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[PATCH] printk: avoid deadlock in panic
by Ye Weihua 16 Mar '24

16 Mar '24

hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I991OV -------------------------------- In the process of load testing against panic, a deadlock issue was discovered. The reason is that in the panic process, console_unlock doesn't handle the printk_context variable evenly, causing printk_context to overflow downwards, allowing vprintk_func to enter the nmi direct branch without disabling interrupt. Upon holding the logbuf_lock lock, an interrupt running wake_up_klogd_work_func was called, resulting in a deadlock. To avoid this issue, move printk_safe_ext_irqrestore after check abandon_console_lock_in_panic(). Fixes: 7c2aff380e41 ([Backport] printk: Drop console_sem during panic) Signed-off-by: Ye Weihua <yeweihua4(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/printk/printk.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/printk/printk.c b/kernel/printk/printk.c index 87cd50ae6cd6..ffd7f90b8f02 100644 --- a/kernel/printk/printk.c +++ b/kernel/printk/printk.c @@ -2609,12 +2609,12 @@ void console_unlock(void) return; } - printk_safe_exit_irqrestore(flags); - /* Allow panic_cpu to take over the consoles safely */ if (abandon_console_lock_in_panic()) break; + printk_safe_exit_irqrestore(flags); + if (do_cond_resched) cond_resched(); } -- 2.34.1

1 0

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/3] Fix CVE-2024-26629
by Li Lingfeng 16 Mar '24

16 Mar '24

The third patch is fix patch. The first two patches are applied to reduce conflict. Chuck Lever (2): NFSD: Modernize nfsd4_release_lockowner() NFSD: Add documenting comment for nfsd4_release_lockowner() NeilBrown (1): nfsd: fix RELEASE_LOCKOWNER fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c | 65 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------- 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-) -- 2.31.1

2 4

[PATCH OLK-6.6] nfsd: fix RELEASE_LOCKOWNER
by Li Lingfeng 16 Mar '24

16 Mar '24

From: NeilBrown <neilb(a)suse.de> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.8-rc2 commit edcf9725150e42beeca42d085149f4c88fa97afd category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I98BN3 CVE: CVE-2024-26629 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- The test on so_count in nfsd4_release_lockowner() is nonsense and harmful. Revert to using check_for_locks(), changing that to not sleep. First: harmful. As is documented in the kdoc comment for nfsd4_release_lockowner(), the test on so_count can transiently return a false positive resulting in a return of NFS4ERR_LOCKS_HELD when in fact no locks are held. This is clearly a protocol violation and with the Linux NFS client it can cause incorrect behaviour. If RELEASE_LOCKOWNER is sent while some other thread is still processing a LOCK request which failed because, at the time that request was received, the given owner held a conflicting lock, then the nfsd thread processing that LOCK request can hold a reference (conflock) to the lock owner that causes nfsd4_release_lockowner() to return an incorrect error. The Linux NFS client ignores that NFS4ERR_LOCKS_HELD error because it never sends NFS4_RELEASE_LOCKOWNER without first releasing any locks, so it knows that the error is impossible. It assumes the lock owner was in fact released so it feels free to use the same lock owner identifier in some later locking request. When it does reuse a lock owner identifier for which a previous RELEASE failed, it will naturally use a lock_seqid of zero. However the server, which didn't release the lock owner, will expect a larger lock_seqid and so will respond with NFS4ERR_BAD_SEQID. So clearly it is harmful to allow a false positive, which testing so_count allows. The test is nonsense because ... well... it doesn't mean anything. so_count is the sum of three different counts. 1/ the set of states listed on so_stateids 2/ the set of active vfs locks owned by any of those states 3/ various transient counts such as for conflicting locks. When it is tested against '2' it is clear that one of these is the transient reference obtained by find_lockowner_str_locked(). It is not clear what the other one is expected to be. In practice, the count is often 2 because there is precisely one state on so_stateids. If there were more, this would fail. In my testing I see two circumstances when RELEASE_LOCKOWNER is called. In one case, CLOSE is called before RELEASE_LOCKOWNER. That results in all the lock states being removed, and so the lockowner being discarded (it is removed when there are no more references which usually happens when the lock state is discarded). When nfsd4_release_lockowner() finds that the lock owner doesn't exist, it returns success. The other case shows an so_count of '2' and precisely one state listed in so_stateid. It appears that the Linux client uses a separate lock owner for each file resulting in one lock state per lock owner, so this test on '2' is safe. For another client it might not be safe. So this patch changes check_for_locks() to use the (newish) find_any_file_locked() so that it doesn't take a reference on the nfs4_file and so never calls nfsd_file_put(), and so never sleeps. With this check is it safe to restore the use of check_for_locks() rather than testing so_count against the mysterious '2'. Fixes: ce3c4ad7f4ce ("NFSD: Fix possible sleep during nfsd4_release_lockowner()") Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb(a)suse.de> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton(a)kernel.org> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v6.2+ Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Li Lingfeng <lilingfeng3(a)huawei.com> --- fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c | 26 +++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c index 529b3ed3b317..f4cccbf664ce 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c @@ -7890,14 +7890,16 @@ check_for_locks(struct nfs4_file *fp, struct nfs4_lockowner *lowner) { struct file_lock *fl; int status = false; - struct nfsd_file *nf = find_any_file(fp); + struct nfsd_file *nf; struct inode *inode; struct file_lock_context *flctx; + spin_lock(&fp->fi_lock); + nf = find_any_file_locked(fp); if (!nf) { /* Any valid lock stateid should have some sort of access */ WARN_ON_ONCE(1); - return status; + goto out; } inode = file_inode(nf->nf_file); @@ -7913,7 +7915,8 @@ check_for_locks(struct nfs4_file *fp, struct nfs4_lockowner *lowner) } spin_unlock(&flctx->flc_lock); } - nfsd_file_put(nf); +out: + spin_unlock(&fp->fi_lock); return status; } @@ -7923,10 +7926,8 @@ check_for_locks(struct nfs4_file *fp, struct nfs4_lockowner *lowner) * @cstate: NFSv4 COMPOUND state * @u: RELEASE_LOCKOWNER arguments * - * The lockowner's so_count is bumped when a lock record is added - * or when copying a conflicting lock. The latter case is brief, - * but can lead to fleeting false positives when looking for - * locks-in-use. + * Check if theree are any locks still held and if not - free the lockowner + * and any lock state that is owned. * * Return values: * %nfs_ok: lockowner released or not found @@ -7962,10 +7963,13 @@ nfsd4_release_lockowner(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, spin_unlock(&clp->cl_lock); return nfs_ok; } - if (atomic_read(&lo->lo_owner.so_count) != 2) { - spin_unlock(&clp->cl_lock); - nfs4_put_stateowner(&lo->lo_owner); - return nfserr_locks_held; + + list_for_each_entry(stp, &lo->lo_owner.so_stateids, st_perstateowner) { + if (check_for_locks(stp->st_stid.sc_file, lo)) { + spin_unlock(&clp->cl_lock); + nfs4_put_stateowner(&lo->lo_owner); + return nfserr_locks_held; + } } unhash_lockowner_locked(lo); while (!list_empty(&lo->lo_owner.so_stateids)) { -- 2.31.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] phonet/pep: refuse to enable an unbound pipe
by Dong Chenchen 16 Mar '24

16 Mar '24

From: Rémi Denis-Courmont <remi(a)remlab.net> stable inclusion from stable-v4.19.222 commit 982b6ba1ce626ef87e5c29f26f2401897554f235 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I95RE9 CVE: CVE-2021-47086 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 75a2f31520095600f650597c0ac41f48b5ba0068 upstream. This ioctl() implicitly assumed that the socket was already bound to a valid local socket name, i.e. Phonet object. If the socket was not bound, two separate problems would occur: 1) We'd send an pipe enablement request with an invalid source object. 2) Later socket calls could BUG on the socket unexpectedly being connected yet not bound to a valid object. Reported-by: syzbot+2dc91e7fc3dea88b1e8a(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Rémi Denis-Courmont <remi(a)remlab.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- net/phonet/pep.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/phonet/pep.c b/net/phonet/pep.c index 63d34e702df5..fe01cc788448 100644 --- a/net/phonet/pep.c +++ b/net/phonet/pep.c @@ -960,6 +960,8 @@ static int pep_ioctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, unsigned long arg) ret = -EBUSY; else if (sk->sk_state == TCP_ESTABLISHED) ret = -EISCONN; + else if (!pn->pn_sk.sobject) + ret = -EADDRNOTAVAIL; else ret = pep_sock_enable(sk, NULL, 0); release_sock(sk); -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] net/smc: fix illegal rmb_desc access in SMC-D connection dump
by Dong Chenchen 16 Mar '24

16 Mar '24

From: Wen Gu <guwen(a)linux.alibaba.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.209 commit 5fed92ca32eafbfae8b6bee8ca34cca71c6a8b6d category: bugfix bugzilla: 189676, https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I97NHS CVE: CVE-2024-26615 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit dbc153fd3c142909e564bb256da087e13fbf239c ] A crash was found when dumping SMC-D connections. It can be reproduced by following steps: - run nginx/wrk test: smc_run nginx smc_run wrk -t 16 -c 1000 -d <duration> -H 'Connection: Close' <URL> - continuously dump SMC-D connections in parallel: watch -n 1 'smcss -D' BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000030 CPU: 2 PID: 7204 Comm: smcss Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E 6.7.0+ #55 RIP: 0010:__smc_diag_dump.constprop.0+0x5e5/0x620 [smc_diag] Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die+0x24/0x70 ? page_fault_oops+0x66/0x150 ? exc_page_fault+0x69/0x140 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30 ? __smc_diag_dump.constprop.0+0x5e5/0x620 [smc_diag] ? __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x35d/0x430 ? __alloc_skb+0x77/0x170 smc_diag_dump_proto+0xd0/0xf0 [smc_diag] smc_diag_dump+0x26/0x60 [smc_diag] netlink_dump+0x19f/0x320 __netlink_dump_start+0x1dc/0x300 smc_diag_handler_dump+0x6a/0x80 [smc_diag] ? __pfx_smc_diag_dump+0x10/0x10 [smc_diag] sock_diag_rcv_msg+0x121/0x140 ? __pfx_sock_diag_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10 netlink_rcv_skb+0x5a/0x110 sock_diag_rcv+0x28/0x40 netlink_unicast+0x22a/0x330 netlink_sendmsg+0x1f8/0x420 __sock_sendmsg+0xb0/0xc0 ____sys_sendmsg+0x24e/0x300 ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x62/0x80 ___sys_sendmsg+0x7c/0xd0 ? __do_fault+0x34/0x160 ? do_read_fault+0x5f/0x100 ? do_fault+0xb0/0x110 ? __handle_mm_fault+0x2b0/0x6c0 __sys_sendmsg+0x4d/0x80 do_syscall_64+0x69/0x180 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76 It is possible that the connection is in process of being established when we dump it. Assumed that the connection has been registered in a link group by smc_conn_create() but the rmb_desc has not yet been initialized by smc_buf_create(), thus causing the illegal access to conn->rmb_desc. So fix it by checking before dump. Fixes: 4b1b7d3b30a6 ("net/smc: add SMC-D diag support") Signed-off-by: Wen Gu <guwen(a)linux.alibaba.com> Reviewed-by: Dust Li <dust.li(a)linux.alibaba.com> Reviewed-by: Wenjia Zhang <wenjia(a)linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- net/smc/smc_diag.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/smc/smc_diag.c b/net/smc/smc_diag.c index 4dd4f9e694da..5fb64b66a319 100644 --- a/net/smc/smc_diag.c +++ b/net/smc/smc_diag.c @@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ static int __smc_diag_dump(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, } if (smc->conn.lgr && smc->conn.lgr->is_smcd && (req->diag_ext & (1 << (SMC_DIAG_DMBINFO - 1))) && - !list_empty(&smc->conn.lgr->list)) { + !list_empty(&smc->conn.lgr->list) && smc->conn.rmb_desc) { struct smc_connection *conn = &smc->conn; struct smcd_diag_dmbinfo dinfo; -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] net/smc: fix illegal rmb_desc access in SMC-D connection dump
by Dong Chenchen 16 Mar '24

16 Mar '24

From: Wen Gu <guwen(a)linux.alibaba.com> stable inclusion from stable-v4.19.306 commit 27aea64838914c6122db5b8bd4bed865c9736f22 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I97NHS CVE: CVE-2024-26615 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit dbc153fd3c142909e564bb256da087e13fbf239c ] A crash was found when dumping SMC-D connections. It can be reproduced by following steps: - run nginx/wrk test: smc_run nginx smc_run wrk -t 16 -c 1000 -d <duration> -H 'Connection: Close' <URL> - continuously dump SMC-D connections in parallel: watch -n 1 'smcss -D' BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000030 CPU: 2 PID: 7204 Comm: smcss Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E 6.7.0+ #55 RIP: 0010:__smc_diag_dump.constprop.0+0x5e5/0x620 [smc_diag] Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die+0x24/0x70 ? page_fault_oops+0x66/0x150 ? exc_page_fault+0x69/0x140 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30 ? __smc_diag_dump.constprop.0+0x5e5/0x620 [smc_diag] ? __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x35d/0x430 ? __alloc_skb+0x77/0x170 smc_diag_dump_proto+0xd0/0xf0 [smc_diag] smc_diag_dump+0x26/0x60 [smc_diag] netlink_dump+0x19f/0x320 __netlink_dump_start+0x1dc/0x300 smc_diag_handler_dump+0x6a/0x80 [smc_diag] ? __pfx_smc_diag_dump+0x10/0x10 [smc_diag] sock_diag_rcv_msg+0x121/0x140 ? __pfx_sock_diag_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10 netlink_rcv_skb+0x5a/0x110 sock_diag_rcv+0x28/0x40 netlink_unicast+0x22a/0x330 netlink_sendmsg+0x1f8/0x420 __sock_sendmsg+0xb0/0xc0 ____sys_sendmsg+0x24e/0x300 ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x62/0x80 ___sys_sendmsg+0x7c/0xd0 ? __do_fault+0x34/0x160 ? do_read_fault+0x5f/0x100 ? do_fault+0xb0/0x110 ? __handle_mm_fault+0x2b0/0x6c0 __sys_sendmsg+0x4d/0x80 do_syscall_64+0x69/0x180 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76 It is possible that the connection is in process of being established when we dump it. Assumed that the connection has been registered in a link group by smc_conn_create() but the rmb_desc has not yet been initialized by smc_buf_create(), thus causing the illegal access to conn->rmb_desc. So fix it by checking before dump. Fixes: 4b1b7d3b30a6 ("net/smc: add SMC-D diag support") Signed-off-by: Wen Gu <guwen(a)linux.alibaba.com> Reviewed-by: Dust Li <dust.li(a)linux.alibaba.com> Reviewed-by: Wenjia Zhang <wenjia(a)linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: net/smc/smc_diag.c Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- net/smc/smc_diag.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/smc/smc_diag.c b/net/smc/smc_diag.c index dbf64a93d68a..d0b2f991a9e4 100644 --- a/net/smc/smc_diag.c +++ b/net/smc/smc_diag.c @@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ static int __smc_diag_dump(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, } if (smc->conn.lgr && smc->conn.lgr->is_smcd && (req->diag_ext & (1 << (SMC_DIAG_DMBINFO - 1))) && - !list_empty(&smc->conn.lgr->list)) { + !list_empty(&smc->conn.lgr->list) && smc->conn.rmb_desc) { struct smc_connection *conn = &smc->conn; struct smcd_diag_dmbinfo dinfo = { .linkid = *((u32 *)conn->lgr->id), -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] printk: avoid deadlock in panic
by Ye Weihua 16 Mar '24

16 Mar '24

hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I991OV -------------------------------- In the process of load testing against panic, a deadlock issue was discovered. The reason is that in the panic process, console_unlock doesn't handle the printk_context variable evenly, causing printk_context to overflow downwards, allowing vprintk_func to enter the nmi direct branch without disabling interrupt. Upon holding the logbuf_lock lock, an interrupt running wake_up_klogd_work_func was called, resulting in a deadlock. To avoid this issue, move printk_safe_ext_irqrestore after check abandon_console_lock_in_panic(). Fixes: 06a14c5f9e7d (printk: Drop console_sem during panic) Signed-off-by: Ye Weihua <yeweihua4(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/printk/printk.c | 11 +++++++---- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/printk/printk.c b/kernel/printk/printk.c index f52eceb3c48a..11ebe66c473a 100644 --- a/kernel/printk/printk.c +++ b/kernel/printk/printk.c @@ -2426,7 +2426,7 @@ void console_unlock(void) static char text[LOG_LINE_MAX + PREFIX_MAX]; static int panic_console_dropped; unsigned long flags; - bool do_cond_resched, retry; + bool do_cond_resched, retry, locked = false; if (console_suspended) { up_console_sem(); @@ -2469,6 +2469,7 @@ void console_unlock(void) printk_safe_enter_irqsave(flags); raw_spin_lock(&logbuf_lock); + locked = true; if (console_seq < log_first_seq) { len = snprintf(text, sizeof(text), "** %llu printk messages dropped **\n", @@ -2520,6 +2521,7 @@ void console_unlock(void) } console_idx = log_next(console_idx); console_seq++; + locked = false; raw_spin_unlock(&logbuf_lock); /* @@ -2539,19 +2541,20 @@ void console_unlock(void) return; } - printk_safe_exit_irqrestore(flags); - /* Allow panic_cpu to take over the consoles safely */ if (abandon_console_lock_in_panic()) break; + printk_safe_exit_irqrestore(flags); + if (do_cond_resched) cond_resched(); } console_locked = 0; - raw_spin_unlock(&logbuf_lock); + if (likely(locked)) + raw_spin_unlock(&logbuf_lock); up_console_sem(); -- 2.34.1

2 1

[OLK-5.10 v2 PATCH] iomap: add support to track dirty state of sub pages
by Yu Kuai 16 Mar '24

16 Mar '24

hulk inclusion category: performance bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I93TU0 CVE: NA ------------------------------------------ commit 9dc55f1389f9 ("iomap: add support for sub-pagesize buffered I/O without buffer heads") replace the per-block structure buffer_head with the per-page structure iomap_page. However, iomap_page can't track the dirty state of sub pages, which will cause performance issue since sub pages will be writeback even if they are not dirty. For example, if block size is 4k and page size is 64k: dd if=/dev/zero of=testfile bs=4k count=16 oflag=sync With buffer_head implementation, the above dd cmd will writeback 4k in each round. However, with iomap_page implementation, the range of writeback in each round is from the start of the page to the end offset we just wrote. Thus add support to track dirty state in iomap_page. test environment: platform: arm64 pagesize: 64k blocksize: 4k test case: dd if=/dev/zero of=/mnt/testfile bs=1M count=128 fio --ioengine=sync --rw=randwrite --iodepth=64 --name=test \ --filename=/mnt/testfile --bs=4k --fsync=1 The test result is: xfs with patch: WRITE: bw=4609KiB/s (4720kB/s) xfs without patch WRITE: bw=2714KiB/s (2780kB/s) ext4: WRITE: bw=3840KiB/s (3932kB/s) Signed-off-by: Yu Kuai <yukuai3(a)huawei.com> --- Changes in v2: - remove changes to iomap_page_mkwrite_actor(). fs/iomap/buffered-io.c | 83 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 67 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/iomap/buffered-io.c b/fs/iomap/buffered-io.c index d9092aa5c3fb..25448d5827d2 100644 --- a/fs/iomap/buffered-io.c +++ b/fs/iomap/buffered-io.c @@ -25,13 +25,13 @@ /* * Structure allocated for each page or THP when block size < page size - * to track sub-page uptodate status and I/O completions. + * to track sub-page uptodate and dirty status and I/O completions. */ struct iomap_page { atomic_t read_bytes_pending; atomic_t write_bytes_pending; - spinlock_t uptodate_lock; - unsigned long uptodate[]; + spinlock_t state_lock; + unsigned long state[]; }; static inline struct iomap_page *to_iomap_page(struct page *page) @@ -59,11 +59,13 @@ iomap_page_create(struct inode *inode, struct page *page) if (iop || nr_blocks <= 1) return iop; - iop = kzalloc(struct_size(iop, uptodate, BITS_TO_LONGS(nr_blocks)), + iop = kzalloc(struct_size(iop, state, BITS_TO_LONGS(2 * nr_blocks)), GFP_NOFS | __GFP_NOFAIL); - spin_lock_init(&iop->uptodate_lock); + spin_lock_init(&iop->state_lock); if (PageUptodate(page)) - bitmap_fill(iop->uptodate, nr_blocks); + bitmap_set(iop->state, 0, nr_blocks); + if (PageDirty(page)) + bitmap_set(iop->state, nr_blocks, nr_blocks); attach_page_private(page, iop); return iop; } @@ -78,7 +80,7 @@ iomap_page_release(struct page *page) return; WARN_ON_ONCE(atomic_read(&iop->read_bytes_pending)); WARN_ON_ONCE(atomic_read(&iop->write_bytes_pending)); - WARN_ON_ONCE(bitmap_full(iop->uptodate, nr_blocks) != + WARN_ON_ONCE(bitmap_full(iop->state, nr_blocks) != PageUptodate(page)); kfree(iop); } @@ -109,7 +111,7 @@ iomap_adjust_read_range(struct inode *inode, struct iomap_page *iop, /* move forward for each leading block marked uptodate */ for (i = first; i <= last; i++) { - if (!test_bit(i, iop->uptodate)) + if (!test_bit(i, iop->state)) break; *pos += block_size; poff += block_size; @@ -119,7 +121,7 @@ iomap_adjust_read_range(struct inode *inode, struct iomap_page *iop, /* truncate len if we find any trailing uptodate block(s) */ for ( ; i <= last; i++) { - if (test_bit(i, iop->uptodate)) { + if (test_bit(i, iop->state)) { plen -= (last - i + 1) * block_size; last = i - 1; break; @@ -143,6 +145,53 @@ iomap_adjust_read_range(struct inode *inode, struct iomap_page *iop, *lenp = plen; } +static void +iomap_set_range_dirty(struct page *page, unsigned int off, unsigned int len) +{ + struct inode *inode = page->mapping->host; + unsigned int nr_blocks = i_blocks_per_page(inode, page); + unsigned int first = off >> inode->i_blkbits; + unsigned int last = (off + len - 1) >> inode->i_blkbits; + unsigned long flags; + struct iomap_page *iop; + + if (PageError(page)) + return; + + if (len) + iomap_set_page_dirty(page); + + if (!page_has_private(page)) + return; + + iop = to_iomap_page(page); + spin_lock_irqsave(&iop->state_lock, flags); + bitmap_set(iop->state, first + nr_blocks, last - first + 1); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&iop->state_lock, flags); +} + +static void +iomap_clear_range_dirty(struct page *page, unsigned int off, unsigned int len) +{ + struct inode *inode = page->mapping->host; + unsigned int nr_blocks = i_blocks_per_page(inode, page); + unsigned int first = off >> inode->i_blkbits; + unsigned int last = (off + len - 1) >> inode->i_blkbits; + unsigned long flags; + struct iomap_page *iop; + + if (PageError(page)) + return; + + if (!page_has_private(page)) + return; + + iop = to_iomap_page(page); + spin_lock_irqsave(&iop->state_lock, flags); + bitmap_clear(iop->state, first + nr_blocks, last - first + 1); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&iop->state_lock, flags); +} + static void iomap_iop_set_range_uptodate(struct page *page, unsigned off, unsigned len) { @@ -152,11 +201,11 @@ iomap_iop_set_range_uptodate(struct page *page, unsigned off, unsigned len) unsigned last = (off + len - 1) >> inode->i_blkbits; unsigned long flags; - spin_lock_irqsave(&iop->uptodate_lock, flags); - bitmap_set(iop->uptodate, first, last - first + 1); - if (bitmap_full(iop->uptodate, i_blocks_per_page(inode, page))) + spin_lock_irqsave(&iop->state_lock, flags); + bitmap_set(iop->state, first, last - first + 1); + if (bitmap_full(iop->state, i_blocks_per_page(inode, page))) SetPageUptodate(page); - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&iop->uptodate_lock, flags); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&iop->state_lock, flags); } static void @@ -451,7 +500,7 @@ iomap_is_partially_uptodate(struct page *page, unsigned long from, if (iop) { for (i = first; i <= last; i++) - if (!test_bit(i, iop->uptodate)) + if (!test_bit(i, iop->state)) return 0; return 1; } @@ -708,7 +757,7 @@ static size_t __iomap_write_end(struct inode *inode, loff_t pos, size_t len, if (unlikely(copied < len && !PageUptodate(page))) return 0; iomap_set_range_uptodate(page, offset_in_page(pos), len); - iomap_set_page_dirty(page); + iomap_set_range_dirty(page, offset_in_page(pos), len); return copied; } @@ -1407,6 +1456,7 @@ iomap_writepage_map(struct iomap_writepage_ctx *wpc, { struct iomap_page *iop = iomap_page_create(inode, page); struct iomap_ioend *ioend, *next; + unsigned int nr_blocks = i_blocks_per_page(inode, page); unsigned len = i_blocksize(inode); u64 file_offset; /* file offset of page */ int error = 0, count = 0, i; @@ -1422,7 +1472,7 @@ iomap_writepage_map(struct iomap_writepage_ctx *wpc, for (i = 0, file_offset = page_offset(page); i < (PAGE_SIZE >> inode->i_blkbits) && file_offset < end_offset; i++, file_offset += len) { - if (iop && !test_bit(i, iop->uptodate)) + if (iop && !test_bit(i + nr_blocks, iop->state)) continue; error = wpc->ops->map_blocks(wpc, inode, file_offset); @@ -1465,6 +1515,7 @@ iomap_writepage_map(struct iomap_writepage_ctx *wpc, } } + iomap_clear_range_dirty(page, 0, PAGE_SIZE); set_page_writeback(page); unlock_page(page); -- 2.39.2

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[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS 0/2] Fix failure of LTP testcase af_alg05
by GUO Zihua 16 Mar '24

16 Mar '24

This patchset fixes the failure of af_alg05 cause by uninitialized crypto ctx. Herbert Xu (1): crypto: algif_aead - Only wake up when ctx->more is zero Ondrej Mosnacek (1): crypto: algif_aead - fix uninitialized ctx->init crypto/af_alg.c | 11 ++++++++--- crypto/algif_aead.c | 10 ++-------- crypto/algif_skcipher.c | 11 +++-------- include/crypto/if_alg.h | 4 +++- 4 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] printk: avoid deadlock in panic
by Ye Weihua 16 Mar '24

16 Mar '24

hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I991OV -------------------------------- In the process of load testing against panic, a deadlock issue was discovered. The reason is that in the panic process, console_unlock doesn't handle the printk_context variable evenly, causing printk_context to overflow downwards, allowing vprintk_func to enter the nmi direct branch without disabling interrupt. Upon holding the logbuf_lock lock, an interrupt running wake_up_klogd_work_func was called, resulting in a deadlock. To avoid this issue, move printk_safe_ext_irqrestore after check abandon_console_lock_in_panic(). Fixes: 06a14c5f9e7d (printk: Drop console_sem during panic) Signed-off-by: Ye Weihua <yeweihua4(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/printk/printk.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/printk/printk.c b/kernel/printk/printk.c index f52eceb3c48a..c164761da3ec 100644 --- a/kernel/printk/printk.c +++ b/kernel/printk/printk.c @@ -2539,12 +2539,12 @@ void console_unlock(void) return; } - printk_safe_exit_irqrestore(flags); - /* Allow panic_cpu to take over the consoles safely */ if (abandon_console_lock_in_panic()) break; + printk_safe_exit_irqrestore(flags); + if (do_cond_resched) cond_resched(); } -- 2.34.1

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