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[PATCH OLK-5.10 v2] net: fix one NULL pointer dereference bug in net_rship module
by Liu Jian 05 Jul '24

05 Jul '24

hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/IAAZJ8 -------------------------------- The call trace as below: Call trace: __netdev_alloc_skb+0x8c/0x1e0 ad_lacpdu_send+0x34/0x18c [bonding] ad_tx_machine+0xcc/0x174 [bonding] bond_3ad_state_machine_handler+0x120/0x470 [bonding] process_one_work+0x1d8/0x4e0 worker_thread+0x154/0x420 kthread+0x108/0x150 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 Fixes: 64ba5634c4c6 ("net: add some bpf hooks in tcp stack for network numa relationship") Signed-off-by: Liu Jian <liujian56(a)huawei.com> --- include/net/net_rship.h | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/net/net_rship.h b/include/net/net_rship.h index ad8af5a5cb9b..dda4dd732bd0 100644 --- a/include/net/net_rship.h +++ b/include/net/net_rship.h @@ -222,6 +222,9 @@ static inline void net_rship_skb_record_dev_rxinfo(struct sk_buff *skb, struct n if (gnet_bpf_enabled(GNET_RCV_NIC_NODE)) { struct sched_net_rship_skb *ext = __get_skb_net_rship(skb); + if (!dev) + return; + ext->rx_dev_idx = dev->ifindex; ext->rx_dev_net_cookie = dev_net(dev)->net_cookie; } -- 2.34.1

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[openeuler:OLK-6.6 3342/10589] crypto/asymmetric_keys/pgp_public_key.c:359:undefined reference to `public_key_subtype'
by kernel test robot 05 Jul '24

05 Jul '24

tree: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel.git OLK-6.6 head: 17b5ba51d6bc20767e5e5c03df0acf15609b6d11 commit: 43d4042e06d2bf96adf67d25e8d91653507a4cf9 [3342/10589] KEYS: Provide a function to load keys from a PGP keyring blob config: x86_64-randconfig-014-20240705 (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20240705/202407051911.Va4emssv-lkp@…) compiler: gcc-13 (Ubuntu 13.2.0-4ubuntu3) 13.2.0 reproduce (this is a W=1 build): (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20240705/202407051911.Va4emssv-lkp@…) If you fix the issue in a separate patch/commit (i.e. not just a new version of the same patch/commit), kindly add following tags | Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp(a)intel.com> | Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202407051911.Va4emssv-lkp@intel.com/ All errors (new ones prefixed by >>): ld: vmlinux.o: in function `pgp_key_parse': >> crypto/asymmetric_keys/pgp_public_key.c:359:(.text+0x1b11e1c): undefined reference to `public_key_subtype' >> ld: crypto/asymmetric_keys/pgp_public_key.c:359:(.text+0x1b11e3b): undefined reference to `public_key_subtype' ld: crypto/asymmetric_keys/pgp_public_key.c:360:(.text+0x1b11e67): undefined reference to `public_key_subtype' >> ld: crypto/asymmetric_keys/pgp_public_key.c:369:(.text+0x1b11f38): undefined reference to `public_key_free' ld: crypto/asymmetric_keys/pgp_public_key.c:359:(.text+0x1b11fbf): undefined reference to `public_key_subtype' Kconfig warnings: (for reference only) WARNING: unmet direct dependencies detected for PGP_KEY_PARSER Depends on [n]: CRYPTO [=y] && ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE [=y] && ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE [=n] Selected by [y]: - PGP_PRELOAD [=y] && CRYPTO [=y] && ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE [=y] vim +359 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pgp_public_key.c 4e59d757dc3f7f Roberto Sassu 2023-09-12 300 4e59d757dc3f7f Roberto Sassu 2023-09-12 301 /* 4e59d757dc3f7f Roberto Sassu 2023-09-12 302 * Attempt to parse the instantiation data blob for a key as a PGP packet 4e59d757dc3f7f Roberto Sassu 2023-09-12 303 * message holding a key. 4e59d757dc3f7f Roberto Sassu 2023-09-12 304 */ 4e59d757dc3f7f Roberto Sassu 2023-09-12 305 static int pgp_key_parse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) 4e59d757dc3f7f Roberto Sassu 2023-09-12 306 { 4e59d757dc3f7f Roberto Sassu 2023-09-12 307 struct pgp_key_data_parse_context ctx; 4e59d757dc3f7f Roberto Sassu 2023-09-12 308 int ret; 4e59d757dc3f7f Roberto Sassu 2023-09-12 309 4e59d757dc3f7f Roberto Sassu 2023-09-12 310 kenter(""); 4e59d757dc3f7f Roberto Sassu 2023-09-12 311 4e59d757dc3f7f Roberto Sassu 2023-09-12 312 memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); e8c01f299ab793 David Howells 2023-09-12 313 ctx.pgp.types_of_interest = (1 << PGP_PKT_PUBLIC_KEY) | e8c01f299ab793 David Howells 2023-09-12 314 (1 << PGP_PKT_USER_ID); 4e59d757dc3f7f Roberto Sassu 2023-09-12 315 ctx.pgp.process_packet = pgp_process_public_key; 4e59d757dc3f7f Roberto Sassu 2023-09-12 316 4e59d757dc3f7f Roberto Sassu 2023-09-12 317 ret = pgp_parse_packets(prep->data, prep->datalen, &ctx.pgp); 4e59d757dc3f7f Roberto Sassu 2023-09-12 318 if (ret < 0) 4e59d757dc3f7f Roberto Sassu 2023-09-12 319 goto error; 4e59d757dc3f7f Roberto Sassu 2023-09-12 320 e8c01f299ab793 David Howells 2023-09-12 321 if (!ctx.fingerprint) { e8c01f299ab793 David Howells 2023-09-12 322 ret = -EINVAL; e8c01f299ab793 David Howells 2023-09-12 323 goto error; e8c01f299ab793 David Howells 2023-09-12 324 } e8c01f299ab793 David Howells 2023-09-12 325 e8c01f299ab793 David Howells 2023-09-12 326 if (ctx.user_id && ctx.user_id_len > 0) { e8c01f299ab793 David Howells 2023-09-12 327 /* Propose a description for the key e8c01f299ab793 David Howells 2023-09-12 328 * (user ID without the comment) e8c01f299ab793 David Howells 2023-09-12 329 */ e8c01f299ab793 David Howells 2023-09-12 330 size_t ulen = ctx.user_id_len, flen = ctx.fingerprint_len; e8c01f299ab793 David Howells 2023-09-12 331 const char *p; e8c01f299ab793 David Howells 2023-09-12 332 e8c01f299ab793 David Howells 2023-09-12 333 p = memchr(ctx.user_id, '(', ulen); e8c01f299ab793 David Howells 2023-09-12 334 if (p) { e8c01f299ab793 David Howells 2023-09-12 335 /* Remove the comment */ e8c01f299ab793 David Howells 2023-09-12 336 do { e8c01f299ab793 David Howells 2023-09-12 337 p--; e8c01f299ab793 David Howells 2023-09-12 338 } while (*p == ' ' && p > ctx.user_id); e8c01f299ab793 David Howells 2023-09-12 339 if (*p != ' ') e8c01f299ab793 David Howells 2023-09-12 340 p++; e8c01f299ab793 David Howells 2023-09-12 341 ulen = p - ctx.user_id; e8c01f299ab793 David Howells 2023-09-12 342 } e8c01f299ab793 David Howells 2023-09-12 343 e8c01f299ab793 David Howells 2023-09-12 344 if (ulen > 255 - 9) e8c01f299ab793 David Howells 2023-09-12 345 ulen = 255 - 9; e8c01f299ab793 David Howells 2023-09-12 346 prep->description = kmalloc(ulen + 1 + 8 + 1, GFP_KERNEL); e8c01f299ab793 David Howells 2023-09-12 347 ret = -ENOMEM; e8c01f299ab793 David Howells 2023-09-12 348 if (!prep->description) e8c01f299ab793 David Howells 2023-09-12 349 goto error; e8c01f299ab793 David Howells 2023-09-12 350 memcpy(prep->description, ctx.user_id, ulen); e8c01f299ab793 David Howells 2023-09-12 351 prep->description[ulen] = ' '; e8c01f299ab793 David Howells 2023-09-12 352 memcpy(prep->description + ulen + 1, e8c01f299ab793 David Howells 2023-09-12 353 ctx.fingerprint + flen - 8, 8); e8c01f299ab793 David Howells 2023-09-12 354 prep->description[ulen + 9] = 0; e8c01f299ab793 David Howells 2023-09-12 355 pr_debug("desc '%s'\n", prep->description); e8c01f299ab793 David Howells 2023-09-12 356 } e8c01f299ab793 David Howells 2023-09-12 357 4e59d757dc3f7f Roberto Sassu 2023-09-12 358 /* We're pinning the module by being linked against it */ 4e59d757dc3f7f Roberto Sassu 2023-09-12 @359 __module_get(public_key_subtype.owner); 4e59d757dc3f7f Roberto Sassu 2023-09-12 360 prep->payload.data[asym_subtype] = &public_key_subtype; 4e59d757dc3f7f Roberto Sassu 2023-09-12 361 prep->payload.data[asym_key_ids] = pgp_key_generate_id(&ctx); 4e59d757dc3f7f Roberto Sassu 2023-09-12 362 prep->payload.data[asym_crypto] = ctx.pub; 4e59d757dc3f7f Roberto Sassu 2023-09-12 363 prep->quotalen = 100; 4e59d757dc3f7f Roberto Sassu 2023-09-12 364 kfree(ctx.fingerprint); 4e59d757dc3f7f Roberto Sassu 2023-09-12 365 kfree(ctx.raw_fingerprint); 4e59d757dc3f7f Roberto Sassu 2023-09-12 366 return 0; 4e59d757dc3f7f Roberto Sassu 2023-09-12 367 4e59d757dc3f7f Roberto Sassu 2023-09-12 368 error: 4e59d757dc3f7f Roberto Sassu 2023-09-12 @369 public_key_free(ctx.pub); 4e59d757dc3f7f Roberto Sassu 2023-09-12 370 kfree(ctx.fingerprint); 4e59d757dc3f7f Roberto Sassu 2023-09-12 371 kfree(ctx.raw_fingerprint); 4e59d757dc3f7f Roberto Sassu 2023-09-12 372 return ret; 4e59d757dc3f7f Roberto Sassu 2023-09-12 373 } 4e59d757dc3f7f Roberto Sassu 2023-09-12 374 :::::: The code at line 359 was first introduced by commit :::::: 4e59d757dc3f7f2e2a646a2e3f0f271ae4599eeb KEYS: PGP data parser :::::: TO: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu(a)huawei.com> :::::: CC: zgzxx <zhangguangzhi3(a)huawei.com> -- 0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service https://github.com/intel/lkp-tests/wiki

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[PATCH OLK-6.6] net: fix wrong return value in bpf_sock_ops_get_uid_gid
by Liu Jian 05 Jul '24

05 Jul '24

hulk inclusion category: feature bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I8KU3B CVE: NA -------------------------------- We should return 0 on success. Fixes: e62b4a1c5593 ("bpf: Add bpf_get_sockops_uid_gid helper function") Signed-off-by: Liu Jian <liujian56(a)huawei.com> --- net/core/filter.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c index 6ec353bf36f3..c88f51f7d3f9 100644 --- a/net/core/filter.c +++ b/net/core/filter.c @@ -5675,7 +5675,7 @@ static int bpf_sock_ops_get_uid_gid(struct bpf_sock_ops_kern *bpf_sock, *(u32 *)optval = from_kgid_munged(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, gid); *((u32 *)optval + 1) = from_kuid_munged(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, uid); - return sizeof(u64); + return 0; } static int bpf_sk_original_addr(struct bpf_sock_ops_kern *bpf_sock, -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] net: fix one NULL pointer dereference bug in net_rship module
by Liu Jian 05 Jul '24

05 Jul '24

hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/IAAZJ8 -------------------------------- The call trace as below: Call trace: __netdev_alloc_skb+0x8c/0x1e0 ad_lacpdu_send+0x34/0x18c [bonding] ad_tx_machine+0xcc/0x174 [bonding] bond_3ad_state_machine_handler+0x120/0x470 [bonding] process_one_work+0x1d8/0x4e0 worker_thread+0x154/0x420 kthread+0x108/0x150 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 Signed-off-by: Liu Jian <liujian56(a)huawei.com> --- include/net/net_rship.h | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/net/net_rship.h b/include/net/net_rship.h index ad8af5a5cb9b..dda4dd732bd0 100644 --- a/include/net/net_rship.h +++ b/include/net/net_rship.h @@ -222,6 +222,9 @@ static inline void net_rship_skb_record_dev_rxinfo(struct sk_buff *skb, struct n if (gnet_bpf_enabled(GNET_RCV_NIC_NODE)) { struct sched_net_rship_skb *ext = __get_skb_net_rship(skb); + if (!dev) + return; + ext->rx_dev_idx = dev->ifindex; ext->rx_dev_net_cookie = dev_net(dev)->net_cookie; } -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] drm/exynos: fix a possible null-pointer dereference due to data race in exynos_drm_crtc_atomic_disable()
by Hui Tang 05 Jul '24

05 Jul '24

From: Tuo Li <islituo(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.6-rc1 commit 2e63972a2de14482d0eae1a03a73e379f1c3f44c category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I917IV CVE: CVE-2024-22386 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… ----------------------------------- The variable crtc->state->event is often protected by the lock crtc->dev->event_lock when is accessed. However, it is accessed as a condition of an if statement in exynos_drm_crtc_atomic_disable() without holding the lock: if (crtc->state->event && !crtc->state->active) However, if crtc->state->event is changed to NULL by another thread right after the conditions of the if statement is checked to be true, a null-pointer dereference can occur in drm_crtc_send_vblank_event(): e->pipe = pipe; To fix this possible null-pointer dereference caused by data race, the spin lock coverage is extended to protect the if statement as well as the function call to drm_crtc_send_vblank_event(). Reported-by: BassCheck <bass(a)buaa.edu.cn> Link: https://sites.google.com/view/basscheck/home Signed-off-by: Tuo Li <islituo(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski(a)linaro.org> Added relevant link. Signed-off-by: Inki Dae <inki.dae(a)samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Hui Tang <tanghui20(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/gpu/drm/exynos/exynos_drm_crtc.c | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/exynos/exynos_drm_crtc.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/exynos/exynos_drm_crtc.c index 2696289ecc78..b3e23ace5869 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/exynos/exynos_drm_crtc.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/exynos/exynos_drm_crtc.c @@ -43,13 +43,12 @@ static void exynos_drm_crtc_atomic_disable(struct drm_crtc *crtc, if (exynos_crtc->ops->disable) exynos_crtc->ops->disable(exynos_crtc); + spin_lock_irq(&crtc->dev->event_lock); if (crtc->state->event && !crtc->state->active) { - spin_lock_irq(&crtc->dev->event_lock); drm_crtc_send_vblank_event(crtc, crtc->state->event); - spin_unlock_irq(&crtc->dev->event_lock); - crtc->state->event = NULL; } + spin_unlock_irq(&crtc->dev->event_lock); } static int exynos_crtc_atomic_check(struct drm_crtc *crtc, -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] drm/exynos: fix a possible null-pointer dereference due to data race in exynos_drm_crtc_atomic_disable()
by Hui Tang 05 Jul '24

05 Jul '24

From: Tuo Li <islituo(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6-rc1 commit 2e63972a2de14482d0eae1a03a73e379f1c3f44c category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I917IV CVE: CVE-2024-22386 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… --------------------------- The variable crtc->state->event is often protected by the lock crtc->dev->event_lock when is accessed. However, it is accessed as a condition of an if statement in exynos_drm_crtc_atomic_disable() without holding the lock: if (crtc->state->event && !crtc->state->active) However, if crtc->state->event is changed to NULL by another thread right after the conditions of the if statement is checked to be true, a null-pointer dereference can occur in drm_crtc_send_vblank_event(): e->pipe = pipe; To fix this possible null-pointer dereference caused by data race, the spin lock coverage is extended to protect the if statement as well as the function call to drm_crtc_send_vblank_event(). Reported-by: BassCheck <bass(a)buaa.edu.cn> Link: https://sites.google.com/view/basscheck/home Signed-off-by: Tuo Li <islituo(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski(a)linaro.org> Added relevant link. Signed-off-by: Inki Dae <inki.dae(a)samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Hui Tang <tanghui20(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/gpu/drm/exynos/exynos_drm_crtc.c | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/exynos/exynos_drm_crtc.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/exynos/exynos_drm_crtc.c index 2696289ecc78..b3e23ace5869 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/exynos/exynos_drm_crtc.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/exynos/exynos_drm_crtc.c @@ -43,13 +43,12 @@ static void exynos_drm_crtc_atomic_disable(struct drm_crtc *crtc, if (exynos_crtc->ops->disable) exynos_crtc->ops->disable(exynos_crtc); + spin_lock_irq(&crtc->dev->event_lock); if (crtc->state->event && !crtc->state->active) { - spin_lock_irq(&crtc->dev->event_lock); drm_crtc_send_vblank_event(crtc, crtc->state->event); - spin_unlock_irq(&crtc->dev->event_lock); - crtc->state->event = NULL; } + spin_unlock_irq(&crtc->dev->event_lock); } static int exynos_crtc_atomic_check(struct drm_crtc *crtc, -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1 0/3] CVE-2024-38598
by Li Nan 05 Jul '24

05 Jul '24

Li Nan (2): Revert "md/raid10: fix slab-out-of-bounds in md_bitmap_get_counter" md/raid10: check slab-out-of-bounds in md_bitmap_get_counter Yu Kuai (1): md: fix resync softlockup when bitmap size is less than array size drivers/md/md-bitmap.c | 24 +++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) -- 2.39.2

2 4

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/3] CVE-2024-38598
by Li Nan 05 Jul '24

05 Jul '24

Li Nan (2): Revert "md/raid10: fix slab-out-of-bounds in md_bitmap_get_counter" md/raid10: check slab-out-of-bounds in md_bitmap_get_counter Yu Kuai (1): md: fix resync softlockup when bitmap size is less than array size drivers/md/md-bitmap.c | 24 +++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) -- 2.39.2

2 4

[OLK-6.6] usb-storage: alauda: Check whether the media is initialized
by Jinjiang Tu 05 Jul '24

05 Jul '24

From: Shichao Lai <shichaorai(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.10-rc4 commit 16637fea001ab3c8df528a8995b3211906165a30 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IA6YQV CVE: CVE-2024-38619 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- The member "uzonesize" of struct alauda_info will remain 0 if alauda_init_media() fails, potentially causing divide errors in alauda_read_data() and alauda_write_lba(). - Add a member "media_initialized" to struct alauda_info. - Change a condition in alauda_check_media() to ensure the first initialization. - Add an error check for the return value of alauda_init_media(). Fixes: e80b0fade09e ("[PATCH] USB Storage: add alauda support") Reported-by: xingwei lee <xrivendell7(a)gmail.com> Reported-by: yue sun <samsun1006219(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Alan Stern <stern(a)rowland.harvard.edu> Signed-off-by: Shichao Lai <shichaorai(a)gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240526012745.2852061-1-shichaorai@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Jinjiang Tu <tujinjiang(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/usb/storage/alauda.c | 9 ++++++--- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/storage/alauda.c b/drivers/usb/storage/alauda.c index 115f05a6201a..40d34cc28344 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/storage/alauda.c +++ b/drivers/usb/storage/alauda.c @@ -105,6 +105,8 @@ struct alauda_info { unsigned char sense_key; unsigned long sense_asc; /* additional sense code */ unsigned long sense_ascq; /* additional sense code qualifier */ + + bool media_initialized; }; #define short_pack(lsb,msb) ( ((u16)(lsb)) | ( ((u16)(msb))<<8 ) ) @@ -476,11 +478,12 @@ static int alauda_check_media(struct us_data *us) } /* Check for media change */ - if (status[0] & 0x08) { + if (status[0] & 0x08 || !info->media_initialized) { usb_stor_dbg(us, "Media change detected\n"); alauda_free_maps(&MEDIA_INFO(us)); - alauda_init_media(us); - + rc = alauda_init_media(us); + if (rc == USB_STOR_TRANSPORT_GOOD) + info->media_initialized = true; info->sense_key = UNIT_ATTENTION; info->sense_asc = 0x28; info->sense_ascq = 0x00; -- 2.25.1

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[openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] ksmbd: fix wrong DataOffset validation of create context
by Jinjiang Tu 05 Jul '24

05 Jul '24

From: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon(a)kernel.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.6-rc1 commit 17d5b135bb720832364e8f55f6a887a3c7ec8fdb category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAAVBH CVE: CVE-2023-4458 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- If ->DataOffset of create context is 0, DataBuffer size is not correctly validated. This patch change wrong validation code and consider tag length in request. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: zdi-disclosures(a)trendmicro.com # ZDI-CAN-21824 Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench(a)microsoft.com> Conflicts: fs/ksmbd/oplock.c fs/smb/server/oplock.c [oplock.c hasn't moved from fs/ksmbd to fs/smb/server.] Signed-off-by: Jinjiang Tu <tujinjiang(a)huawei.com> --- fs/ksmbd/oplock.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/ksmbd/oplock.c b/fs/ksmbd/oplock.c index fc5b2137002f..6df455a54b70 100644 --- a/fs/ksmbd/oplock.c +++ b/fs/ksmbd/oplock.c @@ -1488,7 +1488,7 @@ struct create_context *smb2_find_context_vals(void *open_req, const char *tag, i name_len < 4 || name_off + name_len > cc_len || (value_off & 0x7) != 0 || - (value_off && (value_off < name_off + name_len)) || + (value_len && value_off < name_off + (name_len < 8 ? 8 : name_len)) || ((u64)value_off + value_len > cc_len)) return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); -- 2.25.1

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