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[PATCH OLK-5.10] net/mlx5: Add a timeout to acquire the command queue semaphore
by Zhengchao Shao 26 Jun '24

26 Jun '24

From: Akiva Goldberger <agoldberger(a)nvidia.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.10-rc1 commit 485d65e1357123a697c591a5aeb773994b247ad7 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IA6S89 CVE: CVE-2024-38556 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Prevent forced completion handling on an entry that has not yet been assigned an index, causing an out of bounds access on idx = -22. Instead of waiting indefinitely for the sem, blocking flow now waits for index to be allocated or a sem acquisition timeout before beginning the timer for FW completion. Kernel log example: mlx5_core 0000:06:00.0: wait_func_handle_exec_timeout:1128:(pid 185911): cmd[-22]: CREATE_UCTX(0xa04) No done completion Fixes: 8e715cd613a1 ("net/mlx5: Set command entry semaphore up once got index free") Signed-off-by: Akiva Goldberger <agoldberger(a)nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Moshe Shemesh <moshe(a)nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt(a)nvidia.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240509112951.590184-5-tariqt@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/cmd.c [The conflict occurs because the commit 5945e1adeab5("net/mlx5: Read timeout values from init segment") and 58db72869a9f("net/mlx5: Re-organize mlx5_cmd struct") and 8f5100da56b3("net/mlx5e: Fix a race in command alloc flow") and 7cb5eb937231("net/mlx5: Introduce and use opcode getter in command interface") and f086470122d5("net/mlx5: cmdif, Return value improvements") are not merged. MLX5_CMD_TIMEOUT_MSEC is used for timeout and cannot be configured by users. struct mlx5_cmd does not contain the var variable and directly references to sem.] Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/cmd.c | 36 +++++++++++++++---- include/linux/mlx5/driver.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/cmd.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/cmd.c index bb1dba03de7c..f1478c6ec765 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/cmd.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/cmd.c @@ -900,18 +900,30 @@ static void cmd_work_handler(struct work_struct *work) struct mlx5_cmd_work_ent *ent = container_of(work, struct mlx5_cmd_work_ent, work); struct mlx5_cmd *cmd = ent->cmd; struct mlx5_core_dev *dev = container_of(cmd, struct mlx5_core_dev, cmd); - unsigned long cb_timeout = msecs_to_jiffies(MLX5_CMD_TIMEOUT_MSEC); + unsigned long timeout = msecs_to_jiffies(MLX5_CMD_TIMEOUT_MSEC); struct mlx5_cmd_layout *lay; - struct semaphore *sem; unsigned long flags; bool poll_cmd = ent->polling; int alloc_ret; int cmd_mode; complete(&ent->handling); - sem = ent->page_queue ? &cmd->pages_sem : &cmd->sem; - down(sem); if (!ent->page_queue) { + if (down_timeout(&cmd->sem, timeout)) { + mlx5_core_warn(dev, "%s(0x%x) timed out while waiting for a slot.\n", + mlx5_command_str(ent->op), ent->op); + if (ent->callback) { + ent->callback(-EBUSY, ent->context); + mlx5_free_cmd_msg(dev, ent->out); + free_msg(dev, ent->in); + cmd_ent_put(ent); + } else { + ent->ret = -EBUSY; + complete(&ent->done); + } + complete(&ent->slotted); + return; + } alloc_ret = cmd_alloc_index(cmd); if (alloc_ret < 0) { mlx5_core_err_rl(dev, "failed to allocate command entry\n"); @@ -924,11 +936,12 @@ static void cmd_work_handler(struct work_struct *work) ent->ret = -EAGAIN; complete(&ent->done); } - up(sem); + up(&cmd->sem); return; } ent->idx = alloc_ret; } else { + down(&cmd->pages_sem); ent->idx = cmd->max_reg_cmds; spin_lock_irqsave(&cmd->alloc_lock, flags); clear_bit(ent->idx, &cmd->bitmask); @@ -936,6 +949,8 @@ static void cmd_work_handler(struct work_struct *work) } cmd->ent_arr[ent->idx] = ent; + + complete(&ent->slotted); lay = get_inst(cmd, ent->idx); ent->lay = lay; memset(lay, 0, sizeof(*lay)); @@ -955,7 +970,7 @@ static void cmd_work_handler(struct work_struct *work) ent->ts1 = ktime_get_ns(); cmd_mode = cmd->mode; - if (ent->callback && schedule_delayed_work(&ent->cb_timeout_work, cb_timeout)) + if (ent->callback && schedule_delayed_work(&ent->cb_timeout_work, timeout)) cmd_ent_get(ent); set_bit(MLX5_CMD_ENT_STATE_PENDING_COMP, &ent->state); @@ -1056,6 +1071,9 @@ static int wait_func(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev, struct mlx5_cmd_work_ent *ent) ent->ret = -ECANCELED; goto out_err; } + + wait_for_completion(&ent->slotted); + if (cmd->mode == CMD_MODE_POLLING || ent->polling) wait_for_completion(&ent->done); else if (!wait_for_completion_timeout(&ent->done, timeout)) @@ -1072,6 +1090,9 @@ static int wait_func(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev, struct mlx5_cmd_work_ent *ent) mlx5_core_warn(dev, "%s(0x%x) canceled on out of queue timeout.\n", mlx5_command_str(msg_to_opcode(ent->in)), msg_to_opcode(ent->in)); + } else if (err == -EBUSY) { + mlx5_core_warn(dev, "%s(0x%x) timeout while waiting for command semaphore.\n", + mlx5_command_str(ent->op), ent->op); } mlx5_core_dbg(dev, "err %d, delivery status %s(%d)\n", err, deliv_status_to_str(ent->status), ent->status); @@ -1113,6 +1134,7 @@ static int mlx5_cmd_invoke(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev, struct mlx5_cmd_msg *in, ent->polling = force_polling; init_completion(&ent->handling); + init_completion(&ent->slotted); if (!callback) init_completion(&ent->done); @@ -1130,7 +1152,7 @@ static int mlx5_cmd_invoke(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev, struct mlx5_cmd_msg *in, goto out; /* mlx5_cmd_comp_handler() will put(ent) */ err = wait_func(dev, ent); - if (err == -ETIMEDOUT || err == -ECANCELED) + if (err == -ETIMEDOUT || err == -ECANCELED || err == -EBUSY) goto out_free; ds = ent->ts2 - ent->ts1; diff --git a/include/linux/mlx5/driver.h b/include/linux/mlx5/driver.h index 2cd89af4dbf6..63feb2878c7a 100644 --- a/include/linux/mlx5/driver.h +++ b/include/linux/mlx5/driver.h @@ -762,6 +762,7 @@ struct mlx5_cmd_work_ent { void *context; int idx; struct completion handling; + struct completion slotted; struct completion done; struct mlx5_cmd *cmd; struct work_struct work; -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] net/mlx5: Add a timeout to acquire the command queue semaphore
by Zhengchao Shao 26 Jun '24

26 Jun '24

From: Akiva Goldberger <agoldberger(a)nvidia.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.10-rc1 commit 485d65e1357123a697c591a5aeb773994b247ad7 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IA6S89 CVE: CVE-2024-38556 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Prevent forced completion handling on an entry that has not yet been assigned an index, causing an out of bounds access on idx = -22. Instead of waiting indefinitely for the sem, blocking flow now waits for index to be allocated or a sem acquisition timeout before beginning the timer for FW completion. Kernel log example: mlx5_core 0000:06:00.0: wait_func_handle_exec_timeout:1128:(pid 185911): cmd[-22]: CREATE_UCTX(0xa04) No done completion Fixes: 8e715cd613a1 ("net/mlx5: Set command entry semaphore up once got index free") Signed-off-by: Akiva Goldberger <agoldberger(a)nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Moshe Shemesh <moshe(a)nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt(a)nvidia.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240509112951.590184-5-tariqt@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/cmd.c [The conflict occurs because the commit 5945e1adeab5("net/mlx5: Read timeout values from init segment") and 58db72869a9f("net/mlx5: Re-organize mlx5_cmd struct") and 8f5100da56b3("net/mlx5e: Fix a race in command alloc flow") and 7cb5eb937231("net/mlx5: Introduce and use opcode getter in command interface") and f086470122d5("net/mlx5: cmdif, Return value improvements") are not merged. MLX5_CMD_TIMEOUT_MSEC is used for timeout and cannot be configured by users. struct mlx5_cmd does not contain the var variable and directly references to sem.] Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/cmd.c | 36 +++++++++++++++---- include/linux/mlx5/driver.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/cmd.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/cmd.c index fb196d312548..6c7efba80c97 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/cmd.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/cmd.c @@ -900,18 +900,30 @@ static void cmd_work_handler(struct work_struct *work) struct mlx5_cmd_work_ent *ent = container_of(work, struct mlx5_cmd_work_ent, work); struct mlx5_cmd *cmd = ent->cmd; struct mlx5_core_dev *dev = container_of(cmd, struct mlx5_core_dev, cmd); - unsigned long cb_timeout = msecs_to_jiffies(MLX5_CMD_TIMEOUT_MSEC); + unsigned long timeout = msecs_to_jiffies(MLX5_CMD_TIMEOUT_MSEC); struct mlx5_cmd_layout *lay; - struct semaphore *sem; unsigned long flags; bool poll_cmd = ent->polling; int alloc_ret; int cmd_mode; complete(&ent->handling); - sem = ent->page_queue ? &cmd->pages_sem : &cmd->sem; - down(sem); if (!ent->page_queue) { + if (down_timeout(&cmd->sem, timeout)) { + mlx5_core_warn(dev, "%s(0x%x) timed out while waiting for a slot.\n", + mlx5_command_str(ent->op), ent->op); + if (ent->callback) { + ent->callback(-EBUSY, ent->context); + mlx5_free_cmd_msg(dev, ent->out); + free_msg(dev, ent->in); + cmd_ent_put(ent); + } else { + ent->ret = -EBUSY; + complete(&ent->done); + } + complete(&ent->slotted); + return; + } alloc_ret = cmd_alloc_index(cmd); if (alloc_ret < 0) { mlx5_core_err_rl(dev, "failed to allocate command entry\n"); @@ -924,11 +936,12 @@ static void cmd_work_handler(struct work_struct *work) ent->ret = -EAGAIN; complete(&ent->done); } - up(sem); + up(&cmd->sem); return; } ent->idx = alloc_ret; } else { + down(&cmd->pages_sem); ent->idx = cmd->max_reg_cmds; spin_lock_irqsave(&cmd->alloc_lock, flags); clear_bit(ent->idx, &cmd->bitmask); @@ -936,6 +949,8 @@ static void cmd_work_handler(struct work_struct *work) } cmd->ent_arr[ent->idx] = ent; + + complete(&ent->slotted); lay = get_inst(cmd, ent->idx); ent->lay = lay; memset(lay, 0, sizeof(*lay)); @@ -955,7 +970,7 @@ static void cmd_work_handler(struct work_struct *work) ent->ts1 = ktime_get_ns(); cmd_mode = cmd->mode; - if (ent->callback && schedule_delayed_work(&ent->cb_timeout_work, cb_timeout)) + if (ent->callback && schedule_delayed_work(&ent->cb_timeout_work, timeout)) cmd_ent_get(ent); set_bit(MLX5_CMD_ENT_STATE_PENDING_COMP, &ent->state); @@ -1056,6 +1071,9 @@ static int wait_func(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev, struct mlx5_cmd_work_ent *ent) ent->ret = -ECANCELED; goto out_err; } + + wait_for_completion(&ent->slotted); + if (cmd->mode == CMD_MODE_POLLING || ent->polling) wait_for_completion(&ent->done); else if (!wait_for_completion_timeout(&ent->done, timeout)) @@ -1072,6 +1090,9 @@ static int wait_func(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev, struct mlx5_cmd_work_ent *ent) mlx5_core_warn(dev, "%s(0x%x) canceled on out of queue timeout.\n", mlx5_command_str(msg_to_opcode(ent->in)), msg_to_opcode(ent->in)); + } else if (err == -EBUSY) { + mlx5_core_warn(dev, "%s(0x%x) timeout while waiting for command semaphore.\n", + mlx5_command_str(ent->op), ent->op); } mlx5_core_dbg(dev, "err %d, delivery status %s(%d)\n", err, deliv_status_to_str(ent->status), ent->status); @@ -1113,6 +1134,7 @@ static int mlx5_cmd_invoke(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev, struct mlx5_cmd_msg *in, ent->polling = force_polling; init_completion(&ent->handling); + init_completion(&ent->slotted); if (!callback) init_completion(&ent->done); @@ -1130,7 +1152,7 @@ static int mlx5_cmd_invoke(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev, struct mlx5_cmd_msg *in, goto out; /* mlx5_cmd_comp_handler() will put(ent) */ err = wait_func(dev, ent); - if (err == -ETIMEDOUT || err == -ECANCELED) + if (err == -ETIMEDOUT || err == -ECANCELED || err == -EBUSY) goto out_free; ds = ent->ts2 - ent->ts1; diff --git a/include/linux/mlx5/driver.h b/include/linux/mlx5/driver.h index 41fbb4793394..f3695ef9db60 100644 --- a/include/linux/mlx5/driver.h +++ b/include/linux/mlx5/driver.h @@ -756,6 +756,7 @@ struct mlx5_cmd_work_ent { void *context; int idx; struct completion handling; + struct completion slotted; struct completion done; struct mlx5_cmd *cmd; struct work_struct work; -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH OLK-6.6] io_uring: check for non-NULL file pointer in io_file_can_poll()
by Yifan Qiao 26 Jun '24

26 Jun '24

From: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.35 commit 43cfac7b88adedfb26c27834386992650f1642f3 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IA8AEH CVE: CVE-2024-39371 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 5fc16fa5f13b3c06fdb959ef262050bd810416a2 upstream. In earlier kernels, it was possible to trigger a NULL pointer dereference off the forced async preparation path, if no file had been assigned. The trace leading to that looks as follows: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000b0 PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP CPU: 67 PID: 1633 Comm: buf-ring-invali Not tainted 6.8.0-rc3+ #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS unknown 2/2/2022 RIP: 0010:io_buffer_select+0xc3/0x210 Code: 00 00 48 39 d1 0f 82 ae 00 00 00 48 81 4b 48 00 00 01 00 48 89 73 70 0f b7 50 0c 66 89 53 42 85 ed 0f 85 d2 00 00 00 48 8b 13 <48> 8b 92 b0 00 00 00 48 83 7a 40 00 0f 84 21 01 00 00 4c 8b 20 5b RSP: 0018:ffffb7bec38c7d88 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: ffff97af2be61000 RBX: ffff97af234f1700 RCX: 0000000000000040 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff97aecfb04820 RDI: ffff97af234f1700 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000200030 R09: 0000000000000020 R10: ffffb7bec38c7dc8 R11: 000000000000c000 R12: ffffb7bec38c7db8 R13: ffff97aecfb05800 R14: ffff97aecfb05800 R15: ffff97af2be5e000 FS: 00007f852f74b740(0000) GS:ffff97b1eeec0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000000000b0 CR3: 000000016deab005 CR4: 0000000000370ef0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die+0x1f/0x60 ? page_fault_oops+0x14d/0x420 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x61/0x6a0 ? exc_page_fault+0x6c/0x150 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 ? io_buffer_select+0xc3/0x210 __io_import_iovec+0xb5/0x120 io_readv_prep_async+0x36/0x70 io_queue_sqe_fallback+0x20/0x260 io_submit_sqes+0x314/0x630 __do_sys_io_uring_enter+0x339/0xbc0 ? __do_sys_io_uring_register+0x11b/0xc50 ? vm_mmap_pgoff+0xce/0x160 do_syscall_64+0x5f/0x180 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e RIP: 0033:0x55e0a110a67e Code: ba cc 00 00 00 45 31 c0 44 0f b6 92 d0 00 00 00 31 d2 41 b9 08 00 00 00 41 83 e2 01 41 c1 e2 04 41 09 c2 b8 aa 01 00 00 0f 05 <c3> 90 89 30 eb a9 0f 1f 40 00 48 8b 42 20 8b 00 a8 06 75 af 85 f6 because the request is marked forced ASYNC and has a bad file fd, and hence takes the forced async prep path. Current kernels with the request async prep cleaned up can no longer hit this issue, but for ease of backporting, let's add this safety check in here too as it really doesn't hurt. For both cases, this will inevitably end with a CQE posted with -EBADF. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: a76c0b31eef5 ("io_uring: commit non-pollable provided mapped buffers upfront") Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Yifan Qiao <qiaoyifan4(a)huawei.com> --- io_uring/kbuf.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/io_uring/kbuf.c b/io_uring/kbuf.c index 26a00920042c..702c08c26cd4 100644 --- a/io_uring/kbuf.c +++ b/io_uring/kbuf.c @@ -168,7 +168,8 @@ static void __user *io_ring_buffer_select(struct io_kiocb *req, size_t *len, req->buf_list = bl; req->buf_index = buf->bid; - if (issue_flags & IO_URING_F_UNLOCKED || !file_can_poll(req->file)) { + if (issue_flags & IO_URING_F_UNLOCKED || + (req->file && !file_can_poll(req->file))) { /* * If we came in unlocked, we have no choice but to consume the * buffer here, otherwise nothing ensures that the buffer won't -- 2.39.2

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[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] CVE-2024-38662
by Pu Lehui 26 Jun '24

26 Jun '24

Jakub Sitnicki (2): bpf: Allow delete from sockmap/sockhash only if update is allowed Revert "bpf, sockmap: Prevent lock inversion deadlock in map delete elem" kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 10 +++++++--- net/core/sock_map.c | 6 ------ 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS 0/2] quota: Fix rcu annotations of inode dquot pointers
by Baokun Li 26 Jun '24

26 Jun '24

Jan Kara (1): quota: Fix rcu annotations of inode dquot pointers Jiang Biao (1): fs/quota: erase unused but set variable warning fs/quota/dquot.c | 71 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------- 1 file changed, 43 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-) -- 2.31.1

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[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/1] fix CVE-2024-38621
by Liao Chen 26 Jun '24

26 Jun '24

media: stk1160: fix bounds checking in stk1160_copy_video() Dan Carpenter (1): media: stk1160: fix bounds checking in stk1160_copy_video() drivers/media/usb/stk1160/stk1160-video.c | 20 +++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH OLK-5.10 v2 0/2] CVE-2024-27032
by Xiongfeng Wang 26 Jun '24

26 Jun '24

Chao Yu (2): f2fs: fix to check return value of f2fs_reserve_new_block() f2fs: fix to avoid potential panic during recovery fs/f2fs/f2fs.h | 5 +++++ fs/f2fs/recovery.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++-------- 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) -- 2.20.1

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[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1 v2 0/2] CVE-2024-27032
by Xiongfeng Wang 26 Jun '24

26 Jun '24

Chao Yu (2): f2fs: fix to check return value of f2fs_reserve_new_block() f2fs: fix to avoid potential panic during recovery fs/f2fs/f2fs.h | 5 +++++ fs/f2fs/recovery.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++-------- 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) -- 2.20.1

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[PATCH OLK-6.6] bpf: Fix verifier assumptions about socket->sk
by Tengda Wu 26 Jun '24

26 Jun '24

From: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.10-rc1 commit 0db63c0b86e981a1e97d2596d64ceceba1a5470e category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IA77YV CVE: CVE-2024-38566 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- The verifier assumes that 'sk' field in 'struct socket' is valid and non-NULL when 'socket' pointer itself is trusted and non-NULL. That may not be the case when socket was just created and passed to LSM socket_accept hook. Fix this verifier assumption and adjust tests. Reported-by: Liam Wisehart <liamwisehart(a)meta.com> Acked-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor(a)gmail.com> Fixes: 6fcd486b3a0a ("bpf: Refactor RCU enforcement in the verifier.") Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240427002544.68803-1-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.c… Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: kernel/bpf/verifier.c [this is because we did not backport commit 36d8bdf75a93 ("bpf: Add alloc/xchg/direct_access support for local percpu kptr")] since it is a feature commit] Signed-off-by: Tengda Wu <wutengda2(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 23 +++++++++++++++---- .../bpf/progs/bench_local_storage_create.c | 5 ++-- .../selftests/bpf/progs/local_storage.c | 20 ++++++++-------- .../testing/selftests/bpf/progs/lsm_cgroup.c | 8 +++++-- 4 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 1fcba0c46f6e..555c7801d90f 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -2543,6 +2543,8 @@ static void mark_btf_ld_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, regs[regno].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | flag; regs[regno].btf = btf; regs[regno].btf_id = btf_id; + if (type_may_be_null(flag)) + regs[regno].id = ++env->id_gen; } #define DEF_NOT_SUBREG (0) @@ -5375,8 +5377,6 @@ static int check_map_kptr_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, rcu_safe_kptr(kptr_field) && in_rcu_cs(env) ? PTR_MAYBE_NULL | MEM_RCU : PTR_MAYBE_NULL | PTR_UNTRUSTED); - /* For mark_ptr_or_null_reg */ - val_reg->id = ++env->id_gen; } else if (class == BPF_STX) { val_reg = reg_state(env, value_regno); if (!register_is_null(val_reg) && @@ -5686,7 +5686,8 @@ static bool is_trusted_reg(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) return true; /* Types listed in the reg2btf_ids are always trusted */ - if (reg2btf_ids[base_type(reg->type)]) + if (reg2btf_ids[base_type(reg->type)] && + !bpf_type_has_unsafe_modifiers(reg->type)) return true; /* If a register is not referenced, it is trusted if it has the @@ -6265,6 +6266,7 @@ static int bpf_map_direct_read(struct bpf_map *map, int off, int size, u64 *val, #define BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU(__type) __PASTE(__type, __safe_rcu) #define BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU_OR_NULL(__type) __PASTE(__type, __safe_rcu_or_null) #define BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(__type) __PASTE(__type, __safe_trusted) +#define BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED_OR_NULL(__type) __PASTE(__type, __safe_trusted_or_null) /* * Allow list few fields as RCU trusted or full trusted. @@ -6328,7 +6330,7 @@ BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct dentry) { struct inode *d_inode; }; -BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct socket) { +BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED_OR_NULL(struct socket) { struct sock *sk; }; @@ -6363,11 +6365,20 @@ static bool type_is_trusted(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct linux_binprm)); BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct file)); BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct dentry)); - BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct socket)); return btf_nested_type_is_trusted(&env->log, reg, field_name, btf_id, "__safe_trusted"); } +static bool type_is_trusted_or_null(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, + struct bpf_reg_state *reg, + const char *field_name, u32 btf_id) +{ + BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED_OR_NULL(struct socket)); + + return btf_nested_type_is_trusted(&env->log, reg, field_name, btf_id, + "__safe_trusted_or_null"); +} + static int check_ptr_to_btf_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *regs, int regno, int off, int size, @@ -6476,6 +6487,8 @@ static int check_ptr_to_btf_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, */ if (type_is_trusted(env, reg, field_name, btf_id)) { flag |= PTR_TRUSTED; + } else if (type_is_trusted_or_null(env, reg, field_name, btf_id)) { + flag |= PTR_TRUSTED | PTR_MAYBE_NULL; } else if (in_rcu_cs(env) && !type_may_be_null(reg->type)) { if (type_is_rcu(env, reg, field_name, btf_id)) { /* ignore __rcu tag and mark it MEM_RCU */ diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bench_local_storage_create.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bench_local_storage_create.c index e4bfbba6c193..c8ec0d0368e4 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bench_local_storage_create.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bench_local_storage_create.c @@ -61,14 +61,15 @@ SEC("lsm.s/socket_post_create") int BPF_PROG(socket_post_create, struct socket *sock, int family, int type, int protocol, int kern) { + struct sock *sk = sock->sk; struct storage *stg; __u32 pid; pid = bpf_get_current_pid_tgid() >> 32; - if (pid != bench_pid) + if (pid != bench_pid || !sk) return 0; - stg = bpf_sk_storage_get(&sk_storage_map, sock->sk, NULL, + stg = bpf_sk_storage_get(&sk_storage_map, sk, NULL, BPF_LOCAL_STORAGE_GET_F_CREATE); if (stg) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/local_storage.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/local_storage.c index bc8ea56671a1..3bf75f4ea690 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/local_storage.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/local_storage.c @@ -140,11 +140,12 @@ int BPF_PROG(socket_bind, struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, { __u32 pid = bpf_get_current_pid_tgid() >> 32; struct local_storage *storage; + struct sock *sk = sock->sk; - if (pid != monitored_pid) + if (pid != monitored_pid || !sk) return 0; - storage = bpf_sk_storage_get(&sk_storage_map, sock->sk, 0, 0); + storage = bpf_sk_storage_get(&sk_storage_map, sk, 0, 0); if (!storage) return 0; @@ -155,24 +156,24 @@ int BPF_PROG(socket_bind, struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, /* This tests that we can associate multiple elements * with the local storage. */ - storage = bpf_sk_storage_get(&sk_storage_map2, sock->sk, 0, + storage = bpf_sk_storage_get(&sk_storage_map2, sk, 0, BPF_LOCAL_STORAGE_GET_F_CREATE); if (!storage) return 0; - if (bpf_sk_storage_delete(&sk_storage_map2, sock->sk)) + if (bpf_sk_storage_delete(&sk_storage_map2, sk)) return 0; - storage = bpf_sk_storage_get(&sk_storage_map2, sock->sk, 0, + storage = bpf_sk_storage_get(&sk_storage_map2, sk, 0, BPF_LOCAL_STORAGE_GET_F_CREATE); if (!storage) return 0; - if (bpf_sk_storage_delete(&sk_storage_map, sock->sk)) + if (bpf_sk_storage_delete(&sk_storage_map, sk)) return 0; /* Ensure that the sk_storage_map is disconnected from the storage. */ - if (!sock->sk->sk_bpf_storage || sock->sk->sk_bpf_storage->smap) + if (!sk->sk_bpf_storage || sk->sk_bpf_storage->smap) return 0; sk_storage_result = 0; @@ -185,11 +186,12 @@ int BPF_PROG(socket_post_create, struct socket *sock, int family, int type, { __u32 pid = bpf_get_current_pid_tgid() >> 32; struct local_storage *storage; + struct sock *sk = sock->sk; - if (pid != monitored_pid) + if (pid != monitored_pid || !sk) return 0; - storage = bpf_sk_storage_get(&sk_storage_map, sock->sk, 0, + storage = bpf_sk_storage_get(&sk_storage_map, sk, 0, BPF_LOCAL_STORAGE_GET_F_CREATE); if (!storage) return 0; diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/lsm_cgroup.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/lsm_cgroup.c index 02c11d16b692..d7598538aa2d 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/lsm_cgroup.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/lsm_cgroup.c @@ -103,11 +103,15 @@ static __always_inline int real_bind(struct socket *sock, int addrlen) { struct sockaddr_ll sa = {}; + struct sock *sk = sock->sk; - if (sock->sk->__sk_common.skc_family != AF_PACKET) + if (!sk) + return 1; + + if (sk->__sk_common.skc_family != AF_PACKET) return 1; - if (sock->sk->sk_kern_sock) + if (sk->sk_kern_sock) return 1; bpf_probe_read_kernel(&sa, sizeof(sa), address); -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] bpf: Add BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB attach type enforcement in BPF_LINK_CREATE
by Tengda Wu 26 Jun '24

26 Jun '24

mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.10-rc1 commit 543576ec15b17c0c93301ac8297333c7b6e84ac7 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IA6S6Q CVE: CVE-2024-38564 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- bpf_prog_attach uses attach_type_to_prog_type to enforce proper attach type for BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB. link_create uses bpf_prog_get and relies on bpf_prog_attach_check_attach_type to properly verify prog_type <> attach_type association. Add missing attach_type enforcement for the link_create case. Otherwise, it's currently possible to attach cgroup_skb prog types to other cgroup hooks. Fixes: af6eea57437a ("bpf: Implement bpf_link-based cgroup BPF program attachment") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/0000000000004792a90615a1dde0@google.com/ Reported-by: syzbot+838346b979830606c854(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf(a)google.com> Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87(a)gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240426231621.2716876-2-sdf@google.com Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: kernel/bpf/syscall.c [Although this mainline patch itself has no conflicts, due to the lack of ptype and attach_type_to_prog_type declarations which comes from unnecessary commit db8eae6bc5c7 and 3505cb9fa26c, we fix it manually] Signed-off-by: Tengda Wu <wutengda2(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------- 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c index 6c8122ae938f..da8154c4706c 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c @@ -2945,29 +2945,6 @@ static int bpf_raw_tracepoint_open(const union bpf_attr *attr) return err; } -static int bpf_prog_attach_check_attach_type(const struct bpf_prog *prog, - enum bpf_attach_type attach_type) -{ - switch (prog->type) { - case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK: - case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK_ADDR: - case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCKOPT: - case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_LOOKUP: - return attach_type == prog->expected_attach_type ? 0 : -EINVAL; - case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB: - if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) - /* cg-skb progs can be loaded by unpriv user. - * check permissions at attach time. - */ - return -EPERM; - return prog->enforce_expected_attach_type && - prog->expected_attach_type != attach_type ? - -EINVAL : 0; - default: - return 0; - } -} - static enum bpf_prog_type attach_type_to_prog_type(enum bpf_attach_type attach_type) { @@ -3022,6 +2999,36 @@ attach_type_to_prog_type(enum bpf_attach_type attach_type) } } +static int bpf_prog_attach_check_attach_type(const struct bpf_prog *prog, + enum bpf_attach_type attach_type) +{ + enum bpf_prog_type ptype; + + switch (prog->type) { + case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK: + case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK_ADDR: + case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCKOPT: + case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_LOOKUP: + return attach_type == prog->expected_attach_type ? 0 : -EINVAL; + case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB: + if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) + /* cg-skb progs can be loaded by unpriv user. + * check permissions at attach time. + */ + return -EPERM; + + ptype = attach_type_to_prog_type(attach_type); + if (prog->type != ptype) + return -EINVAL; + + return prog->enforce_expected_attach_type && + prog->expected_attach_type != attach_type ? + -EINVAL : 0; + default: + return 0; + } +} + #define BPF_PROG_ATTACH_LAST_FIELD replace_bpf_fd #define BPF_F_ATTACH_MASK \ -- 2.34.1

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