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[PATCH OLK-6.6 00/11] xsched: XCU Partition
by Zicheng Qu 25 Nov '25

25 Nov '25

Zicheng Qu (11): xsched: unify log prefix format and remove duplicated prefix macros xsched: enforce valid xsched scheduler config dependencies xsched: add missing spin_unlock() in xcu_move_task() error path xsched: avoid sleeping while holding spinlock in xcu_move_task() xsched: remove parent->lock and rely on cgroup_mutex for shares update xsched: unify root detection logic for cgroups xsched: replace hard-coded numeric values xsched: modify the logic for inc and dec the count value xsched: add null check for sched in xsched_xse_set_class xsched: rename vstream->id to vstream->sq_id xsched: move stream_lock into xsched_vsm_add_tail() to avoid sleeping in atomic context arch/arm64/configs/openeuler_defconfig | 3 +- arch/x86/configs/openeuler_defconfig | 3 +- drivers/xcu/xcu_group.c | 2 + include/linux/vstream.h | 2 +- include/linux/xsched.h | 76 ++++++++--------------- kernel/xsched/Kconfig | 5 +- kernel/xsched/cgroup.c | 79 ++++++++++-------------- kernel/xsched/core.c | 83 ++++++++++++++------------ kernel/xsched/vstream.c | 29 +++------ 9 files changed, 119 insertions(+), 163 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 12

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/2] Fix CVE-2024-53179
by Long Li 25 Nov '25

25 Nov '25

This patch set fix CVE-2024-53179 Paulo Alcantara (1): smb: client: fix use-after-free of signing key Shyam Prasad N (1): cifs: missed ref-counting smb session in find fs/cifs/smb2proto.h | 2 -- fs/cifs/smb2transport.c | 59 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- 2 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) -- 2.39.2

2 3

[PATCH OLK-6.6] netfilter: nft_objref: validate objref and objrefmap expressions
by Dong Chenchen 25 Nov '25

25 Nov '25

From: Fernando Fernandez Mancera <fmancera(a)suse.de> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.113 commit 0028e0134c64d9ed21728341a74fcfc59cd0f944 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/ID6BWD CVE: CVE-2025-40206 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit f359b809d54c6e3dd1d039b97e0b68390b0e53e4 ] Referencing a synproxy stateful object from OUTPUT hook causes kernel crash due to infinite recursive calls: BUG: TASK stack guard page was hit at 000000008bda5b8c (stack is 000000003ab1c4a5..00000000494d8b12) [...] Call Trace: __find_rr_leaf+0x99/0x230 fib6_table_lookup+0x13b/0x2d0 ip6_pol_route+0xa4/0x400 fib6_rule_lookup+0x156/0x240 ip6_route_output_flags+0xc6/0x150 __nf_ip6_route+0x23/0x50 synproxy_send_tcp_ipv6+0x106/0x200 synproxy_send_client_synack_ipv6+0x1aa/0x1f0 nft_synproxy_do_eval+0x263/0x310 nft_do_chain+0x5a8/0x5f0 [nf_tables nft_do_chain_inet+0x98/0x110 nf_hook_slow+0x43/0xc0 __ip6_local_out+0xf0/0x170 ip6_local_out+0x17/0x70 synproxy_send_tcp_ipv6+0x1a2/0x200 synproxy_send_client_synack_ipv6+0x1aa/0x1f0 [...] Implement objref and objrefmap expression validate functions. Currently, only NFT_OBJECT_SYNPROXY object type requires validation. This will also handle a jump to a chain using a synproxy object from the OUTPUT hook. Now when trying to reference a synproxy object in the OUTPUT hook, nft will produce the following error: synproxy_crash.nft: Error: Could not process rule: Operation not supported synproxy name mysynproxy ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ Fixes: ee394f96ad75 ("netfilter: nft_synproxy: add synproxy stateful object support") Reported-by: Georg Pfuetzenreuter <georg.pfuetzenreuter(a)suse.com> Closes: https://bugzilla.suse.com/1250237 Signed-off-by: Fernando Fernandez Mancera <fmancera(a)suse.de> Reviewed-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw(a)strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: net/netfilter/nft_objref.c [commit eaf9b2c875ec is not backport] Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- net/netfilter/nft_objref.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 41 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_objref.c b/net/netfilter/nft_objref.c index 509011b1ef59..2e024f4dd603 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nft_objref.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_objref.c @@ -22,6 +22,36 @@ void nft_objref_eval(const struct nft_expr *expr, obj->ops->eval(obj, regs, pkt); } +static int nft_objref_validate_obj_type(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, u32 type) +{ + unsigned int hooks; + + switch (type) { + case NFT_OBJECT_SYNPROXY: + if (ctx->family != NFPROTO_IPV4 && + ctx->family != NFPROTO_IPV6 && + ctx->family != NFPROTO_INET) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + + hooks = (1 << NF_INET_LOCAL_IN) | (1 << NF_INET_FORWARD); + + return nft_chain_validate_hooks(ctx->chain, hooks); + default: + break; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int nft_objref_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, + const struct nft_expr *expr, + const struct nft_data **data) +{ + struct nft_object *obj = nft_objref_priv(expr); + + return nft_objref_validate_obj_type(ctx, obj->ops->type->type); +} + static int nft_objref_init(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, const struct nft_expr *expr, const struct nlattr * const tb[]) @@ -93,6 +123,7 @@ static const struct nft_expr_ops nft_objref_ops = { .activate = nft_objref_activate, .deactivate = nft_objref_deactivate, .dump = nft_objref_dump, + .validate = nft_objref_validate, .reduce = NFT_REDUCE_READONLY, }; @@ -198,6 +229,15 @@ static void nft_objref_map_destroy(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, nf_tables_destroy_set(ctx, priv->set); } +static int nft_objref_map_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, + const struct nft_expr *expr, + const struct nft_data **data) +{ + const struct nft_objref_map *priv = nft_expr_priv(expr); + + return nft_objref_validate_obj_type(ctx, priv->set->objtype); +} + static const struct nft_expr_ops nft_objref_map_ops = { .type = &nft_objref_type, .size = NFT_EXPR_SIZE(sizeof(struct nft_objref_map)), @@ -207,6 +247,7 @@ static const struct nft_expr_ops nft_objref_map_ops = { .deactivate = nft_objref_map_deactivate, .destroy = nft_objref_map_destroy, .dump = nft_objref_map_dump, + .validate = nft_objref_map_validate, .reduce = NFT_REDUCE_READONLY, }; -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] net/ip6_tunnel: Prevent perpetual tunnel growth
by Dong Chenchen 25 Nov '25

25 Nov '25

From: Dmitry Safonov <dima(a)arista.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.114 commit 48294a67863c9cfa367abb66bbf0ef6548ae124f category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/ID6BBR CVE: CVE-2025-40173 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 21f4d45eba0b2dcae5dbc9e5e0ad08735c993f16 ] Similarly to ipv4 tunnel, ipv6 version updates dev->needed_headroom, too. While ipv4 tunnel headroom adjustment growth was limited in commit 5ae1e9922bbd ("net: ip_tunnel: prevent perpetual headroom growth"), ipv6 tunnel yet increases the headroom without any ceiling. Reflect ipv4 tunnel headroom adjustment limit on ipv6 version. Credits to Francesco Ruggeri, who was originally debugging this issue and wrote local Arista-specific patch and a reproducer. Fixes: 8eb30be0352d ("ipv6: Create ip6_tnl_xmit") Cc: Florian Westphal <fw(a)strlen.de> Cc: Francesco Ruggeri <fruggeri05(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima(a)arista.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251009-ip6_tunnel-headroom-v2-1-8e4dbd8f7e35@ari… Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- include/net/ip_tunnels.h | 15 +++++++++++++++ net/ipv4/ip_tunnel.c | 14 -------------- net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c | 3 +-- 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/ip_tunnels.h b/include/net/ip_tunnels.h index 006a61ddd36f..3d36794cb189 100644 --- a/include/net/ip_tunnels.h +++ b/include/net/ip_tunnels.h @@ -489,6 +489,21 @@ struct metadata_dst *iptunnel_metadata_reply(struct metadata_dst *md, int skb_tunnel_check_pmtu(struct sk_buff *skb, struct dst_entry *encap_dst, int headroom, bool reply); +static inline void ip_tunnel_adj_headroom(struct net_device *dev, + unsigned int headroom) +{ + /* we must cap headroom to some upperlimit, else pskb_expand_head + * will overflow header offsets in skb_headers_offset_update(). + */ + const unsigned int max_allowed = 512; + + if (headroom > max_allowed) + headroom = max_allowed; + + if (headroom > READ_ONCE(dev->needed_headroom)) + WRITE_ONCE(dev->needed_headroom, headroom); +} + int iptunnel_handle_offloads(struct sk_buff *skb, int gso_type_mask); static inline int iptunnel_pull_offloads(struct sk_buff *skb) diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_tunnel.c b/net/ipv4/ip_tunnel.c index b5d64cd3ab0a..090403c8cc6c 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/ip_tunnel.c +++ b/net/ipv4/ip_tunnel.c @@ -567,20 +567,6 @@ static int tnl_update_pmtu(struct net_device *dev, struct sk_buff *skb, return 0; } -static void ip_tunnel_adj_headroom(struct net_device *dev, unsigned int headroom) -{ - /* we must cap headroom to some upperlimit, else pskb_expand_head - * will overflow header offsets in skb_headers_offset_update(). - */ - static const unsigned int max_allowed = 512; - - if (headroom > max_allowed) - headroom = max_allowed; - - if (headroom > READ_ONCE(dev->needed_headroom)) - WRITE_ONCE(dev->needed_headroom, headroom); -} - void ip_md_tunnel_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev, u8 proto, int tunnel_hlen) { diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c index 97905d4174ec..c70ff45649ad 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c +++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c @@ -1255,8 +1255,7 @@ int ip6_tnl_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev, __u8 dsfield, */ max_headroom = LL_RESERVED_SPACE(dst->dev) + sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) + dst->header_len + t->hlen; - if (max_headroom > READ_ONCE(dev->needed_headroom)) - WRITE_ONCE(dev->needed_headroom, max_headroom); + ip_tunnel_adj_headroom(dev, max_headroom); err = ip6_tnl_encap(skb, t, &proto, fl6); if (err) -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] tls: wait for pending async decryptions if tls_strp_msg_hold fails
by Dong Chenchen 25 Nov '25

25 Nov '25

From: Sabrina Dubroca <sd(a)queasysnail.net> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.114 commit c61d4368197d65c4809d9271f3b85325a600586a category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/ID6BBY CVE: CVE-2025-40176 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit b8a6ff84abbcbbc445463de58704686011edc8e1 ] Async decryption calls tls_strp_msg_hold to create a clone of the input skb to hold references to the memory it uses. If we fail to allocate that clone, proceeding with async decryption can lead to various issues (UAF on the skb, writing into userspace memory after the recv() call has returned). In this case, wait for all pending decryption requests. Fixes: 84c61fe1a75b ("tls: rx: do not use the standard strparser") Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd(a)queasysnail.net> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/b9fe61dcc07dab15da9b35cf4c7d86382a98caf2.176043204… Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- net/tls/tls_sw.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/tls/tls_sw.c b/net/tls/tls_sw.c index bf445a518883..d7c1b7c1b1db 100644 --- a/net/tls/tls_sw.c +++ b/net/tls/tls_sw.c @@ -1612,8 +1612,10 @@ static int tls_decrypt_sg(struct sock *sk, struct iov_iter *out_iov, if (unlikely(darg->async)) { err = tls_strp_msg_hold(&ctx->strp, &ctx->async_hold); - if (err) - __skb_queue_tail(&ctx->async_hold, darg->skb); + if (err) { + err = tls_decrypt_async_wait(ctx); + darg->async = false; + } return err; } -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] Squashfs: fix uninit-value in squashfs_get_parent
by Long Li 25 Nov '25

25 Nov '25

From: Phillip Lougher <phillip(a)squashfs.org.uk> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.17-rc4 commit 74058c0a9fc8b2b4d5f4a0ef7ee2cfa66a9e49cf category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/ID3WGW CVE: CVE-2025-40049 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Syzkaller reports a "KMSAN: uninit-value in squashfs_get_parent" bug. This is caused by open_by_handle_at() being called with a file handle containing an invalid parent inode number. In particular the inode number is that of a symbolic link, rather than a directory. Squashfs_get_parent() gets called with that symbolic link inode, and accesses the parent member field. unsigned int parent_ino = squashfs_i(inode)->parent; Because non-directory inodes in Squashfs do not have a parent value, this is uninitialised, and this causes an uninitialised value access. The fix is to initialise parent with the invalid inode 0, which will cause an EINVAL error to be returned. Regular inodes used to share the parent field with the block_list_start field. This is removed in this commit to enable the parent field to contain the invalid inode number 0. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250918233308.293861-1-phillip@squashfs.org.uk Fixes: 122601408d20 ("Squashfs: export operations") Signed-off-by: Phillip Lougher <phillip(a)squashfs.org.uk> Reported-by: syzbot+157bdef5cf596ad0da2c(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/68cc2431.050a0220.139b6.0001.GAE@google.com/ Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Long Li <leo.lilong(a)huawei.com> --- fs/squashfs/inode.c | 7 +++++++ fs/squashfs/squashfs_fs_i.h | 2 +- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/squashfs/inode.c b/fs/squashfs/inode.c index d5918eba27e3..53104f25de51 100644 --- a/fs/squashfs/inode.c +++ b/fs/squashfs/inode.c @@ -165,6 +165,7 @@ int squashfs_read_inode(struct inode *inode, long long ino) squashfs_i(inode)->start = le32_to_cpu(sqsh_ino->start_block); squashfs_i(inode)->block_list_start = block; squashfs_i(inode)->offset = offset; + squashfs_i(inode)->parent = 0; inode->i_data.a_ops = &squashfs_aops; TRACE("File inode %x:%x, start_block %llx, block_list_start " @@ -212,6 +213,7 @@ int squashfs_read_inode(struct inode *inode, long long ino) squashfs_i(inode)->start = le64_to_cpu(sqsh_ino->start_block); squashfs_i(inode)->block_list_start = block; squashfs_i(inode)->offset = offset; + squashfs_i(inode)->parent = 0; inode->i_data.a_ops = &squashfs_aops; TRACE("File inode %x:%x, start_block %llx, block_list_start " @@ -292,6 +294,7 @@ int squashfs_read_inode(struct inode *inode, long long ino) inode->i_mode |= S_IFLNK; squashfs_i(inode)->start = block; squashfs_i(inode)->offset = offset; + squashfs_i(inode)->parent = 0; if (type == SQUASHFS_LSYMLINK_TYPE) { __le32 xattr; @@ -329,6 +332,7 @@ int squashfs_read_inode(struct inode *inode, long long ino) set_nlink(inode, le32_to_cpu(sqsh_ino->nlink)); rdev = le32_to_cpu(sqsh_ino->rdev); init_special_inode(inode, inode->i_mode, new_decode_dev(rdev)); + squashfs_i(inode)->parent = 0; TRACE("Device inode %x:%x, rdev %x\n", SQUASHFS_INODE_BLK(ino), offset, rdev); @@ -353,6 +357,7 @@ int squashfs_read_inode(struct inode *inode, long long ino) set_nlink(inode, le32_to_cpu(sqsh_ino->nlink)); rdev = le32_to_cpu(sqsh_ino->rdev); init_special_inode(inode, inode->i_mode, new_decode_dev(rdev)); + squashfs_i(inode)->parent = 0; TRACE("Device inode %x:%x, rdev %x\n", SQUASHFS_INODE_BLK(ino), offset, rdev); @@ -373,6 +378,7 @@ int squashfs_read_inode(struct inode *inode, long long ino) inode->i_mode |= S_IFSOCK; set_nlink(inode, le32_to_cpu(sqsh_ino->nlink)); init_special_inode(inode, inode->i_mode, 0); + squashfs_i(inode)->parent = 0; break; } case SQUASHFS_LFIFO_TYPE: @@ -392,6 +398,7 @@ int squashfs_read_inode(struct inode *inode, long long ino) inode->i_op = &squashfs_inode_ops; set_nlink(inode, le32_to_cpu(sqsh_ino->nlink)); init_special_inode(inode, inode->i_mode, 0); + squashfs_i(inode)->parent = 0; break; } default: diff --git a/fs/squashfs/squashfs_fs_i.h b/fs/squashfs/squashfs_fs_i.h index 2c82d6f2a456..8e497ac07b9a 100644 --- a/fs/squashfs/squashfs_fs_i.h +++ b/fs/squashfs/squashfs_fs_i.h @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ struct squashfs_inode_info { u64 xattr; unsigned int xattr_size; int xattr_count; + int parent; union { struct { u64 fragment_block; @@ -27,7 +28,6 @@ struct squashfs_inode_info { u64 dir_idx_start; int dir_idx_offset; int dir_idx_cnt; - int parent; }; }; struct inode vfs_inode; -- 2.39.2

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] media: uvcvideo: Mark invalid entities with id UVC_INVALID_ENTITY_ID
by Long Li 25 Nov '25

25 Nov '25

From: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo(a)igalia.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.17-rc1 commit 0e2ee70291e64a30fe36960c85294726d34a103e category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/ID2QLY CVE: CVE-2025-40016 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Per UVC 1.1+ specification 3.7.2, units and terminals must have a non-zero unique ID. ``` Each Unit and Terminal within the video function is assigned a unique identification number, the Unit ID (UID) or Terminal ID (TID), contained in the bUnitID or bTerminalID field of the descriptor. The value 0x00 is reserved for undefined ID, ``` If we add a new entity with id 0 or a duplicated ID, it will be marked as UVC_INVALID_ENTITY_ID. In a previous attempt commit 3dd075fe8ebb ("media: uvcvideo: Require entities to have a non-zero unique ID"), we ignored all the invalid units, this broke a lot of non-compatible cameras. Hopefully we are more lucky this time. This also prevents some syzkaller reproducers from triggering warnings due to a chain of entities referring to themselves. In one particular case, an Output Unit is connected to an Input Unit, both with the same ID of 1. But when looking up for the source ID of the Output Unit, that same entity is found instead of the input entity, which leads to such warnings. In another case, a backward chain was considered finished as the source ID was 0. Later on, that entity was found, but its pads were not valid. Here is a sample stack trace for one of those cases. [ 20.650953] usb 1-1: new high-speed USB device number 2 using dummy_hcd [ 20.830206] usb 1-1: Using ep0 maxpacket: 8 [ 20.833501] usb 1-1: config 0 descriptor?? [ 21.038518] usb 1-1: string descriptor 0 read error: -71 [ 21.038893] usb 1-1: Found UVC 0.00 device <unnamed> (2833:0201) [ 21.039299] uvcvideo 1-1:0.0: Entity type for entity Output 1 was not initialized! [ 21.041583] uvcvideo 1-1:0.0: Entity type for entity Input 1 was not initialized! [ 21.042218] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 21.042536] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 9 at drivers/media/mc/mc-entity.c:1147 media_create_pad_link+0x2c4/0x2e0 [ 21.043195] Modules linked in: [ 21.043535] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 9 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc7-00030-g3480e43aeccf #444 [ 21.044101] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 [ 21.044639] Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event [ 21.045100] RIP: 0010:media_create_pad_link+0x2c4/0x2e0 [ 21.045508] Code: fe e8 20 01 00 00 b8 f4 ff ff ff 48 83 c4 30 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 cc cc cc cc 0f 0b eb e9 0f 0b eb 0a 0f 0b eb 06 <0f> 0b eb 02 0f 0b b8 ea ff ff ff eb d4 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 [ 21.046801] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000004b318 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 21.047227] RAX: ffff888004e5d458 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff818fccf1 [ 21.047719] RDX: 000000000000007b RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff888004313290 [ 21.048241] RBP: ffff888004313290 R08: 0001ffffffffffff R09: 0000000000000000 [ 21.048701] R10: 0000000000000013 R11: 0001888004313290 R12: 0000000000000003 [ 21.049138] R13: ffff888004313080 R14: ffff888004313080 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 21.049648] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88803ec00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 21.050271] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 21.050688] CR2: 0000592cc27635b0 CR3: 000000000431c000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0 [ 21.051136] PKRU: 55555554 [ 21.051331] Call Trace: [ 21.051480] <TASK> [ 21.051611] ? __warn+0xc4/0x210 [ 21.051861] ? media_create_pad_link+0x2c4/0x2e0 [ 21.052252] ? report_bug+0x11b/0x1a0 [ 21.052540] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x31/0x40 [ 21.052901] ? handle_bug+0x3d/0x70 [ 21.053197] ? exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x50 [ 21.053511] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 [ 21.053924] ? media_create_pad_link+0x91/0x2e0 [ 21.054364] ? media_create_pad_link+0x2c4/0x2e0 [ 21.054834] ? media_create_pad_link+0x91/0x2e0 [ 21.055131] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x1e/0x40 [ 21.055441] ? __v4l2_device_register_subdev+0x202/0x210 [ 21.055837] uvc_mc_register_entities+0x358/0x400 [ 21.056144] uvc_register_chains+0x1fd/0x290 [ 21.056413] uvc_probe+0x380e/0x3dc0 [ 21.056676] ? __lock_acquire+0x5aa/0x26e0 [ 21.056946] ? find_held_lock+0x33/0xa0 [ 21.057196] ? kernfs_activate+0x70/0x80 [ 21.057533] ? usb_match_dynamic_id+0x1b/0x70 [ 21.057811] ? find_held_lock+0x33/0xa0 [ 21.058047] ? usb_match_dynamic_id+0x55/0x70 [ 21.058330] ? lock_release+0x124/0x260 [ 21.058657] ? usb_match_one_id_intf+0xa2/0x100 [ 21.058997] usb_probe_interface+0x1ba/0x330 [ 21.059399] really_probe+0x1ba/0x4c0 [ 21.059662] __driver_probe_device+0xb2/0x180 [ 21.059944] driver_probe_device+0x5a/0x100 [ 21.060170] __device_attach_driver+0xe9/0x160 [ 21.060427] ? __pfx___device_attach_driver+0x10/0x10 [ 21.060872] bus_for_each_drv+0xa9/0x100 [ 21.061312] __device_attach+0xed/0x190 [ 21.061812] device_initial_probe+0xe/0x20 [ 21.062229] bus_probe_device+0x4d/0xd0 [ 21.062590] device_add+0x308/0x590 [ 21.062912] usb_set_configuration+0x7b6/0xaf0 [ 21.063403] usb_generic_driver_probe+0x36/0x80 [ 21.063714] usb_probe_device+0x7b/0x130 [ 21.063936] really_probe+0x1ba/0x4c0 [ 21.064111] __driver_probe_device+0xb2/0x180 [ 21.064577] driver_probe_device+0x5a/0x100 [ 21.065019] __device_attach_driver+0xe9/0x160 [ 21.065403] ? __pfx___device_attach_driver+0x10/0x10 [ 21.065820] bus_for_each_drv+0xa9/0x100 [ 21.066094] __device_attach+0xed/0x190 [ 21.066535] device_initial_probe+0xe/0x20 [ 21.066992] bus_probe_device+0x4d/0xd0 [ 21.067250] device_add+0x308/0x590 [ 21.067501] usb_new_device+0x347/0x610 [ 21.067817] hub_event+0x156b/0x1e30 [ 21.068060] ? process_scheduled_works+0x48b/0xaf0 [ 21.068337] process_scheduled_works+0x5a3/0xaf0 [ 21.068668] worker_thread+0x3cf/0x560 [ 21.068932] ? kthread+0x109/0x1b0 [ 21.069133] kthread+0x197/0x1b0 [ 21.069343] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 21.069598] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 21.069908] ret_from_fork+0x32/0x40 [ 21.070169] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 21.070424] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 21.070737] </TASK> Reported-by: syzbot+0584f746fde3d52b4675(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=0584f746fde3d52b4675 Reported-by: syzbot+dd320d114deb3f5bb79b(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=dd320d114deb3f5bb79b Reported-by: Youngjun Lee <yjjuny.lee(a)samsung.com> Fixes: a3fbc2e6bb05 ("media: mc-entity.c: use WARN_ON, validate link pads") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo(a)igalia.com> Co-developed-by: Ricardo Ribalda <ribalda(a)chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Ricardo Ribalda <ribalda(a)chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart(a)ideasonboard.com> Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede <hansg(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hansg(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart(a)ideasonboard.com> Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil+cisco(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Long Li <leo.lilong(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_driver.c | 73 +++++++++++++++++++----------- drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvcvideo.h | 2 + 2 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_driver.c b/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_driver.c index f98dff65264d..832590a7767c 100644 --- a/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_driver.c +++ b/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_driver.c @@ -135,6 +135,9 @@ struct uvc_entity *uvc_entity_by_id(struct uvc_device *dev, int id) { struct uvc_entity *entity; + if (id == UVC_INVALID_ENTITY_ID) + return NULL; + list_for_each_entry(entity, &dev->entities, list) { if (entity->id == id) return entity; @@ -778,14 +781,27 @@ static const u8 uvc_media_transport_input_guid[16] = UVC_GUID_UVC_MEDIA_TRANSPORT_INPUT; static const u8 uvc_processing_guid[16] = UVC_GUID_UVC_PROCESSING; -static struct uvc_entity *uvc_alloc_entity(u16 type, u16 id, - unsigned int num_pads, unsigned int extra_size) +static struct uvc_entity *uvc_alloc_new_entity(struct uvc_device *dev, u16 type, + u16 id, unsigned int num_pads, + unsigned int extra_size) { struct uvc_entity *entity; unsigned int num_inputs; unsigned int size; unsigned int i; + /* Per UVC 1.1+ spec 3.7.2, the ID should be non-zero. */ + if (id == 0) { + dev_err(&dev->intf->dev, "Found Unit with invalid ID 0\n"); + id = UVC_INVALID_ENTITY_ID; + } + + /* Per UVC 1.1+ spec 3.7.2, the ID is unique. */ + if (uvc_entity_by_id(dev, id)) { + dev_err(&dev->intf->dev, "Found multiple Units with ID %u\n", id); + id = UVC_INVALID_ENTITY_ID; + } + extra_size = roundup(extra_size, sizeof(*entity->pads)); if (num_pads) num_inputs = type & UVC_TERM_OUTPUT ? num_pads : num_pads - 1; @@ -795,7 +811,7 @@ static struct uvc_entity *uvc_alloc_entity(u16 type, u16 id, + num_inputs; entity = kzalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL); if (entity == NULL) - return NULL; + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); entity->id = id; entity->type = type; @@ -907,10 +923,10 @@ static int uvc_parse_vendor_control(struct uvc_device *dev, break; } - unit = uvc_alloc_entity(UVC_VC_EXTENSION_UNIT, buffer[3], - p + 1, 2*n); - if (unit == NULL) - return -ENOMEM; + unit = uvc_alloc_new_entity(dev, UVC_VC_EXTENSION_UNIT, + buffer[3], p + 1, 2 * n); + if (IS_ERR(unit)) + return PTR_ERR(unit); memcpy(unit->guid, &buffer[4], 16); unit->extension.bNumControls = buffer[20]; @@ -1019,10 +1035,10 @@ static int uvc_parse_standard_control(struct uvc_device *dev, return -EINVAL; } - term = uvc_alloc_entity(type | UVC_TERM_INPUT, buffer[3], - 1, n + p); - if (term == NULL) - return -ENOMEM; + term = uvc_alloc_new_entity(dev, type | UVC_TERM_INPUT, + buffer[3], 1, n + p); + if (IS_ERR(term)) + return PTR_ERR(term); if (UVC_ENTITY_TYPE(term) == UVC_ITT_CAMERA) { term->camera.bControlSize = n; @@ -1078,10 +1094,10 @@ static int uvc_parse_standard_control(struct uvc_device *dev, return 0; } - term = uvc_alloc_entity(type | UVC_TERM_OUTPUT, buffer[3], - 1, 0); - if (term == NULL) - return -ENOMEM; + term = uvc_alloc_new_entity(dev, type | UVC_TERM_OUTPUT, + buffer[3], 1, 0); + if (IS_ERR(term)) + return PTR_ERR(term); memcpy(term->baSourceID, &buffer[7], 1); @@ -1100,9 +1116,10 @@ static int uvc_parse_standard_control(struct uvc_device *dev, return -EINVAL; } - unit = uvc_alloc_entity(buffer[2], buffer[3], p + 1, 0); - if (unit == NULL) - return -ENOMEM; + unit = uvc_alloc_new_entity(dev, buffer[2], buffer[3], + p + 1, 0); + if (IS_ERR(unit)) + return PTR_ERR(unit); memcpy(unit->baSourceID, &buffer[5], p); @@ -1122,9 +1139,9 @@ static int uvc_parse_standard_control(struct uvc_device *dev, return -EINVAL; } - unit = uvc_alloc_entity(buffer[2], buffer[3], 2, n); - if (unit == NULL) - return -ENOMEM; + unit = uvc_alloc_new_entity(dev, buffer[2], buffer[3], 2, n); + if (IS_ERR(unit)) + return PTR_ERR(unit); memcpy(unit->baSourceID, &buffer[4], 1); unit->processing.wMaxMultiplier = @@ -1151,9 +1168,10 @@ static int uvc_parse_standard_control(struct uvc_device *dev, return -EINVAL; } - unit = uvc_alloc_entity(buffer[2], buffer[3], p + 1, n); - if (unit == NULL) - return -ENOMEM; + unit = uvc_alloc_new_entity(dev, buffer[2], buffer[3], + p + 1, n); + if (IS_ERR(unit)) + return PTR_ERR(unit); memcpy(unit->guid, &buffer[4], 16); unit->extension.bNumControls = buffer[20]; @@ -1293,9 +1311,10 @@ static int uvc_gpio_parse(struct uvc_device *dev) return dev_err_probe(&dev->intf->dev, irq, "No IRQ for privacy GPIO\n"); - unit = uvc_alloc_entity(UVC_EXT_GPIO_UNIT, UVC_EXT_GPIO_UNIT_ID, 0, 1); - if (!unit) - return -ENOMEM; + unit = uvc_alloc_new_entity(dev, UVC_EXT_GPIO_UNIT, + UVC_EXT_GPIO_UNIT_ID, 0, 1); + if (IS_ERR(unit)) + return PTR_ERR(unit); unit->gpio.gpio_privacy = gpio_privacy; unit->gpio.irq = irq; diff --git a/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvcvideo.h b/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvcvideo.h index e99bfaa62266..cbb5ce963cd0 100644 --- a/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvcvideo.h +++ b/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvcvideo.h @@ -41,6 +41,8 @@ #define UVC_EXT_GPIO_UNIT 0x7ffe #define UVC_EXT_GPIO_UNIT_ID 0x100 +#define UVC_INVALID_ENTITY_ID 0xffff + /* ------------------------------------------------------------------------ * Driver specific constants. */ -- 2.39.2

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] media: venus: Add a check for packet size after reading from shared memory
by Long Li 25 Nov '25

25 Nov '25

From: Vedang Nagar <quic_vnagar(a)quicinc.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.16-rc1 commit 49befc830daa743e051a65468c05c2ff9e8580e6 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/ICWO23 CVE: CVE-2025-39710 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Add a check to ensure that the packet size does not exceed the number of available words after reading the packet header from shared memory. This ensures that the size provided by the firmware is safe to process and prevent potential out-of-bounds memory access. Fixes: d96d3f30c0f2 ("[media] media: venus: hfi: add Venus HFI files") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Vedang Nagar <quic_vnagar(a)quicinc.com> Co-developed-by: Dikshita Agarwal <quic_dikshita(a)quicinc.com> Signed-off-by: Dikshita Agarwal <quic_dikshita(a)quicinc.com> Reviewed-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bod(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil(a)xs4all.nl> Signed-off-by: Long Li <leo.lilong(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/media/platform/qcom/venus/hfi_venus.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/media/platform/qcom/venus/hfi_venus.c b/drivers/media/platform/qcom/venus/hfi_venus.c index ab93757fff4b..72b7cd72b318 100644 --- a/drivers/media/platform/qcom/venus/hfi_venus.c +++ b/drivers/media/platform/qcom/venus/hfi_venus.c @@ -239,6 +239,7 @@ static int venus_write_queue(struct venus_hfi_device *hdev, static int venus_read_queue(struct venus_hfi_device *hdev, struct iface_queue *queue, void *pkt, u32 *tx_req) { + struct hfi_pkt_hdr *pkt_hdr = NULL; struct hfi_queue_header *qhdr; u32 dwords, new_rd_idx; u32 rd_idx, wr_idx, type, qsize; @@ -304,6 +305,9 @@ static int venus_read_queue(struct venus_hfi_device *hdev, memcpy(pkt, rd_ptr, len); memcpy(pkt + len, queue->qmem.kva, new_rd_idx << 2); } + pkt_hdr = (struct hfi_pkt_hdr *)(pkt); + if ((pkt_hdr->size >> 2) != dwords) + return -EINVAL; } else { /* bad packet received, dropping */ new_rd_idx = qhdr->write_idx; -- 2.39.2

2 1

[openeuler:OLK-6.6 3316/3316] kernel/xsched/core.c:497:12: warning: no previous prototype for 'xsched_sched_init'
by kernel test robot 25 Nov '25

25 Nov '25

tree: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel.git OLK-6.6 head: c1bc27c0f90c1e34d319455cb1e28b2705987616 commit: 832ec54e11a079d968d8f23780ab455b1537b214 [3316/3316] xsched: Add xsched RT class config: x86_64-buildonly-randconfig-002-20251125 (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20251125/202511251921.jfyR52m4-lkp@…) compiler: gcc-14 (Debian 14.2.0-19) 14.2.0 reproduce (this is a W=1 build): (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20251125/202511251921.jfyR52m4-lkp@…) If you fix the issue in a separate patch/commit (i.e. not just a new version of the same patch/commit), kindly add following tags | Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp(a)intel.com> | Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202511251921.jfyR52m4-lkp@intel.com/ All warnings (new ones prefixed by >>): kernel/xsched/core.c:189:5: warning: no previous prototype for 'xsched_xse_set_class' [-Wmissing-prototypes] 189 | int xsched_xse_set_class(struct xsched_entity *xse) | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ >> kernel/xsched/core.c:497:12: warning: no previous prototype for 'xsched_sched_init' [-Wmissing-prototypes] 497 | __init int xsched_sched_init(void) | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -- >> kernel/xsched/rt.c:207:6: warning: no previous prototype for 'rq_init_rt' [-Wmissing-prototypes] 207 | void rq_init_rt(struct xsched_cu *xcu) | ^~~~~~~~~~ >> kernel/xsched/rt.c:218:6: warning: no previous prototype for 'xse_init_rt' [-Wmissing-prototypes] 218 | void xse_init_rt(struct xsched_entity *xse) | ^~~~~~~~~~~ >> kernel/xsched/rt.c:228:6: warning: no previous prototype for 'xse_deinit_rt' [-Wmissing-prototypes] 228 | void xse_deinit_rt(struct xsched_entity *xse) | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~ vim +/xsched_sched_init +497 kernel/xsched/core.c 496 > 497 __init int xsched_sched_init(void) -- 0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service https://github.com/intel/lkp-tests/wiki

1 0

[PATCH OLK-6.6] eventpoll: Fix semi-unbounded recursion
by Long Li 25 Nov '25

25 Nov '25

From: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.16-rc1 commit f2e467a48287c868818085aa35389a224d226732 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/ICU73P CVE: CVE-2025-38614 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Ensure that epoll instances can never form a graph deeper than EP_MAX_NESTS+1 links. Currently, ep_loop_check_proc() ensures that the graph is loop-free and does some recursion depth checks, but those recursion depth checks don't limit the depth of the resulting tree for two reasons: - They don't look upwards in the tree. - If there are multiple downwards paths of different lengths, only one of the paths is actually considered for the depth check since commit 28d82dc1c4ed ("epoll: limit paths"). Essentially, the current recursion depth check in ep_loop_check_proc() just serves to prevent it from recursing too deeply while checking for loops. A more thorough check is done in reverse_path_check() after the new graph edge has already been created; this checks, among other things, that no paths going upwards from any non-epoll file with a length of more than 5 edges exist. However, this check does not apply to non-epoll files. As a result, it is possible to recurse to a depth of at least roughly 500, tested on v6.15. (I am unsure if deeper recursion is possible; and this may have changed with commit 8c44dac8add7 ("eventpoll: Fix priority inversion problem").) To fix it: 1. In ep_loop_check_proc(), note the subtree depth of each visited node, and use subtree depths for the total depth calculation even when a subtree has already been visited. 2. Add ep_get_upwards_depth_proc() for similarly determining the maximum depth of an upwards walk. 3. In ep_loop_check(), use these values to limit the total path length between epoll nodes to EP_MAX_NESTS edges. Fixes: 22bacca48a17 ("epoll: prevent creating circular epoll structures") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250711-epoll-recursion-fix-v1-1-fb2457c33292@goog… Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Long Li <leo.lilong(a)huawei.com> --- fs/eventpoll.c | 60 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 46 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/eventpoll.c b/fs/eventpoll.c index 31b32d9e7bbc..6b2d655c1cef 100644 --- a/fs/eventpoll.c +++ b/fs/eventpoll.c @@ -217,6 +217,7 @@ struct eventpoll { /* used to optimize loop detection check */ u64 gen; struct hlist_head refs; + u8 loop_check_depth; /* * usage count, used together with epitem->dying to @@ -1986,23 +1987,24 @@ static int ep_poll(struct eventpoll *ep, struct epoll_event __user *events, } /** - * ep_loop_check_proc - verify that adding an epoll file inside another - * epoll structure does not violate the constraints, in - * terms of closed loops, or too deep chains (which can - * result in excessive stack usage). + * ep_loop_check_proc - verify that adding an epoll file @ep inside another + * epoll file does not create closed loops, and + * determine the depth of the subtree starting at @ep * * @ep: the &struct eventpoll to be currently checked. * @depth: Current depth of the path being checked. * - * Return: %zero if adding the epoll @file inside current epoll - * structure @ep does not violate the constraints, or %-1 otherwise. + * Return: depth of the subtree, or INT_MAX if we found a loop or went too deep. */ static int ep_loop_check_proc(struct eventpoll *ep, int depth) { - int error = 0; + int result = 0; struct rb_node *rbp; struct epitem *epi; + if (ep->gen == loop_check_gen) + return ep->loop_check_depth; + mutex_lock_nested(&ep->mtx, depth + 1); ep->gen = loop_check_gen; for (rbp = rb_first_cached(&ep->rbr); rbp; rbp = rb_next(rbp)) { @@ -2010,13 +2012,11 @@ static int ep_loop_check_proc(struct eventpoll *ep, int depth) if (unlikely(is_file_epoll(epi->ffd.file))) { struct eventpoll *ep_tovisit; ep_tovisit = epi->ffd.file->private_data; - if (ep_tovisit->gen == loop_check_gen) - continue; if (ep_tovisit == inserting_into || depth > EP_MAX_NESTS) - error = -1; + result = INT_MAX; else - error = ep_loop_check_proc(ep_tovisit, depth + 1); - if (error != 0) + result = max(result, ep_loop_check_proc(ep_tovisit, depth + 1) + 1); + if (result > EP_MAX_NESTS) break; } else { /* @@ -2030,9 +2030,27 @@ static int ep_loop_check_proc(struct eventpoll *ep, int depth) list_file(epi->ffd.file); } } + ep->loop_check_depth = result; mutex_unlock(&ep->mtx); - return error; + return result; +} + +/** + * ep_get_upwards_depth_proc - determine depth of @ep when traversed upwards + */ +static int ep_get_upwards_depth_proc(struct eventpoll *ep, int depth) +{ + int result = 0; + struct epitem *epi; + + if (ep->gen == loop_check_gen) + return ep->loop_check_depth; + hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(epi, &ep->refs, fllink) + result = max(result, ep_get_upwards_depth_proc(epi->ep, depth + 1) + 1); + ep->gen = loop_check_gen; + ep->loop_check_depth = result; + return result; } /** @@ -2048,8 +2066,22 @@ static int ep_loop_check_proc(struct eventpoll *ep, int depth) */ static int ep_loop_check(struct eventpoll *ep, struct eventpoll *to) { + int depth, upwards_depth; + inserting_into = ep; - return ep_loop_check_proc(to, 0); + /* + * Check how deep down we can get from @to, and whether it is possible + * to loop up to @ep. + */ + depth = ep_loop_check_proc(to, 0); + if (depth > EP_MAX_NESTS) + return -1; + /* Check how far up we can go from @ep. */ + rcu_read_lock(); + upwards_depth = ep_get_upwards_depth_proc(ep, 0); + rcu_read_unlock(); + + return (depth+1+upwards_depth > EP_MAX_NESTS) ? -1 : 0; } static void clear_tfile_check_list(void) -- 2.39.2

2 1