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[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/1] CVE-2024-53158
by Lin Yujun 06 Jan '25

06 Jan '25

Dan Carpenter (1): soc: qcom: geni-se: fix array underflow in geni_se_clk_tbl_get() drivers/soc/qcom/qcom-geni-se.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/1] CVE-2024-53158
by Lin Yujun 06 Jan '25

06 Jan '25

Dan Carpenter (1): [Backport] soc: qcom: geni-se: fix array underflow in geni_se_clk_tbl_get() drivers/soc/qcom/qcom-geni-se.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH OLK-6.6] bpf: Fix narrow scalar spill onto 64-bit spilled scalar slots
by Chen Zhongjin 06 Jan '25

06 Jan '25

From: Tao Lyu <tao.lyu(a)epfl.ch> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.66 commit c169daf3cf3939df45796f025bed12565e0c8202 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/IBFYC8 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit b0e66977dc072906bb76555fb1a64261d7f63d0f ] When CAP_PERFMON and CAP_SYS_ADMIN (allow_ptr_leaks) are disabled, the verifier aims to reject partial overwrite on an 8-byte stack slot that contains a spilled pointer. However, in such a scenario, it rejects all partial stack overwrites as long as the targeted stack slot is a spilled register, because it does not check if the stack slot is a spilled pointer. Incomplete checks will result in the rejection of valid programs, which spill narrower scalar values onto scalar slots, as shown below. 0: R1=ctx() R10=fp0 ; asm volatile ( @ repro.bpf.c:679 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 1 ; R10=fp0 fp-8_w=1 1: (62) *(u32 *)(r10 -8) = 1 attempt to corrupt spilled pointer on stack processed 2 insns (limit 1000000) max_states_per_insn 0 total_states 0 peak_states 0 mark_read 0. Fix this by expanding the check to not consider spilled scalar registers when rejecting the write into the stack. Previous discussion on this patch is at link [0]. [0]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240403202409.2615469-1-tao.lyu@epfl.ch Fixes: ab125ed3ec1c ("bpf: fix check for attempt to corrupt spilled pointer") Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87(a)gmail.com> Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Tao Lyu <tao.lyu(a)epfl.ch> Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor(a)gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241204044757.1483141-3-memxor@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Chen Zhongjin <chenzhongjin(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 8fa7b37152c0..8d56fce24713 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -4630,6 +4630,7 @@ static int check_stack_write_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, */ if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks && is_spilled_reg(&state->stack[spi]) && + !is_spilled_scalar_reg(&state->stack[spi]) && size != BPF_REG_SIZE) { verbose(env, "attempt to corrupt spilled pointer on stack\n"); return -EACCES; -- 2.25.1

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[PATCH OLK-6.6] um: ubd: Do not use drvdata in release
by Yuan Can 06 Jan '25

06 Jan '25

From: Tiwei Bie <tiwei.btw(a)antgroup.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.64 commit 2d194d951895df214e066d08146e77cb6e02c1d4 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IBEAEN CVE: CVE-2024-53184 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 5bee35e5389f450a7eea7318deb9073e9414d3b1 upstream. The drvdata is not available in release. Let's just use container_of() to get the ubd instance. Otherwise, removing a ubd device will result in a crash: RIP: 0033:blk_mq_free_tag_set+0x1f/0xba RSP: 00000000e2083bf0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 000000006021463a RBX: 0000000000000348 RCX: 0000000062604d00 RDX: 0000000004208060 RSI: 00000000605241a0 RDI: 0000000000000348 RBP: 00000000e2083c10 R08: 0000000062414010 R09: 00000000601603f7 R10: 000000000000133a R11: 000000006038c4bd R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000060213a5c R14: 0000000062405d20 R15: 00000000604f7aa0 Kernel panic - not syncing: Segfault with no mm CPU: 0 PID: 17 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc3-00107-gba3f67c11638 #1 Workqueue: events mc_work_proc Stack: 00000000 604f7ef0 62c5d000 62405d20 e2083c30 6002c776 6002c755 600e47ff e2083c60 6025ffe3 04208060 603d36e0 Call Trace: [<6002c776>] ubd_device_release+0x21/0x55 [<6002c755>] ? ubd_device_release+0x0/0x55 [<600e47ff>] ? kfree+0x0/0x100 [<6025ffe3>] device_release+0x70/0xba [<60381d6a>] kobject_put+0xb5/0xe2 [<6026027b>] put_device+0x19/0x1c [<6026a036>] platform_device_put+0x26/0x29 [<6026ac5a>] platform_device_unregister+0x2c/0x2e [<6002c52e>] ubd_remove+0xb8/0xd6 [<6002bb74>] ? mconsole_reply+0x0/0x50 [<6002b926>] mconsole_remove+0x160/0x1cc [<6002bbbc>] ? mconsole_reply+0x48/0x50 [<6003379c>] ? um_set_signals+0x3b/0x43 [<60061c55>] ? update_min_vruntime+0x14/0x70 [<6006251f>] ? dequeue_task_fair+0x164/0x235 [<600620aa>] ? update_cfs_group+0x0/0x40 [<603a0e77>] ? __schedule+0x0/0x3ed [<60033761>] ? um_set_signals+0x0/0x43 [<6002af6a>] mc_work_proc+0x77/0x91 [<600520b4>] process_scheduled_works+0x1af/0x2c3 [<6004ede3>] ? assign_work+0x0/0x58 [<600527a1>] worker_thread+0x2f7/0x37a [<6004ee3b>] ? set_pf_worker+0x0/0x64 [<6005765d>] ? arch_local_irq_save+0x0/0x2d [<60058e07>] ? kthread_exit+0x0/0x3a [<600524aa>] ? worker_thread+0x0/0x37a [<60058f9f>] kthread+0x130/0x135 [<6002068e>] new_thread_handler+0x85/0xb6 Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Tiwei Bie <tiwei.btw(a)antgroup.com> Acked-By: Anton Ivanov <anton.ivanov(a)cambridgegreys.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241104163203.435515-3-tiwei.btw@antgroup.com Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Yuan Can <yuancan(a)huawei.com> --- arch/um/drivers/ubd_kern.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/um/drivers/ubd_kern.c b/arch/um/drivers/ubd_kern.c index ef7b4b911a45..7ddda2c0ae43 100644 --- a/arch/um/drivers/ubd_kern.c +++ b/arch/um/drivers/ubd_kern.c @@ -799,7 +799,7 @@ static int ubd_open_dev(struct ubd *ubd_dev) static void ubd_device_release(struct device *dev) { - struct ubd *ubd_dev = dev_get_drvdata(dev); + struct ubd *ubd_dev = container_of(dev, struct ubd, pdev.dev); blk_mq_free_tag_set(&ubd_dev->tag_set); *ubd_dev = ((struct ubd) DEFAULT_UBD); -- 2.22.0

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[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] CVE-2024-56724
by Liao Chen 06 Jan '25

06 Jan '25

fix CVE-2024-56724 Andy Shevchenko (2): mfd: intel_soc_pmic_bxtwc: Use IRQ domain for USB Type-C device mfd: intel_soc_pmic_bxtwc: Use IRQ domain for TMU device drivers/mfd/intel_soc_pmic_bxtwc.c | 82 +++++++++++++++++--------- drivers/platform/x86/intel/bxtwc_tmu.c | 22 ++----- drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/wcove.c | 4 -- 3 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH OLK-6.6] Bluetooth: MGMT: Fix possible deadlocks
by dinglongwei 06 Jan '25

06 Jan '25

From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz(a)intel.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.64 commit 5703fb1d85f653e35b327b14de4db7da239e4fd9 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/IBA6RL Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit a66dfaf18fd61bb75ef8cee83db46b2aadf153d0 ] This fixes possible deadlocks like the following caused by hci_cmd_sync_dequeue causing the destroy function to run: INFO: task kworker/u19:0:143 blocked for more than 120 seconds. Tainted: G W O 6.8.0-2024-03-19-intel-next-iLS-24ww14 #1 "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. task:kworker/u19:0 state:D stack:0 pid:143 tgid:143 ppid:2 flags:0x00004000 Workqueue: hci0 hci_cmd_sync_work [bluetooth] Call Trace: <TASK> __schedule+0x374/0xaf0 schedule+0x3c/0xf0 schedule_preempt_disabled+0x1c/0x30 __mutex_lock.constprop.0+0x3ef/0x7a0 __mutex_lock_slowpath+0x13/0x20 mutex_lock+0x3c/0x50 mgmt_set_connectable_complete+0xa4/0x150 [bluetooth] ? kfree+0x211/0x2a0 hci_cmd_sync_dequeue+0xae/0x130 [bluetooth] ? __pfx_cmd_complete_rsp+0x10/0x10 [bluetooth] cmd_complete_rsp+0x26/0x80 [bluetooth] mgmt_pending_foreach+0x4d/0x70 [bluetooth] __mgmt_power_off+0x8d/0x180 [bluetooth] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x23/0x40 hci_dev_close_sync+0x445/0x5b0 [bluetooth] hci_set_powered_sync+0x149/0x250 [bluetooth] set_powered_sync+0x24/0x60 [bluetooth] hci_cmd_sync_work+0x90/0x150 [bluetooth] process_one_work+0x13e/0x300 worker_thread+0x2f7/0x420 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0x107/0x140 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x3d/0x60 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 </TASK> Tested-by: Kiran K <kiran.k(a)intel.com> Fixes: f53e1c9c726d ("Bluetooth: MGMT: Fix possible crash on mgmt_index_removed") Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: ZhangPeng <zhangpeng362(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: dinglongwei <dinglongwei1(a)huawei.com> --- net/bluetooth/mgmt.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c b/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c index 1f3a39c20a91..2238f431858a 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c @@ -1503,7 +1503,8 @@ static void mgmt_set_discoverable_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data, bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "err %d", err); /* Make sure cmd still outstanding. */ - if (cmd != pending_find(MGMT_OP_SET_DISCOVERABLE, hdev)) + if (err == -ECANCELED || + cmd != pending_find(MGMT_OP_SET_DISCOVERABLE, hdev)) return; hci_dev_lock(hdev); @@ -1677,7 +1678,8 @@ static void mgmt_set_connectable_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data, bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "err %d", err); /* Make sure cmd still outstanding. */ - if (cmd != pending_find(MGMT_OP_SET_CONNECTABLE, hdev)) + if (err == -ECANCELED || + cmd != pending_find(MGMT_OP_SET_CONNECTABLE, hdev)) return; hci_dev_lock(hdev); @@ -1910,7 +1912,7 @@ static void set_ssp_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data, int err) bool changed; /* Make sure cmd still outstanding. */ - if (cmd != pending_find(MGMT_OP_SET_SSP, hdev)) + if (err == -ECANCELED || cmd != pending_find(MGMT_OP_SET_SSP, hdev)) return; if (err) { @@ -3775,7 +3777,8 @@ static void set_name_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data, int err) bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "err %d", err); - if (cmd != pending_find(MGMT_OP_SET_LOCAL_NAME, hdev)) + if (err == -ECANCELED || + cmd != pending_find(MGMT_OP_SET_LOCAL_NAME, hdev)) return; if (status) { @@ -3950,7 +3953,8 @@ static void set_default_phy_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data, int err) struct sk_buff *skb = cmd->skb; u8 status = mgmt_status(err); - if (cmd != pending_find(MGMT_OP_SET_PHY_CONFIGURATION, hdev)) + if (err == -ECANCELED || + cmd != pending_find(MGMT_OP_SET_PHY_CONFIGURATION, hdev)) return; if (!status) { @@ -5841,13 +5845,16 @@ static void start_discovery_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data, int err) { struct mgmt_pending_cmd *cmd = data; + bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "err %d", err); + + if (err == -ECANCELED) + return; + if (cmd != pending_find(MGMT_OP_START_DISCOVERY, hdev) && cmd != pending_find(MGMT_OP_START_LIMITED_DISCOVERY, hdev) && cmd != pending_find(MGMT_OP_START_SERVICE_DISCOVERY, hdev)) return; - bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "err %d", err); - mgmt_cmd_complete(cmd->sk, cmd->index, cmd->opcode, mgmt_status(err), cmd->param, 1); mgmt_pending_remove(cmd); @@ -6080,7 +6087,8 @@ static void stop_discovery_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data, int err) { struct mgmt_pending_cmd *cmd = data; - if (cmd != pending_find(MGMT_OP_STOP_DISCOVERY, hdev)) + if (err == -ECANCELED || + cmd != pending_find(MGMT_OP_STOP_DISCOVERY, hdev)) return; bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "err %d", err); @@ -8025,7 +8033,8 @@ static void read_local_oob_ext_data_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data, u8 status = mgmt_status(err); u16 eir_len; - if (cmd != pending_find(MGMT_OP_READ_LOCAL_OOB_EXT_DATA, hdev)) + if (err == -ECANCELED || + cmd != pending_find(MGMT_OP_READ_LOCAL_OOB_EXT_DATA, hdev)) return; if (!status) { -- 2.22.0

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[PATCH OLK-6.6] arm64: probes: Disable kprobes/uprobes on MOPS instructions
by Chen Zhongjin 06 Jan '25

06 Jan '25

From: Kristina Martsenko <kristina.martsenko(a)arm.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.64 commit 0dd9a53bb9b2562c7f73edbca2f399828700b7a6 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/IBA6RL Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit c56c599d9002d44f559be3852b371db46adac87c ] FEAT_MOPS instructions require that all three instructions (prologue, main and epilogue) appear consecutively in memory. Placing a kprobe/uprobe on one of them doesn't work as only a single instruction gets executed out-of-line or simulated. So don't allow placing a probe on a MOPS instruction. Fixes: b7564127ffcb ("arm64: mops: detect and enable FEAT_MOPS") Signed-off-by: Kristina Martsenko <kristina.martsenko(a)arm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240930161051.3777828-2-kristina.martsenko@arm.c… Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas(a)arm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Chen Zhongjin <chenzhongjin(a)huawei.com> --- arch/arm64/include/asm/insn.h | 1 + arch/arm64/kernel/probes/decode-insn.c | 7 +++++-- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/insn.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/insn.h index db1aeacd4cd9..0ccf51afde31 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/insn.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/insn.h @@ -347,6 +347,7 @@ __AARCH64_INSN_FUNCS(ldrsw_lit, 0xFF000000, 0x98000000) __AARCH64_INSN_FUNCS(exclusive, 0x3F800000, 0x08000000) __AARCH64_INSN_FUNCS(load_ex, 0x3F400000, 0x08400000) __AARCH64_INSN_FUNCS(store_ex, 0x3F400000, 0x08000000) +__AARCH64_INSN_FUNCS(mops, 0x3B200C00, 0x19000400) __AARCH64_INSN_FUNCS(stp, 0x7FC00000, 0x29000000) __AARCH64_INSN_FUNCS(ldp, 0x7FC00000, 0x29400000) __AARCH64_INSN_FUNCS(stp_post, 0x7FC00000, 0x28800000) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/probes/decode-insn.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/probes/decode-insn.c index 3496d6169e59..42b69936cee3 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/probes/decode-insn.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/probes/decode-insn.c @@ -58,10 +58,13 @@ static bool __kprobes aarch64_insn_is_steppable(u32 insn) * Instructions which load PC relative literals are not going to work * when executed from an XOL slot. Instructions doing an exclusive * load/store are not going to complete successfully when single-step - * exception handling happens in the middle of the sequence. + * exception handling happens in the middle of the sequence. Memory + * copy/set instructions require that all three instructions be placed + * consecutively in memory. */ if (aarch64_insn_uses_literal(insn) || - aarch64_insn_is_exclusive(insn)) + aarch64_insn_is_exclusive(insn) || + aarch64_insn_is_mops(insn)) return false; return true; -- 2.25.1

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[PATCH OLK-6.6] [Backport] btrfs: fix use-after-free in btrfs_encoded_read_endio()
by Yongjian Sun 06 Jan '25

06 Jan '25

From: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn(a)wdc.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.12-rc3 commit 05b36b04d74a517d6675bf2f90829ff1ac7e28dc category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IBEAOP CVE: CVE-2024-56582 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Shinichiro reported the following use-after free that sometimes is happening in our CI system when running fstests' btrfs/284 on a TCMU runner device: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in lock_release+0x708/0x780 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888106a83f18 by task kworker/u80:6/219 CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 219 Comm: kworker/u80:6 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc6-kts+ #15 Hardware name: Supermicro Super Server/X11SPi-TF, BIOS 3.3 02/21/2020 Workqueue: btrfs-endio btrfs_end_bio_work [btrfs] Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x6e/0xa0 ? lock_release+0x708/0x780 print_report+0x174/0x505 ? lock_release+0x708/0x780 ? __virt_addr_valid+0x224/0x410 ? lock_release+0x708/0x780 kasan_report+0xda/0x1b0 ? lock_release+0x708/0x780 ? __wake_up+0x44/0x60 lock_release+0x708/0x780 ? __pfx_lock_release+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_do_raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10 ? lock_is_held_type+0x9a/0x110 _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x1f/0x60 __wake_up+0x44/0x60 btrfs_encoded_read_endio+0x14b/0x190 [btrfs] btrfs_check_read_bio+0x8d9/0x1360 [btrfs] ? lock_release+0x1b0/0x780 ? trace_lock_acquire+0x12f/0x1a0 ? __pfx_btrfs_check_read_bio+0x10/0x10 [btrfs] ? process_one_work+0x7e3/0x1460 ? lock_acquire+0x31/0xc0 ? process_one_work+0x7e3/0x1460 process_one_work+0x85c/0x1460 ? __pfx_process_one_work+0x10/0x10 ? assign_work+0x16c/0x240 worker_thread+0x5e6/0xfc0 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0x2c3/0x3a0 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x31/0x70 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> Allocated by task 3661: kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0 btrfs_encoded_read_regular_fill_pages+0x16c/0x6d0 [btrfs] send_extent_data+0xf0f/0x24a0 [btrfs] process_extent+0x48a/0x1830 [btrfs] changed_cb+0x178b/0x2ea0 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl_send+0x3bf9/0x5c20 [btrfs] _btrfs_ioctl_send+0x117/0x330 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl+0x184a/0x60a0 [btrfs] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x12e/0x1a0 do_syscall_64+0x95/0x180 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Freed by task 3661: kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x70 __kasan_slab_free+0x4f/0x70 kfree+0x143/0x490 btrfs_encoded_read_regular_fill_pages+0x531/0x6d0 [btrfs] send_extent_data+0xf0f/0x24a0 [btrfs] process_extent+0x48a/0x1830 [btrfs] changed_cb+0x178b/0x2ea0 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl_send+0x3bf9/0x5c20 [btrfs] _btrfs_ioctl_send+0x117/0x330 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl+0x184a/0x60a0 [btrfs] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x12e/0x1a0 do_syscall_64+0x95/0x180 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888106a83f00 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-rnd-07-96 of size 96 The buggy address is located 24 bytes inside of freed 96-byte region [ffff888106a83f00, ffff888106a83f60) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff888106a83800 pfn:0x106a83 flags: 0x17ffffc0000000(node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff) page_type: f5(slab) raw: 0017ffffc0000000 ffff888100053680 ffffea0004917200 0000000000000004 raw: ffff888106a83800 0000000080200019 00000001f5000000 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888106a83e00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc ffff888106a83e80: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc >ffff888106a83f00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc ^ ffff888106a83f80: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc ffff888106a84000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ================================================================== Further analyzing the trace and the crash dump's vmcore file shows that the wake_up() call in btrfs_encoded_read_endio() is calling wake_up() on the wait_queue that is in the private data passed to the end_io handler. Commit 4ff47df40447 ("btrfs: move priv off stack in btrfs_encoded_read_regular_fill_pages()") moved 'struct btrfs_encoded_read_private' off the stack. Before that commit one can see a corruption of the private data when analyzing the vmcore after a crash: *(struct btrfs_encoded_read_private *)0xffff88815626eec8 = { .wait = (wait_queue_head_t){ .lock = (spinlock_t){ .rlock = (struct raw_spinlock){ .raw_lock = (arch_spinlock_t){ .val = (atomic_t){ .counter = (int)-2005885696, }, .locked = (u8)0, .pending = (u8)157, .locked_pending = (u16)40192, .tail = (u16)34928, }, .magic = (unsigned int)536325682, .owner_cpu = (unsigned int)29, .owner = (void *)__SCT__tp_func_btrfs_transaction_commit+0x0 = 0x0, .dep_map = (struct lockdep_map){ .key = (struct lock_class_key *)0xffff8881575a3b6c, .class_cache = (struct lock_class *[2]){ 0xffff8882a71985c0, 0xffffea00066f5d40 }, .name = (const char *)0xffff88815626f100 = "", .wait_type_outer = (u8)37, .wait_type_inner = (u8)178, .lock_type = (u8)154, }, }, .__padding = (u8 [24]){ 0, 157, 112, 136, 50, 174, 247, 31, 29 }, .dep_map = (struct lockdep_map){ .key = (struct lock_class_key *)0xffff8881575a3b6c, .class_cache = (struct lock_class *[2]){ 0xffff8882a71985c0, 0xffffea00066f5d40 }, .name = (const char *)0xffff88815626f100 = "", .wait_type_outer = (u8)37, .wait_type_inner = (u8)178, .lock_type = (u8)154, }, }, .head = (struct list_head){ .next = (struct list_head *)0x112cca, .prev = (struct list_head *)0x47, }, }, .pending = (atomic_t){ .counter = (int)-1491499288, }, .status = (blk_status_t)130, } Here we can see several indicators of in-memory data corruption, e.g. the large negative atomic values of ->pending or ->wait->lock->rlock->raw_lock->val, as well as the bogus spinlock magic 0x1ff7ae32 (decimal 536325682 above) instead of 0xdead4ead or the bogus pointer values for ->wait->head. To fix this, change atomic_dec_return() to atomic_dec_and_test() to fix the corruption, as atomic_dec_return() is defined as two instructions on x86_64, whereas atomic_dec_and_test() is defined as a single atomic operation. This can lead to a situation where counter value is already decremented but the if statement in btrfs_encoded_read_endio() is not completely processed, i.e. the 0 test has not completed. If another thread continues executing btrfs_encoded_read_regular_fill_pages() the atomic_dec_return() there can see an already updated ->pending counter and continues by freeing the private data. Continuing in the endio handler the test for 0 succeeds and the wait_queue is woken up, resulting in a use-after-free. Reported-by: Shinichiro Kawasaki <shinichiro.kawasaki(a)wdc.com> Suggested-by: Damien Le Moal <Damien.LeMoal(a)wdc.com> Fixes: 1881fba89bd5 ("btrfs: add BTRFS_IOC_ENCODED_READ ioctl") CC: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 6.1+ Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana(a)suse.com> Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu(a)suse.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn(a)wdc.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba(a)suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba(a)suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sun Yongjian <sunyongjian1(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Yongjian Sun <sunyongjian1(a)huawei.com> --- fs/btrfs/inode.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/btrfs/inode.c b/fs/btrfs/inode.c index fae45b8d485e..1511405abfe0 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/inode.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/inode.c @@ -9974,7 +9974,7 @@ static void btrfs_encoded_read_endio(struct btrfs_bio *bbio) */ WRITE_ONCE(priv->status, bbio->bio.bi_status); } - if (!atomic_dec_return(&priv->pending)) + if (!atomic_dec_and_test(&priv->pending)) wake_up(&priv->wait); bio_put(&bbio->bio); } -- 2.39.2

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[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/6] LoongArch: fix some issue
by Hongchen Zhang 06 Jan '25

06 Jan '25

Zhao Qunqin (3): pci/quirks: LS7A2000: fix pm transition of devices under pcie port net: stmmac: dwmac-loongson: fix Mac DMA reset drivers/char: add ACPI firmware support for Loongson SE driver wanghongliang (3): LoongArch: fix i2c related issues LoongArch: eiointc: fix ext irq route error LoongArch: adjust the calc method of number of packages. arch/loongarch/configs/loongson3_defconfig | 2 + arch/loongarch/include/asm/topology.h | 4 + arch/loongarch/kernel/setup.c | 1 + arch/loongarch/kernel/smp.c | 3 + drivers/char/loongson_se.c | 440 +++++++----------- drivers/char/lsse_sdf_cdev.c | 310 ++++++------ drivers/gpio/gpio-loongson-64bit.c | 298 ++++++++++-- drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-ls2x.c | 12 +- drivers/irqchip/irq-loongson-eiointc.c | 47 +- .../ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac-loongson.c | 14 + drivers/pci/quirks.c | 30 ++ drivers/platform/loongarch/cpu_hwmon.c | 3 +- include/linux/pci.h | 1 + .../include/asm => include/soc/loongson}/se.h | 52 +-- 14 files changed, 710 insertions(+), 507 deletions(-) rename {arch/loongarch/include/asm => include/soc/loongson}/se.h (68%) -- 2.33.0

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[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS 1/1] 9p/xen: fix release of IRQ
by Ze Zuo 06 Jan '25

06 Jan '25

From: Alex Zenla <alex(a)edera.dev> stable inclusion from stable-v4.19.325 commit 692eb06703afc3e24d889d77e94a0e20229f6a4a category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IBEDPA CVE: CVE-2024-56704 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit e43c608f40c065b30964f0a806348062991b802d ] Kernel logs indicate an IRQ was double-freed. Pass correct device ID during IRQ release. Fixes: 71ebd71921e45 ("xen/9pfs: connect to the backend") Signed-off-by: Alex Zenla <alex(a)edera.dev> Signed-off-by: Alexander Merritt <alexander(a)edera.dev> Signed-off-by: Ariadne Conill <ariadne(a)ariadne.space> Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross(a)suse.com> Message-ID: <20241121225100.5736-1-alexander(a)edera.dev> [Dominique: remove confusing variable reset to 0] Signed-off-by: Dominique Martinet <asmadeus(a)codewreck.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> (cherry picked from commit 692eb06703afc3e24d889d77e94a0e20229f6a4a) Signed-off-by: Ze Zuo <zuoze1(a)huawei.com> --- net/9p/trans_xen.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/9p/trans_xen.c b/net/9p/trans_xen.c index 8e158f09cba8..4096cfc7efc6 100644 --- a/net/9p/trans_xen.c +++ b/net/9p/trans_xen.c @@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ static void xen_9pfs_front_free(struct xen_9pfs_front_priv *priv) if (!priv->rings[i].intf) break; if (priv->rings[i].irq > 0) - unbind_from_irqhandler(priv->rings[i].irq, priv->dev); + unbind_from_irqhandler(priv->rings[i].irq, ring); if (priv->rings[i].data.in) { for (j = 0; j < (1 << XEN_9PFS_RING_ORDER); j++) { grant_ref_t ref; -- 2.25.1

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