From: KP Singh <kpsingh(a)kernel.org>
stable inclusion
from stable-v4.19.276
commit 10543fb3c9b019e45e2045f08f46fdf526add593
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I6V7TU
CVE: CVE-2023-1998
--------------------------------
commit 6921ed9049bc7457f66c1596c5b78aec0dae4a9d upstream.
When plain IBRS is enabled (not enhanced IBRS), the logic in
spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation() determines that STIBP is not needed.
The IBRS bit implicitly protects against cross-thread branch target
injection. However, with legacy IBRS, the IBRS bit is cleared on
returning to userspace for performance reasons which leaves userspace
threads vulnerable to cross-thread branch target injection against which
STIBP protects.
Exclude IBRS from the spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode() check to allow for
enabling STIBP (through seccomp/prctl() by default or always-on, if
selected by spectre_v2_user kernel cmdline parameter).
[ bp: Massage. ]
Fixes: 7c693f54c873 ("x86/speculation: Add spectre_v2=ibrs option to support Kernel IBRS")
Reported-by: José Oliveira <joseloliveira11(a)gmail.com>
Reported-by: Rodrigo Branco <rodrigo(a)kernelhacking.com>
Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp(a)alien8.de>
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230220120127.1975241-1-kpsingh@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230221184908.2349578-1-kpsingh@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Wei Li <liwei391(a)huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Wang Weiyang <wangweiyang2(a)huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Xiongfeng Wang <wangxiongfeng2(a)huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Yongqiang Liu <liuyongqiang13(a)huawei.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++-------
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 836000481438..a7becbe9a890 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -973,14 +973,18 @@ spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(void)
return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO;
}
-static inline bool spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode)
+static inline bool spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode)
{
- return mode == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS ||
- mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS ||
+ return mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS ||
mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE ||
mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE;
}
+static inline bool spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode)
+{
+ return spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(mode) || mode == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS;
+}
+
static void __init
spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void)
{
@@ -1043,12 +1047,19 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void)
}
/*
- * If no STIBP, IBRS or enhanced IBRS is enabled, or SMT impossible,
- * STIBP is not required.
+ * If no STIBP, enhanced IBRS is enabled, or SMT impossible, STIBP
+ * is not required.
+ *
+ * Enhanced IBRS also protects against cross-thread branch target
+ * injection in user-mode as the IBRS bit remains always set which
+ * implicitly enables cross-thread protections. However, in legacy IBRS
+ * mode, the IBRS bit is set only on kernel entry and cleared on return
+ * to userspace. This disables the implicit cross-thread protection,
+ * so allow for STIBP to be selected in that case.
*/
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP) ||
!smt_possible ||
- spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled))
+ spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled))
return;
/*
@@ -2084,7 +2095,7 @@ static ssize_t mmio_stale_data_show_state(char *buf)
static char *stibp_state(void)
{
- if (spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled))
+ if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled))
return "";
switch (spectre_v2_user_stibp) {
--
2.25.1
From: KP Singh <kpsingh(a)kernel.org>
stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.173
commit abfed855f05863d292de2d0ebab4656791bab9c8
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I6V7TU
CVE: CVE-2023-1998
Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id…
--------------------------------
commit 6921ed9049bc7457f66c1596c5b78aec0dae4a9d upstream.
When plain IBRS is enabled (not enhanced IBRS), the logic in
spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation() determines that STIBP is not needed.
The IBRS bit implicitly protects against cross-thread branch target
injection. However, with legacy IBRS, the IBRS bit is cleared on
returning to userspace for performance reasons which leaves userspace
threads vulnerable to cross-thread branch target injection against which
STIBP protects.
Exclude IBRS from the spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode() check to allow for
enabling STIBP (through seccomp/prctl() by default or always-on, if
selected by spectre_v2_user kernel cmdline parameter).
[ bp: Massage. ]
Fixes: 7c693f54c873 ("x86/speculation: Add spectre_v2=ibrs option to support Kernel IBRS")
Reported-by: José Oliveira <joseloliveira11(a)gmail.com>
Reported-by: Rodrigo Branco <rodrigo(a)kernelhacking.com>
Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp(a)alien8.de>
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230220120127.1975241-1-kpsingh@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230221184908.2349578-1-kpsingh@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Wei Li <liwei391(a)huawei.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++-------
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 25f3fad210e0..0dd4f8a8d821 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1051,14 +1051,18 @@ spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(void)
return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO;
}
-static inline bool spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode)
+static inline bool spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode)
{
- return mode == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS ||
- mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS ||
+ return mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS ||
mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE ||
mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE;
}
+static inline bool spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode)
+{
+ return spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(mode) || mode == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS;
+}
+
static void __init
spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void)
{
@@ -1121,12 +1125,19 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void)
}
/*
- * If no STIBP, IBRS or enhanced IBRS is enabled, or SMT impossible,
- * STIBP is not required.
+ * If no STIBP, enhanced IBRS is enabled, or SMT impossible, STIBP
+ * is not required.
+ *
+ * Enhanced IBRS also protects against cross-thread branch target
+ * injection in user-mode as the IBRS bit remains always set which
+ * implicitly enables cross-thread protections. However, in legacy IBRS
+ * mode, the IBRS bit is set only on kernel entry and cleared on return
+ * to userspace. This disables the implicit cross-thread protection,
+ * so allow for STIBP to be selected in that case.
*/
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP) ||
!smt_possible ||
- spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled))
+ spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled))
return;
/*
@@ -2220,7 +2231,7 @@ static ssize_t mmio_stale_data_show_state(char *buf)
static char *stibp_state(void)
{
- if (spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled))
+ if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled))
return "";
switch (spectre_v2_user_stibp) {
--
2.25.1
From: Zheng Wang <zyytlz.wz(a)163.com>
mainline inclusion
from mainline-v6.3-rc3
commit 5000fe6c27827a61d8250a7e4a1d26c3298ef4f6
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I6UW64
CVE: CVE-2023-1990
Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit?i…
--------------------------------
This bug influences both st_nci_i2c_remove and st_nci_spi_remove.
Take st_nci_i2c_remove as an example.
In st_nci_i2c_probe, it called ndlc_probe and bound &ndlc->sm_work
with llt_ndlc_sm_work.
When it calls ndlc_recv or timeout handler, it will finally call
schedule_work to start the work.
When we call st_nci_i2c_remove to remove the driver, there
may be a sequence as follows:
Fix it by finishing the work before cleanup in ndlc_remove
CPU0 CPU1
|llt_ndlc_sm_work
st_nci_i2c_remove |
ndlc_remove |
st_nci_remove |
nci_free_device|
kfree(ndev) |
//free ndlc->ndev |
|llt_ndlc_rcv_queue
|nci_recv_frame
|//use ndlc->ndev
Fixes: 35630df68d60 ("NFC: st21nfcb: Add driver for STMicroelectronics ST21NFCB NFC chip")
Signed-off-by: Zheng Wang <zyytlz.wz(a)163.com>
Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski(a)linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230312160837.2040857-1-zyytlz.wz@163.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Wei Li <liwei391(a)huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Xiongfeng Wang <wangxiongfeng2(a)huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Wang Weiyang <wangweiyang2(a)huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Yongqiang Liu <liuyongqiang13(a)huawei.com>
---
drivers/nfc/st-nci/ndlc.c | 6 ++++--
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/nfc/st-nci/ndlc.c b/drivers/nfc/st-nci/ndlc.c
index f26d938d240f..12d73f9dbe9f 100644
--- a/drivers/nfc/st-nci/ndlc.c
+++ b/drivers/nfc/st-nci/ndlc.c
@@ -297,13 +297,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(ndlc_probe);
void ndlc_remove(struct llt_ndlc *ndlc)
{
- st_nci_remove(ndlc->ndev);
-
/* cancel timers */
del_timer_sync(&ndlc->t1_timer);
del_timer_sync(&ndlc->t2_timer);
ndlc->t2_active = false;
ndlc->t1_active = false;
+ /* cancel work */
+ cancel_work_sync(&ndlc->sm_work);
+
+ st_nci_remove(ndlc->ndev);
skb_queue_purge(&ndlc->rcv_q);
skb_queue_purge(&ndlc->send_q);
--
2.25.1