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[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] md/raid5: avoid BUG_ON() while continue reshape after reassembling
by Li Nan 04 Sep '24

04 Sep '24

From: Yu Kuai <yukuai3(a)huawei.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.224 commit c384dd4f1fb3b14a2fd199360701cc163ea88705 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAMNBN CVE: CVE-2024-43914 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 305a5170dc5cf3d395bb4c4e9239bca6d0b54b49 ] Currently, mdadm support --revert-reshape to abort the reshape while reassembling, as the test 07revert-grow. However, following BUG_ON() can be triggerred by the test: kernel BUG at drivers/md/raid5.c:6278! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI irq event stamp: 158985 CPU: 6 PID: 891 Comm: md0_reshape Not tainted 6.9.0-03335-g7592a0b0049a #94 RIP: 0010:reshape_request+0x3f1/0xe60 Call Trace: <TASK> raid5_sync_request+0x43d/0x550 md_do_sync+0xb7a/0x2110 md_thread+0x294/0x2b0 kthread+0x147/0x1c0 ret_from_fork+0x59/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> Root cause is that --revert-reshape update the raid_disks from 5 to 4, while reshape position is still set, and after reassembling the array, reshape position will be read from super block, then during reshape the checking of 'writepos' that is caculated by old reshape position will fail. Fix this panic the easy way first, by converting the BUG_ON() to WARN_ON(), and stop the reshape if checkings fail. Noted that mdadm must fix --revert-shape as well, and probably md/raid should enhance metadata validation as well, however this means reassemble will fail and there must be user tools to fix the wrong metadata. Signed-off-by: Yu Kuai <yukuai3(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song(a)kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240611132251.1967786-13-yukuai1@huaweicloud.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Li Nan <linan122(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/md/raid5.c | 20 +++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/md/raid5.c b/drivers/md/raid5.c index 3cb90d7e88d9..126b9ecfe750 100644 --- a/drivers/md/raid5.c +++ b/drivers/md/raid5.c @@ -5997,7 +5997,9 @@ static sector_t reshape_request(struct mddev *mddev, sector_t sector_nr, int *sk safepos = conf->reshape_safe; sector_div(safepos, data_disks); if (mddev->reshape_backwards) { - BUG_ON(writepos < reshape_sectors); + if (WARN_ON(writepos < reshape_sectors)) + return MaxSector; + writepos -= reshape_sectors; readpos += reshape_sectors; safepos += reshape_sectors; @@ -6015,14 +6017,18 @@ static sector_t reshape_request(struct mddev *mddev, sector_t sector_nr, int *sk * to set 'stripe_addr' which is where we will write to. */ if (mddev->reshape_backwards) { - BUG_ON(conf->reshape_progress == 0); + if (WARN_ON(conf->reshape_progress == 0)) + return MaxSector; + stripe_addr = writepos; - BUG_ON((mddev->dev_sectors & - ~((sector_t)reshape_sectors - 1)) - - reshape_sectors - stripe_addr - != sector_nr); + if (WARN_ON((mddev->dev_sectors & + ~((sector_t)reshape_sectors - 1)) - + reshape_sectors - stripe_addr != sector_nr)) + return MaxSector; } else { - BUG_ON(writepos != sector_nr + reshape_sectors); + if (WARN_ON(writepos != sector_nr + reshape_sectors)) + return MaxSector; + stripe_addr = sector_nr; } -- 2.39.2

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] net: missing check virtio
by Zhang Changzhong 04 Sep '24

04 Sep '24

From: Denis Arefev <arefev(a)swemel.ru> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.44 commit 90d41ebe0cd4635f6410471efc1dd71b33e894cf category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAKQ33 CVE: CVE-2024-43817 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit e269d79c7d35aa3808b1f3c1737d63dab504ddc8 ] Two missing check in virtio_net_hdr_to_skb() allowed syzbot to crash kernels again 1. After the skb_segment function the buffer may become non-linear (nr_frags != 0), but since the SKBTX_SHARED_FRAG flag is not set anywhere the __skb_linearize function will not be executed, then the buffer will remain non-linear. Then the condition (offset >= skb_headlen(skb)) becomes true, which causes WARN_ON_ONCE in skb_checksum_help. 2. The struct sk_buff and struct virtio_net_hdr members must be mathematically related. (gso_size) must be greater than (needed) otherwise WARN_ON_ONCE. (remainder) must be greater than (needed) otherwise WARN_ON_ONCE. (remainder) may be 0 if division is without remainder. offset+2 (4191) > skb_headlen() (1116) WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 5084 at net/core/dev.c:3303 skb_checksum_help+0x5e2/0x740 net/core/dev.c:3303 Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 5084 Comm: syz-executor336 Not tainted 6.7.0-rc3-syzkaller-00014-gdf60cee26a2e #0 Hardware name: Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 11/10/2023 RIP: 0010:skb_checksum_help+0x5e2/0x740 net/core/dev.c:3303 Code: 89 e8 83 e0 07 83 c0 03 38 d0 7c 08 84 d2 0f 85 52 01 00 00 44 89 e2 2b 53 74 4c 89 ee 48 c7 c7 40 57 e9 8b e8 af 8f dd f8 90 <0f> 0b 90 90 e9 87 fe ff ff e8 40 0f 6e f9 e9 4b fa ff ff 48 89 ef RSP: 0018:ffffc90003a9f338 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888025125780 RCX: ffffffff814db209 RDX: ffff888015393b80 RSI: ffffffff814db216 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: ffff8880251257f4 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 000000000000045c R13: 000000000000105f R14: ffff8880251257f0 R15: 000000000000105d FS: 0000555555c24380(0000) GS:ffff8880b9900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000000002000f000 CR3: 0000000023151000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> ip_do_fragment+0xa1b/0x18b0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:777 ip_fragment.constprop.0+0x161/0x230 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:584 ip_finish_output_gso net/ipv4/ip_output.c:286 [inline] __ip_finish_output net/ipv4/ip_output.c:308 [inline] __ip_finish_output+0x49c/0x650 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:295 ip_finish_output+0x31/0x310 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:323 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:303 [inline] ip_output+0x13b/0x2a0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:433 dst_output include/net/dst.h:451 [inline] ip_local_out+0xaf/0x1a0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:129 iptunnel_xmit+0x5b4/0x9b0 net/ipv4/ip_tunnel_core.c:82 ipip6_tunnel_xmit net/ipv6/sit.c:1034 [inline] sit_tunnel_xmit+0xed2/0x28f0 net/ipv6/sit.c:1076 __netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4940 [inline] netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4954 [inline] xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3545 [inline] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x13d/0x6d0 net/core/dev.c:3561 __dev_queue_xmit+0x7c1/0x3d60 net/core/dev.c:4346 dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3134 [inline] packet_xmit+0x257/0x380 net/packet/af_packet.c:276 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3087 [inline] packet_sendmsg+0x24ca/0x5240 net/packet/af_packet.c:3119 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0xd5/0x180 net/socket.c:745 __sys_sendto+0x255/0x340 net/socket.c:2190 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2202 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2198 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0xe0/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2198 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x40/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:82 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller Fixes: 0f6925b3e8da ("virtio_net: Do not pull payload in skb->head") Signed-off-by: Denis Arefev <arefev(a)swemel.ru> Message-Id: <20240613095448.27118-1-arefev(a)swemel.ru> Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Zhang Changzhong <zhangchangzhong(a)huawei.com> --- include/linux/virtio_net.h | 11 +++++++++++ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/linux/virtio_net.h b/include/linux/virtio_net.h index 6c395a2..c824c52 100644 --- a/include/linux/virtio_net.h +++ b/include/linux/virtio_net.h @@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ static inline int virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int thlen = 0; unsigned int p_off = 0; unsigned int ip_proto; + u64 ret, remainder, gso_size; if (hdr->gso_type != VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_NONE) { switch (hdr->gso_type & ~VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_ECN) { @@ -98,6 +99,16 @@ static inline int virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 off = __virtio16_to_cpu(little_endian, hdr->csum_offset); u32 needed = start + max_t(u32, thlen, off + sizeof(__sum16)); + if (hdr->gso_size) { + gso_size = __virtio16_to_cpu(little_endian, hdr->gso_size); + ret = div64_u64_rem(skb->len, gso_size, &remainder); + if (!(ret && (hdr->gso_size > needed) && + ((remainder > needed) || (remainder == 0)))) { + return -EINVAL; + } + skb_shinfo(skb)->tx_flags |= SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG; + } + if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, needed)) return -EINVAL; -- 2.9.5

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] net: missing check virtio
by Zhang Changzhong 04 Sep '24

04 Sep '24

From: Denis Arefev <arefev(a)swemel.ru> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.11-rc1 commit e269d79c7d35aa3808b1f3c1737d63dab504ddc8 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAKQ33 CVE: CVE-2024-43817 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Two missing check in virtio_net_hdr_to_skb() allowed syzbot to crash kernels again 1. After the skb_segment function the buffer may become non-linear (nr_frags != 0), but since the SKBTX_SHARED_FRAG flag is not set anywhere the __skb_linearize function will not be executed, then the buffer will remain non-linear. Then the condition (offset >= skb_headlen(skb)) becomes true, which causes WARN_ON_ONCE in skb_checksum_help. 2. The struct sk_buff and struct virtio_net_hdr members must be mathematically related. (gso_size) must be greater than (needed) otherwise WARN_ON_ONCE. (remainder) must be greater than (needed) otherwise WARN_ON_ONCE. (remainder) may be 0 if division is without remainder. offset+2 (4191) > skb_headlen() (1116) WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 5084 at net/core/dev.c:3303 skb_checksum_help+0x5e2/0x740 net/core/dev.c:3303 Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 5084 Comm: syz-executor336 Not tainted 6.7.0-rc3-syzkaller-00014-gdf60cee26a2e #0 Hardware name: Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 11/10/2023 RIP: 0010:skb_checksum_help+0x5e2/0x740 net/core/dev.c:3303 Code: 89 e8 83 e0 07 83 c0 03 38 d0 7c 08 84 d2 0f 85 52 01 00 00 44 89 e2 2b 53 74 4c 89 ee 48 c7 c7 40 57 e9 8b e8 af 8f dd f8 90 <0f> 0b 90 90 e9 87 fe ff ff e8 40 0f 6e f9 e9 4b fa ff ff 48 89 ef RSP: 0018:ffffc90003a9f338 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888025125780 RCX: ffffffff814db209 RDX: ffff888015393b80 RSI: ffffffff814db216 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: ffff8880251257f4 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 000000000000045c R13: 000000000000105f R14: ffff8880251257f0 R15: 000000000000105d FS: 0000555555c24380(0000) GS:ffff8880b9900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000000002000f000 CR3: 0000000023151000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> ip_do_fragment+0xa1b/0x18b0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:777 ip_fragment.constprop.0+0x161/0x230 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:584 ip_finish_output_gso net/ipv4/ip_output.c:286 [inline] __ip_finish_output net/ipv4/ip_output.c:308 [inline] __ip_finish_output+0x49c/0x650 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:295 ip_finish_output+0x31/0x310 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:323 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:303 [inline] ip_output+0x13b/0x2a0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:433 dst_output include/net/dst.h:451 [inline] ip_local_out+0xaf/0x1a0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:129 iptunnel_xmit+0x5b4/0x9b0 net/ipv4/ip_tunnel_core.c:82 ipip6_tunnel_xmit net/ipv6/sit.c:1034 [inline] sit_tunnel_xmit+0xed2/0x28f0 net/ipv6/sit.c:1076 __netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4940 [inline] netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4954 [inline] xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3545 [inline] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x13d/0x6d0 net/core/dev.c:3561 __dev_queue_xmit+0x7c1/0x3d60 net/core/dev.c:4346 dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3134 [inline] packet_xmit+0x257/0x380 net/packet/af_packet.c:276 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3087 [inline] packet_sendmsg+0x24ca/0x5240 net/packet/af_packet.c:3119 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0xd5/0x180 net/socket.c:745 __sys_sendto+0x255/0x340 net/socket.c:2190 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2202 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2198 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0xe0/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2198 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x40/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:82 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller Fixes: 0f6925b3e8da ("virtio_net: Do not pull payload in skb->head") Signed-off-by: Denis Arefev <arefev(a)swemel.ru> Message-Id: <20240613095448.27118-1-arefev(a)swemel.ru> Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Zhang Changzhong <zhangchangzhong(a)huawei.com> --- include/linux/virtio_net.h | 11 +++++++++++ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/linux/virtio_net.h b/include/linux/virtio_net.h index a960de6..b6a9d07 100644 --- a/include/linux/virtio_net.h +++ b/include/linux/virtio_net.h @@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ static inline int virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int thlen = 0; unsigned int p_off = 0; unsigned int ip_proto; + u64 ret, remainder, gso_size; if (hdr->gso_type != VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_NONE) { switch (hdr->gso_type & ~VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_ECN) { @@ -87,6 +88,16 @@ static inline int virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 off = __virtio16_to_cpu(little_endian, hdr->csum_offset); u32 needed = start + max_t(u32, thlen, off + sizeof(__sum16)); + if (hdr->gso_size) { + gso_size = __virtio16_to_cpu(little_endian, hdr->gso_size); + ret = div64_u64_rem(skb->len, gso_size, &remainder); + if (!(ret && (hdr->gso_size > needed) && + ((remainder > needed) || (remainder == 0)))) { + return -EINVAL; + } + skb_shinfo(skb)->tx_flags |= SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG; + } + if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, needed)) return -EINVAL; -- 2.9.5

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] net: missing check virtio
by Zhang Changzhong 04 Sep '24

04 Sep '24

From: Denis Arefev <arefev(a)swemel.ru> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.11-rc1 commit e269d79c7d35aa3808b1f3c1737d63dab504ddc8 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAKQ33 CVE: CVE-2024-43817 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Two missing check in virtio_net_hdr_to_skb() allowed syzbot to crash kernels again 1. After the skb_segment function the buffer may become non-linear (nr_frags != 0), but since the SKBTX_SHARED_FRAG flag is not set anywhere the __skb_linearize function will not be executed, then the buffer will remain non-linear. Then the condition (offset >= skb_headlen(skb)) becomes true, which causes WARN_ON_ONCE in skb_checksum_help. 2. The struct sk_buff and struct virtio_net_hdr members must be mathematically related. (gso_size) must be greater than (needed) otherwise WARN_ON_ONCE. (remainder) must be greater than (needed) otherwise WARN_ON_ONCE. (remainder) may be 0 if division is without remainder. offset+2 (4191) > skb_headlen() (1116) WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 5084 at net/core/dev.c:3303 skb_checksum_help+0x5e2/0x740 net/core/dev.c:3303 Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 5084 Comm: syz-executor336 Not tainted 6.7.0-rc3-syzkaller-00014-gdf60cee26a2e #0 Hardware name: Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 11/10/2023 RIP: 0010:skb_checksum_help+0x5e2/0x740 net/core/dev.c:3303 Code: 89 e8 83 e0 07 83 c0 03 38 d0 7c 08 84 d2 0f 85 52 01 00 00 44 89 e2 2b 53 74 4c 89 ee 48 c7 c7 40 57 e9 8b e8 af 8f dd f8 90 <0f> 0b 90 90 e9 87 fe ff ff e8 40 0f 6e f9 e9 4b fa ff ff 48 89 ef RSP: 0018:ffffc90003a9f338 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888025125780 RCX: ffffffff814db209 RDX: ffff888015393b80 RSI: ffffffff814db216 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: ffff8880251257f4 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 000000000000045c R13: 000000000000105f R14: ffff8880251257f0 R15: 000000000000105d FS: 0000555555c24380(0000) GS:ffff8880b9900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000000002000f000 CR3: 0000000023151000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> ip_do_fragment+0xa1b/0x18b0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:777 ip_fragment.constprop.0+0x161/0x230 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:584 ip_finish_output_gso net/ipv4/ip_output.c:286 [inline] __ip_finish_output net/ipv4/ip_output.c:308 [inline] __ip_finish_output+0x49c/0x650 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:295 ip_finish_output+0x31/0x310 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:323 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:303 [inline] ip_output+0x13b/0x2a0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:433 dst_output include/net/dst.h:451 [inline] ip_local_out+0xaf/0x1a0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:129 iptunnel_xmit+0x5b4/0x9b0 net/ipv4/ip_tunnel_core.c:82 ipip6_tunnel_xmit net/ipv6/sit.c:1034 [inline] sit_tunnel_xmit+0xed2/0x28f0 net/ipv6/sit.c:1076 __netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4940 [inline] netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4954 [inline] xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3545 [inline] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x13d/0x6d0 net/core/dev.c:3561 __dev_queue_xmit+0x7c1/0x3d60 net/core/dev.c:4346 dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3134 [inline] packet_xmit+0x257/0x380 net/packet/af_packet.c:276 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3087 [inline] packet_sendmsg+0x24ca/0x5240 net/packet/af_packet.c:3119 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0xd5/0x180 net/socket.c:745 __sys_sendto+0x255/0x340 net/socket.c:2190 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2202 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2198 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0xe0/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2198 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x40/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:82 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller Fixes: 0f6925b3e8da ("virtio_net: Do not pull payload in skb->head") Signed-off-by: Denis Arefev <arefev(a)swemel.ru> Message-Id: <20240613095448.27118-1-arefev(a)swemel.ru> Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Zhang Changzhong <zhangchangzhong(a)huawei.com> --- include/linux/virtio_net.h | 11 +++++++++++ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/linux/virtio_net.h b/include/linux/virtio_net.h index 6047058..29b19d0 100644 --- a/include/linux/virtio_net.h +++ b/include/linux/virtio_net.h @@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ static inline int virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int thlen = 0; unsigned int p_off = 0; unsigned int ip_proto; + u64 ret, remainder, gso_size; if (hdr->gso_type != VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_NONE) { switch (hdr->gso_type & ~VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_ECN) { @@ -87,6 +88,16 @@ static inline int virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 off = __virtio16_to_cpu(little_endian, hdr->csum_offset); u32 needed = start + max_t(u32, thlen, off + sizeof(__sum16)); + if (hdr->gso_size) { + gso_size = __virtio16_to_cpu(little_endian, hdr->gso_size); + ret = div64_u64_rem(skb->len, gso_size, &remainder); + if (!(ret && (hdr->gso_size > needed) && + ((remainder > needed) || (remainder == 0)))) { + return -EINVAL; + } + skb_shinfo(skb)->tx_flags |= SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG; + } + if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, needed)) return -EINVAL; -- 2.9.5

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] wifi: cfg80211: Avoid Wdiscarded-qualifiers warning
by Yue Haibing 04 Sep '24

04 Sep '24

hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/IAGX1C -------------------------------- Commit 591481cccbad trigger a warning: In file included from ./include/net/genetlink.h:6, from net/wireless/nl80211.c:25: net/wireless/nl80211.c:692:69: warning: initialization discards 'const' qualifier from pointer target type [-Wdiscarded-qualifiers] 692 | [NL80211_ATTR_TXQ_QUANTUM] = NLA_POLICY_FULL_RANGE(NLA_U32, &q_range), | ^ ./include/net/netlink.h:407:18: note: in definition of macro 'NLA_POLICY_FULL_RANGE' 407 | .range = _range, \ | ^~~~~~ Remove const qualifier to fix this. Fixes: 591481cccbad ("wifi: cfg80211: restrict NL80211_ATTR_TXQ_QUANTUM values") Signed-off-by: Yue Haibing <yuehaibing(a)huawei.com> --- net/wireless/nl80211.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/wireless/nl80211.c b/net/wireless/nl80211.c index 89b94d482fcf..674a0d54aff8 100644 --- a/net/wireless/nl80211.c +++ b/net/wireless/nl80211.c @@ -403,7 +403,7 @@ nl80211_unsol_bcast_probe_resp_policy[NL80211_UNSOL_BCAST_PROBE_RESP_ATTR_MAX + .len = IEEE80211_MAX_DATA_LEN } }; -static const struct netlink_range_validation q_range = { +static struct netlink_range_validation q_range = { .max = INT_MAX, }; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] f2fs: fix null reference error when checking end of zone
by Kaixiong Yu 04 Sep '24

04 Sep '24

From: Daejun Park <daejun7.park(a)samsung.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.10.3 commit 381cbe85592c78fbaeb3e770e3e9f3bfa3e67efb category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/381cbe85592c78fbaeb3e770e3e9f… CVE: CVE-2024-43857 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit c82bc1ab2a8a5e73d9728e80c4c2ed87e8921a38 ] This patch fixes a potentially null pointer being accessed by is_end_zone_blkaddr() that checks the last block of a zone when f2fs is mounted as a single device. Fixes: e067dc3c6b9c ("f2fs: maintain six open zones for zoned devices") Signed-off-by: Daejun Park <daejun7.park(a)samsung.com> Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Daeho Jeong <daehojeong(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: fs/f2fs/data.c [Since hulk-6.6 does not merge stable inclusion commit 7437bb73f087 ("block: remove support for the host aware zone model")] Signed-off-by: Kaixiong Yu <yukaixiong(a)huawei.com> --- fs/f2fs/data.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/f2fs/data.c b/fs/f2fs/data.c index 84fc87018180..0acafb505efc 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/data.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/data.c @@ -924,6 +924,7 @@ int f2fs_merge_page_bio(struct f2fs_io_info *fio) #ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_ZONED static bool is_end_zone_blkaddr(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, block_t blkaddr) { + struct block_device *bdev = sbi->sb->s_bdev; int devi = 0; if (f2fs_is_multi_device(sbi)) { @@ -934,8 +935,9 @@ static bool is_end_zone_blkaddr(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, block_t blkaddr) return false; } blkaddr -= FDEV(devi).start_blk; + bdev = FDEV(devi).bdev; } - return bdev_zoned_model(FDEV(devi).bdev) == BLK_ZONED_HM && + return bdev_zoned_model(bdev) == BLK_ZONED_HM && f2fs_blkz_is_seq(sbi, devi, blkaddr) && (blkaddr % sbi->blocks_per_blkz == sbi->blocks_per_blkz - 1); } -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] btrfs: do not start relocation until in progress drops are done
by Long Li 04 Sep '24

04 Sep '24

From: Josef Bacik <josef(a)toxicpanda.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.15.26 commit 6599d5e8bd758d897fd2ef4dc388ae50278b1f7e category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IALPSL CVE: CVE-2022-48901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?h=… -------------------------------- commit b4be6aefa73c9a6899ef3ba9c5faaa8a66e333ef upstream. We hit a bug with a recovering relocation on mount for one of our file systems in production. I reproduced this locally by injecting errors into snapshot delete with balance running at the same time. This presented as an error while looking up an extent item WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 1501 at fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:866 lookup_inline_extent_backref+0x647/0x680 CPU: 5 PID: 1501 Comm: btrfs-balance Not tainted 5.16.0-rc8+ #8 RIP: 0010:lookup_inline_extent_backref+0x647/0x680 RSP: 0018:ffffae0a023ab960 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000000c RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffff943fd2a39b60 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 0001434088152de0 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000001d05000 R13: ffff943fd2a39b60 R14: ffff943fdb96f2a0 R15: ffff9442fc923000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff944e9eb40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f1157b1fca8 CR3: 000000010f092000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0 Call Trace: <TASK> insert_inline_extent_backref+0x46/0xd0 __btrfs_inc_extent_ref.isra.0+0x5f/0x200 ? btrfs_merge_delayed_refs+0x164/0x190 __btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x561/0xfa0 ? btrfs_search_slot+0x7b4/0xb30 ? btrfs_update_root+0x1a9/0x2c0 btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x73/0x1f0 ? btrfs_update_root+0x1a9/0x2c0 btrfs_commit_transaction+0x50/0xa50 ? btrfs_update_reloc_root+0x122/0x220 prepare_to_merge+0x29f/0x320 relocate_block_group+0x2b8/0x550 btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x1a6/0x350 btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x27/0xe0 btrfs_balance+0x777/0xe60 balance_kthread+0x35/0x50 ? btrfs_balance+0xe60/0xe60 kthread+0x16b/0x190 ? set_kthread_struct+0x40/0x40 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 </TASK> Normally snapshot deletion and relocation are excluded from running at the same time by the fs_info->cleaner_mutex. However if we had a pending balance waiting to get the ->cleaner_mutex, and a snapshot deletion was running, and then the box crashed, we would come up in a state where we have a half deleted snapshot. Again, in the normal case the snapshot deletion needs to complete before relocation can start, but in this case relocation could very well start before the snapshot deletion completes, as we simply add the root to the dead roots list and wait for the next time the cleaner runs to clean up the snapshot. Fix this by setting a bit on the fs_info if we have any DEAD_ROOT's that had a pending drop_progress key. If they do then we know we were in the middle of the drop operation and set a flag on the fs_info. Then balance can wait until this flag is cleared to start up again. If there are DEAD_ROOT's that don't have a drop_progress set then we're safe to start balance right away as we'll be properly protected by the cleaner_mutex. CC: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 5.10+ Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana(a)suse.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef(a)toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba(a)suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba(a)suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Conflicts: fs/btrfs/disk-io.c fs/btrfs/ctree.h fs/btrfs/transaction.h [conflicts due to 8cd2908846d1 ("btrfs: clear oneshot options on mount and remount") not mergered] Signed-off-by: Long Li <leo.lilong(a)huawei.com> --- fs/btrfs/ctree.h | 10 ++++++++++ fs/btrfs/disk-io.c | 10 ++++++++++ fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c | 10 ++++++++++ fs/btrfs/relocation.c | 13 +++++++++++++ fs/btrfs/root-tree.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ fs/btrfs/transaction.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- fs/btrfs/transaction.h | 1 + 7 files changed, 91 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/btrfs/ctree.h b/fs/btrfs/ctree.h index 84ac3642023f..90b46ac13003 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/ctree.h +++ b/fs/btrfs/ctree.h @@ -567,6 +567,9 @@ enum { /* Indicate that we can't trust the free space tree for caching yet */ BTRFS_FS_FREE_SPACE_TREE_UNTRUSTED, + + /* Indicate we have half completed snapshot deletions pending. */ + BTRFS_FS_UNFINISHED_DROPS, }; /* @@ -1033,8 +1036,15 @@ enum { BTRFS_ROOT_HAS_LOG_TREE, /* Qgroup flushing is in progress */ BTRFS_ROOT_QGROUP_FLUSHING, + /* This root has a drop operation that was started previously. */ + BTRFS_ROOT_UNFINISHED_DROP, }; +static inline void btrfs_wake_unfinished_drop(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info) +{ + clear_and_wake_up_bit(BTRFS_FS_UNFINISHED_DROPS, &fs_info->flags); +} + /* * Record swapped tree blocks of a subvolume tree for delayed subtree trace * code. For detail check comment in fs/btrfs/qgroup.c. diff --git a/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c b/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c index b9a3bdacdede..05bc52003e19 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c @@ -3427,6 +3427,10 @@ int __cold open_ctree(struct super_block *sb, struct btrfs_fs_devices *fs_device } set_bit(BTRFS_FS_OPEN, &fs_info->flags); + /* Kick the cleaner thread so it'll start deleting snapshots. */ + if (test_bit(BTRFS_FS_UNFINISHED_DROPS, &fs_info->flags)) + wake_up_process(fs_info->cleaner_kthread); + /* * backuproot only affect mount behavior, and if open_ctree succeeded, * no need to keep the flag @@ -4092,6 +4096,12 @@ void __cold close_ctree(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info) */ kthread_park(fs_info->cleaner_kthread); + /* + * If we had UNFINISHED_DROPS we could still be processing them, so + * clear that bit and wake up relocation so it can stop. + */ + btrfs_wake_unfinished_drop(fs_info); + /* wait for the qgroup rescan worker to stop */ btrfs_qgroup_wait_for_completion(fs_info, false); diff --git a/fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c b/fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c index 284294620e9f..578b217bc4ea 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c @@ -5353,6 +5353,7 @@ int btrfs_drop_snapshot(struct btrfs_root *root, int update_ref, int for_reloc) int ret; int level; bool root_dropped = false; + bool unfinished_drop = false; btrfs_debug(fs_info, "Drop subvolume %llu", root->root_key.objectid); @@ -5395,6 +5396,8 @@ int btrfs_drop_snapshot(struct btrfs_root *root, int update_ref, int for_reloc) * already dropped. */ set_bit(BTRFS_ROOT_DELETING, &root->state); + unfinished_drop = test_bit(BTRFS_ROOT_UNFINISHED_DROP, &root->state); + if (btrfs_disk_key_objectid(&root_item->drop_progress) == 0) { level = btrfs_header_level(root->node); path->nodes[level] = btrfs_lock_root_node(root); @@ -5571,6 +5574,13 @@ int btrfs_drop_snapshot(struct btrfs_root *root, int update_ref, int for_reloc) kfree(wc); btrfs_free_path(path); out: + /* + * We were an unfinished drop root, check to see if there are any + * pending, and if not clear and wake up any waiters. + */ + if (!err && unfinished_drop) + btrfs_maybe_wake_unfinished_drop(fs_info); + /* * So if we need to stop dropping the snapshot for whatever reason we * need to make sure to add it back to the dead root list so that we diff --git a/fs/btrfs/relocation.c b/fs/btrfs/relocation.c index c21545c5b34b..cf7a8fcea4d6 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/relocation.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/relocation.c @@ -3595,6 +3595,19 @@ int btrfs_relocate_block_group(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info, u64 group_start) int rw = 0; int err = 0; + /* + * This only gets set if we had a half-deleted snapshot on mount. We + * cannot allow relocation to start while we're still trying to clean up + * these pending deletions. + */ + ret = wait_on_bit(&fs_info->flags, BTRFS_FS_UNFINISHED_DROPS, TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE); + if (ret) + return ret; + + /* We may have been woken up by close_ctree, so bail if we're closing. */ + if (btrfs_fs_closing(fs_info)) + return -EINTR; + bg = btrfs_lookup_block_group(fs_info, group_start); if (!bg) return -ENOENT; diff --git a/fs/btrfs/root-tree.c b/fs/btrfs/root-tree.c index cd40e7a92552..7bdaccb58ec0 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/root-tree.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/root-tree.c @@ -280,6 +280,21 @@ int btrfs_find_orphan_roots(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info) WARN_ON(!test_bit(BTRFS_ROOT_ORPHAN_ITEM_INSERTED, &root->state)); if (btrfs_root_refs(&root->root_item) == 0) { + struct btrfs_key drop_key; + + btrfs_disk_key_to_cpu(&drop_key, &root->root_item.drop_progress); + /* + * If we have a non-zero drop_progress then we know we + * made it partly through deleting this snapshot, and + * thus we need to make sure we block any balance from + * happening until this snapshot is completely dropped. + */ + if (drop_key.objectid != 0 || drop_key.type != 0 || + drop_key.offset != 0) { + set_bit(BTRFS_FS_UNFINISHED_DROPS, &fs_info->flags); + set_bit(BTRFS_ROOT_UNFINISHED_DROP, &root->state); + } + set_bit(BTRFS_ROOT_DEAD_TREE, &root->state); btrfs_add_dead_root(root); } diff --git a/fs/btrfs/transaction.c b/fs/btrfs/transaction.c index a6ddf91d5c40..cf7e8a20bb02 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/transaction.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/transaction.c @@ -1294,6 +1294,32 @@ static noinline int commit_cowonly_roots(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans) return 0; } +/* + * If we had a pending drop we need to see if there are any others left in our + * dead roots list, and if not clear our bit and wake any waiters. + */ +void btrfs_maybe_wake_unfinished_drop(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info) +{ + /* + * We put the drop in progress roots at the front of the list, so if the + * first entry doesn't have UNFINISHED_DROP set we can wake everybody + * up. + */ + spin_lock(&fs_info->trans_lock); + if (!list_empty(&fs_info->dead_roots)) { + struct btrfs_root *root = list_first_entry(&fs_info->dead_roots, + struct btrfs_root, + root_list); + if (test_bit(BTRFS_ROOT_UNFINISHED_DROP, &root->state)) { + spin_unlock(&fs_info->trans_lock); + return; + } + } + spin_unlock(&fs_info->trans_lock); + + btrfs_wake_unfinished_drop(fs_info); +} + /* * dead roots are old snapshots that need to be deleted. This allocates * a dirty root struct and adds it into the list of dead roots that need to @@ -1306,7 +1332,12 @@ void btrfs_add_dead_root(struct btrfs_root *root) spin_lock(&fs_info->trans_lock); if (list_empty(&root->root_list)) { btrfs_grab_root(root); - list_add_tail(&root->root_list, &fs_info->dead_roots); + + /* We want to process the partially complete drops first. */ + if (test_bit(BTRFS_ROOT_UNFINISHED_DROP, &root->state)) + list_add(&root->root_list, &fs_info->dead_roots); + else + list_add_tail(&root->root_list, &fs_info->dead_roots); } spin_unlock(&fs_info->trans_lock); } diff --git a/fs/btrfs/transaction.h b/fs/btrfs/transaction.h index eb26eb068fe8..0599e3994633 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/transaction.h +++ b/fs/btrfs/transaction.h @@ -216,6 +216,7 @@ int btrfs_wait_for_commit(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info, u64 transid); void btrfs_add_dead_root(struct btrfs_root *root); int btrfs_defrag_root(struct btrfs_root *root); +void btrfs_maybe_wake_unfinished_drop(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info); int btrfs_clean_one_deleted_snapshot(struct btrfs_root *root); int btrfs_commit_transaction(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans); int btrfs_commit_transaction_async(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans, -- 2.39.2

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] btrfs: do not start relocation until in progress drops are done
by Long Li 04 Sep '24

04 Sep '24

From: Josef Bacik <josef(a)toxicpanda.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.15.26 commit 6599d5e8bd758d897fd2ef4dc388ae50278b1f7e category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IALPSL CVE: CVE-2022-48901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?h=… -------------------------------- commit b4be6aefa73c9a6899ef3ba9c5faaa8a66e333ef upstream. We hit a bug with a recovering relocation on mount for one of our file systems in production. I reproduced this locally by injecting errors into snapshot delete with balance running at the same time. This presented as an error while looking up an extent item WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 1501 at fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:866 lookup_inline_extent_backref+0x647/0x680 CPU: 5 PID: 1501 Comm: btrfs-balance Not tainted 5.16.0-rc8+ #8 RIP: 0010:lookup_inline_extent_backref+0x647/0x680 RSP: 0018:ffffae0a023ab960 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000000c RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffff943fd2a39b60 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 0001434088152de0 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000001d05000 R13: ffff943fd2a39b60 R14: ffff943fdb96f2a0 R15: ffff9442fc923000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff944e9eb40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f1157b1fca8 CR3: 000000010f092000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0 Call Trace: <TASK> insert_inline_extent_backref+0x46/0xd0 __btrfs_inc_extent_ref.isra.0+0x5f/0x200 ? btrfs_merge_delayed_refs+0x164/0x190 __btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x561/0xfa0 ? btrfs_search_slot+0x7b4/0xb30 ? btrfs_update_root+0x1a9/0x2c0 btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x73/0x1f0 ? btrfs_update_root+0x1a9/0x2c0 btrfs_commit_transaction+0x50/0xa50 ? btrfs_update_reloc_root+0x122/0x220 prepare_to_merge+0x29f/0x320 relocate_block_group+0x2b8/0x550 btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x1a6/0x350 btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x27/0xe0 btrfs_balance+0x777/0xe60 balance_kthread+0x35/0x50 ? btrfs_balance+0xe60/0xe60 kthread+0x16b/0x190 ? set_kthread_struct+0x40/0x40 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 </TASK> Normally snapshot deletion and relocation are excluded from running at the same time by the fs_info->cleaner_mutex. However if we had a pending balance waiting to get the ->cleaner_mutex, and a snapshot deletion was running, and then the box crashed, we would come up in a state where we have a half deleted snapshot. Again, in the normal case the snapshot deletion needs to complete before relocation can start, but in this case relocation could very well start before the snapshot deletion completes, as we simply add the root to the dead roots list and wait for the next time the cleaner runs to clean up the snapshot. Fix this by setting a bit on the fs_info if we have any DEAD_ROOT's that had a pending drop_progress key. If they do then we know we were in the middle of the drop operation and set a flag on the fs_info. Then balance can wait until this flag is cleared to start up again. If there are DEAD_ROOT's that don't have a drop_progress set then we're safe to start balance right away as we'll be properly protected by the cleaner_mutex. CC: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 5.10+ Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana(a)suse.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef(a)toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba(a)suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba(a)suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Conflicts: fs/btrfs/disk-io.c fs/btrfs/ctree.h fs/btrfs/transaction.h [conflicts due to 8cd2908846d1 ("btrfs: clear oneshot options on mount and remount") not mergered] Signed-off-by: Long Li <leo.lilong(a)huawei.com> --- fs/btrfs/ctree.h | 10 ++++++++++ fs/btrfs/disk-io.c | 10 ++++++++++ fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c | 10 ++++++++++ fs/btrfs/relocation.c | 13 +++++++++++++ fs/btrfs/root-tree.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ fs/btrfs/transaction.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- fs/btrfs/transaction.h | 1 + 7 files changed, 91 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/btrfs/ctree.h b/fs/btrfs/ctree.h index 482842ac397b..abc1e72a4464 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/ctree.h +++ b/fs/btrfs/ctree.h @@ -565,6 +565,9 @@ enum { /* Indicate that we can't trust the free space tree for caching yet */ BTRFS_FS_FREE_SPACE_TREE_UNTRUSTED, + + /* Indicate we have half completed snapshot deletions pending. */ + BTRFS_FS_UNFINISHED_DROPS, }; /* @@ -1031,8 +1034,15 @@ enum { BTRFS_ROOT_HAS_LOG_TREE, /* Qgroup flushing is in progress */ BTRFS_ROOT_QGROUP_FLUSHING, + /* This root has a drop operation that was started previously. */ + BTRFS_ROOT_UNFINISHED_DROP, }; +static inline void btrfs_wake_unfinished_drop(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info) +{ + clear_and_wake_up_bit(BTRFS_FS_UNFINISHED_DROPS, &fs_info->flags); +} + /* * Record swapped tree blocks of a subvolume tree for delayed subtree trace * code. For detail check comment in fs/btrfs/qgroup.c. diff --git a/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c b/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c index 707344288b1c..b923011dec85 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c @@ -3444,6 +3444,10 @@ int __cold open_ctree(struct super_block *sb, struct btrfs_fs_devices *fs_device } set_bit(BTRFS_FS_OPEN, &fs_info->flags); + /* Kick the cleaner thread so it'll start deleting snapshots. */ + if (test_bit(BTRFS_FS_UNFINISHED_DROPS, &fs_info->flags)) + wake_up_process(fs_info->cleaner_kthread); + /* * backuproot only affect mount behavior, and if open_ctree succeeded, * no need to keep the flag @@ -4109,6 +4113,12 @@ void __cold close_ctree(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info) */ kthread_park(fs_info->cleaner_kthread); + /* + * If we had UNFINISHED_DROPS we could still be processing them, so + * clear that bit and wake up relocation so it can stop. + */ + btrfs_wake_unfinished_drop(fs_info); + /* wait for the qgroup rescan worker to stop */ btrfs_qgroup_wait_for_completion(fs_info, false); diff --git a/fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c b/fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c index 3ba43a40032c..1cf787209798 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c @@ -5365,6 +5365,7 @@ int btrfs_drop_snapshot(struct btrfs_root *root, int update_ref, int for_reloc) int ret; int level; bool root_dropped = false; + bool unfinished_drop = false; btrfs_debug(fs_info, "Drop subvolume %llu", root->root_key.objectid); @@ -5407,6 +5408,8 @@ int btrfs_drop_snapshot(struct btrfs_root *root, int update_ref, int for_reloc) * already dropped. */ set_bit(BTRFS_ROOT_DELETING, &root->state); + unfinished_drop = test_bit(BTRFS_ROOT_UNFINISHED_DROP, &root->state); + if (btrfs_disk_key_objectid(&root_item->drop_progress) == 0) { level = btrfs_header_level(root->node); path->nodes[level] = btrfs_lock_root_node(root); @@ -5583,6 +5586,13 @@ int btrfs_drop_snapshot(struct btrfs_root *root, int update_ref, int for_reloc) kfree(wc); btrfs_free_path(path); out: + /* + * We were an unfinished drop root, check to see if there are any + * pending, and if not clear and wake up any waiters. + */ + if (!err && unfinished_drop) + btrfs_maybe_wake_unfinished_drop(fs_info); + /* * So if we need to stop dropping the snapshot for whatever reason we * need to make sure to add it back to the dead root list so that we diff --git a/fs/btrfs/relocation.c b/fs/btrfs/relocation.c index 93db4486a943..bdfa4a93d373 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/relocation.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/relocation.c @@ -3601,6 +3601,19 @@ int btrfs_relocate_block_group(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info, u64 group_start) int rw = 0; int err = 0; + /* + * This only gets set if we had a half-deleted snapshot on mount. We + * cannot allow relocation to start while we're still trying to clean up + * these pending deletions. + */ + ret = wait_on_bit(&fs_info->flags, BTRFS_FS_UNFINISHED_DROPS, TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE); + if (ret) + return ret; + + /* We may have been woken up by close_ctree, so bail if we're closing. */ + if (btrfs_fs_closing(fs_info)) + return -EINTR; + bg = btrfs_lookup_block_group(fs_info, group_start); if (!bg) return -ENOENT; diff --git a/fs/btrfs/root-tree.c b/fs/btrfs/root-tree.c index cd40e7a92552..7bdaccb58ec0 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/root-tree.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/root-tree.c @@ -280,6 +280,21 @@ int btrfs_find_orphan_roots(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info) WARN_ON(!test_bit(BTRFS_ROOT_ORPHAN_ITEM_INSERTED, &root->state)); if (btrfs_root_refs(&root->root_item) == 0) { + struct btrfs_key drop_key; + + btrfs_disk_key_to_cpu(&drop_key, &root->root_item.drop_progress); + /* + * If we have a non-zero drop_progress then we know we + * made it partly through deleting this snapshot, and + * thus we need to make sure we block any balance from + * happening until this snapshot is completely dropped. + */ + if (drop_key.objectid != 0 || drop_key.type != 0 || + drop_key.offset != 0) { + set_bit(BTRFS_FS_UNFINISHED_DROPS, &fs_info->flags); + set_bit(BTRFS_ROOT_UNFINISHED_DROP, &root->state); + } + set_bit(BTRFS_ROOT_DEAD_TREE, &root->state); btrfs_add_dead_root(root); } diff --git a/fs/btrfs/transaction.c b/fs/btrfs/transaction.c index 89117cc2cf05..7d0ea8aeadb0 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/transaction.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/transaction.c @@ -1301,6 +1301,32 @@ static noinline int commit_cowonly_roots(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans) return 0; } +/* + * If we had a pending drop we need to see if there are any others left in our + * dead roots list, and if not clear our bit and wake any waiters. + */ +void btrfs_maybe_wake_unfinished_drop(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info) +{ + /* + * We put the drop in progress roots at the front of the list, so if the + * first entry doesn't have UNFINISHED_DROP set we can wake everybody + * up. + */ + spin_lock(&fs_info->trans_lock); + if (!list_empty(&fs_info->dead_roots)) { + struct btrfs_root *root = list_first_entry(&fs_info->dead_roots, + struct btrfs_root, + root_list); + if (test_bit(BTRFS_ROOT_UNFINISHED_DROP, &root->state)) { + spin_unlock(&fs_info->trans_lock); + return; + } + } + spin_unlock(&fs_info->trans_lock); + + btrfs_wake_unfinished_drop(fs_info); +} + /* * dead roots are old snapshots that need to be deleted. This allocates * a dirty root struct and adds it into the list of dead roots that need to @@ -1313,7 +1339,12 @@ void btrfs_add_dead_root(struct btrfs_root *root) spin_lock(&fs_info->trans_lock); if (list_empty(&root->root_list)) { btrfs_grab_root(root); - list_add_tail(&root->root_list, &fs_info->dead_roots); + + /* We want to process the partially complete drops first. */ + if (test_bit(BTRFS_ROOT_UNFINISHED_DROP, &root->state)) + list_add(&root->root_list, &fs_info->dead_roots); + else + list_add_tail(&root->root_list, &fs_info->dead_roots); } spin_unlock(&fs_info->trans_lock); } diff --git a/fs/btrfs/transaction.h b/fs/btrfs/transaction.h index eb26eb068fe8..0599e3994633 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/transaction.h +++ b/fs/btrfs/transaction.h @@ -216,6 +216,7 @@ int btrfs_wait_for_commit(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info, u64 transid); void btrfs_add_dead_root(struct btrfs_root *root); int btrfs_defrag_root(struct btrfs_root *root); +void btrfs_maybe_wake_unfinished_drop(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info); int btrfs_clean_one_deleted_snapshot(struct btrfs_root *root); int btrfs_commit_transaction(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans); int btrfs_commit_transaction_async(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans, -- 2.39.2

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] nfc: pn533: Wait for out_urb's completion in pn533_usb_send_frame()
by Kaixiong Yu 04 Sep '24

04 Sep '24

From: Minsuk Kang <linuxlovemin(a)yonsei.ac.kr> stable inclusion from stable-v4.19.270 commit 321db5131c92983dac4f3338e8fbb6df214238c0 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IALIN1 CVE: CVE-2023-52907 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 9dab880d675b9d0dd56c6428e4e8352a3339371d ] Fix a use-after-free that occurs in hcd when in_urb sent from pn533_usb_send_frame() is completed earlier than out_urb. Its callback frees the skb data in pn533_send_async_complete() that is used as a transfer buffer of out_urb. Wait before sending in_urb until the callback of out_urb is called. To modify the callback of out_urb alone, separate the complete function of out_urb and ack_urb. Found by a modified version of syzkaller. BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in dummy_timer Call Trace: memcpy (mm/kasan/shadow.c:65) dummy_perform_transfer (drivers/usb/gadget/udc/dummy_hcd.c:1352) transfer (drivers/usb/gadget/udc/dummy_hcd.c:1453) dummy_timer (drivers/usb/gadget/udc/dummy_hcd.c:1972) arch_static_branch (arch/x86/include/asm/jump_label.h:27) static_key_false (include/linux/jump_label.h:207) timer_expire_exit (include/trace/events/timer.h:127) call_timer_fn (kernel/time/timer.c:1475) expire_timers (kernel/time/timer.c:1519) __run_timers (kernel/time/timer.c:1790) run_timer_softirq (kernel/time/timer.c:1803) Fixes: c46ee38620a2 ("NFC: pn533: add NXP pn533 nfc device driver") Signed-off-by: Minsuk Kang <linuxlovemin(a)yonsei.ac.kr> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kaixiong Yu <yukaixiong(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/nfc/pn533/usb.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 41 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/nfc/pn533/usb.c b/drivers/nfc/pn533/usb.c index 84f2983bf384..57b07446bb76 100644 --- a/drivers/nfc/pn533/usb.c +++ b/drivers/nfc/pn533/usb.c @@ -153,10 +153,17 @@ static int pn533_usb_send_ack(struct pn533 *dev, gfp_t flags) return usb_submit_urb(phy->ack_urb, flags); } +struct pn533_out_arg { + struct pn533_usb_phy *phy; + struct completion done; +}; + static int pn533_usb_send_frame(struct pn533 *dev, struct sk_buff *out) { struct pn533_usb_phy *phy = dev->phy; + struct pn533_out_arg arg; + void *cntx; int rc; if (phy->priv == NULL) @@ -168,10 +175,17 @@ static int pn533_usb_send_frame(struct pn533 *dev, print_hex_dump_debug("PN533 TX: ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1, out->data, out->len, false); + init_completion(&arg.done); + cntx = phy->out_urb->context; + phy->out_urb->context = &arg; + rc = usb_submit_urb(phy->out_urb, GFP_KERNEL); if (rc) return rc; + wait_for_completion(&arg.done); + phy->out_urb->context = cntx; + if (dev->protocol_type == PN533_PROTO_REQ_RESP) { /* request for response for sent packet directly */ rc = pn533_submit_urb_for_response(phy, GFP_KERNEL); @@ -412,7 +426,31 @@ static int pn533_acr122_poweron_rdr(struct pn533_usb_phy *phy) return arg.rc; } -static void pn533_send_complete(struct urb *urb) +static void pn533_out_complete(struct urb *urb) +{ + struct pn533_out_arg *arg = urb->context; + struct pn533_usb_phy *phy = arg->phy; + + switch (urb->status) { + case 0: + break; /* success */ + case -ECONNRESET: + case -ENOENT: + dev_dbg(&phy->udev->dev, + "The urb has been stopped (status %d)\n", + urb->status); + break; + case -ESHUTDOWN: + default: + nfc_err(&phy->udev->dev, + "Urb failure (status %d)\n", + urb->status); + } + + complete(&arg->done); +} + +static void pn533_ack_complete(struct urb *urb) { struct pn533_usb_phy *phy = urb->context; @@ -500,10 +538,10 @@ static int pn533_usb_probe(struct usb_interface *interface, usb_fill_bulk_urb(phy->out_urb, phy->udev, usb_sndbulkpipe(phy->udev, out_endpoint), - NULL, 0, pn533_send_complete, phy); + NULL, 0, pn533_out_complete, phy); usb_fill_bulk_urb(phy->ack_urb, phy->udev, usb_sndbulkpipe(phy->udev, out_endpoint), - NULL, 0, pn533_send_complete, phy); + NULL, 0, pn533_ack_complete, phy); switch (id->driver_info) { case PN533_DEVICE_STD: -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] net: hns3: do not allow call hns3_nic_net_open repeatedly
by Xiang Yang 04 Sep '24

04 Sep '24

From: Jian Shen <shenjian15(a)huawei.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.15-rc4 commit 5b09e88e1bf7fe86540fab4b5f3eece8abead39e category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9R4O1 CVE: CVE-2021-47400 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- hns3_nic_net_open() is not allowed to called repeatly, but there is no checking for this. When doing device reset and setup tc concurrently, there is a small oppotunity to call hns3_nic_net_open repeatedly, and cause kernel bug by calling napi_enable twice. The calltrace information is like below: [ 3078.222780] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 3078.230255] kernel BUG at net/core/dev.c:6991! [ 3078.236224] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 3078.243431] Modules linked in: hns3 hclgevf hclge hnae3 vfio_iommu_type1 vfio_pci vfio_virqfd vfio pv680_mii(O) [ 3078.258880] CPU: 0 PID: 295 Comm: kworker/u8:5 Tainted: G O 5.14.0-rc4+ #1 [ 3078.269102] Hardware name: , BIOS KpxxxFPGA 1P B600 V181 08/12/2021 [ 3078.276801] Workqueue: hclge hclge_service_task [hclge] [ 3078.288774] pstate: 60400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--) [ 3078.296168] pc : napi_enable+0x80/0x84 tc qdisc sho[w 3d0e7v8 .e3t0h218 79] lr : hns3_nic_net_open+0x138/0x510 [hns3] [ 3078.314771] sp : ffff8000108abb20 [ 3078.319099] x29: ffff8000108abb20 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: ffff0820a8490300 [ 3078.329121] x26: 0000000000000001 x25: ffff08209cfc6200 x24: 0000000000000000 [ 3078.339044] x23: ffff0820a8490300 x22: ffff08209cd76000 x21: ffff0820abfe3880 [ 3078.349018] x20: 0000000000000000 x19: ffff08209cd76900 x18: 0000000000000000 [ 3078.358620] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffffc816e1727a50 x15: 0000ffff8f4ff930 [ 3078.368895] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000259e9dbeb6b4 [ 3078.377987] x11: 0096a8f7e764eb40 x10: 634615ad28d3eab5 x9 : ffffc816ad8885b8 [ 3078.387091] x8 : ffff08209cfc6fb8 x7 : ffff0820ac0da058 x6 : ffff0820a8490344 [ 3078.396356] x5 : 0000000000000140 x4 : 0000000000000003 x3 : ffff08209cd76938 [ 3078.405365] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000010 x0 : ffff0820abfe38a0 [ 3078.414657] Call trace: [ 3078.418517] napi_enable+0x80/0x84 [ 3078.424626] hns3_reset_notify_up_enet+0x78/0xd0 [hns3] [ 3078.433469] hns3_reset_notify+0x64/0x80 [hns3] [ 3078.441430] hclge_notify_client+0x68/0xb0 [hclge] [ 3078.450511] hclge_reset_rebuild+0x524/0x884 [hclge] [ 3078.458879] hclge_reset_service_task+0x3c4/0x680 [hclge] [ 3078.467470] hclge_service_task+0xb0/0xb54 [hclge] [ 3078.475675] process_one_work+0x1dc/0x48c [ 3078.481888] worker_thread+0x15c/0x464 [ 3078.487104] kthread+0x160/0x170 [ 3078.492479] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 [ 3078.498785] Code: c8027c81 35ffffa2 d50323bf d65f03c0 (d4210000) [ 3078.506889] ---[ end trace 8ebe0340a1b0fb44 ]--- Once hns3_nic_net_open() is excute success, the flag HNS3_NIC_STATE_DOWN will be cleared. So add checking for this flag, directly return when HNS3_NIC_STATE_DOWN is no set. Fixes: e888402789b9 ("net: hns3: call hns3_nic_net_open() while doing HNAE3_UP_CLIENT") Signed-off-by: Jian Shen <shenjian15(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Guangbin Huang <huangguangbin2(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Xiang Yang <xiangyang3(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns3/hns3_enet.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns3/hns3_enet.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns3/hns3_enet.c index 20703ce86281..89f1d0597844 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns3/hns3_enet.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns3/hns3_enet.c @@ -438,6 +438,11 @@ static int hns3_nic_net_open(struct net_device *netdev) if (hns3_nic_resetting(netdev)) return -EBUSY; + if (!test_bit(HNS3_NIC_STATE_DOWN, &priv->state)) { + netdev_warn(netdev, "net open repeatedly!\n"); + return 0; + } + netif_carrier_off(netdev); ret = hns3_nic_set_real_num_queue(netdev); -- 2.34.1

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