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[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] net: pktgen: fix proc entry use-after-free
by JiangJieHua 21 Sep '26

21 Sep '26

From: Chengfeng Ye <nicoyip.dev(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.2-rc6 commit 817ff6efdb7f484ea547218e11e17d8e43daa3b4 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/17690 CVE: CVE-2026-74479 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- pktgen_change_name() replaces pkt_dev->entry while holding t->if_lock. pktgen_remove_device() removes the same entry before _rem_dev_from_if_list() takes that lock. This allows the following interleaving: CPU 0 (NETDEV_CHANGENAME) CPU 1 (kpktgend) if_lock(t) proc_remove(pkt_dev->entry) proc_remove(pkt_dev->entry) pkt_dev->entry = proc_create_data(...) if_unlock(t) The kthread can pass the stale proc_dir_entry to proc_remove() after the rename path has freed it. A reproducer with a widened race window reports: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in proc_remove+0x78/0x80 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881478fea70 by task kpktgend_0/67 Call Trace: proc_remove+0x78/0x80 pktgen_remove_device.isra.0+0x11c/0x4c0 pktgen_thread_worker+0x1214/0x6bc0 kthread+0x2c6/0x3b0 Allocated by task 95: __proc_create+0x204/0x790 proc_create_data+0x72/0xe0 pktgen_thread_write+0xd61/0x1510 Freed by task 28: kmem_cache_free+0xcb/0x3d0 proc_free_inode+0x5b/0x80 rcu_core+0x50a/0x1850 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881478fea00 which belongs to the cache proc_dir_entry of size 192 Move proc_remove() into the if_lock-protected list removal helper. Keep it before list_del_rcu() to preserve the ordering required by add_device(). The rename path must then finish replacing the entry before removal, or it observes that the device is no longer on the list. Fixes: 39df232f1a9b ("[PKTGEN]: fix device name handling") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Chengfeng Ye <nicoyip.dev(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms(a)kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260719145740.2888967-1-nicoyip.dev@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: net/core/pktgen.c [Context differences are due to the following patches not being merged: 870b856cb478 ("net: pktgen: fix code style (WARNING: Block comments)")] Signed-off-by: JiangJieHua <jiangjiehua1(a)huawei.com> --- net/core/pktgen.c | 4 +--- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/core/pktgen.c b/net/core/pktgen.c index 092fa3d75b32a..369f590ce235d 100644 --- a/net/core/pktgen.c +++ b/net/core/pktgen.c @@ -3743,6 +3743,7 @@ static void _rem_dev_from_if_list(struct pktgen_thread *t, struct pktgen_dev *p; if_lock(t); + proc_remove(pkt_dev->entry); list_for_each_safe(q, n, &t->if_list) { p = list_entry(q, struct pktgen_dev, list); if (p == pkt_dev) @@ -3771,9 +3772,6 @@ static int pktgen_remove_device(struct pktgen_thread *t, /* Remove proc before if_list entry, because add_device uses * list to determine if interface already exist, avoid race * with proc_create_data() */ - proc_remove(pkt_dev->entry); - - /* And update the thread if_list */ _rem_dev_from_if_list(t, pkt_dev); #ifdef CONFIG_XFRM -- 2.33.8

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[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] ipv4: fib: Don't dump dying fib_info in fib_leaf_notify().
by JiangJieHua 21 Sep '26

21 Sep '26

From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu(a)google.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.2-rc1 commit 06b693d2eb6651a63ad85bad8673de3b7d4edd6d category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/17956 CVE: CVE-2026-74289 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- syzbot reported use-after-free in nsim_fib4_prepare_event(). [0] The problem is that the following functions call fib_info_hold() / refcount_inc() while dumping fib_info under RCU, which is unsafe. * mlxsw_sp_router_fib4_event() * rocker_router_fib_event() * nsim_fib4_prepare_event() refcount_inc_not_zero() must be used, but it would be too late there. Let's guarantee the lifetime of fib_info in fib_leaf_notify(). Note that IPv6 does not need the corresponding change since fib6_table_dump() holds fib6_table.tb6_lock. [0]: refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free. WARNING: lib/refcount.c:25 at refcount_warn_saturate+0x9f/0x110 lib/refcount.c:25, CPU#0: kworker/u8:15/3420 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 3420 Comm: kworker/u8:15 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT_{RT,(full)} Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/18/2026 Workqueue: netns cleanup_net RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0x9f/0x110 lib/refcount.c:25 Code: eb 66 85 db 74 3e 83 fb 01 75 4c e8 1b f1 22 fd 48 8d 3d 84 cb f1 0a 67 48 0f b9 3a eb 4a e8 08 f1 22 fd 48 8d 3d 81 cb f1 0a <67> 48 0f b9 3a eb 37 e8 f5 f0 22 fd 48 8d 3d 7e cb f1 0a 67 48 0f RSP: 0018:ffffc9000f2c7270 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: ffffffff84a18858 RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: ffff888032ff9ec0 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffffff8f9353e0 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff888032ff9ec0 R09: 0000000000000005 R10: 0000000000000100 R11: 0000000000000004 R12: ffff8880570cc000 R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff88802b40563c R15: ffff8880570cc000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888126173000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fb1f4d5d000 CR3: 000000006072a000 CR4: 00000000003526f0 Call Trace: <TASK> __refcount_add include/linux/refcount.h:-1 [inline] __refcount_inc include/linux/refcount.h:366 [inline] refcount_inc include/linux/refcount.h:383 [inline] fib_info_hold include/net/ip_fib.h:629 [inline] nsim_fib4_prepare_event drivers/net/netdevsim/fib.c:930 [inline] nsim_fib_event_schedule_work drivers/net/netdevsim/fib.c:1000 [inline] nsim_fib_event_nb+0x1055/0x1240 drivers/net/netdevsim/fib.c:1043 call_fib_notifier+0x45/0x80 net/core/fib_notifier.c:25 call_fib_entry_notifier net/ipv4/fib_trie.c:90 [inline] fib_leaf_notify net/ipv4/fib_trie.c:2176 [inline] fib_table_notify net/ipv4/fib_trie.c:2194 [inline] fib_notify+0x36b/0x5e0 net/ipv4/fib_trie.c:2217 fib_net_dump net/core/fib_notifier.c:70 [inline] register_fib_notifier+0x184/0x360 net/core/fib_notifier.c:108 nsim_fib_create+0x85d/0x9f0 drivers/net/netdevsim/fib.c:1596 nsim_dev_reload_create drivers/net/netdevsim/dev.c:1604 [inline] nsim_dev_reload_up+0x374/0x7c0 drivers/net/netdevsim/dev.c:1058 devlink_reload+0x501/0x8d0 net/devlink/dev.c:475 devlink_pernet_pre_exit+0x1ff/0x420 net/devlink/core.c:558 ops_pre_exit_list net/core/net_namespace.c:161 [inline] ops_undo_list+0x187/0x940 net/core/net_namespace.c:234 cleanup_net+0x56e/0x800 net/core/net_namespace.c:702 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3314 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xb5d/0x1860 kernel/workqueue.c:3397 worker_thread+0xa53/0xfc0 kernel/workqueue.c:3478 kthread+0x388/0x470 kernel/kthread.c:436 ret_from_fork+0x514/0xb70 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245 </TASK> Fixes: 0ae3eb7b4611 ("netdevsim: fib: Perform the route programming in a non-atomic context") Fixes: c3852ef7f2f8 ("ipv4: fib: Replay events when registering FIB notifier") Reported-by: syzbot+cb2aa2390ac024e25f5c(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/6a290011.39669fcc.33b062.00b1.GAE@google.com/ Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu(a)google.com> Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch(a)nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern(a)kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260610061744.2030996-2-kuniyu@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: net/ipv4/fib_trie.c [Context differences are due to the following patches not being merged: net: fib_notifier per-netns / error / extack rework: 7c550daffe22 ("net: fib_notifier: make FIB notifier per-netns") 55c894f762a1 ("net: fib_notifier: propagate possible error during fib notifier registration") b7a595577ef3 ("net: fib_notifier: propagate extack down to the notifier block callback") route replay dedup and ADD->REPLACE conversion: 20d1565203e6 ("ipv4: Only Replay routes of interest to new listeners") 446f739104f4 ("ipv4: Remove old route notifications and convert listeners")] Signed-off-by: JiangJieHua <jiangjiehua1(a)huawei.com> --- include/net/ip_fib.h | 5 +++++ net/ipv4/fib_trie.c | 4 ++++ 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/net/ip_fib.h b/include/net/ip_fib.h index 95eed32d8c6bb..1ba7d0c878145 100644 --- a/include/net/ip_fib.h +++ b/include/net/ip_fib.h @@ -431,6 +431,11 @@ static inline void fib_info_hold(struct fib_info *fi) refcount_inc(&fi->fib_clntref); } +static inline bool fib_info_hold_safe(struct fib_info *fi) +{ + return refcount_inc_not_zero(&fi->fib_clntref); +} + static inline void fib_info_put(struct fib_info *fi) { if (refcount_dec_and_test(&fi->fib_clntref)) diff --git a/net/ipv4/fib_trie.c b/net/ipv4/fib_trie.c index 48d7125501b4e..592a8c7f69366 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/fib_trie.c +++ b/net/ipv4/fib_trie.c @@ -1959,8 +1959,12 @@ static void fib_leaf_notify(struct net *net, struct key_vector *l, if (tb->tb_id != fa->tb_id) continue; + if (!fib_info_hold_safe(fa->fa_info)) + continue; + call_fib_entry_notifier(nb, net, FIB_EVENT_ENTRY_ADD, l->key, KEYLENGTH - fa->fa_slen, fa); + fib_info_put(fa->fa_info); } } -- 2.33.8

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[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] tcp: ipv6: clamp default adverting MSS to avoid GSO_BY_FRAGS (0xFFFF)
by JiangJieHua 21 Sep '26

21 Sep '26

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.2-rc1 commit 2bf43d0e2e6a27d52a7d624e2d6b9116972e8a22 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/18083 CVE: CVE-2026-72502 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- When MTU is large, ip6_default_advmss() can return IPV6_MAXPLEN (65535). This is interpreted by TCP as mss_clamp, allowing the MSS to reach 65535. However, 0xFFFF is also used as a magic value GSO_BY_FRAGS in the kernel. If a TCP packet with gso_size=0xFFFF is passed to skb_segment(), it will be mistakenly treated as GSO_BY_FRAGS, leading to a NULL pointer dereference because local TCP packets do not use frag_list. Fix this by returning min(IPV6_MAXPLEN, GSO_BY_FRAGS - 1) (65534) from ip6_default_advmss() when MTU is large. Also update the stale comment in ip6_default_advmss() which suggested that IPV6_MAXPLEN is returned to mean "any MSS". Fixes: 3953c46c3ac7 ("sk_buff: allow segmenting based on frag sizes") Reported-by: syzbot+ebdb22d461c904fc3cb2(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/6a2c3193.8812e0fc.3c3fa4.0001.GAE@google.com… Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu(a)google.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260612162517.83394-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: JiangJieHua <jiangjiehua1(a)huawei.com> --- net/ipv6/route.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv6/route.c b/net/ipv6/route.c index 907a5e5078199..8873c4c85d6f4 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/route.c +++ b/net/ipv6/route.c @@ -2665,11 +2665,11 @@ static unsigned int ip6_default_advmss(const struct dst_entry *dst) /* * Maximal non-jumbo IPv6 payload is IPV6_MAXPLEN and * corresponding MSS is IPV6_MAXPLEN - tcp_header_size. - * IPV6_MAXPLEN is also valid and means: "any MSS, - * rely only on pmtu discovery" + * Limit the default MSS to GSO_BY_FRAGS - 1 to avoid + * collision with the GSO_BY_FRAGS magic value (0xFFFF). */ if (mtu > IPV6_MAXPLEN - sizeof(struct tcphdr)) - mtu = IPV6_MAXPLEN; + mtu = min_t(unsigned int, IPV6_MAXPLEN, GSO_BY_FRAGS - 1); return mtu; } -- 2.33.8

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] openvswitch: fix GSO userspace truncation underflow
by Yi Yang 21 Sep '26

21 Sep '26

From: Kyle Zeng <kylebot(a)openai.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.265 commit 50a6a85f3d6b1d22d8436848606cdef5d2c490b4 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/16932 CVE: CVE-2026-68123 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 4032f8ed10fcb84d41c508dfb04be96589f78dfe ] OVS_ACTION_ATTR_TRUNC currently stores a delta from the original skb length in OVS_CB(skb)->cutlen. When a later userspace action segments a GSO skb, queue_gso_packets() reuses that delta for each smaller segment. A segment can then reach queue_userspace_packet() with cutlen greater than skb->len, underflowing the length passed to skb_zerocopy(). Store the maximum preserved length instead and bound each consumer against the current skb length. Use U32_MAX as the no-truncation sentinel so the value remains valid if skb geometry changes before a consumer handles it. Fixes: f2a4d086ed4c ("openvswitch: Add packet truncation support.") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.5 Signed-off-by: Kyle Zeng <kylebot(a)openai.com> Reviewed-by: Ilya Maximets <i.maximets(a)ovn.org> Reviewed-by: Aaron Conole <aconole(a)redhat.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260707221635.27489-1-kylebot@openai.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> [5.10.y supports neither OVS_ACTION_ATTR_PSAMPLE nor OVS drop reasons] Signed-off-by: Ilya Maximets <i.maximets(a)ovn.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: net/openvswitch/actions.c [The max function requires that the types be the same.] net/openvswitch/datapath.c [Context conflicts.] Signed-off-by: Yi Yang <yiyang13(a)huawei.com> --- net/openvswitch/actions.c | 16 ++++++---------- net/openvswitch/datapath.c | 25 ++++++++++++++----------- net/openvswitch/datapath.h | 2 +- net/openvswitch/vport.c | 2 +- 4 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/openvswitch/actions.c b/net/openvswitch/actions.c index 7ac5f75e06a9..669578e423f9 100644 --- a/net/openvswitch/actions.c +++ b/net/openvswitch/actions.c @@ -949,12 +949,9 @@ static void do_output(struct datapath *dp, struct sk_buff *skb, int out_port, u16 mru = OVS_CB(skb)->mru; u32 cutlen = OVS_CB(skb)->cutlen; - if (unlikely(cutlen > 0)) { - if (skb->len - cutlen > ovs_mac_header_len(key)) - pskb_trim(skb, skb->len - cutlen); - else - pskb_trim(skb, ovs_mac_header_len(key)); - } + if (unlikely(cutlen < skb->len)) + pskb_trim(skb, max_t(u32, cutlen, + ovs_mac_header_len(key))); if (likely(!mru || (skb->len <= mru + vport->dev->hard_header_len))) { @@ -1237,22 +1234,21 @@ static int do_execute_actions(struct datapath *dp, struct sk_buff *skb, clone = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC); if (clone) do_output(dp, clone, port, key); - OVS_CB(skb)->cutlen = 0; + OVS_CB(skb)->cutlen = U32_MAX; break; } case OVS_ACTION_ATTR_TRUNC: { struct ovs_action_trunc *trunc = nla_data(a); - if (skb->len > trunc->max_len) - OVS_CB(skb)->cutlen = skb->len - trunc->max_len; + OVS_CB(skb)->cutlen = trunc->max_len; break; } case OVS_ACTION_ATTR_USERSPACE: output_userspace(dp, skb, key, a, attr, len, OVS_CB(skb)->cutlen); - OVS_CB(skb)->cutlen = 0; + OVS_CB(skb)->cutlen = U32_MAX; break; case OVS_ACTION_ATTR_HASH: diff --git a/net/openvswitch/datapath.c b/net/openvswitch/datapath.c index bd00e63603ca..1aeeb18c8812 100644 --- a/net/openvswitch/datapath.c +++ b/net/openvswitch/datapath.c @@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ void ovs_dp_process_packet(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sw_flow_key *key) upcall.cmd = OVS_PACKET_CMD_MISS; upcall.portid = ovs_vport_find_upcall_portid(p, skb); upcall.mru = OVS_CB(skb)->mru; - error = ovs_dp_upcall(dp, skb, key, &upcall, 0); + error = ovs_dp_upcall(dp, skb, key, &upcall, U32_MAX); if (unlikely(error)) kfree_skb(skb); else @@ -399,7 +399,8 @@ static int queue_userspace_packet(struct datapath *dp, struct sk_buff *skb, struct sk_buff *nskb = NULL; struct sk_buff *user_skb = NULL; /* to be queued to userspace */ struct nlattr *nla; - size_t len; + size_t msg_size; + size_t skb_len; unsigned int hlen; int err, dp_ifindex; @@ -419,7 +420,8 @@ static int queue_userspace_packet(struct datapath *dp, struct sk_buff *skb, skb = nskb; } - if (nla_attr_size(skb->len) > USHRT_MAX) { + skb_len = min(skb->len, cutlen); + if (nla_attr_size(skb_len) > USHRT_MAX) { err = -EFBIG; goto out; } @@ -434,13 +436,13 @@ static int queue_userspace_packet(struct datapath *dp, struct sk_buff *skb, * padding logic. Only perform zerocopy if padding is not required. */ if (dp->user_features & OVS_DP_F_UNALIGNED) - hlen = skb_zerocopy_headlen(skb); + hlen = min(skb_zerocopy_headlen(skb), cutlen); else - hlen = skb->len; + hlen = skb_len; - len = upcall_msg_size(upcall_info, hlen - cutlen, - OVS_CB(skb)->acts_origlen); - user_skb = genlmsg_new(len, GFP_ATOMIC); + msg_size = upcall_msg_size(upcall_info, hlen, + OVS_CB(skb)->acts_origlen); + user_skb = genlmsg_new(msg_size, GFP_ATOMIC); if (!user_skb) { err = -ENOMEM; goto out; @@ -503,7 +505,7 @@ static int queue_userspace_packet(struct datapath *dp, struct sk_buff *skb, } /* Add OVS_PACKET_ATTR_LEN when packet is truncated */ - if (cutlen > 0) { + if (skb_len < skb->len) { if (nla_put_u32(user_skb, OVS_PACKET_ATTR_LEN, skb->len)) { err = -ENOBUFS; @@ -518,9 +520,9 @@ static int queue_userspace_packet(struct datapath *dp, struct sk_buff *skb, err = -ENOBUFS; goto out; } - nla->nla_len = nla_attr_size(skb->len - cutlen); + nla->nla_len = nla_attr_size(skb_len); - err = skb_zerocopy(user_skb, skb, skb->len - cutlen, hlen); + err = skb_zerocopy(user_skb, skb, skb_len, hlen); if (err) goto out; @@ -575,6 +577,7 @@ static int ovs_packet_cmd_execute(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info) packet->ignore_df = 1; } OVS_CB(packet)->mru = mru; + OVS_CB(packet)->cutlen = U32_MAX; /* Build an sw_flow for sending this packet. */ flow = ovs_flow_alloc(); diff --git a/net/openvswitch/datapath.h b/net/openvswitch/datapath.h index c9eb267c6f7e..9192c9970cc3 100644 --- a/net/openvswitch/datapath.h +++ b/net/openvswitch/datapath.h @@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ struct datapath { * @mru: The maximum received fragement size; 0 if the packet is not * fragmented. * @acts_origlen: The netlink size of the flow actions applied to this skb. - * @cutlen: The number of bytes from the packet end to be removed. + * @cutlen: The number of bytes in the packet to preserve on output. */ struct ovs_skb_cb { struct vport *input_vport; diff --git a/net/openvswitch/vport.c b/net/openvswitch/vport.c index 5541f4c9a0a1..586428d2015d 100644 --- a/net/openvswitch/vport.c +++ b/net/openvswitch/vport.c @@ -447,7 +447,7 @@ int ovs_vport_receive(struct vport *vport, struct sk_buff *skb, OVS_CB(skb)->input_vport = vport; OVS_CB(skb)->mru = 0; - OVS_CB(skb)->cutlen = 0; + OVS_CB(skb)->cutlen = U32_MAX; if (unlikely(dev_net(skb->dev) != ovs_dp_get_net(vport->dp))) { u32 mark; -- 2.25.1

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[PATCH v2 OLK-5.10 0/3] CVE-2026-89636
by Yifan Qiao 21 Sep '26

21 Sep '26

Fredric Cover (3): smb: client: harden DFS cache against invalid target hints smb: client: clear ce->tgthint in free_tgts() smb: client: fill cache fields after populating cache in copy_ref_data() fs/cifs/dfs_cache.c | 61 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 44 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) -- 2.52.0

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[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS V1] IB/isert: reject login PDUs declaring more data than was received
by Yao Yiqi 21 Sep '26

21 Sep '26

From: Yehyeong Lee <yhlee(a)isslab.korea.ac.kr> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.270 commit b1f3313e7b3e396e4985fea5c709477387e0a065 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/19431 CVE: CVE-2026-90413 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… ------------------------------ [ Upstream commit 2488b5b4827e5415768afc8daf097e8eb83c98df ] isert_login_recv_done() records how many bytes the HCA actually placed in the login buffer, but nothing compares that against the length the login PDU's BHS declares. isert_rx_login_req() copies min(login_req_len, MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS) bytes into login->req_buf, and the login code then reads the declared length back out of that buffer - for the first PDU in iscsi_target_locate_portal(), payload_length = ntoh24(login_req->dlength); tmpbuf = kmemdup_nul(login->req_buf, payload_length, GFP_KERNEL); and for the ones after it in iscsi_decode_text_input(), reached from iscsi_target_do_login(). login->req_buf is a fixed MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS (8192) byte allocation, so an initiator that declares more than it sends reads off the end of it, before authentication and with the length under its control: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kmemdup_nul+0x43/0x80 Read of size 8193 at addr ffff8881056a8000 by task iscsi_np/167 __asan_memcpy+0x23/0x60 kmemdup_nul+0x43/0x80 iscsi_target_locate_portal+0x48d/0x1180 iscsi_target_login_thread+0x19a9/0x3350 Allocated by task 167: __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x158/0x370 iscsi_target_login_thread+0x971/0x3350 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8k of size 8192 allocated 8192-byte region Falsifying the second login PDU instead reaches the other reader, on the same buffer: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kmemdup_nul+0x43/0x80 Read of size 8193 at addr ffff888104d10000 by task kworker/1:1/50 Workqueue: isert_login_wq iscsi_target_do_login_rx __asan_memcpy+0x23/0x60 kmemdup_nul+0x43/0x80 iscsi_decode_text_input+0xc6/0x11c0 iscsi_target_do_login+0x261/0x1470 iscsi_target_do_login_rx+0x51d/0x7d0 iscsit over TCP is not exposed: iscsit_get_login_rx() validates the declared length with iscsi_target_check_login_request() and then reads exactly that many bytes off the socket, so the declared length governs how much arrives rather than how much is copied out of an already-filled buffer. isert does not call iscsi_target_check_login_request() at all. Reject a login PDU whose declared DataSegmentLength exceeds what was received, in both paths that reach isert_rx_login_req(): isert_get_login_rx() for the first login PDU and isert_login_recv_done() for the ones after it. dlength <= login_req_len is allowed because the received count can include up to three bytes of iSCSI padding. Once the check is in place the copy out can no longer exceed the copy in: the posted login SGE is ISER_RX_PAYLOAD_SIZE, so login_req_len cannot exceed MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS and the min() in isert_rx_login_req() is login_req_len. Like the existing short-PDU check added by 29e7b925ae6d, the reject in isert_login_recv_done() returns without completing login_req_comp, so a malformed subsequent PDU leaves the login to be torn down by the login timer rather than failing immediately. The first-PDU path returns an error and fails straight away. Reproduced on 7.2.0-rc4 with soft-RoCE (rdma_rxe) under KASAN, using an initiator that sends the real key=value payload while declaring 8193 in the BHS, on the first login PDU and on the second in separate runs. The reported read size tracks the declared value exactly; 16384 and 61440 behave the same. Unpatched 3 of 3 runs report on each of the two paths, patched 0 of 3 on both, run alternately in a single session, and a normal login still completes on the patched build. Fixes: b8d26b3be8b3 ("iser-target: Add iSCSI Extensions for RDMA (iSER) target driver") Suggested-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro(a)nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Yehyeong Lee <yhlee(a)isslab.korea.ac.kr> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260726163931.971063-3-yhlee@isslab.korea.ac.kr Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: drivers/infiniband/ulp/isert/ib_isert.c [ 4.19 does not have isert_get_iscsi_hdr helper funciton ] Signed-off-by: Yao Yiqi <yaoyiqi3(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/infiniband/ulp/isert/ib_isert.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/ulp/isert/ib_isert.c b/drivers/infiniband/ulp/isert/ib_isert.c index 97119e8e0751..fbe073ebfbcc 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/ulp/isert/ib_isert.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/ulp/isert/ib_isert.c @@ -1056,6 +1056,21 @@ isert_put_login_tx(struct iscsi_conn *conn, struct iscsi_login *login, return 0; } +static int +isert_check_login_req(struct isert_conn *isert_conn) +{ + struct iscsi_hdr *hdr = &isert_conn->login_req_buf->iscsi_header; + u32 dlength = ntoh24(hdr->dlength); + + if (unlikely(dlength > (u32)isert_conn->login_req_len)) { + isert_dbg("login PDU declares %u data bytes but only %d were received\n", + dlength, isert_conn->login_req_len); + return -EINVAL; + } + + return 0; +} + static void isert_rx_login_req(struct isert_conn *isert_conn) { @@ -1484,8 +1499,12 @@ isert_login_recv_done(struct ib_cq *cq, struct ib_wc *wc) if (isert_conn->conn) { struct iscsi_login *login = isert_conn->conn->conn_login; - if (login && !login->first_request) + if (login && !login->first_request) { + if (isert_check_login_req(isert_conn)) + return; + isert_rx_login_req(isert_conn); + } } mutex_lock(&isert_conn->mutex); @@ -2445,6 +2464,10 @@ isert_get_login_rx(struct iscsi_conn *conn, struct iscsi_login *login) if (!login->first_request) return 0; + ret = isert_check_login_req(isert_conn); + if (ret) + return ret; + isert_rx_login_req(isert_conn); isert_info("before login_comp conn: %p\n", conn); -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] selinux: check connect-related permissions on TCP Fast Open
by Yi Yang 21 Sep '26

21 Sep '26

From: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.2-rc3 commit 44c74d27d1b9aaa99fa8a83640c1223575262b80 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/17775 CVE: CVE-2026-72243 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Similar to Landlock, SELinux was not updated when TCP Fast Open support was introduced to ensure connect-related permissions are checked when using TCP Fast Open. Update its socket_sendmsg() hook to call selinux_socket_connect() when MSG_FASTOPEN is passed. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20260616201615.275032-1-hexla… Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20260617180526.15627-2-matthi… Reported-by: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity(a)proton.me> Reported-by: Matthieu Buffet <matthieu(a)buffet.re> Reported-by: Mikhail Ivanov <ivanov.mikhail1(a)huawei-partners.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work(a)gmail.com> Tested-by: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity(a)proton.me> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com> Conflicts: security/selinux/hooks.c [The sk_is_tcp function was not introduced.] Signed-off-by: Yi Yang <yiyang13(a)huawei.com> --- security/selinux/hooks.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 3550ded07457..f85147d8704d 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -4910,7 +4910,25 @@ static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock) static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int size) { - return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__WRITE); + int rc; + struct sockaddr *const addr = msg->msg_name; + const int addrlen = msg->msg_namelen; + + rc = sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__WRITE); + if (rc) + return rc; + + if (addr && (msg->msg_flags & MSG_FASTOPEN) && + (sock->sk->sk_family == AF_INET || + sock->sk->sk_family == AF_INET6) && + sock->sk->sk_type == SOCK_STREAM && + sock->sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_TCP) { + rc = selinux_socket_connect(sock, addr, addrlen); + if (rc) + return rc; + } + + return 0; } static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS V1] IB/isert: reject login PDUs declaring more data than was received
by Yao Yiqi 21 Sep '26

21 Sep '26

From: Yehyeong Lee <yhlee(a)isslab.korea.ac.kr> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.270 commit b1f3313e7b3e396e4985fea5c709477387e0a065 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/19431 CVE: CVE-2026-90413 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… ------------------------------ [ Upstream commit 2488b5b4827e5415768afc8daf097e8eb83c98df ] isert_login_recv_done() records how many bytes the HCA actually placed in the login buffer, but nothing compares that against the length the login PDU's BHS declares. isert_rx_login_req() copies min(login_req_len, MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS) bytes into login->req_buf, and the login code then reads the declared length back out of that buffer - for the first PDU in iscsi_target_locate_portal(), payload_length = ntoh24(login_req->dlength); tmpbuf = kmemdup_nul(login->req_buf, payload_length, GFP_KERNEL); and for the ones after it in iscsi_decode_text_input(), reached from iscsi_target_do_login(). login->req_buf is a fixed MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS (8192) byte allocation, so an initiator that declares more than it sends reads off the end of it, before authentication and with the length under its control: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kmemdup_nul+0x43/0x80 Read of size 8193 at addr ffff8881056a8000 by task iscsi_np/167 __asan_memcpy+0x23/0x60 kmemdup_nul+0x43/0x80 iscsi_target_locate_portal+0x48d/0x1180 iscsi_target_login_thread+0x19a9/0x3350 Allocated by task 167: __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x158/0x370 iscsi_target_login_thread+0x971/0x3350 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8k of size 8192 allocated 8192-byte region Falsifying the second login PDU instead reaches the other reader, on the same buffer: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kmemdup_nul+0x43/0x80 Read of size 8193 at addr ffff888104d10000 by task kworker/1:1/50 Workqueue: isert_login_wq iscsi_target_do_login_rx __asan_memcpy+0x23/0x60 kmemdup_nul+0x43/0x80 iscsi_decode_text_input+0xc6/0x11c0 iscsi_target_do_login+0x261/0x1470 iscsi_target_do_login_rx+0x51d/0x7d0 iscsit over TCP is not exposed: iscsit_get_login_rx() validates the declared length with iscsi_target_check_login_request() and then reads exactly that many bytes off the socket, so the declared length governs how much arrives rather than how much is copied out of an already-filled buffer. isert does not call iscsi_target_check_login_request() at all. Reject a login PDU whose declared DataSegmentLength exceeds what was received, in both paths that reach isert_rx_login_req(): isert_get_login_rx() for the first login PDU and isert_login_recv_done() for the ones after it. dlength <= login_req_len is allowed because the received count can include up to three bytes of iSCSI padding. Once the check is in place the copy out can no longer exceed the copy in: the posted login SGE is ISER_RX_PAYLOAD_SIZE, so login_req_len cannot exceed MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS and the min() in isert_rx_login_req() is login_req_len. Like the existing short-PDU check added by 29e7b925ae6d, the reject in isert_login_recv_done() returns without completing login_req_comp, so a malformed subsequent PDU leaves the login to be torn down by the login timer rather than failing immediately. The first-PDU path returns an error and fails straight away. Reproduced on 7.2.0-rc4 with soft-RoCE (rdma_rxe) under KASAN, using an initiator that sends the real key=value payload while declaring 8193 in the BHS, on the first login PDU and on the second in separate runs. The reported read size tracks the declared value exactly; 16384 and 61440 behave the same. Unpatched 3 of 3 runs report on each of the two paths, patched 0 of 3 on both, run alternately in a single session, and a normal login still completes on the patched build. Fixes: b8d26b3be8b3 ("iser-target: Add iSCSI Extensions for RDMA (iSER) target driver") Suggested-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro(a)nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Yehyeong Lee <yhlee(a)isslab.korea.ac.kr> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260726163931.971063-3-yhlee@isslab.korea.ac.kr Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Yao Yiqi <yaoyiqi3(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/infiniband/ulp/isert/ib_isert.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/ulp/isert/ib_isert.c b/drivers/infiniband/ulp/isert/ib_isert.c index 97119e8e0751..4d0da69103cf 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/ulp/isert/ib_isert.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/ulp/isert/ib_isert.c @@ -1056,6 +1056,21 @@ isert_put_login_tx(struct iscsi_conn *conn, struct iscsi_login *login, return 0; } +static int +isert_check_login_req(struct isert_conn *isert_conn) +{ + struct iscsi_hdr *hdr = isert_get_iscsi_hdr(isert_conn->login_desc); + u32 dlength = ntoh24(hdr->dlength); + + if (unlikely(dlength > (u32)isert_conn->login_req_len)) { + isert_dbg("login PDU declares %u data bytes but only %d were received\n", + dlength, isert_conn->login_req_len); + return -EINVAL; + } + + return 0; +} + static void isert_rx_login_req(struct isert_conn *isert_conn) { @@ -1484,8 +1499,12 @@ isert_login_recv_done(struct ib_cq *cq, struct ib_wc *wc) if (isert_conn->conn) { struct iscsi_login *login = isert_conn->conn->conn_login; - if (login && !login->first_request) + if (login && !login->first_request) { + if (isert_check_login_req(isert_conn)) + return; + isert_rx_login_req(isert_conn); + } } mutex_lock(&isert_conn->mutex); @@ -2445,6 +2464,10 @@ isert_get_login_rx(struct iscsi_conn *conn, struct iscsi_login *login) if (!login->first_request) return 0; + ret = isert_check_login_req(isert_conn); + if (ret) + return ret; + isert_rx_login_req(isert_conn); isert_info("before login_comp conn: %p\n", conn); -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS V1] IB/isert: reject PDUs declaring more data than was received
by Yao Yiqi 21 Sep '26

21 Sep '26

From: Yehyeong Lee <yhlee(a)isslab.korea.ac.kr> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.270 commit b4706722ed3ea72882b3c986a19b4a1ba66384c4 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/19430 CVE: CVE-2026-90414 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… ------------------------------ [ Upstream commit 957f92ea4022fb6af4618271615a2a21a7b5bef9 ] isert_recv_done() hands each received PDU to the opcode handlers without ever looking at wc->byte_len, the number of bytes the HCA actually placed in the receive descriptor. The handlers then copy that many bytes - the data-segment length the initiator declared in the BHS (ntoh24(hdr->dlength), via the derived unsol_data_len / imm_data_len) - out of the fixed-size descriptor: isert_handle_iscsi_dataout(): sg_copy_from_buffer(sg_start, sg_nents, isert_get_data(rx_desc), unsol_data_len); isert_handle_scsi_cmd(): sg_copy_from_buffer(cmd->se_cmd.t_data_sg, sg_nents, isert_get_data(rx_desc), imm_data_len); Because the declared length is never checked against wc->byte_len, an initiator can declare a data segment larger than the bytes it actually sent (and larger than the descriptor) and cause an out-of-bounds read of the receive buffer. Nothing upstream of isert closes this door: - __iscsit_check_dataout_hdr() bounds the inbound payload against conn_ops->MaxXmitDataSegmentLength (MXDSL) - a transmit parameter, used here for the inbound check. - iscsi_set_connection_parameters() sets ops->MaxXmitDataSegmentLength = ops->TargetRecvDataSegmentLength; and TARGETRECVDATASEGMENTLENGTH is absent from the min()-clamp list in iscsi_check_acceptor_state(), so the value the initiator declares is adopted verbatim (type range 512..16777215). The initiator effectively raises its own ceiling. - isert never clamps the negotiated value to its own fixed receive descriptor (ISER_RX_SIZE, 9216 bytes), so the target core's bound and the descriptor size are unrelated. The imm_data_len == data_len path is more than an over-read: it aliases the receive descriptor via sg_set_buf() and passes it to the backend as the data source for the SCSI WRITE, so an over-declared length causes heap contents past the descriptor to be written through the backend to the backing store. The backend is the victim of the oversized scatterlist isert hands it, not the cause; no read-back of the written bytes was demonstrated. Trigger: after login completes (full feature phase), an initiator that has declared a large TargetRecvDataSegmentLength and a FirstBurstLength that permits unsolicited/immediate data sends a PDU whose declared data-segment length exceeds what was received. With KASAN: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in sg_copy_buffer+0x150/0x1c0 Read of size 4096 at addr ffff888109720800 by task kworker/1:0H/25 Workqueue: ib-comp-wq ib_cq_poll_work Call Trace: sg_copy_buffer+0x150/0x1c0 isert_recv_done+0xba6/0x2390 __ib_process_cq+0xe1/0x390 ib_cq_poll_work+0x46/0x150 isert_recv_done+0xba6 resolves to isert_handle_iscsi_dataout() (ib_isert.c:1160), inlined through isert_rx_opcode(). Validate wc->byte_len against the framing in isert_recv_done() before the PDU reaches any handler, and reinstate the connection if it is short. Because the test compares without subtracting the header length, it also rejects PDUs shorter than the iSER and iSCSI headers, which would otherwise be parsed out of stale descriptor contents. The login handler rejects PDUs shorter than ISER_HEADERS_LEN (commit 29e7b925ae6d ("IB/isert: Reject login PDUs shorter than ISER_HEADERS_LEN")) but does not bound the declared length either; that is fixed in the next patch. The data handlers had no length check at all. isert reads the data segment from a fixed offset: isert_get_data() returns the iSER header plus ISER_HEADERS_LEN and makes no adjustment for an AHS. The bytes the handlers touch are therefore exactly [ISER_HEADERS_LEN, ISER_HEADERS_LEN + dlength), and comparing that sum against wc->byte_len bounds precisely the region that is read. An AHS term would only make the test stricter without bounding anything further, and cannot cause a false reject: a PDU carrying an AHS is longer, not shorter. This is a memory-safety fix that verifies the bytes that were actually received; it does not touch RFC 7145 length negotiation and is not the MaxXmitDataSegmentLength negotiation redesign raised in the 2017 "[Query] iSER-Target: QP errors observed on increasing MaxXmitDataSegmentLength" discussion. That redesign is explicitly out of scope here. The patched kernel rejects the malformed DataOut PDU and both immediate-data variants with "PDU declares ... bytes were received" and continues to pass normal traffic with no regression. Reproduced with soft-RoCE (rdma_rxe) and a raw rdma_cm/ibv initiator; no kernel-side test hooks were needed. Fixes: b8d26b3be8b3 ("iser-target: Add iSCSI Extensions for RDMA (iSER) target driver") Signed-off-by: Yehyeong Lee <yhlee(a)isslab.korea.ac.kr> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260726163931.971063-2-yhlee@isslab.korea.ac.kr Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: drivers/infiniband/ulp/isert/ib_isert.c [ Context conflicts ] Signed-off-by: Yao Yiqi <yaoyiqi3(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/infiniband/ulp/isert/ib_isert.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/ulp/isert/ib_isert.c b/drivers/infiniband/ulp/isert/ib_isert.c index 97119e8e0751..d950cfd1be53 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/ulp/isert/ib_isert.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/ulp/isert/ib_isert.c @@ -1423,6 +1423,21 @@ isert_recv_done(struct ib_cq *cq, struct ib_wc *wc) ib_dma_sync_single_for_cpu(ib_dev, rx_desc->dma_addr, ISER_RX_PAYLOAD_SIZE, DMA_FROM_DEVICE); + /* + * The data segment length declared in the BHS is attacker controlled + * and is used further down to read that many bytes out of the fixed + * size receive descriptor, so it has to be checked against the number + * of bytes that were actually received. Comparing without subtracting + * also rejects PDUs shorter than the iSER and iSCSI headers, which + * would otherwise be parsed out of stale descriptor contents. + */ + if (unlikely(wc->byte_len < ISER_HEADERS_LEN + ntoh24(hdr->dlength))) { + isert_err("PDU declares %u data bytes but only %u bytes were received\n", + ntoh24(hdr->dlength), wc->byte_len); + iscsit_cause_connection_reinstatement(isert_conn->conn, 0); + return; + } + isert_dbg("DMA: 0x%llx, iSCSI opcode: 0x%02x, ITT: 0x%08x, flags: 0x%02x dlen: %d\n", rx_desc->dma_addr, hdr->opcode, hdr->itt, hdr->flags, (int)(wc->byte_len - ISER_HEADERS_LEN)); -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] openvswitch: fix GSO userspace truncation underflow
by Yi Yang 21 Sep '26

21 Sep '26

From: Kyle Zeng <kylebot(a)openai.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.265 commit 50a6a85f3d6b1d22d8436848606cdef5d2c490b4 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/16932 CVE: CVE-2026-68123 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 4032f8ed10fcb84d41c508dfb04be96589f78dfe ] OVS_ACTION_ATTR_TRUNC currently stores a delta from the original skb length in OVS_CB(skb)->cutlen. When a later userspace action segments a GSO skb, queue_gso_packets() reuses that delta for each smaller segment. A segment can then reach queue_userspace_packet() with cutlen greater than skb->len, underflowing the length passed to skb_zerocopy(). Store the maximum preserved length instead and bound each consumer against the current skb length. Use U32_MAX as the no-truncation sentinel so the value remains valid if skb geometry changes before a consumer handles it. Fixes: f2a4d086ed4c ("openvswitch: Add packet truncation support.") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.5 Signed-off-by: Kyle Zeng <kylebot(a)openai.com> Reviewed-by: Ilya Maximets <i.maximets(a)ovn.org> Reviewed-by: Aaron Conole <aconole(a)redhat.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260707221635.27489-1-kylebot@openai.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> [5.10.y supports neither OVS_ACTION_ATTR_PSAMPLE nor OVS drop reasons] Signed-off-by: Ilya Maximets <i.maximets(a)ovn.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: net/openvswitch/datapath.c [Context conflicts.] Signed-off-by: Yi Yang <yiyang13(a)huawei.com> --- net/openvswitch/actions.c | 15 +++++---------- net/openvswitch/datapath.c | 25 ++++++++++++++----------- net/openvswitch/datapath.h | 2 +- net/openvswitch/vport.c | 2 +- 4 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/openvswitch/actions.c b/net/openvswitch/actions.c index 7ac5f75e06a9..f3b3fd459600 100644 --- a/net/openvswitch/actions.c +++ b/net/openvswitch/actions.c @@ -949,12 +949,8 @@ static void do_output(struct datapath *dp, struct sk_buff *skb, int out_port, u16 mru = OVS_CB(skb)->mru; u32 cutlen = OVS_CB(skb)->cutlen; - if (unlikely(cutlen > 0)) { - if (skb->len - cutlen > ovs_mac_header_len(key)) - pskb_trim(skb, skb->len - cutlen); - else - pskb_trim(skb, ovs_mac_header_len(key)); - } + if (unlikely(cutlen < skb->len)) + pskb_trim(skb, max(cutlen, ovs_mac_header_len(key))); if (likely(!mru || (skb->len <= mru + vport->dev->hard_header_len))) { @@ -1237,22 +1233,21 @@ static int do_execute_actions(struct datapath *dp, struct sk_buff *skb, clone = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC); if (clone) do_output(dp, clone, port, key); - OVS_CB(skb)->cutlen = 0; + OVS_CB(skb)->cutlen = U32_MAX; break; } case OVS_ACTION_ATTR_TRUNC: { struct ovs_action_trunc *trunc = nla_data(a); - if (skb->len > trunc->max_len) - OVS_CB(skb)->cutlen = skb->len - trunc->max_len; + OVS_CB(skb)->cutlen = trunc->max_len; break; } case OVS_ACTION_ATTR_USERSPACE: output_userspace(dp, skb, key, a, attr, len, OVS_CB(skb)->cutlen); - OVS_CB(skb)->cutlen = 0; + OVS_CB(skb)->cutlen = U32_MAX; break; case OVS_ACTION_ATTR_HASH: diff --git a/net/openvswitch/datapath.c b/net/openvswitch/datapath.c index bd00e63603ca..1aeeb18c8812 100644 --- a/net/openvswitch/datapath.c +++ b/net/openvswitch/datapath.c @@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ void ovs_dp_process_packet(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sw_flow_key *key) upcall.cmd = OVS_PACKET_CMD_MISS; upcall.portid = ovs_vport_find_upcall_portid(p, skb); upcall.mru = OVS_CB(skb)->mru; - error = ovs_dp_upcall(dp, skb, key, &upcall, 0); + error = ovs_dp_upcall(dp, skb, key, &upcall, U32_MAX); if (unlikely(error)) kfree_skb(skb); else @@ -399,7 +399,8 @@ static int queue_userspace_packet(struct datapath *dp, struct sk_buff *skb, struct sk_buff *nskb = NULL; struct sk_buff *user_skb = NULL; /* to be queued to userspace */ struct nlattr *nla; - size_t len; + size_t msg_size; + size_t skb_len; unsigned int hlen; int err, dp_ifindex; @@ -419,7 +420,8 @@ static int queue_userspace_packet(struct datapath *dp, struct sk_buff *skb, skb = nskb; } - if (nla_attr_size(skb->len) > USHRT_MAX) { + skb_len = min(skb->len, cutlen); + if (nla_attr_size(skb_len) > USHRT_MAX) { err = -EFBIG; goto out; } @@ -434,13 +436,13 @@ static int queue_userspace_packet(struct datapath *dp, struct sk_buff *skb, * padding logic. Only perform zerocopy if padding is not required. */ if (dp->user_features & OVS_DP_F_UNALIGNED) - hlen = skb_zerocopy_headlen(skb); + hlen = min(skb_zerocopy_headlen(skb), cutlen); else - hlen = skb->len; + hlen = skb_len; - len = upcall_msg_size(upcall_info, hlen - cutlen, - OVS_CB(skb)->acts_origlen); - user_skb = genlmsg_new(len, GFP_ATOMIC); + msg_size = upcall_msg_size(upcall_info, hlen, + OVS_CB(skb)->acts_origlen); + user_skb = genlmsg_new(msg_size, GFP_ATOMIC); if (!user_skb) { err = -ENOMEM; goto out; @@ -503,7 +505,7 @@ static int queue_userspace_packet(struct datapath *dp, struct sk_buff *skb, } /* Add OVS_PACKET_ATTR_LEN when packet is truncated */ - if (cutlen > 0) { + if (skb_len < skb->len) { if (nla_put_u32(user_skb, OVS_PACKET_ATTR_LEN, skb->len)) { err = -ENOBUFS; @@ -518,9 +520,9 @@ static int queue_userspace_packet(struct datapath *dp, struct sk_buff *skb, err = -ENOBUFS; goto out; } - nla->nla_len = nla_attr_size(skb->len - cutlen); + nla->nla_len = nla_attr_size(skb_len); - err = skb_zerocopy(user_skb, skb, skb->len - cutlen, hlen); + err = skb_zerocopy(user_skb, skb, skb_len, hlen); if (err) goto out; @@ -575,6 +577,7 @@ static int ovs_packet_cmd_execute(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info) packet->ignore_df = 1; } OVS_CB(packet)->mru = mru; + OVS_CB(packet)->cutlen = U32_MAX; /* Build an sw_flow for sending this packet. */ flow = ovs_flow_alloc(); diff --git a/net/openvswitch/datapath.h b/net/openvswitch/datapath.h index c9eb267c6f7e..9192c9970cc3 100644 --- a/net/openvswitch/datapath.h +++ b/net/openvswitch/datapath.h @@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ struct datapath { * @mru: The maximum received fragement size; 0 if the packet is not * fragmented. * @acts_origlen: The netlink size of the flow actions applied to this skb. - * @cutlen: The number of bytes from the packet end to be removed. + * @cutlen: The number of bytes in the packet to preserve on output. */ struct ovs_skb_cb { struct vport *input_vport; diff --git a/net/openvswitch/vport.c b/net/openvswitch/vport.c index 5541f4c9a0a1..586428d2015d 100644 --- a/net/openvswitch/vport.c +++ b/net/openvswitch/vport.c @@ -447,7 +447,7 @@ int ovs_vport_receive(struct vport *vport, struct sk_buff *skb, OVS_CB(skb)->input_vport = vport; OVS_CB(skb)->mru = 0; - OVS_CB(skb)->cutlen = 0; + OVS_CB(skb)->cutlen = U32_MAX; if (unlikely(dev_net(skb->dev) != ovs_dp_get_net(vport->dp))) { u32 mark; -- 2.25.1

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