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[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] pci/hotplug/pnv_php: Fix hotplug driver crash on Powernv
by Zeng Heng 26 Sep '24

26 Sep '24

From: Krishna Kumar <krishnak(a)linux.ibm.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.226 commit bc1faed19db95abf0933b104910a3fb01b138f59 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IARWMF CVE: CVE-2024-46761 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 335e35b748527f0c06ded9eebb65387f60647fda ] The hotplug driver for powerpc (pci/hotplug/pnv_php.c) causes a kernel crash when we try to hot-unplug/disable the PCIe switch/bridge from the PHB. The crash occurs because although the MSI data structure has been released during disable/hot-unplug path and it has been assigned with NULL, still during unregistration the code was again trying to explicitly disable the MSI which causes the NULL pointer dereference and kernel crash. The patch fixes the check during unregistration path to prevent invoking pci_disable_msi/msix() since its data structure is already freed. Reported-by: Timothy Pearson <tpearson(a)raptorengineering.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/1981605666.2142272.1703742465927.JavaMail.zimbr… Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas(a)google.com> Tested-by: Shawn Anastasio <sanastasio(a)raptorengineering.com> Signed-off-by: Krishna Kumar <krishnak(a)linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe(a)ellerman.id.au> Link: https://msgid.link/20240701074513.94873-2-krishnak@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Zeng Heng <zengheng4(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/pci/hotplug/pnv_php.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/pci/hotplug/pnv_php.c b/drivers/pci/hotplug/pnv_php.c index 04565162a449..cf9c0e75f0be 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/hotplug/pnv_php.c +++ b/drivers/pci/hotplug/pnv_php.c @@ -38,7 +38,6 @@ static void pnv_php_disable_irq(struct pnv_php_slot *php_slot, bool disable_device) { struct pci_dev *pdev = php_slot->pdev; - int irq = php_slot->irq; u16 ctrl; if (php_slot->irq > 0) { @@ -57,7 +56,7 @@ static void pnv_php_disable_irq(struct pnv_php_slot *php_slot, php_slot->wq = NULL; } - if (disable_device || irq > 0) { + if (disable_device) { if (pdev->msix_enabled) pci_disable_msix(pdev); else if (pdev->msi_enabled) -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] pci/hotplug/pnv_php: Fix hotplug driver crash on Powernv
by Zeng Heng 26 Sep '24

26 Sep '24

From: Krishna Kumar <krishnak(a)linux.ibm.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.51 commit b82d4d5c736f4fd2ed224c35f554f50d1953d21e category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IARWMF CVE: CVE-2024-46761 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 335e35b748527f0c06ded9eebb65387f60647fda ] The hotplug driver for powerpc (pci/hotplug/pnv_php.c) causes a kernel crash when we try to hot-unplug/disable the PCIe switch/bridge from the PHB. The crash occurs because although the MSI data structure has been released during disable/hot-unplug path and it has been assigned with NULL, still during unregistration the code was again trying to explicitly disable the MSI which causes the NULL pointer dereference and kernel crash. The patch fixes the check during unregistration path to prevent invoking pci_disable_msi/msix() since its data structure is already freed. Reported-by: Timothy Pearson <tpearson(a)raptorengineering.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/1981605666.2142272.1703742465927.JavaMail.zimbr… Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas(a)google.com> Tested-by: Shawn Anastasio <sanastasio(a)raptorengineering.com> Signed-off-by: Krishna Kumar <krishnak(a)linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe(a)ellerman.id.au> Link: https://msgid.link/20240701074513.94873-2-krishnak@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Zeng Heng <zengheng4(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/pci/hotplug/pnv_php.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/pci/hotplug/pnv_php.c b/drivers/pci/hotplug/pnv_php.c index 881d420637bf..092c9ac0d26d 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/hotplug/pnv_php.c +++ b/drivers/pci/hotplug/pnv_php.c @@ -39,7 +39,6 @@ static void pnv_php_disable_irq(struct pnv_php_slot *php_slot, bool disable_device) { struct pci_dev *pdev = php_slot->pdev; - int irq = php_slot->irq; u16 ctrl; if (php_slot->irq > 0) { @@ -58,7 +57,7 @@ static void pnv_php_disable_irq(struct pnv_php_slot *php_slot, php_slot->wq = NULL; } - if (disable_device || irq > 0) { + if (disable_device) { if (pdev->msix_enabled) pci_disable_msix(pdev); else if (pdev->msi_enabled) -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] PCI: Add missing bridge lock to pci_bus_lock()
by liwei 26 Sep '24

26 Sep '24

From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.11-rc1 commit a4e772898f8bf2e7e1cf661a12c60a5612c4afab category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IARWL9 CVE: CVE-2024-46750 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- One of the true positives that the cfg_access_lock lockdep effort identified is this sequence: WARNING: CPU: 14 PID: 1 at drivers/pci/pci.c:4886 pci_bridge_secondary_bus_reset+0x5d/0x70 RIP: 0010:pci_bridge_secondary_bus_reset+0x5d/0x70 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __warn+0x8c/0x190 ? pci_bridge_secondary_bus_reset+0x5d/0x70 ? report_bug+0x1f8/0x200 ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x70 ? exc_invalid_op+0x18/0x70 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 ? pci_bridge_secondary_bus_reset+0x5d/0x70 pci_reset_bus+0x1d8/0x270 vmd_probe+0x778/0xa10 pci_device_probe+0x95/0x120 Where pci_reset_bus() users are triggering unlocked secondary bus resets. Ironically pci_bus_reset(), several calls down from pci_reset_bus(), uses pci_bus_lock() before issuing the reset which locks everything *but* the bridge itself. For the same motivation as adding: bridge = pci_upstream_bridge(dev); if (bridge) pci_dev_lock(bridge); to pci_reset_function() for the "bus" and "cxl_bus" reset cases, add pci_dev_lock() for @bus->self to pci_bus_lock(). Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/171711747501.1628941.15217746952476635316.stgit@d… Reported-by: Imre Deak <imre.deak(a)intel.com> Closes: http://lore.kernel.org/r/6657833b3b5ae_14984b29437@dwillia2-xfh.jf.intel.co… Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch(a)kernel.org> [bhelgaas: squash in recursive locking deadlock fix from Keith Busch: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240711193650.701834-1-kbusch@meta.com] Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas(a)google.com> Tested-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede(a)redhat.com> Tested-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: liwei <liwei728(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/pci/pci.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/pci/pci.c b/drivers/pci/pci.c index 21ae34013c35..1e60458e72ff 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/pci.c +++ b/drivers/pci/pci.c @@ -5737,10 +5737,12 @@ static void pci_bus_lock(struct pci_bus *bus) { struct pci_dev *dev; + pci_dev_lock(bus->self); list_for_each_entry(dev, &bus->devices, bus_list) { - pci_dev_lock(dev); if (dev->subordinate) pci_bus_lock(dev->subordinate); + else + pci_dev_lock(dev); } } @@ -5752,8 +5754,10 @@ static void pci_bus_unlock(struct pci_bus *bus) list_for_each_entry(dev, &bus->devices, bus_list) { if (dev->subordinate) pci_bus_unlock(dev->subordinate); - pci_dev_unlock(dev); + else + pci_dev_unlock(dev); } + pci_dev_unlock(bus->self); } /* Return 1 on successful lock, 0 on contention */ @@ -5761,15 +5765,15 @@ static int pci_bus_trylock(struct pci_bus *bus) { struct pci_dev *dev; + if (!pci_dev_trylock(bus->self)) + return 0; + list_for_each_entry(dev, &bus->devices, bus_list) { - if (!pci_dev_trylock(dev)) - goto unlock; if (dev->subordinate) { - if (!pci_bus_trylock(dev->subordinate)) { - pci_dev_unlock(dev); + if (!pci_bus_trylock(dev->subordinate)) goto unlock; - } - } + } else if (!pci_dev_trylock(dev)) + goto unlock; } return 1; @@ -5777,8 +5781,10 @@ static int pci_bus_trylock(struct pci_bus *bus) list_for_each_entry_continue_reverse(dev, &bus->devices, bus_list) { if (dev->subordinate) pci_bus_unlock(dev->subordinate); - pci_dev_unlock(dev); + else + pci_dev_unlock(dev); } + pci_dev_unlock(bus->self); return 0; } @@ -5810,9 +5816,10 @@ static void pci_slot_lock(struct pci_slot *slot) list_for_each_entry(dev, &slot->bus->devices, bus_list) { if (!dev->slot || dev->slot != slot) continue; - pci_dev_lock(dev); if (dev->subordinate) pci_bus_lock(dev->subordinate); + else + pci_dev_lock(dev); } } @@ -5838,14 +5845,13 @@ static int pci_slot_trylock(struct pci_slot *slot) list_for_each_entry(dev, &slot->bus->devices, bus_list) { if (!dev->slot || dev->slot != slot) continue; - if (!pci_dev_trylock(dev)) - goto unlock; if (dev->subordinate) { if (!pci_bus_trylock(dev->subordinate)) { pci_dev_unlock(dev); goto unlock; } - } + } else if (!pci_dev_trylock(dev)) + goto unlock; } return 1; @@ -5856,7 +5862,8 @@ static int pci_slot_trylock(struct pci_slot *slot) continue; if (dev->subordinate) pci_bus_unlock(dev->subordinate); - pci_dev_unlock(dev); + else + pci_dev_unlock(dev); } return 0; } -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] usb: dwc3: st: fix probed platform device ref count on probe error path
by liwei 26 Sep '24

26 Sep '24

From: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski(a)linaro.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.11-rc6 commit ddfcfeba891064b88bb844208b43bef2ef970f0c category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAR624 CVE: CVE-2024-46674 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- The probe function never performs any paltform device allocation, thus error path "undo_platform_dev_alloc" is entirely bogus. It drops the reference count from the platform device being probed. If error path is triggered, this will lead to unbalanced device reference counts and premature release of device resources, thus possible use-after-free when releasing remaining devm-managed resources. Fixes: f83fca0707c6 ("usb: dwc3: add ST dwc3 glue layer to manage dwc3 HC") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski(a)linaro.org> Acked-by: Thinh Nguyen <Thinh.Nguyen(a)synopsys.com> Reviewed-by: Patrice Chotard <patrice.chotard(a)foss.st.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240814093957.37940-1-krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro… Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: liwei <liwei728(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/usb/dwc3/dwc3-st.c | 11 +++-------- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/dwc3/dwc3-st.c b/drivers/usb/dwc3/dwc3-st.c index 211360eee95a..a9cb04043f08 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/dwc3/dwc3-st.c +++ b/drivers/usb/dwc3/dwc3-st.c @@ -219,10 +219,8 @@ static int st_dwc3_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) dwc3_data->regmap = regmap; res = platform_get_resource_byname(pdev, IORESOURCE_MEM, "syscfg-reg"); - if (!res) { - ret = -ENXIO; - goto undo_platform_dev_alloc; - } + if (!res) + return -ENXIO; dwc3_data->syscfg_reg_off = res->start; @@ -233,8 +231,7 @@ static int st_dwc3_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) devm_reset_control_get_exclusive(dev, "powerdown"); if (IS_ERR(dwc3_data->rstc_pwrdn)) { dev_err(&pdev->dev, "could not get power controller\n"); - ret = PTR_ERR(dwc3_data->rstc_pwrdn); - goto undo_platform_dev_alloc; + return PTR_ERR(dwc3_data->rstc_pwrdn); } /* Manage PowerDown */ @@ -300,8 +297,6 @@ static int st_dwc3_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) reset_control_assert(dwc3_data->rstc_rst); undo_powerdown: reset_control_assert(dwc3_data->rstc_pwrdn); -undo_platform_dev_alloc: - platform_device_put(pdev); return ret; } -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] usb: dwc3: st: fix probed platform device ref count on probe error path
by liwei 26 Sep '24

26 Sep '24

From: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski(a)linaro.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.11-rc6 commit ddfcfeba891064b88bb844208b43bef2ef970f0c category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAR624 CVE: CVE-2024-46674 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- The probe function never performs any paltform device allocation, thus error path "undo_platform_dev_alloc" is entirely bogus. It drops the reference count from the platform device being probed. If error path is triggered, this will lead to unbalanced device reference counts and premature release of device resources, thus possible use-after-free when releasing remaining devm-managed resources. Fixes: f83fca0707c6 ("usb: dwc3: add ST dwc3 glue layer to manage dwc3 HC") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski(a)linaro.org> Acked-by: Thinh Nguyen <Thinh.Nguyen(a)synopsys.com> Reviewed-by: Patrice Chotard <patrice.chotard(a)foss.st.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240814093957.37940-1-krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro… Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: liwei <liwei728(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/usb/dwc3/dwc3-st.c | 11 +++-------- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/dwc3/dwc3-st.c b/drivers/usb/dwc3/dwc3-st.c index e733be840545..a150855b4b05 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/dwc3/dwc3-st.c +++ b/drivers/usb/dwc3/dwc3-st.c @@ -219,10 +219,8 @@ static int st_dwc3_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) dwc3_data->regmap = regmap; res = platform_get_resource_byname(pdev, IORESOURCE_MEM, "syscfg-reg"); - if (!res) { - ret = -ENXIO; - goto undo_platform_dev_alloc; - } + if (!res) + return -ENXIO; dwc3_data->syscfg_reg_off = res->start; @@ -233,8 +231,7 @@ static int st_dwc3_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) devm_reset_control_get_exclusive(dev, "powerdown"); if (IS_ERR(dwc3_data->rstc_pwrdn)) { dev_err(&pdev->dev, "could not get power controller\n"); - ret = PTR_ERR(dwc3_data->rstc_pwrdn); - goto undo_platform_dev_alloc; + return PTR_ERR(dwc3_data->rstc_pwrdn); } /* Manage PowerDown */ @@ -300,8 +297,6 @@ static int st_dwc3_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) reset_control_assert(dwc3_data->rstc_rst); undo_powerdown: reset_control_assert(dwc3_data->rstc_pwrdn); -undo_platform_dev_alloc: - platform_device_put(pdev); return ret; } -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] PCI: Add missing bridge lock to pci_bus_lock()
by liwei 26 Sep '24

26 Sep '24

From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.11-rc1 commit a4e772898f8bf2e7e1cf661a12c60a5612c4afab category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IARWL9 CVE: CVE-2024-46750 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- One of the true positives that the cfg_access_lock lockdep effort identified is this sequence: WARNING: CPU: 14 PID: 1 at drivers/pci/pci.c:4886 pci_bridge_secondary_bus_reset+0x5d/0x70 RIP: 0010:pci_bridge_secondary_bus_reset+0x5d/0x70 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __warn+0x8c/0x190 ? pci_bridge_secondary_bus_reset+0x5d/0x70 ? report_bug+0x1f8/0x200 ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x70 ? exc_invalid_op+0x18/0x70 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 ? pci_bridge_secondary_bus_reset+0x5d/0x70 pci_reset_bus+0x1d8/0x270 vmd_probe+0x778/0xa10 pci_device_probe+0x95/0x120 Where pci_reset_bus() users are triggering unlocked secondary bus resets. Ironically pci_bus_reset(), several calls down from pci_reset_bus(), uses pci_bus_lock() before issuing the reset which locks everything *but* the bridge itself. For the same motivation as adding: bridge = pci_upstream_bridge(dev); if (bridge) pci_dev_lock(bridge); to pci_reset_function() for the "bus" and "cxl_bus" reset cases, add pci_dev_lock() for @bus->self to pci_bus_lock(). Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/171711747501.1628941.15217746952476635316.stgit@d… Reported-by: Imre Deak <imre.deak(a)intel.com> Closes: http://lore.kernel.org/r/6657833b3b5ae_14984b29437@dwillia2-xfh.jf.intel.co… Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch(a)kernel.org> [bhelgaas: squash in recursive locking deadlock fix from Keith Busch: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240711193650.701834-1-kbusch@meta.com] Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas(a)google.com> Tested-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede(a)redhat.com> Tested-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: liwei <liwei728(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/pci/pci.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/pci/pci.c b/drivers/pci/pci.c index 336daa667fb1..269fb2419325 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/pci.c +++ b/drivers/pci/pci.c @@ -5268,10 +5268,12 @@ static void pci_bus_lock(struct pci_bus *bus) { struct pci_dev *dev; + pci_dev_lock(bus->self); list_for_each_entry(dev, &bus->devices, bus_list) { - pci_dev_lock(dev); if (dev->subordinate) pci_bus_lock(dev->subordinate); + else + pci_dev_lock(dev); } } @@ -5283,8 +5285,10 @@ static void pci_bus_unlock(struct pci_bus *bus) list_for_each_entry(dev, &bus->devices, bus_list) { if (dev->subordinate) pci_bus_unlock(dev->subordinate); - pci_dev_unlock(dev); + else + pci_dev_unlock(dev); } + pci_dev_unlock(bus->self); } /* Return 1 on successful lock, 0 on contention */ @@ -5292,15 +5296,15 @@ static int pci_bus_trylock(struct pci_bus *bus) { struct pci_dev *dev; + if (!pci_dev_trylock(bus->self)) + return 0; + list_for_each_entry(dev, &bus->devices, bus_list) { - if (!pci_dev_trylock(dev)) - goto unlock; if (dev->subordinate) { - if (!pci_bus_trylock(dev->subordinate)) { - pci_dev_unlock(dev); + if (!pci_bus_trylock(dev->subordinate)) goto unlock; - } - } + } else if (!pci_dev_trylock(dev)) + goto unlock; } return 1; @@ -5308,8 +5312,10 @@ static int pci_bus_trylock(struct pci_bus *bus) list_for_each_entry_continue_reverse(dev, &bus->devices, bus_list) { if (dev->subordinate) pci_bus_unlock(dev->subordinate); - pci_dev_unlock(dev); + else + pci_dev_unlock(dev); } + pci_dev_unlock(bus->self); return 0; } @@ -5341,9 +5347,10 @@ static void pci_slot_lock(struct pci_slot *slot) list_for_each_entry(dev, &slot->bus->devices, bus_list) { if (!dev->slot || dev->slot != slot) continue; - pci_dev_lock(dev); if (dev->subordinate) pci_bus_lock(dev->subordinate); + else + pci_dev_lock(dev); } } @@ -5369,14 +5376,13 @@ static int pci_slot_trylock(struct pci_slot *slot) list_for_each_entry(dev, &slot->bus->devices, bus_list) { if (!dev->slot || dev->slot != slot) continue; - if (!pci_dev_trylock(dev)) - goto unlock; if (dev->subordinate) { if (!pci_bus_trylock(dev->subordinate)) { pci_dev_unlock(dev); goto unlock; } - } + } else if (!pci_dev_trylock(dev)) + goto unlock; } return 1; @@ -5387,7 +5393,8 @@ static int pci_slot_trylock(struct pci_slot *slot) continue; if (dev->subordinate) pci_bus_unlock(dev->subordinate); - pci_dev_unlock(dev); + else + pci_dev_unlock(dev); } return 0; } -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] PCI: Add missing bridge lock to pci_bus_lock()
by liwei 26 Sep '24

26 Sep '24

From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.11-rc1 commit a4e772898f8bf2e7e1cf661a12c60a5612c4afab category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IARWL9 CVE: CVE-2024-46750 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- One of the true positives that the cfg_access_lock lockdep effort identified is this sequence: WARNING: CPU: 14 PID: 1 at drivers/pci/pci.c:4886 pci_bridge_secondary_bus_reset+0x5d/0x70 RIP: 0010:pci_bridge_secondary_bus_reset+0x5d/0x70 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __warn+0x8c/0x190 ? pci_bridge_secondary_bus_reset+0x5d/0x70 ? report_bug+0x1f8/0x200 ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x70 ? exc_invalid_op+0x18/0x70 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 ? pci_bridge_secondary_bus_reset+0x5d/0x70 pci_reset_bus+0x1d8/0x270 vmd_probe+0x778/0xa10 pci_device_probe+0x95/0x120 Where pci_reset_bus() users are triggering unlocked secondary bus resets. Ironically pci_bus_reset(), several calls down from pci_reset_bus(), uses pci_bus_lock() before issuing the reset which locks everything *but* the bridge itself. For the same motivation as adding: bridge = pci_upstream_bridge(dev); if (bridge) pci_dev_lock(bridge); to pci_reset_function() for the "bus" and "cxl_bus" reset cases, add pci_dev_lock() for @bus->self to pci_bus_lock(). Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/171711747501.1628941.15217746952476635316.stgit@d… Reported-by: Imre Deak <imre.deak(a)intel.com> Closes: http://lore.kernel.org/r/6657833b3b5ae_14984b29437@dwillia2-xfh.jf.intel.co… Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch(a)kernel.org> [bhelgaas: squash in recursive locking deadlock fix from Keith Busch: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240711193650.701834-1-kbusch@meta.com] Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas(a)google.com> Tested-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede(a)redhat.com> Tested-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: liwei <liwei728(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/pci/pci.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/pci/pci.c b/drivers/pci/pci.c index 8ace56c8141b..5ca3201d4f3e 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/pci.c +++ b/drivers/pci/pci.c @@ -5265,10 +5265,12 @@ static void pci_bus_lock(struct pci_bus *bus) { struct pci_dev *dev; + pci_dev_lock(bus->self); list_for_each_entry(dev, &bus->devices, bus_list) { - pci_dev_lock(dev); if (dev->subordinate) pci_bus_lock(dev->subordinate); + else + pci_dev_lock(dev); } } @@ -5280,8 +5282,10 @@ static void pci_bus_unlock(struct pci_bus *bus) list_for_each_entry(dev, &bus->devices, bus_list) { if (dev->subordinate) pci_bus_unlock(dev->subordinate); - pci_dev_unlock(dev); + else + pci_dev_unlock(dev); } + pci_dev_unlock(bus->self); } /* Return 1 on successful lock, 0 on contention */ @@ -5289,15 +5293,15 @@ static int pci_bus_trylock(struct pci_bus *bus) { struct pci_dev *dev; + if (!pci_dev_trylock(bus->self)) + return 0; + list_for_each_entry(dev, &bus->devices, bus_list) { - if (!pci_dev_trylock(dev)) - goto unlock; if (dev->subordinate) { - if (!pci_bus_trylock(dev->subordinate)) { - pci_dev_unlock(dev); + if (!pci_bus_trylock(dev->subordinate)) goto unlock; - } - } + } else if (!pci_dev_trylock(dev)) + goto unlock; } return 1; @@ -5305,8 +5309,10 @@ static int pci_bus_trylock(struct pci_bus *bus) list_for_each_entry_continue_reverse(dev, &bus->devices, bus_list) { if (dev->subordinate) pci_bus_unlock(dev->subordinate); - pci_dev_unlock(dev); + else + pci_dev_unlock(dev); } + pci_dev_unlock(bus->self); return 0; } @@ -5338,9 +5344,10 @@ static void pci_slot_lock(struct pci_slot *slot) list_for_each_entry(dev, &slot->bus->devices, bus_list) { if (!dev->slot || dev->slot != slot) continue; - pci_dev_lock(dev); if (dev->subordinate) pci_bus_lock(dev->subordinate); + else + pci_dev_lock(dev); } } @@ -5366,14 +5373,13 @@ static int pci_slot_trylock(struct pci_slot *slot) list_for_each_entry(dev, &slot->bus->devices, bus_list) { if (!dev->slot || dev->slot != slot) continue; - if (!pci_dev_trylock(dev)) - goto unlock; if (dev->subordinate) { if (!pci_bus_trylock(dev->subordinate)) { pci_dev_unlock(dev); goto unlock; } - } + } else if (!pci_dev_trylock(dev)) + goto unlock; } return 1; @@ -5384,7 +5390,8 @@ static int pci_slot_trylock(struct pci_slot *slot) continue; if (dev->subordinate) pci_bus_unlock(dev->subordinate); - pci_dev_unlock(dev); + else + pci_dev_unlock(dev); } return 0; } -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] usb: dwc3: st: fix probed platform device ref count on probe error path
by liwei 26 Sep '24

26 Sep '24

From: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski(a)linaro.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.11-rc6 commit ddfcfeba891064b88bb844208b43bef2ef970f0c category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAR624 CVE: CVE-2024-46674 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- The probe function never performs any paltform device allocation, thus error path "undo_platform_dev_alloc" is entirely bogus. It drops the reference count from the platform device being probed. If error path is triggered, this will lead to unbalanced device reference counts and premature release of device resources, thus possible use-after-free when releasing remaining devm-managed resources. Fixes: f83fca0707c6 ("usb: dwc3: add ST dwc3 glue layer to manage dwc3 HC") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski(a)linaro.org> Acked-by: Thinh Nguyen <Thinh.Nguyen(a)synopsys.com> Reviewed-by: Patrice Chotard <patrice.chotard(a)foss.st.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240814093957.37940-1-krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro… Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: liwei <liwei728(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/usb/dwc3/dwc3-st.c | 11 +++-------- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/dwc3/dwc3-st.c b/drivers/usb/dwc3/dwc3-st.c index e733be840545..a150855b4b05 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/dwc3/dwc3-st.c +++ b/drivers/usb/dwc3/dwc3-st.c @@ -219,10 +219,8 @@ static int st_dwc3_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) dwc3_data->regmap = regmap; res = platform_get_resource_byname(pdev, IORESOURCE_MEM, "syscfg-reg"); - if (!res) { - ret = -ENXIO; - goto undo_platform_dev_alloc; - } + if (!res) + return -ENXIO; dwc3_data->syscfg_reg_off = res->start; @@ -233,8 +231,7 @@ static int st_dwc3_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) devm_reset_control_get_exclusive(dev, "powerdown"); if (IS_ERR(dwc3_data->rstc_pwrdn)) { dev_err(&pdev->dev, "could not get power controller\n"); - ret = PTR_ERR(dwc3_data->rstc_pwrdn); - goto undo_platform_dev_alloc; + return PTR_ERR(dwc3_data->rstc_pwrdn); } /* Manage PowerDown */ @@ -300,8 +297,6 @@ static int st_dwc3_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) reset_control_assert(dwc3_data->rstc_rst); undo_powerdown: reset_control_assert(dwc3_data->rstc_pwrdn); -undo_platform_dev_alloc: - platform_device_put(pdev); return ret; } -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] PCI: Add missing bridge lock to pci_bus_lock()
by liwei 26 Sep '24

26 Sep '24

From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.11-rc1 commit a4e772898f8bf2e7e1cf661a12c60a5612c4afab category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IARWL9 CVE: CVE-2024-46750 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- One of the true positives that the cfg_access_lock lockdep effort identified is this sequence: WARNING: CPU: 14 PID: 1 at drivers/pci/pci.c:4886 pci_bridge_secondary_bus_reset+0x5d/0x70 RIP: 0010:pci_bridge_secondary_bus_reset+0x5d/0x70 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __warn+0x8c/0x190 ? pci_bridge_secondary_bus_reset+0x5d/0x70 ? report_bug+0x1f8/0x200 ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x70 ? exc_invalid_op+0x18/0x70 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 ? pci_bridge_secondary_bus_reset+0x5d/0x70 pci_reset_bus+0x1d8/0x270 vmd_probe+0x778/0xa10 pci_device_probe+0x95/0x120 Where pci_reset_bus() users are triggering unlocked secondary bus resets. Ironically pci_bus_reset(), several calls down from pci_reset_bus(), uses pci_bus_lock() before issuing the reset which locks everything *but* the bridge itself. For the same motivation as adding: bridge = pci_upstream_bridge(dev); if (bridge) pci_dev_lock(bridge); to pci_reset_function() for the "bus" and "cxl_bus" reset cases, add pci_dev_lock() for @bus->self to pci_bus_lock(). Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/171711747501.1628941.15217746952476635316.stgit@d… Reported-by: Imre Deak <imre.deak(a)intel.com> Closes: http://lore.kernel.org/r/6657833b3b5ae_14984b29437@dwillia2-xfh.jf.intel.co… Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch(a)kernel.org> [bhelgaas: squash in recursive locking deadlock fix from Keith Busch: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240711193650.701834-1-kbusch@meta.com] Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas(a)google.com> Tested-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede(a)redhat.com> Tested-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: liwei <liwei728(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/pci/pci.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/pci/pci.c b/drivers/pci/pci.c index e58fe13c99e1..b93605616d4e 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/pci.c +++ b/drivers/pci/pci.c @@ -5035,10 +5035,12 @@ static void pci_bus_lock(struct pci_bus *bus) { struct pci_dev *dev; + pci_dev_lock(bus->self); list_for_each_entry(dev, &bus->devices, bus_list) { - pci_dev_lock(dev); if (dev->subordinate) pci_bus_lock(dev->subordinate); + else + pci_dev_lock(dev); } } @@ -5050,8 +5052,10 @@ static void pci_bus_unlock(struct pci_bus *bus) list_for_each_entry(dev, &bus->devices, bus_list) { if (dev->subordinate) pci_bus_unlock(dev->subordinate); - pci_dev_unlock(dev); + else + pci_dev_unlock(dev); } + pci_dev_unlock(bus->self); } /* Return 1 on successful lock, 0 on contention */ @@ -5059,15 +5063,15 @@ static int pci_bus_trylock(struct pci_bus *bus) { struct pci_dev *dev; + if (!pci_dev_trylock(bus->self)) + return 0; + list_for_each_entry(dev, &bus->devices, bus_list) { - if (!pci_dev_trylock(dev)) - goto unlock; if (dev->subordinate) { - if (!pci_bus_trylock(dev->subordinate)) { - pci_dev_unlock(dev); + if (!pci_bus_trylock(dev->subordinate)) goto unlock; - } - } + } else if (!pci_dev_trylock(dev)) + goto unlock; } return 1; @@ -5075,8 +5079,10 @@ static int pci_bus_trylock(struct pci_bus *bus) list_for_each_entry_continue_reverse(dev, &bus->devices, bus_list) { if (dev->subordinate) pci_bus_unlock(dev->subordinate); - pci_dev_unlock(dev); + else + pci_dev_unlock(dev); } + pci_dev_unlock(bus->self); return 0; } @@ -5108,9 +5114,10 @@ static void pci_slot_lock(struct pci_slot *slot) list_for_each_entry(dev, &slot->bus->devices, bus_list) { if (!dev->slot || dev->slot != slot) continue; - pci_dev_lock(dev); if (dev->subordinate) pci_bus_lock(dev->subordinate); + else + pci_dev_lock(dev); } } @@ -5136,14 +5143,13 @@ static int pci_slot_trylock(struct pci_slot *slot) list_for_each_entry(dev, &slot->bus->devices, bus_list) { if (!dev->slot || dev->slot != slot) continue; - if (!pci_dev_trylock(dev)) - goto unlock; if (dev->subordinate) { if (!pci_bus_trylock(dev->subordinate)) { pci_dev_unlock(dev); goto unlock; } - } + } else if (!pci_dev_trylock(dev)) + goto unlock; } return 1; @@ -5154,7 +5160,8 @@ static int pci_slot_trylock(struct pci_slot *slot) continue; if (dev->subordinate) pci_bus_unlock(dev->subordinate); - pci_dev_unlock(dev); + else + pci_dev_unlock(dev); } return 0; } -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] usb: dwc3: st: fix probed platform device ref count on probe error path
by liwei 26 Sep '24

26 Sep '24

From: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski(a)linaro.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.11-rc6 commit ddfcfeba891064b88bb844208b43bef2ef970f0c category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAR624 CVE: CVE-2024-46674 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- The probe function never performs any paltform device allocation, thus error path "undo_platform_dev_alloc" is entirely bogus. It drops the reference count from the platform device being probed. If error path is triggered, this will lead to unbalanced device reference counts and premature release of device resources, thus possible use-after-free when releasing remaining devm-managed resources. Fixes: f83fca0707c6 ("usb: dwc3: add ST dwc3 glue layer to manage dwc3 HC") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski(a)linaro.org> Acked-by: Thinh Nguyen <Thinh.Nguyen(a)synopsys.com> Reviewed-by: Patrice Chotard <patrice.chotard(a)foss.st.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240814093957.37940-1-krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro… Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: liwei <liwei728(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/usb/dwc3/dwc3-st.c | 11 +++-------- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/dwc3/dwc3-st.c b/drivers/usb/dwc3/dwc3-st.c index 16081383c401..6127505770ce 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/dwc3/dwc3-st.c +++ b/drivers/usb/dwc3/dwc3-st.c @@ -219,10 +219,8 @@ static int st_dwc3_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) dwc3_data->regmap = regmap; res = platform_get_resource_byname(pdev, IORESOURCE_MEM, "syscfg-reg"); - if (!res) { - ret = -ENXIO; - goto undo_platform_dev_alloc; - } + if (!res) + return -ENXIO; dwc3_data->syscfg_reg_off = res->start; @@ -233,8 +231,7 @@ static int st_dwc3_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) devm_reset_control_get_exclusive(dev, "powerdown"); if (IS_ERR(dwc3_data->rstc_pwrdn)) { dev_err(&pdev->dev, "could not get power controller\n"); - ret = PTR_ERR(dwc3_data->rstc_pwrdn); - goto undo_platform_dev_alloc; + return PTR_ERR(dwc3_data->rstc_pwrdn); } /* Manage PowerDown */ @@ -296,8 +293,6 @@ static int st_dwc3_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) reset_control_assert(dwc3_data->rstc_rst); undo_powerdown: reset_control_assert(dwc3_data->rstc_pwrdn); -undo_platform_dev_alloc: - platform_device_put(pdev); return ret; } -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] btrfs: handle errors from btrfs_dec_ref() properly
by Long Li 26 Sep '24

26 Sep '24

From: Josef Bacik <josef(a)toxicpanda.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.10-rc2 commit 5eb178f373b4f16f3b42d55ff88fc94dd95b93b1 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IARYDJ CVE: CVE-2024-46753 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- In walk_up_proc() we BUG_ON(ret) from btrfs_dec_ref(). This is incorrect, we have proper error handling here, return the error. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef(a)toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba(a)suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba(a)suse.com> Conflicts: fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c [Conflict due to not merge mainline commit e094f48040cd] Signed-off-by: Long Li <leo.lilong(a)huawei.com> --- fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c b/fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c index c6ecfd05e1db..b6be2e2f1994 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c @@ -5505,7 +5505,10 @@ static noinline int walk_up_proc(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans, ret = btrfs_dec_ref(trans, root, eb, 1); else ret = btrfs_dec_ref(trans, root, eb, 0); - BUG_ON(ret); /* -ENOMEM */ + if (ret) { + btrfs_abort_transaction(trans, ret); + return ret; + } if (is_fstree(root->root_key.objectid)) { ret = btrfs_qgroup_trace_leaf_items(trans, eb); if (ret) { -- 2.39.2

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] btrfs: handle errors from btrfs_dec_ref() properly
by Long Li 26 Sep '24

26 Sep '24

From: Josef Bacik <josef(a)toxicpanda.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.10-rc2 commit 5eb178f373b4f16f3b42d55ff88fc94dd95b93b1 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IARYDJ CVE: CVE-2024-46753 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- In walk_up_proc() we BUG_ON(ret) from btrfs_dec_ref(). This is incorrect, we have proper error handling here, return the error. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef(a)toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba(a)suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba(a)suse.com> Conflicts: fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c [Conflict due to not merge mainline commit e094f48040cd] Signed-off-by: Long Li <leo.lilong(a)huawei.com> --- fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c b/fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c index 1cf787209798..42617407feb1 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c @@ -5227,7 +5227,10 @@ static noinline int walk_up_proc(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans, ret = btrfs_dec_ref(trans, root, eb, 1); else ret = btrfs_dec_ref(trans, root, eb, 0); - BUG_ON(ret); /* -ENOMEM */ + if (ret) { + btrfs_abort_transaction(trans, ret); + return ret; + } if (is_fstree(root->root_key.objectid)) { ret = btrfs_qgroup_trace_leaf_items(trans, eb); if (ret) { -- 2.39.2

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/8] fix CVE-2024-46701
by Yu Kuai 26 Sep '24

26 Sep '24

Chuck Lever (5): libfs: Re-arrange locking in offset_iterate_dir() libfs: Define a minimum directory offset libfs: Add simple_offset_empty() maple_tree: Add mtree_alloc_cyclic() libfs: Convert simple directory offsets to use a Maple Tree Liam R. Howlett (1): test_maple_tree: testing the cyclic allocation Yu Kuai (1): fs: fix kabi kroken in struct offset_ctx yangerkun (1): libfs: fix infinite directory reads for offset dir fs/libfs.c | 129 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ include/linux/fs.h | 15 ++++- include/linux/maple_tree.h | 7 ++ lib/maple_tree.c | 93 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ lib/test_maple_tree.c | 44 +++++++++++++ mm/shmem.c | 4 +- 6 files changed, 247 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-) -- 2.39.2

2 9

[PATCH OLK-5.10] NFSD: Reset cb_seq_status after NFS4ERR_DELAY
by Li Lingfeng 26 Sep '24

26 Sep '24

From: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever(a)oracle.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.9-rc1 commit 961b4b5e86bf56a2e4b567f81682defa5cba957e category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/IATOAX Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- I noticed that once an NFSv4.1 callback operation gets a NFS4ERR_DELAY status on CB_SEQUENCE and then the connection is lost, the callback client loops, resending it indefinitely. The switch arm in nfsd4_cb_sequence_done() that handles NFS4ERR_DELAY uses rpc_restart_call() to rearm the RPC state machine for the retransmit, but that path does not call the rpc_prepare_call callback again. Thus cb_seq_status is set to -10008 by the first NFS4ERR_DELAY result, but is never set back to 1 for the retransmits. nfsd4_cb_sequence_done() thinks it's getting nothing but a long series of CB_SEQUENCE NFS4ERR_DELAY replies. Fixes: 7ba6cad6c88f ("nfsd: New helper nfsd4_cb_sequence_done() for processing more cb errors") Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Benjamin Coddington <bcodding(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Li Lingfeng <lilingfeng3(a)huawei.com> --- fs/nfsd/nfs4callback.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4callback.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4callback.c index f5b7ad0847f2..bd79fc4934f0 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4callback.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4callback.c @@ -1126,6 +1126,7 @@ static bool nfsd4_cb_sequence_done(struct rpc_task *task, struct nfsd4_callback ret = false; break; case -NFS4ERR_DELAY: + cb->cb_seq_status = 1; if (!rpc_restart_call(task)) goto out; -- 2.31.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] NFSD: Reset cb_seq_status after NFS4ERR_DELAY
by Li Lingfeng 26 Sep '24

26 Sep '24

From: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever(a)oracle.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.9-rc1 commit 961b4b5e86bf56a2e4b567f81682defa5cba957e category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/IATOAX Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- I noticed that once an NFSv4.1 callback operation gets a NFS4ERR_DELAY status on CB_SEQUENCE and then the connection is lost, the callback client loops, resending it indefinitely. The switch arm in nfsd4_cb_sequence_done() that handles NFS4ERR_DELAY uses rpc_restart_call() to rearm the RPC state machine for the retransmit, but that path does not call the rpc_prepare_call callback again. Thus cb_seq_status is set to -10008 by the first NFS4ERR_DELAY result, but is never set back to 1 for the retransmits. nfsd4_cb_sequence_done() thinks it's getting nothing but a long series of CB_SEQUENCE NFS4ERR_DELAY replies. Fixes: 7ba6cad6c88f ("nfsd: New helper nfsd4_cb_sequence_done() for processing more cb errors") Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Benjamin Coddington <bcodding(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Li Lingfeng <lilingfeng3(a)huawei.com> --- fs/nfsd/nfs4callback.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4callback.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4callback.c index 4039ffcf90ba..49a88dde9631 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4callback.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4callback.c @@ -1202,6 +1202,7 @@ static bool nfsd4_cb_sequence_done(struct rpc_task *task, struct nfsd4_callback ret = false; break; case -NFS4ERR_DELAY: + cb->cb_seq_status = 1; if (!rpc_restart_call(task)) goto out; -- 2.31.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] VMCI: Fix use-after-free when removing resource in vmci_resource_remove()
by Zhang Kunbo 26 Sep '24

26 Sep '24

From: David Fernandez Gonzalez <david.fernandez.gonzalez(a)oracle.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.226 commit 6c563a29857aa8053b67ee141191f69757f27f6e category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IARY1L CVE: CVE-2024-46738 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 48b9a8dabcc3cf5f961b2ebcd8933bf9204babb7 upstream. When removing a resource from vmci_resource_table in vmci_resource_remove(), the search is performed using the resource handle by comparing context and resource fields. It is possible though to create two resources with different types but same handle (same context and resource fields). When trying to remove one of the resources, vmci_resource_remove() may not remove the intended one, but the object will still be freed as in the case of the datagram type in vmci_datagram_destroy_handle(). vmci_resource_table will still hold a pointer to this freed resource leading to a use-after-free vulnerability. BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in vmci_handle_is_equal include/linux/vmw_vmci_defs.h:142 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in vmci_resource_remove+0x3a1/0x410 drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_resource.c:147 Read of size 4 at addr ffff88801c16d800 by task syz-executor197/1592 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x82/0xa9 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x21/0x366 mm/kasan/report.c:239 __kasan_report.cold+0x7f/0x132 mm/kasan/report.c:425 kasan_report+0x38/0x51 mm/kasan/report.c:442 vmci_handle_is_equal include/linux/vmw_vmci_defs.h:142 [inline] vmci_resource_remove+0x3a1/0x410 drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_resource.c:147 vmci_qp_broker_detach+0x89a/0x11b9 drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_queue_pair.c:2182 ctx_free_ctx+0x473/0xbe1 drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_context.c:444 kref_put include/linux/kref.h:65 [inline] vmci_ctx_put drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_context.c:497 [inline] vmci_ctx_destroy+0x170/0x1d6 drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_context.c:195 vmci_host_close+0x125/0x1ac drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_host.c:143 __fput+0x261/0xa34 fs/file_table.c:282 task_work_run+0xf0/0x194 kernel/task_work.c:164 tracehook_notify_resume include/linux/tracehook.h:189 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x184/0x189 kernel/entry/common.c:187 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x11b/0x123 kernel/entry/common.c:220 __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:302 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x18/0x42 kernel/entry/common.c:313 do_syscall_64+0x41/0x85 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x0 This change ensures the type is also checked when removing the resource from vmci_resource_table in vmci_resource_remove(). Fixes: bc63dedb7d46 ("VMCI: resource object implementation.") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: George Kennedy <george.kennedy(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David Fernandez Gonzalez <david.fernandez.gonzalez(a)oracle.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240828154338.754746-1-david.fernandez.gonzalez@… Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Zhang Kunbo <zhangkunbo(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_resource.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_resource.c b/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_resource.c index 692daa9eff34..19c9d2cdd277 100644 --- a/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_resource.c +++ b/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_resource.c @@ -144,7 +144,8 @@ void vmci_resource_remove(struct vmci_resource *resource) spin_lock(&vmci_resource_table.lock); hlist_for_each_entry(r, &vmci_resource_table.entries[idx], node) { - if (vmci_handle_is_equal(r->handle, resource->handle)) { + if (vmci_handle_is_equal(r->handle, resource->handle) && + resource->type == r->type) { hlist_del_init_rcu(&r->node); break; } -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] pktgen: use cpus_read_lock() in pg_net_init()
by Wang Liang 26 Sep '24

26 Sep '24

mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.11-rc6 commit 979b581e4c69257acab1af415ddad6b2d78a2fa5 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAR4B3 CVE: CVE-2024-46681 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- We must use cpus_read_lock()/cpus_read_unlock() around the for_each_online_cpu(cpu) loop. While we are at it use WARN_ON_ONCE() to avoid a possible syslog flood. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240821175339.1191779-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: net/core/pktgen.c [conflicts due to not mergered f568a3d49af9 ("bpf,lsm: Add BPF token LSM hooks") which include linux/bpf.h, and lead to inclusion of linux/cpu.h indirectly. The commit(f568a3d49af9) is complex and irrelevant to this problem. To solve the compile error, include linux/cpu.h manually.] Signed-off-by: Wang Liang <wangliang74(a)huawei.com> --- net/core/pktgen.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/core/pktgen.c b/net/core/pktgen.c index 3fba429f1f57..89ac59ff6598 100644 --- a/net/core/pktgen.c +++ b/net/core/pktgen.c @@ -170,6 +170,7 @@ #include <linux/uaccess.h> #include <asm/dma.h> #include <asm/div64.h> /* do_div */ +#include <linux/cpu.h> #define VERSION "2.75" #define IP_NAME_SZ 32 @@ -3464,7 +3465,7 @@ static int pktgen_thread_worker(void *arg) struct pktgen_dev *pkt_dev = NULL; int cpu = t->cpu; - WARN_ON(smp_processor_id() != cpu); + WARN_ON_ONCE(smp_processor_id() != cpu); init_waitqueue_head(&t->queue); complete(&t->start_done); @@ -3800,6 +3801,7 @@ static int __net_init pg_net_init(struct net *net) goto remove; } + cpus_read_lock(); for_each_online_cpu(cpu) { int err; @@ -3808,6 +3810,7 @@ static int __net_init pg_net_init(struct net *net) pr_warn("Cannot create thread for cpu %d (%d)\n", cpu, err); } + cpus_read_unlock(); if (list_empty(&pn->pktgen_threads)) { pr_err("Initialization failed for all threads\n"); -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] pktgen: use cpus_read_lock() in pg_net_init()
by Wang Liang 26 Sep '24

26 Sep '24

mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.11-rc6 commit 979b581e4c69257acab1af415ddad6b2d78a2fa5 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAR4B3 CVE: CVE-2024-46681 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- We must use cpus_read_lock()/cpus_read_unlock() around the for_each_online_cpu(cpu) loop. While we are at it use WARN_ON_ONCE() to avoid a possible syslog flood. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240821175339.1191779-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: net/core/pktgen.c [conflicts due to not mergered f568a3d49af9 ("bpf,lsm: Add BPF token LSM hooks") which include linux/bpf.h, and lead to inclusion of linux/cpu.h indirectly. The commit(f568a3d49af9) is complex and irrelevant to this problem. To solve the compile error, include linux/cpu.h manually.] Signed-off-by: Wang Liang <wangliang74(a)huawei.com> --- net/core/pktgen.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/core/pktgen.c b/net/core/pktgen.c index c1e3d3bea128..28ba48d836d5 100644 --- a/net/core/pktgen.c +++ b/net/core/pktgen.c @@ -170,6 +170,7 @@ #include <linux/uaccess.h> #include <asm/dma.h> #include <asm/div64.h> /* do_div */ +#include <linux/cpu.h> #define VERSION "2.75" #define IP_NAME_SZ 32 @@ -3464,7 +3465,7 @@ static int pktgen_thread_worker(void *arg) struct pktgen_dev *pkt_dev = NULL; int cpu = t->cpu; - WARN_ON(smp_processor_id() != cpu); + WARN_ON_ONCE(smp_processor_id() != cpu); init_waitqueue_head(&t->queue); complete(&t->start_done); @@ -3800,6 +3801,7 @@ static int __net_init pg_net_init(struct net *net) goto remove; } + cpus_read_lock(); for_each_online_cpu(cpu) { int err; @@ -3808,6 +3810,7 @@ static int __net_init pg_net_init(struct net *net) pr_warn("Cannot create thread for cpu %d (%d)\n", cpu, err); } + cpus_read_unlock(); if (list_empty(&pn->pktgen_threads)) { pr_err("Initialization failed for all threads\n"); -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10 v2] drm/amd/display: Ensure index calculation will not overflow
by Tong Tiangen 26 Sep '24

26 Sep '24

mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.1-rc1 commit 8e2734bf444767fed787305ccdcb36a2be5301a2 bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IARV8L CVE: CVE-2024-46726 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- [WHY & HOW] Make sure vmid0p72_idx, vnom0p8_idx and vmax0p9_idx calculation will never overflow and exceess array size. This fixes 3 OVERRUN and 1 INTEGER_OVERFLOW issues reported by Coverity. Reviewed-by: Harry Wentland <harry.wentland(a)amd.com> Acked-by: Tom Chung <chiahsuan.chung(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Hung <alex.hung(a)amd.com> Tested-by: Daniel Wheeler <daniel.wheeler(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher(a)amd.com> Conflicts: drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/calcs/dcn_calcs.c [Conflicts from: 1) commit 552b7cb0eed1 move drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/calcs/dcn_calcs.c to drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dml/calcs/dcn_calcs.c; 2) commit 91954c6c904b move dcn_bw_update_from_pplib() to dcn_bw_update_from_pplib_fclks() and the code logic is the same.] Signed-off-by: Tong Tiangen <tongtiangen(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/calcs/dcn_calcs.c | 7 +++---- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/calcs/dcn_calcs.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/calcs/dcn_calcs.c index 51397b565ddf..2186603d915c 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/calcs/dcn_calcs.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/calcs/dcn_calcs.c @@ -1498,10 +1498,9 @@ void dcn_bw_update_from_pplib(struct dc *dc) ASSERT(fclks.num_levels); vmin0p65_idx = 0; - vmid0p72_idx = fclks.num_levels - - (fclks.num_levels > 2 ? 3 : (fclks.num_levels > 1 ? 2 : 1)); - vnom0p8_idx = fclks.num_levels - (fclks.num_levels > 1 ? 2 : 1); - vmax0p9_idx = fclks.num_levels - 1; + vmid0p72_idx = fclks.num_levels > 2 ? fclks.num_levels - 3 : 0; + vnom0p8_idx = fclks.num_levels > 1 ? fclks.num_levels - 2 : 0; + vmax0p9_idx = fclks.num_levels > 0 ? fclks.num_levels - 1 : 0; dc->dcn_soc->fabric_and_dram_bandwidth_vmin0p65 = 32 * (fclks.data[vmin0p65_idx].clocks_in_khz / 1000.0) / 1000.0; -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] pktgen: use cpus_read_lock() in pg_net_init()
by Wang Liang 26 Sep '24

26 Sep '24

mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.11-rc6 commit 979b581e4c69257acab1af415ddad6b2d78a2fa5 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAR4B3 CVE: CVE-2024-46681 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- We must use cpus_read_lock()/cpus_read_unlock() around the for_each_online_cpu(cpu) loop. While we are at it use WARN_ON_ONCE() to avoid a possible syslog flood. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240821175339.1191779-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: net/core/pktgen.c [conflicts due to not mergered f568a3d49af9 ("bpf,lsm: Add BPF token LSM hooks") which include linux/bpf.h, and lead to inclusion of linux/cpu.h indirectly. The commit(f568a3d49af9) is complex and irrelevant to this problem. To solve the compile error, include linux/cpu.h manually.] Signed-off-by: Wang Liang <wangliang74(a)huawei.com> --- net/core/pktgen.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/core/pktgen.c b/net/core/pktgen.c index 0e472f6fab85..473503217201 100644 --- a/net/core/pktgen.c +++ b/net/core/pktgen.c @@ -170,6 +170,7 @@ #include <linux/uaccess.h> #include <asm/dma.h> #include <asm/div64.h> /* do_div */ +#include <linux/cpu.h> #define VERSION "2.75" #define IP_NAME_SZ 32 @@ -3605,7 +3606,7 @@ static int pktgen_thread_worker(void *arg) struct pktgen_dev *pkt_dev = NULL; int cpu = t->cpu; - WARN_ON(smp_processor_id() != cpu); + WARN_ON_ONCE(smp_processor_id() != cpu); init_waitqueue_head(&t->queue); complete(&t->start_done); @@ -3941,6 +3942,7 @@ static int __net_init pg_net_init(struct net *net) goto remove; } + cpus_read_lock(); for_each_online_cpu(cpu) { int err; @@ -3949,6 +3951,7 @@ static int __net_init pg_net_init(struct net *net) pr_warn("Cannot create thread for cpu %d (%d)\n", cpu, err); } + cpus_read_unlock(); if (list_empty(&pn->pktgen_threads)) { pr_err("Initialization failed for all threads\n"); -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] VMCI: Fix use-after-free when removing resource in vmci_resource_remove()
by Zhang Kunbo 26 Sep '24

26 Sep '24

From: David Fernandez Gonzalez <david.fernandez.gonzalez(a)oracle.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.226 commit 6c563a29857aa8053b67ee141191f69757f27f6e category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IARY1L CVE: CVE-2024-46738 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 48b9a8dabcc3cf5f961b2ebcd8933bf9204babb7 upstream. When removing a resource from vmci_resource_table in vmci_resource_remove(), the search is performed using the resource handle by comparing context and resource fields. It is possible though to create two resources with different types but same handle (same context and resource fields). When trying to remove one of the resources, vmci_resource_remove() may not remove the intended one, but the object will still be freed as in the case of the datagram type in vmci_datagram_destroy_handle(). vmci_resource_table will still hold a pointer to this freed resource leading to a use-after-free vulnerability. BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in vmci_handle_is_equal include/linux/vmw_vmci_defs.h:142 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in vmci_resource_remove+0x3a1/0x410 drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_resource.c:147 Read of size 4 at addr ffff88801c16d800 by task syz-executor197/1592 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x82/0xa9 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x21/0x366 mm/kasan/report.c:239 __kasan_report.cold+0x7f/0x132 mm/kasan/report.c:425 kasan_report+0x38/0x51 mm/kasan/report.c:442 vmci_handle_is_equal include/linux/vmw_vmci_defs.h:142 [inline] vmci_resource_remove+0x3a1/0x410 drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_resource.c:147 vmci_qp_broker_detach+0x89a/0x11b9 drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_queue_pair.c:2182 ctx_free_ctx+0x473/0xbe1 drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_context.c:444 kref_put include/linux/kref.h:65 [inline] vmci_ctx_put drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_context.c:497 [inline] vmci_ctx_destroy+0x170/0x1d6 drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_context.c:195 vmci_host_close+0x125/0x1ac drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_host.c:143 __fput+0x261/0xa34 fs/file_table.c:282 task_work_run+0xf0/0x194 kernel/task_work.c:164 tracehook_notify_resume include/linux/tracehook.h:189 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x184/0x189 kernel/entry/common.c:187 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x11b/0x123 kernel/entry/common.c:220 __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:302 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x18/0x42 kernel/entry/common.c:313 do_syscall_64+0x41/0x85 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x0 This change ensures the type is also checked when removing the resource from vmci_resource_table in vmci_resource_remove(). Fixes: bc63dedb7d46 ("VMCI: resource object implementation.") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: George Kennedy <george.kennedy(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David Fernandez Gonzalez <david.fernandez.gonzalez(a)oracle.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240828154338.754746-1-david.fernandez.gonzalez@… Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Zhang Kunbo <zhangkunbo(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_resource.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_resource.c b/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_resource.c index 692daa9eff34..19c9d2cdd277 100644 --- a/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_resource.c +++ b/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_resource.c @@ -144,7 +144,8 @@ void vmci_resource_remove(struct vmci_resource *resource) spin_lock(&vmci_resource_table.lock); hlist_for_each_entry(r, &vmci_resource_table.entries[idx], node) { - if (vmci_handle_is_equal(r->handle, resource->handle)) { + if (vmci_handle_is_equal(r->handle, resource->handle) && + resource->type == r->type) { hlist_del_init_rcu(&r->node); break; } -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] memcg_write_event_control(): fix a user-triggerable oops
by Jinjiang Tu 26 Sep '24

26 Sep '24

From: Al Viro <viro(a)zeniv.linux.org.uk> stable inclusion from stable-v4.19.321 commit fa5bfdf6cb5846a00e712d630a43e3cf55ccb411 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAQOJK CVE: CVE-2024-45021 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 046667c4d3196938e992fba0dfcde570aa85cd0e upstream. we are *not* guaranteed that anything past the terminating NUL is mapped (let alone initialized with anything sane). Fixes: 0dea116876ee ("cgroup: implement eventfd-based generic API for notifications") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko(a)suse.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro(a)zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Jinjiang Tu <tujinjiang(a)huawei.com> --- mm/memcontrol.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/memcontrol.c b/mm/memcontrol.c index f6b6a6c4b491..778e1b5bf80a 100644 --- a/mm/memcontrol.c +++ b/mm/memcontrol.c @@ -4578,9 +4578,12 @@ static ssize_t memcg_write_event_control(struct kernfs_open_file *of, buf = endp + 1; cfd = simple_strtoul(buf, &endp, 10); - if ((*endp != ' ') && (*endp != '\0')) + if (*endp == '\0') + buf = endp; + else if (*endp == ' ') + buf = endp + 1; + else return -EINVAL; - buf = endp + 1; event = kzalloc(sizeof(*event), GFP_KERNEL); if (!event) -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] hwmon: (w83627ehf) Fix underflows seen when writing limit attributes
by Tong Tiangen 26 Sep '24

26 Sep '24

From: Guenter Roeck <linux(a)roeck-us.net> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.51 commit 8fecb75bff1b7d87a071c32a37aa0700f2be379d category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IARX5F CVE: CVE-2024-46756 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 5c1de37969b7bc0abcb20b86e91e70caebbd4f89 ] DIV_ROUND_CLOSEST() after kstrtol() results in an underflow if a large negative number such as -9223372036854775808 is provided by the user. Fix it by reordering clamp_val() and DIV_ROUND_CLOSEST() operations. Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux(a)roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> --- drivers/hwmon/w83627ehf.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/hwmon/w83627ehf.c b/drivers/hwmon/w83627ehf.c index fe960c0a624f..7d7d70afde65 100644 --- a/drivers/hwmon/w83627ehf.c +++ b/drivers/hwmon/w83627ehf.c @@ -895,7 +895,7 @@ store_target_temp(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, if (err < 0) return err; - val = clamp_val(DIV_ROUND_CLOSEST(val, 1000), 0, 127); + val = DIV_ROUND_CLOSEST(clamp_val(val, 0, 127000), 1000); mutex_lock(&data->update_lock); data->target_temp[nr] = val; @@ -920,7 +920,7 @@ store_tolerance(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, return err; /* Limit the temp to 0C - 15C */ - val = clamp_val(DIV_ROUND_CLOSEST(val, 1000), 0, 15); + val = DIV_ROUND_CLOSEST(clamp_val(val, 0, 15000), 1000); mutex_lock(&data->update_lock); reg = w83627ehf_read_value(data, W83627EHF_REG_TOLERANCE[nr]); -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] hwmon: (w83627ehf) Fix underflows seen when writing limit attributes
by Tong Tiangen 26 Sep '24

26 Sep '24

From: Guenter Roeck <linux(a)roeck-us.net> stable inclusion from stable-v4.19.322 commit 93cf73a7bfdce683bde3a7bb65f270d3bd24497b category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IARX5F CVE: CVE-2024-46756 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 5c1de37969b7bc0abcb20b86e91e70caebbd4f89 ] DIV_ROUND_CLOSEST() after kstrtol() results in an underflow if a large negative number such as -9223372036854775808 is provided by the user. Fix it by reordering clamp_val() and DIV_ROUND_CLOSEST() operations. Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux(a)roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Tong Tiangen <tongtiangen(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/hwmon/w83627ehf.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/hwmon/w83627ehf.c b/drivers/hwmon/w83627ehf.c index ad68b6d9ff17..8da5f77b8987 100644 --- a/drivers/hwmon/w83627ehf.c +++ b/drivers/hwmon/w83627ehf.c @@ -1519,7 +1519,7 @@ store_target_temp(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, if (err < 0) return err; - val = clamp_val(DIV_ROUND_CLOSEST(val, 1000), 0, 127); + val = DIV_ROUND_CLOSEST(clamp_val(val, 0, 127000), 1000); mutex_lock(&data->update_lock); data->target_temp[nr] = val; @@ -1545,7 +1545,7 @@ store_tolerance(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, return err; /* Limit the temp to 0C - 15C */ - val = clamp_val(DIV_ROUND_CLOSEST(val, 1000), 0, 15); + val = DIV_ROUND_CLOSEST(clamp_val(val, 0, 15000), 1000); mutex_lock(&data->update_lock); if (sio_data->kind == nct6775 || sio_data->kind == nct6776) { -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] VMCI: Fix use-after-free when removing resource in vmci_resource_remove()
by Zhang Kunbo 26 Sep '24

26 Sep '24

From: David Fernandez Gonzalez <david.fernandez.gonzalez(a)oracle.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.51 commit 39e7e593418ccdbd151f2925fa6be1a616d16c96 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IARY1L CVE: CVE-2024-46738 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 48b9a8dabcc3cf5f961b2ebcd8933bf9204babb7 upstream. When removing a resource from vmci_resource_table in vmci_resource_remove(), the search is performed using the resource handle by comparing context and resource fields. It is possible though to create two resources with different types but same handle (same context and resource fields). When trying to remove one of the resources, vmci_resource_remove() may not remove the intended one, but the object will still be freed as in the case of the datagram type in vmci_datagram_destroy_handle(). vmci_resource_table will still hold a pointer to this freed resource leading to a use-after-free vulnerability. BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in vmci_handle_is_equal include/linux/vmw_vmci_defs.h:142 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in vmci_resource_remove+0x3a1/0x410 drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_resource.c:147 Read of size 4 at addr ffff88801c16d800 by task syz-executor197/1592 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x82/0xa9 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x21/0x366 mm/kasan/report.c:239 __kasan_report.cold+0x7f/0x132 mm/kasan/report.c:425 kasan_report+0x38/0x51 mm/kasan/report.c:442 vmci_handle_is_equal include/linux/vmw_vmci_defs.h:142 [inline] vmci_resource_remove+0x3a1/0x410 drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_resource.c:147 vmci_qp_broker_detach+0x89a/0x11b9 drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_queue_pair.c:2182 ctx_free_ctx+0x473/0xbe1 drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_context.c:444 kref_put include/linux/kref.h:65 [inline] vmci_ctx_put drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_context.c:497 [inline] vmci_ctx_destroy+0x170/0x1d6 drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_context.c:195 vmci_host_close+0x125/0x1ac drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_host.c:143 __fput+0x261/0xa34 fs/file_table.c:282 task_work_run+0xf0/0x194 kernel/task_work.c:164 tracehook_notify_resume include/linux/tracehook.h:189 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x184/0x189 kernel/entry/common.c:187 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x11b/0x123 kernel/entry/common.c:220 __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:302 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x18/0x42 kernel/entry/common.c:313 do_syscall_64+0x41/0x85 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x0 This change ensures the type is also checked when removing the resource from vmci_resource_table in vmci_resource_remove(). Fixes: bc63dedb7d46 ("VMCI: resource object implementation.") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: George Kennedy <george.kennedy(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David Fernandez Gonzalez <david.fernandez.gonzalez(a)oracle.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240828154338.754746-1-david.fernandez.gonzalez@… Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Zhang Kunbo <zhangkunbo(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_resource.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_resource.c b/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_resource.c index 692daa9eff34..19c9d2cdd277 100644 --- a/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_resource.c +++ b/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_resource.c @@ -144,7 +144,8 @@ void vmci_resource_remove(struct vmci_resource *resource) spin_lock(&vmci_resource_table.lock); hlist_for_each_entry(r, &vmci_resource_table.entries[idx], node) { - if (vmci_handle_is_equal(r->handle, resource->handle)) { + if (vmci_handle_is_equal(r->handle, resource->handle) && + resource->type == r->type) { hlist_del_init_rcu(&r->node); break; } -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] char: xillybus: Check USB endpoints when probing device
by Ye Bin 26 Sep '24

26 Sep '24

From: Eli Billauer <eli.billauer(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.48 commit 5cff754692ad45d5086b75fef8cc3a99c30a1005 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAQOJN CVE: CVE-2024-45011 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 2374bf7558de915edc6ec8cb10ec3291dfab9594 upstream. Ensure, as the driver probes the device, that all endpoints that the driver may attempt to access exist and are of the correct type. All XillyUSB devices must have a Bulk IN and Bulk OUT endpoint at address 1. This is verified in xillyusb_setup_base_eps(). On top of that, a XillyUSB device may have additional Bulk OUT endpoints. The information about these endpoints' addresses is deduced from a data structure (the IDT) that the driver fetches from the device while probing it. These endpoints are checked in setup_channels(). A XillyUSB device never has more than one IN endpoint, as all data towards the host is multiplexed in this single Bulk IN endpoint. This is why setup_channels() only checks OUT endpoints. Reported-by: syzbot+eac39cba052f2e750dbe(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: stable <stable(a)kernel.org> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/0000000000001d44a6061f7a54ee@google.com/T/ Fixes: a53d1202aef1 ("char: xillybus: Add driver for XillyUSB (Xillybus variant for USB)"). Signed-off-by: Eli Billauer <eli.billauer(a)gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240816070200.50695-2-eli.billauer@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: ZhangPeng <zhangpeng362(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Ye Bin <yebin10(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/char/xillybus/xillyusb.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/xillybus/xillyusb.c b/drivers/char/xillybus/xillyusb.c index 5a5afa14ca8c..613c366a2df6 100644 --- a/drivers/char/xillybus/xillyusb.c +++ b/drivers/char/xillybus/xillyusb.c @@ -1906,6 +1906,13 @@ static const struct file_operations xillyusb_fops = { static int xillyusb_setup_base_eps(struct xillyusb_dev *xdev) { + struct usb_device *udev = xdev->udev; + + /* Verify that device has the two fundamental bulk in/out endpoints */ + if (usb_pipe_type_check(udev, usb_sndbulkpipe(udev, MSG_EP_NUM)) || + usb_pipe_type_check(udev, usb_rcvbulkpipe(udev, IN_EP_NUM))) + return -ENODEV; + xdev->msg_ep = endpoint_alloc(xdev, MSG_EP_NUM | USB_DIR_OUT, bulk_out_work, 1, 2); if (!xdev->msg_ep) @@ -1935,14 +1942,15 @@ static int setup_channels(struct xillyusb_dev *xdev, __le16 *chandesc, int num_channels) { - struct xillyusb_channel *chan; + struct usb_device *udev = xdev->udev; + struct xillyusb_channel *chan, *new_channels; int i; chan = kcalloc(num_channels, sizeof(*chan), GFP_KERNEL); if (!chan) return -ENOMEM; - xdev->channels = chan; + new_channels = chan; for (i = 0; i < num_channels; i++, chan++) { unsigned int in_desc = le16_to_cpu(*chandesc++); @@ -1971,6 +1979,15 @@ static int setup_channels(struct xillyusb_dev *xdev, */ if ((out_desc & 0x80) && i < 14) { /* Entry is valid */ + if (usb_pipe_type_check(udev, + usb_sndbulkpipe(udev, i + 2))) { + dev_err(xdev->dev, + "Missing BULK OUT endpoint %d\n", + i + 2); + kfree(new_channels); + return -ENODEV; + } + chan->writable = 1; chan->out_synchronous = !!(out_desc & 0x40); chan->out_seekable = !!(out_desc & 0x20); @@ -1980,6 +1997,7 @@ static int setup_channels(struct xillyusb_dev *xdev, } } + xdev->channels = new_channels; return 0; } -- 2.34.1

2 1

[openeuler:OLK-6.6 8439/14122] cpu.c:undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_commit'
by kernel test robot 26 Sep '24

26 Sep '24

tree: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel.git OLK-6.6 head: 81a41d2ac1de43215c014bc71d907a026042e55b commit: 4c7a7e37c75ec2611be134d953ae976bc25c793b [8439/14122] LoongArch: Change __my_cpu_offset definition to avoid mis-optimization config: loongarch-randconfig-002-20240925 (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20240926/202409261955.pho8kSov-lkp@…) compiler: loongarch64-linux-gcc (GCC) 14.1.0 reproduce (this is a W=1 build): (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20240926/202409261955.pho8kSov-lkp@…) If you fix the issue in a separate patch/commit (i.e. not just a new version of the same patch/commit), kindly add following tags | Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp(a)intel.com> | Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202409261955.pho8kSov-lkp@intel.com/ All errors (new ones prefixed by >>): loongarch64-linux-ld: warning: orphan section `_ftrace_events' from `sound/core/pcm_lib.o' being placed in section `_ftrace_events' loongarch64-linux-ld: warning: orphan section `_ftrace_events' from `lib/maple_tree.o' being placed in section `_ftrace_events' loongarch64-linux-ld: init/main.o: in function `.L199': main.c:(.text+0x1f0): undefined reference to `perf_trace_buf_alloc' loongarch64-linux-ld: main.c:(.text+0x22c): undefined reference to `perf_trace_run_bpf_submit' loongarch64-linux-ld: init/main.o: in function `perf_trace_initcall_start': main.c:(.text+0x364): undefined reference to `perf_trace_buf_alloc' loongarch64-linux-ld: main.c:(.text+0x38c): undefined reference to `perf_trace_run_bpf_submit' loongarch64-linux-ld: init/main.o: in function `perf_trace_initcall_finish': main.c:(.text+0x44c): undefined reference to `perf_trace_buf_alloc' loongarch64-linux-ld: main.c:(.text+0x478): undefined reference to `perf_trace_run_bpf_submit' loongarch64-linux-ld: init/main.o: in function `trace_event_raw_event_initcall_start': main.c:(.text+0x550): undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_reserve' loongarch64-linux-ld: main.c:(.text+0x560): undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_commit' loongarch64-linux-ld: init/main.o: in function `.L240': main.c:(.text+0x5a8): undefined reference to `__trace_trigger_soft_disabled' loongarch64-linux-ld: init/main.o: in function `trace_event_raw_event_initcall_finish': main.c:(.text+0x620): undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_reserve' loongarch64-linux-ld: main.c:(.text+0x634): undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_commit' loongarch64-linux-ld: init/main.o: in function `.L251': main.c:(.text+0x688): undefined reference to `__trace_trigger_soft_disabled' loongarch64-linux-ld: init/main.o: in function `.L247': main.c:(.text+0x6bc): undefined reference to `trace_raw_output_prep' loongarch64-linux-ld: init/main.o: in function `trace_raw_output_initcall_level': main.c:(.text+0x714): undefined reference to `trace_event_printf' loongarch64-linux-ld: main.c:(.text+0x734): undefined reference to `trace_handle_return' loongarch64-linux-ld: main.c:(.text+0x75c): undefined reference to `trace_raw_output_prep' loongarch64-linux-ld: init/main.o: in function `trace_raw_output_initcall_start': main.c:(.text+0x7b0): undefined reference to `trace_event_printf' loongarch64-linux-ld: main.c:(.text+0x7d0): undefined reference to `trace_handle_return' loongarch64-linux-ld: main.c:(.text+0x7fc): undefined reference to `trace_raw_output_prep' loongarch64-linux-ld: init/main.o: in function `trace_raw_output_initcall_finish': main.c:(.text+0x854): undefined reference to `trace_event_printf' loongarch64-linux-ld: main.c:(.text+0x874): undefined reference to `trace_handle_return' loongarch64-linux-ld: init/main.o: in function `trace_event_raw_event_initcall_level': main.c:(.text+0x8f8): undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_reserve' loongarch64-linux-ld: main.c:(.text+0x914): undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_commit' loongarch64-linux-ld: init/main.o: in function `.L312': main.c:(.text+0x97c): undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_reserve' loongarch64-linux-ld: init/main.o: in function `.L299': main.c:(.text+0x9c8): undefined reference to `__trace_trigger_soft_disabled' loongarch64-linux-ld: init/main.o:(.ref.data+0x18): undefined reference to `trace_event_reg' loongarch64-linux-ld: init/main.o:(.ref.data+0x40): undefined reference to `trace_event_raw_init' loongarch64-linux-ld: init/main.o:(.ref.data+0x60): undefined reference to `trace_event_reg' loongarch64-linux-ld: init/main.o:(.ref.data+0x88): undefined reference to `trace_event_raw_init' loongarch64-linux-ld: init/main.o:(.ref.data+0xa8): undefined reference to `trace_event_reg' loongarch64-linux-ld: init/main.o:(.ref.data+0xd0): undefined reference to `trace_event_raw_init' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/fork.o: in function `perf_trace_task_newtask': fork.c:(.text+0x168): undefined reference to `perf_trace_buf_alloc' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/fork.o: in function `.L34': fork.c:(.text+0x1bc): undefined reference to `perf_trace_run_bpf_submit' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/fork.o: in function `.L33': fork.c:(.text+0x238): undefined reference to `perf_trace_buf_alloc' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/fork.o: in function `trace_event_raw_event_task_newtask': fork.c:(.text+0x2f4): undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_reserve' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/fork.o: in function `.L39': fork.c:(.text+0x32c): undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_commit' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/fork.o: in function `.L35': fork.c:(.text+0x36c): undefined reference to `__trace_trigger_soft_disabled' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/fork.o: in function `.L36': fork.c:(.text+0x3a4): undefined reference to `trace_raw_output_prep' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/fork.o: in function `trace_raw_output_task_newtask': fork.c:(.text+0x3fc): undefined reference to `trace_event_printf' loongarch64-linux-ld: fork.c:(.text+0x41c): undefined reference to `trace_handle_return' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/fork.o: in function `.L52': fork.c:(.text+0x444): undefined reference to `trace_raw_output_prep' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/fork.o: in function `trace_raw_output_task_rename': fork.c:(.text+0x49c): undefined reference to `trace_event_printf' loongarch64-linux-ld: fork.c:(.text+0x4bc): undefined reference to `trace_handle_return' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/fork.o: in function `.L58': fork.c:(.text+0x520): undefined reference to `perf_trace_buf_alloc' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/fork.o: in function `perf_trace_task_rename': fork.c:(.text+0x580): undefined reference to `perf_trace_run_bpf_submit' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/fork.o: in function `.L59': fork.c:(.text+0x5f8): undefined reference to `perf_trace_buf_alloc' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/fork.o: in function `.L70': fork.c:(.text+0x6b8): undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_reserve' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/fork.o: in function `trace_event_raw_event_task_rename': fork.c:(.text+0x6fc): undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_commit' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/fork.o: in function `.L77': fork.c:(.text+0x748): undefined reference to `__trace_trigger_soft_disabled' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/fork.o:(.ref.data+0x18): undefined reference to `trace_event_reg' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/fork.o:(.ref.data+0x40): undefined reference to `trace_event_raw_init' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/fork.o:(.ref.data+0x60): undefined reference to `trace_event_reg' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/fork.o:(.ref.data+0x88): undefined reference to `trace_event_raw_init' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/cpu.o: in function `perf_trace_cpuhp_enter': cpu.c:(.text+0x2cc): undefined reference to `perf_trace_buf_alloc' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/cpu.o: in function `.L35': cpu.c:(.text+0x300): undefined reference to `perf_trace_run_bpf_submit' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/cpu.o: in function `perf_trace_cpuhp_multi_enter': cpu.c:(.text+0x3dc): undefined reference to `perf_trace_buf_alloc' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/cpu.o: in function `.L47': cpu.c:(.text+0x410): undefined reference to `perf_trace_run_bpf_submit' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/cpu.o: in function `perf_trace_cpuhp_exit': cpu.c:(.text+0x4fc): undefined reference to `perf_trace_buf_alloc' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/cpu.o: in function `.L59': cpu.c:(.text+0x530): undefined reference to `perf_trace_run_bpf_submit' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/cpu.o: in function `trace_event_raw_event_cpuhp_enter': cpu.c:(.text+0x628): undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_reserve' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/cpu.o: in function `.L74': >> cpu.c:(.text+0x644): undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_commit' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/cpu.o: in function `.L70': cpu.c:(.text+0x6a8): undefined reference to `__trace_trigger_soft_disabled' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/cpu.o: in function `trace_event_raw_event_cpuhp_multi_enter': cpu.c:(.text+0x730): undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_reserve' loongarch64-linux-ld: cpu.c:(.text+0x74c): undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_commit' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/cpu.o: in function `.L81': cpu.c:(.text+0x7a8): undefined reference to `__trace_trigger_soft_disabled' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/cpu.o: in function `trace_event_raw_event_cpuhp_exit': cpu.c:(.text+0x830): undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_reserve' loongarch64-linux-ld: cpu.c:(.text+0x84c): undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_commit' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/cpu.o: in function `.L92': cpu.c:(.text+0x8a8): undefined reference to `__trace_trigger_soft_disabled' loongarch64-linux-ld: cpu.c:(.text+0x8dc): undefined reference to `trace_raw_output_prep' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/cpu.o: in function `trace_raw_output_cpuhp_enter': cpu.c:(.text+0x93c): undefined reference to `trace_event_printf' loongarch64-linux-ld: cpu.c:(.text+0x95c): undefined reference to `trace_handle_return' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/cpu.o: in function `.L108': >> cpu.c:(.text+0x984): undefined reference to `trace_raw_output_prep' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/cpu.o: in function `trace_raw_output_cpuhp_multi_enter': cpu.c:(.text+0x9dc): undefined reference to `trace_event_printf' loongarch64-linux-ld: cpu.c:(.text+0x9fc): undefined reference to `trace_handle_return' loongarch64-linux-ld: cpu.c:(.text+0xa24): undefined reference to `trace_raw_output_prep' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/cpu.o: in function `trace_raw_output_cpuhp_exit': cpu.c:(.text+0xa7c): undefined reference to `trace_event_printf' loongarch64-linux-ld: cpu.c:(.text+0xa9c): undefined reference to `trace_handle_return' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/cpu.o:(.ref.data+0x18): undefined reference to `trace_event_reg' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/cpu.o:(.ref.data+0x40): undefined reference to `trace_event_raw_init' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/cpu.o:(.ref.data+0x60): undefined reference to `trace_event_reg' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/cpu.o:(.ref.data+0x88): undefined reference to `trace_event_raw_init' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/cpu.o:(.ref.data+0xa8): undefined reference to `trace_event_reg' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/cpu.o:(.ref.data+0xd0): undefined reference to `trace_event_raw_init' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/softirq.o: in function `perf_trace_irq_handler_exit': softirq.c:(.text+0x454): undefined reference to `perf_trace_buf_alloc' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/softirq.o: in function `.L74': softirq.c:(.text+0x480): undefined reference to `perf_trace_run_bpf_submit' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/softirq.o: in function `perf_trace_softirq': softirq.c:(.text+0x544): undefined reference to `perf_trace_buf_alloc' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/softirq.o: in function `.L86': softirq.c:(.text+0x56c): undefined reference to `perf_trace_run_bpf_submit' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/softirq.o: in function `perf_trace_tasklet': softirq.c:(.text+0x62c): undefined reference to `perf_trace_buf_alloc' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/softirq.o: in function `.L98': softirq.c:(.text+0x658): undefined reference to `perf_trace_run_bpf_submit' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/softirq.o: in function `trace_event_raw_event_irq_handler_exit': softirq.c:(.text+0x738): undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_reserve' loongarch64-linux-ld: softirq.c:(.text+0x74c): undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_commit' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/softirq.o: in function `.L109': softirq.c:(.text+0x7a8): undefined reference to `__trace_trigger_soft_disabled' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/softirq.o: in function `trace_event_raw_event_softirq': softirq.c:(.text+0x818): undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_reserve' loongarch64-linux-ld: softirq.c:(.text+0x828): undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_commit' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/softirq.o: in function `.L120': softirq.c:(.text+0x868): undefined reference to `__trace_trigger_soft_disabled' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/softirq.o: in function `trace_event_raw_event_tasklet': softirq.c:(.text+0x8e0): undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_reserve' loongarch64-linux-ld: softirq.c:(.text+0x8f4): undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_commit' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/softirq.o: in function `.L131': softirq.c:(.text+0x948): undefined reference to `__trace_trigger_soft_disabled' loongarch64-linux-ld: softirq.c:(.text+0x97c): undefined reference to `trace_raw_output_prep' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/softirq.o: in function `trace_raw_output_irq_handler_entry': softirq.c:(.text+0x9d8): undefined reference to `trace_event_printf' loongarch64-linux-ld: softirq.c:(.text+0x9f8): undefined reference to `trace_handle_return' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/softirq.o: in function `.L147': softirq.c:(.text+0xa24): undefined reference to `trace_raw_output_prep' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/softirq.o: in function `trace_raw_output_irq_handler_exit': softirq.c:(.text+0xa50): undefined reference to `trace_event_printf' loongarch64-linux-ld: softirq.c:(.text+0xa70): undefined reference to `trace_handle_return' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/softirq.o: in function `.L153': softirq.c:(.text+0xaf4): undefined reference to `trace_raw_output_prep' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/softirq.o: in function `trace_raw_output_tasklet': softirq.c:(.text+0xb54): undefined reference to `trace_event_printf' loongarch64-linux-ld: softirq.c:(.text+0xb74): undefined reference to `trace_handle_return' loongarch64-linux-ld: softirq.c:(.text+0xb9c): undefined reference to `trace_raw_output_prep' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/softirq.o: in function `trace_raw_output_softirq': softirq.c:(.text+0xbf4): undefined reference to `trace_print_symbols_seq' loongarch64-linux-ld: softirq.c:(.text+0xc0c): undefined reference to `trace_event_printf' loongarch64-linux-ld: softirq.c:(.text+0xc2c): undefined reference to `trace_handle_return' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/softirq.o: in function `.L206': softirq.c:(.text+0xff4): undefined reference to `perf_trace_buf_alloc' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/softirq.o: in function `.L205': softirq.c:(.text+0x1044): undefined reference to `perf_trace_run_bpf_submit' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/softirq.o: in function `.L230': softirq.c:(.text+0x11d4): undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_reserve' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/softirq.o: in function `.L227': softirq.c:(.text+0x1204): undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_commit' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/softirq.o: in function `trace_event_raw_event_irq_handler_entry': softirq.c:(.text+0x1288): undefined reference to `__trace_trigger_soft_disabled' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/softirq.o:(.ref.data+0x18): undefined reference to `trace_event_reg' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/softirq.o:(.ref.data+0x40): undefined reference to `trace_event_raw_init' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/softirq.o:(.ref.data+0x60): undefined reference to `trace_event_reg' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/softirq.o:(.ref.data+0x88): undefined reference to `trace_event_raw_init' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/softirq.o:(.ref.data+0xa8): undefined reference to `trace_event_reg' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/softirq.o:(.ref.data+0xd0): undefined reference to `trace_event_raw_init' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/softirq.o:(.ref.data+0xf0): undefined reference to `trace_event_reg' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/softirq.o:(.ref.data+0x118): undefined reference to `trace_event_raw_init' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/signal.o: in function `perf_trace_signal_generate': signal.c:(.text+0x260): undefined reference to `perf_trace_buf_alloc' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/signal.o: in function `.L30': signal.c:(.text+0x2cc): undefined reference to `perf_trace_run_bpf_submit' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/signal.o: in function `.L41': signal.c:(.text+0x358): undefined reference to `perf_trace_buf_alloc' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/signal.o: in function `perf_trace_signal_deliver': signal.c:(.text+0x414): undefined reference to `perf_trace_buf_alloc' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/signal.o: in function `.L49': signal.c:(.text+0x468): undefined reference to `perf_trace_run_bpf_submit' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/signal.o: in function `trace_event_raw_event_signal_generate': signal.c:(.text+0x590): undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_reserve' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/signal.o: in function `.L66': signal.c:(.text+0x5e0): undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_commit' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/signal.o: in function `.L62': signal.c:(.text+0x688): undefined reference to `__trace_trigger_soft_disabled' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/signal.o: in function `trace_event_raw_event_signal_deliver': signal.c:(.text+0x708): undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_reserve' loongarch64-linux-ld: signal.c:(.text+0x748): undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_commit' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/signal.o: in function `.L78': signal.c:(.text+0x7e8): undefined reference to `__trace_trigger_soft_disabled' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/signal.o: in function `.L92': signal.c:(.text+0x81c): undefined reference to `trace_raw_output_prep' -- update.c:(.text+0x630): undefined reference to `trace_event_printf' loongarch64-linux-ld: update.c:(.text+0x650): undefined reference to `trace_handle_return' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/rcu/update.o: in function `.L88': update.c:(.text+0x67c): undefined reference to `trace_raw_output_prep' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/rcu/update.o: in function `trace_raw_output_rcu_stall_warning': update.c:(.text+0x6d4): undefined reference to `trace_event_printf' loongarch64-linux-ld: update.c:(.text+0x6f4): undefined reference to `trace_handle_return' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/rcu/update.o:(.ref.data+0x18): undefined reference to `trace_event_reg' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/rcu/update.o:(.ref.data+0x40): undefined reference to `trace_event_raw_init' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/rcu/update.o:(.ref.data+0x60): undefined reference to `trace_event_reg' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/rcu/update.o:(.ref.data+0x88): undefined reference to `trace_event_raw_init' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/dma/swiotlb.o: in function `.L51': swiotlb.c:(.text+0x46c): undefined reference to `trace_raw_output_prep' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/dma/swiotlb.o: in function `trace_raw_output_swiotlb_bounced': swiotlb.c:(.text+0x4a8): undefined reference to `trace_event_printf' loongarch64-linux-ld: swiotlb.c:(.text+0x4c8): undefined reference to `trace_handle_return' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/dma/swiotlb.o: in function `.L237': swiotlb.c:(.text+0x11c4): undefined reference to `perf_trace_buf_alloc' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/dma/swiotlb.o: in function `perf_trace_swiotlb_bounced': swiotlb.c:(.text+0x1234): undefined reference to `perf_trace_run_bpf_submit' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/dma/swiotlb.o: in function `.L239': swiotlb.c:(.text+0x1394): undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_reserve' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/dma/swiotlb.o: in function `.L264': swiotlb.c:(.text+0x13ec): undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_commit' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/dma/swiotlb.o: in function `trace_event_raw_event_swiotlb_bounced': swiotlb.c:(.text+0x147c): undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_reserve' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/dma/swiotlb.o: in function `.L293': swiotlb.c:(.text+0x14e8): undefined reference to `__trace_trigger_soft_disabled' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/dma/swiotlb.o:(.ref.data+0x18): undefined reference to `trace_event_reg' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/dma/swiotlb.o:(.ref.data+0x40): undefined reference to `trace_event_raw_init' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/entry/common.o: in function `.L22': common.c:(.text+0x154): undefined reference to `perf_trace_buf_alloc' loongarch64-linux-ld: common.c:(.text+0x184): undefined reference to `perf_trace_run_bpf_submit' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/entry/common.o: in function `perf_trace_sys_enter': common.c:(.text+0x250): undefined reference to `perf_trace_buf_alloc' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/entry/common.o: in function `.L46': common.c:(.text+0x298): undefined reference to `perf_trace_run_bpf_submit' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/entry/common.o: in function `.L33': common.c:(.text+0x318): undefined reference to `perf_trace_buf_alloc' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/entry/common.o: in function `trace_event_raw_event_sys_enter': common.c:(.text+0x3d8): undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_reserve' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/entry/common.o: in function `.L51': common.c:(.text+0x404): undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_commit' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/entry/common.o: in function `.L47': common.c:(.text+0x448): undefined reference to `__trace_trigger_soft_disabled' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/entry/common.o: in function `trace_event_raw_event_sys_exit': common.c:(.text+0x4c0): undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_reserve' loongarch64-linux-ld: common.c:(.text+0x4dc): undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_commit' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/entry/common.o: in function `.L58': common.c:(.text+0x528): undefined reference to `__trace_trigger_soft_disabled' loongarch64-linux-ld: common.c:(.text+0x55c): undefined reference to `trace_raw_output_prep' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/entry/common.o: in function `trace_raw_output_sys_enter': common.c:(.text+0x5cc): undefined reference to `trace_event_printf' loongarch64-linux-ld: common.c:(.text+0x5ec): undefined reference to `trace_handle_return' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/entry/common.o: in function `.L74': common.c:(.text+0x614): undefined reference to `trace_raw_output_prep' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/entry/common.o: in function `trace_raw_output_sys_exit': common.c:(.text+0x674): undefined reference to `trace_event_printf' loongarch64-linux-ld: common.c:(.text+0x694): undefined reference to `trace_handle_return' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/entry/common.o:(.ref.data+0x18): undefined reference to `trace_event_reg' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/entry/common.o:(.ref.data+0x40): undefined reference to `trace_event_raw_init' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/entry/common.o:(.ref.data+0x60): undefined reference to `trace_event_reg' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/entry/common.o:(.ref.data+0x88): undefined reference to `trace_event_raw_init' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/timer.o: in function `.L114': timer.c:(.text+0x814): undefined reference to `perf_trace_buf_alloc' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/timer.o: in function `perf_trace_timer_class': timer.c:(.text+0x83c): undefined reference to `perf_trace_run_bpf_submit' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/timer.o: in function `perf_trace_timer_start': timer.c:(.text+0x914): undefined reference to `perf_trace_buf_alloc' loongarch64-linux-ld: timer.c:(.text+0x958): undefined reference to `perf_trace_run_bpf_submit' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/timer.o: in function `.L143': timer.c:(.text+0xa2c): undefined reference to `perf_trace_buf_alloc' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/timer.o: in function `perf_trace_timer_expire_entry': timer.c:(.text+0xa6c): undefined reference to `perf_trace_run_bpf_submit' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/timer.o: in function `.L144': timer.c:(.text+0xb34): undefined reference to `perf_trace_buf_alloc' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/timer.o: in function `perf_trace_hrtimer_init': timer.c:(.text+0xb64): undefined reference to `perf_trace_run_bpf_submit' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/timer.o: in function `.L156': timer.c:(.text+0xc2c): undefined reference to `perf_trace_buf_alloc' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/timer.o: in function `perf_trace_hrtimer_start': timer.c:(.text+0xc70): undefined reference to `perf_trace_run_bpf_submit' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/timer.o: in function `.L168': timer.c:(.text+0xd2c): undefined reference to `perf_trace_buf_alloc' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/timer.o: in function `.L179': timer.c:(.text+0xd64): undefined reference to `perf_trace_run_bpf_submit' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/timer.o: in function `.L180': timer.c:(.text+0xe24): undefined reference to `perf_trace_buf_alloc' loongarch64-linux-ld: timer.c:(.text+0xe4c): undefined reference to `perf_trace_run_bpf_submit' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/timer.o: in function `.L192': timer.c:(.text+0xf14): undefined reference to `perf_trace_buf_alloc' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/timer.o: in function `.L203': timer.c:(.text+0xf60): undefined reference to `perf_trace_run_bpf_submit' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/timer.o: in function `.L204': timer.c:(.text+0x1034): undefined reference to `perf_trace_buf_alloc' loongarch64-linux-ld: timer.c:(.text+0x1070): undefined reference to `perf_trace_run_bpf_submit' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/timer.o: in function `.L219': timer.c:(.text+0x1130): undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_reserve' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/timer.o: in function `.L216': timer.c:(.text+0x1140): undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_commit' >> loongarch64-linux-ld: timer.c:(.text+0x1188): undefined reference to `__trace_trigger_soft_disabled' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/timer.o: in function `trace_event_raw_event_timer_class': timer.c:(.text+0x1208): undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_reserve' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/timer.o: in function `.L231': timer.c:(.text+0x1238): undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_commit' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/timer.o: in function `.L232': timer.c:(.text+0x1288): undefined reference to `__trace_trigger_soft_disabled' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/timer.o: in function `.L246': timer.c:(.text+0x1300): undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_reserve' loongarch64-linux-ld: timer.c:(.text+0x132c): undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_commit' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/timer.o: in function `.L242': timer.c:(.text+0x1368): undefined reference to `__trace_trigger_soft_disabled' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/timer.o: in function `trace_event_raw_event_timer_expire_entry': timer.c:(.text+0x13e8): undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_reserve' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/timer.o: in function `.L257': timer.c:(.text+0x1400): undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_commit' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/timer.o: in function `.L253': timer.c:(.text+0x1448): undefined reference to `__trace_trigger_soft_disabled' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/timer.o: in function `trace_event_raw_event_hrtimer_init': timer.c:(.text+0x14b8): undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_reserve' loongarch64-linux-ld: timer.c:(.text+0x14e8): undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_commit' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/timer.o: in function `.L264': timer.c:(.text+0x152c): undefined reference to `__trace_trigger_soft_disabled' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/timer.o: in function `trace_event_raw_event_hrtimer_start': timer.c:(.text+0x15a8): undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_reserve' loongarch64-linux-ld: timer.c:(.text+0x15cc): undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_commit' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/timer.o: in function `.L279': timer.c:(.text+0x1608): undefined reference to `__trace_trigger_soft_disabled' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/timer.o: in function `.L276': timer.c:(.text+0x1678): undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_reserve' loongarch64-linux-ld: timer.c:(.text+0x1688): undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_commit' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/timer.o: in function `trace_event_raw_event_hrtimer_expire_entry': timer.c:(.text+0x16c8): undefined reference to `__trace_trigger_soft_disabled' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/timer.o: in function `.L286': timer.c:(.text+0x1748): undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_reserve' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/timer.o: in function `.L287': timer.c:(.text+0x1780): undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_commit' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/timer.o: in function `trace_event_raw_event_hrtimer_class': timer.c:(.text+0x17c8): undefined reference to `__trace_trigger_soft_disabled' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/timer.o: in function `.L298': timer.c:(.text+0x1848): undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_reserve' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/timer.o: in function `trace_event_raw_event_itimer_state': timer.c:(.text+0x186c): undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_commit' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/timer.o: in function `.L312': timer.c:(.text+0x18c8): undefined reference to `__trace_trigger_soft_disabled' loongarch64-linux-ld: timer.c:(.text+0x18fc): undefined reference to `trace_raw_output_prep' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/timer.o: in function `.L308': timer.c:(.text+0x1950): undefined reference to `trace_event_printf' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/timer.o: in function `trace_event_raw_event_itimer_expire': timer.c:(.text+0x1970): undefined reference to `trace_handle_return' loongarch64-linux-ld: timer.c:(.text+0x199c): undefined reference to `trace_raw_output_prep' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/timer.o: in function `.L324': timer.c:(.text+0x19fc): undefined reference to `trace_event_printf' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/timer.o: in function `.L319': timer.c:(.text+0x1a1c): undefined reference to `trace_handle_return' loongarch64-linux-ld: timer.c:(.text+0x1a44): undefined reference to `trace_raw_output_prep' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/timer.o: in function `trace_raw_output_timer_class': timer.c:(.text+0x1a98): undefined reference to `trace_event_printf' loongarch64-linux-ld: timer.c:(.text+0x1ab8): undefined reference to `trace_handle_return' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/timer.o: in function `.L338': timer.c:(.text+0x1ae4): undefined reference to `trace_raw_output_prep' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/timer.o: in function `trace_raw_output_timer_expire_entry': timer.c:(.text+0x1b30): undefined reference to `trace_event_printf' loongarch64-linux-ld: timer.c:(.text+0x1b50): undefined reference to `trace_handle_return' loongarch64-linux-ld: timer.c:(.text+0x1b7c): undefined reference to `trace_raw_output_prep' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/timer.o: in function `trace_raw_output_hrtimer_expire_entry': timer.c:(.text+0x1bf0): undefined reference to `trace_event_printf' loongarch64-linux-ld: timer.c:(.text+0x1c10): undefined reference to `trace_handle_return' loongarch64-linux-ld: timer.c:(.text+0x1c3c): undefined reference to `trace_raw_output_prep' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/timer.o: in function `trace_raw_output_hrtimer_class': timer.c:(.text+0x1c98): undefined reference to `trace_event_printf' loongarch64-linux-ld: timer.c:(.text+0x1cb8): undefined reference to `trace_handle_return' loongarch64-linux-ld: timer.c:(.text+0x1ce4): undefined reference to `trace_raw_output_prep' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/timer.o: in function `trace_raw_output_itimer_state': timer.c:(.text+0x1d84): undefined reference to `trace_print_flags_seq' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/timer.o: in function `.L362': timer.c:(.text+0x1db0): undefined reference to `trace_event_printf' loongarch64-linux-ld: timer.c:(.text+0x1de0): undefined reference to `trace_handle_return' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/timer.o: in function `trace_raw_output_itimer_expire': timer.c:(.text+0x1e0c): undefined reference to `trace_raw_output_prep' loongarch64-linux-ld: timer.c:(.text+0x1e68): undefined reference to `trace_print_symbols_seq' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/timer.o: in function `.L368': timer.c:(.text+0x1e80): undefined reference to `trace_print_symbols_seq' loongarch64-linux-ld: timer.c:(.text+0x1e9c): undefined reference to `trace_event_printf' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/timer.o: in function `trace_raw_output_timer_start': timer.c:(.text+0x1ec8): undefined reference to `trace_handle_return' loongarch64-linux-ld: timer.c:(.text+0x1ef4): undefined reference to `trace_raw_output_prep' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/timer.o: in function `.L374': timer.c:(.text+0x1f70): undefined reference to `trace_print_symbols_seq' loongarch64-linux-ld: timer.c:(.text+0x1f94): undefined reference to `trace_event_printf' loongarch64-linux-ld: timer.c:(.text+0x1fc0): undefined reference to `trace_handle_return' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/timer.o:(.ref.data+0x18): undefined reference to `trace_event_reg' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/timer.o:(.ref.data+0x40): undefined reference to `trace_event_raw_init' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/timer.o:(.ref.data+0x60): undefined reference to `trace_event_reg' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/timer.o:(.ref.data+0x88): undefined reference to `trace_event_raw_init' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/timer.o:(.ref.data+0xa8): undefined reference to `trace_event_reg' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/timer.o:(.ref.data+0xd0): undefined reference to `trace_event_raw_init' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/timer.o:(.ref.data+0xf0): undefined reference to `trace_event_reg' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/timer.o:(.ref.data+0x118): undefined reference to `trace_event_raw_init' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/timer.o:(.ref.data+0x138): undefined reference to `trace_event_reg' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/timer.o:(.ref.data+0x160): undefined reference to `trace_event_raw_init' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/timer.o:(.ref.data+0x180): undefined reference to `trace_event_reg' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/timer.o:(.ref.data+0x1a8): undefined reference to `trace_event_raw_init' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/timer.o:(.ref.data+0x1c8): undefined reference to `trace_event_reg' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/timer.o:(.ref.data+0x1f0): undefined reference to `trace_event_raw_init' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/timer.o:(.ref.data+0x210): undefined reference to `trace_event_reg' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/timer.o:(.ref.data+0x238): undefined reference to `trace_event_raw_init' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/timer.o:(.ref.data+0x258): undefined reference to `trace_event_reg' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/timer.o:(.ref.data+0x280): undefined reference to `trace_event_raw_init' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/alarmtimer.o: in function `perf_trace_alarmtimer_suspend': alarmtimer.c:(.text+0x2d4): undefined reference to `perf_trace_buf_alloc' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/alarmtimer.o: in function `.L46': alarmtimer.c:(.text+0x300): undefined reference to `perf_trace_run_bpf_submit' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/alarmtimer.o: in function `perf_trace_alarm_class': alarmtimer.c:(.text+0x3cc): undefined reference to `perf_trace_buf_alloc' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/alarmtimer.o: in function `.L58': alarmtimer.c:(.text+0x408): undefined reference to `perf_trace_run_bpf_submit' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/alarmtimer.o: in function `trace_event_raw_event_alarmtimer_suspend': alarmtimer.c:(.text+0x4d8): undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_reserve' loongarch64-linux-ld: alarmtimer.c:(.text+0x4ec): undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_commit' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/alarmtimer.o: in function `.L73': alarmtimer.c:(.text+0x528): undefined reference to `__trace_trigger_soft_disabled' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/alarmtimer.o: in function `.L70': alarmtimer.c:(.text+0x598): undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_reserve' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/alarmtimer.o: in function `trace_event_raw_event_alarm_class': alarmtimer.c:(.text+0x5c0): undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_commit' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/alarmtimer.o: in function `.L84': alarmtimer.c:(.text+0x60c): undefined reference to `__trace_trigger_soft_disabled' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/alarmtimer.o: in function `.L80': alarmtimer.c:(.text+0x644): undefined reference to `trace_raw_output_prep' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/alarmtimer.o: in function `trace_raw_output_alarmtimer_suspend': alarmtimer.c:(.text+0x6a0): undefined reference to `trace_print_flags_seq' loongarch64-linux-ld: alarmtimer.c:(.text+0x6b8): undefined reference to `trace_event_printf' loongarch64-linux-ld: alarmtimer.c:(.text+0x6d8): undefined reference to `trace_handle_return' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/alarmtimer.o: in function `.L96': alarmtimer.c:(.text+0x704): undefined reference to `trace_raw_output_prep' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/alarmtimer.o: in function `trace_raw_output_alarm_class': alarmtimer.c:(.text+0x76c): undefined reference to `trace_print_flags_seq' loongarch64-linux-ld: alarmtimer.c:(.text+0x78c): undefined reference to `trace_event_printf' loongarch64-linux-ld: alarmtimer.c:(.text+0x7b0): undefined reference to `trace_handle_return' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/alarmtimer.o:(.ref.data+0x18): undefined reference to `trace_event_reg' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/alarmtimer.o:(.ref.data+0x40): undefined reference to `trace_event_raw_init' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/alarmtimer.o:(.ref.data+0x60): undefined reference to `trace_event_reg' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/time/alarmtimer.o:(.ref.data+0x88): undefined reference to `trace_event_raw_init' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/smp.o: in function `perf_trace_csd_queue_cpu': smp.c:(.text+0x214): undefined reference to `perf_trace_buf_alloc' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/smp.o: in function `.L30': smp.c:(.text+0x248): undefined reference to `perf_trace_run_bpf_submit' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/smp.o: in function `perf_trace_csd_function': smp.c:(.text+0x30c): undefined reference to `perf_trace_buf_alloc' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/smp.o: in function `.L42': smp.c:(.text+0x338): undefined reference to `perf_trace_run_bpf_submit' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/smp.o: in function `trace_event_raw_event_csd_queue_cpu': smp.c:(.text+0x428): undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_reserve' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/smp.o: in function `.L57': smp.c:(.text+0x444): undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_commit' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/smp.o: in function `.L53': smp.c:(.text+0x4a8): undefined reference to `__trace_trigger_soft_disabled' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/smp.o: in function `trace_event_raw_event_csd_function': smp.c:(.text+0x520): undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_reserve' >> loongarch64-linux-ld: smp.c:(.text+0x534): undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_commit' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/smp.o: in function `.L64': smp.c:(.text+0x588): undefined reference to `__trace_trigger_soft_disabled' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/smp.o: in function `.L65': smp.c:(.text+0x5bc): undefined reference to `trace_raw_output_prep' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/smp.o: in function `trace_raw_output_csd_queue_cpu': smp.c:(.text+0x61c): undefined reference to `trace_event_printf' loongarch64-linux-ld: smp.c:(.text+0x63c): undefined reference to `trace_handle_return' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/smp.o: in function `.L80': smp.c:(.text+0x664): undefined reference to `trace_raw_output_prep' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/smp.o: in function `trace_raw_output_csd_function': smp.c:(.text+0x6b4): undefined reference to `trace_event_printf' loongarch64-linux-ld: smp.c:(.text+0x6d4): undefined reference to `trace_handle_return' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/smp.o:(.ref.data+0x18): undefined reference to `trace_event_reg' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/smp.o:(.ref.data+0x40): undefined reference to `trace_event_raw_init' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/smp.o:(.ref.data+0x60): undefined reference to `trace_event_reg' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/smp.o:(.ref.data+0x88): undefined reference to `trace_event_raw_init' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/kexec_core.o: in function `.L255': kexec_core.c:(.text+0x1b10): undefined reference to `machine_kexec_cleanup' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/kexec_core.o: in function `.L296': kexec_core.c:(.text+0x1d70): undefined reference to `machine_crash_shutdown' loongarch64-linux-ld: kexec_core.c:(.text+0x1d78): undefined reference to `machine_kexec' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/kexec_core.o: in function `.L383': kexec_core.c:(.text+0x2350): undefined reference to `machine_shutdown' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/kexec_core.o: in function `.L380': kexec_core.c:(.text+0x2360): undefined reference to `machine_kexec' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/cgroup/cgroup.o: in function `.L128': cgroup.c:(.text+0x858): undefined reference to `perf_trace_buf_alloc' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/cgroup/cgroup.o: in function `.L129': cgroup.c:(.text+0x8b0): undefined reference to `perf_trace_run_bpf_submit' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/cgroup/cgroup.o: in function `perf_trace_cgroup_event': cgroup.c:(.text+0xa58): undefined reference to `perf_trace_buf_alloc' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/cgroup/cgroup.o: in function `.L147': cgroup.c:(.text+0xab8): undefined reference to `perf_trace_run_bpf_submit' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/cgroup/cgroup.o: in function `.L168': cgroup.c:(.text+0xd70): undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_reserve' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/cgroup/cgroup.o: in function `.L21': cgroup.c:(.text+0xdb4): undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_commit' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/cgroup/cgroup.o: in function `.L192': cgroup.c:(.text+0xe68): undefined reference to `__trace_trigger_soft_disabled' loongarch64-linux-ld: cgroup.c:(.text+0xe9c): undefined reference to `trace_raw_output_prep' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/cgroup/cgroup.o: in function `.L189': cgroup.c:(.text+0xefc): undefined reference to `trace_event_printf' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/cgroup/cgroup.o: in function `.L200': cgroup.c:(.text+0xf1c): undefined reference to `trace_handle_return' loongarch64-linux-ld: cgroup.c:(.text+0xf44): undefined reference to `trace_raw_output_prep' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/cgroup/cgroup.o: in function `.L190': cgroup.c:(.text+0xfa0): undefined reference to `trace_event_printf' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/cgroup/cgroup.o: in function `trace_raw_output_cgroup_root': cgroup.c:(.text+0xfc0): undefined reference to `trace_handle_return' loongarch64-linux-ld: cgroup.c:(.text+0xfec): undefined reference to `trace_raw_output_prep' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/cgroup/cgroup.o: in function `trace_raw_output_cgroup': cgroup.c:(.text+0x106c): undefined reference to `trace_event_printf' loongarch64-linux-ld: cgroup.c:(.text+0x108c): undefined reference to `trace_handle_return' loongarch64-linux-ld: cgroup.c:(.text+0x10b4): undefined reference to `trace_raw_output_prep' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/cgroup/cgroup.o: in function `trace_raw_output_cgroup_migrate': cgroup.c:(.text+0x1124): undefined reference to `trace_event_printf' loongarch64-linux-ld: cgroup.c:(.text+0x1144): undefined reference to `trace_handle_return' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/cgroup/cgroup.o: in function `.L725': cgroup.c:(.text+0x3e50): undefined reference to `perf_trace_buf_alloc' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/cgroup/cgroup.o: in function `.L15': cgroup.c:(.text+0x3ed4): undefined reference to `perf_trace_run_bpf_submit' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/cgroup/cgroup.o: in function `.L756': cgroup.c:(.text+0x4020): undefined reference to `perf_trace_buf_alloc' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/cgroup/cgroup.o: in function `.L761': cgroup.c:(.text+0x407c): undefined reference to `perf_trace_run_bpf_submit' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/cgroup/cgroup.o: in function `.L779': cgroup.c:(.text+0x41d4): undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_reserve' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/cgroup/cgroup.o: in function `.L769': cgroup.c:(.text+0x4218): undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_commit' loongarch64-linux-ld: cgroup.c:(.text+0x4274): undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_reserve' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/cgroup/cgroup.o: in function `.L772': cgroup.c:(.text+0x42c8): undefined reference to `__trace_trigger_soft_disabled' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/cgroup/cgroup.o: in function `perf_trace_cgroup_migrate': cgroup.c:(.text+0x4364): undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_reserve' loongarch64-linux-ld: cgroup.c:(.text+0x4394): undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_commit' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/cgroup/cgroup.o: in function `.L783': cgroup.c:(.text+0x43ec): undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_reserve' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/cgroup/cgroup.o: in function `.L784': cgroup.c:(.text+0x4448): undefined reference to `__trace_trigger_soft_disabled' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/cgroup/cgroup.o: in function `.L799': cgroup.c:(.text+0x4520): undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_reserve' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/cgroup/cgroup.o: in function `perf_trace_cgroup': cgroup.c:(.text+0x4588): undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_commit' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/cgroup/cgroup.o: in function `.L802': cgroup.c:(.text+0x4668): undefined reference to `__trace_trigger_soft_disabled' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/cgroup/cgroup.o:(.ref.data+0x18): undefined reference to `trace_event_reg' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/cgroup/cgroup.o:(.ref.data+0x40): undefined reference to `trace_event_raw_init' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/cgroup/cgroup.o:(.ref.data+0x60): undefined reference to `trace_event_reg' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/cgroup/cgroup.o:(.ref.data+0x88): undefined reference to `trace_event_raw_init' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/cgroup/cgroup.o:(.ref.data+0xa8): undefined reference to `trace_event_reg' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/cgroup/cgroup.o:(.ref.data+0xd0): undefined reference to `trace_event_raw_init' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/cgroup/cgroup.o:(.ref.data+0xf0): undefined reference to `trace_event_reg' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/cgroup/cgroup.o:(.ref.data+0x118): undefined reference to `trace_event_raw_init' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/trace/error_report-traces.o: in function `.L12': error_report-traces.c:(.text+0xdc): undefined reference to `perf_trace_buf_alloc' loongarch64-linux-ld: error_report-traces.c:(.text+0x108): undefined reference to `perf_trace_run_bpf_submit' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/trace/error_report-traces.o: in function `trace_event_raw_event_error_report_template': error_report-traces.c:(.text+0x1d8): undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_reserve' loongarch64-linux-ld: kernel/trace/error_report-traces.o: in function `.L27': error_report-traces.c:(.text+0x1ec): undefined reference to `trace_event_buffer_commit' .. Kconfig warnings: (for reference only) WARNING: unmet direct dependencies detected for PGP_PRELOAD Depends on [n]: CRYPTO [=y] && ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE [=n] Selected by [y]: - PGP_PRELOAD_PUBLIC_KEYS [=y] && CRYPTO [=y] -- 0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service https://github.com/intel/lkp-tests/wiki

1 0

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1 v2 0/5] Fix CVE-2024-45025
by Long Li 26 Sep '24

26 Sep '24

This patch set fix cve-2024-45025 Al Viro (1): fix bitmap corruption on close_range() with CLOSE_RANGE_UNSHARE Alexander Lobakin (4): tools: move alignment-related macros to new <linux/align.h> fs/ntfs3: add prefix to bitmap_size() and use BITS_TO_U64() bitmap: introduce generic optimized bitmap_size() s390/cio: rename bitmap_size() -> idset_bitmap_size() drivers/md/dm-clone-metadata.c | 5 --- drivers/s390/cio/idset.c | 12 ++++--- fs/file.c | 30 +++++++--------- fs/ntfs3/bitmap.c | 4 +-- fs/ntfs3/fsntfs.c | 2 +- fs/ntfs3/index.c | 11 +++--- fs/ntfs3/ntfs_fs.h | 4 +-- fs/ntfs3/super.c | 2 +- include/linux/bitmap.h | 20 +++++++++-- include/linux/cpumask.h | 2 +- lib/math/prime_numbers.c | 2 -- tools/include/linux/align.h | 12 +++++++ tools/include/linux/bitmap.h | 9 ++--- .../testing/selftests/core/close_range_test.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++ 14 files changed, 102 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-) create mode 100644 tools/include/linux/align.h -- 2.39.2

2 6

[PATCH OLK-6.6] arm64/mpam: Fix redefined reference of 'mpam_detect_is_enabled'
by Zeng Heng 26 Sep '24

26 Sep '24

hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/IATSCU -------------------------------- Fix re-defined reference of 'mpam_detect_is_enabled' when CONFIG_ARM64_MPAM is enabled. Fixes: 797c68d3b52d ("arm64/mpam: Check mpam_detect_is_enabled() before accessing MPAM registers") Signed-off-by: Zeng Heng <zengheng4(a)huawei.com> --- arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 7 ------- 1 file changed, 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h index f8ec4b20fa69..4c759e0dcc21 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h @@ -858,14 +858,7 @@ static inline bool cpus_support_mpam(void) cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_MPAM); } -#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_MPAM bool mpam_detect_is_enabled(void); -#else -static inline bool mpam_detect_is_enabled(void) -{ - return false; -} -#endif int do_emulate_mrs(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 sys_reg, u32 rt); bool try_emulate_mrs(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 isn); -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] acpi/arm64: Do not add CPU to node_to_cpumask_map in acpi_map_cpu()
by Xiongfeng Wang 26 Sep '24

26 Sep '24

hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/IATDZ5 CVE: NA -------------------------------- When two vCPUs of NUMA1 are hot added and then taken to online, e.g.: In qemu monitor: device_add host-arm-cpu,socket-id=1,cluster-id=0,core-id=0, thread-id=0,id=core4 device_add host-arm-cpu,socket-id=1,cluster-id=0,core-id=0, thread-id=1,id=core5 In guest: echo 1 > /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu4/online it will appear calltrace as below: WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 286 at kernel/sched/core.c:2293 __set_cpus_allowed_ptr+0x468/0x4d4 Modules linked in: ... CPU: 4 PID: 286 Comm: cpuhp/4 Tainted: G W OE 5.10.0 #1 Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 pstate: 20400085 (nzCv daIf +PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--) pc : __set_cpus_allowed_ptr+0x468/0x4d4 lr : __set_cpus_allowed_ptr+0x440/0x4d4 sp : ffff800010a43c30 x29: ffff800010a43c30 x28: ffff4e2fbffe7c40 x27: ffffa34037fcb450 x26: ffffa340372f2000 x25: 0000000000000004 x24: ffffa34037c47140 x23: ffff4e2f3ffc7480 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: ffff4e2ec0fee040 x20: ffffa34037cb8530 x19: ffffa34037cb7c80 x18: ffff4e2f80242787 x17: 00000000248943a4 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: ffff800010760000 x14: 0000000000001000 x13: ffff80000fffffff x12: 0000000000007290 x11: ffff4e2fbffeeed0 x10: ffffa3403826eea8 x9 : ffffa340341b8290 x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : ffffa3403826a3c8 x6 : ffff4e2ec0fee4f8 x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 00000000000007c7 x3 : ffffffffffffffff x2 : 00000000000000ff x1 : 0000000000000004 x0 : 0000000000000001 Call trace: __set_cpus_allowed_ptr+0x468/0x4d4 set_cpus_allowed_ptr+0x38/0x5c kcompactd_cpu_online+0xb0/0x190 cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x274/0xbb0 cpuhp_thread_fun+0x188/0x36c smpboot_thread_fn+0x144/0x380 kthread+0x190/0x1fc ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 When the WARN_ON occurs, the mask variables is as follows. new_mask: 0-4 activ_mask:0-3 nr_cpus_allowed:2 numa_add_cpu() is called in secondary_start_kernel() when the CPU is brought up online. We need to remove numa_add_cpu() in acpi_map_cpu(). So it is for arch/x86. Also fix it in acpi_unmap_cpu() as well. Fixes: 7eaf6534f708 ("arm64: Add CPU hotplug support") Signed-off-by: Xiongfeng Wang <wangxiongfeng2(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zhou Wang <wangzhou1(a)hisilicon.com> --- arch/arm64/kernel/acpi.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/acpi.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/acpi.c index a81105cfe57e2..f043bec3ba50f 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/acpi.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/acpi.c @@ -417,7 +417,6 @@ int acpi_map_cpu(acpi_handle handle, phys_cpuid_t physid, u32 acpi_id, nid = acpi_get_node(handle); if (nid != NUMA_NO_NODE) { set_cpu_numa_node(cpu, nid); - numa_add_cpu(cpu); } *pcpu = cpu; @@ -430,7 +429,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(acpi_map_cpu); int acpi_unmap_cpu(int cpu) { set_cpu_present(cpu, false); - numa_clear_node(cpu); + set_cpu_numa_node(cpu, NUMA_NO_NODE); return 0; } -- 2.20.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] VMCI: Fix use-after-free when removing resource in vmci_resource_remove()
by Zhang Kunbo 26 Sep '24

26 Sep '24

From: David Fernandez Gonzalez <david.fernandez.gonzalez(a)oracle.com> stable inclusion from stable-v4.19.322 commit f6365931bf7c07b2b397dbb06a4f6573cc9fae73 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IARY1L CVE: CVE-2024-46738 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 48b9a8dabcc3cf5f961b2ebcd8933bf9204babb7 upstream. When removing a resource from vmci_resource_table in vmci_resource_remove(), the search is performed using the resource handle by comparing context and resource fields. It is possible though to create two resources with different types but same handle (same context and resource fields). When trying to remove one of the resources, vmci_resource_remove() may not remove the intended one, but the object will still be freed as in the case of the datagram type in vmci_datagram_destroy_handle(). vmci_resource_table will still hold a pointer to this freed resource leading to a use-after-free vulnerability. BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in vmci_handle_is_equal include/linux/vmw_vmci_defs.h:142 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in vmci_resource_remove+0x3a1/0x410 drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_resource.c:147 Read of size 4 at addr ffff88801c16d800 by task syz-executor197/1592 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x82/0xa9 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x21/0x366 mm/kasan/report.c:239 __kasan_report.cold+0x7f/0x132 mm/kasan/report.c:425 kasan_report+0x38/0x51 mm/kasan/report.c:442 vmci_handle_is_equal include/linux/vmw_vmci_defs.h:142 [inline] vmci_resource_remove+0x3a1/0x410 drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_resource.c:147 vmci_qp_broker_detach+0x89a/0x11b9 drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_queue_pair.c:2182 ctx_free_ctx+0x473/0xbe1 drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_context.c:444 kref_put include/linux/kref.h:65 [inline] vmci_ctx_put drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_context.c:497 [inline] vmci_ctx_destroy+0x170/0x1d6 drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_context.c:195 vmci_host_close+0x125/0x1ac drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_host.c:143 __fput+0x261/0xa34 fs/file_table.c:282 task_work_run+0xf0/0x194 kernel/task_work.c:164 tracehook_notify_resume include/linux/tracehook.h:189 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x184/0x189 kernel/entry/common.c:187 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x11b/0x123 kernel/entry/common.c:220 __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:302 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x18/0x42 kernel/entry/common.c:313 do_syscall_64+0x41/0x85 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x0 This change ensures the type is also checked when removing the resource from vmci_resource_table in vmci_resource_remove(). Fixes: bc63dedb7d46 ("VMCI: resource object implementation.") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: George Kennedy <george.kennedy(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David Fernandez Gonzalez <david.fernandez.gonzalez(a)oracle.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240828154338.754746-1-david.fernandez.gonzalez@… Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Zhang Kunbo <zhangkunbo(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_resource.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_resource.c b/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_resource.c index da1ee2e1ba99..2779704e128a 100644 --- a/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_resource.c +++ b/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_resource.c @@ -152,7 +152,8 @@ void vmci_resource_remove(struct vmci_resource *resource) spin_lock(&vmci_resource_table.lock); hlist_for_each_entry(r, &vmci_resource_table.entries[idx], node) { - if (vmci_handle_is_equal(r->handle, resource->handle)) { + if (vmci_handle_is_equal(r->handle, resource->handle) && + resource->type == r->type) { hlist_del_init_rcu(&r->node); break; } -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS 0/2] fix CVE-2024-46777 for 4.19
by Wupeng Ma 26 Sep '24

26 Sep '24

From: Ma Wupeng <mawupeng1(a)huawei.com> fix cve for CVE-2024-46777. Jan Kara (2): udf: Define EFSCORRUPTED error code udf: Avoid excessive partition lengths fs/udf/super.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ fs/udf/udf_sb.h | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+) -- 2.25.1

2 3

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] bcache: fix variable length array abuse in btree_iter
by Yuan Can 26 Sep '24

26 Sep '24

From: Matthew Mirvish <matthew(a)mm12.xyz> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.221 commit 2c3d7b03b658dc8bfa6112b194b67b92a87e081b category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAB04K CVE: CVE-2024-39482 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 3a861560ccb35f2a4f0a4b8207fa7c2a35fc7f31 upstream. btree_iter is used in two ways: either allocated on the stack with a fixed size MAX_BSETS, or from a mempool with a dynamic size based on the specific cache set. Previously, the struct had a fixed-length array of size MAX_BSETS which was indexed out-of-bounds for the dynamically-sized iterators, which causes UBSAN to complain. This patch uses the same approach as in bcachefs's sort_iter and splits the iterator into a btree_iter with a flexible array member and a btree_iter_stack which embeds a btree_iter as well as a fixed-length data array. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Closes: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/linux/+bug/2039368 Signed-off-by: Matthew Mirvish <matthew(a)mm12.xyz> Signed-off-by: Coly Li <colyli(a)suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240509011117.2697-3-colyli@suse.de Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Yuan Can <yuancan(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/md/bcache/bset.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++------------------ drivers/md/bcache/bset.h | 28 ++++++++++++++-------- drivers/md/bcache/btree.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++--------------- drivers/md/bcache/super.c | 5 ++-- drivers/md/bcache/sysfs.c | 2 +- drivers/md/bcache/writeback.c | 10 ++++---- 6 files changed, 70 insertions(+), 59 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/md/bcache/bset.c b/drivers/md/bcache/bset.c index 94d38e8a59b3..cb544207427b 100644 --- a/drivers/md/bcache/bset.c +++ b/drivers/md/bcache/bset.c @@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ void bch_dump_bucket(struct btree_keys *b) int __bch_count_data(struct btree_keys *b) { unsigned int ret = 0; - struct btree_iter iter; + struct btree_iter_stack iter; struct bkey *k; if (b->ops->is_extents) @@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ void __bch_check_keys(struct btree_keys *b, const char *fmt, ...) { va_list args; struct bkey *k, *p = NULL; - struct btree_iter iter; + struct btree_iter_stack iter; const char *err; for_each_key(b, k, &iter) { @@ -879,7 +879,7 @@ unsigned int bch_btree_insert_key(struct btree_keys *b, struct bkey *k, unsigned int status = BTREE_INSERT_STATUS_NO_INSERT; struct bset *i = bset_tree_last(b)->data; struct bkey *m, *prev = NULL; - struct btree_iter iter; + struct btree_iter_stack iter; struct bkey preceding_key_on_stack = ZERO_KEY; struct bkey *preceding_key_p = &preceding_key_on_stack; @@ -895,9 +895,9 @@ unsigned int bch_btree_insert_key(struct btree_keys *b, struct bkey *k, else preceding_key(k, &preceding_key_p); - m = bch_btree_iter_init(b, &iter, preceding_key_p); + m = bch_btree_iter_stack_init(b, &iter, preceding_key_p); - if (b->ops->insert_fixup(b, k, &iter, replace_key)) + if (b->ops->insert_fixup(b, k, &iter.iter, replace_key)) return status; status = BTREE_INSERT_STATUS_INSERT; @@ -1100,33 +1100,33 @@ void bch_btree_iter_push(struct btree_iter *iter, struct bkey *k, btree_iter_cmp)); } -static struct bkey *__bch_btree_iter_init(struct btree_keys *b, - struct btree_iter *iter, - struct bkey *search, - struct bset_tree *start) +static struct bkey *__bch_btree_iter_stack_init(struct btree_keys *b, + struct btree_iter_stack *iter, + struct bkey *search, + struct bset_tree *start) { struct bkey *ret = NULL; - iter->size = ARRAY_SIZE(iter->data); - iter->used = 0; + iter->iter.size = ARRAY_SIZE(iter->stack_data); + iter->iter.used = 0; #ifdef CONFIG_BCACHE_DEBUG - iter->b = b; + iter->iter.b = b; #endif for (; start <= bset_tree_last(b); start++) { ret = bch_bset_search(b, start, search); - bch_btree_iter_push(iter, ret, bset_bkey_last(start->data)); + bch_btree_iter_push(&iter->iter, ret, bset_bkey_last(start->data)); } return ret; } -struct bkey *bch_btree_iter_init(struct btree_keys *b, - struct btree_iter *iter, +struct bkey *bch_btree_iter_stack_init(struct btree_keys *b, + struct btree_iter_stack *iter, struct bkey *search) { - return __bch_btree_iter_init(b, iter, search, b->set); + return __bch_btree_iter_stack_init(b, iter, search, b->set); } static inline struct bkey *__bch_btree_iter_next(struct btree_iter *iter, @@ -1293,10 +1293,10 @@ void bch_btree_sort_partial(struct btree_keys *b, unsigned int start, struct bset_sort_state *state) { size_t order = b->page_order, keys = 0; - struct btree_iter iter; + struct btree_iter_stack iter; int oldsize = bch_count_data(b); - __bch_btree_iter_init(b, &iter, NULL, &b->set[start]); + __bch_btree_iter_stack_init(b, &iter, NULL, &b->set[start]); if (start) { unsigned int i; @@ -1307,7 +1307,7 @@ void bch_btree_sort_partial(struct btree_keys *b, unsigned int start, order = get_order(__set_bytes(b->set->data, keys)); } - __btree_sort(b, &iter, start, order, false, state); + __btree_sort(b, &iter.iter, start, order, false, state); EBUG_ON(oldsize >= 0 && bch_count_data(b) != oldsize); } @@ -1323,11 +1323,11 @@ void bch_btree_sort_into(struct btree_keys *b, struct btree_keys *new, struct bset_sort_state *state) { uint64_t start_time = local_clock(); - struct btree_iter iter; + struct btree_iter_stack iter; - bch_btree_iter_init(b, &iter, NULL); + bch_btree_iter_stack_init(b, &iter, NULL); - btree_mergesort(b, new->set->data, &iter, false, true); + btree_mergesort(b, new->set->data, &iter.iter, false, true); bch_time_stats_update(&state->time, start_time); diff --git a/drivers/md/bcache/bset.h b/drivers/md/bcache/bset.h index d795c84246b0..011f6062c4c0 100644 --- a/drivers/md/bcache/bset.h +++ b/drivers/md/bcache/bset.h @@ -321,7 +321,14 @@ struct btree_iter { #endif struct btree_iter_set { struct bkey *k, *end; - } data[MAX_BSETS]; + } data[]; +}; + +/* Fixed-size btree_iter that can be allocated on the stack */ + +struct btree_iter_stack { + struct btree_iter iter; + struct btree_iter_set stack_data[MAX_BSETS]; }; typedef bool (*ptr_filter_fn)(struct btree_keys *b, const struct bkey *k); @@ -333,9 +340,9 @@ struct bkey *bch_btree_iter_next_filter(struct btree_iter *iter, void bch_btree_iter_push(struct btree_iter *iter, struct bkey *k, struct bkey *end); -struct bkey *bch_btree_iter_init(struct btree_keys *b, - struct btree_iter *iter, - struct bkey *search); +struct bkey *bch_btree_iter_stack_init(struct btree_keys *b, + struct btree_iter_stack *iter, + struct bkey *search); struct bkey *__bch_bset_search(struct btree_keys *b, struct bset_tree *t, const struct bkey *search); @@ -350,13 +357,14 @@ static inline struct bkey *bch_bset_search(struct btree_keys *b, return search ? __bch_bset_search(b, t, search) : t->data->start; } -#define for_each_key_filter(b, k, iter, filter) \ - for (bch_btree_iter_init((b), (iter), NULL); \ - ((k) = bch_btree_iter_next_filter((iter), (b), filter));) +#define for_each_key_filter(b, k, stack_iter, filter) \ + for (bch_btree_iter_stack_init((b), (stack_iter), NULL); \ + ((k) = bch_btree_iter_next_filter(&((stack_iter)->iter), (b), \ + filter));) -#define for_each_key(b, k, iter) \ - for (bch_btree_iter_init((b), (iter), NULL); \ - ((k) = bch_btree_iter_next(iter));) +#define for_each_key(b, k, stack_iter) \ + for (bch_btree_iter_stack_init((b), (stack_iter), NULL); \ + ((k) = bch_btree_iter_next(&((stack_iter)->iter)));) /* Sorting */ diff --git a/drivers/md/bcache/btree.c b/drivers/md/bcache/btree.c index 98daa9d200f7..da24a3ca69e5 100644 --- a/drivers/md/bcache/btree.c +++ b/drivers/md/bcache/btree.c @@ -1274,7 +1274,7 @@ static bool btree_gc_mark_node(struct btree *b, struct gc_stat *gc) uint8_t stale = 0; unsigned int keys = 0, good_keys = 0; struct bkey *k; - struct btree_iter iter; + struct btree_iter_stack iter; struct bset_tree *t; gc->nodes++; @@ -1533,7 +1533,7 @@ static int btree_gc_rewrite_node(struct btree *b, struct btree_op *op, static unsigned int btree_gc_count_keys(struct btree *b) { struct bkey *k; - struct btree_iter iter; + struct btree_iter_stack iter; unsigned int ret = 0; for_each_key_filter(&b->keys, k, &iter, bch_ptr_bad) @@ -1574,17 +1574,18 @@ static int btree_gc_recurse(struct btree *b, struct btree_op *op, int ret = 0; bool should_rewrite; struct bkey *k; - struct btree_iter iter; + struct btree_iter_stack iter; struct gc_merge_info r[GC_MERGE_NODES]; struct gc_merge_info *i, *last = r + ARRAY_SIZE(r) - 1; - bch_btree_iter_init(&b->keys, &iter, &b->c->gc_done); + bch_btree_iter_stack_init(&b->keys, &iter, &b->c->gc_done); for (i = r; i < r + ARRAY_SIZE(r); i++) i->b = ERR_PTR(-EINTR); while (1) { - k = bch_btree_iter_next_filter(&iter, &b->keys, bch_ptr_bad); + k = bch_btree_iter_next_filter(&iter.iter, &b->keys, + bch_ptr_bad); if (k) { r->b = bch_btree_node_get(b->c, op, k, b->level - 1, true, b); @@ -1874,7 +1875,7 @@ static int bch_btree_check_recurse(struct btree *b, struct btree_op *op) { int ret = 0; struct bkey *k, *p = NULL; - struct btree_iter iter; + struct btree_iter_stack iter; for_each_key_filter(&b->keys, k, &iter, bch_ptr_invalid) bch_initial_mark_key(b->c, b->level, k); @@ -1882,10 +1883,10 @@ static int bch_btree_check_recurse(struct btree *b, struct btree_op *op) bch_initial_mark_key(b->c, b->level + 1, &b->key); if (b->level) { - bch_btree_iter_init(&b->keys, &iter, NULL); + bch_btree_iter_stack_init(&b->keys, &iter, NULL); do { - k = bch_btree_iter_next_filter(&iter, &b->keys, + k = bch_btree_iter_next_filter(&iter.iter, &b->keys, bch_ptr_bad); if (k) { btree_node_prefetch(b, k); @@ -1913,7 +1914,7 @@ static int bch_btree_check_thread(void *arg) struct btree_check_info *info = arg; struct btree_check_state *check_state = info->state; struct cache_set *c = check_state->c; - struct btree_iter iter; + struct btree_iter_stack iter; struct bkey *k, *p; int cur_idx, prev_idx, skip_nr; @@ -1922,8 +1923,8 @@ static int bch_btree_check_thread(void *arg) ret = 0; /* root node keys are checked before thread created */ - bch_btree_iter_init(&c->root->keys, &iter, NULL); - k = bch_btree_iter_next_filter(&iter, &c->root->keys, bch_ptr_bad); + bch_btree_iter_stack_init(&c->root->keys, &iter, NULL); + k = bch_btree_iter_next_filter(&iter.iter, &c->root->keys, bch_ptr_bad); BUG_ON(!k); p = k; @@ -1941,7 +1942,7 @@ static int bch_btree_check_thread(void *arg) skip_nr = cur_idx - prev_idx; while (skip_nr) { - k = bch_btree_iter_next_filter(&iter, + k = bch_btree_iter_next_filter(&iter.iter, &c->root->keys, bch_ptr_bad); if (k) @@ -2005,7 +2006,7 @@ int bch_btree_check(struct cache_set *c) int ret = 0; int i; struct bkey *k = NULL; - struct btree_iter iter; + struct btree_iter_stack iter; struct btree_check_state check_state; /* check and mark root node keys */ @@ -2501,11 +2502,11 @@ static int bch_btree_map_nodes_recurse(struct btree *b, struct btree_op *op, if (b->level) { struct bkey *k; - struct btree_iter iter; + struct btree_iter_stack iter; - bch_btree_iter_init(&b->keys, &iter, from); + bch_btree_iter_stack_init(&b->keys, &iter, from); - while ((k = bch_btree_iter_next_filter(&iter, &b->keys, + while ((k = bch_btree_iter_next_filter(&iter.iter, &b->keys, bch_ptr_bad))) { ret = bcache_btree(map_nodes_recurse, k, b, op, from, fn, flags); @@ -2534,11 +2535,12 @@ int bch_btree_map_keys_recurse(struct btree *b, struct btree_op *op, { int ret = MAP_CONTINUE; struct bkey *k; - struct btree_iter iter; + struct btree_iter_stack iter; - bch_btree_iter_init(&b->keys, &iter, from); + bch_btree_iter_stack_init(&b->keys, &iter, from); - while ((k = bch_btree_iter_next_filter(&iter, &b->keys, bch_ptr_bad))) { + while ((k = bch_btree_iter_next_filter(&iter.iter, &b->keys, + bch_ptr_bad))) { ret = !b->level ? fn(op, b, k) : bcache_btree(map_keys_recurse, k, diff --git a/drivers/md/bcache/super.c b/drivers/md/bcache/super.c index b5601f200c09..c778862f4f33 100644 --- a/drivers/md/bcache/super.c +++ b/drivers/md/bcache/super.c @@ -1928,8 +1928,9 @@ struct cache_set *bch_cache_set_alloc(struct cache_sb *sb) INIT_LIST_HEAD(&c->btree_cache_freed); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&c->data_buckets); - iter_size = ((meta_bucket_pages(sb) * PAGE_SECTORS) / sb->block_size + 1) * - sizeof(struct btree_iter_set); + iter_size = sizeof(struct btree_iter) + + ((meta_bucket_pages(sb) * PAGE_SECTORS) / sb->block_size) * + sizeof(struct btree_iter_set); c->devices = kcalloc(c->nr_uuids, sizeof(void *), GFP_KERNEL); if (!c->devices) diff --git a/drivers/md/bcache/sysfs.c b/drivers/md/bcache/sysfs.c index 8467e37411a7..84b8e9e90ee6 100644 --- a/drivers/md/bcache/sysfs.c +++ b/drivers/md/bcache/sysfs.c @@ -660,7 +660,7 @@ static unsigned int bch_root_usage(struct cache_set *c) unsigned int bytes = 0; struct bkey *k; struct btree *b; - struct btree_iter iter; + struct btree_iter_stack iter; goto lock_root; diff --git a/drivers/md/bcache/writeback.c b/drivers/md/bcache/writeback.c index 83dcdd85abc0..9502cc9b0c80 100644 --- a/drivers/md/bcache/writeback.c +++ b/drivers/md/bcache/writeback.c @@ -899,15 +899,15 @@ static int bch_dirty_init_thread(void *arg) struct dirty_init_thrd_info *info = arg; struct bch_dirty_init_state *state = info->state; struct cache_set *c = state->c; - struct btree_iter iter; + struct btree_iter_stack iter; struct bkey *k, *p; int cur_idx, prev_idx, skip_nr; k = p = NULL; cur_idx = prev_idx = 0; - bch_btree_iter_init(&c->root->keys, &iter, NULL); - k = bch_btree_iter_next_filter(&iter, &c->root->keys, bch_ptr_bad); + bch_btree_iter_stack_init(&c->root->keys, &iter, NULL); + k = bch_btree_iter_next_filter(&iter.iter, &c->root->keys, bch_ptr_bad); BUG_ON(!k); p = k; @@ -921,7 +921,7 @@ static int bch_dirty_init_thread(void *arg) skip_nr = cur_idx - prev_idx; while (skip_nr) { - k = bch_btree_iter_next_filter(&iter, + k = bch_btree_iter_next_filter(&iter.iter, &c->root->keys, bch_ptr_bad); if (k) @@ -969,7 +969,7 @@ void bch_sectors_dirty_init(struct bcache_device *d) { int i; struct bkey *k = NULL; - struct btree_iter iter; + struct btree_iter_stack iter; struct sectors_dirty_init op; struct cache_set *c = d->c; struct bch_dirty_init_state state; -- 2.17.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] usb: gadget: f_fs: Fix race between aio_cancel() and AIO request complete
by Yuan Can 26 Sep '24

26 Sep '24

From: Wesley Cheng <quic_wcheng(a)quicinc.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.221 commit e500b1c4e29ad0bd1c1332a1eaea2913627a92dd category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9TXIA CVE: CVE-2024-36894 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 24729b307eefcd7c476065cd7351c1a018082c19 ] FFS based applications can utilize the aio_cancel() callback to dequeue pending USB requests submitted to the UDC. There is a scenario where the FFS application issues an AIO cancel call, while the UDC is handling a soft disconnect. For a DWC3 based implementation, the callstack looks like the following: DWC3 Gadget FFS Application dwc3_gadget_soft_disconnect() ... --> dwc3_stop_active_transfers() --> dwc3_gadget_giveback(-ESHUTDOWN) --> ffs_epfile_async_io_complete() ffs_aio_cancel() --> usb_ep_free_request() --> usb_ep_dequeue() There is currently no locking implemented between the AIO completion handler and AIO cancel, so the issue occurs if the completion routine is running in parallel to an AIO cancel call coming from the FFS application. As the completion call frees the USB request (io_data->req) the FFS application is also referencing it for the usb_ep_dequeue() call. This can lead to accessing a stale/hanging pointer. commit b566d38857fc ("usb: gadget: f_fs: use io_data->status consistently") relocated the usb_ep_free_request() into ffs_epfile_async_io_complete(). However, in order to properly implement locking to mitigate this issue, the spinlock can't be added to ffs_epfile_async_io_complete(), as usb_ep_dequeue() (if successfully dequeuing a USB request) will call the function driver's completion handler in the same context. Hence, leading into a deadlock. Fix this issue by moving the usb_ep_free_request() back to ffs_user_copy_worker(), and ensuring that it explicitly sets io_data->req to NULL after freeing it within the ffs->eps_lock. This resolves the race condition above, as the ffs_aio_cancel() routine will not continue attempting to dequeue a request that has already been freed, or the ffs_user_copy_work() not freeing the USB request until the AIO cancel is done referencing it. This fix depends on commit b566d38857fc ("usb: gadget: f_fs: use io_data->status consistently") Fixes: 2e4c7553cd6f ("usb: gadget: f_fs: add aio support") Cc: stable <stable(a)kernel.org> # b566d38857fc ("usb: gadget: f_fs: use io_data->status consistently") Signed-off-by: Wesley Cheng <quic_wcheng(a)quicinc.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240409014059.6740-1-quic_wcheng@quicinc.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Yuan Can <yuancan(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c index bb0d92837f67..f98a6010fa50 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c +++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c @@ -822,6 +822,7 @@ static void ffs_user_copy_worker(struct work_struct *work) int ret = io_data->req->status ? io_data->req->status : io_data->req->actual; bool kiocb_has_eventfd = io_data->kiocb->ki_flags & IOCB_EVENTFD; + unsigned long flags; if (io_data->read && ret > 0) { kthread_use_mm(io_data->mm); @@ -834,7 +835,10 @@ static void ffs_user_copy_worker(struct work_struct *work) if (io_data->ffs->ffs_eventfd && !kiocb_has_eventfd) eventfd_signal(io_data->ffs->ffs_eventfd, 1); + spin_lock_irqsave(&io_data->ffs->eps_lock, flags); usb_ep_free_request(io_data->ep, io_data->req); + io_data->req = NULL; + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&io_data->ffs->eps_lock, flags); if (io_data->read) kfree(io_data->to_free); -- 2.17.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] misc: fastrpc: Fix double free of 'buf' in error path
by Xiaomeng Zhang 26 Sep '24

26 Sep '24

From: Sukrut Bellary <sukrut.bellary(a)linux.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.10.10 commit bfc1704d909dc9911a558b1a5833d3d61a43a1f2 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IATRLJ CVE: CVE-2024-46741 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit e8c276d4dc0e19ee48385f74426aebc855b49aaf upstream. smatch warning: drivers/misc/fastrpc.c:1926 fastrpc_req_mmap() error: double free of 'buf' In fastrpc_req_mmap() error path, the fastrpc buffer is freed in fastrpc_req_munmap_impl() if unmap is successful. But in the end, there is an unconditional call to fastrpc_buf_free(). So the above case triggers the double free of fastrpc buf. Fixes: 72fa6f7820c4 ("misc: fastrpc: Rework fastrpc_req_munmap") Reviewed-by: Shuah Khan <skhan(a)linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter(a)linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <srinivas.kandagatla(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Sukrut Bellary <sukrut.bellary(a)linux.com> Signed-off-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <srinivas.kandagatla(a)linaro.org> Cc: stable <stable(a)kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240902141409.70371-2-srinivas.kandagatla@linaro… Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Xiaomeng Zhang <zhangxiaomeng13(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/misc/fastrpc.c | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/misc/fastrpc.c b/drivers/misc/fastrpc.c index bbcbc921f3ab..8be1504baf53 100644 --- a/drivers/misc/fastrpc.c +++ b/drivers/misc/fastrpc.c @@ -1912,7 +1912,8 @@ static int fastrpc_req_mmap(struct fastrpc_user *fl, char __user *argp) &args[0]); if (err) { dev_err(dev, "mmap error (len 0x%08llx)\n", buf->size); - goto err_invoke; + fastrpc_buf_free(buf); + return err; } /* update the buffer to be able to deallocate the memory on the DSP */ @@ -1950,8 +1951,6 @@ static int fastrpc_req_mmap(struct fastrpc_user *fl, char __user *argp) err_assign: fastrpc_req_munmap_impl(fl, buf); -err_invoke: - fastrpc_buf_free(buf); return err; } -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] bcache: fix variable length array abuse in btree_iter
by Yuan Can 26 Sep '24

26 Sep '24

From: Matthew Mirvish <matthew(a)mm12.xyz> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.221 commit 2c3d7b03b658dc8bfa6112b194b67b92a87e081b category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAB04K CVE: CVE-2024-39482 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 3a861560ccb35f2a4f0a4b8207fa7c2a35fc7f31 upstream. btree_iter is used in two ways: either allocated on the stack with a fixed size MAX_BSETS, or from a mempool with a dynamic size based on the specific cache set. Previously, the struct had a fixed-length array of size MAX_BSETS which was indexed out-of-bounds for the dynamically-sized iterators, which causes UBSAN to complain. This patch uses the same approach as in bcachefs's sort_iter and splits the iterator into a btree_iter with a flexible array member and a btree_iter_stack which embeds a btree_iter as well as a fixed-length data array. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Closes: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/linux/+bug/2039368 Signed-off-by: Matthew Mirvish <matthew(a)mm12.xyz> Signed-off-by: Coly Li <colyli(a)suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240509011117.2697-3-colyli@suse.de Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Yuan Can <yuancan(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/md/bcache/bset.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++------------------ drivers/md/bcache/bset.h | 28 ++++++++++++++-------- drivers/md/bcache/btree.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++--------------- drivers/md/bcache/super.c | 5 ++-- drivers/md/bcache/sysfs.c | 2 +- drivers/md/bcache/writeback.c | 10 ++++---- 6 files changed, 70 insertions(+), 59 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/md/bcache/bset.c b/drivers/md/bcache/bset.c index 94d38e8a59b3..cb544207427b 100644 --- a/drivers/md/bcache/bset.c +++ b/drivers/md/bcache/bset.c @@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ void bch_dump_bucket(struct btree_keys *b) int __bch_count_data(struct btree_keys *b) { unsigned int ret = 0; - struct btree_iter iter; + struct btree_iter_stack iter; struct bkey *k; if (b->ops->is_extents) @@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ void __bch_check_keys(struct btree_keys *b, const char *fmt, ...) { va_list args; struct bkey *k, *p = NULL; - struct btree_iter iter; + struct btree_iter_stack iter; const char *err; for_each_key(b, k, &iter) { @@ -879,7 +879,7 @@ unsigned int bch_btree_insert_key(struct btree_keys *b, struct bkey *k, unsigned int status = BTREE_INSERT_STATUS_NO_INSERT; struct bset *i = bset_tree_last(b)->data; struct bkey *m, *prev = NULL; - struct btree_iter iter; + struct btree_iter_stack iter; struct bkey preceding_key_on_stack = ZERO_KEY; struct bkey *preceding_key_p = &preceding_key_on_stack; @@ -895,9 +895,9 @@ unsigned int bch_btree_insert_key(struct btree_keys *b, struct bkey *k, else preceding_key(k, &preceding_key_p); - m = bch_btree_iter_init(b, &iter, preceding_key_p); + m = bch_btree_iter_stack_init(b, &iter, preceding_key_p); - if (b->ops->insert_fixup(b, k, &iter, replace_key)) + if (b->ops->insert_fixup(b, k, &iter.iter, replace_key)) return status; status = BTREE_INSERT_STATUS_INSERT; @@ -1100,33 +1100,33 @@ void bch_btree_iter_push(struct btree_iter *iter, struct bkey *k, btree_iter_cmp)); } -static struct bkey *__bch_btree_iter_init(struct btree_keys *b, - struct btree_iter *iter, - struct bkey *search, - struct bset_tree *start) +static struct bkey *__bch_btree_iter_stack_init(struct btree_keys *b, + struct btree_iter_stack *iter, + struct bkey *search, + struct bset_tree *start) { struct bkey *ret = NULL; - iter->size = ARRAY_SIZE(iter->data); - iter->used = 0; + iter->iter.size = ARRAY_SIZE(iter->stack_data); + iter->iter.used = 0; #ifdef CONFIG_BCACHE_DEBUG - iter->b = b; + iter->iter.b = b; #endif for (; start <= bset_tree_last(b); start++) { ret = bch_bset_search(b, start, search); - bch_btree_iter_push(iter, ret, bset_bkey_last(start->data)); + bch_btree_iter_push(&iter->iter, ret, bset_bkey_last(start->data)); } return ret; } -struct bkey *bch_btree_iter_init(struct btree_keys *b, - struct btree_iter *iter, +struct bkey *bch_btree_iter_stack_init(struct btree_keys *b, + struct btree_iter_stack *iter, struct bkey *search) { - return __bch_btree_iter_init(b, iter, search, b->set); + return __bch_btree_iter_stack_init(b, iter, search, b->set); } static inline struct bkey *__bch_btree_iter_next(struct btree_iter *iter, @@ -1293,10 +1293,10 @@ void bch_btree_sort_partial(struct btree_keys *b, unsigned int start, struct bset_sort_state *state) { size_t order = b->page_order, keys = 0; - struct btree_iter iter; + struct btree_iter_stack iter; int oldsize = bch_count_data(b); - __bch_btree_iter_init(b, &iter, NULL, &b->set[start]); + __bch_btree_iter_stack_init(b, &iter, NULL, &b->set[start]); if (start) { unsigned int i; @@ -1307,7 +1307,7 @@ void bch_btree_sort_partial(struct btree_keys *b, unsigned int start, order = get_order(__set_bytes(b->set->data, keys)); } - __btree_sort(b, &iter, start, order, false, state); + __btree_sort(b, &iter.iter, start, order, false, state); EBUG_ON(oldsize >= 0 && bch_count_data(b) != oldsize); } @@ -1323,11 +1323,11 @@ void bch_btree_sort_into(struct btree_keys *b, struct btree_keys *new, struct bset_sort_state *state) { uint64_t start_time = local_clock(); - struct btree_iter iter; + struct btree_iter_stack iter; - bch_btree_iter_init(b, &iter, NULL); + bch_btree_iter_stack_init(b, &iter, NULL); - btree_mergesort(b, new->set->data, &iter, false, true); + btree_mergesort(b, new->set->data, &iter.iter, false, true); bch_time_stats_update(&state->time, start_time); diff --git a/drivers/md/bcache/bset.h b/drivers/md/bcache/bset.h index d795c84246b0..011f6062c4c0 100644 --- a/drivers/md/bcache/bset.h +++ b/drivers/md/bcache/bset.h @@ -321,7 +321,14 @@ struct btree_iter { #endif struct btree_iter_set { struct bkey *k, *end; - } data[MAX_BSETS]; + } data[]; +}; + +/* Fixed-size btree_iter that can be allocated on the stack */ + +struct btree_iter_stack { + struct btree_iter iter; + struct btree_iter_set stack_data[MAX_BSETS]; }; typedef bool (*ptr_filter_fn)(struct btree_keys *b, const struct bkey *k); @@ -333,9 +340,9 @@ struct bkey *bch_btree_iter_next_filter(struct btree_iter *iter, void bch_btree_iter_push(struct btree_iter *iter, struct bkey *k, struct bkey *end); -struct bkey *bch_btree_iter_init(struct btree_keys *b, - struct btree_iter *iter, - struct bkey *search); +struct bkey *bch_btree_iter_stack_init(struct btree_keys *b, + struct btree_iter_stack *iter, + struct bkey *search); struct bkey *__bch_bset_search(struct btree_keys *b, struct bset_tree *t, const struct bkey *search); @@ -350,13 +357,14 @@ static inline struct bkey *bch_bset_search(struct btree_keys *b, return search ? __bch_bset_search(b, t, search) : t->data->start; } -#define for_each_key_filter(b, k, iter, filter) \ - for (bch_btree_iter_init((b), (iter), NULL); \ - ((k) = bch_btree_iter_next_filter((iter), (b), filter));) +#define for_each_key_filter(b, k, stack_iter, filter) \ + for (bch_btree_iter_stack_init((b), (stack_iter), NULL); \ + ((k) = bch_btree_iter_next_filter(&((stack_iter)->iter), (b), \ + filter));) -#define for_each_key(b, k, iter) \ - for (bch_btree_iter_init((b), (iter), NULL); \ - ((k) = bch_btree_iter_next(iter));) +#define for_each_key(b, k, stack_iter) \ + for (bch_btree_iter_stack_init((b), (stack_iter), NULL); \ + ((k) = bch_btree_iter_next(&((stack_iter)->iter)));) /* Sorting */ diff --git a/drivers/md/bcache/btree.c b/drivers/md/bcache/btree.c index 98daa9d200f7..da24a3ca69e5 100644 --- a/drivers/md/bcache/btree.c +++ b/drivers/md/bcache/btree.c @@ -1274,7 +1274,7 @@ static bool btree_gc_mark_node(struct btree *b, struct gc_stat *gc) uint8_t stale = 0; unsigned int keys = 0, good_keys = 0; struct bkey *k; - struct btree_iter iter; + struct btree_iter_stack iter; struct bset_tree *t; gc->nodes++; @@ -1533,7 +1533,7 @@ static int btree_gc_rewrite_node(struct btree *b, struct btree_op *op, static unsigned int btree_gc_count_keys(struct btree *b) { struct bkey *k; - struct btree_iter iter; + struct btree_iter_stack iter; unsigned int ret = 0; for_each_key_filter(&b->keys, k, &iter, bch_ptr_bad) @@ -1574,17 +1574,18 @@ static int btree_gc_recurse(struct btree *b, struct btree_op *op, int ret = 0; bool should_rewrite; struct bkey *k; - struct btree_iter iter; + struct btree_iter_stack iter; struct gc_merge_info r[GC_MERGE_NODES]; struct gc_merge_info *i, *last = r + ARRAY_SIZE(r) - 1; - bch_btree_iter_init(&b->keys, &iter, &b->c->gc_done); + bch_btree_iter_stack_init(&b->keys, &iter, &b->c->gc_done); for (i = r; i < r + ARRAY_SIZE(r); i++) i->b = ERR_PTR(-EINTR); while (1) { - k = bch_btree_iter_next_filter(&iter, &b->keys, bch_ptr_bad); + k = bch_btree_iter_next_filter(&iter.iter, &b->keys, + bch_ptr_bad); if (k) { r->b = bch_btree_node_get(b->c, op, k, b->level - 1, true, b); @@ -1874,7 +1875,7 @@ static int bch_btree_check_recurse(struct btree *b, struct btree_op *op) { int ret = 0; struct bkey *k, *p = NULL; - struct btree_iter iter; + struct btree_iter_stack iter; for_each_key_filter(&b->keys, k, &iter, bch_ptr_invalid) bch_initial_mark_key(b->c, b->level, k); @@ -1882,10 +1883,10 @@ static int bch_btree_check_recurse(struct btree *b, struct btree_op *op) bch_initial_mark_key(b->c, b->level + 1, &b->key); if (b->level) { - bch_btree_iter_init(&b->keys, &iter, NULL); + bch_btree_iter_stack_init(&b->keys, &iter, NULL); do { - k = bch_btree_iter_next_filter(&iter, &b->keys, + k = bch_btree_iter_next_filter(&iter.iter, &b->keys, bch_ptr_bad); if (k) { btree_node_prefetch(b, k); @@ -1913,7 +1914,7 @@ static int bch_btree_check_thread(void *arg) struct btree_check_info *info = arg; struct btree_check_state *check_state = info->state; struct cache_set *c = check_state->c; - struct btree_iter iter; + struct btree_iter_stack iter; struct bkey *k, *p; int cur_idx, prev_idx, skip_nr; @@ -1922,8 +1923,8 @@ static int bch_btree_check_thread(void *arg) ret = 0; /* root node keys are checked before thread created */ - bch_btree_iter_init(&c->root->keys, &iter, NULL); - k = bch_btree_iter_next_filter(&iter, &c->root->keys, bch_ptr_bad); + bch_btree_iter_stack_init(&c->root->keys, &iter, NULL); + k = bch_btree_iter_next_filter(&iter.iter, &c->root->keys, bch_ptr_bad); BUG_ON(!k); p = k; @@ -1941,7 +1942,7 @@ static int bch_btree_check_thread(void *arg) skip_nr = cur_idx - prev_idx; while (skip_nr) { - k = bch_btree_iter_next_filter(&iter, + k = bch_btree_iter_next_filter(&iter.iter, &c->root->keys, bch_ptr_bad); if (k) @@ -2005,7 +2006,7 @@ int bch_btree_check(struct cache_set *c) int ret = 0; int i; struct bkey *k = NULL; - struct btree_iter iter; + struct btree_iter_stack iter; struct btree_check_state check_state; /* check and mark root node keys */ @@ -2501,11 +2502,11 @@ static int bch_btree_map_nodes_recurse(struct btree *b, struct btree_op *op, if (b->level) { struct bkey *k; - struct btree_iter iter; + struct btree_iter_stack iter; - bch_btree_iter_init(&b->keys, &iter, from); + bch_btree_iter_stack_init(&b->keys, &iter, from); - while ((k = bch_btree_iter_next_filter(&iter, &b->keys, + while ((k = bch_btree_iter_next_filter(&iter.iter, &b->keys, bch_ptr_bad))) { ret = bcache_btree(map_nodes_recurse, k, b, op, from, fn, flags); @@ -2534,11 +2535,12 @@ int bch_btree_map_keys_recurse(struct btree *b, struct btree_op *op, { int ret = MAP_CONTINUE; struct bkey *k; - struct btree_iter iter; + struct btree_iter_stack iter; - bch_btree_iter_init(&b->keys, &iter, from); + bch_btree_iter_stack_init(&b->keys, &iter, from); - while ((k = bch_btree_iter_next_filter(&iter, &b->keys, bch_ptr_bad))) { + while ((k = bch_btree_iter_next_filter(&iter.iter, &b->keys, + bch_ptr_bad))) { ret = !b->level ? fn(op, b, k) : bcache_btree(map_keys_recurse, k, diff --git a/drivers/md/bcache/super.c b/drivers/md/bcache/super.c index b5601f200c09..c778862f4f33 100644 --- a/drivers/md/bcache/super.c +++ b/drivers/md/bcache/super.c @@ -1928,8 +1928,9 @@ struct cache_set *bch_cache_set_alloc(struct cache_sb *sb) INIT_LIST_HEAD(&c->btree_cache_freed); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&c->data_buckets); - iter_size = ((meta_bucket_pages(sb) * PAGE_SECTORS) / sb->block_size + 1) * - sizeof(struct btree_iter_set); + iter_size = sizeof(struct btree_iter) + + ((meta_bucket_pages(sb) * PAGE_SECTORS) / sb->block_size) * + sizeof(struct btree_iter_set); c->devices = kcalloc(c->nr_uuids, sizeof(void *), GFP_KERNEL); if (!c->devices) diff --git a/drivers/md/bcache/sysfs.c b/drivers/md/bcache/sysfs.c index 8467e37411a7..84b8e9e90ee6 100644 --- a/drivers/md/bcache/sysfs.c +++ b/drivers/md/bcache/sysfs.c @@ -660,7 +660,7 @@ static unsigned int bch_root_usage(struct cache_set *c) unsigned int bytes = 0; struct bkey *k; struct btree *b; - struct btree_iter iter; + struct btree_iter_stack iter; goto lock_root; diff --git a/drivers/md/bcache/writeback.c b/drivers/md/bcache/writeback.c index 83dcdd85abc0..9502cc9b0c80 100644 --- a/drivers/md/bcache/writeback.c +++ b/drivers/md/bcache/writeback.c @@ -899,15 +899,15 @@ static int bch_dirty_init_thread(void *arg) struct dirty_init_thrd_info *info = arg; struct bch_dirty_init_state *state = info->state; struct cache_set *c = state->c; - struct btree_iter iter; + struct btree_iter_stack iter; struct bkey *k, *p; int cur_idx, prev_idx, skip_nr; k = p = NULL; cur_idx = prev_idx = 0; - bch_btree_iter_init(&c->root->keys, &iter, NULL); - k = bch_btree_iter_next_filter(&iter, &c->root->keys, bch_ptr_bad); + bch_btree_iter_stack_init(&c->root->keys, &iter, NULL); + k = bch_btree_iter_next_filter(&iter.iter, &c->root->keys, bch_ptr_bad); BUG_ON(!k); p = k; @@ -921,7 +921,7 @@ static int bch_dirty_init_thread(void *arg) skip_nr = cur_idx - prev_idx; while (skip_nr) { - k = bch_btree_iter_next_filter(&iter, + k = bch_btree_iter_next_filter(&iter.iter, &c->root->keys, bch_ptr_bad); if (k) @@ -969,7 +969,7 @@ void bch_sectors_dirty_init(struct bcache_device *d) { int i; struct bkey *k = NULL; - struct btree_iter iter; + struct btree_iter_stack iter; struct sectors_dirty_init op; struct cache_set *c = d->c; struct bch_dirty_init_state state; -- 2.17.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] fix: fix version showed in ethtool
by s00851154 26 Sep '24

26 Sep '24

Fix the version in the output of ethtool commands from empty to the kernel version. Use the macro HINIC3_NIC_DRV_VERSION to record driver changes for developers. The last number 1.0.X grow as minor changes, like this revision which does not affect the main functions. The middle number 1.X.1 iterates with changes to drivers functionality and fixing of serious bugs, and the first one X.0.1 means the number of releases of the driver. Signed-off-by: Shi Jing <shijing34(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/net/ethernet/huawei/hinic3/hinic3_ethtool.c | 1 - drivers/net/ethernet/huawei/hinic3/hinic3_nic_dev.h | 2 +- 2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/huawei/hinic3/hinic3_ethtool.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/huawei/hinic3/hinic3_ethtool.c index 5a1995956a555..4ea526329d155 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/huawei/hinic3/hinic3_ethtool.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/huawei/hinic3/hinic3_ethtool.c @@ -45,7 +45,6 @@ static void hinic3_get_drvinfo(struct net_device *netdev, int err; strscpy(info->driver, HINIC3_NIC_DRV_NAME, sizeof(info->driver)); - strscpy(info->version, HINIC3_NIC_DRV_VERSION, sizeof(info->version)); strscpy(info->bus_info, pci_name(pdev), sizeof(info->bus_info)); err = hinic3_get_mgmt_version(nic_dev->hwdev, mgmt_ver, diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/huawei/hinic3/hinic3_nic_dev.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/huawei/hinic3/hinic3_nic_dev.h index 2967311aab76c..5868187eafa99 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/huawei/hinic3/hinic3_nic_dev.h +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/huawei/hinic3/hinic3_nic_dev.h @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ #include "hinic3_dcb.h" #define HINIC3_NIC_DRV_NAME "hinic3" -#define HINIC3_NIC_DRV_VERSION "" +#define HINIC3_NIC_DRV_VERSION "1.0.1" #define HINIC3_FUNC_IS_VF(hwdev) (hinic3_func_type(hwdev) == TYPE_VF) -- 2.28.0.windows.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] bpf: verifier: prevent userspace memory access
by Pu Lehui 26 Sep '24

26 Sep '24

From: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay12(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.9-rc7 commit 66e13b615a0ce76b785d780ecc9776ba71983629 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/IATK7C Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- With BPF_PROBE_MEM, BPF allows de-referencing an untrusted pointer. To thwart invalid memory accesses, the JITs add an exception table entry for all such accesses. But in case the src_reg + offset is a userspace address, the BPF program might read that memory if the user has mapped it. Make the verifier add guard instructions around such memory accesses and skip the load if the address falls into the userspace region. The JITs need to implement bpf_arch_uaddress_limit() to define where the userspace addresses end for that architecture or TASK_SIZE is taken as default. The implementation is as follows: REG_AX = SRC_REG if(offset) REG_AX += offset; REG_AX >>= 32; if (REG_AX <= (uaddress_limit >> 32)) DST_REG = 0; else DST_REG = *(size *)(SRC_REG + offset); Comparing just the upper 32 bits of the load address with the upper 32 bits of uaddress_limit implies that the values are being aligned down to a 4GB boundary before comparison. The above means that all loads with address <= uaddress_limit + 4GB are skipped. This is acceptable because there is a large hole (much larger than 4GB) between userspace and kernel space memory, therefore a correctly functioning BPF program should not access this 4GB memory above the userspace. Let's analyze what this patch does to the following fentry program dereferencing an untrusted pointer: SEC("fentry/tcp_v4_connect") int BPF_PROG(fentry_tcp_v4_connect, struct sock *sk) { *(volatile long *)sk; return 0; } BPF Program before | BPF Program after ------------------ | ----------------- 0: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0) 0: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0) ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 1: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0) --\ 1: (bf) r11 = r1 ----------------------------\ \ 2: (77) r11 >>= 32 2: (b7) r0 = 0 \ \ 3: (b5) if r11 <= 0x8000 goto pc+2 3: (95) exit \ \-> 4: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0) \ 5: (05) goto pc+1 \ 6: (b7) r1 = 0 \-------------------------------------- 7: (b7) r0 = 0 8: (95) exit As you can see from above, in the best case (off=0), 5 extra instructions are emitted. Now, we analyze the same program after it has gone through the JITs of ARM64 and RISC-V architectures. We follow the single load instruction that has the untrusted pointer and see what instrumentation has been added around it. x86-64 JIT ========== JIT's Instrumentation (upstream) --------------------- 0: nopl 0x0(%rax,%rax,1) 5: xchg %ax,%ax 7: push %rbp 8: mov %rsp,%rbp b: mov 0x0(%rdi),%rdi --------------------------------- f: movabs $0x800000000000,%r11 19: cmp %r11,%rdi 1c: jb 0x000000000000002a 1e: mov %rdi,%r11 21: add $0x0,%r11 28: jae 0x000000000000002e 2a: xor %edi,%edi 2c: jmp 0x0000000000000032 2e: mov 0x0(%rdi),%rdi --------------------------------- 32: xor %eax,%eax 34: leave 35: ret The x86-64 JIT already emits some instructions to protect against user memory access. This patch doesn't make any changes for the x86-64 JIT. ARM64 JIT ========= No Intrumentation Verifier's Instrumentation (upstream) (This patch) ----------------- -------------------------- 0: add x9, x30, #0x0 0: add x9, x30, #0x0 4: nop 4: nop 8: paciasp 8: paciasp c: stp x29, x30, [sp, #-16]! c: stp x29, x30, [sp, #-16]! 10: mov x29, sp 10: mov x29, sp 14: stp x19, x20, [sp, #-16]! 14: stp x19, x20, [sp, #-16]! 18: stp x21, x22, [sp, #-16]! 18: stp x21, x22, [sp, #-16]! 1c: stp x25, x26, [sp, #-16]! 1c: stp x25, x26, [sp, #-16]! 20: stp x27, x28, [sp, #-16]! 20: stp x27, x28, [sp, #-16]! 24: mov x25, sp 24: mov x25, sp 28: mov x26, #0x0 28: mov x26, #0x0 2c: sub x27, x25, #0x0 2c: sub x27, x25, #0x0 30: sub sp, sp, #0x0 30: sub sp, sp, #0x0 34: ldr x0, [x0] 34: ldr x0, [x0] -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 38: ldr x0, [x0] ----------\ 38: add x9, x0, #0x0 -----------------------------------\\ 3c: lsr x9, x9, #32 3c: mov x7, #0x0 \\ 40: cmp x9, #0x10, lsl #12 40: mov sp, sp \\ 44: b.ls 0x0000000000000050 44: ldp x27, x28, [sp], #16 \\--> 48: ldr x0, [x0] 48: ldp x25, x26, [sp], #16 \ 4c: b 0x0000000000000054 4c: ldp x21, x22, [sp], #16 \ 50: mov x0, #0x0 50: ldp x19, x20, [sp], #16 \--------------------------------------- 54: ldp x29, x30, [sp], #16 54: mov x7, #0x0 58: add x0, x7, #0x0 58: mov sp, sp 5c: autiasp 5c: ldp x27, x28, [sp], #16 60: ret 60: ldp x25, x26, [sp], #16 64: nop 64: ldp x21, x22, [sp], #16 68: ldr x10, 0x0000000000000070 68: ldp x19, x20, [sp], #16 6c: br x10 6c: ldp x29, x30, [sp], #16 70: add x0, x7, #0x0 74: autiasp 78: ret 7c: nop 80: ldr x10, 0x0000000000000088 84: br x10 There are 6 extra instructions added in ARM64 in the best case. This will become 7 in the worst case (off != 0). RISC-V JIT (RISCV_ISA_C Disabled) ========== No Intrumentation Verifier's Instrumentation (upstream) (This patch) ----------------- -------------------------- 0: nop 0: nop 4: nop 4: nop 8: li a6, 33 8: li a6, 33 c: addi sp, sp, -16 c: addi sp, sp, -16 10: sd s0, 8(sp) 10: sd s0, 8(sp) 14: addi s0, sp, 16 14: addi s0, sp, 16 18: ld a0, 0(a0) 18: ld a0, 0(a0) --------------------------------------------------------------- 1c: ld a0, 0(a0) --\ 1c: mv t0, a0 --------------------------\ \ 20: srli t0, t0, 32 20: li a5, 0 \ \ 24: lui t1, 4096 24: ld s0, 8(sp) \ \ 28: sext.w t1, t1 28: addi sp, sp, 16 \ \ 2c: bgeu t1, t0, 12 2c: sext.w a0, a5 \ \--> 30: ld a0, 0(a0) 30: ret \ 34: j 8 \ 38: li a0, 0 \------------------------------ 3c: li a5, 0 40: ld s0, 8(sp) 44: addi sp, sp, 16 48: sext.w a0, a5 4c: ret There are 7 extra instructions added in RISC-V. Fixes: 800834285361 ("bpf, arm64: Add BPF exception tables") Reported-by: Breno Leitao <leitao(a)debian.org> Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org> Acked-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii(a)linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay12(a)gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240424100210.11982-2-puranjay@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c kernel/bpf/core.c kernel/bpf/verifier.c include/linux/filter.h [The conflicts were due to not support BPF_PROBE_MEMSX and refactoring about do_misc_fixups] Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui <pulehui(a)huawei.com> --- arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 6 ++++++ include/linux/filter.h | 1 + kernel/bpf/core.c | 9 +++++++++ kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 45 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c index 8e3c3d8916dd..6c8b9151eda8 100644 --- a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +++ b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c @@ -2156,3 +2156,9 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog) tmp : orig_prog); return prog; } + +/* x86-64 JIT emits its own code to filter user addresses so return 0 here */ +u64 bpf_arch_uaddress_limit(void) +{ + return 0; +} diff --git a/include/linux/filter.h b/include/linux/filter.h index ee12183ffad9..8ee00f20614f 100644 --- a/include/linux/filter.h +++ b/include/linux/filter.h @@ -908,6 +908,7 @@ u64 __bpf_call_base(u64 r1, u64 r2, u64 r3, u64 r4, u64 r5); struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog); void bpf_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog); bool bpf_jit_needs_zext(void); +u64 bpf_arch_uaddress_limit(void); bool bpf_helper_changes_pkt_data(void *func); static inline bool bpf_dump_raw_ok(const struct cred *cred) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c index 681070bf910b..7db8a815e835 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/core.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c @@ -2321,6 +2321,15 @@ bool __weak bpf_helper_changes_pkt_data(void *func) return false; } +u64 __weak bpf_arch_uaddress_limit(void) +{ +#if defined(CONFIG_64BIT) && defined(CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_NON_OVERLAPPING_ADDRESS_SPACE) + return TASK_SIZE; +#else + return 0; +#endif +} + /* Return TRUE if the JIT backend wants verifier to enable sub-register usage * analysis code and wants explicit zero extension inserted by verifier. * Otherwise, return FALSE. diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 18ab413ef2ba..a2a77348fa60 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -11464,6 +11464,35 @@ static int fixup_bpf_calls(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) continue; } + /* Make it impossible to de-reference a userspace address */ + if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LDX && + BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_PROBE_MEM) { + struct bpf_insn *patch = &insn_buf[0]; + u64 uaddress_limit = bpf_arch_uaddress_limit(); + + if (!uaddress_limit) + continue; + + *patch++ = BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_AX, insn->src_reg); + if (insn->off) + *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_AX, insn->off); + *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_RSH, BPF_REG_AX, 32); + *patch++ = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JLE, BPF_REG_AX, uaddress_limit >> 32, 2); + *patch++ = *insn; + *patch++ = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 1); + *patch++ = BPF_MOV64_IMM(insn->dst_reg, 0); + + cnt = patch - insn_buf; + new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); + if (!new_prog) + return -ENOMEM; + + delta += cnt - 1; + env->prog = prog = new_prog; + insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; + continue; + } + if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LD && (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ABS || BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_IND)) { -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] bpf: verifier: prevent userspace memory access
by Pu Lehui 26 Sep '24

26 Sep '24

From: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay12(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.9-rc7 commit 66e13b615a0ce76b785d780ecc9776ba71983629 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/IATK7C Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- With BPF_PROBE_MEM, BPF allows de-referencing an untrusted pointer. To thwart invalid memory accesses, the JITs add an exception table entry for all such accesses. But in case the src_reg + offset is a userspace address, the BPF program might read that memory if the user has mapped it. Make the verifier add guard instructions around such memory accesses and skip the load if the address falls into the userspace region. The JITs need to implement bpf_arch_uaddress_limit() to define where the userspace addresses end for that architecture or TASK_SIZE is taken as default. The implementation is as follows: REG_AX = SRC_REG if(offset) REG_AX += offset; REG_AX >>= 32; if (REG_AX <= (uaddress_limit >> 32)) DST_REG = 0; else DST_REG = *(size *)(SRC_REG + offset); Comparing just the upper 32 bits of the load address with the upper 32 bits of uaddress_limit implies that the values are being aligned down to a 4GB boundary before comparison. The above means that all loads with address <= uaddress_limit + 4GB are skipped. This is acceptable because there is a large hole (much larger than 4GB) between userspace and kernel space memory, therefore a correctly functioning BPF program should not access this 4GB memory above the userspace. Let's analyze what this patch does to the following fentry program dereferencing an untrusted pointer: SEC("fentry/tcp_v4_connect") int BPF_PROG(fentry_tcp_v4_connect, struct sock *sk) { *(volatile long *)sk; return 0; } BPF Program before | BPF Program after ------------------ | ----------------- 0: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0) 0: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0) ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 1: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0) --\ 1: (bf) r11 = r1 ----------------------------\ \ 2: (77) r11 >>= 32 2: (b7) r0 = 0 \ \ 3: (b5) if r11 <= 0x8000 goto pc+2 3: (95) exit \ \-> 4: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0) \ 5: (05) goto pc+1 \ 6: (b7) r1 = 0 \-------------------------------------- 7: (b7) r0 = 0 8: (95) exit As you can see from above, in the best case (off=0), 5 extra instructions are emitted. Now, we analyze the same program after it has gone through the JITs of ARM64 and RISC-V architectures. We follow the single load instruction that has the untrusted pointer and see what instrumentation has been added around it. x86-64 JIT ========== JIT's Instrumentation (upstream) --------------------- 0: nopl 0x0(%rax,%rax,1) 5: xchg %ax,%ax 7: push %rbp 8: mov %rsp,%rbp b: mov 0x0(%rdi),%rdi --------------------------------- f: movabs $0x800000000000,%r11 19: cmp %r11,%rdi 1c: jb 0x000000000000002a 1e: mov %rdi,%r11 21: add $0x0,%r11 28: jae 0x000000000000002e 2a: xor %edi,%edi 2c: jmp 0x0000000000000032 2e: mov 0x0(%rdi),%rdi --------------------------------- 32: xor %eax,%eax 34: leave 35: ret The x86-64 JIT already emits some instructions to protect against user memory access. This patch doesn't make any changes for the x86-64 JIT. ARM64 JIT ========= No Intrumentation Verifier's Instrumentation (upstream) (This patch) ----------------- -------------------------- 0: add x9, x30, #0x0 0: add x9, x30, #0x0 4: nop 4: nop 8: paciasp 8: paciasp c: stp x29, x30, [sp, #-16]! c: stp x29, x30, [sp, #-16]! 10: mov x29, sp 10: mov x29, sp 14: stp x19, x20, [sp, #-16]! 14: stp x19, x20, [sp, #-16]! 18: stp x21, x22, [sp, #-16]! 18: stp x21, x22, [sp, #-16]! 1c: stp x25, x26, [sp, #-16]! 1c: stp x25, x26, [sp, #-16]! 20: stp x27, x28, [sp, #-16]! 20: stp x27, x28, [sp, #-16]! 24: mov x25, sp 24: mov x25, sp 28: mov x26, #0x0 28: mov x26, #0x0 2c: sub x27, x25, #0x0 2c: sub x27, x25, #0x0 30: sub sp, sp, #0x0 30: sub sp, sp, #0x0 34: ldr x0, [x0] 34: ldr x0, [x0] -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 38: ldr x0, [x0] ----------\ 38: add x9, x0, #0x0 -----------------------------------\\ 3c: lsr x9, x9, #32 3c: mov x7, #0x0 \\ 40: cmp x9, #0x10, lsl #12 40: mov sp, sp \\ 44: b.ls 0x0000000000000050 44: ldp x27, x28, [sp], #16 \\--> 48: ldr x0, [x0] 48: ldp x25, x26, [sp], #16 \ 4c: b 0x0000000000000054 4c: ldp x21, x22, [sp], #16 \ 50: mov x0, #0x0 50: ldp x19, x20, [sp], #16 \--------------------------------------- 54: ldp x29, x30, [sp], #16 54: mov x7, #0x0 58: add x0, x7, #0x0 58: mov sp, sp 5c: autiasp 5c: ldp x27, x28, [sp], #16 60: ret 60: ldp x25, x26, [sp], #16 64: nop 64: ldp x21, x22, [sp], #16 68: ldr x10, 0x0000000000000070 68: ldp x19, x20, [sp], #16 6c: br x10 6c: ldp x29, x30, [sp], #16 70: add x0, x7, #0x0 74: autiasp 78: ret 7c: nop 80: ldr x10, 0x0000000000000088 84: br x10 There are 6 extra instructions added in ARM64 in the best case. This will become 7 in the worst case (off != 0). RISC-V JIT (RISCV_ISA_C Disabled) ========== No Intrumentation Verifier's Instrumentation (upstream) (This patch) ----------------- -------------------------- 0: nop 0: nop 4: nop 4: nop 8: li a6, 33 8: li a6, 33 c: addi sp, sp, -16 c: addi sp, sp, -16 10: sd s0, 8(sp) 10: sd s0, 8(sp) 14: addi s0, sp, 16 14: addi s0, sp, 16 18: ld a0, 0(a0) 18: ld a0, 0(a0) --------------------------------------------------------------- 1c: ld a0, 0(a0) --\ 1c: mv t0, a0 --------------------------\ \ 20: srli t0, t0, 32 20: li a5, 0 \ \ 24: lui t1, 4096 24: ld s0, 8(sp) \ \ 28: sext.w t1, t1 28: addi sp, sp, 16 \ \ 2c: bgeu t1, t0, 12 2c: sext.w a0, a5 \ \--> 30: ld a0, 0(a0) 30: ret \ 34: j 8 \ 38: li a0, 0 \------------------------------ 3c: li a5, 0 40: ld s0, 8(sp) 44: addi sp, sp, 16 48: sext.w a0, a5 4c: ret There are 7 extra instructions added in RISC-V. Fixes: 800834285361 ("bpf, arm64: Add BPF exception tables") Reported-by: Breno Leitao <leitao(a)debian.org> Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org> Acked-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii(a)linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay12(a)gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240424100210.11982-2-puranjay@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c kernel/bpf/core.c kernel/bpf/verifier.c include/linux/filter.h [The conflicts were due to not support BPF_PROBE_MEMSX and refactoring about do_misc_fixups] Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui <pulehui(a)huawei.com> --- arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 6 ++++++ include/linux/filter.h | 1 + kernel/bpf/core.c | 9 +++++++++ kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 45 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c index 8e3c3d8916dd..6c8b9151eda8 100644 --- a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +++ b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c @@ -2156,3 +2156,9 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog) tmp : orig_prog); return prog; } + +/* x86-64 JIT emits its own code to filter user addresses so return 0 here */ +u64 bpf_arch_uaddress_limit(void) +{ + return 0; +} diff --git a/include/linux/filter.h b/include/linux/filter.h index ee12183ffad9..8ee00f20614f 100644 --- a/include/linux/filter.h +++ b/include/linux/filter.h @@ -908,6 +908,7 @@ u64 __bpf_call_base(u64 r1, u64 r2, u64 r3, u64 r4, u64 r5); struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog); void bpf_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog); bool bpf_jit_needs_zext(void); +u64 bpf_arch_uaddress_limit(void); bool bpf_helper_changes_pkt_data(void *func); static inline bool bpf_dump_raw_ok(const struct cred *cred) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c index 681070bf910b..7db8a815e835 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/core.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c @@ -2321,6 +2321,15 @@ bool __weak bpf_helper_changes_pkt_data(void *func) return false; } +u64 __weak bpf_arch_uaddress_limit(void) +{ +#if defined(CONFIG_64BIT) && defined(CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_NON_OVERLAPPING_ADDRESS_SPACE) + return TASK_SIZE; +#else + return 0; +#endif +} + /* Return TRUE if the JIT backend wants verifier to enable sub-register usage * analysis code and wants explicit zero extension inserted by verifier. * Otherwise, return FALSE. diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 18ab413ef2ba..a2a77348fa60 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -11464,6 +11464,35 @@ static int fixup_bpf_calls(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) continue; } + /* Make it impossible to de-reference a userspace address */ + if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LDX && + BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_PROBE_MEM) { + struct bpf_insn *patch = &insn_buf[0]; + u64 uaddress_limit = bpf_arch_uaddress_limit(); + + if (!uaddress_limit) + continue; + + *patch++ = BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_AX, insn->src_reg); + if (insn->off) + *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_AX, insn->off); + *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_RSH, BPF_REG_AX, 32); + *patch++ = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JLE, BPF_REG_AX, uaddress_limit >> 32, 2); + *patch++ = *insn; + *patch++ = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 1); + *patch++ = BPF_MOV64_IMM(insn->dst_reg, 0); + + cnt = patch - insn_buf; + new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); + if (!new_prog) + return -ENOMEM; + + delta += cnt - 1; + env->prog = prog = new_prog; + insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; + continue; + } + if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LD && (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ABS || BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_IND)) { -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] bpf: verifier: prevent userspace memory access
by Pu Lehui 26 Sep '24

26 Sep '24

From: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay12(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.9-rc7 commit 66e13b615a0ce76b785d780ecc9776ba71983629 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/IATK7C Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- With BPF_PROBE_MEM, BPF allows de-referencing an untrusted pointer. To thwart invalid memory accesses, the JITs add an exception table entry for all such accesses. But in case the src_reg + offset is a userspace address, the BPF program might read that memory if the user has mapped it. Make the verifier add guard instructions around such memory accesses and skip the load if the address falls into the userspace region. The JITs need to implement bpf_arch_uaddress_limit() to define where the userspace addresses end for that architecture or TASK_SIZE is taken as default. The implementation is as follows: REG_AX = SRC_REG if(offset) REG_AX += offset; REG_AX >>= 32; if (REG_AX <= (uaddress_limit >> 32)) DST_REG = 0; else DST_REG = *(size *)(SRC_REG + offset); Comparing just the upper 32 bits of the load address with the upper 32 bits of uaddress_limit implies that the values are being aligned down to a 4GB boundary before comparison. The above means that all loads with address <= uaddress_limit + 4GB are skipped. This is acceptable because there is a large hole (much larger than 4GB) between userspace and kernel space memory, therefore a correctly functioning BPF program should not access this 4GB memory above the userspace. Let's analyze what this patch does to the following fentry program dereferencing an untrusted pointer: SEC("fentry/tcp_v4_connect") int BPF_PROG(fentry_tcp_v4_connect, struct sock *sk) { *(volatile long *)sk; return 0; } BPF Program before | BPF Program after ------------------ | ----------------- 0: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0) 0: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0) ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 1: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0) --\ 1: (bf) r11 = r1 ----------------------------\ \ 2: (77) r11 >>= 32 2: (b7) r0 = 0 \ \ 3: (b5) if r11 <= 0x8000 goto pc+2 3: (95) exit \ \-> 4: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0) \ 5: (05) goto pc+1 \ 6: (b7) r1 = 0 \-------------------------------------- 7: (b7) r0 = 0 8: (95) exit As you can see from above, in the best case (off=0), 5 extra instructions are emitted. Now, we analyze the same program after it has gone through the JITs of ARM64 and RISC-V architectures. We follow the single load instruction that has the untrusted pointer and see what instrumentation has been added around it. x86-64 JIT ========== JIT's Instrumentation (upstream) --------------------- 0: nopl 0x0(%rax,%rax,1) 5: xchg %ax,%ax 7: push %rbp 8: mov %rsp,%rbp b: mov 0x0(%rdi),%rdi --------------------------------- f: movabs $0x800000000000,%r11 19: cmp %r11,%rdi 1c: jb 0x000000000000002a 1e: mov %rdi,%r11 21: add $0x0,%r11 28: jae 0x000000000000002e 2a: xor %edi,%edi 2c: jmp 0x0000000000000032 2e: mov 0x0(%rdi),%rdi --------------------------------- 32: xor %eax,%eax 34: leave 35: ret The x86-64 JIT already emits some instructions to protect against user memory access. This patch doesn't make any changes for the x86-64 JIT. ARM64 JIT ========= No Intrumentation Verifier's Instrumentation (upstream) (This patch) ----------------- -------------------------- 0: add x9, x30, #0x0 0: add x9, x30, #0x0 4: nop 4: nop 8: paciasp 8: paciasp c: stp x29, x30, [sp, #-16]! c: stp x29, x30, [sp, #-16]! 10: mov x29, sp 10: mov x29, sp 14: stp x19, x20, [sp, #-16]! 14: stp x19, x20, [sp, #-16]! 18: stp x21, x22, [sp, #-16]! 18: stp x21, x22, [sp, #-16]! 1c: stp x25, x26, [sp, #-16]! 1c: stp x25, x26, [sp, #-16]! 20: stp x27, x28, [sp, #-16]! 20: stp x27, x28, [sp, #-16]! 24: mov x25, sp 24: mov x25, sp 28: mov x26, #0x0 28: mov x26, #0x0 2c: sub x27, x25, #0x0 2c: sub x27, x25, #0x0 30: sub sp, sp, #0x0 30: sub sp, sp, #0x0 34: ldr x0, [x0] 34: ldr x0, [x0] -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 38: ldr x0, [x0] ----------\ 38: add x9, x0, #0x0 -----------------------------------\\ 3c: lsr x9, x9, #32 3c: mov x7, #0x0 \\ 40: cmp x9, #0x10, lsl #12 40: mov sp, sp \\ 44: b.ls 0x0000000000000050 44: ldp x27, x28, [sp], #16 \\--> 48: ldr x0, [x0] 48: ldp x25, x26, [sp], #16 \ 4c: b 0x0000000000000054 4c: ldp x21, x22, [sp], #16 \ 50: mov x0, #0x0 50: ldp x19, x20, [sp], #16 \--------------------------------------- 54: ldp x29, x30, [sp], #16 54: mov x7, #0x0 58: add x0, x7, #0x0 58: mov sp, sp 5c: autiasp 5c: ldp x27, x28, [sp], #16 60: ret 60: ldp x25, x26, [sp], #16 64: nop 64: ldp x21, x22, [sp], #16 68: ldr x10, 0x0000000000000070 68: ldp x19, x20, [sp], #16 6c: br x10 6c: ldp x29, x30, [sp], #16 70: add x0, x7, #0x0 74: autiasp 78: ret 7c: nop 80: ldr x10, 0x0000000000000088 84: br x10 There are 6 extra instructions added in ARM64 in the best case. This will become 7 in the worst case (off != 0). RISC-V JIT (RISCV_ISA_C Disabled) ========== No Intrumentation Verifier's Instrumentation (upstream) (This patch) ----------------- -------------------------- 0: nop 0: nop 4: nop 4: nop 8: li a6, 33 8: li a6, 33 c: addi sp, sp, -16 c: addi sp, sp, -16 10: sd s0, 8(sp) 10: sd s0, 8(sp) 14: addi s0, sp, 16 14: addi s0, sp, 16 18: ld a0, 0(a0) 18: ld a0, 0(a0) --------------------------------------------------------------- 1c: ld a0, 0(a0) --\ 1c: mv t0, a0 --------------------------\ \ 20: srli t0, t0, 32 20: li a5, 0 \ \ 24: lui t1, 4096 24: ld s0, 8(sp) \ \ 28: sext.w t1, t1 28: addi sp, sp, 16 \ \ 2c: bgeu t1, t0, 12 2c: sext.w a0, a5 \ \--> 30: ld a0, 0(a0) 30: ret \ 34: j 8 \ 38: li a0, 0 \------------------------------ 3c: li a5, 0 40: ld s0, 8(sp) 44: addi sp, sp, 16 48: sext.w a0, a5 4c: ret There are 7 extra instructions added in RISC-V. Fixes: 800834285361 ("bpf, arm64: Add BPF exception tables") Reported-by: Breno Leitao <leitao(a)debian.org> Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org> Acked-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii(a)linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay12(a)gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240424100210.11982-2-puranjay@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c kernel/bpf/core.c kernel/bpf/verifier.c include/linux/filter.h [The conflicts were due to refactoring about do_misc_fixups] Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui <pulehui(a)huawei.com> --- arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 6 ++++++ include/linux/filter.h | 1 + kernel/bpf/core.c | 9 +++++++++ kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 46 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c index 878a4c6dd756..989b409f0cee 100644 --- a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +++ b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c @@ -2968,3 +2968,9 @@ void bpf_arch_poke_desc_update(struct bpf_jit_poke_descriptor *poke, BUG_ON(ret < 0); } } + +/* x86-64 JIT emits its own code to filter user addresses so return 0 here */ +u64 bpf_arch_uaddress_limit(void) +{ + return 0; +} diff --git a/include/linux/filter.h b/include/linux/filter.h index 20b777ef5531..29f6a10b3acf 100644 --- a/include/linux/filter.h +++ b/include/linux/filter.h @@ -916,6 +916,7 @@ bool bpf_jit_needs_zext(void); bool bpf_jit_supports_subprog_tailcalls(void); bool bpf_jit_supports_kfunc_call(void); bool bpf_jit_supports_far_kfunc_call(void); +u64 bpf_arch_uaddress_limit(void); bool bpf_helper_changes_pkt_data(void *func); static inline bool bpf_dump_raw_ok(const struct cred *cred) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c index d568244f5ae8..caea5f14ac99 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/core.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c @@ -2906,6 +2906,15 @@ bool __weak bpf_jit_supports_far_kfunc_call(void) return false; } +u64 __weak bpf_arch_uaddress_limit(void) +{ +#if defined(CONFIG_64BIT) && defined(CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_NON_OVERLAPPING_ADDRESS_SPACE) + return TASK_SIZE; +#else + return 0; +#endif +} + /* To execute LD_ABS/LD_IND instructions __bpf_prog_run() may call * skb_copy_bits(), so provide a weak definition of it for NET-less config. */ diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 6a94f341587a..cbaa7dbf5f20 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -18942,6 +18942,36 @@ static int do_misc_fixups(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) continue; } + /* Make it impossible to de-reference a userspace address */ + if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LDX && + (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_PROBE_MEM || + BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_PROBE_MEMSX)) { + struct bpf_insn *patch = &insn_buf[0]; + u64 uaddress_limit = bpf_arch_uaddress_limit(); + + if (!uaddress_limit) + continue; + + *patch++ = BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_AX, insn->src_reg); + if (insn->off) + *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_AX, insn->off); + *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_RSH, BPF_REG_AX, 32); + *patch++ = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JLE, BPF_REG_AX, uaddress_limit >> 32, 2); + *patch++ = *insn; + *patch++ = BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 1); + *patch++ = BPF_MOV64_IMM(insn->dst_reg, 0); + + cnt = patch - insn_buf; + new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt); + if (!new_prog) + return -ENOMEM; + + delta += cnt - 1; + env->prog = prog = new_prog; + insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta; + continue; + } + /* Implement LD_ABS and LD_IND with a rewrite, if supported by the program type. */ if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LD && (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ABS || -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] fix CVE-2024-46771
by Zhang Changzhong 26 Sep '24

26 Sep '24

Kuniyuki Iwashima (2): can: bcm: Remove proc entry when dev is unregistered. can: bcm: Clear bo->bcm_proc_read after remove_proc_entry(). net/can/bcm.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) -- 2.9.5

2 3

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/2] CVE-2024-46771
by Zhang Changzhong 26 Sep '24

26 Sep '24

Kuniyuki Iwashima (2): can: bcm: Remove proc entry when dev is unregistered. can: bcm: Clear bo->bcm_proc_read after remove_proc_entry(). net/can/bcm.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) -- 2.9.5

2 3

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS 0/2] CVE-2024-46771
by Zhang Changzhong 26 Sep '24

26 Sep '24

Kuniyuki Iwashima (2): can: bcm: Remove proc entry when dev is unregistered. can: bcm: Clear bo->bcm_proc_read after remove_proc_entry(). net/can/bcm.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) -- 2.9.5

2 3

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1 0/2] fix CVE-2024-46771
by Zhang Changzhong 26 Sep '24

26 Sep '24

Kuniyuki Iwashima (2): can: bcm: Remove proc entry when dev is unregistered. can: bcm: Clear bo->bcm_proc_read after remove_proc_entry(). net/can/bcm.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) -- 2.9.5

2 3

[PATCH OLK-6.6] userfaultfd: fix checks for huge PMDs
by Liu Shixin 26 Sep '24

26 Sep '24

From: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.51 commit 3c6b4bcf37845c9359aed926324bed66bdd2448d category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IARWOX CVE: CVE-2024-46787 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 71c186efc1b2cf1aeabfeff3b9bd5ac4c5ac14d8 upstream. Patch series "userfaultfd: fix races around pmd_trans_huge() check", v2. The pmd_trans_huge() code in mfill_atomic() is wrong in three different ways depending on kernel version: 1. The pmd_trans_huge() check is racy and can lead to a BUG_ON() (if you hit the right two race windows) - I've tested this in a kernel build with some extra mdelay() calls. See the commit message for a description of the race scenario. On older kernels (before 6.5), I think the same bug can even theoretically lead to accessing transhuge page contents as a page table if you hit the right 5 narrow race windows (I haven't tested this case). 2. As pointed out by Qi Zheng, pmd_trans_huge() is not sufficient for detecting PMDs that don't point to page tables. On older kernels (before 6.5), you'd just have to win a single fairly wide race to hit this. I've tested this on 6.1 stable by racing migration (with a mdelay() patched into try_to_migrate()) against UFFDIO_ZEROPAGE - on my x86 VM, that causes a kernel oops in ptlock_ptr(). 3. On newer kernels (>=6.5), for shmem mappings, khugepaged is allowed to yank page tables out from under us (though I haven't tested that), so I think the BUG_ON() checks in mfill_atomic() are just wrong. I decided to write two separate fixes for these (one fix for bugs 1+2, one fix for bug 3), so that the first fix can be backported to kernels affected by bugs 1+2. This patch (of 2): This fixes two issues. I discovered that the following race can occur: mfill_atomic other thread ============ ============ <zap PMD> pmdp_get_lockless() [reads none pmd] <bail if trans_huge> <if none:> <pagefault creates transhuge zeropage> __pte_alloc [no-op] <zap PMD> <bail if pmd_trans_huge(*dst_pmd)> BUG_ON(pmd_none(*dst_pmd)) I have experimentally verified this in a kernel with extra mdelay() calls; the BUG_ON(pmd_none(*dst_pmd)) triggers. On kernels newer than commit 0d940a9b270b ("mm/pgtable: allow pte_offset_map[_lock]() to fail"), this can't lead to anything worse than a BUG_ON(), since the page table access helpers are actually designed to deal with page tables concurrently disappearing; but on older kernels (<=6.4), I think we could probably theoretically race past the two BUG_ON() checks and end up treating a hugepage as a page table. The second issue is that, as Qi Zheng pointed out, there are other types of huge PMDs that pmd_trans_huge() can't catch: devmap PMDs and swap PMDs (in particular, migration PMDs). On <=6.4, this is worse than the first issue: If mfill_atomic() runs on a PMD that contains a migration entry (which just requires winning a single, fairly wide race), it will pass the PMD to pte_offset_map_lock(), which assumes that the PMD points to a page table. Breakage follows: First, the kernel tries to take the PTE lock (which will crash or maybe worse if there is no "struct page" for the address bits in the migration entry PMD - I think at least on X86 there usually is no corresponding "struct page" thanks to the PTE inversion mitigation, amd64 looks different). If that didn't crash, the kernel would next try to write a PTE into what it wrongly thinks is a page table. As part of fixing these issues, get rid of the check for pmd_trans_huge() before __pte_alloc() - that's redundant, we're going to have to check for that after the __pte_alloc() anyway. Backport note: pmdp_get_lockless() is pmd_read_atomic() in older kernels. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240813-uffd-thp-flip-fix-v2-0-5efa61078a41@goog… Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240813-uffd-thp-flip-fix-v2-1-5efa61078a41@goog… Fixes: c1a4de99fada ("userfaultfd: mcopy_atomic|mfill_zeropage: UFFDIO_COPY|UFFDIO_ZEROPAGE preparation") Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange(a)redhat.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd(a)google.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul(a)virtuozzo.com> Cc: Qi Zheng <zhengqi.arch(a)bytedance.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Liu Shixin <liushixin2(a)huawei.com> --- mm/userfaultfd.c | 22 ++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/userfaultfd.c b/mm/userfaultfd.c index 8c22dd4e5e15..b7562e6847b2 100644 --- a/mm/userfaultfd.c +++ b/mm/userfaultfd.c @@ -704,21 +704,23 @@ static __always_inline ssize_t mfill_atomic(struct mm_struct *dst_mm, } dst_pmdval = pmdp_get_lockless(dst_pmd); - /* - * If the dst_pmd is mapped as THP don't - * override it and just be strict. - */ - if (unlikely(pmd_trans_huge(dst_pmdval))) { - err = -EEXIST; - break; - } if (unlikely(pmd_none(dst_pmdval)) && unlikely(__pte_alloc(dst_mm, dst_pmd))) { err = -ENOMEM; break; } - /* If an huge pmd materialized from under us fail */ - if (unlikely(pmd_trans_huge(*dst_pmd))) { + dst_pmdval = pmdp_get_lockless(dst_pmd); + /* + * If the dst_pmd is THP don't override it and just be strict. + * (This includes the case where the PMD used to be THP and + * changed back to none after __pte_alloc().) + */ + if (unlikely(!pmd_present(dst_pmdval) || pmd_trans_huge(dst_pmdval) || + pmd_devmap(dst_pmdval))) { + err = -EEXIST; + break; + } + if (unlikely(pmd_bad(dst_pmdval))) { err = -EFAULT; break; } -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] VMCI: Fix use-after-free when removing resource in vmci_resource_remove()
by Zhang Kunbo 26 Sep '24

26 Sep '24

From: David Fernandez Gonzalez <david.fernandez.gonzalez(a)oracle.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.11-rc7 commit 48b9a8dabcc3cf5f961b2ebcd8933bf9204babb7 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IARY1L CVE: CVE-2024-46738 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- When removing a resource from vmci_resource_table in vmci_resource_remove(), the search is performed using the resource handle by comparing context and resource fields. It is possible though to create two resources with different types but same handle (same context and resource fields). When trying to remove one of the resources, vmci_resource_remove() may not remove the intended one, but the object will still be freed as in the case of the datagram type in vmci_datagram_destroy_handle(). vmci_resource_table will still hold a pointer to this freed resource leading to a use-after-free vulnerability. BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in vmci_handle_is_equal include/linux/vmw_vmci_defs.h:142 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in vmci_resource_remove+0x3a1/0x410 drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_resource.c:147 Read of size 4 at addr ffff88801c16d800 by task syz-executor197/1592 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x82/0xa9 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x21/0x366 mm/kasan/report.c:239 __kasan_report.cold+0x7f/0x132 mm/kasan/report.c:425 kasan_report+0x38/0x51 mm/kasan/report.c:442 vmci_handle_is_equal include/linux/vmw_vmci_defs.h:142 [inline] vmci_resource_remove+0x3a1/0x410 drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_resource.c:147 vmci_qp_broker_detach+0x89a/0x11b9 drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_queue_pair.c:2182 ctx_free_ctx+0x473/0xbe1 drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_context.c:444 kref_put include/linux/kref.h:65 [inline] vmci_ctx_put drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_context.c:497 [inline] vmci_ctx_destroy+0x170/0x1d6 drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_context.c:195 vmci_host_close+0x125/0x1ac drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_host.c:143 __fput+0x261/0xa34 fs/file_table.c:282 task_work_run+0xf0/0x194 kernel/task_work.c:164 tracehook_notify_resume include/linux/tracehook.h:189 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x184/0x189 kernel/entry/common.c:187 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x11b/0x123 kernel/entry/common.c:220 __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:302 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x18/0x42 kernel/entry/common.c:313 do_syscall_64+0x41/0x85 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x0 This change ensures the type is also checked when removing the resource from vmci_resource_table in vmci_resource_remove(). Fixes: bc63dedb7d46 ("VMCI: resource object implementation.") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: George Kennedy <george.kennedy(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David Fernandez Gonzalez <david.fernandez.gonzalez(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Zhang Kunbo <zhangkunbo(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_resource.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_resource.c b/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_resource.c index da1ee2e1ba99..2779704e128a 100644 --- a/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_resource.c +++ b/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_resource.c @@ -152,7 +152,8 @@ void vmci_resource_remove(struct vmci_resource *resource) spin_lock(&vmci_resource_table.lock); hlist_for_each_entry(r, &vmci_resource_table.entries[idx], node) { - if (vmci_handle_is_equal(r->handle, resource->handle)) { + if (vmci_handle_is_equal(r->handle, resource->handle) && + resource->type == r->type) { hlist_del_init_rcu(&r->node); break; } -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] VMCI: Fix use-after-free when removing resource in vmci_resource_remove()
by Zhang Kunbo 26 Sep '24

26 Sep '24

From: David Fernandez Gonzalez <david.fernandez.gonzalez(a)oracle.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.11-rc7 commit 48b9a8dabcc3cf5f961b2ebcd8933bf9204babb7 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IARY1L CVE: CVE-2024-46738 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- When removing a resource from vmci_resource_table in vmci_resource_remove(), the search is performed using the resource handle by comparing context and resource fields. It is possible though to create two resources with different types but same handle (same context and resource fields). When trying to remove one of the resources, vmci_resource_remove() may not remove the intended one, but the object will still be freed as in the case of the datagram type in vmci_datagram_destroy_handle(). vmci_resource_table will still hold a pointer to this freed resource leading to a use-after-free vulnerability. BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in vmci_handle_is_equal include/linux/vmw_vmci_defs.h:142 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in vmci_resource_remove+0x3a1/0x410 drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_resource.c:147 Read of size 4 at addr ffff88801c16d800 by task syz-executor197/1592 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x82/0xa9 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x21/0x366 mm/kasan/report.c:239 __kasan_report.cold+0x7f/0x132 mm/kasan/report.c:425 kasan_report+0x38/0x51 mm/kasan/report.c:442 vmci_handle_is_equal include/linux/vmw_vmci_defs.h:142 [inline] vmci_resource_remove+0x3a1/0x410 drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_resource.c:147 vmci_qp_broker_detach+0x89a/0x11b9 drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_queue_pair.c:2182 ctx_free_ctx+0x473/0xbe1 drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_context.c:444 kref_put include/linux/kref.h:65 [inline] vmci_ctx_put drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_context.c:497 [inline] vmci_ctx_destroy+0x170/0x1d6 drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_context.c:195 vmci_host_close+0x125/0x1ac drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_host.c:143 __fput+0x261/0xa34 fs/file_table.c:282 task_work_run+0xf0/0x194 kernel/task_work.c:164 tracehook_notify_resume include/linux/tracehook.h:189 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x184/0x189 kernel/entry/common.c:187 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x11b/0x123 kernel/entry/common.c:220 __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:302 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x18/0x42 kernel/entry/common.c:313 do_syscall_64+0x41/0x85 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x0 This change ensures the type is also checked when removing the resource from vmci_resource_table in vmci_resource_remove(). Fixes: bc63dedb7d46 ("VMCI: resource object implementation.") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: George Kennedy <george.kennedy(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David Fernandez Gonzalez <david.fernandez.gonzalez(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Zhang Kunbo <zhangkunbo(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_resource.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_resource.c b/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_resource.c index 692daa9eff34..19c9d2cdd277 100644 --- a/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_resource.c +++ b/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_resource.c @@ -144,7 +144,8 @@ void vmci_resource_remove(struct vmci_resource *resource) spin_lock(&vmci_resource_table.lock); hlist_for_each_entry(r, &vmci_resource_table.entries[idx], node) { - if (vmci_handle_is_equal(r->handle, resource->handle)) { + if (vmci_handle_is_equal(r->handle, resource->handle) && + resource->type == r->type) { hlist_del_init_rcu(&r->node); break; } -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] VMCI: Fix use-after-free when removing resource in vmci_resource_remove()
by Zhang Kunbo 26 Sep '24

26 Sep '24

From: David Fernandez Gonzalez <david.fernandez.gonzalez(a)oracle.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.11-rc7 commit 48b9a8dabcc3cf5f961b2ebcd8933bf9204babb7 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IARY1L CVE: CVE-2024-46738 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- When removing a resource from vmci_resource_table in vmci_resource_remove(), the search is performed using the resource handle by comparing context and resource fields. It is possible though to create two resources with different types but same handle (same context and resource fields). When trying to remove one of the resources, vmci_resource_remove() may not remove the intended one, but the object will still be freed as in the case of the datagram type in vmci_datagram_destroy_handle(). vmci_resource_table will still hold a pointer to this freed resource leading to a use-after-free vulnerability. BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in vmci_handle_is_equal include/linux/vmw_vmci_defs.h:142 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in vmci_resource_remove+0x3a1/0x410 drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_resource.c:147 Read of size 4 at addr ffff88801c16d800 by task syz-executor197/1592 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x82/0xa9 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x21/0x366 mm/kasan/report.c:239 __kasan_report.cold+0x7f/0x132 mm/kasan/report.c:425 kasan_report+0x38/0x51 mm/kasan/report.c:442 vmci_handle_is_equal include/linux/vmw_vmci_defs.h:142 [inline] vmci_resource_remove+0x3a1/0x410 drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_resource.c:147 vmci_qp_broker_detach+0x89a/0x11b9 drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_queue_pair.c:2182 ctx_free_ctx+0x473/0xbe1 drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_context.c:444 kref_put include/linux/kref.h:65 [inline] vmci_ctx_put drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_context.c:497 [inline] vmci_ctx_destroy+0x170/0x1d6 drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_context.c:195 vmci_host_close+0x125/0x1ac drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_host.c:143 __fput+0x261/0xa34 fs/file_table.c:282 task_work_run+0xf0/0x194 kernel/task_work.c:164 tracehook_notify_resume include/linux/tracehook.h:189 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x184/0x189 kernel/entry/common.c:187 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x11b/0x123 kernel/entry/common.c:220 __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:302 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x18/0x42 kernel/entry/common.c:313 do_syscall_64+0x41/0x85 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x0 This change ensures the type is also checked when removing the resource from vmci_resource_table in vmci_resource_remove(). Fixes: bc63dedb7d46 ("VMCI: resource object implementation.") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: George Kennedy <george.kennedy(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David Fernandez Gonzalez <david.fernandez.gonzalez(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Zhang Kunbo <zhangkunbo(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_resource.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_resource.c b/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_resource.c index 692daa9eff34..19c9d2cdd277 100644 --- a/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_resource.c +++ b/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_resource.c @@ -144,7 +144,8 @@ void vmci_resource_remove(struct vmci_resource *resource) spin_lock(&vmci_resource_table.lock); hlist_for_each_entry(r, &vmci_resource_table.entries[idx], node) { - if (vmci_handle_is_equal(r->handle, resource->handle)) { + if (vmci_handle_is_equal(r->handle, resource->handle) && + resource->type == r->type) { hlist_del_init_rcu(&r->node); break; } -- 2.34.1

2 2

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] VMCI: Fix use-after-free when removing resource in vmci_resource_remove()
by Zhang Kunbo 26 Sep '24

26 Sep '24

From: David Fernandez Gonzalez <david.fernandez.gonzalez(a)oracle.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.11-rc7 commit 48b9a8dabcc3cf5f961b2ebcd8933bf9204babb7 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IARY1L CVE: CVE-2024-46738 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- When removing a resource from vmci_resource_table in vmci_resource_remove(), the search is performed using the resource handle by comparing context and resource fields. It is possible though to create two resources with different types but same handle (same context and resource fields). When trying to remove one of the resources, vmci_resource_remove() may not remove the intended one, but the object will still be freed as in the case of the datagram type in vmci_datagram_destroy_handle(). vmci_resource_table will still hold a pointer to this freed resource leading to a use-after-free vulnerability. BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in vmci_handle_is_equal include/linux/vmw_vmci_defs.h:142 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in vmci_resource_remove+0x3a1/0x410 drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_resource.c:147 Read of size 4 at addr ffff88801c16d800 by task syz-executor197/1592 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x82/0xa9 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x21/0x366 mm/kasan/report.c:239 __kasan_report.cold+0x7f/0x132 mm/kasan/report.c:425 kasan_report+0x38/0x51 mm/kasan/report.c:442 vmci_handle_is_equal include/linux/vmw_vmci_defs.h:142 [inline] vmci_resource_remove+0x3a1/0x410 drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_resource.c:147 vmci_qp_broker_detach+0x89a/0x11b9 drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_queue_pair.c:2182 ctx_free_ctx+0x473/0xbe1 drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_context.c:444 kref_put include/linux/kref.h:65 [inline] vmci_ctx_put drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_context.c:497 [inline] vmci_ctx_destroy+0x170/0x1d6 drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_context.c:195 vmci_host_close+0x125/0x1ac drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_host.c:143 __fput+0x261/0xa34 fs/file_table.c:282 task_work_run+0xf0/0x194 kernel/task_work.c:164 tracehook_notify_resume include/linux/tracehook.h:189 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x184/0x189 kernel/entry/common.c:187 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x11b/0x123 kernel/entry/common.c:220 __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:302 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x18/0x42 kernel/entry/common.c:313 do_syscall_64+0x41/0x85 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x0 This change ensures the type is also checked when removing the resource from vmci_resource_table in vmci_resource_remove(). Fixes: bc63dedb7d46 ("VMCI: resource object implementation.") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: George Kennedy <george.kennedy(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David Fernandez Gonzalez <david.fernandez.gonzalez(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Zhang Kunbo <zhangkunbo(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_resource.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_resource.c b/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_resource.c index 692daa9eff34..19c9d2cdd277 100644 --- a/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_resource.c +++ b/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_resource.c @@ -144,7 +144,8 @@ void vmci_resource_remove(struct vmci_resource *resource) spin_lock(&vmci_resource_table.lock); hlist_for_each_entry(r, &vmci_resource_table.entries[idx], node) { - if (vmci_handle_is_equal(r->handle, resource->handle)) { + if (vmci_handle_is_equal(r->handle, resource->handle) && + resource->type == r->type) { hlist_del_init_rcu(&r->node); break; } -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] drm/amd/display: Ensure index calculation will not overflow
by Tong Tiangen 26 Sep '24

26 Sep '24

mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.1-rc1 commit 91954c6c904b515baafaee6a1f35c94409a3bb68 bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IARV8L CVE: CVE-2024-46726 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- [WHY & HOW] Make sure vmid0p72_idx, vnom0p8_idx and vmax0p9_idx calculation will never overflow and exceess array size. This fixes 3 OVERRUN and 1 INTEGER_OVERFLOW issues reported by Coverity. Reviewed-by: Harry Wentland <harry.wentland(a)amd.com> Acked-by: Tom Chung <chiahsuan.chung(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Hung <alex.hung(a)amd.com> Tested-by: Daniel Wheeler <daniel.wheeler(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher(a)amd.com> Conflicts: drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/calcs/dcn_calcs.c [Conflicts from: 1) commit 552b7cb0eed1 move drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/calcs/dcn_calcs.c to drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dml/calcs/dcn_calcs.c; 2) commit 91954c6c904b move dcn_bw_update_from_pplib() to dcn_bw_update_from_pplib_fclks() and the code logic is the same.] Signed-off-by: Tong Tiangen <tongtiangen(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/calcs/dcn_calcs.c | 7 +++---- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/calcs/dcn_calcs.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/calcs/dcn_calcs.c index 51397b565ddf..2186603d915c 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/calcs/dcn_calcs.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/calcs/dcn_calcs.c @@ -1498,10 +1498,9 @@ void dcn_bw_update_from_pplib(struct dc *dc) ASSERT(fclks.num_levels); vmin0p65_idx = 0; - vmid0p72_idx = fclks.num_levels - - (fclks.num_levels > 2 ? 3 : (fclks.num_levels > 1 ? 2 : 1)); - vnom0p8_idx = fclks.num_levels - (fclks.num_levels > 1 ? 2 : 1); - vmax0p9_idx = fclks.num_levels - 1; + vmid0p72_idx = fclks.num_levels > 2 ? fclks.num_levels - 3 : 0; + vnom0p8_idx = fclks.num_levels > 1 ? fclks.num_levels - 2 : 0; + vmax0p9_idx = fclks.num_levels > 0 ? fclks.num_levels - 1 : 0; dc->dcn_soc->fabric_and_dram_bandwidth_vmin0p65 = 32 * (fclks.data[vmin0p65_idx].clocks_in_khz / 1000.0) / 1000.0; -- 2.25.1

2 1