XMIT_DROP) { + /* SKB completed but not sent */ + err = -EBUSY; + xs->skb = NULL; + goto out; + } + + sent_frame = true; + xs->skb = NULL; + } + + if (xskq_has_descs(xs->tx)) { + if (xs->skb) + xsk_drop_skb(xs->skb); + xskq_cons_release(xs->tx); + } + +out: + if (sent_frame) + if (xsk_tx_writeable(xs)) + sk->sk_write_space(sk); + + mutex_unlock(&xs->mutex); + return err; +} +#endif + static int xsk_generic_xmit(struct sock *sk) { struct xdp_sock *xs = xdp_sk(sk); @@ -631,7 +856,14 @@ static int __xsk_sendmsg(struct sock *sk) if (unlikely(!xs->tx)) return -ENOBUFS; +#ifdef CONFIG_XSK_MULTI_BUF + if (xs->zc) + return xsk_zc_xmit(xs); + else + return xs->sg ? xsk_generic_xmit_multi(sk) : xsk_generic_xmit(sk); +#else return xs->zc ? xsk_zc_xmit(xs) : xsk_generic_xmit(sk); +#endif } static int xsk_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *m, size_t total_len) @@ -769,6 +1001,11 @@ static int xsk_release(struct socket *sock) net = sock_net(sk); +#ifdef CONFIG_XSK_MULTI_BUF + if (xs->skb) + xsk_drop_skb(xs->skb); +#endif + mutex_lock(&net->xdp.lock); sk_del_node_init_rcu(sk); mutex_unlock(&net->xdp.lock); diff --git a/net/xdp/xsk_queue.h b/net/xdp/xsk_queue.h index 75d6fe2ae32d..419cd38d635f 100644 --- a/net/xdp/xsk_queue.h +++ b/net/xdp/xsk_queue.h @@ -186,6 +186,13 @@ static inline bool xp_validate_desc(struct xsk_buff_pool *pool, xp_aligned_validate_desc(pool, desc); } +#ifdef CONFIG_XSK_MULTI_BUF +static inline bool xskq_has_descs(struct xsk_queue *q) +{ + return q->cached_cons != q->cached_prod; +} +#endif + static inline bool xskq_cons_is_valid_desc(struct xsk_queue *q, struct xdp_desc *d, struct xsk_buff_pool *pool) @@ -282,6 +289,13 @@ static inline bool xskq_cons_is_full(struct xsk_queue *q) q->nentries; } +#ifdef CONFIG_XSK_MULTI_BUF +static inline void xskq_cons_cancel_n(struct xsk_queue *q, u32 cnt) +{ + q->cached_cons -= cnt; +} +#endif + static inline u32 xskq_cons_present_entries(struct xsk_queue *q) { /* No barriers needed since data is not accessed */ -- 2.34.1

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