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[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS 0/1] ARM: 9324/1: fix get_user() broken with veneer
by Yuntao Liu 28 Aug '24

28 Aug '24

ARM: 9324/1: fix get_user() broken with veneer Masahiro Yamada (1): ARM: 9324/1: fix get_user() broken with veneer arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h | 14 ++------------ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] efi: fix NULL-deref in init error path
by Gu Bowen 28 Aug '24

28 Aug '24

From: Johan Hovold <johan+linaro(a)kernel.org> stable inclusion from stable-v4.19.320 commit 585a0b2b3ae7903c6abee3087d09c69e955a7794 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IALIAT CVE: CVE-2022-48879 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 703c13fe3c9af557d312f5895ed6a5fda2711104 ] In cases where runtime services are not supported or have been disabled, the runtime services workqueue will never have been allocated. Do not try to destroy the workqueue unconditionally in the unlikely event that EFI initialisation fails to avoid dereferencing a NULL pointer. Fixes: 98086df8b70c ("efi: add missed destroy_workqueue when efisubsys_init fails") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: Li Heng <liheng40(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan+linaro(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Gu Bowen <gubowen5(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 9 ++++++--- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c index 184ad34b9c58..e71037917dd5 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c @@ -361,8 +361,8 @@ static int __init efisubsys_init(void) efi_kobj = kobject_create_and_add("efi", firmware_kobj); if (!efi_kobj) { pr_err("efi: Firmware registration failed.\n"); - destroy_workqueue(efi_rts_wq); - return -ENOMEM; + error = -ENOMEM; + goto err_destroy_wq; } error = generic_ops_register(); @@ -398,7 +398,10 @@ static int __init efisubsys_init(void) generic_ops_unregister(); err_put: kobject_put(efi_kobj); - destroy_workqueue(efi_rts_wq); +err_destroy_wq: + if (efi_rts_wq) + destroy_workqueue(efi_rts_wq); + return error; } -- 2.25.1

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[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/1] CVE-2024-43892
by Chen Ridong 28 Aug '24

28 Aug '24

*** BLURB HERE *** Shakeel Butt (1): memcg: protect concurrent access to mem_cgroup_idr mm/memcontrol.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] Bluetooth: MGMT: Add error handling to pair_device()
by Zhengchao Shao 28 Aug '24

28 Aug '24

From: Griffin Kroah-Hartman <griffin(a)kroah.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.11-rc5 commit 538fd3921afac97158d4177139a0ad39f056dbb2 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAMK01 CVE: CVE-2024-43884 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… ------------------------------------------- hci_conn_params_add() never checks for a NULL value and could lead to a NULL pointer dereference causing a crash. Fixed by adding error handling in the function. Cc: Stable <stable(a)kernel.org> Fixes: 5157b8a503fa ("Bluetooth: Fix initializing conn_params in scan phase") Signed-off-by: Griffin Kroah-Hartman <griffin(a)kroah.com> Reported-by: Yiwei Zhang <zhan4630(a)purdue.edu> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao(a)huawei.com> --- net/bluetooth/mgmt.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c b/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c index 878bf7382244..2b1687485be0 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c @@ -2961,6 +2961,10 @@ static int pair_device(struct sock *sk, struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data, * will be kept and this function does nothing. */ p = hci_conn_params_add(hdev, &cp->addr.bdaddr, addr_type); + if (!p) { + err = -EIO; + goto unlock; + } if (p->auto_connect == HCI_AUTO_CONN_EXPLICIT) p->auto_connect = HCI_AUTO_CONN_DISABLED; -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH OLK-5.10] Bluetooth: MGMT: Add error handling to pair_device()
by Zhengchao Shao 28 Aug '24

28 Aug '24

From: Griffin Kroah-Hartman <griffin(a)kroah.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.11-rc5 commit 538fd3921afac97158d4177139a0ad39f056dbb2 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAMK01 CVE: CVE-2024-43884 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… ------------------------------------------- hci_conn_params_add() never checks for a NULL value and could lead to a NULL pointer dereference causing a crash. Fixed by adding error handling in the function. Cc: Stable <stable(a)kernel.org> Fixes: 5157b8a503fa ("Bluetooth: Fix initializing conn_params in scan phase") Signed-off-by: Griffin Kroah-Hartman <griffin(a)kroah.com> Reported-by: Yiwei Zhang <zhan4630(a)purdue.edu> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao(a)huawei.com> --- net/bluetooth/mgmt.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c b/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c index bd8cfcfca7ae..0078e33e12ba 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c @@ -2962,6 +2962,10 @@ static int pair_device(struct sock *sk, struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data, * will be kept and this function does nothing. */ p = hci_conn_params_add(hdev, &cp->addr.bdaddr, addr_type); + if (!p) { + err = -EIO; + goto unlock; + } if (p->auto_connect == HCI_AUTO_CONN_EXPLICIT) p->auto_connect = HCI_AUTO_CONN_DISABLED; -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH OLK-6.6] tracing: Have format file honor EVENT_FILE_FL_FREED
by Zheng Yejian 28 Aug '24

28 Aug '24

From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt(a)goodmis.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.11-rc3 commit b1560408692cd0ab0370cfbe9deb03ce97ab3f6d category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAMNBO CVE: CVE-2024-43891 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- commit b1560408692cd0ab0370cfbe9deb03ce97ab3f6d upstream. When eventfs was introduced, special care had to be done to coordinate the freeing of the file meta data with the files that are exposed to user space. The file meta data would have a ref count that is set when the file is created and would be decremented and freed after the last user that opened the file closed it. When the file meta data was to be freed, it would set a flag (EVENT_FILE_FL_FREED) to denote that the file is freed, and any new references made (like new opens or reads) would fail as it is marked freed. This allowed other meta data to be freed after this flag was set (under the event_mutex). All the files that were dynamically created in the events directory had a pointer to the file meta data and would call event_release() when the last reference to the user space file was closed. This would be the time that it is safe to free the file meta data. A shortcut was made for the "format" file. It's i_private would point to the "call" entry directly and not point to the file's meta data. This is because all format files are the same for the same "call", so it was thought there was no reason to differentiate them. The other files maintain state (like the "enable", "trigger", etc). But this meant if the file were to disappear, the "format" file would be unaware of it. This caused a race that could be trigger via the user_events test (that would create dynamic events and free them), and running a loop that would read the user_events format files: In one console run: # cd tools/testing/selftests/user_events # while true; do ./ftrace_test; done And in another console run: # cd /sys/kernel/tracing/ # while true; do cat events/user_events/__test_event/format; done 2>/dev/null With KASAN memory checking, it would trigger a use-after-free bug report (which was a real bug). This was because the format file was not checking the file's meta data flag "EVENT_FILE_FL_FREED", so it would access the event that the file meta data pointed to after the event was freed. After inspection, there are other locations that were found to not check the EVENT_FILE_FL_FREED flag when accessing the trace_event_file. Add a new helper function: event_file_file() that will make sure that the event_mutex is held, and will return NULL if the trace_event_file has the EVENT_FILE_FL_FREED flag set. Have the first reference of the struct file pointer use event_file_file() and check for NULL. Later uses can still use the event_file_data() helper function if the event_mutex is still held and was not released since the event_file_file() call. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240719204701.1605950-1-minipli@grsecurity.net/ Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat(a)kernel.org> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers(a)efficios.com> Cc: Ajay Kaher <ajay.kaher(a)broadcom.com> Cc: Ilkka Naulapää <digirigawa(a)gmail.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro(a)zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter(a)linaro.org> Cc: Beau Belgrave <beaub(a)linux.microsoft.com> Cc: Florian Fainelli <florian.fainelli(a)broadcom.com> Cc: Alexey Makhalov <alexey.makhalov(a)broadcom.com> Cc: Vasavi Sirnapalli <vasavi.sirnapalli(a)broadcom.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20240730110657.3b69d3c1@gandalf.local.home Fixes: b63db58e2fa5d ("eventfs/tracing: Add callback for release of an eventfs_inode") Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli(a)grsecurity.net> Tested-by: Mathias Krause <minipli(a)grsecurity.net> Conflicts: kernel/trace/trace_events.c [Resolve conflict due to lack of commit a1f157c7a3bb ("tracing: Expand all ring buffers individually") which add tracing_update_buffers() in event_enable_write(), that commit is more of a feature than a bugfix and is not related to the problem fixed by this patch] Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt(a)goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Zheng Yejian <zhengyejian1(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/trace/trace.h | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++ kernel/trace/trace_events.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++------------ kernel/trace/trace_events_hist.c | 4 ++-- kernel/trace/trace_events_inject.c | 2 +- kernel/trace/trace_events_trigger.c | 6 +++--- 5 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace.h b/kernel/trace/trace.h index 5d81b6efaa1e..3ff785aa9444 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/trace.h +++ b/kernel/trace/trace.h @@ -1563,6 +1563,29 @@ static inline void *event_file_data(struct file *filp) extern struct mutex event_mutex; extern struct list_head ftrace_events; +/* + * When the trace_event_file is the filp->i_private pointer, + * it must be taken under the event_mutex lock, and then checked + * if the EVENT_FILE_FL_FREED flag is set. If it is, then the + * data pointed to by the trace_event_file can not be trusted. + * + * Use the event_file_file() to access the trace_event_file from + * the filp the first time under the event_mutex and check for + * NULL. If it is needed to be retrieved again and the event_mutex + * is still held, then the event_file_data() can be used and it + * is guaranteed to be valid. + */ +static inline struct trace_event_file *event_file_file(struct file *filp) +{ + struct trace_event_file *file; + + lockdep_assert_held(&event_mutex); + file = READ_ONCE(file_inode(filp)->i_private); + if (!file || file->flags & EVENT_FILE_FL_FREED) + return NULL; + return file; +} + extern const struct file_operations event_trigger_fops; extern const struct file_operations event_hist_fops; extern const struct file_operations event_hist_debug_fops; diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_events.c b/kernel/trace/trace_events.c index 2ae0f2807438..c68dc50c8bec 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/trace_events.c +++ b/kernel/trace/trace_events.c @@ -1386,12 +1386,12 @@ event_enable_read(struct file *filp, char __user *ubuf, size_t cnt, char buf[4] = "0"; mutex_lock(&event_mutex); - file = event_file_data(filp); + file = event_file_file(filp); if (likely(file)) flags = file->flags; mutex_unlock(&event_mutex); - if (!file || flags & EVENT_FILE_FL_FREED) + if (!file) return -ENODEV; if (flags & EVENT_FILE_FL_ENABLED && @@ -1428,8 +1428,8 @@ event_enable_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *ubuf, size_t cnt, case 1: ret = -ENODEV; mutex_lock(&event_mutex); - file = event_file_data(filp); - if (likely(file && !(file->flags & EVENT_FILE_FL_FREED))) + file = event_file_file(filp); + if (likely(file)) ret = ftrace_event_enable_disable(file, val); mutex_unlock(&event_mutex); break; @@ -1538,7 +1538,8 @@ enum { static void *f_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos) { - struct trace_event_call *call = event_file_data(m->private); + struct trace_event_file *file = event_file_data(m->private); + struct trace_event_call *call = file->event_call; struct list_head *common_head = &ftrace_common_fields; struct list_head *head = trace_get_fields(call); struct list_head *node = v; @@ -1570,7 +1571,8 @@ static void *f_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos) static int f_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) { - struct trace_event_call *call = event_file_data(m->private); + struct trace_event_file *file = event_file_data(m->private); + struct trace_event_call *call = file->event_call; struct ftrace_event_field *field; const char *array_descriptor; @@ -1625,12 +1627,14 @@ static int f_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) static void *f_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos) { + struct trace_event_file *file; void *p = (void *)FORMAT_HEADER; loff_t l = 0; /* ->stop() is called even if ->start() fails */ mutex_lock(&event_mutex); - if (!event_file_data(m->private)) + file = event_file_file(m->private); + if (!file) return ERR_PTR(-ENODEV); while (l < *pos && p) @@ -1704,8 +1708,8 @@ event_filter_read(struct file *filp, char __user *ubuf, size_t cnt, trace_seq_init(s); mutex_lock(&event_mutex); - file = event_file_data(filp); - if (file && !(file->flags & EVENT_FILE_FL_FREED)) + file = event_file_file(filp); + if (file) print_event_filter(file, s); mutex_unlock(&event_mutex); @@ -1734,9 +1738,13 @@ event_filter_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *ubuf, size_t cnt, return PTR_ERR(buf); mutex_lock(&event_mutex); - file = event_file_data(filp); - if (file) - err = apply_event_filter(file, buf); + file = event_file_file(filp); + if (file) { + if (file->flags & EVENT_FILE_FL_FREED) + err = -ENODEV; + else + err = apply_event_filter(file, buf); + } mutex_unlock(&event_mutex); kfree(buf); @@ -2451,7 +2459,6 @@ static int event_callback(const char *name, umode_t *mode, void **data, if (strcmp(name, "format") == 0) { *mode = TRACE_MODE_READ; *fops = &ftrace_event_format_fops; - *data = call; return 1; } diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_events_hist.c b/kernel/trace/trace_events_hist.c index 68aaf0bd7a78..dd16faf0d150 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/trace_events_hist.c +++ b/kernel/trace/trace_events_hist.c @@ -5609,7 +5609,7 @@ static int hist_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) mutex_lock(&event_mutex); - event_file = event_file_data(m->private); + event_file = event_file_file(m->private); if (unlikely(!event_file)) { ret = -ENODEV; goto out_unlock; @@ -5888,7 +5888,7 @@ static int hist_debug_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) mutex_lock(&event_mutex); - event_file = event_file_data(m->private); + event_file = event_file_file(m->private); if (unlikely(!event_file)) { ret = -ENODEV; goto out_unlock; diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_events_inject.c b/kernel/trace/trace_events_inject.c index 8650562bdaa9..a8f076809db4 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/trace_events_inject.c +++ b/kernel/trace/trace_events_inject.c @@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ event_inject_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *ubuf, size_t cnt, strim(buf); mutex_lock(&event_mutex); - file = event_file_data(filp); + file = event_file_file(filp); if (file) { call = file->event_call; size = parse_entry(buf, call, &entry); diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_events_trigger.c b/kernel/trace/trace_events_trigger.c index b33c3861fbbb..76abc9a45f97 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/trace_events_trigger.c +++ b/kernel/trace/trace_events_trigger.c @@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ static void *trigger_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos) /* ->stop() is called even if ->start() fails */ mutex_lock(&event_mutex); - event_file = event_file_data(m->private); + event_file = event_file_file(m->private); if (unlikely(!event_file)) return ERR_PTR(-ENODEV); @@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ static int event_trigger_regex_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) mutex_lock(&event_mutex); - if (unlikely(!event_file_data(file))) { + if (unlikely(!event_file_file(file))) { mutex_unlock(&event_mutex); return -ENODEV; } @@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ static ssize_t event_trigger_regex_write(struct file *file, strim(buf); mutex_lock(&event_mutex); - event_file = event_file_data(file); + event_file = event_file_file(file); if (unlikely(!event_file)) { mutex_unlock(&event_mutex); kfree(buf); -- 2.25.1

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[PATCH OLK-6.6] Bluetooth: MGMT: Add error handling to pair_device()
by Zhengchao Shao 28 Aug '24

28 Aug '24

From: Griffin Kroah-Hartman <griffin(a)kroah.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.11-rc5 commit 538fd3921afac97158d4177139a0ad39f056dbb2 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAMK01 CVE: CVE-2024-43884 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… ------------------------------------------- hci_conn_params_add() never checks for a NULL value and could lead to a NULL pointer dereference causing a crash. Fixed by adding error handling in the function. Cc: Stable <stable(a)kernel.org> Fixes: 5157b8a503fa ("Bluetooth: Fix initializing conn_params in scan phase") Signed-off-by: Griffin Kroah-Hartman <griffin(a)kroah.com> Reported-by: Yiwei Zhang <zhan4630(a)purdue.edu> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao(a)huawei.com> --- net/bluetooth/mgmt.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c b/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c index 0ca6593a029c..3533ac679e42 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c @@ -3449,6 +3449,10 @@ static int pair_device(struct sock *sk, struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data, * will be kept and this function does nothing. */ p = hci_conn_params_add(hdev, &cp->addr.bdaddr, addr_type); + if (!p) { + err = -EIO; + goto unlock; + } if (p->auto_connect == HCI_AUTO_CONN_EXPLICIT) p->auto_connect = HCI_AUTO_CONN_DISABLED; -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] ext4: sanity check for NULL pointer after ext4_force_shutdown
by Zizhi Wo 28 Aug '24

28 Aug '24

From: Wojciech Gładysz <wojciech.gladysz(a)infogain.com> stable inclusion from stable-6.6.47 commit 3f6bbe6e07e5239294ecc3d2efa70d1f98aed52e category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAMM9L CVE: CVE-2024-43898 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 83f4414b8f84249d538905825b088ff3ae555652 ] Test case: 2 threads write short inline data to a file. In ext4_page_mkwrite the resulting inline data is converted. Handling ext4_grp_locked_error with description "block bitmap and bg descriptor inconsistent: X vs Y free clusters" calls ext4_force_shutdown. The conversion clears EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA but fails for ext4_destroy_inline_data_nolock and ext4_mark_iloc_dirty due to ext4_forced_shutdown. The restoration of inline data fails for the same reason not setting EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA. Without the flag set a regular process path in ext4_da_write_end follows trying to dereference page folio private pointer that has not been set. The fix calls early return with -EIO error shall the pointer to private be NULL. Sample crash report: Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address dfff800000000004 KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000020-0x0000000000000027] Mem abort info: ESR = 0x0000000096000005 EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits SET = 0, FnV = 0 EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 FSC = 0x05: level 1 translation fault Data abort info: ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000005, ISS2 = 0x00000000 CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 [dfff800000000004] address between user and kernel address ranges Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000005 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 20274 Comm: syz-executor185 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc7-syzkaller-gfda5695d692c #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024 pstate: 80400005 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : __block_commit_write+0x64/0x2b0 fs/buffer.c:2167 lr : __block_commit_write+0x3c/0x2b0 fs/buffer.c:2160 sp : ffff8000a1957600 x29: ffff8000a1957610 x28: dfff800000000000 x27: ffff0000e30e34b0 x26: 0000000000000000 x25: dfff800000000000 x24: dfff800000000000 x23: fffffdffc397c9e0 x22: 0000000000000020 x21: 0000000000000020 x20: 0000000000000040 x19: fffffdffc397c9c0 x18: 1fffe000367bd196 x17: ffff80008eead000 x16: ffff80008ae89e3c x15: 00000000200000c0 x14: 1fffe0001cbe4e04 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 x11: 0000000000000001 x10: 0000000000ff0100 x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 0000000000000004 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000 x5 : fffffdffc397c9c0 x4 : 0000000000000020 x3 : 0000000000000020 x2 : 0000000000000040 x1 : 0000000000000020 x0 : fffffdffc397c9c0 Call trace: __block_commit_write+0x64/0x2b0 fs/buffer.c:2167 block_write_end+0xb4/0x104 fs/buffer.c:2253 ext4_da_do_write_end fs/ext4/inode.c:2955 [inline] ext4_da_write_end+0x2c4/0xa40 fs/ext4/inode.c:3028 generic_perform_write+0x394/0x588 mm/filemap.c:3985 ext4_buffered_write_iter+0x2c0/0x4ec fs/ext4/file.c:299 ext4_file_write_iter+0x188/0x1780 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2110 [inline] new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:497 [inline] vfs_write+0x968/0xc3c fs/read_write.c:590 ksys_write+0x15c/0x26c fs/read_write.c:643 __do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:655 [inline] __se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:652 [inline] __arm64_sys_write+0x7c/0x90 fs/read_write.c:652 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:34 [inline] invoke_syscall+0x98/0x2b8 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:48 el0_svc_common+0x130/0x23c arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:133 do_el0_svc+0x48/0x58 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:152 el0_svc+0x54/0x168 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:712 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xfc arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:730 el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:598 Code: 97f85911 f94002da 91008356 d343fec8 (38796908) ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- ---------------- Code disassembly (best guess): 0: 97f85911 bl 0xffffffffffe16444 4: f94002da ldr x26, [x22] 8: 91008356 add x22, x26, #0x20 c: d343fec8 lsr x8, x22, #3 * 10: 38796908 ldrb w8, [x8, x25] <-- trapping instruction Reported-by: syzbot+18df508cf00a0598d9a6(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=18df508cf00a0598d9a6 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/000000000000f19a1406109eb5c5@google.com/T/ Signed-off-by: Wojciech Gładysz <wojciech.gladysz(a)infogain.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240703070112.10235-1-wojciech.gladysz@infogain.c… Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso(a)mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: fs/buffer.c fs/ext4/inode.c [Since folio is not defined in the earlier version, page_private is judged ahead of time.] Signed-off-by: Zizhi Wo <wozizhi(a)huawei.com> --- fs/buffer.c | 3 +++ fs/ext4/inode.c | 3 +++ 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/buffer.c b/fs/buffer.c index af88734d1d38..0a813fad9002 100644 --- a/fs/buffer.c +++ b/fs/buffer.c @@ -2037,6 +2037,9 @@ static int __block_commit_write(struct inode *inode, struct page *page, unsigned blocksize; struct buffer_head *bh, *head; + if (!page_private(page)) + return 0; + bh = head = page_buffers(page); blocksize = bh->b_size; diff --git a/fs/ext4/inode.c b/fs/ext4/inode.c index 35033bb43149..6c3e5aedc2ca 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/inode.c +++ b/fs/ext4/inode.c @@ -3155,6 +3155,9 @@ static int ext4_da_write_end(struct file *file, if (unlikely(copied < len) && !PageUptodate(page)) copied = 0; + if (unlikely(!page_private(page))) + return -EIO; + start = pos & (PAGE_SIZE - 1); end = start + copied - 1; -- 2.39.2

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[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] ext4: sanity check for NULL pointer after ext4_force_shutdown
by Zizhi Wo 28 Aug '24

28 Aug '24

From: Wojciech Gładysz <wojciech.gladysz(a)infogain.com> stable inclusion from stable-6.6.47 commit 3f6bbe6e07e5239294ecc3d2efa70d1f98aed52e category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAMM9L CVE: CVE-2024-43898 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 83f4414b8f84249d538905825b088ff3ae555652 ] Test case: 2 threads write short inline data to a file. In ext4_page_mkwrite the resulting inline data is converted. Handling ext4_grp_locked_error with description "block bitmap and bg descriptor inconsistent: X vs Y free clusters" calls ext4_force_shutdown. The conversion clears EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA but fails for ext4_destroy_inline_data_nolock and ext4_mark_iloc_dirty due to ext4_forced_shutdown. The restoration of inline data fails for the same reason not setting EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA. Without the flag set a regular process path in ext4_da_write_end follows trying to dereference page folio private pointer that has not been set. The fix calls early return with -EIO error shall the pointer to private be NULL. Sample crash report: Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address dfff800000000004 KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000020-0x0000000000000027] Mem abort info: ESR = 0x0000000096000005 EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits SET = 0, FnV = 0 EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 FSC = 0x05: level 1 translation fault Data abort info: ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000005, ISS2 = 0x00000000 CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 [dfff800000000004] address between user and kernel address ranges Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000005 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 20274 Comm: syz-executor185 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc7-syzkaller-gfda5695d692c #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024 pstate: 80400005 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : __block_commit_write+0x64/0x2b0 fs/buffer.c:2167 lr : __block_commit_write+0x3c/0x2b0 fs/buffer.c:2160 sp : ffff8000a1957600 x29: ffff8000a1957610 x28: dfff800000000000 x27: ffff0000e30e34b0 x26: 0000000000000000 x25: dfff800000000000 x24: dfff800000000000 x23: fffffdffc397c9e0 x22: 0000000000000020 x21: 0000000000000020 x20: 0000000000000040 x19: fffffdffc397c9c0 x18: 1fffe000367bd196 x17: ffff80008eead000 x16: ffff80008ae89e3c x15: 00000000200000c0 x14: 1fffe0001cbe4e04 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 x11: 0000000000000001 x10: 0000000000ff0100 x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 0000000000000004 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000 x5 : fffffdffc397c9c0 x4 : 0000000000000020 x3 : 0000000000000020 x2 : 0000000000000040 x1 : 0000000000000020 x0 : fffffdffc397c9c0 Call trace: __block_commit_write+0x64/0x2b0 fs/buffer.c:2167 block_write_end+0xb4/0x104 fs/buffer.c:2253 ext4_da_do_write_end fs/ext4/inode.c:2955 [inline] ext4_da_write_end+0x2c4/0xa40 fs/ext4/inode.c:3028 generic_perform_write+0x394/0x588 mm/filemap.c:3985 ext4_buffered_write_iter+0x2c0/0x4ec fs/ext4/file.c:299 ext4_file_write_iter+0x188/0x1780 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2110 [inline] new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:497 [inline] vfs_write+0x968/0xc3c fs/read_write.c:590 ksys_write+0x15c/0x26c fs/read_write.c:643 __do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:655 [inline] __se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:652 [inline] __arm64_sys_write+0x7c/0x90 fs/read_write.c:652 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:34 [inline] invoke_syscall+0x98/0x2b8 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:48 el0_svc_common+0x130/0x23c arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:133 do_el0_svc+0x48/0x58 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:152 el0_svc+0x54/0x168 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:712 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xfc arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:730 el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:598 Code: 97f85911 f94002da 91008356 d343fec8 (38796908) ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- ---------------- Code disassembly (best guess): 0: 97f85911 bl 0xffffffffffe16444 4: f94002da ldr x26, [x22] 8: 91008356 add x22, x26, #0x20 c: d343fec8 lsr x8, x22, #3 * 10: 38796908 ldrb w8, [x8, x25] <-- trapping instruction Reported-by: syzbot+18df508cf00a0598d9a6(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=18df508cf00a0598d9a6 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/000000000000f19a1406109eb5c5@google.com/T/ Signed-off-by: Wojciech Gładysz <wojciech.gladysz(a)infogain.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240703070112.10235-1-wojciech.gladysz@infogain.c… Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso(a)mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: fs/buffer.c fs/ext4/inode.c [Since folio is not defined in the earlier version, page_private is judged ahead of time.] Signed-off-by: Zizhi Wo <wozizhi(a)huawei.com> --- fs/buffer.c | 3 +++ fs/ext4/inode.c | 3 +++ 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/buffer.c b/fs/buffer.c index af88734d1d38..0a813fad9002 100644 --- a/fs/buffer.c +++ b/fs/buffer.c @@ -2037,6 +2037,9 @@ static int __block_commit_write(struct inode *inode, struct page *page, unsigned blocksize; struct buffer_head *bh, *head; + if (!page_private(page)) + return 0; + bh = head = page_buffers(page); blocksize = bh->b_size; diff --git a/fs/ext4/inode.c b/fs/ext4/inode.c index 35033bb43149..743141449809 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/inode.c +++ b/fs/ext4/inode.c @@ -3155,6 +3155,9 @@ static int ext4_da_write_end(struct file *file, if (unlikely(copied < len) && !PageUptodate(page)) copied = 0; + if (!page_private(page)) + return -EIO; + start = pos & (PAGE_SIZE - 1); end = start + copied - 1; -- 2.39.2

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[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] apparmor: Fix null pointer deref when receiving skb during sock creation
by Gu Bowen 28 Aug '24

28 Aug '24

From: Xiao Liang <shaw.leon(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.224 commit 347dcb84a4874b5fb375092c08d8cc4069b94f81 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAKPW7 CVE: CVE-2023-52889 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit fce09ea314505a52f2436397608fa0a5d0934fb1 ] The panic below is observed when receiving ICMP packets with secmark set while an ICMP raw socket is being created. SK_CTX(sk)->label is updated in apparmor_socket_post_create(), but the packet is delivered to the socket before that, causing the null pointer dereference. Drop the packet if label context is not set. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000004c #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 0 PID: 407 Comm: a.out Not tainted 6.4.12-arch1-1 #1 3e6fa2753a2d75925c34ecb78e22e85a65d083df Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/28/2020 RIP: 0010:aa_label_next_confined+0xb/0x40 Code: 00 00 48 89 ef e8 d5 25 0c 00 e9 66 ff ff ff 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 66 0f 1f 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 89 f0 <8b> 77 4c 39 c6 7e 1f 48 63 d0 48 8d 14 d7 eb 0b 83 c0 01 48 83 c2 RSP: 0018:ffffa92940003b08 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 000000000000000e RDX: ffffa92940003be8 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffff8b57471e7800 R08: ffff8b574c642400 R09: 0000000000000002 R10: ffffffffbd820eeb R11: ffffffffbeb7ff00 R12: ffff8b574c642400 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007fb092ea7640(0000) GS:ffff8b577bc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000000000000004c CR3: 00000001020f2005 CR4: 00000000007706f0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <IRQ> ? __die+0x23/0x70 ? page_fault_oops+0x171/0x4e0 ? exc_page_fault+0x7f/0x180 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30 ? aa_label_next_confined+0xb/0x40 apparmor_secmark_check+0xec/0x330 security_sock_rcv_skb+0x35/0x50 sk_filter_trim_cap+0x47/0x250 sock_queue_rcv_skb_reason+0x20/0x60 raw_rcv+0x13c/0x210 raw_local_deliver+0x1f3/0x250 ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x4f/0x2f0 ip_local_deliver_finish+0x76/0xa0 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x89/0xa0 netif_receive_skb+0x119/0x170 ? __netdev_alloc_skb+0x3d/0x140 vmxnet3_rq_rx_complete+0xb23/0x1010 [vmxnet3 56a84f9c97178c57a43a24ec073b45a9d6f01f3a] vmxnet3_poll_rx_only+0x36/0xb0 [vmxnet3 56a84f9c97178c57a43a24ec073b45a9d6f01f3a] __napi_poll+0x28/0x1b0 net_rx_action+0x2a4/0x380 __do_softirq+0xd1/0x2c8 __irq_exit_rcu+0xbb/0xf0 common_interrupt+0x86/0xa0 </IRQ> <TASK> asm_common_interrupt+0x26/0x40 RIP: 0010:apparmor_socket_post_create+0xb/0x200 Code: 08 48 85 ff 75 a1 eb b1 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3 0f 1e fa 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 54 <55> 48 89 fd 53 45 85 c0 0f 84 b2 00 00 00 48 8b 1d 80 56 3f 02 48 RSP: 0018:ffffa92940ce7e50 EFLAGS: 00000286 RAX: ffffffffbc756440 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000001 RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: 0000000000000002 RDI: ffff8b574eaab740 RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffff8b57444cec70 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000003 R13: 0000000000000002 R14: ffff8b574eaab740 R15: ffffffffbd8e4748 ? __pfx_apparmor_socket_post_create+0x10/0x10 security_socket_post_create+0x4b/0x80 __sock_create+0x176/0x1f0 __sys_socket+0x89/0x100 __x64_sys_socket+0x17/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x5d/0x90 ? do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x90 ? do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x90 ? do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc Fixes: ab9f2115081a ("apparmor: Allow filtering based on secmark policy") Signed-off-by: Xiao Liang <shaw.leon(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen(a)canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Gu Bowen <gubowen5(a)huawei.com> --- security/apparmor/lsm.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c index ffeaee5ed968..44eaaa8b7754 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c @@ -1048,6 +1048,13 @@ static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) if (!skb->secmark) return 0; + /* + * If reach here before socket_post_create hook is called, in which + * case label is null, drop the packet. + */ + if (!ctx->label) + return -EACCES; + return apparmor_secmark_check(ctx->label, OP_RECVMSG, AA_MAY_RECEIVE, skb->secmark, sk); } -- 2.25.1

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