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[PATCH OLK-6.6] Bluetooth: hci_conn: fix potential UAF in set_cig_params_sync
by Chen Jinghuang 12 May '26

12 May '26

From: Pauli Virtanen <pav(a)iki.fi> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.0-rc7 commit a2639a7f0f5bf7d73f337f8f077c19415c62ed2c category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14551 CVE: CVE-2026-43019 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… ---------------------------------------------------------------------- hci_conn lookup and field access must be covered by hdev lock in set_cig_params_sync, otherwise it's possible it is freed concurrently. Take hdev lock to prevent hci_conn from being deleted or modified concurrently. Just RCU lock is not suitable here, as we also want to avoid "tearing" in the configuration. Fixes: a091289218202 ("Bluetooth: hci_conn: Fix hci_le_set_cig_params") Signed-off-by: Pauli Virtanen <pav(a)iki.fi> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz(a)intel.com> Conflicts: net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c [context conflicts] Signed-off-by: Chen Jinghuang <chenjinghuang2(a)huawei.com> --- net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c index 6c0ae4131b0f..34fe2f7486d7 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c @@ -1757,9 +1757,13 @@ static int set_cig_params_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data) struct iso_cig_params pdu; u8 cis_id; + hci_dev_lock(hdev); + conn = hci_conn_hash_lookup_cig(hdev, cig_id); - if (!conn) + if (!conn) { + hci_dev_unlock(hdev); return 0; + } memset(&pdu, 0, sizeof(pdu)); @@ -1799,6 +1803,8 @@ static int set_cig_params_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data) cis->p_rtn = qos->ucast.in.rtn; } + hci_dev_unlock(hdev); + if (!pdu.cp.num_cis) return 0; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] rxrpc: proc: size address buffers for %pISpc output
by Zhao Yipeng 12 May '26

12 May '26

From: Pengpeng Hou <pengpeng(a)iscas.ac.cn> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.0 commit a44ce6aa2efb61fe44f2cfab72bb01544bbca272 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14372 CVE: CVE-2026-31630 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- The AF_RXRPC procfs helpers format local and remote socket addresses into fixed 50-byte stack buffers with "%pISpc". That is too small for the longest current-tree IPv6-with-port form the formatter can produce. In lib/vsprintf.c, the compressed IPv6 path uses a dotted-quad tail not only for v4mapped addresses, but also for ISATAP addresses via ipv6_addr_is_isatap(). As a result, a case such as [ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:0:5efe:255.255.255.255]:65535 is possible with the current formatter. That is 50 visible characters, so 51 bytes including the trailing NUL, which does not fit in the existing char[50] buffers used by net/rxrpc/proc.c. Size the buffers from the formatter's maximum textual form and switch the call sites to scnprintf(). Changes since v1: - correct the changelog to cite the actual maximum current-tree case explicitly - frame the proof around the ISATAP formatting path instead of the earlier mapped-v4 example Fixes: 75b54cb57ca3 ("rxrpc: Add IPv6 support") Signed-off-by: Pengpeng Hou <pengpeng(a)iscas.ac.cn> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells(a)redhat.com> cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne(a)auristor.com> cc: Anderson Nascimento <anderson(a)allelesecurity.com> cc: Simon Horman <horms(a)kernel.org> cc: linux-afs(a)lists.infradead.org cc: stable(a)kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-22-dhowells@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: net/rxrpc/proc.c [Context conflicts.] Signed-off-by: Zhao Yipeng <zhaoyipeng5(a)huawei.com> --- net/rxrpc/proc.c | 26 +++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/rxrpc/proc.c b/net/rxrpc/proc.c index 8967201fd8e5..67553dfe6a3e 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/proc.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/proc.c @@ -10,6 +10,10 @@ #include <net/af_rxrpc.h> #include "ar-internal.h" +#define RXRPC_PROC_ADDRBUF_SIZE \ + (sizeof("[xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:255.255.255.255]") + \ + sizeof(":12345")) + static const char *const rxrpc_conn_states[RXRPC_CONN__NR_STATES] = { [RXRPC_CONN_UNUSED] = "Unused ", [RXRPC_CONN_CLIENT] = "Client ", @@ -61,7 +65,7 @@ static int rxrpc_call_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) struct rxrpc_net *rxnet = rxrpc_net(seq_file_net(seq)); unsigned long timeout = 0; rxrpc_seq_t tx_hard_ack, rx_hard_ack; - char lbuff[50], rbuff[50]; + char lbuff[RXRPC_PROC_ADDRBUF_SIZE], rbuff[RXRPC_PROC_ADDRBUF_SIZE]; if (v == &rxnet->calls) { seq_puts(seq, @@ -78,7 +82,7 @@ static int rxrpc_call_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) if (rx) { local = READ_ONCE(rx->local); if (local) - sprintf(lbuff, "%pISpc", &local->srx.transport); + scnprintf(lbuff, sizeof(lbuff), "%pISpc", &local->srx.transport); else strcpy(lbuff, "no_local"); } else { @@ -87,7 +91,7 @@ static int rxrpc_call_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) peer = call->peer; if (peer) - sprintf(rbuff, "%pISpc", &peer->srx.transport); + scnprintf(rbuff, sizeof(rbuff), "%pISpc", &peer->srx.transport); else strcpy(rbuff, "no_connection"); @@ -158,7 +162,7 @@ static int rxrpc_connection_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) { struct rxrpc_connection *conn; struct rxrpc_net *rxnet = rxrpc_net(seq_file_net(seq)); - char lbuff[50], rbuff[50]; + char lbuff[RXRPC_PROC_ADDRBUF_SIZE], rbuff[RXRPC_PROC_ADDRBUF_SIZE]; if (v == &rxnet->conn_proc_list) { seq_puts(seq, @@ -177,9 +181,9 @@ static int rxrpc_connection_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) goto print; } - sprintf(lbuff, "%pISpc", &conn->params.local->srx.transport); + scnprintf(lbuff, sizeof(lbuff), "%pISpc", &conn->params.local->srx.transport); - sprintf(rbuff, "%pISpc", &conn->params.peer->srx.transport); + scnprintf(rbuff, sizeof(rbuff), "%pISpc", &conn->params.peer->srx.transport); print: seq_printf(seq, "UDP %-47.47s %-47.47s %4x %08x %s %3u" @@ -216,7 +220,7 @@ static int rxrpc_peer_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) { struct rxrpc_peer *peer; time64_t now; - char lbuff[50], rbuff[50]; + char lbuff[RXRPC_PROC_ADDRBUF_SIZE], rbuff[RXRPC_PROC_ADDRBUF_SIZE]; if (v == SEQ_START_TOKEN) { seq_puts(seq, @@ -229,9 +233,9 @@ static int rxrpc_peer_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) peer = list_entry(v, struct rxrpc_peer, hash_link); - sprintf(lbuff, "%pISpc", &peer->local->srx.transport); + scnprintf(lbuff, sizeof(lbuff), "%pISpc", &peer->local->srx.transport); - sprintf(rbuff, "%pISpc", &peer->srx.transport); + scnprintf(rbuff, sizeof(rbuff), "%pISpc", &peer->srx.transport); now = ktime_get_seconds(); seq_printf(seq, @@ -341,7 +345,7 @@ const struct seq_operations rxrpc_peer_seq_ops = { static int rxrpc_local_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) { struct rxrpc_local *local; - char lbuff[50]; + char lbuff[RXRPC_PROC_ADDRBUF_SIZE]; if (v == SEQ_START_TOKEN) { seq_puts(seq, @@ -352,7 +356,7 @@ static int rxrpc_local_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) local = hlist_entry(v, struct rxrpc_local, link); - sprintf(lbuff, "%pISpc", &local->srx.transport); + scnprintf(lbuff, sizeof(lbuff), "%pISpc", &local->srx.transport); seq_printf(seq, "UDP %-47.47s %3u %3u\n", -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] rxrpc: proc: size address buffers for %pISpc output
by Zhao Yipeng 12 May '26

12 May '26

From: Pengpeng Hou <pengpeng(a)iscas.ac.cn> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.0 commit a44ce6aa2efb61fe44f2cfab72bb01544bbca272 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14372 CVE: CVE-2026-31630 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- The AF_RXRPC procfs helpers format local and remote socket addresses into fixed 50-byte stack buffers with "%pISpc". That is too small for the longest current-tree IPv6-with-port form the formatter can produce. In lib/vsprintf.c, the compressed IPv6 path uses a dotted-quad tail not only for v4mapped addresses, but also for ISATAP addresses via ipv6_addr_is_isatap(). As a result, a case such as [ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:0:5efe:255.255.255.255]:65535 is possible with the current formatter. That is 50 visible characters, so 51 bytes including the trailing NUL, which does not fit in the existing char[50] buffers used by net/rxrpc/proc.c. Size the buffers from the formatter's maximum textual form and switch the call sites to scnprintf(). Changes since v1: - correct the changelog to cite the actual maximum current-tree case explicitly - frame the proof around the ISATAP formatting path instead of the earlier mapped-v4 example Fixes: 75b54cb57ca3 ("rxrpc: Add IPv6 support") Signed-off-by: Pengpeng Hou <pengpeng(a)iscas.ac.cn> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells(a)redhat.com> cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne(a)auristor.com> cc: Anderson Nascimento <anderson(a)allelesecurity.com> cc: Simon Horman <horms(a)kernel.org> cc: linux-afs(a)lists.infradead.org cc: stable(a)kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-22-dhowells@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: net/rxrpc/proc.c [Context conflicts.] Signed-off-by: Zhao Yipeng <zhaoyipeng5(a)huawei.com> --- net/rxrpc/proc.c | 26 +++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/rxrpc/proc.c b/net/rxrpc/proc.c index 208312c244f6..2177117234ad 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/proc.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/proc.c @@ -10,6 +10,10 @@ #include <net/af_rxrpc.h> #include "ar-internal.h" +#define RXRPC_PROC_ADDRBUF_SIZE \ + (sizeof("[xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:255.255.255.255]") + \ + sizeof(":12345")) + static const char *const rxrpc_conn_states[RXRPC_CONN__NR_STATES] = { [RXRPC_CONN_UNUSED] = "Unused ", [RXRPC_CONN_CLIENT_UNSECURED] = "ClUnsec ", @@ -54,7 +58,7 @@ static int rxrpc_call_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) enum rxrpc_call_state state; unsigned long timeout = 0; rxrpc_seq_t acks_hard_ack; - char lbuff[50], rbuff[50]; + char lbuff[RXRPC_PROC_ADDRBUF_SIZE], rbuff[RXRPC_PROC_ADDRBUF_SIZE]; if (v == &rxnet->calls) { seq_puts(seq, @@ -69,11 +73,11 @@ static int rxrpc_call_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) local = call->local; if (local) - sprintf(lbuff, "%pISpc", &local->srx.transport); + scnprintf(lbuff, sizeof(lbuff), "%pISpc", &local->srx.transport); else strcpy(lbuff, "no_local"); - sprintf(rbuff, "%pISpc", &call->dest_srx.transport); + scnprintf(rbuff, sizeof(rbuff), "%pISpc", &call->dest_srx.transport); state = rxrpc_call_state(call); if (state != RXRPC_CALL_SERVER_PREALLOC) { @@ -144,7 +148,7 @@ static int rxrpc_connection_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) struct rxrpc_connection *conn; struct rxrpc_net *rxnet = rxrpc_net(seq_file_net(seq)); const char *state; - char lbuff[50], rbuff[50]; + char lbuff[RXRPC_PROC_ADDRBUF_SIZE], rbuff[RXRPC_PROC_ADDRBUF_SIZE]; if (v == &rxnet->conn_proc_list) { seq_puts(seq, @@ -163,8 +167,8 @@ static int rxrpc_connection_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) goto print; } - sprintf(lbuff, "%pISpc", &conn->local->srx.transport); - sprintf(rbuff, "%pISpc", &conn->peer->srx.transport); + scnprintf(lbuff, sizeof(lbuff), "%pISpc", &conn->local->srx.transport); + scnprintf(rbuff, sizeof(rbuff), "%pISpc", &conn->peer->srx.transport); print: state = rxrpc_is_conn_aborted(conn) ? rxrpc_call_completions[conn->completion] : @@ -205,7 +209,7 @@ static int rxrpc_peer_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) { struct rxrpc_peer *peer; time64_t now; - char lbuff[50], rbuff[50]; + char lbuff[RXRPC_PROC_ADDRBUF_SIZE], rbuff[RXRPC_PROC_ADDRBUF_SIZE]; if (v == SEQ_START_TOKEN) { seq_puts(seq, @@ -218,9 +222,9 @@ static int rxrpc_peer_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) peer = list_entry(v, struct rxrpc_peer, hash_link); - sprintf(lbuff, "%pISpc", &peer->local->srx.transport); + scnprintf(lbuff, sizeof(lbuff), "%pISpc", &peer->local->srx.transport); - sprintf(rbuff, "%pISpc", &peer->srx.transport); + scnprintf(rbuff, sizeof(rbuff), "%pISpc", &peer->srx.transport); now = ktime_get_seconds(); seq_printf(seq, @@ -330,7 +334,7 @@ const struct seq_operations rxrpc_peer_seq_ops = { static int rxrpc_local_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) { struct rxrpc_local *local; - char lbuff[50]; + char lbuff[RXRPC_PROC_ADDRBUF_SIZE]; if (v == SEQ_START_TOKEN) { seq_puts(seq, @@ -341,7 +345,7 @@ static int rxrpc_local_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) local = hlist_entry(v, struct rxrpc_local, link); - sprintf(lbuff, "%pISpc", &local->srx.transport); + scnprintf(lbuff, sizeof(lbuff), "%pISpc", &local->srx.transport); seq_printf(seq, "UDP %-47.47s %3u %3u %3u\n", -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] HID: logitech-hidpp: Prevent use-after-free on force feedback initialisation failure
by Chen Jinghuang 12 May '26

12 May '26

From: Lee Jones <lee(a)kernel.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.0-rc5 commit f7a4c78bfeb320299c1b641500fe7761eadbd101 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14581 CVE: CVE-2026-43049 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Presently, if the force feedback initialisation fails when probing the Logitech G920 Driving Force Racing Wheel for Xbox One, an error number will be returned and propagated before the userspace infrastructure (sysfs and /dev/input) has been torn down. If userspace ignores the errors and continues to use its references to these dangling entities, a UAF will promptly follow. We have 2 options; continue to return the error, but ensure that all of the infrastructure is torn down accordingly or continue to treat this condition as a warning by emitting the message but returning success. It is thought that the original author's intention was to emit the warning but keep the device functional, less the force feedback feature, so let's go with that. Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Günther Noack <gnoack(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Benjamin Tissoires <bentiss(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: drivers/hid/hid-logitech-hidpp.c [context conflicts] Signed-off-by: Chen Jinghuang <chenjinghuang2(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/hid/hid-logitech-hidpp.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-logitech-hidpp.c b/drivers/hid/hid-logitech-hidpp.c index 8bdcd4027416..12ff00b3685a 100644 --- a/drivers/hid/hid-logitech-hidpp.c +++ b/drivers/hid/hid-logitech-hidpp.c @@ -3933,10 +3933,12 @@ static int hidpp_probe(struct hid_device *hdev, const struct hid_device_id *id) if (hidpp->quirks & HIDPP_QUIRK_CLASS_G920) { ret = hidpp_ff_init(hidpp, &data); - if (ret) + if (ret) { hid_warn(hidpp->hid_dev, "Unable to initialize force feedback support, errno %d\n", ret); + ret = 0; + } } /* -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] HID: logitech-hidpp: Prevent use-after-free on force feedback initialisation failure
by Chen Jinghuang 12 May '26

12 May '26

From: Lee Jones <lee(a)kernel.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.0-rc5 commit f7a4c78bfeb320299c1b641500fe7761eadbd101 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14581 CVE: CVE-2026-43049 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Presently, if the force feedback initialisation fails when probing the Logitech G920 Driving Force Racing Wheel for Xbox One, an error number will be returned and propagated before the userspace infrastructure (sysfs and /dev/input) has been torn down. If userspace ignores the errors and continues to use its references to these dangling entities, a UAF will promptly follow. We have 2 options; continue to return the error, but ensure that all of the infrastructure is torn down accordingly or continue to treat this condition as a warning by emitting the message but returning success. It is thought that the original author's intention was to emit the warning but keep the device functional, less the force feedback feature, so let's go with that. Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Günther Noack <gnoack(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Benjamin Tissoires <bentiss(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: drivers/hid/hid-logitech-hidpp.c [context conflicts] Signed-off-by: Chen Jinghuang <chenjinghuang2(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/hid/hid-logitech-hidpp.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-logitech-hidpp.c b/drivers/hid/hid-logitech-hidpp.c index 5a2fe703cf57..4af075070665 100644 --- a/drivers/hid/hid-logitech-hidpp.c +++ b/drivers/hid/hid-logitech-hidpp.c @@ -4529,10 +4529,12 @@ static int hidpp_probe(struct hid_device *hdev, const struct hid_device_id *id) if (hidpp->quirks & HIDPP_QUIRK_CLASS_G920) { ret = hidpp_ff_init(hidpp, &data); - if (ret) + if (ret) { hid_warn(hidpp->hid_dev, "Unable to initialize force feedback support, errno %d\n", ret); + ret = 0; + } } /* -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] ceph: fix memory leaks in ceph_mdsc_build_path()
by Pu Lehui 12 May '26

12 May '26

From: Max Kellermann <max.kellermann(a)ionos.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.130 commit 657dc653b06a3cc0282aea447a3f137fa94066a4 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14977 CVE: CVE-2026-43419 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 040d159a45ded7f33201421a81df0aa2a86e5a0b upstream. Add __putname() calls to error code paths that did not free the "path" pointer obtained by __getname(). If ownership of this pointer is not passed to the caller via path_info.path, the function must free it before returning. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 3fd945a79e14 ("ceph: encode encrypted name in ceph_mdsc_build_path and dentry release") Fixes: 550f7ca98ee0 ("ceph: give up on paths longer than PATH_MAX") Signed-off-by: Max Kellermann <max.kellermann(a)ionos.com> Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <Slava.Dubeyko(a)ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Conflicts: fs/ceph/mds_client.c [Context conflict.] Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui <pulehui(a)huawei.com> --- fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/ceph/mds_client.c b/fs/ceph/mds_client.c index af3783ccd665..47ddad3606da 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/mds_client.c +++ b/fs/ceph/mds_client.c @@ -2671,6 +2671,7 @@ char *ceph_mdsc_build_path(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc, struct dentry *dentry, if (ret < 0) { dput(parent); dput(cur); + __putname(path); return ERR_PTR(ret); } @@ -2680,6 +2681,7 @@ char *ceph_mdsc_build_path(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc, struct dentry *dentry, if (len < 0) { dput(parent); dput(cur); + __putname(path); return ERR_PTR(len); } } @@ -2716,6 +2718,7 @@ char *ceph_mdsc_build_path(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc, struct dentry *dentry, * cannot ever succeed. Creating paths that long is * possible with Ceph, but Linux cannot use them. */ + __putname(path); return ERR_PTR(-ENAMETOOLONG); } -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] ceph: supply snapshot context in ceph_zero_partial_object()
by Pu Lehui 12 May '26

12 May '26

From: ethanwu <ethanwu(a)synology.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.128 commit 9efa154609cdb658f51c7d76b30a09f7e6485250 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14817 CVE: CVE-2026-43273 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit f16bd3fa74a2084ee7e16a8a2be7e7399b970907 ] The ceph_zero_partial_object function was missing proper snapshot context for its OSD write operations, which could lead to data inconsistencies in snapshots. Reproducer: ../src/vstart.sh --new -x --localhost --bluestore ./bin/ceph auth caps client.fs_a mds 'allow rwps fsname=a' mon 'allow r fsname=a' osd 'allow rw tag cephfs data=a' mount -t ceph fs_a@.a=/ /mnt/mycephfs/ -o conf=./ceph.conf dd if=/dev/urandom of=/mnt/mycephfs/foo bs=64K count=1 mkdir /mnt/mycephfs/.snap/snap1 md5sum /mnt/mycephfs/.snap/snap1/foo fallocate -p -o 0 -l 4096 /mnt/mycephfs/foo echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop/caches md5sum /mnt/mycephfs/.snap/snap1/foo # get different md5sum!! Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: ad7a60de882ac ("ceph: punch hole support") Signed-off-by: ethanwu <ethanwu(a)synology.com> Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <Slava.Dubeyko(a)ibm.com> Tested-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <Slava.Dubeyko(a)ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui <pulehui(a)huawei.com> --- fs/ceph/file.c | 17 ++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/ceph/file.c b/fs/ceph/file.c index 0a7e7b57f36f..ea477fc059b7 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/file.c +++ b/fs/ceph/file.c @@ -2467,6 +2467,7 @@ static int ceph_zero_partial_object(struct inode *inode, struct ceph_inode_info *ci = ceph_inode(inode); struct ceph_fs_client *fsc = ceph_inode_to_fs_client(inode); struct ceph_osd_request *req; + struct ceph_snap_context *snapc; int ret = 0; loff_t zero = 0; int op; @@ -2481,12 +2482,25 @@ static int ceph_zero_partial_object(struct inode *inode, op = CEPH_OSD_OP_ZERO; } + spin_lock(&ci->i_ceph_lock); + if (__ceph_have_pending_cap_snap(ci)) { + struct ceph_cap_snap *capsnap = + list_last_entry(&ci->i_cap_snaps, + struct ceph_cap_snap, + ci_item); + snapc = ceph_get_snap_context(capsnap->context); + } else { + BUG_ON(!ci->i_head_snapc); + snapc = ceph_get_snap_context(ci->i_head_snapc); + } + spin_unlock(&ci->i_ceph_lock); + req = ceph_osdc_new_request(&fsc->client->osdc, &ci->i_layout, ceph_vino(inode), offset, length, 0, 1, op, CEPH_OSD_FLAG_WRITE, - NULL, 0, 0, false); + snapc, 0, 0, false); if (IS_ERR(req)) { ret = PTR_ERR(req); goto out; @@ -2500,6 +2514,7 @@ static int ceph_zero_partial_object(struct inode *inode, ceph_osdc_put_request(req); out: + ceph_put_snap_context(snapc); return ret; } -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] ALSA: caiaq: fix stack out-of-bounds read in init_card
by Zhang Yuwei 11 May '26

11 May '26

From: Berk Cem Goksel <berkcgoksel(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.253 commit 02d9c5b0b5553a391448b6d655262bd829f90234 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14527 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 45424e871abf2a152e247a9cff78359f18dd95c0 upstream. The loop creates a whitespace-stripped copy of the card shortname where `len < sizeof(card->id)` is used for the bounds check. Since sizeof(card->id) is 16 and the local id buffer is also 16 bytes, writing 16 non-space characters fills the entire buffer, overwriting the terminating nullbyte. When this non-null-terminated string is later passed to snd_card_set_id() -> copy_valid_id_string(), the function scans forward with `while (*nid && ...)` and reads past the end of the stack buffer, reading the contents of the stack. A USB device with a product name containing many non-ASCII, non-space characters (e.g. multibyte UTF-8) will reliably trigger this as follows: BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in copy_valid_id_string sound/core/init.c:696 [inline] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in snd_card_set_id_no_lock+0x698/0x74c sound/core/init.c:718 The off-by-one has been present since commit bafeee5b1f8d ("ALSA: snd_usb_caiaq: give better shortname") from June 2009 (v2.6.31-rc1), which first introduced this whitespace-stripping loop. The original code never accounted for the null terminator when bounding the copy. Fix this by changing the loop bound to `sizeof(card->id) - 1`, ensuring at least one byte remains as the null terminator. Fixes: bafeee5b1f8d ("ALSA: snd_usb_caiaq: give better shortname") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl(a)gmail.com> Reported-by: Berk Cem Goksel <berkcgoksel(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Berk Cem Goksel <berkcgoksel(a)gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260329133825.581585-1-berkcgoksel@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai(a)suse.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809(a)h-partners.com> --- sound/usb/caiaq/device.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/sound/usb/caiaq/device.c b/sound/usb/caiaq/device.c index 2af3b7eb0a88..748d075f10e0 100644 --- a/sound/usb/caiaq/device.c +++ b/sound/usb/caiaq/device.c @@ -491,7 +491,7 @@ static int init_card(struct snd_usb_caiaqdev *cdev) memset(id, 0, sizeof(id)); for (c = card->shortname, len = 0; - *c && len < sizeof(card->id); c++) + *c && len < sizeof(card->id) - 1; c++) if (*c != ' ') id[len++] = *c; -- 2.22.0

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[PATCH OLK-6.6] ceph: fix i_nlink underrun during async unlink
by Tengda Wu 11 May '26

11 May '26

From: Max Kellermann <max.kellermann(a)ionos.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.130 commit b3f5513141ecc6b277a8f7b7efe58a0cf9a5e859 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15033 CVE: CVE-2026-43420 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit ce0123cbb4a40a2f1bbb815f292b26e96088639f upstream. During async unlink, we drop the `i_nlink` counter before we receive the completion (that will eventually update the `i_nlink`) because "we assume that the unlink will succeed". That is not a bad idea, but it races against deletions by other clients (or against the completion of our own unlink) and can lead to an underrun which emits a WARNING like this one: WARNING: CPU: 85 PID: 25093 at fs/inode.c:407 drop_nlink+0x50/0x68 Modules linked in: CPU: 85 UID: 3221252029 PID: 25093 Comm: php-cgi8.1 Not tainted 6.14.11-cm4all1-ampere #655 Hardware name: Supermicro ARS-110M-NR/R12SPD-A, BIOS 1.1b 10/17/2023 pstate: 60400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : drop_nlink+0x50/0x68 lr : ceph_unlink+0x6c4/0x720 sp : ffff80012173bc90 x29: ffff80012173bc90 x28: ffff086d0a45aaf8 x27: ffff0871d0eb5680 x26: ffff087f2a64a718 x25: 0000020000000180 x24: 0000000061c88647 x23: 0000000000000002 x22: ffff07ff9236d800 x21: 0000000000001203 x20: ffff07ff9237b000 x19: ffff088b8296afc0 x18: 00000000f3c93365 x17: 0000000000070000 x16: ffff08faffcbdfe8 x15: ffff08faffcbdfec x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 45445f65645f3037 x12: 34385f6369706f74 x11: 0000a2653104bb20 x10: ffffd85f26d73290 x9 : ffffd85f25664f94 x8 : 00000000000000c0 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000002 x5 : 0000000000000081 x4 : 0000000000000481 x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff08727d3f91e8 Call trace: drop_nlink+0x50/0x68 (P) vfs_unlink+0xb0/0x2e8 do_unlinkat+0x204/0x288 __arm64_sys_unlinkat+0x3c/0x80 invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x54/0xe8 do_el0_svc+0xa4/0xc8 el0_svc+0x18/0x58 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x104/0x130 el0t_64_sync+0x154/0x158 In ceph_unlink(), a call to ceph_mdsc_submit_request() submits the CEPH_MDS_OP_UNLINK to the MDS, but does not wait for completion. Meanwhile, between this call and the following drop_nlink() call, a worker thread may process a CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT, CEPH_CAP_OP_GRANT or just a CEPH_MSG_CLIENT_REPLY (the latter of which could be our own completion). These will lead to a set_nlink() call, updating the `i_nlink` counter to the value received from the MDS. If that new `i_nlink` value happens to be zero, it is illegal to decrement it further. But that is exactly what ceph_unlink() will do then. The WARNING can be reproduced this way: 1. Force async unlink; only the async code path is affected. Having no real clue about Ceph internals, I was unable to find out why the MDS wouldn't give me the "Fxr" capabilities, so I patched get_caps_for_async_unlink() to always succeed. (Note that the WARNING dump above was found on an unpatched kernel, without this kludge - this is not a theoretical bug.) 2. Add a sleep call after ceph_mdsc_submit_request() so the unlink completion gets handled by a worker thread before drop_nlink() is called. This guarantees that the `i_nlink` is already zero before drop_nlink() runs. The solution is to skip the counter decrement when it is already zero, but doing so without a lock is still racy (TOCTOU). Since ceph_fill_inode() and handle_cap_grant() both hold the `ceph_inode_info.i_ceph_lock` spinlock while set_nlink() runs, this seems like the proper lock to protect the `i_nlink` updates. I found prior art in NFS and SMB (using `inode.i_lock`) and AFS (using `afs_vnode.cb_lock`). All three have the zero check as well. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 2ccb45462aea ("ceph: perform asynchronous unlink if we have sufficient caps") Signed-off-by: Max Kellermann <max.kellermann(a)ionos.com> Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <Slava.Dubeyko(a)ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Tengda Wu <wutengda2(a)huawei.com> --- fs/ceph/dir.c | 15 ++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/ceph/dir.c b/fs/ceph/dir.c index 2728ca628cff..beedb07ee4af 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/dir.c +++ b/fs/ceph/dir.c @@ -1290,6 +1290,7 @@ static int ceph_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) struct ceph_fs_client *fsc = ceph_sb_to_fs_client(dir->i_sb); struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc = fsc->mdsc; struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry); + struct ceph_inode_info *ci = ceph_inode(inode); struct ceph_mds_request *req; bool try_async = ceph_test_mount_opt(fsc, ASYNC_DIROPS); int err = -EROFS; @@ -1347,7 +1348,19 @@ static int ceph_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) * We have enough caps, so we assume that the unlink * will succeed. Fix up the target inode and dcache. */ - drop_nlink(inode); + + /* + * Protect the i_nlink update with i_ceph_lock + * to precent racing against ceph_fill_inode() + * handling our completion on a worker thread + * and don't decrement if i_nlink has already + * been updated to zero by this completion. + */ + spin_lock(&ci->i_ceph_lock); + if (inode->i_nlink > 0) + drop_nlink(inode); + spin_unlock(&ci->i_ceph_lock); + d_delete(dentry); } else { spin_lock(&fsc->async_unlink_conflict_lock); -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] Fix CVE-2026-43429
by Hongbo Li 11 May '26

11 May '26

Fix CVE-2026-43429. Alan Stern (2): USB: usbcore: Introduce usb_bulk_msg_killable() USB: usbtmc: Use usb_bulk_msg_killable() with user-specified timeouts drivers/usb/class/usbtmc.c | 6 +-- drivers/usb/core/message.c | 79 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- include/linux/usb.h | 5 ++- 3 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

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