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[PATCH OLK-6.6] smb: client: validate the whole DACL before rewriting it in cifsacl
by Zizhi Wo 03 Jun '26

03 Jun '26

From: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v7.0.2 commit b78db9bddc84136f6a0bb49e8883cf200dfb87a8 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14459 CVE: CVE-2026-31709 Reference: https://web.git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit… -------------------------------- commit 0a8cf165566ba55a39fd0f4de172119dd646d39a upstream. build_sec_desc() and id_mode_to_cifs_acl() derive a DACL pointer from a server-supplied dacloffset and then use the incoming ACL to rebuild the chmod/chown security descriptor. The original fix only checked that the struct smb_acl header fits before reading dacl_ptr->size or dacl_ptr->num_aces. That avoids the immediate header-field OOB read, but the rewrite helpers still walk ACEs based on pdacl->num_aces with no structural validation of the incoming DACL body. A malicious server can return a truncated DACL that still contains a header, claims one or more ACEs, and then drive replace_sids_and_copy_aces() or set_chmod_dacl() past the validated extent while they compare or copy attacker-controlled ACEs. Factor the DACL structural checks into validate_dacl(), extend them to validate each ACE against the DACL bounds, and use the shared validator before the chmod/chown rebuild paths. parse_dacl() reuses the same validator so the read-side parser and write-side rewrite paths agree on what constitutes a well-formed incoming DACL. Fixes: bc3e9dd9d104 ("cifs: Change SIDs in ACEs while transferring file ownership.") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-6 Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5-4 Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench(a)microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Conflicts: fs/smb/client/cifsacl.c [Because of commit 64e1ae59edaf ("[Backport] smb: client: validate dacloffset before building DACL pointers") merged, introduce dacl_offset_valid(), lead to some context conflicts, not affect this patch.] Signed-off-by: Zizhi Wo <wozizhi(a)huawei.com> --- fs/smb/client/cifsacl.c | 116 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 85 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/smb/client/cifsacl.c b/fs/smb/client/cifsacl.c index 7ec087896cac..4a82d11dfe4b 100644 --- a/fs/smb/client/cifsacl.c +++ b/fs/smb/client/cifsacl.c @@ -756,18 +756,89 @@ static void dump_ace(struct smb_ace *pace, char *end_of_acl) return; } #endif +static int validate_dacl(struct smb_acl *pdacl, char *end_of_acl) +{ + int i, ace_hdr_size, ace_size, min_ace_size; + u16 dacl_size, num_aces; + char *acl_base, *end_of_dacl; + struct smb_ace *pace; + + if (!pdacl) + return 0; + + if (end_of_acl < (char *)pdacl + sizeof(struct smb_acl)) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "ACL too small to parse DACL\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + + dacl_size = le16_to_cpu(pdacl->size); + if (dacl_size < sizeof(struct smb_acl) || + end_of_acl < (char *)pdacl + dacl_size) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "ACL too small to parse DACL\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + + num_aces = le16_to_cpu(pdacl->num_aces); + if (!num_aces) + return 0; + + ace_hdr_size = offsetof(struct smb_ace, sid) + + offsetof(struct smb_sid, sub_auth); + min_ace_size = ace_hdr_size + sizeof(__le32); + if (num_aces > (dacl_size - sizeof(struct smb_acl)) / min_ace_size) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "ACL too small to parse DACL\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + + end_of_dacl = (char *)pdacl + dacl_size; + acl_base = (char *)pdacl; + ace_size = sizeof(struct smb_acl); + + for (i = 0; i < num_aces; ++i) { + if (end_of_dacl - acl_base < ace_size) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "ACL too small to parse ACE\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + + pace = (struct smb_ace *)(acl_base + ace_size); + acl_base = (char *)pace; + + if (end_of_dacl - acl_base < ace_hdr_size || + pace->sid.num_subauth == 0 || + pace->sid.num_subauth > SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "ACL too small to parse ACE\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + + ace_size = ace_hdr_size + sizeof(__le32) * pace->sid.num_subauth; + if (end_of_dacl - acl_base < ace_size || + le16_to_cpu(pace->size) < ace_size) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "ACL too small to parse ACE\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + + ace_size = le16_to_cpu(pace->size); + if (end_of_dacl - acl_base < ace_size) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "ACL too small to parse ACE\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + } + + return 0; +} + static void parse_dacl(struct smb_acl *pdacl, char *end_of_acl, struct smb_sid *pownersid, struct smb_sid *pgrpsid, struct cifs_fattr *fattr, bool mode_from_special_sid) { int i; int num_aces = 0; int acl_size; - char *acl_base; + char *acl_base, *end_of_dacl; struct smb_ace **ppace; /* BB need to add parm so we can store the SID BB */ if (!pdacl) { @@ -775,63 +846,40 @@ static void parse_dacl(struct smb_acl *pdacl, char *end_of_acl, all the permissions for user/group/other */ fattr->cf_mode |= 0777; return; } - /* validate that we do not go past end of acl */ - if (end_of_acl < (char *)pdacl + sizeof(struct smb_acl) || - end_of_acl < (char *)pdacl + le16_to_cpu(pdacl->size)) { - cifs_dbg(VFS, "ACL too small to parse DACL\n"); + if (validate_dacl(pdacl, end_of_acl)) return; - } cifs_dbg(NOISY, "DACL revision %d size %d num aces %d\n", le16_to_cpu(pdacl->revision), le16_to_cpu(pdacl->size), le32_to_cpu(pdacl->num_aces)); /* reset rwx permissions for user/group/other. Also, if num_aces is 0 i.e. DACL has no ACEs, user/group/other have no permissions */ fattr->cf_mode &= ~(0777); + end_of_dacl = (char *)pdacl + le16_to_cpu(pdacl->size); acl_base = (char *)pdacl; acl_size = sizeof(struct smb_acl); num_aces = le32_to_cpu(pdacl->num_aces); if (num_aces > 0) { umode_t denied_mode = 0; - if (num_aces > (le16_to_cpu(pdacl->size) - sizeof(struct smb_acl)) / - (offsetof(struct smb_ace, sid) + - offsetof(struct smb_sid, sub_auth) + sizeof(__le16))) - return; - ppace = kmalloc_array(num_aces, sizeof(struct smb_ace *), GFP_KERNEL); if (!ppace) return; for (i = 0; i < num_aces; ++i) { - if (end_of_acl - acl_base < acl_size) - break; - ppace[i] = (struct smb_ace *) (acl_base + acl_size); - acl_base = (char *)ppace[i]; - acl_size = offsetof(struct smb_ace, sid) + - offsetof(struct smb_sid, sub_auth); - - if (end_of_acl - acl_base < acl_size || - ppace[i]->sid.num_subauth == 0 || - ppace[i]->sid.num_subauth > SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES || - (end_of_acl - acl_base < - acl_size + sizeof(__le32) * ppace[i]->sid.num_subauth) || - (le16_to_cpu(ppace[i]->size) < - acl_size + sizeof(__le32) * ppace[i]->sid.num_subauth)) - break; #ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_DEBUG2 - dump_ace(ppace[i], end_of_acl); + dump_ace(ppace[i], end_of_dacl); #endif if (mode_from_special_sid && (compare_sids(&(ppace[i]->sid), &sid_unix_NFS_mode) == 0)) { /* @@ -869,10 +917,11 @@ static void parse_dacl(struct smb_acl *pdacl, char *end_of_acl, /* memcpy((void *)(&(cifscred->aces[i])), (void *)ppace[i], sizeof(struct smb_ace)); */ + acl_base = (char *)ppace[i]; acl_size = le16_to_cpu(ppace[i]->size); } kfree(ppace); } @@ -1314,14 +1363,13 @@ static int build_sec_desc(struct smb_ntsd *pntsd, struct smb_ntsd *pnntsd, cifs_dbg(VFS, "Server returned illegal DACL offset\n"); return -EINVAL; } dacl_ptr = (struct smb_acl *)((char *)pntsd + dacloffset); - if (end_of_acl < (char *)dacl_ptr + le16_to_cpu(dacl_ptr->size)) { - cifs_dbg(VFS, "Server returned illegal ACL size\n"); - return -EINVAL; - } + rc = validate_dacl(dacl_ptr, end_of_acl); + if (rc) + return rc; } owner_sid_ptr = (struct smb_sid *)((char *)pntsd + le32_to_cpu(pntsd->osidoffset)); group_sid_ptr = (struct smb_sid *)((char *)pntsd + @@ -1694,10 +1742,16 @@ id_mode_to_cifs_acl(struct inode *inode, const char *path, __u64 *pnmode, rc = -EINVAL; goto id_mode_to_cifs_acl_exit; } dacl_ptr = (struct smb_acl *)((char *)pntsd + dacloffset); + rc = validate_dacl(dacl_ptr, (char *)pntsd + secdesclen); + if (rc) { + kfree(pntsd); + cifs_put_tlink(tlink); + return rc; + } if (mode_from_sid) nsecdesclen += le32_to_cpu(dacl_ptr->num_aces) * sizeof(struct smb_ace); else /* cifsacl */ nsecdesclen += le16_to_cpu(dacl_ptr->size); -- 2.52.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] dm-thin: fix metadata refcount underflow
by Zizhi Wo 03 Jun '26

03 Jun '26

From: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka(a)redhat.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.140 commit 12161e03d33afce781f68fa11cc6060538862fad category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15360 CVE: CVE-2026-46107 Reference: https://web.git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit… -------------------------------- commit 09a65adc7d8bbfce06392cb6d375468e2728ead5 upstream. There's a bug in dm-thin in the function rebalance_children. If the internal btree node has one entry, the code tries to copy all btree entries from the node's child to the node itself and then decrement the child's reference count. If the child node is shared (it has reference count > 1), we won't free it, so there would be two pointers to each of the grandchildren nodes. But the reference counts of the grandchildren is not increased, thus the reference count doesn't match the number of pointers that point to the grandchildren. This results in "device mapper: space map common: unable to decrement block" errors. Fix this bug by incrementing reference counts on the grandchildren if the btree node is shared. Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka(a)redhat.com> Fixes: 3241b1d3e0aa ("dm: add persistent data library") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Conflicts: drivers/md/persistent-data/dm-transaction-manager.c drivers/md/persistent-data/dm-transaction-manager.h [This kernel version does not have dm_tm_block_is_shared() function as commit 4eafdb1515a7 ("dm btree: improve btree residency") not merged. So the functionality of this function was implemented manually.] Signed-off-by: Zizhi Wo <wozizhi(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/md/persistent-data/dm-btree-remove.c | 8 ++++++++ drivers/md/persistent-data/dm-transaction-manager.c | 9 +++++++++ drivers/md/persistent-data/dm-transaction-manager.h | 7 +++++++ 3 files changed, 24 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/md/persistent-data/dm-btree-remove.c b/drivers/md/persistent-data/dm-btree-remove.c index 63f2baed3c8a..1cf31861020b 100644 --- a/drivers/md/persistent-data/dm-btree-remove.c +++ b/drivers/md/persistent-data/dm-btree-remove.c @@ -413,16 +413,24 @@ static int rebalance_children(struct shadow_spine *s, n = dm_block_data(shadow_current(s)); if (le32_to_cpu(n->header.nr_entries) == 1) { struct dm_block *child; + int is_shared; dm_block_t b = value64(n, 0); + r = dm_tm_block_is_shared(info->tm, b, &is_shared); + if (r) + return r; + r = dm_tm_read_lock(info->tm, b, &btree_node_validator, &child); if (r) return r; + if (is_shared) + inc_children(info->tm, dm_block_data(child), vt); + memcpy(n, dm_block_data(child), dm_bm_block_size(dm_tm_get_bm(info->tm))); dm_tm_dec(info->tm, dm_block_location(child)); dm_tm_unlock(info->tm, child); diff --git a/drivers/md/persistent-data/dm-transaction-manager.c b/drivers/md/persistent-data/dm-transaction-manager.c index 73f57977b2e3..eda9d7a02008 100644 --- a/drivers/md/persistent-data/dm-transaction-manager.c +++ b/drivers/md/persistent-data/dm-transaction-manager.c @@ -380,10 +380,19 @@ int dm_tm_ref(struct dm_transaction_manager *tm, dm_block_t b, return -EWOULDBLOCK; return dm_sm_get_count(tm->sm, b, result); } +int dm_tm_block_is_shared(struct dm_transaction_manager *tm, dm_block_t b, + int *result) +{ + if (tm->is_clone) + return -EWOULDBLOCK; + + return dm_sm_count_is_more_than_one(tm->sm, b, result); +} + struct dm_block_manager *dm_tm_get_bm(struct dm_transaction_manager *tm) { return tm->bm; } diff --git a/drivers/md/persistent-data/dm-transaction-manager.h b/drivers/md/persistent-data/dm-transaction-manager.h index f3a18be68f30..dbc6e4b13b06 100644 --- a/drivers/md/persistent-data/dm-transaction-manager.h +++ b/drivers/md/persistent-data/dm-transaction-manager.h @@ -104,10 +104,17 @@ void dm_tm_inc(struct dm_transaction_manager *tm, dm_block_t b); void dm_tm_dec(struct dm_transaction_manager *tm, dm_block_t b); int dm_tm_ref(struct dm_transaction_manager *tm, dm_block_t b, uint32_t *result); +/* + * Finds out if a given block is shared (ie. has a reference count higher + * than one). + */ +int dm_tm_block_is_shared(struct dm_transaction_manager *tm, dm_block_t b, + int *result); + struct dm_block_manager *dm_tm_get_bm(struct dm_transaction_manager *tm); /* * If you're using a non-blocking clone the tm will build up a list of * requested blocks that weren't in core. This call will request those -- 2.52.0

2 2

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS V1] RDMA/rxe: Fix double free in rxe_srq_from_init
by Cheng Yu 03 Jun '26

03 Jun '26

From: Jiasheng Jiang <jiashengjiangcool(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.0-rc1 commit 0beefd0e15d962f497aad750b2d5e9c3570b66d1 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15105 CVE: CVE-2026-45852 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- In rxe_srq_from_init(), the queue pointer 'q' is assigned to 'srq->rq.queue' before copying the SRQ number to user space. If copy_to_user() fails, the function calls rxe_queue_cleanup() to free the queue, but leaves the now-invalid pointer in 'srq->rq.queue'. The caller of rxe_srq_from_init() (rxe_create_srq) eventually calls rxe_srq_cleanup() upon receiving the error, which triggers a second rxe_queue_cleanup() on the same memory, leading to a double free. The call trace looks like this: kmem_cache_free+0x.../0x... rxe_queue_cleanup+0x1a/0x30 [rdma_rxe] rxe_srq_cleanup+0x42/0x60 [rdma_rxe] rxe_elem_release+0x31/0x70 [rdma_rxe] rxe_create_srq+0x12b/0x1a0 [rdma_rxe] ib_create_srq_user+0x9a/0x150 [ib_core] Fix this by moving 'srq->rq.queue = q' after copy_to_user. Fixes: aae0484e15f0 ("IB/rxe: avoid srq memory leak") Signed-off-by: Jiasheng Jiang <jiashengjiangcool(a)gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260112015412.29458-1-jiashengjiangcool@gmail.com Reviewed-by: Zhu Yanjun <yanjun.Zhu(a)linux.dev> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_srq.c [The conflict is caused by not having applied the patch cc28f351155d("RDMA/rxe: Fix rxe_modify_srq"). ] Signed-off-by: Cheng Yu <serein.chengyu(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_srq.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_srq.c b/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_srq.c index c41a5fee81f7..ec564e7010c4 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_srq.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_srq.c @@ -126,8 +126,6 @@ int rxe_srq_from_init(struct rxe_dev *rxe, struct rxe_srq *srq, return -ENOMEM; } - srq->rq.queue = q; - err = do_mmap_info(rxe, uresp ? &uresp->mi : NULL, context, q->buf, q->buf_size, &q->ip); if (err) { @@ -144,6 +142,8 @@ int rxe_srq_from_init(struct rxe_dev *rxe, struct rxe_srq *srq, } } + srq->rq.queue = q; + return 0; } -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] fs/ntfs3: Fix slab-out-of-bounds read in DeleteIndexEntryRoot
by Zizhi Wo 03 Jun '26

03 Jun '26

From: Jiasheng Jiang <jiashengjiangcool(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.15.202 commit 36c03f7f177b34d51f1cf1d2304b1074607bf4b0 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15173 CVE: CVE-2026-45935 Reference: https://web.git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit b2bc7c44ed1779fc9eaab9a186db0f0d01439622 ] In the 'DeleteIndexEntryRoot' case of the 'do_action' function, the entry size ('esize') is retrieved from the log record without adequate bounds checking. Specifically, the code calculates the end of the entry ('e2') using: e2 = Add2Ptr(e1, esize); It then calculates the size for memmove using 'PtrOffset(e2, ...)', which subtracts the end pointer from the buffer limit. If 'esize' is maliciously large, 'e2' exceeds the used buffer size. This results in a negative offset which, when cast to size_t for memmove, interprets as a massive unsigned integer, leading to a heap buffer overflow. This commit adds a check to ensure that the entry size ('esize') strictly fits within the remaining used space of the index header before performing memory operations. Fixes: b46acd6a6a62 ("fs/ntfs3: Add NTFS journal") Signed-off-by: Jiasheng Jiang <jiashengjiangcool(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich(a)paragon-software.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Zizhi Wo <wozizhi(a)huawei.com> --- fs/ntfs3/fslog.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/ntfs3/fslog.c b/fs/ntfs3/fslog.c index d1f48ffe846e..ef4e7dbc35cf 100644 --- a/fs/ntfs3/fslog.c +++ b/fs/ntfs3/fslog.c @@ -3435,10 +3435,13 @@ static int do_action(struct ntfs_log *log, struct OPEN_ATTR_ENRTY *oe, goto dirty_vol; } e1 = Add2Ptr(attr, le16_to_cpu(lrh->attr_off)); esize = le16_to_cpu(e1->size); + if (PtrOffset(e1, Add2Ptr(hdr, used)) < esize) + goto dirty_vol; + e2 = Add2Ptr(e1, esize); memmove(e1, e2, PtrOffset(e2, Add2Ptr(hdr, used))); le32_sub_cpu(&attr->res.data_size, esize); -- 2.52.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/3] CVEs
by Liu Kai 03 Jun '26

03 Jun '26

CVEs Chiara Meiohas (1): RDMA/mlx5: Fix UMR hang in LAG error state unload Jonathan McDowell (1): hwrng: core - Allow runtime disabling of the HW RNG Lianjie Wang (1): hwrng: core - use RCU and work_struct to fix race condition drivers/char/hw_random/core.c | 178 +++++++++++++++++---------- drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/main.c | 75 +++++++++-- drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/mlx5_ib.h | 2 + include/linux/hw_random.h | 2 + 4 files changed, 184 insertions(+), 73 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 4

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] ipv6: prevent possible UaF in addrconf_permanent_addr()
by Zhang Changzhong 03 Jun '26

03 Jun '26

From: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.0-rc7 commit fd63f185979b047fb22a0dfc6bd94d0cab6a6a70 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14897 CVE: CVE-2026-43339 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- The mentioned helper try to warn the user about an exceptional condition, but the message is delivered too late, accessing the ipv6 after its possible deletion. Reorder the statement to avoid the possible UaF; while at it, place the warning outside the idev->lock as it needs no protection. Reported-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/8c8bfe2e1a324e501f0e15fef404a77443fd8caf.177… Fixes: f1705ec197e7 ("net: ipv6: Make address flushing on ifdown optional") Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/ef973c3a8cb4f8f1787ed469f3e5391b9fe95aa0.177460154… Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Zhang Changzhong <zhangchangzhong(a)huawei.com> --- net/ipv6/addrconf.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv6/addrconf.c b/net/ipv6/addrconf.c index 6c76c0c..98a24b5 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/addrconf.c +++ b/net/ipv6/addrconf.c @@ -3421,12 +3421,12 @@ static void addrconf_permanent_addr(struct net *net, struct net_device *dev) if ((ifp->flags & IFA_F_PERMANENT) && fixup_permanent_addr(net, idev, ifp) < 0) { write_unlock_bh(&idev->lock); - in6_ifa_hold(ifp); - ipv6_del_addr(ifp); - write_lock_bh(&idev->lock); net_info_ratelimited("%s: Failed to add prefix route for address %pI6c; dropping\n", idev->dev->name, &ifp->addr); + in6_ifa_hold(ifp); + ipv6_del_addr(ifp); + write_lock_bh(&idev->lock); } } -- 2.9.5

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/6] Fix CVE-2026-46242
by Zizhi Wo 03 Jun '26

03 Jun '26

Fix CVE-2026-46242 Christian Brauner (6): eventpoll: use hlist_is_singular_node() in __ep_remove() eventpoll: split __ep_remove() eventpoll: kill __ep_remove() eventpoll: drop vestigial __ prefix from ep_remove_{file,epi}() eventpoll: move epi_fget() up eventpoll: fix ep_remove struct eventpoll / struct file UAF fs/eventpoll.c | 128 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------- 1 file changed, 73 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-) -- 2.52.0

2 7

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS 0/7] backport some zram bugfixes
by Jinjiang Tu 03 Jun '26

03 Jun '26

Georgi Djakov (1): mm/page_io: use pr_alert_ratelimited for swap read/write errors Ming Lei (3): zram: fix race between zram_reset_device() and disksize_store() zram: don't fail to remove zram during unloading module zram: avoid race between zram_remove and disksize_store Rokudo Yan (1): zsmalloc: account the number of compacted pages correctly Sergey Senozhatsky (2): zram: do not lookup algorithm in backends table drivers/block/zram/zram_drv.c: do not keep dangling zcomp pointer after zram reset drivers/block/zram/zcomp.c | 11 ++++---- drivers/block/zram/zram_drv.c | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- include/linux/zsmalloc.h | 2 +- mm/page_io.c | 12 ++++---- mm/zsmalloc.c | 17 +++++++---- 5 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-) -- 2.43.0

2 8

[PATCH OLK-6.6 v2] bpf: Remove smap argument from bpf_selem_free()
by Pu Lehui 03 Jun '26

03 Jun '26

From: Amery Hung <ameryhung(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.19-rc1 commit e76a33e1c7186526c2c133af73ea70da9275e1ba category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/9328 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Since selem already saves a pointer to smap, use it instead of an additional argument in bpf_selem_free(). This requires moving the SDATA(selem)->smap assignment from bpf_selem_link_map() to bpf_selem_alloc() since bpf_selem_free() may be called without the selem being linked to smap in bpf_local_storage_update(). Signed-off-by: Amery Hung <ameryhung(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau(a)kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251114201329.3275875-3-ameryhung@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org> Fixes: 499c90ae60d8 ("bpf: Convert bpf_selem_unlink_map to failable") Conflicts: include/linux/bpf_local_storage.h kernel/bpf/bpf_local_storage.c net/core/bpf_sk_storage.c [Not merged bpf_selem_free_list] Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui <pulehui(a)huawei.com> --- include/linux/bpf_local_storage.h | 1 - kernel/bpf/bpf_local_storage.c | 14 +++++++++----- net/core/bpf_sk_storage.c | 4 ++-- 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_local_storage.h b/include/linux/bpf_local_storage.h index cec87412cef9..05153bc722ba 100644 --- a/include/linux/bpf_local_storage.h +++ b/include/linux/bpf_local_storage.h @@ -170,7 +170,6 @@ bpf_selem_alloc(struct bpf_local_storage_map *smap, void *owner, void *value, bool charge_mem, gfp_t gfp_flags); void bpf_selem_free(struct bpf_local_storage_elem *selem, - struct bpf_local_storage_map *smap, bool reuse_now); int diff --git a/kernel/bpf/bpf_local_storage.c b/kernel/bpf/bpf_local_storage.c index 8b1280bef364..c27d8f75a2dc 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/bpf_local_storage.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/bpf_local_storage.c @@ -89,6 +89,8 @@ bpf_selem_alloc(struct bpf_local_storage_map *smap, void *owner, } if (selem) { + RCU_INIT_POINTER(SDATA(selem)->smap, smap); + if (value) copy_map_value(&smap->map, SDATA(selem)->data, value); /* No need to call check_and_init_map_value as memory is zero init */ @@ -213,9 +215,12 @@ static void bpf_selem_free_trace_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu) } void bpf_selem_free(struct bpf_local_storage_elem *selem, - struct bpf_local_storage_map *smap, bool reuse_now) { + struct bpf_local_storage_map *smap; + + smap = rcu_dereference_check(SDATA(selem)->smap, bpf_rcu_lock_held()); + bpf_obj_free_fields(smap->map.record, SDATA(selem)->data); if (!smap->bpf_ma) { @@ -286,7 +291,7 @@ static bool bpf_selem_unlink_storage_nolock(struct bpf_local_storage *local_stor SDATA(selem)) RCU_INIT_POINTER(local_storage->cache[smap->cache_idx], NULL); - bpf_selem_free(selem, smap, reuse_now); + bpf_selem_free(selem, reuse_now); if (rcu_access_pointer(local_storage->smap) == smap) RCU_INIT_POINTER(local_storage->smap, NULL); @@ -368,7 +373,6 @@ int bpf_selem_link_map(struct bpf_local_storage_map *smap, b = select_bucket(smap, local_storage); raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&b->lock, flags); - RCU_INIT_POINTER(SDATA(selem)->smap, smap); hlist_add_head_rcu(&selem->map_node, &b->list); raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&b->lock, flags); @@ -600,7 +604,7 @@ bpf_local_storage_update(void *owner, struct bpf_local_storage_map *smap, err = bpf_local_storage_alloc(owner, smap, selem, gfp_flags); if (err) { - bpf_selem_free(selem, smap, true); + bpf_selem_free(selem, true); mem_uncharge(smap, owner, smap->elem_size); return ERR_PTR(err); } @@ -680,7 +684,7 @@ bpf_local_storage_update(void *owner, struct bpf_local_storage_map *smap, raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&local_storage->lock, flags); if (alloc_selem) { mem_uncharge(smap, owner, smap->elem_size); - bpf_selem_free(alloc_selem, smap, true); + bpf_selem_free(alloc_selem, true); } return err ? ERR_PTR(err) : SDATA(selem); } diff --git a/net/core/bpf_sk_storage.c b/net/core/bpf_sk_storage.c index 626d0aa79751..35bbd8b372df 100644 --- a/net/core/bpf_sk_storage.c +++ b/net/core/bpf_sk_storage.c @@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ int bpf_sk_storage_clone(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk) if (new_sk_storage) { ret = bpf_selem_link_map(smap, new_sk_storage, copy_selem); if (ret) { - bpf_selem_free(copy_selem, smap, true); + bpf_selem_free(copy_selem, true); atomic_sub(smap->elem_size, &newsk->sk_omem_alloc); bpf_map_put(map); @@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ int bpf_sk_storage_clone(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk) } else { ret = bpf_local_storage_alloc(newsk, smap, copy_selem, GFP_ATOMIC); if (ret) { - bpf_selem_free(copy_selem, smap, true); + bpf_selem_free(copy_selem, true); atomic_sub(smap->elem_size, &newsk->sk_omem_alloc); bpf_map_put(map); -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] bpf: Remove smap argument from bpf_selem_free()
by Pu Lehui 03 Jun '26

03 Jun '26

From: Amery Hung <ameryhung(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.19-rc1 commit e76a33e1c7186526c2c133af73ea70da9275e1ba category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/9328 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Since selem already saves a pointer to smap, use it instead of an additional argument in bpf_selem_free(). This requires moving the SDATA(selem)->smap assignment from bpf_selem_link_map() to bpf_selem_alloc() since bpf_selem_free() may be called without the selem being linked to smap in bpf_local_storage_update(). Signed-off-by: Amery Hung <ameryhung(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau(a)kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251114201329.3275875-3-ameryhung@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org> Fixes: 65aeed7d8c14 ("[Backport] bpf: Convert bpf_selem_unlink_map to failable") Conflicts: include/linux/bpf_local_storage.h kernel/bpf/bpf_local_storage.c net/core/bpf_sk_storage.c [Not merged bpf_selem_free_list] Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui <pulehui(a)huawei.com> --- include/linux/bpf_local_storage.h | 1 - kernel/bpf/bpf_local_storage.c | 14 +++++++++----- net/core/bpf_sk_storage.c | 4 ++-- 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_local_storage.h b/include/linux/bpf_local_storage.h index cec87412cef9..05153bc722ba 100644 --- a/include/linux/bpf_local_storage.h +++ b/include/linux/bpf_local_storage.h @@ -170,7 +170,6 @@ bpf_selem_alloc(struct bpf_local_storage_map *smap, void *owner, void *value, bool charge_mem, gfp_t gfp_flags); void bpf_selem_free(struct bpf_local_storage_elem *selem, - struct bpf_local_storage_map *smap, bool reuse_now); int diff --git a/kernel/bpf/bpf_local_storage.c b/kernel/bpf/bpf_local_storage.c index 8b1280bef364..c27d8f75a2dc 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/bpf_local_storage.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/bpf_local_storage.c @@ -89,6 +89,8 @@ bpf_selem_alloc(struct bpf_local_storage_map *smap, void *owner, } if (selem) { + RCU_INIT_POINTER(SDATA(selem)->smap, smap); + if (value) copy_map_value(&smap->map, SDATA(selem)->data, value); /* No need to call check_and_init_map_value as memory is zero init */ @@ -213,9 +215,12 @@ static void bpf_selem_free_trace_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu) } void bpf_selem_free(struct bpf_local_storage_elem *selem, - struct bpf_local_storage_map *smap, bool reuse_now) { + struct bpf_local_storage_map *smap; + + smap = rcu_dereference_check(SDATA(selem)->smap, bpf_rcu_lock_held()); + bpf_obj_free_fields(smap->map.record, SDATA(selem)->data); if (!smap->bpf_ma) { @@ -286,7 +291,7 @@ static bool bpf_selem_unlink_storage_nolock(struct bpf_local_storage *local_stor SDATA(selem)) RCU_INIT_POINTER(local_storage->cache[smap->cache_idx], NULL); - bpf_selem_free(selem, smap, reuse_now); + bpf_selem_free(selem, reuse_now); if (rcu_access_pointer(local_storage->smap) == smap) RCU_INIT_POINTER(local_storage->smap, NULL); @@ -368,7 +373,6 @@ int bpf_selem_link_map(struct bpf_local_storage_map *smap, b = select_bucket(smap, local_storage); raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&b->lock, flags); - RCU_INIT_POINTER(SDATA(selem)->smap, smap); hlist_add_head_rcu(&selem->map_node, &b->list); raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&b->lock, flags); @@ -600,7 +604,7 @@ bpf_local_storage_update(void *owner, struct bpf_local_storage_map *smap, err = bpf_local_storage_alloc(owner, smap, selem, gfp_flags); if (err) { - bpf_selem_free(selem, smap, true); + bpf_selem_free(selem, true); mem_uncharge(smap, owner, smap->elem_size); return ERR_PTR(err); } @@ -680,7 +684,7 @@ bpf_local_storage_update(void *owner, struct bpf_local_storage_map *smap, raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&local_storage->lock, flags); if (alloc_selem) { mem_uncharge(smap, owner, smap->elem_size); - bpf_selem_free(alloc_selem, smap, true); + bpf_selem_free(alloc_selem, true); } return err ? ERR_PTR(err) : SDATA(selem); } diff --git a/net/core/bpf_sk_storage.c b/net/core/bpf_sk_storage.c index 626d0aa79751..35bbd8b372df 100644 --- a/net/core/bpf_sk_storage.c +++ b/net/core/bpf_sk_storage.c @@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ int bpf_sk_storage_clone(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk) if (new_sk_storage) { ret = bpf_selem_link_map(smap, new_sk_storage, copy_selem); if (ret) { - bpf_selem_free(copy_selem, smap, true); + bpf_selem_free(copy_selem, true); atomic_sub(smap->elem_size, &newsk->sk_omem_alloc); bpf_map_put(map); @@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ int bpf_sk_storage_clone(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk) } else { ret = bpf_local_storage_alloc(newsk, smap, copy_selem, GFP_ATOMIC); if (ret) { - bpf_selem_free(copy_selem, smap, true); + bpf_selem_free(copy_selem, true); atomic_sub(smap->elem_size, &newsk->sk_omem_alloc); bpf_map_put(map); -- 2.34.1

2 1

openEuler Kernel SIG双周例会
by openEuler conference 03 Jun '26

03 Jun '26

您好！ Kernel 邀请您参加 2026-06-05 14:00 召开的WeLink会议(自动录制) 会议主题：openEuler Kernel SIG双周例会会议发起人： LiaoTao_Wave 会议内容： 1. 进展update 2. 议题征集中（新增议题请填报至会议纪要看板）会议链接：https://meeting.huaweicloud.com:36443/#/j/961342573 会议纪要&签到链接：https://etherpad.openeuler.org/p/Kernel-meetings 更多资讯尽在：https://www.openeuler.org/zh/ Hello! Kernel invites you to attend the WeLink conference(auto recording) will be held at 2026-06-05 14:00 The subject of the conference is openEuler Kernel SIG双周例会 The sponsor of the conference is LiaoTao_Wave Summary: 1. 进展update 2. 议题征集中（新增议题请填报至会议纪要看板） You can join the meeting at https://meeting.huaweicloud.com:36443/#/j/961342573 Add topics at https://etherpad.openeuler.org/p/Kernel-meetings More information: https://www.openeuler.org/en/

1 0

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] ip6_gre: Use cached t->net in ip6erspan_changelink().
by superdcc97＠163.com 03 Jun '26

03 Jun '26

From: Maoyi Xie <maoyixie.tju(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.1-rc3 commit 1d324c2f43f70c965f25c58cc3611c779adbe47e category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15387 CVE: CVE-2026-46120 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- After commit 5e72ce3e3980 ("net: ipv6: Use link netns in newlink() of rtnl_link_ops"), ip6erspan_newlink() correctly resolves the per-netns ip6gre hash via link_net. ip6erspan_changelink() was not converted in that series and still uses dev_net(dev), which diverges from the device's creation netns after IFLA_NET_NS_FD migration. This re-inserts the tunnel into the wrong per-netns hash. The original netns keeps a stale entry. When that netns is later destroyed, ip6gre_exit_rtnl_net() walks the stale entry, producing a slab-use-after-free reported by KASAN, followed by a kernel BUG at net/core/dev.c (LIST_POISON1) in unregister_netdevice_many_notify(). Reachable from an unprivileged user namespace (unshare --user --map-root-user --net). ip6gre_changelink() earlier in the same file already uses the cached t->net; only ip6erspan_changelink() has the wrong shape. Fixes: 2d665034f239 ("net: ip6_gre: Fix ip6erspan hlen calculation") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v5.15+ Signed-off-by: Maoyi Xie <maoyi.xie(a)ntu.edu.sg> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu(a)google.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260430103318.3206018-1-maoyi.xie@ntu.edu.sg Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c index ea880805ddf5..7d870eb5061d 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c +++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c @@ -2295,10 +2295,11 @@ static int ip6erspan_changelink(struct net_device *dev, struct nlattr *tb[], struct nlattr *data[], struct netlink_ext_ack *extack) { - struct ip6gre_net *ign = net_generic(dev_net(dev), ip6gre_net_id); + struct ip6_tnl *t = netdev_priv(dev); struct __ip6_tnl_parm p; - struct ip6_tnl *t; + struct ip6gre_net *ign; + ign = net_generic(t->net, ip6gre_net_id); t = ip6gre_changelink_common(dev, tb, data, &p, extack); if (IS_ERR(t)) return PTR_ERR(t); -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] drm/gem: Fix inconsistent plane dimension calculation in drm_gem_fb_init_with_funcs()
by Hongtao Zhang 03 Jun '26

03 Jun '26

From: Ashutosh Desai <ashutoshdesai993(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.140 commit 6b992591e04f2cce813bcf239b354f375bbf84d3 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15462 CVE: CVE-2026-46209 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 3d4c2268bd7243c3780fe32bf24ff876da272acf upstream. drm_gem_fb_init_with_funcs() computes sub-sampled plane dimensions using plain integer division: unsigned int width = mode_cmd->width / (i ? info->hsub : 1); unsigned int height = mode_cmd->height / (i ? info->vsub : 1); However, the ioctl-level framebuffer_check() in drm_framebuffer.c uses drm_format_info_plane_width/height() which round up dimensions via DIV_ROUND_UP(). This inconsistency corrupts the subsequent GEM object size check for certain pixel format and dimension combinations. For example, with NV12 (vsub=2) and a 1-pixel-tall framebuffer the GEM size validation path sees height=0 instead of height=1. The expression (height - 1) then wraps to UINT_MAX as an unsigned int, causing min_size to overflow and wrap back to a small value. A tiny GEM object therefore passes the size guard, yet when the GPU accesses the chroma plane it will read or write memory beyond the object's bounds. Fix by replacing the open-coded divisions with drm_format_info_plane_width() and drm_format_info_plane_height(), which use DIV_ROUND_UP() and match the calculation already used in framebuffer_check(). Fixes: 4c3dbb2c312c ("drm: Add GEM backed framebuffer library") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v4.14+ Reviewed-by: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann(a)suse.de> Signed-off-by: Ashutosh Desai <ashutoshdesai993(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann(a)suse.de> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260420013637.457751-1-ashutoshdesai993@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Conflicts: drivers/gpu/drm/drm_gem_framebuffer_helper.c [Not merge bf39607c1614 and f2b816d78a94] Signed-off-by: Zhang Hongtao <zhanghongtao35(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/gpu/drm/drm_gem_framebuffer_helper.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_gem_framebuffer_helper.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_gem_framebuffer_helper.c index 2810d4131411..42c396d47d51 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_gem_framebuffer_helper.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_gem_framebuffer_helper.c @@ -158,8 +158,10 @@ drm_gem_fb_create_with_funcs(struct drm_device *dev, struct drm_file *file, return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); for (i = 0; i < info->num_planes; i++) { - unsigned int width = mode_cmd->width / (i ? info->hsub : 1); - unsigned int height = mode_cmd->height / (i ? info->vsub : 1); + unsigned int width = i ? DIV_ROUND_UP(mode_cmd->width, info->hsub) : + mode_cmd->width; + unsigned int height = i ? DIV_ROUND_UP(mode_cmd->height, info->vsub) : + mode_cmd->height; unsigned int min_size; objs[i] = drm_gem_object_lookup(file, mode_cmd->handles[i]); -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] fix CVE-2026-45893
by Gu Bowen 03 Jun '26

03 Jun '26

fix CVE-2026-45893 Helge Deller (2): AppArmor: Allow apparmor to handle unaligned dfa tables apparmor: Fix & Optimize table creation from possibly unaligned memory security/apparmor/include/match.h | 12 +++++++----- security/apparmor/match.c | 22 +++++++++++----------- 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) -- 2.43.0

2 3

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] ipmi: Add limits to event and receive message requests
by Zhao Yipeng 03 Jun '26

03 Jun '26

From: Corey Minyard <corey(a)minyard.net> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.1-rc3 commit c4cca236968683eb0d59abfb12d5c7e4d8514227 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15454 CVE: CVE-2026-46177 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- The driver would just fetch events and receive messages until the BMC said it was done. To avoid issues with BMCs that never say they are done, add a limit of 10 fetches at a time. In addition, an si interface has an attn state it can return from the hardware which is supposed to cause a flag fetch to see if the driver needs to fetch events or message or a few other things. If the attn bit gets stuck, it's a similar problem. So allow messages in between flag fetches so the driver itself doesn't get stuck. This is a more general fix than the previous fix for the specific bad BMC, but should fix the more general issue of a BMC that won't stop saying it has data. This has been there from the beginning of the driver. It's not a bug per-se, but it is accounting for bugs in BMCs. Reported-by: Matt Fleming <mfleming(a)cloudflare.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20260415115930.3428942-1-matt@readmodwrite.com/ Fixes: <1da177e4c3f4> ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <corey(a)minyard.net> Conflicts: drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_intf.c [Context conflicts.] Signed-off-by: Zhao Yipeng <zhaoyipeng5(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_intf.c | 54 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------- drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_ssif.c | 23 ++++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_intf.c b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_intf.c index 955bb53def90..56684f0ed4fa 100644 --- a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_intf.c +++ b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_intf.c @@ -160,6 +160,10 @@ struct smi_info { OEM2_DATA_AVAIL) unsigned char msg_flags; + /* When requesting events and messages, don't do it forever. */ + unsigned int num_requests_in_a_row; + bool last_was_flag_fetch; + /* Does the BMC have an event buffer? */ bool has_event_buffer; @@ -397,7 +401,10 @@ static void start_getting_msg_queue(struct smi_info *smi_info) start_new_msg(smi_info, smi_info->curr_msg->data, smi_info->curr_msg->data_size); - smi_info->si_state = SI_GETTING_MESSAGES; + if (smi_info->si_state != SI_GETTING_MESSAGES) { + smi_info->num_requests_in_a_row = 0; + smi_info->si_state = SI_GETTING_MESSAGES; + } } static void start_getting_events(struct smi_info *smi_info) @@ -408,7 +415,10 @@ static void start_getting_events(struct smi_info *smi_info) start_new_msg(smi_info, smi_info->curr_msg->data, smi_info->curr_msg->data_size); - smi_info->si_state = SI_GETTING_EVENTS; + if (smi_info->si_state != SI_GETTING_EVENTS) { + smi_info->num_requests_in_a_row = 0; + smi_info->si_state = SI_GETTING_EVENTS; + } } /* @@ -582,6 +592,7 @@ static void handle_transaction_done(struct smi_info *smi_info) smi_info->si_state = SI_NORMAL; } else { smi_info->msg_flags = msg[3]; + smi_info->last_was_flag_fetch = true; handle_flags(smi_info); } break; @@ -627,6 +638,11 @@ static void handle_transaction_done(struct smi_info *smi_info) } else { smi_inc_stat(smi_info, events); + smi_info->num_requests_in_a_row++; + if (smi_info->num_requests_in_a_row > 10) + /* Stop if we do this too many times. */ + smi_info->msg_flags &= ~EVENT_MSG_BUFFER_FULL; + /* * Do this before we deliver the message * because delivering the message releases the @@ -665,6 +681,11 @@ static void handle_transaction_done(struct smi_info *smi_info) } else { smi_inc_stat(smi_info, incoming_messages); + smi_info->num_requests_in_a_row++; + if (smi_info->num_requests_in_a_row > 10) + /* Stop if we do this too many times. */ + smi_info->msg_flags &= ~RECEIVE_MSG_AVAIL; + /* * Do this before we deliver the message * because delivering the message releases the @@ -792,6 +813,26 @@ static enum si_sm_result smi_event_handler(struct smi_info *smi_info, goto restart; } + /* + * If we are currently idle, or if the last thing that was + * done was a flag fetch and there is a message pending, try + * to start the next message. + * + * We do the waiting message check to avoid a stuck flag + * completely wedging the driver. Let a message through + * in between flag operations if that happens. + */ + if (si_sm_result == SI_SM_IDLE || + (si_sm_result == SI_SM_ATTN && smi_info->waiting_msg && + smi_info->last_was_flag_fetch)) { + smi_info->last_was_flag_fetch = false; + smi_inc_stat(smi_info, idles); + + si_sm_result = start_next_msg(smi_info); + if (si_sm_result != SI_SM_IDLE) + goto restart; + } + /* * We prefer handling attn over new messages. But don't do * this if there is not yet an upper layer to handle anything. @@ -825,15 +866,6 @@ static enum si_sm_result smi_event_handler(struct smi_info *smi_info, } } - /* If we are currently idle, try to start the next message. */ - if (si_sm_result == SI_SM_IDLE) { - smi_inc_stat(smi_info, idles); - - si_sm_result = start_next_msg(smi_info); - if (si_sm_result != SI_SM_IDLE) - goto restart; - } - if ((si_sm_result == SI_SM_IDLE) && (atomic_read(&smi_info->req_events))) { /* diff --git a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_ssif.c b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_ssif.c index 3160f6565f33..f15db2d2134f 100644 --- a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_ssif.c +++ b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_ssif.c @@ -227,6 +227,9 @@ struct ssif_info { bool has_event_buffer; bool supports_alert; + /* When requesting events and messages, don't do it forever. */ + unsigned int num_requests_in_a_row; + /* * Used to tell what we should do with alerts. If we are * waiting on a response, read the data immediately. @@ -415,7 +418,10 @@ static void start_event_fetch(struct ssif_info *ssif_info, unsigned long *flags) } ssif_info->curr_msg = msg; - ssif_info->ssif_state = SSIF_GETTING_EVENTS; + if (ssif_info->ssif_state != SSIF_GETTING_EVENTS) { + ssif_info->num_requests_in_a_row = 0; + ssif_info->ssif_state = SSIF_GETTING_EVENTS; + } ipmi_ssif_unlock_cond(ssif_info, flags); msg->data[0] = (IPMI_NETFN_APP_REQUEST << 2); @@ -438,7 +444,10 @@ static void start_recv_msg_fetch(struct ssif_info *ssif_info, } ssif_info->curr_msg = msg; - ssif_info->ssif_state = SSIF_GETTING_MESSAGES; + if (ssif_info->ssif_state != SSIF_GETTING_MESSAGES) { + ssif_info->num_requests_in_a_row = 0; + ssif_info->ssif_state = SSIF_GETTING_MESSAGES; + } ipmi_ssif_unlock_cond(ssif_info, flags); msg->data[0] = (IPMI_NETFN_APP_REQUEST << 2); @@ -847,6 +856,11 @@ static void msg_done_handler(struct ssif_info *ssif_info, int result, ssif_info->msg_flags &= ~EVENT_MSG_BUFFER_FULL; handle_flags(ssif_info, flags); } else { + ssif_info->num_requests_in_a_row++; + if (ssif_info->num_requests_in_a_row > 10) + /* Stop if we do this too many times. */ + ssif_info->msg_flags &= ~EVENT_MSG_BUFFER_FULL; + handle_flags(ssif_info, flags); ssif_inc_stat(ssif_info, events); deliver_recv_msg(ssif_info, msg); @@ -871,6 +885,11 @@ static void msg_done_handler(struct ssif_info *ssif_info, int result, ssif_info->msg_flags &= ~RECEIVE_MSG_AVAIL; handle_flags(ssif_info, flags); } else { + ssif_info->num_requests_in_a_row++; + if (ssif_info->num_requests_in_a_row > 10) + /* Stop if we do this too many times. */ + ssif_info->msg_flags &= ~RECEIVE_MSG_AVAIL; + ssif_inc_stat(ssif_info, incoming_messages); handle_flags(ssif_info, flags); deliver_recv_msg(ssif_info, msg); -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] bonding: alb: fix UAF in rlb_arp_recv during bond up/down
by superdcc97＠163.com 03 Jun '26

03 Jun '26

From: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.0-rc1 commit e6834a4c474697df23ab9948fd3577b26bf48656 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15209 CVE: CVE-2026-45970 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- The ALB RX path may access rx_hashtbl concurrently with bond teardown. During rapid bond up/down cycles, rlb_deinitialize() frees rx_hashtbl while RX handlers are still running, leading to a null pointer dereference detected by KASAN. However, the root cause is that rlb_arp_recv() can still be accessed after setting recv_probe to NULL, which is actually a use-after-free (UAF) issue. That is the reason for using the referenced commit in the Fixes tag. [ 214.174138] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000001d: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI [ 214.186478] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x00000000000000e8-0x00000000000000ef] [ 214.194933] CPU: 30 UID: 0 PID: 2375 Comm: ping Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.19.0-rc8+ #2 PREEMPT(voluntary) [ 214.205907] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R730/0WCJNT, BIOS 2.14.0 01/14/2022 [ 214.214357] RIP: 0010:rlb_arp_recv+0x505/0xab0 [bonding] [ 214.220320] Code: 0f 85 2b 05 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 40 0f b6 ed 48 c1 e5 06 49 03 ad 78 01 00 00 48 8d 7d 28 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 04 02 84 c0 74 06 0f 8e 12 05 00 00 80 7d 28 00 0f 84 8c 00 [ 214.241280] RSP: 0018:ffffc900073d8870 EFLAGS: 00010206 [ 214.247116] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff888168556822 RCX: ffff88816855681e [ 214.255082] RDX: 000000000000001d RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: 00000000000000e8 [ 214.263048] RBP: 00000000000000c0 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: ffffed11192021c8 [ 214.271013] R10: ffff8888c9010e43 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 1ffff92000e7b119 [ 214.278978] R13: ffff8888c9010e00 R14: ffff888168556822 R15: ffff888168556810 [ 214.286943] FS: 00007f85d2d9cb80(0000) GS:ffff88886ccb3000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 214.295966] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 214.302380] CR2: 00007f0d047b5e34 CR3: 00000008a1c2e002 CR4: 00000000001726f0 [ 214.310347] Call Trace: [ 214.313070] <IRQ> [ 214.315318] ? __pfx_rlb_arp_recv+0x10/0x10 [bonding] [ 214.320975] bond_handle_frame+0x166/0xb60 [bonding] [ 214.326537] ? __pfx_bond_handle_frame+0x10/0x10 [bonding] [ 214.332680] __netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0+0x576/0x2710 [ 214.339199] ? __pfx_arp_process+0x10/0x10 [ 214.343775] ? sched_balance_find_src_group+0x98/0x630 [ 214.349513] ? __pfx___netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0+0x10/0x10 [ 214.356513] ? arp_rcv+0x307/0x690 [ 214.360311] ? __pfx_arp_rcv+0x10/0x10 [ 214.364499] ? __lock_acquire+0x58c/0xbd0 [ 214.368975] __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0xae/0x1b0 [ 214.374518] ? __pfx___netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x10/0x10 [ 214.380743] ? lock_acquire+0x10b/0x140 [ 214.385026] process_backlog+0x3f1/0x13a0 [ 214.389502] ? process_backlog+0x3aa/0x13a0 [ 214.394174] __napi_poll.constprop.0+0x9f/0x370 [ 214.399233] net_rx_action+0x8c1/0xe60 [ 214.403423] ? __pfx_net_rx_action+0x10/0x10 [ 214.408193] ? lock_acquire.part.0+0xbd/0x260 [ 214.413058] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x6c/0x540 [ 214.417540] ? mark_held_locks+0x40/0x70 [ 214.421920] handle_softirqs+0x1fd/0x860 [ 214.426302] ? __pfx_handle_softirqs+0x10/0x10 [ 214.431264] ? __neigh_event_send+0x2d6/0xf50 [ 214.436131] do_softirq+0xb1/0xf0 [ 214.439830] </IRQ> The issue is reproducible by repeatedly running ip link set bond0 up/down while receiving ARP messages, where rlb_arp_recv() can race with rlb_deinitialize() and dereference a freed rx_hashtbl entry. Fix this by setting recv_probe to NULL and then calling synchronize_net() to wait for any concurrent RX processing to finish. This ensures that no RX handler can access rx_hashtbl after it is freed in bond_alb_deinitialize(). Reported-by: Liang Li <liali(a)redhat.com> Fixes: 3aba891dde38 ("bonding: move processing of recv handlers into handle_frame()") Reviewed-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay(a)nvidia.com> Acked-by: Jay Vosburgh <jv(a)jvosburgh.net> Signed-off-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin(a)gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260218060919.101574-1-liuhangbin@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c [commit ce7a381697cb ("net: bonding: add broadcast_neighbor option for 802.3ad") is not backported, so the target kernel has a simplified bond_close() without the BOND_MODE_8023AD block, causing patch context mismatch. Applied the core fix (WRITE_ONCE + synchronize_net + removing the old bond->recv_probe = NULL) while keeping the target's existing code structure.] Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c b/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c index 56c16b171e35..30a9bf8804ac 100644 --- a/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c @@ -3475,9 +3475,13 @@ static int bond_close(struct net_device *bond_dev) bond_work_cancel_all(bond); bond->send_peer_notif = 0; + WRITE_ONCE(bond->recv_probe, NULL); + + /* Wait for any in-flight RX handlers */ + synchronize_net(); + if (bond_is_lb(bond)) bond_alb_deinitialize(bond); - bond->recv_probe = NULL; return 0; } -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH] bonding: alb: fix UAF in rlb_arp_recv during bond up/down
by superdcc97＠163.com 03 Jun '26

03 Jun '26

From: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.0-rc1 commit e6834a4c474697df23ab9948fd3577b26bf48656 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15209 CVE: CVE-2026-45970 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- The ALB RX path may access rx_hashtbl concurrently with bond teardown. During rapid bond up/down cycles, rlb_deinitialize() frees rx_hashtbl while RX handlers are still running, leading to a null pointer dereference detected by KASAN. However, the root cause is that rlb_arp_recv() can still be accessed after setting recv_probe to NULL, which is actually a use-after-free (UAF) issue. That is the reason for using the referenced commit in the Fixes tag. [ 214.174138] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000001d: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI [ 214.186478] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x00000000000000e8-0x00000000000000ef] [ 214.194933] CPU: 30 UID: 0 PID: 2375 Comm: ping Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.19.0-rc8+ #2 PREEMPT(voluntary) [ 214.205907] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R730/0WCJNT, BIOS 2.14.0 01/14/2022 [ 214.214357] RIP: 0010:rlb_arp_recv+0x505/0xab0 [bonding] [ 214.220320] Code: 0f 85 2b 05 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 40 0f b6 ed 48 c1 e5 06 49 03 ad 78 01 00 00 48 8d 7d 28 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 04 02 84 c0 74 06 0f 8e 12 05 00 00 80 7d 28 00 0f 84 8c 00 [ 214.241280] RSP: 0018:ffffc900073d8870 EFLAGS: 00010206 [ 214.247116] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff888168556822 RCX: ffff88816855681e [ 214.255082] RDX: 000000000000001d RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: 00000000000000e8 [ 214.263048] RBP: 00000000000000c0 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: ffffed11192021c8 [ 214.271013] R10: ffff8888c9010e43 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 1ffff92000e7b119 [ 214.278978] R13: ffff8888c9010e00 R14: ffff888168556822 R15: ffff888168556810 [ 214.286943] FS: 00007f85d2d9cb80(0000) GS:ffff88886ccb3000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 214.295966] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 214.302380] CR2: 00007f0d047b5e34 CR3: 00000008a1c2e002 CR4: 00000000001726f0 [ 214.310347] Call Trace: [ 214.313070] <IRQ> [ 214.315318] ? __pfx_rlb_arp_recv+0x10/0x10 [bonding] [ 214.320975] bond_handle_frame+0x166/0xb60 [bonding] [ 214.326537] ? __pfx_bond_handle_frame+0x10/0x10 [bonding] [ 214.332680] __netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0+0x576/0x2710 [ 214.339199] ? __pfx_arp_process+0x10/0x10 [ 214.343775] ? sched_balance_find_src_group+0x98/0x630 [ 214.349513] ? __pfx___netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0+0x10/0x10 [ 214.356513] ? arp_rcv+0x307/0x690 [ 214.360311] ? __pfx_arp_rcv+0x10/0x10 [ 214.364499] ? __lock_acquire+0x58c/0xbd0 [ 214.368975] __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0xae/0x1b0 [ 214.374518] ? __pfx___netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x10/0x10 [ 214.380743] ? lock_acquire+0x10b/0x140 [ 214.385026] process_backlog+0x3f1/0x13a0 [ 214.389502] ? process_backlog+0x3aa/0x13a0 [ 214.394174] __napi_poll.constprop.0+0x9f/0x370 [ 214.399233] net_rx_action+0x8c1/0xe60 [ 214.403423] ? __pfx_net_rx_action+0x10/0x10 [ 214.408193] ? lock_acquire.part.0+0xbd/0x260 [ 214.413058] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x6c/0x540 [ 214.417540] ? mark_held_locks+0x40/0x70 [ 214.421920] handle_softirqs+0x1fd/0x860 [ 214.426302] ? __pfx_handle_softirqs+0x10/0x10 [ 214.431264] ? __neigh_event_send+0x2d6/0xf50 [ 214.436131] do_softirq+0xb1/0xf0 [ 214.439830] </IRQ> The issue is reproducible by repeatedly running ip link set bond0 up/down while receiving ARP messages, where rlb_arp_recv() can race with rlb_deinitialize() and dereference a freed rx_hashtbl entry. Fix this by setting recv_probe to NULL and then calling synchronize_net() to wait for any concurrent RX processing to finish. This ensures that no RX handler can access rx_hashtbl after it is freed in bond_alb_deinitialize(). Reported-by: Liang Li <liali(a)redhat.com> Fixes: 3aba891dde38 ("bonding: move processing of recv handlers into handle_frame()") Reviewed-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay(a)nvidia.com> Acked-by: Jay Vosburgh <jv(a)jvosburgh.net> Signed-off-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin(a)gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260218060919.101574-1-liuhangbin@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c [commit ce7a381697cb ("net: bonding: add broadcast_neighbor option for 802.3ad") is not backported, so the target kernel has a simplified bond_close() without the BOND_MODE_8023AD block, causing patch context mismatch. Applied the core fix (WRITE_ONCE + synchronize_net + removing the old bond->recv_probe = NULL) while keeping the target's existing code structure.] Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c b/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c index 56c16b171e35..30a9bf8804ac 100644 --- a/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c @@ -3475,9 +3475,13 @@ static int bond_close(struct net_device *bond_dev) bond_work_cancel_all(bond); bond->send_peer_notif = 0; + WRITE_ONCE(bond->recv_probe, NULL); + + /* Wait for any in-flight RX handlers */ + synchronize_net(); + if (bond_is_lb(bond)) bond_alb_deinitialize(bond); - bond->recv_probe = NULL; return 0; } -- 2.43.0

1 0

[PATCH OLK-5.10] KVM: nSVM: Sync interrupt shadow to cached vmcb12 after VMRUN of L2
by Zhang Kunbo 03 Jun '26

03 Jun '26

From: Yosry Ahmed <yosry(a)kernel.org> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.140 commit 1709418535a8df95532999d61b03d59975280258 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15238 CVE: CVE-2026-45987 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 03bee264f8ebfd39e0254c98e112d033a7aa9055 upstream. After VMRUN in guest mode, nested_sync_control_from_vmcb02() syncs fields written by the CPU from vmcb02 to the cached vmcb12. This is because the cached vmcb12 is used as the authoritative copy of some of the controls, and is the payload when saving/restoring nested state. int_state is also written by the CPU, specifically bit 0 (i.e. SVM_INTERRUPT_SHADOW_MASK) for nested VMs, but it is not sync'd to cached vmcb12. This does not cause a problem if KVM_SET_NESTED_STATE preceeds KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS in the restore path, as an interrupt shadow would be correctly restored to vmcb02 (KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS overwrites what KVM_SET_NESTED_STATE restored in int_state). However, if KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS preceeds KVM_SET_NESTED_STATE, an interrupt shadow would be restored into vmcb01 instead of vmcb02. This would mostly be benign for L1 (delays an interrupt), but not for L2. For L2, the vCPU could hang (e.g. if a wakeup interrupt is delivered before a HLT that should have been in an interrupt shadow). Sync int_state to the cached vmcb12 in nested_sync_control_from_vmcb02() to avoid this problem. With that, KVM_SET_NESTED_STATE restores the correct interrupt shadow state, and if KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS follows it would overwrite it with the same value. Fixes: cc440cdad5b7 ("KVM: nSVM: implement KVM_GET_NESTED_STATE and KVM_SET_NESTED_STATE") CC: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Yosry Ahmed <yosry(a)kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260225005950.3739782-3-yosry@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Zhang Kunbo <zhangkunbo(a)huawei.com> --- arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c index 382ff1b18161..6dcd9b4cae29 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c @@ -307,6 +307,7 @@ void sync_nested_vmcb_control(struct vcpu_svm *svm) u32 mask; svm->nested.ctl.event_inj = svm->vmcb->control.event_inj; svm->nested.ctl.event_inj_err = svm->vmcb->control.event_inj_err; + svm->nested.ctl.int_state = svm->vmcb->control.int_state; /* Only a few fields of int_ctl are written by the processor. */ mask = V_IRQ_MASK | V_TPR_MASK; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6 1/2] AppArmor: Allow apparmor to handle unaligned dfa tables
by Gu Bowen 03 Jun '26

03 Jun '26

From: Helge Deller <deller(a)kernel.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.0-rc1 commit 64802f731214a51dfe3c6c27636b3ddafd003eb0 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15143 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- The dfa tables can originate from kernel or userspace and 8-byte alignment isn't always guaranteed and as such may trigger unaligned memory accesses on various architectures. Resulting in the following [ 73.901376] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 341 at security/apparmor/match.c:316 aa_dfa_unpack+0x6cc/0x720 [ 74.015867] Modules linked in: binfmt_misc evdev flash sg drm drm_panel_orientation_quirks backlight i2c_core configfs nfnetlink autofs4 ext4 crc16 mbcache jbd2 hid_generic usbhid sr_mod hid cdrom sd_mod ata_generic ohci_pci ehci_pci ehci_hcd ohci_hcd pata_ali libata sym53c8xx scsi_transport_spi tg3 scsi_mod usbcore libphy scsi_common mdio_bus usb_common [ 74.428977] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 341 Comm: apparmor_parser Not tainted 6.18.0-rc6+ #9 NONE [ 74.536543] Call Trace: [ 74.568561] [<0000000000434c24>] dump_stack+0x8/0x18 [ 74.633757] [<0000000000476438>] __warn+0xd8/0x100 [ 74.696664] [<00000000004296d4>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x34/0x74 [ 74.771006] [<00000000008db28c>] aa_dfa_unpack+0x6cc/0x720 [ 74.843062] [<00000000008e643c>] unpack_pdb+0xbc/0x7e0 [ 74.910545] [<00000000008e7740>] unpack_profile+0xbe0/0x1300 [ 74.984888] [<00000000008e82e0>] aa_unpack+0xe0/0x6a0 [ 75.051226] [<00000000008e3ec4>] aa_replace_profiles+0x64/0x1160 [ 75.130144] [<00000000008d4d90>] policy_update+0xf0/0x280 [ 75.201057] [<00000000008d4fc8>] profile_replace+0xa8/0x100 [ 75.274258] [<0000000000766bd0>] vfs_write+0x90/0x420 [ 75.340594] [<00000000007670cc>] ksys_write+0x4c/0xe0 [ 75.406932] [<0000000000767174>] sys_write+0x14/0x40 [ 75.472126] [<0000000000406174>] linux_sparc_syscall+0x34/0x44 [ 75.548802] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 75.609503] dfa blob stream 0xfff0000008926b96 not aligned. [ 75.682695] Kernel unaligned access at TPC[8db2a8] aa_dfa_unpack+0x6e8/0x720 Work around it by using the get_unaligned_xx() helpers. Fixes: e6e8bf418850d ("apparmor: fix restricted endian type warnings for dfa unpack") Reported-by: John Paul Adrian Glaubitz <glaubitz(a)physik.fu-berlin.de> Closes: https://github.com/sparclinux/issues/issues/30 Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller(a)gmx.de> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen(a)canonical.com> Conflicts: security/apparmor/match.c [Due to commit 5f60d5f6bbc1 ("move asm/unaligned.h to linux/unaligned.h") not merge.] Signed-off-by: Gu Bowen <gubowen5(a)huawei.com> --- security/apparmor/match.c | 15 ++++++++------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/apparmor/match.c b/security/apparmor/match.c index ed2ed6e40849..063f0b053320 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/match.c +++ b/security/apparmor/match.c @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ #include <linux/vmalloc.h> #include <linux/err.h> #include <linux/kref.h> +#include <asm/unaligned.h> #include "include/lib.h" #include "include/match.h" @@ -86,11 +87,11 @@ static struct table_header *unpack_table(char *blob, size_t bsize) /* loaded td_id's start at 1, subtract 1 now to avoid doing * it every time we use td_id as an index */ - th.td_id = be16_to_cpu(*(__be16 *) (blob)) - 1; + th.td_id = get_unaligned_be16(blob) - 1; if (th.td_id > YYTD_ID_MAX) goto out; - th.td_flags = be16_to_cpu(*(__be16 *) (blob + 2)); - th.td_lolen = be32_to_cpu(*(__be32 *) (blob + 8)); + th.td_flags = get_unaligned_be16(blob + 2); + th.td_lolen = get_unaligned_be32(blob + 8); blob += sizeof(struct table_header); if (!(th.td_flags == YYTD_DATA16 || th.td_flags == YYTD_DATA32 || @@ -337,14 +338,14 @@ struct aa_dfa *aa_dfa_unpack(void *blob, size_t size, int flags) if (size < sizeof(struct table_set_header)) goto fail; - if (ntohl(*(__be32 *) data) != YYTH_MAGIC) + if (get_unaligned_be32(data) != YYTH_MAGIC) goto fail; - hsize = ntohl(*(__be32 *) (data + 4)); + hsize = get_unaligned_be32(data + 4); if (size < hsize) goto fail; - dfa->flags = ntohs(*(__be16 *) (data + 12)); + dfa->flags = get_unaligned_be16(data + 12); if (dfa->flags & ~(YYTH_FLAGS)) goto fail; @@ -353,7 +354,7 @@ struct aa_dfa *aa_dfa_unpack(void *blob, size_t size, int flags) * if (dfa->flags & YYTH_FLAGS_OOB_TRANS) { * if (hsize < 16 + 4) * goto fail; - * dfa->max_oob = ntol(*(__be32 *) (data + 16)); + * dfa->max_oob = get_unaligned_be32(data + 16); * if (dfa->max <= MAX_OOB_SUPPORTED) { * pr_err("AppArmor DFA OOB greater than supported\n"); * goto fail; -- 2.43.0

2 2

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/4] hungtask fix patch and mainline backport
by Chen Jinghuang 03 Jun '26

03 Jun '26

*** BLURB HERE *** Chen Jinghuang (1): sched: Fix kabi broken of struct sched_entity Peter Zijlstra (2): sched/fair: Fix lag clamp sched/fair: Revert 6d71a9c61604 ("sched/fair: Fix EEVDF entity placement bug causing scheduling lag") Zhan Xusheng (1): sched/fair: Fix math notation errors in avg_vruntime comment include/linux/sched.h | 2 +- kernel/sched/fair.c | 188 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- 2 files changed, 161 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 5

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/3] CVEs
by Liu Kai 03 Jun '26

03 Jun '26

CVEs Michael Bommarito (1): RDMA/rxe: Reject unknown opcodes before ICRC processing Shuvam Pandey (1): Bluetooth: hci_event: fix potential UAF in SSP passkey handlers hkbinbin (1): RDMA/rxe: Validate pad and ICRC before payload_size() in rxe_rcv drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_recv.c | 14 +++++++++++++- net/bluetooth/hci_event.c | 18 ++++++++++++++---- 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 4

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS 0/3] *** revert CVE-2026-31527 ***
by Lin Ruifeng 03 Jun '26

03 Jun '26

*** revert CVE-2026-31527 *** Lin Ruifeng (3): Revert "driver/core: Fix kabi broken of platform_device/device/bus_type" Revert "driver core: platform: use generic driver_override infrastructure" Revert "driver core: generalize driver_override in struct device" drivers/base/bus.c | 49 +-------------------- drivers/base/core.c | 3 -- drivers/base/dd.c | 61 --------------------------- drivers/base/platform.c | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++--- drivers/slimbus/qcom-ngd-ctrl.c | 12 +----- include/linux/device.h | 75 --------------------------------- include/linux/platform_device.h | 7 +-- 7 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 209 deletions(-) -- 2.43.0

2 4

[PATCH OLK-6.6] xfs: fix possible bugon in xfs_trans_unreserve_and_mod_sb()
by Long Li 03 Jun '26

03 Jun '26

From: Ye Bin <yebin10(a)huawei.com> hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/9228 CVE: NA -------------------------------- Recently, I encountered a problem where a BUG was triggered in the write-back process. The detailed problem information is as follows: xfs_bmap_extents_to_btree: ip=0xffff888148ecad00 wasdel=0 sde: writeback error on inode 68, offset 61440, sector 1400 XFS (sde): Corruption of in-memory data (0x8) detected at xfs_trans_mod_sb+0xaa6/0xc60 (fs/xfs/xfs_trans.c:351). Shutting. XFS (sde): Please unmount the filesystem and rectify the problem(s) XFS: Assertion failed: tp->t_blk_res || tp->t_fdblocks_delta >= 0, file: fs/xfs/xfs_trans.c, line: 610 ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/xfs/xfs_message.c:102! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 13 Comm: kworker/u32:1 Not tainted 7.0.0-rc6-next-20260402-00028-g56f243e5f8ea-dirty #360 P Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-8:64) RIP: 0010:assfail+0x9f/0xb0 Code: fe 84 db 75 20 e8 41 2e 33 fe 0f 0b 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d e9 94 34 a5 06 48 c7 c7 58 ae 2b 8d e8 f8 72 a0 RSP: 0018:ffffc900000dedd0 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: ffffffff838c91b6 RDX: ffff88810425d880 RSI: ffffffff838c91df RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed10e3b14901 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffffffff8a956520 R13: 0000000000000262 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffffffffffffff FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88878bdc5000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fccb3c788f0 CR3: 000000000c98a000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: <TASK> xfs_trans_unreserve_and_mod_sb+0xb86/0xd00 __xfs_trans_commit+0x38b/0xe00 xfs_trans_commit+0xeb/0x1a0 xfs_bmapi_convert_one_delalloc+0xba9/0x12d0 xfs_bmapi_convert_delalloc+0x101/0x350 xfs_writeback_range+0x76c/0x12d0 iomap_writeback_folio+0x9ed/0x2100 iomap_writepages+0x13c/0x2a0 xfs_vm_writepages+0x278/0x330 do_writepages+0x247/0x5c0 __writeback_single_inode+0x123/0x1370 writeback_sb_inodes+0x71e/0x1b90 __writeback_inodes_wb+0xc3/0x280 wb_writeback+0x730/0xb80 wb_workfn+0x8b0/0xbc0 process_one_work+0xa08/0x1d00 worker_thread+0x698/0xeb0 kthread+0x408/0x540 ret_from_fork+0xa4d/0xdd0 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> After analyzing the above issues, the possible triggering process is as follows: xfs_bmapi_convert_delalloc xfs_bmapi_convert_one_delalloc xfs_bmapi_allocate xfs_bmap_add_extent_delay_real da_old = startblockval(PREV.br_startblock); // da_old = 5 case BMAP_LEFT_FILLING: ifp->if_nextents++; // 21 + 1 = 22 if (xfs_bmap_needs_btree(bma->ip, whichfork)) // 22 > 21 xfs_bmap_extents_to_btree // convert to btree cur->bc_ino.allocated++; // da_new = 5 - 1 = 4 da_new = XFS_FILBLKS_MIN(xfs_bmap_worst_indlen(bma->ip, temp), startblockval(PREV.br_startblock) - (bma->cur ? bma->cur->bc_ino.allocated : 0)) //xfs_bmapi_convert_one_delalloc() return PREV.br_startblock = nullstartblock(da_new); xfs_bmap_del_extent_real case BMAP_LEFT_FILLING | BMAP_RIGHT_FILLING: ifp->if_nextents--; // 22 - 1 = 21 if (xfs_bmap_needs_btree(ip, whichfork)) xfs_bmap_extents_to_btree(); else // convert to extents xfs_bmap_btree_to_extents(); ... // Alternate a few times in the middle. da_old = 4 da_old = 3 da_old = 2 da_old = 1 ... xfs_bmapi_convert_delalloc xfs_bmapi_convert_one_delalloc // Both blocks and rtextents are 0 error = xfs_trans_alloc(mp, &M_RES(mp)->tr_write, 0, 0, XFS_TRANS_RESERVE, &tp); tp = kmem_cache_zalloc(xfs_trans_cache, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOFAIL); error = xfs_trans_reserve(tp, resp, blocks, rtextents); if (blocks > 0) error = xfs_mod_fdblocks(mp, -((int64_t)blocks), rsvd); // The value of blocks is 0, so the value of tp->t_blk_res is 0 tp->t_blk_res += blocks; xfs_bmapi_allocate xfs_bmap_add_extent_delay_real da_old = startblockval(PREV.br_startblock); // da_old = 0 // The current delay extent is just exhausted. case BMAP_LEFT_FILLING | BMAP_RIGHT_FILLING ifp->if_nextents++; // 21 + 1 + 22 if (xfs_bmap_needs_btree(bma->ip, whichfork)) // 22 > 21 // Converted to btree. da_old > 0 is false. error = xfs_bmap_extents_to_btree(bma->tp, bma->ip, &bma->cur, da_old > 0, &tmp_logflags, whichfork); args.wasdel = wasdel; // wasdel is false error = xfs_alloc_vextent_start_ag(&args, XFS_INO_TO_FSB(mp, ip->i_ino)); xfs_alloc_vextent_finish(args, minimum_agno, error, true); xfs_ag_resv_alloc_extent(args->pag, args->resv, args); case XFS_AG_RESV_NONE: field = args->wasdel ? XFS_TRANS_SB_RES_FDBLOCKS : XFS_TRANS_SB_FDBLOCKS; //args->wasdel == false xfs_trans_mod_sb(args->tp, field, -(int64_t)args->len); case XFS_TRANS_SB_FDBLOCKS: if (delta < 0) tp->t_blk_res_used += (uint)-delta; if (tp->t_blk_res_used > tp->t_blk_res) // ***tp->t_blk_res is 0, thus triggering xfs_force_shutdown()*** xfs_force_shutdown(mp, SHUTDOWN_CORRUPT_INCORE); The logic that triggers the issue above was designed by me to facilitate the construction of the problem. Besides the scenario where BTREE and EXTENTS are converted back and forth, there is also the scenario of btree splitting. The core reason for the issue is that in xfs_bmapi_convert_delalloc(), the call to xfs_bmap_worst_indlen() calculates the worst-case number of reserved blocks, which is the number of additional blocks required after a complete conversion of the entire delayed extent. It assumes that the entire conversion process is atomic. However, the current process cannot guarantee such atomicity. In the case of a fragmented filesystem, the most extreme scenario is that every block conversion triggers a full btree split, in which case the reserved blocks are far from sufficient. When this issue is triggered, the filesystem fragmentation in the environment is indeed quite severe. Further analysis of this abnormal model shows that because the reserved blocks are continuously consumed, they may eventually exceed the reserved amount. When the space is nearly exhausted, xfs_bmap_extents_to_btree() may fail to allocate blocks, triggering a warning. This failure to allocate additional blocks can lead to issues with normal block allocation. Since a single delay extent cannot guarantee a one-time completion of the conversion, the 'inlen' of the delay extent should be maintained at the value calculated by xfs_bmap_worst_indlen(). Commit d69bee6a35d3 ("xfs: fix xfs_bmap_add_extent_delay_real for partial conversions") addressed the issue of potentially not reserving enough space in emergency situations. Based on this modification, we can recalculate the worst-case 'inlen' required for the remaining delay extents after the conversion in xfs_bmap_add_extent_delay_real(), instead of using the remaining value. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Ye Bin <yebin10(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Long Li <leo.lilong(a)huawei.com> --- fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_bmap.c | 14 ++++---------- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_bmap.c b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_bmap.c index 9ed22d82c000..3d655c1bef7d 100644 --- a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_bmap.c +++ b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_bmap.c @@ -1656,8 +1656,7 @@ xfs_bmap_add_extent_delay_real( */ old = LEFT; temp = PREV.br_blockcount - new->br_blockcount; - da_new = XFS_FILBLKS_MIN(xfs_bmap_worst_indlen(bma->ip, temp), - startblockval(PREV.br_startblock)); + da_new = xfs_bmap_worst_indlen(bma->ip, temp); LEFT.br_blockcount += new->br_blockcount; @@ -1724,9 +1723,7 @@ xfs_bmap_add_extent_delay_real( } temp = PREV.br_blockcount - new->br_blockcount; - da_new = XFS_FILBLKS_MIN(xfs_bmap_worst_indlen(bma->ip, temp), - startblockval(PREV.br_startblock) - - (bma->cur ? bma->cur->bc_ino.allocated : 0)); + da_new = xfs_bmap_worst_indlen(bma->ip, temp); PREV.br_startoff = new_endoff; PREV.br_blockcount = temp; @@ -1763,8 +1760,7 @@ xfs_bmap_add_extent_delay_real( } temp = PREV.br_blockcount - new->br_blockcount; - da_new = XFS_FILBLKS_MIN(xfs_bmap_worst_indlen(bma->ip, temp), - startblockval(PREV.br_startblock)); + da_new = xfs_bmap_worst_indlen(bma->ip, temp); PREV.br_blockcount = temp; PREV.br_startblock = nullstartblock(da_new); @@ -1812,9 +1808,7 @@ xfs_bmap_add_extent_delay_real( } temp = PREV.br_blockcount - new->br_blockcount; - da_new = XFS_FILBLKS_MIN(xfs_bmap_worst_indlen(bma->ip, temp), - startblockval(PREV.br_startblock) - - (bma->cur ? bma->cur->bc_ino.allocated : 0)); + da_new = xfs_bmap_worst_indlen(bma->ip, temp); PREV.br_startblock = nullstartblock(da_new); PREV.br_blockcount = temp; -- 2.52.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/2] xfs: fix delay extent reserve issue
by Long Li 03 Jun '26

03 Jun '26

This patch set fix delay extent reserve issue. Christoph Hellwig (1): xfs: fix xfs_bmap_add_extent_delay_real for partial conversions Ye Bin (1): xfs: fix possible bugon in xfs_trans_unreserve_and_mod_sb() fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_bmap.c | 24 ++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) -- 2.52.0

2 3

[PATCH OLK-6.6] mm/vmscan: fix wrong callback in shrinker_v2_to_v1_scan_objects()
by Qi Xi 03 Jun '26

03 Jun '26

hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/15059 CVE: NA --------------------------- Fixes the incorrect callback invocation that would cause shrinker behavior mismatch when adapting v2 shrinkers to v1 interface. Fixes: 0dabf4e3ac0f ("mm/shrinker: Implementation of register_shrinker() and unregister_shrinker()") Signed-off-by: Qi Xi <xiqi5703(a)163.com> --- mm/vmscan.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/vmscan.c b/mm/vmscan.c index cf6b9e6dc8cd..5c81e3e1e2d7 100644 --- a/mm/vmscan.c +++ b/mm/vmscan.c @@ -7623,9 +7623,9 @@ static unsigned long shrinker_v2_to_v1_scan_objects(struct shrinker_v2 *shk_v2, struct shrink_control *sc) { if (shk_v2->v1) - return shk_v2->v1->count_objects(shk_v2->v1, sc); + return shk_v2->v1->scan_objects(shk_v2->v1, sc); - return SHRINK_EMPTY; + return SHRINK_STOP; } int register_shrinker(struct shrinker *shrinker, const char *fmt, ...) -- 2.53.0

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] netfilter: nf_conntrack_helper: pass helper to expect cleanup
by superdcc97＠163.com 03 Jun '26

03 Jun '26

From: Qi Tang <tpluszz77(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.0-rc7 commit a242a9ae58aa46ff7dae51ce64150a93957abe65 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14559 CVE: CVE-2026-43027 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- nf_conntrack_helper_unregister() calls nf_ct_expect_iterate_destroy() to remove expectations belonging to the helper being unregistered. However, it passes NULL instead of the helper pointer as the data argument, so expect_iter_me() never matches any expectation and all of them survive the cleanup. After unregister returns, nfnl_cthelper_del() frees the helper object immediately. Subsequent expectation dumps or packet-driven init_conntrack() calls then dereference the freed exp->helper, causing a use-after-free. Pass the actual helper pointer so expectations referencing it are properly destroyed before the helper object is freed. BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in string+0x38f/0x430 Read of size 1 at addr ffff888003b14d20 by task poc/103 Call Trace: string+0x38f/0x430 vsnprintf+0x3cc/0x1170 seq_printf+0x17a/0x240 exp_seq_show+0x2e5/0x560 seq_read_iter+0x419/0x1280 proc_reg_read+0x1ac/0x270 vfs_read+0x179/0x930 ksys_read+0xef/0x1c0 Freed by task 103: The buggy address is located 32 bytes inside of freed 192-byte region [ffff888003b14d00, ffff888003b14dc0) Fixes: ac7b84839003 ("netfilter: expect: add and use nf_ct_expect_iterate helpers") Signed-off-by: Qi Tang <tpluszz77(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Phil Sutter <phil(a)nwl.cc> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> Conflicts: net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_helper.c [commit 9c42bc9db90a1 ("netfilter: nf_conntrack_expect: honor expectation helper field") is not backported, which lead to conflicts. The target kernel still contains the old comment and an extra synchronize_rcu() call after nf_ct_iterate_destroy(), while the patch context expects the new comment from mainline.] Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_helper.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_helper.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_helper.c index 06c70d4584cf..31cc05a437c2 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_helper.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_helper.c @@ -464,7 +464,7 @@ void nf_conntrack_helper_unregister(struct nf_conntrack_helper *me) */ synchronize_rcu(); - nf_ct_expect_iterate_destroy(expect_iter_me, NULL); + nf_ct_expect_iterate_destroy(expect_iter_me, me); nf_ct_iterate_destroy(unhelp, me); /* Maybe someone has gotten the helper already when unhelp above. -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] xfs: fix possible bugon in xfs_trans_unreserve_and_mod_sb()
by Long Li 03 Jun '26

03 Jun '26

From: Ye Bin <yebin10(a)huawei.com> Offering: HULK hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/9228 -------------------------------- Recently, I encountered a problem where a BUG was triggered in the write-back process. The detailed problem information is as follows: xfs_bmap_extents_to_btree: ip=0xffff888148ecad00 wasdel=0 sde: writeback error on inode 68, offset 61440, sector 1400 XFS (sde): Corruption of in-memory data (0x8) detected at xfs_trans_mod_sb+0xaa6/0xc60 (fs/xfs/xfs_trans.c:351). Shutting. XFS (sde): Please unmount the filesystem and rectify the problem(s) XFS: Assertion failed: tp->t_blk_res || tp->t_fdblocks_delta >= 0, file: fs/xfs/xfs_trans.c, line: 610 ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/xfs/xfs_message.c:102! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 13 Comm: kworker/u32:1 Not tainted 7.0.0-rc6-next-20260402-00028-g56f243e5f8ea-dirty #360 P Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-8:64) RIP: 0010:assfail+0x9f/0xb0 Code: fe 84 db 75 20 e8 41 2e 33 fe 0f 0b 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d e9 94 34 a5 06 48 c7 c7 58 ae 2b 8d e8 f8 72 a0 RSP: 0018:ffffc900000dedd0 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: ffffffff838c91b6 RDX: ffff88810425d880 RSI: ffffffff838c91df RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed10e3b14901 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffffffff8a956520 R13: 0000000000000262 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffffffffffffff FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88878bdc5000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fccb3c788f0 CR3: 000000000c98a000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: <TASK> xfs_trans_unreserve_and_mod_sb+0xb86/0xd00 __xfs_trans_commit+0x38b/0xe00 xfs_trans_commit+0xeb/0x1a0 xfs_bmapi_convert_one_delalloc+0xba9/0x12d0 xfs_bmapi_convert_delalloc+0x101/0x350 xfs_writeback_range+0x76c/0x12d0 iomap_writeback_folio+0x9ed/0x2100 iomap_writepages+0x13c/0x2a0 xfs_vm_writepages+0x278/0x330 do_writepages+0x247/0x5c0 __writeback_single_inode+0x123/0x1370 writeback_sb_inodes+0x71e/0x1b90 __writeback_inodes_wb+0xc3/0x280 wb_writeback+0x730/0xb80 wb_workfn+0x8b0/0xbc0 process_one_work+0xa08/0x1d00 worker_thread+0x698/0xeb0 kthread+0x408/0x540 ret_from_fork+0xa4d/0xdd0 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> After analyzing the above issues, the possible triggering process is as follows: xfs_bmapi_convert_delalloc xfs_bmapi_convert_one_delalloc xfs_bmapi_allocate xfs_bmap_add_extent_delay_real da_old = startblockval(PREV.br_startblock); // da_old = 5 case BMAP_LEFT_FILLING: ifp->if_nextents++; // 21 + 1 = 22 if (xfs_bmap_needs_btree(bma->ip, whichfork)) // 22 > 21 xfs_bmap_extents_to_btree // convert to btree cur->bc_ino.allocated++; // da_new = 5 - 1 = 4 da_new = XFS_FILBLKS_MIN(xfs_bmap_worst_indlen(bma->ip, temp), startblockval(PREV.br_startblock) - (bma->cur ? bma->cur->bc_ino.allocated : 0)) //xfs_bmapi_convert_one_delalloc() return PREV.br_startblock = nullstartblock(da_new); xfs_bmap_del_extent_real case BMAP_LEFT_FILLING | BMAP_RIGHT_FILLING: ifp->if_nextents--; // 22 - 1 = 21 if (xfs_bmap_needs_btree(ip, whichfork)) xfs_bmap_extents_to_btree(); else // convert to extents xfs_bmap_btree_to_extents(); ... // Alternate a few times in the middle. da_old = 4 da_old = 3 da_old = 2 da_old = 1 ... xfs_bmapi_convert_delalloc xfs_bmapi_convert_one_delalloc // Both blocks and rtextents are 0 error = xfs_trans_alloc(mp, &M_RES(mp)->tr_write, 0, 0, XFS_TRANS_RESERVE, &tp); tp = kmem_cache_zalloc(xfs_trans_cache, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOFAIL); error = xfs_trans_reserve(tp, resp, blocks, rtextents); if (blocks > 0) error = xfs_mod_fdblocks(mp, -((int64_t)blocks), rsvd); // The value of blocks is 0, so the value of tp->t_blk_res is 0 tp->t_blk_res += blocks; xfs_bmapi_allocate xfs_bmap_add_extent_delay_real da_old = startblockval(PREV.br_startblock); // da_old = 0 // The current delay extent is just exhausted. case BMAP_LEFT_FILLING | BMAP_RIGHT_FILLING ifp->if_nextents++; // 21 + 1 + 22 if (xfs_bmap_needs_btree(bma->ip, whichfork)) // 22 > 21 // Converted to btree. da_old > 0 is false. error = xfs_bmap_extents_to_btree(bma->tp, bma->ip, &bma->cur, da_old > 0, &tmp_logflags, whichfork); args.wasdel = wasdel; // wasdel is false error = xfs_alloc_vextent_start_ag(&args, XFS_INO_TO_FSB(mp, ip->i_ino)); xfs_alloc_vextent_finish(args, minimum_agno, error, true); xfs_ag_resv_alloc_extent(args->pag, args->resv, args); case XFS_AG_RESV_NONE: field = args->wasdel ? XFS_TRANS_SB_RES_FDBLOCKS : XFS_TRANS_SB_FDBLOCKS; //args->wasdel == false xfs_trans_mod_sb(args->tp, field, -(int64_t)args->len); case XFS_TRANS_SB_FDBLOCKS: if (delta < 0) tp->t_blk_res_used += (uint)-delta; if (tp->t_blk_res_used > tp->t_blk_res) // ***tp->t_blk_res is 0, thus triggering xfs_force_shutdown()*** xfs_force_shutdown(mp, SHUTDOWN_CORRUPT_INCORE); The logic that triggers the issue above was designed by me to facilitate the construction of the problem. Besides the scenario where BTREE and EXTENTS are converted back and forth, there is also the scenario of btree splitting. The core reason for the issue is that in xfs_bmapi_convert_delalloc(), the call to xfs_bmap_worst_indlen() calculates the worst-case number of reserved blocks, which is the number of additional blocks required after a complete conversion of the entire delayed extent. It assumes that the entire conversion process is atomic. However, the current process cannot guarantee such atomicity. In the case of a fragmented filesystem, the most extreme scenario is that every block conversion triggers a full btree split, in which case the reserved blocks are far from sufficient. When this issue is triggered, the filesystem fragmentation in the environment is indeed quite severe. Further analysis of this abnormal model shows that because the reserved blocks are continuously consumed, they may eventually exceed the reserved amount. When the space is nearly exhausted, xfs_bmap_extents_to_btree() may fail to allocate blocks, triggering a warning. This failure to allocate additional blocks can lead to issues with normal block allocation. Since a single delay extent cannot guarantee a one-time completion of the conversion, the 'inlen' of the delay extent should be maintained at the value calculated by xfs_bmap_worst_indlen(). Commit d69bee6a35d3 ("xfs: fix xfs_bmap_add_extent_delay_real for partial conversions") addressed the issue of potentially not reserving enough space in emergency situations. Based on this modification, we can recalculate the worst-case 'inlen' required for the remaining delay extents after the conversion in xfs_bmap_add_extent_delay_real(), instead of using the remaining value. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Ye Bin <yebin10(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Long Li <leo.lilong(a)huawei.com> --- fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_bmap.c | 14 ++++---------- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_bmap.c b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_bmap.c index 9ed22d82c000..3d655c1bef7d 100644 --- a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_bmap.c +++ b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_bmap.c @@ -1656,8 +1656,7 @@ xfs_bmap_add_extent_delay_real( */ old = LEFT; temp = PREV.br_blockcount - new->br_blockcount; - da_new = XFS_FILBLKS_MIN(xfs_bmap_worst_indlen(bma->ip, temp), - startblockval(PREV.br_startblock)); + da_new = xfs_bmap_worst_indlen(bma->ip, temp); LEFT.br_blockcount += new->br_blockcount; @@ -1724,9 +1723,7 @@ xfs_bmap_add_extent_delay_real( } temp = PREV.br_blockcount - new->br_blockcount; - da_new = XFS_FILBLKS_MIN(xfs_bmap_worst_indlen(bma->ip, temp), - startblockval(PREV.br_startblock) - - (bma->cur ? bma->cur->bc_ino.allocated : 0)); + da_new = xfs_bmap_worst_indlen(bma->ip, temp); PREV.br_startoff = new_endoff; PREV.br_blockcount = temp; @@ -1763,8 +1760,7 @@ xfs_bmap_add_extent_delay_real( } temp = PREV.br_blockcount - new->br_blockcount; - da_new = XFS_FILBLKS_MIN(xfs_bmap_worst_indlen(bma->ip, temp), - startblockval(PREV.br_startblock)); + da_new = xfs_bmap_worst_indlen(bma->ip, temp); PREV.br_blockcount = temp; PREV.br_startblock = nullstartblock(da_new); @@ -1812,9 +1808,7 @@ xfs_bmap_add_extent_delay_real( } temp = PREV.br_blockcount - new->br_blockcount; - da_new = XFS_FILBLKS_MIN(xfs_bmap_worst_indlen(bma->ip, temp), - startblockval(PREV.br_startblock) - - (bma->cur ? bma->cur->bc_ino.allocated : 0)); + da_new = xfs_bmap_worst_indlen(bma->ip, temp); PREV.br_startblock = nullstartblock(da_new); PREV.br_blockcount = temp; -- 2.52.0

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS V1] RDMA/rxe: Fix double free in rxe_srq_from_init
by Cheng Yu 03 Jun '26

03 Jun '26

From: Jiasheng Jiang <jiashengjiangcool(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.0-rc1 commit 0beefd0e15d962f497aad750b2d5e9c3570b66d1 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15105 CVE: CVE-2026-45852 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- In rxe_srq_from_init(), the queue pointer 'q' is assigned to 'srq->rq.queue' before copying the SRQ number to user space. If copy_to_user() fails, the function calls rxe_queue_cleanup() to free the queue, but leaves the now-invalid pointer in 'srq->rq.queue'. The caller of rxe_srq_from_init() (rxe_create_srq) eventually calls rxe_srq_cleanup() upon receiving the error, which triggers a second rxe_queue_cleanup() on the same memory, leading to a double free. The call trace looks like this: kmem_cache_free+0x.../0x... rxe_queue_cleanup+0x1a/0x30 [rdma_rxe] rxe_srq_cleanup+0x42/0x60 [rdma_rxe] rxe_elem_release+0x31/0x70 [rdma_rxe] rxe_create_srq+0x12b/0x1a0 [rdma_rxe] ib_create_srq_user+0x9a/0x150 [ib_core] Fix this by moving 'srq->rq.queue = q' after copy_to_user. Fixes: aae0484e15f0 ("IB/rxe: avoid srq memory leak") Signed-off-by: Jiasheng Jiang <jiashengjiangcool(a)gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260112015412.29458-1-jiashengjiangcool@gmail.com Reviewed-by: Zhu Yanjun <yanjun.Zhu(a)linux.dev> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_srq.c [The conflict is caused by not having applied the patch cc28f351155d("RDMA/rxe: Fix rxe_modify_srq"). ] Signed-off-by: Cheng Yu <serein.chengyu(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_srq.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_srq.c b/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_srq.c index c41a5fee81f7..3630d00ca71d 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_srq.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_srq.c @@ -144,6 +144,9 @@ int rxe_srq_from_init(struct rxe_dev *rxe, struct rxe_srq *srq, } } + srq->rq.queue = q; + init->attr.max_wr = srq->rq.max_wr; + return 0; } -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] netfilter: x_tables: ensure names are nul-terminated
by superdcc97＠163.com 03 Jun '26

03 Jun '26

From: Florian Westphal <fw(a)strlen.de> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.0-rc7 commit a958a4f90ddd7de0800b33ca9d7b886b7d40f74e category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14560 CVE: CVE-2026-43028 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Reject names that lack a \0 character before feeding them to functions that expect c-strings. Fixes tag is the most recent commit that needs this change. Fixes: c38c4597e4bf ("netfilter: implement xt_cgroup cgroup2 path match") Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw(a)strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- net/netfilter/xt_cgroup.c | 6 ++++++ net/netfilter/xt_rateest.c | 5 +++++ 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_cgroup.c b/net/netfilter/xt_cgroup.c index 5cb1ecb29ea4..e54fbda5e435 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/xt_cgroup.c +++ b/net/netfilter/xt_cgroup.c @@ -56,6 +56,9 @@ static int cgroup_mt_check_v1(const struct xt_mtchk_param *par) info->priv = NULL; if (info->has_path) { + if (strnlen(info->path, sizeof(info->path)) >= sizeof(info->path)) + return -ENAMETOOLONG; + cgrp = cgroup_get_from_path(info->path); if (IS_ERR(cgrp)) { pr_info_ratelimited("invalid path, errno=%ld\n", @@ -88,6 +91,9 @@ static int cgroup_mt_check_v2(const struct xt_mtchk_param *par) info->priv = NULL; if (info->has_path) { + if (strnlen(info->path, sizeof(info->path)) >= sizeof(info->path)) + return -ENAMETOOLONG; + cgrp = cgroup_get_from_path(info->path); if (IS_ERR(cgrp)) { pr_info_ratelimited("invalid path, errno=%ld\n", diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_rateest.c b/net/netfilter/xt_rateest.c index bf77326861af..a9a60a8fc758 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/xt_rateest.c +++ b/net/netfilter/xt_rateest.c @@ -94,6 +94,11 @@ static int xt_rateest_mt_checkentry(const struct xt_mtchk_param *par) goto err1; } + if (strnlen(info->name1, sizeof(info->name1)) >= sizeof(info->name1)) + return -ENAMETOOLONG; + if (strnlen(info->name2, sizeof(info->name2)) >= sizeof(info->name2)) + return -ENAMETOOLONG; + ret = -ENOENT; est1 = xt_rateest_lookup(par->net, info->name1); if (!est1) -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6 v2 0/2] bpf mainline
by Pu Lehui 03 Jun '26

03 Jun '26

Daniel Borkmann (2): bpf: Drop pkt_end markers on arithmetic to prevent is_pkt_ptr_branch_taken selftests/bpf: Add test for stale pkt range after scalar arithmetic kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 33 +++++++++- .../bpf/progs/verifier_direct_packet_access.c | 61 +++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 91 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 3

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] netfilter: nft_ct: fix use-after-free in timeout object destroy
by superdcc97＠163.com 03 Jun '26

03 Jun '26

From: Tuan Do <tuan(a)calif.io> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.1-rc1 commit f8dca15a1b190787bbd03285304b569631160eda category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14407 CVE: CVE-2026-31665 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- nft_ct_timeout_obj_destroy() frees the timeout object with kfree() immediately after nf_ct_untimeout(), without waiting for an RCU grace period. Concurrent packet processing on other CPUs may still hold RCU-protected references to the timeout object obtained via rcu_dereference() in nf_ct_timeout_data(). Add an rcu_head to struct nf_ct_timeout and use kfree_rcu() to defer freeing until after an RCU grace period, matching the approach already used in nfnetlink_cttimeout.c. KASAN report: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in nf_conntrack_tcp_packet+0x1381/0x29d0 Read of size 4 at addr ffff8881035fe19c by task exploit/80 Call Trace: nf_conntrack_tcp_packet+0x1381/0x29d0 nf_conntrack_in+0x612/0x8b0 nf_hook_slow+0x70/0x100 __ip_local_out+0x1b2/0x210 tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x722/0x1580 __sys_sendto+0x2d8/0x320 Allocated by task 75: nft_ct_timeout_obj_init+0xf6/0x290 nft_obj_init+0x107/0x1b0 nf_tables_newobj+0x680/0x9c0 nfnetlink_rcv_batch+0xc29/0xe00 Freed by task 26: nft_obj_destroy+0x3f/0xa0 nf_tables_trans_destroy_work+0x51c/0x5c0 process_one_work+0x2c4/0x5a0 Fixes: 7e0b2b57f01d ("netfilter: nft_ct: add ct timeout support") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Tuan Do <tuan(a)calif.io> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw(a)strlen.de> Conflicts: include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_timeout.h net/netfilter/nft_ct.c [commit 6daf14140129 ("netfilter: Replace zero-length array with flexible-array member") is not backport, target uses 'char data[0]' instead of 'char data[]', need to insert struct rcu_head before data[0]. commit b184356d0a00 ("netfilter: conntrack: remove module owner field") is not backport, target still has nf_ct_l4proto_put(timeout->l4proto) in nft_ct_timeout_obj_destroy(), need to preserve it while replacing kfree with kfree_rcu.] Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_timeout.h | 1 + net/netfilter/nft_ct.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_timeout.h b/include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_timeout.h index 3394d75e1c80..d6f74145f945 100644 --- a/include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_timeout.h +++ b/include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_timeout.h @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ struct nf_ct_timeout { __u16 l3num; const struct nf_conntrack_l4proto *l4proto; + struct rcu_head rcu; char data[0]; }; diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_ct.c b/net/netfilter/nft_ct.c index b17604b5b48b..2fc92f42cea6 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nft_ct.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_ct.c @@ -906,7 +906,7 @@ static void nft_ct_timeout_obj_destroy(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, nf_ct_untimeout(ctx->net, timeout); nf_ct_l4proto_put(timeout->l4proto); nf_ct_netns_put(ctx->net, ctx->family); - kfree(priv->timeout); + kfree_rcu(priv->timeout, rcu); } static int nft_ct_timeout_obj_dump(struct sk_buff *skb, -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH 0/2] xfs: fix delay extent reserve issue
by Long Li 03 Jun '26

03 Jun '26

This patch set fix delay extent reserve issue. Christoph Hellwig (1): xfs: fix xfs_bmap_add_extent_delay_real for partial conversions Ye Bin (1): xfs: fix possible bugon in xfs_trans_unreserve_and_mod_sb() fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_bmap.c | 24 ++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) -- 2.52.0

1 2

[PATCH OLK-6.6] apparmor: Fix & Optimize table creation from possibly unaligned memory
by Gu Bowen 03 Jun '26

03 Jun '26

From: Helge Deller <deller(a)kernel.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.0-rc1 commit 6fc367bfd4c8886e6b1742aabbd1c0bdc310db3a category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15143 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Source blob may come from userspace and might be unaligned. Try to optize the copying process by avoiding unaligned memory accesses. - Added Fixes tag - Added "Fix &" to description as this doesn't just optimize but fixes a potential unaligned memory access Fixes: e6e8bf418850d ("apparmor: fix restricted endian type warnings for dfa unpack") Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller(a)gmx.de> [jj: remove duplicate word "convert" in comment trigger checkpatch warning] Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen(a)canonical.com> Conflicts: security/apparmor/include/match.h [Context conflicts.] Signed-off-by: Gu Bowen <gubowen5(a)huawei.com> --- security/apparmor/include/match.h | 12 +++++++----- security/apparmor/match.c | 7 +++---- 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/match.h b/security/apparmor/include/match.h index 82b13c103454..47b55a1971de 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/match.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/match.h @@ -105,16 +105,18 @@ struct aa_dfa { extern struct aa_dfa *nulldfa; extern struct aa_dfa *stacksplitdfa; -#define byte_to_byte(X) (X) - #define UNPACK_ARRAY(TABLE, BLOB, LEN, TTYPE, BTYPE, NTOHX) \ do { \ typeof(LEN) __i; \ TTYPE *__t = (TTYPE *) TABLE; \ BTYPE *__b = (BTYPE *) BLOB; \ - for (__i = 0; __i < LEN; __i++) { \ - __t[__i] = NTOHX(__b[__i]); \ - } \ + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(TTYPE) != sizeof(BTYPE)); \ + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN)) \ + memcpy(__t, __b, (LEN) * sizeof(BTYPE)); \ + else /* copy & convert from big-endian */ \ + for (__i = 0; __i < LEN; __i++) { \ + __t[__i] = NTOHX(&__b[__i]); \ + } \ } while (0) static inline size_t table_size(size_t len, size_t el_size) diff --git a/security/apparmor/match.c b/security/apparmor/match.c index ed2ed6e40849..130addfa6bb9 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/match.c +++ b/security/apparmor/match.c @@ -110,14 +110,13 @@ static struct table_header *unpack_table(char *blob, size_t bsize) table->td_flags = th.td_flags; table->td_lolen = th.td_lolen; if (th.td_flags == YYTD_DATA8) - UNPACK_ARRAY(table->td_data, blob, th.td_lolen, - u8, u8, byte_to_byte); + memcpy(table->td_data, blob, th.td_lolen); else if (th.td_flags == YYTD_DATA16) UNPACK_ARRAY(table->td_data, blob, th.td_lolen, - u16, __be16, be16_to_cpu); + u16, __be16, get_unaligned_be16); else if (th.td_flags == YYTD_DATA32) UNPACK_ARRAY(table->td_data, blob, th.td_lolen, - u32, __be32, be32_to_cpu); + u32, __be32, get_unaligned_be32); else goto fail; /* if table was vmalloced make sure the page tables are synced -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] fbcon: Fix the issue of uninitialized charcount in the remaining consoles
by Luo Gengkun 03 Jun '26

03 Jun '26

HULK inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/9126 CVE: NA ---------------------------------------------------------------------- After commit 054a54161b88 ("fbdev: bitblit: bound-check glyph index in bit_putcs*") was merged, using alt+ctrl+f1 to switch the tty from tty0 to tty1 results in garbled display. The reason is the vc->vc_font.charcount is 0, it is clearly an uninitialized value. The mainline is fine because commit a1ac250a82a5 ("fbcon: Avoid using FNTCHARCNT() and hard-coded built-in font charcount") assigns the fvc->vc_font.charcount to vc->vc_font.charcount. Fixes: 06a0aaef1910 ("fbdev: bitblit: bound-check glyph index in bit_putcs*") Signed-off-by: Luo Gengkun <luogengkun2(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c index d0a11b7543b6..d49dc3ef4f53 100644 --- a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c +++ b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c @@ -1071,6 +1071,7 @@ static void fbcon_init(struct vc_data *vc, int init) fvc->vc_font.data); vc->vc_font.width = fvc->vc_font.width; vc->vc_font.height = fvc->vc_font.height; + vc->vc_font.charcount = fvc->vc_font.charcount; p->userfont = t->userfont; if (p->userfont) -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] dlm: validate length in dlm_search_rsb_tree
by Gu Bowen 03 Jun '26

03 Jun '26

From: Ezrak1e <ezrakiez(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.0-rc1 commit 080e5563f878c64e697b89e7439d730d0daad882 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14672 CVE: CVE-2026-43125 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- The len parameter in dlm_dump_rsb_name() is not validated and comes from network messages. When it exceeds DLM_RESNAME_MAXLEN, it can cause out-of-bounds write in dlm_search_rsb_tree(). Add length validation to prevent potential buffer overflow. Signed-off-by: Ezrak1e <ezrakiez(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Alexander Aring <aahringo(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Teigland <teigland(a)redhat.com> Conflicts: fs/dlm/lock.c [Context conflicts due to commit 6c648035cbe7 ("dlm: switch to use rhashtable for rsbs") not merge.] Signed-off-by: Gu Bowen <gubowen5(a)huawei.com> --- fs/dlm/lock.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/dlm/lock.c b/fs/dlm/lock.c index 51ab06308bc7..339f7d4c793f 100644 --- a/fs/dlm/lock.c +++ b/fs/dlm/lock.c @@ -449,6 +449,9 @@ int dlm_search_rsb_tree(struct rb_root *tree, char *name, int len, struct dlm_rsb *r; int rc; + if (len > DLM_RESNAME_MAXLEN) + return -EINVAL; + while (node) { r = rb_entry(node, struct dlm_rsb, res_hashnode); rc = rsb_cmp(r, name, len); -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] dlm: validate length in dlm_search_rsb_tree
by Gu Bowen 03 Jun '26

03 Jun '26

From: Ezrak1e <ezrakiez(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.0-rc1 commit 080e5563f878c64e697b89e7439d730d0daad882 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14672 CVE: CVE-2026-43125 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- The len parameter in dlm_dump_rsb_name() is not validated and comes from network messages. When it exceeds DLM_RESNAME_MAXLEN, it can cause out-of-bounds write in dlm_search_rsb_tree(). Add length validation to prevent potential buffer overflow. Signed-off-by: Ezrak1e <ezrakiez(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Alexander Aring <aahringo(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Teigland <teigland(a)redhat.com> Conflicts: fs/dlm/lock.c [Context conflicts due to commit 6c648035cbe7 ("dlm: switch to use rhashtable for rsbs") not merge.] Signed-off-by: Gu Bowen <gubowen5(a)huawei.com> --- fs/dlm/lock.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/dlm/lock.c b/fs/dlm/lock.c index 6712d733fc90..6c708ccbdf3c 100644 --- a/fs/dlm/lock.c +++ b/fs/dlm/lock.c @@ -444,6 +444,9 @@ int dlm_search_rsb_tree(struct rb_root *tree, const void *name, int len, struct dlm_rsb *r; int rc; + if (len > DLM_RESNAME_MAXLEN) + return -EINVAL; + while (node) { r = rb_entry(node, struct dlm_rsb, res_hashnode); rc = rsb_cmp(r, name, len); -- 2.43.0

2 2

[PATCH OLK-6.6] vsock: fix buffer size clamping order
by Wupeng Ma 03 Jun '26

03 Jun '26

From: Norbert Szetei <norbert(a)doyensec.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.140 commit a998a7e250bf976539e05a00ec64a81292afecaa category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15478 CVE: CVE-2026-46234 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit d114bfdc9b76bf93b881e195b7ec957c14227bab upstream. In vsock_update_buffer_size(), the buffer size was being clamped to the maximum first, and then to the minimum. If a user sets a minimum buffer size larger than the maximum, the minimum check overrides the maximum check, inverting the constraint. This breaks the intended socket memory boundaries by allowing the vsk->buffer_size to grow beyond the configured vsk->buffer_max_size. Fix this by checking the minimum first, and then the maximum. This ensures the buffer size never exceeds the buffer_max_size. Fixes: b9f2b0ffde0c ("vsock: handle buffer_size sockopts in the core") Suggested-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Norbert Szetei <norbert(a)doyensec.com> Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare(a)redhat.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/180118C5-8BCF-4A63-A305-4EE53A34AB9C@doyensec.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Cc: Luigi Leonardi <leonardi(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Wupeng Ma <mawupeng1(a)huawei.com> --- net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c b/net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c index ca1289e64bcc8..187cc259f820b 100644 --- a/net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c +++ b/net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c @@ -1728,12 +1728,12 @@ static void vsock_update_buffer_size(struct vsock_sock *vsk, const struct vsock_transport *transport, u64 val) { - if (val > vsk->buffer_max_size) - val = vsk->buffer_max_size; - if (val < vsk->buffer_min_size) val = vsk->buffer_min_size; + if (val > vsk->buffer_max_size) + val = vsk->buffer_max_size; + if (val != vsk->buffer_size && transport && transport->notify_buffer_size) transport->notify_buffer_size(vsk, &val); -- 2.43.0

2 2

[PATCH OLK-5.10] fbcon: Fix the issue of uninitialized charcount in the remaining consoles
by Luo Gengkun 03 Jun '26

03 Jun '26

From: Luo Gengkun <luogengkun(a)huaweicloud.com> HULK inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/9126 CVE: NA ---------------------------------------------------------------------- After commit 054a54161b88 ("fbdev: bitblit: bound-check glyph index in bit_putcs*") was merged, using alt+ctrl+f1 to switch the tty from tty0 to tty1 results in garbled display. The reason is the vc->vc_font.charcount is 0, it is clearly an uninitialized value. The mainline is fine because commit a1ac250a82a5 ("fbcon: Avoid using FNTCHARCNT() and hard-coded built-in font charcount") assigns the fvc->vc_font.charcount to vc->vc_font.charcount. Fixes: 06a0aaef1910 ("fbdev: bitblit: bound-check glyph index in bit_putcs*") Signed-off-by: Luo Gengkun <luogengkun2(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c index d0a11b7543b6..d49dc3ef4f53 100644 --- a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c +++ b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c @@ -1071,6 +1071,7 @@ static void fbcon_init(struct vc_data *vc, int init) fvc->vc_font.data); vc->vc_font.width = fvc->vc_font.width; vc->vc_font.height = fvc->vc_font.height; + vc->vc_font.charcount = fvc->vc_font.charcount; p->userfont = t->userfont; if (p->userfont) -- 2.34.1

2 2

[PATCH OLK-6.6] fbcon: Fix the issue of uninitialized charcount in the remaining consoles
by Luo Gengkun 03 Jun '26

03 Jun '26

From: Luo Gengkun <luogengkun(a)huaweicloud.com> HULK inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/9126 CVE: NA ---------------------------------------------------------------------- After commit 054a54161b88 ("fbdev: bitblit: bound-check glyph index in bit_putcs*") was merged, using alt+ctrl+f1 to switch the tty from tty0 to tty1 results in garbled display. The reason is the vc->vc_font.charcount is 0, it is clearly an uninitialized value. The mainline is fine because commit a1ac250a82a5 ("fbcon: Avoid using FNTCHARCNT() and hard-coded built-in font charcount") assigns the fvc->vc_font.charcount to vc->vc_font.charcount. Fixes: 06a0aaef1910 ("fbdev: bitblit: bound-check glyph index in bit_putcs*") Signed-off-by: Luo Gengkun <luogengkun2(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c index d0a11b7543b6..d49dc3ef4f53 100644 --- a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c +++ b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c @@ -1071,6 +1071,7 @@ static void fbcon_init(struct vc_data *vc, int init) fvc->vc_font.data); vc->vc_font.width = fvc->vc_font.width; vc->vc_font.height = fvc->vc_font.height; + vc->vc_font.charcount = fvc->vc_font.charcount; p->userfont = t->userfont; if (p->userfont) -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] bpf: Avoid soft lockup in bpf_uprobe_unregister
by Pu Lehui 03 Jun '26

03 Jun '26

hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/9318 -------------------------------- Syzkaller report a following issue: watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 109s! [syz.0.555:3563] Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 3563 Comm: syz.0.555 Not tainted 6.6.0+ #80 RIP: 0010:consumer_del kernel/events/uprobes.c:789 [inline] RIP: 0010:__uprobe_unregister+0x9e/0x260 kernel/events/uprobes.c:1107 RSP: 0018:ffff888143a47a58 EFLAGS: 00000246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffc900156aaf78 RCX: ffffffffa7128384 RDX: 1ffff92002ad55ef RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffff888120c1e050 RBP: ffffc90015504a20 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed1024183c0a R10: ffff888120c1e057 R11: ffff888100e3a058 R12: dffffc0000000000 R13: ffff888120c1e000 R14: ffffc900156aaf20 R15: ffff888120c1e080 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8881e1400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007ffd57aa2048 CR3: 000000021a742006 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 PKRU: 80000000 Call Trace: <TASK> uprobe_unregister+0x62/0x90 kernel/events/uprobes.c:1131 bpf_uprobe_unregister kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:3082 [inline] bpf_uprobe_multi_link_release+0xd5/0x1f0 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:3092 bpf_link_free+0x16b/0x2c0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:2929 bpf_link_put_direct kernel/bpf/syscall.c:2969 [inline] bpf_link_release+0x68/0x80 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:2976 __fput+0x408/0xab0 fs/file_table.c:384 task_work_run+0x154/0x240 kernel/task_work.c:245 exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:45 [inline] do_exit+0x813/0x1140 kernel/exit.c:882 do_group_exit+0xcd/0x280 kernel/exit.c:1023 get_signal+0x185b/0x1910 kernel/signal.c:2908 arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x83/0x3b0 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:310 exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:111 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/entry-common.h:328 [inline] __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:207 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x20b/0x220 kernel/entry/common.c:218 do_syscall_64+0x66/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:82 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x78/0xe2 The reason is that syzkaller attempts to unregister 287088 uprobes when CONFIG_PREEMPT_NONE. Let's add cond_resched to avoid soft lockup in bpf_uprobe_unregister. Fixes: 89ae89f53d20 ("bpf: Add multi uprobe link") Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui <pulehui(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c index 768159fad93c..435f078782e2 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c +++ b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c @@ -3077,6 +3077,7 @@ static void bpf_uprobe_unregister(struct path *path, struct bpf_uprobe *uprobes, for (i = 0; i < cnt; i++) { uprobe_unregister(d_real_inode(path->dentry), uprobes[i].offset, &uprobes[i].consumer); + cond_resched(); } } -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] netfilter: nft_ct: fix use-after-free in timeout object destroy
by superdcc97＠163.com 02 Jun '26

02 Jun '26

From: Tuan Do <tuan(a)calif.io> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.253 commit c458fc1c278a65ad5381083121d39a479973ebed category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14407 CVE: CVE-2026-31665 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit f8dca15a1b190787bbd03285304b569631160eda upstream. nft_ct_timeout_obj_destroy() frees the timeout object with kfree() immediately after nf_ct_untimeout(), without waiting for an RCU grace period. Concurrent packet processing on other CPUs may still hold RCU-protected references to the timeout object obtained via rcu_dereference() in nf_ct_timeout_data(). Add an rcu_head to struct nf_ct_timeout and use kfree_rcu() to defer freeing until after an RCU grace period, matching the approach already used in nfnetlink_cttimeout.c. KASAN report: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in nf_conntrack_tcp_packet+0x1381/0x29d0 Read of size 4 at addr ffff8881035fe19c by task exploit/80 Call Trace: nf_conntrack_tcp_packet+0x1381/0x29d0 nf_conntrack_in+0x612/0x8b0 nf_hook_slow+0x70/0x100 __ip_local_out+0x1b2/0x210 tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x722/0x1580 __sys_sendto+0x2d8/0x320 Allocated by task 75: nft_ct_timeout_obj_init+0xf6/0x290 nft_obj_init+0x107/0x1b0 nf_tables_newobj+0x680/0x9c0 nfnetlink_rcv_batch+0xc29/0xe00 Freed by task 26: nft_obj_destroy+0x3f/0xa0 nf_tables_trans_destroy_work+0x51c/0x5c0 process_one_work+0x2c4/0x5a0 Fixes: 7e0b2b57f01d ("netfilter: nft_ct: add ct timeout support") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Tuan Do <tuan(a)calif.io> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw(a)strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_timeout.h | 1 + net/netfilter/nft_ct.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_timeout.h b/include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_timeout.h index 659b0ea25b4d..16e024ca1587 100644 --- a/include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_timeout.h +++ b/include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_timeout.h @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ struct nf_ct_timeout { __u16 l3num; const struct nf_conntrack_l4proto *l4proto; + struct rcu_head rcu; char data[]; }; diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_ct.c b/net/netfilter/nft_ct.c index e0fa3e73fed4..2ac4c6b16459 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nft_ct.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_ct.c @@ -934,7 +934,7 @@ static void nft_ct_timeout_obj_destroy(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, nf_queue_nf_hook_drop(ctx->net); nf_ct_untimeout(ctx->net, timeout); nf_ct_netns_put(ctx->net, ctx->family); - kfree(priv->timeout); + kfree_rcu(priv->timeout, rcu); } static int nft_ct_timeout_obj_dump(struct sk_buff *skb, -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] vsock: fix buffer size clamping order
by Wupeng Ma 02 Jun '26

02 Jun '26

From: Norbert Szetei <norbert(a)doyensec.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.140 commit a998a7e250bf976539e05a00ec64a81292afecaa category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/9194 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit d114bfdc9b76bf93b881e195b7ec957c14227bab upstream. In vsock_update_buffer_size(), the buffer size was being clamped to the maximum first, and then to the minimum. If a user sets a minimum buffer size larger than the maximum, the minimum check overrides the maximum check, inverting the constraint. This breaks the intended socket memory boundaries by allowing the vsk->buffer_size to grow beyond the configured vsk->buffer_max_size. Fix this by checking the minimum first, and then the maximum. This ensures the buffer size never exceeds the buffer_max_size. Fixes: b9f2b0ffde0c ("vsock: handle buffer_size sockopts in the core") Suggested-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Norbert Szetei <norbert(a)doyensec.com> Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare(a)redhat.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/180118C5-8BCF-4A63-A305-4EE53A34AB9C@doyensec.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Cc: Luigi Leonardi <leonardi(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Yuan Can <yuancan(a)huawei.com> --- net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c b/net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c index ca1289e64bcc8..187cc259f820b 100644 --- a/net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c +++ b/net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c @@ -1728,12 +1728,12 @@ static void vsock_update_buffer_size(struct vsock_sock *vsk, const struct vsock_transport *transport, u64 val) { - if (val > vsk->buffer_max_size) - val = vsk->buffer_max_size; - if (val < vsk->buffer_min_size) val = vsk->buffer_min_size; + if (val > vsk->buffer_max_size) + val = vsk->buffer_max_size; + if (val != vsk->buffer_size && transport && transport->notify_buffer_size) transport->notify_buffer_size(vsk, &val); -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] xfrm: prevent policy_hthresh.work from racing with netns teardown
by superdcc97＠163.com 02 Jun '26

02 Jun '26

From: Minwoo Ra <raminwo0202(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.0-rc6 commit 29fe3a61bcdce398ee3955101c39f89c01a8a77e category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14251 CVE: CVE-2026-31516 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- A XFRM_MSG_NEWSPDINFO request can queue the per-net work item policy_hthresh.work onto the system workqueue. The queued callback, xfrm_hash_rebuild(), retrieves the enclosing struct net via container_of(). If the net namespace is torn down before that work runs, the associated struct net may already have been freed, and xfrm_hash_rebuild() may then dereference stale memory. xfrm_policy_fini() already flushes policy_hash_work during teardown, but it does not synchronize policy_hthresh.work. Synchronize policy_hthresh.work in xfrm_policy_fini() as well, so the queued work cannot outlive the net namespace teardown and access a freed struct net. Fixes: 880a6fab8f6b ("xfrm: configure policy hash table thresholds by netlink") Signed-off-by: Minwoo Ra <raminwo0202(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert(a)secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c index c7a827d4265c..98a8f2623ec7 100644 --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c @@ -4113,6 +4113,8 @@ static void xfrm_policy_fini(struct net *net) unsigned int sz; int dir; + cancel_work_sync(&net->xfrm.policy_hthresh.work); + flush_work(&net->xfrm.policy_hash_work); #ifdef CONFIG_XFRM_SUB_POLICY xfrm_policy_flush(net, XFRM_POLICY_TYPE_SUB, false); -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] xfrm: prevent policy_hthresh.work from racing with netns teardown
by superdcc97＠163.com 02 Jun '26

02 Jun '26

From: Minwoo Ra <raminwo0202(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.0-rc6 commit 29fe3a61bcdce398ee3955101c39f89c01a8a77e category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14251 CVE: CVE-2026-31516 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- A XFRM_MSG_NEWSPDINFO request can queue the per-net work item policy_hthresh.work onto the system workqueue. The queued callback, xfrm_hash_rebuild(), retrieves the enclosing struct net via container_of(). If the net namespace is torn down before that work runs, the associated struct net may already have been freed, and xfrm_hash_rebuild() may then dereference stale memory. xfrm_policy_fini() already flushes policy_hash_work during teardown, but it does not synchronize policy_hthresh.work. Synchronize policy_hthresh.work in xfrm_policy_fini() as well, so the queued work cannot outlive the net namespace teardown and access a freed struct net. Fixes: 880a6fab8f6b ("xfrm: configure policy hash table thresholds by netlink") Signed-off-by: Minwoo Ra <raminwo0202(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert(a)secunet.com> Conflicts: net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c [openEuler-1.0-LTS does not have disable_work_sync() API, use cancel_work_sync() instead. The target kernel's xfrm_policy_fini() function lacks struct xfrm_pol_inexact_bin related code which exists in mainline.] Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c index 5d635f005ab7..9057e806c890 100644 --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c @@ -2878,6 +2878,8 @@ static void xfrm_policy_fini(struct net *net) unsigned int sz; int dir; + cancel_work_sync(&net->xfrm.policy_hthresh.work); + flush_work(&net->xfrm.policy_hash_work); #ifdef CONFIG_XFRM_SUB_POLICY xfrm_policy_flush(net, XFRM_POLICY_TYPE_SUB, false); -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] net: sched: avoid qdisc_reset_all_tx_gt() vs dequeue race for lockless qdiscs
by superdcc97＠163.com 02 Jun '26

02 Jun '26

From: Koichiro Den <den(a)valinux.co.jp> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.0-rc3 commit 7f083faf59d14c04e01ec05a7507f036c965acf8 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13941 CVE: CVE-2026-23340 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- When shrinking the number of real tx queues, netif_set_real_num_tx_queues() calls qdisc_reset_all_tx_gt() to flush qdiscs for queues which will no longer be used. qdisc_reset_all_tx_gt() currently serializes qdisc_reset() with qdisc_lock(). However, for lockless qdiscs, the dequeue path is serialized by qdisc_run_begin/end() using qdisc->seqlock instead, so qdisc_reset() can run concurrently with __qdisc_run() and free skbs while they are still being dequeued, leading to UAF. This can easily be reproduced on e.g. virtio-net by imposing heavy traffic while frequently changing the number of queue pairs: iperf3 -ub0 -c $peer -t 0 & while :; do ethtool -L eth0 combined 1 ethtool -L eth0 combined 2 done With KASAN enabled, this leads to reports like: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __qdisc_run+0x133f/0x1760 ... Call Trace: <TASK> ... __qdisc_run+0x133f/0x1760 __dev_queue_xmit+0x248f/0x3550 ip_finish_output2+0xa42/0x2110 ip_output+0x1a7/0x410 ip_send_skb+0x2e6/0x480 udp_send_skb+0xb0a/0x1590 udp_sendmsg+0x13c9/0x1fc0 ... </TASK> Allocated by task 1270 on cpu 5 at 44.558414s: ... alloc_skb_with_frags+0x84/0x7c0 sock_alloc_send_pskb+0x69a/0x830 __ip_append_data+0x1b86/0x48c0 ip_make_skb+0x1e8/0x2b0 udp_sendmsg+0x13a6/0x1fc0 ... Freed by task 1306 on cpu 3 at 44.558445s: ... kmem_cache_free+0x117/0x5e0 pfifo_fast_reset+0x14d/0x580 qdisc_reset+0x9e/0x5f0 netif_set_real_num_tx_queues+0x303/0x840 virtnet_set_channels+0x1bf/0x260 [virtio_net] ethnl_set_channels+0x684/0xae0 ethnl_default_set_doit+0x31a/0x890 ... Serialize qdisc_reset_all_tx_gt() against the lockless dequeue path by taking qdisc->seqlock for TCQ_F_NOLOCK qdiscs, matching the serialization model already used by dev_reset_queue(). Additionally clear QDISC_STATE_NON_EMPTY after reset so the qdisc state reflects an empty queue, avoiding needless re-scheduling. Fixes: 6b3ba9146fe6 ("net: sched: allow qdiscs to handle locking") Signed-off-by: Koichiro Den <den(a)valinux.co.jp> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260228145307.3955532-1-den@valinux.co.jp Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: include/net/sch_generic.h [Omitted clear_bit(__QDISC_STATE_MISSED) and clear_bit(__QDISC_STATE_DRAINING) as these states do not exist in openEuler-1.0-LTS.] Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- include/net/sch_generic.h | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/net/sch_generic.h b/include/net/sch_generic.h index cb9c6f1a9569..19abc08b305e 100644 --- a/include/net/sch_generic.h +++ b/include/net/sch_generic.h @@ -629,13 +629,20 @@ static inline bool skb_skip_tc_classify(struct sk_buff *skb) static inline void qdisc_reset_all_tx_gt(struct net_device *dev, unsigned int i) { struct Qdisc *qdisc; + bool nolock; for (; i < dev->num_tx_queues; i++) { qdisc = rtnl_dereference(netdev_get_tx_queue(dev, i)->qdisc); if (qdisc) { + nolock = qdisc->flags & TCQ_F_NOLOCK; + + if (nolock) + spin_lock_bh(&qdisc->seqlock); spin_lock_bh(qdisc_lock(qdisc)); qdisc_reset(qdisc); spin_unlock_bh(qdisc_lock(qdisc)); + if (nolock) + spin_unlock_bh(&qdisc->seqlock); } } } -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] net: sched: avoid qdisc_reset_all_tx_gt() vs dequeue race for lockless qdiscs
by superdcc97＠163.com 02 Jun '26

02 Jun '26

From: Koichiro Den <den(a)valinux.co.jp> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.0-rc1 commit 7f083faf59d14c04e01ec05a7507f036c965acf8 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13941 CVE: CVE-2026-23340 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- When shrinking the number of real tx queues, netif_set_real_num_tx_queues() calls qdisc_reset_all_tx_gt() to flush qdiscs for queues which will no longer be used. qdisc_reset_all_tx_gt() currently serializes qdisc_reset() with qdisc_lock(). However, for lockless qdiscs, the dequeue path is serialized by qdisc_run_begin/end() using qdisc->seqlock instead, so qdisc_reset() can run concurrently with __qdisc_run() and free skbs while they are still being dequeued, leading to UAF. This can easily be reproduced on e.g. virtio-net by imposing heavy traffic while frequently changing the number of queue pairs: iperf3 -ub0 -c $peer -t 0 & while :; do ethtool -L eth0 combined 1 ethtool -L eth0 combined 2 done With KASAN enabled, this leads to reports like: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __qdisc_run+0x133f/0x1760 ... Call Trace: <TASK> ... __qdisc_run+0x133f/0x1760 __dev_queue_xmit+0x248f/0x3550 ip_finish_output2+0xa42/0x2110 ip_output+0x1a7/0x410 ip_send_skb+0x2e6/0x480 udp_send_skb+0xb0a/0x1590 udp_sendmsg+0x13c9/0x1fc0 ... </TASK> Allocated by task 1270 on cpu 5 at 44.558414s: ... alloc_skb_with_frags+0x84/0x7c0 sock_alloc_send_pskb+0x69a/0x830 __ip_append_data+0x1b86/0x48c0 ip_make_skb+0x1e8/0x2b0 udp_sendmsg+0x13a6/0x1fc0 ... Freed by task 1306 on cpu 3 at 44.558445s: ... kmem_cache_free+0x117/0x5e0 pfifo_fast_reset+0x14d/0x580 qdisc_reset+0x9e/0x5f0 netif_set_real_num_tx_queues+0x303/0x840 virtnet_set_channels+0x1bf/0x260 [virtio_net] ethnl_set_channels+0x684/0xae0 ethnl_default_set_doit+0x31a/0x890 ... Serialize qdisc_reset_all_tx_gt() against the lockless dequeue path by taking qdisc->seqlock for TCQ_F_NOLOCK qdiscs, matching the serialization model already used by dev_reset_queue(). Additionally clear QDISC_STATE_NON_EMPTY after reset so the qdisc state reflects an empty queue, avoiding needless re-scheduling. Fixes: 6b3ba9146fe6 ("net: sched: allow qdiscs to handle locking") Signed-off-by: Koichiro Den <den(a)valinux.co.jp> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260228145307.3955532-1-den@valinux.co.jp Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: include/net/sch_generic.h [commit c4fef01ba479 is not backport] Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- include/net/sch_generic.h | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/net/sch_generic.h b/include/net/sch_generic.h index 46afe852c455..d010017d69f1 100644 --- a/include/net/sch_generic.h +++ b/include/net/sch_generic.h @@ -751,13 +751,22 @@ static inline bool skb_skip_tc_classify(struct sk_buff *skb) static inline void qdisc_reset_all_tx_gt(struct net_device *dev, unsigned int i) { struct Qdisc *qdisc; + bool nolock; for (; i < dev->num_tx_queues; i++) { qdisc = rtnl_dereference(netdev_get_tx_queue(dev, i)->qdisc); if (qdisc) { + nolock = qdisc->flags & TCQ_F_NOLOCK; + + if (nolock) + spin_lock_bh(&qdisc->seqlock); spin_lock_bh(qdisc_lock(qdisc)); qdisc_reset(qdisc); spin_unlock_bh(qdisc_lock(qdisc)); + if (nolock) { + clear_bit(__QDISC_STATE_MISSED, &qdisc->state); + spin_unlock_bh(&qdisc->seqlock); + } } } } -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] net: usb: catc: enable basic endpoint checking
by Zhang Qilong 02 Jun '26

02 Jun '26

From: Ziyi Guo <n7l8m4(a)u.northwestern.edu> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.128 commit 163d04897e57633c5d2e69734e4e4b22bb63f50d category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15162 CVE: CVE-2026-45923 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 9e7021d2aeae57c323a6f722ed7915686cdcc123 ] catc_probe() fills three URBs with hardcoded endpoint pipes without verifying the endpoint descriptors: - usb_sndbulkpipe(usbdev, 1) and usb_rcvbulkpipe(usbdev, 1) for TX/RX - usb_rcvintpipe(usbdev, 2) for interrupt status A malformed USB device can present these endpoints with transfer types that differ from what the driver assumes. Add a catc_usb_ep enum for endpoint numbers, replacing magic constants throughout. Add usb_check_bulk_endpoints() and usb_check_int_endpoints() calls after usb_set_interface() to verify endpoint types before use, rejecting devices with mismatched descriptors at probe time. Similar to - commit 90b7f2961798 ("net: usb: rtl8150: enable basic endpoint checking") which fixed the issue in rtl8150. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Suggested-by: Simon Horman <horms(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ziyi Guo <n7l8m4(a)u.northwestern.edu> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260212214154.3609844-1-n7l8m4@u.northwestern.edu Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Zhang Qilong <zhangqilong3(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/net/usb/catc.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/catc.c b/drivers/net/usb/catc.c index ff439ef535ac..98346cb4ece0 100644 --- a/drivers/net/usb/catc.c +++ b/drivers/net/usb/catc.c @@ -62,10 +62,20 @@ static const char driver_name[] = "catc"; #define RX_MAX_BURST 15 /* Max packets per rx buffer (> 0, < 16) */ #define TX_MAX_BURST 15 /* Max full sized packets per tx buffer (> 0) */ #define CTRL_QUEUE 16 /* Max control requests in flight (power of two) */ #define RX_PKT_SZ 1600 /* Max size of receive packet for F5U011 */ +/* + * USB endpoints. + */ + +enum catc_usb_ep { + CATC_USB_EP_CONTROL = 0, + CATC_USB_EP_BULK = 1, + CATC_USB_EP_INT_IN = 2, +}; + /* * Control requests. */ enum control_requests { @@ -770,10 +780,17 @@ static int catc_probe(struct usb_interface *intf, const struct usb_device_id *id struct net_device *netdev; struct catc *catc; u8 broadcast[ETH_ALEN]; u8 *macbuf; int pktsz, ret = -ENOMEM; + static const u8 bulk_ep_addr[] = { + CATC_USB_EP_BULK | USB_DIR_OUT, + CATC_USB_EP_BULK | USB_DIR_IN, + 0}; + static const u8 int_ep_addr[] = { + CATC_USB_EP_INT_IN | USB_DIR_IN, + 0}; macbuf = kmalloc(ETH_ALEN, GFP_KERNEL); if (!macbuf) goto error; @@ -782,10 +799,18 @@ static int catc_probe(struct usb_interface *intf, const struct usb_device_id *id dev_err(dev, "Can't set altsetting 1.\n"); ret = -EIO; goto fail_mem; } + /* Verify that all required endpoints are present */ + if (!usb_check_bulk_endpoints(intf, bulk_ep_addr) || + !usb_check_int_endpoints(intf, int_ep_addr)) { + dev_err(dev, "Missing or invalid endpoints\n"); + ret = -ENODEV; + goto fail_mem; + } + netdev = alloc_etherdev(sizeof(struct catc)); if (!netdev) goto fail_mem; catc = netdev_priv(netdev); @@ -826,18 +851,18 @@ static int catc_probe(struct usb_interface *intf, const struct usb_device_id *id } usb_fill_control_urb(catc->ctrl_urb, usbdev, usb_sndctrlpipe(usbdev, 0), NULL, NULL, 0, catc_ctrl_done, catc); - usb_fill_bulk_urb(catc->tx_urb, usbdev, usb_sndbulkpipe(usbdev, 1), - NULL, 0, catc_tx_done, catc); + usb_fill_bulk_urb(catc->tx_urb, usbdev, usb_sndbulkpipe(usbdev, CATC_USB_EP_BULK), + NULL, 0, catc_tx_done, catc); - usb_fill_bulk_urb(catc->rx_urb, usbdev, usb_rcvbulkpipe(usbdev, 1), - catc->rx_buf, pktsz, catc_rx_done, catc); + usb_fill_bulk_urb(catc->rx_urb, usbdev, usb_rcvbulkpipe(usbdev, CATC_USB_EP_BULK), + catc->rx_buf, pktsz, catc_rx_done, catc); - usb_fill_int_urb(catc->irq_urb, usbdev, usb_rcvintpipe(usbdev, 2), - catc->irq_buf, 2, catc_irq_done, catc, 1); + usb_fill_int_urb(catc->irq_urb, usbdev, usb_rcvintpipe(usbdev, CATC_USB_EP_INT_IN), + catc->irq_buf, 2, catc_irq_done, catc, 1); if (!catc->is_f5u011) { u32 *buf; int i; -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] net: ks8851: Reinstate disabling of BHs around IRQ handler
by Zhang Qilong 02 Jun '26

02 Jun '26

From: Marek Vasut <marex(a)nabladev.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.140 commit 640a7631d31db87d5fa1b34cea44a99b6e78854b category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15276 CVE: CVE-2026-46031 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 5c9fcac3c872224316714d0d8914d9af16c76a6d upstream. If the driver executes ks8851_irq() AND a TX packet has been sent, then the driver enables TX queue via netif_wake_queue() which schedules TX softirq to queue packets for this device. If CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT=y is set AND a packet has also been received by the MAC, then ks8851_rx_pkts() calls netdev_alloc_skb_ip_align() to allocate SKBs for the received packets. If netdev_alloc_skb_ip_align() is called with BH enabled, then local_bh_enable() at the end of netdev_alloc_skb_ip_align() will trigger the pending softirq processing, which may ultimately call the .xmit callback ks8851_start_xmit_par(). The ks8851_start_xmit_par() will try to lock struct ks8851_net_par .lock spinlock, which is already locked by ks8851_irq() from which ks8851_start_xmit_par() was called. This leads to a deadlock, which is reported by the kernel, including a trace listed below. If CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT is not set, then since commit 0913ec336a6c0 ("net: ks8851: Fix deadlock with the SPI chip variant") the deadlock can also be triggered without received packet in the RX FIFO. The pending softirqs will be processed on return from spin_unlock_bh(&ks->statelock) in ks8851_irq(), which triggers the deadlock as well. Fix the problem by disabling BH around critical sections, including the IRQ handler, thus preventing the net_tx_action() softirq from triggering during these critical sections. The net_tx_action() softirq is triggered once BH are re-enabled and at the end of the IRQ handler, once all the other IRQ handler actions have been completed. __schedule from schedule_rtlock+0x1c/0x34 schedule_rtlock from rtlock_slowlock_locked+0x548/0x904 rtlock_slowlock_locked from rt_spin_lock+0x60/0x9c rt_spin_lock from ks8851_start_xmit_par+0x74/0x1a8 ks8851_start_xmit_par from netdev_start_xmit+0x20/0x44 netdev_start_xmit from dev_hard_start_xmit+0xd0/0x188 dev_hard_start_xmit from sch_direct_xmit+0xb8/0x25c sch_direct_xmit from __qdisc_run+0x1f8/0x4ec __qdisc_run from qdisc_run+0x1c/0x28 qdisc_run from net_tx_action+0x1f0/0x268 net_tx_action from handle_softirqs+0x1a4/0x270 handle_softirqs from __local_bh_enable_ip+0xcc/0xe0 __local_bh_enable_ip from __alloc_skb+0xd8/0x128 __alloc_skb from __netdev_alloc_skb+0x3c/0x19c __netdev_alloc_skb from ks8851_irq+0x388/0x4d4 ks8851_irq from irq_thread_fn+0x24/0x64 irq_thread_fn from irq_thread+0x178/0x28c irq_thread from kthread+0x12c/0x138 kthread from ret_from_fork+0x14/0x28 Reviewed-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy(a)linutronix.de> Fixes: e0863634bf9f ("net: ks8851: Queue RX packets in IRQ handler instead of disabling BHs") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marek Vasut <marex(a)nabladev.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260415231020.455298-1-marex@nabladev.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Zhang Qilong <zhangqilong3(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/net/ethernet/micrel/ks8851.h | 6 +- drivers/net/ethernet/micrel/ks8851_common.c | 64 +++++++++------------ drivers/net/ethernet/micrel/ks8851_par.c | 15 ++--- drivers/net/ethernet/micrel/ks8851_spi.c | 11 ++-- 4 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 58 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/micrel/ks8851.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/micrel/ks8851.h index 31f75b4a67fd..b795a3a60571 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/micrel/ks8851.h +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/micrel/ks8851.h @@ -406,14 +406,12 @@ struct ks8851_net { struct regulator *vdd_reg; struct regulator *vdd_io; struct gpio_desc *gpio; struct mii_bus *mii_bus; - void (*lock)(struct ks8851_net *ks, - unsigned long *flags); - void (*unlock)(struct ks8851_net *ks, - unsigned long *flags); + void (*lock)(struct ks8851_net *ks); + void (*unlock)(struct ks8851_net *ks); unsigned int (*rdreg16)(struct ks8851_net *ks, unsigned int reg); void (*wrreg16)(struct ks8851_net *ks, unsigned int reg, unsigned int val); void (*rdfifo)(struct ks8851_net *ks, u8 *buff, diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/micrel/ks8851_common.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/micrel/ks8851_common.c index 7fa1820db9cc..8e06656a06c1 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/micrel/ks8851_common.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/micrel/ks8851_common.c @@ -26,29 +26,27 @@ #include "ks8851.h" /** * ks8851_lock - register access lock * @ks: The chip state - * @flags: Spinlock flags * * Claim chip register access lock */ -static void ks8851_lock(struct ks8851_net *ks, unsigned long *flags) +static void ks8851_lock(struct ks8851_net *ks) { - ks->lock(ks, flags); + ks->lock(ks); } /** * ks8851_unlock - register access unlock * @ks: The chip state - * @flags: Spinlock flags * * Release chip register access lock */ -static void ks8851_unlock(struct ks8851_net *ks, unsigned long *flags) +static void ks8851_unlock(struct ks8851_net *ks) { - ks->unlock(ks, flags); + ks->unlock(ks); } /** * ks8851_wrreg16 - write 16bit register value to chip * @ks: The chip state @@ -127,15 +125,14 @@ static void ks8851_set_powermode(struct ks8851_net *ks, unsigned pwrmode) * shutdown the RXQ process whilst setting this. */ static int ks8851_write_mac_addr(struct net_device *dev) { struct ks8851_net *ks = netdev_priv(dev); - unsigned long flags; u16 val; int i; - ks8851_lock(ks, &flags); + ks8851_lock(ks); /* * Wake up chip in case it was powered off when stopped; otherwise, * the first write to the MAC address does not take effect. */ @@ -147,11 +144,11 @@ static int ks8851_write_mac_addr(struct net_device *dev) } if (!netif_running(dev)) ks8851_set_powermode(ks, PMECR_PM_SOFTDOWN); - ks8851_unlock(ks, &flags); + ks8851_unlock(ks); return 0; } /** @@ -161,25 +158,24 @@ static int ks8851_write_mac_addr(struct net_device *dev) * Update our copy of the KS8851 MAC address from the registers of @dev. */ static void ks8851_read_mac_addr(struct net_device *dev) { struct ks8851_net *ks = netdev_priv(dev); - unsigned long flags; u8 addr[ETH_ALEN]; u16 reg; int i; - ks8851_lock(ks, &flags); + ks8851_lock(ks); for (i = 0; i < ETH_ALEN; i += 2) { reg = ks8851_rdreg16(ks, KS_MAR(i)); addr[i] = reg >> 8; addr[i + 1] = reg & 0xff; } eth_hw_addr_set(dev, addr); - ks8851_unlock(ks, &flags); + ks8851_unlock(ks); } /** * ks8851_init_mac - initialise the mac address * @ks: The device structure @@ -326,15 +322,14 @@ static void ks8851_rx_pkts(struct ks8851_net *ks, struct sk_buff_head *rxq) */ static irqreturn_t ks8851_irq(int irq, void *_ks) { struct ks8851_net *ks = _ks; struct sk_buff_head rxq; - unsigned long flags; unsigned int status; struct sk_buff *skb; - ks8851_lock(ks, &flags); + ks8851_lock(ks); status = ks8851_rdreg16(ks, KS_ISR); ks8851_wrreg16(ks, KS_ISR, status); netif_dbg(ks, intr, ks->netdev, @@ -387,11 +382,11 @@ static irqreturn_t ks8851_irq(int irq, void *_ks) ks8851_wrreg16(ks, KS_RXCR2, rxc->rxcr2); ks8851_wrreg16(ks, KS_RXCR1, rxc->rxcr1); } - ks8851_unlock(ks, &flags); + ks8851_unlock(ks); if (status & IRQ_LCI) mii_check_link(&ks->mii); if (status & IRQ_RXI) @@ -419,11 +414,10 @@ static void ks8851_flush_tx_work(struct ks8851_net *ks) * 'ifconfig up' on the device. */ static int ks8851_net_open(struct net_device *dev) { struct ks8851_net *ks = netdev_priv(dev); - unsigned long flags; int ret; ret = request_threaded_irq(dev->irq, NULL, ks8851_irq, IRQF_TRIGGER_LOW | IRQF_ONESHOT, dev->name, ks); @@ -432,11 +426,11 @@ static int ks8851_net_open(struct net_device *dev) return ret; } /* lock the card, even if we may not actually be doing anything * else at the moment */ - ks8851_lock(ks, &flags); + ks8851_lock(ks); netif_dbg(ks, ifup, ks->netdev, "opening\n"); /* bring chip out of any power saving mode it was in */ ks8851_set_powermode(ks, PMECR_PM_NORMAL); @@ -485,11 +479,11 @@ static int ks8851_net_open(struct net_device *dev) ks->tx_space = ks8851_rdreg16(ks, KS_TXMIR); netif_start_queue(ks->netdev); netif_dbg(ks, ifup, ks->netdev, "network device up\n"); - ks8851_unlock(ks, &flags); + ks8851_unlock(ks); mii_check_link(&ks->mii); return 0; } /** @@ -501,36 +495,35 @@ static int ks8851_net_open(struct net_device *dev) * power state whilst it is not being used. */ static int ks8851_net_stop(struct net_device *dev) { struct ks8851_net *ks = netdev_priv(dev); - unsigned long flags; netif_info(ks, ifdown, dev, "shutting down\n"); netif_stop_queue(dev); - ks8851_lock(ks, &flags); + ks8851_lock(ks); /* turn off the IRQs and ack any outstanding */ ks8851_wrreg16(ks, KS_IER, 0x0000); ks8851_wrreg16(ks, KS_ISR, 0xffff); - ks8851_unlock(ks, &flags); + ks8851_unlock(ks); /* stop any outstanding work */ ks8851_flush_tx_work(ks); flush_work(&ks->rxctrl_work); - ks8851_lock(ks, &flags); + ks8851_lock(ks); /* shutdown RX process */ ks8851_wrreg16(ks, KS_RXCR1, 0x0000); /* shutdown TX process */ ks8851_wrreg16(ks, KS_TXCR, 0x0000); /* set powermode to soft power down to save power */ ks8851_set_powermode(ks, PMECR_PM_SOFTDOWN); - ks8851_unlock(ks, &flags); + ks8851_unlock(ks); /* ensure any queued tx buffers are dumped */ while (!skb_queue_empty(&ks->txq)) { struct sk_buff *txb = skb_dequeue(&ks->txq); @@ -580,18 +573,17 @@ static netdev_tx_t ks8851_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, * complete. The interrupt handler then writes the new values into the chip. */ static void ks8851_rxctrl_work(struct work_struct *work) { struct ks8851_net *ks = container_of(work, struct ks8851_net, rxctrl_work); - unsigned long flags; - ks8851_lock(ks, &flags); + ks8851_lock(ks); /* need to shutdown RXQ before modifying filter parameters */ ks8851_wrreg16(ks, KS_RXCR1, 0x00); - ks8851_unlock(ks, &flags); + ks8851_unlock(ks); } static void ks8851_set_rx_mode(struct net_device *dev) { struct ks8851_net *ks = netdev_priv(dev); @@ -794,11 +786,10 @@ static void ks8851_eeprom_release(struct ks8851_net *ks) static int ks8851_set_eeprom(struct net_device *dev, struct ethtool_eeprom *ee, u8 *data) { struct ks8851_net *ks = netdev_priv(dev); int offset = ee->offset; - unsigned long flags; int len = ee->len; u16 tmp; /* currently only support byte writing */ if (len != 1) @@ -808,11 +799,11 @@ static int ks8851_set_eeprom(struct net_device *dev, return -EINVAL; if (!(ks->rc_ccr & CCR_EEPROM)) return -ENOENT; - ks8851_lock(ks, &flags); + ks8851_lock(ks); ks8851_eeprom_claim(ks); eeprom_93cx6_wren(&ks->eeprom, true); @@ -831,39 +822,38 @@ static int ks8851_set_eeprom(struct net_device *dev, eeprom_93cx6_write(&ks->eeprom, offset/2, tmp); eeprom_93cx6_wren(&ks->eeprom, false); ks8851_eeprom_release(ks); - ks8851_unlock(ks, &flags); + ks8851_unlock(ks); return 0; } static int ks8851_get_eeprom(struct net_device *dev, struct ethtool_eeprom *ee, u8 *data) { struct ks8851_net *ks = netdev_priv(dev); int offset = ee->offset; - unsigned long flags; int len = ee->len; /* must be 2 byte aligned */ if (len & 1 || offset & 1) return -EINVAL; if (!(ks->rc_ccr & CCR_EEPROM)) return -ENOENT; - ks8851_lock(ks, &flags); + ks8851_lock(ks); ks8851_eeprom_claim(ks); ee->magic = KS_EEPROM_MAGIC; eeprom_93cx6_multiread(&ks->eeprom, offset/2, (__le16 *)data, len/2); ks8851_eeprom_release(ks); - ks8851_unlock(ks, &flags); + ks8851_unlock(ks); return 0; } static int ks8851_get_eeprom_len(struct net_device *dev) @@ -918,21 +908,20 @@ static int ks8851_phy_reg(int reg) } static int ks8851_phy_read_common(struct net_device *dev, int phy_addr, int reg) { struct ks8851_net *ks = netdev_priv(dev); - unsigned long flags; int result; int ksreg; ksreg = ks8851_phy_reg(reg); if (ksreg < 0) return ksreg; - ks8851_lock(ks, &flags); + ks8851_lock(ks); result = ks8851_rdreg16(ks, ksreg); - ks8851_unlock(ks, &flags); + ks8851_unlock(ks); return result; } /** @@ -963,18 +952,17 @@ static int ks8851_phy_read(struct net_device *dev, int phy_addr, int reg) static void ks8851_phy_write(struct net_device *dev, int phy, int reg, int value) { struct ks8851_net *ks = netdev_priv(dev); - unsigned long flags; int ksreg; ksreg = ks8851_phy_reg(reg); if (ksreg >= 0) { - ks8851_lock(ks, &flags); + ks8851_lock(ks); ks8851_wrreg16(ks, ksreg, value); - ks8851_unlock(ks, &flags); + ks8851_unlock(ks); } } static int ks8851_mdio_read(struct mii_bus *bus, int phy_id, int reg) { diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/micrel/ks8851_par.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/micrel/ks8851_par.c index 96fb0ffcedb9..7f16ee5a91e2 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/micrel/ks8851_par.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/micrel/ks8851_par.c @@ -53,33 +53,31 @@ struct ks8851_net_par { #define to_ks8851_par(ks) container_of((ks), struct ks8851_net_par, ks8851) /** * ks8851_lock_par - register access lock * @ks: The chip state - * @flags: Spinlock flags * * Claim chip register access lock */ -static void ks8851_lock_par(struct ks8851_net *ks, unsigned long *flags) +static void ks8851_lock_par(struct ks8851_net *ks) { struct ks8851_net_par *ksp = to_ks8851_par(ks); - spin_lock_irqsave(&ksp->lock, *flags); + spin_lock_bh(&ksp->lock); } /** * ks8851_unlock_par - register access unlock * @ks: The chip state - * @flags: Spinlock flags * * Release chip register access lock */ -static void ks8851_unlock_par(struct ks8851_net *ks, unsigned long *flags) +static void ks8851_unlock_par(struct ks8851_net *ks) { struct ks8851_net_par *ksp = to_ks8851_par(ks); - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ksp->lock, *flags); + spin_unlock_bh(&ksp->lock); } /** * ks_check_endian - Check whether endianness of the bus is correct * @ks : The chip information @@ -231,19 +229,18 @@ static unsigned int ks8851_rdreg16_par_txqcr(struct ks8851_net *ks) static netdev_tx_t ks8851_start_xmit_par(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev) { struct ks8851_net *ks = netdev_priv(dev); netdev_tx_t ret = NETDEV_TX_OK; - unsigned long flags; unsigned int txqcr; u16 txmir; int err; netif_dbg(ks, tx_queued, ks->netdev, "%s: skb %p, %d@%p\n", __func__, skb, skb->len, skb->data); - ks8851_lock_par(ks, &flags); + ks8851_lock_par(ks); txmir = ks8851_rdreg16_par(ks, KS_TXMIR) & 0x1fff; if (likely(txmir >= skb->len + 12)) { ks8851_wrreg16_par(ks, KS_RXQCR, ks->rc_rxqcr | RXQCR_SDA); @@ -260,11 +257,11 @@ static netdev_tx_t ks8851_start_xmit_par(struct sk_buff *skb, ks8851_done_tx(ks, skb); } else { ret = NETDEV_TX_BUSY; } - ks8851_unlock_par(ks, &flags); + ks8851_unlock_par(ks); return ret; } static int ks8851_probe_par(struct platform_device *pdev) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/micrel/ks8851_spi.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/micrel/ks8851_spi.c index e33a5e7beb39..50afe8c11178 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/micrel/ks8851_spi.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/micrel/ks8851_spi.c @@ -71,29 +71,27 @@ struct ks8851_net_spi { (BYTE_EN(_byteen) | (_reg) << (8 + 2) | (_reg) >> 6) /** * ks8851_lock_spi - register access lock * @ks: The chip state - * @flags: Spinlock flags * * Claim chip register access lock */ -static void ks8851_lock_spi(struct ks8851_net *ks, unsigned long *flags) +static void ks8851_lock_spi(struct ks8851_net *ks) { struct ks8851_net_spi *kss = to_ks8851_spi(ks); mutex_lock(&kss->lock); } /** * ks8851_unlock_spi - register access unlock * @ks: The chip state - * @flags: Spinlock flags * * Release chip register access lock */ -static void ks8851_unlock_spi(struct ks8851_net *ks, unsigned long *flags) +static void ks8851_unlock_spi(struct ks8851_net *ks) { struct ks8851_net_spi *kss = to_ks8851_spi(ks); mutex_unlock(&kss->lock); } @@ -309,19 +307,18 @@ static void ks8851_tx_work(struct work_struct *work) { unsigned int dequeued_len = 0; struct ks8851_net_spi *kss; unsigned short tx_space; struct ks8851_net *ks; - unsigned long flags; struct sk_buff *txb; bool last; kss = container_of(work, struct ks8851_net_spi, tx_work); ks = &kss->ks8851; last = skb_queue_empty(&ks->txq); - ks8851_lock_spi(ks, &flags); + ks8851_lock_spi(ks); while (!last) { txb = skb_dequeue(&ks->txq); last = skb_queue_empty(&ks->txq); @@ -343,11 +340,11 @@ static void ks8851_tx_work(struct work_struct *work) spin_lock_bh(&ks->statelock); ks->queued_len -= dequeued_len; ks->tx_space = tx_space; spin_unlock_bh(&ks->statelock); - ks8851_unlock_spi(ks, &flags); + ks8851_unlock_spi(ks); } /** * ks8851_flush_tx_work_spi - flush outstanding TX work * @ks: The device state -- 2.43.0

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[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] net/sched: Enforce that teql can only be used as root qdisc
by superdcc97＠163.com 02 Jun '26

02 Jun '26

From: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs(a)mojatatu.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.19-rc7 commit 50da4b9d07a7a463e2cfb738f3ad4cff6b2c9c3b category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13607 CVE: CVE-2026-23074 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Design intent of teql is that it is only supposed to be used as root qdisc. We need to check for that constraint. Although not important, I will describe the scenario that unearthed this issue for the curious. GangMin Kim <km.kim1503(a)gmail.com> managed to concot a scenario as follows: ROOT qdisc 1:0 (QFQ) ├── class 1:1 (weight=15, lmax=16384) netem with delay 6.4s └── class 1:2 (weight=1, lmax=1514) teql GangMin sends a packet which is enqueued to 1:1 (netem). Any invocation of dequeue by QFQ from this class will not return a packet until after 6.4s. In the meantime, a second packet is sent and it lands on 1:2. teql's enqueue will return success and this will activate class 1:2. Main issue is that teql only updates the parent visible qlen (sch->q.qlen) at dequeue. Since QFQ will only call dequeue if peek succeeds (and teql's peek always returns NULL), dequeue will never be called and thus the qlen will remain as 0. With that in mind, when GangMin updates 1:2's lmax value, the qfq_change_class calls qfq_deact_rm_from_agg. Since the child qdisc's qlen was not incremented, qfq fails to deactivate the class, but still frees its pointers from the aggregate. So when the first packet is rescheduled after 6.4 seconds (netem's delay), a dangling pointer is accessed causing GangMin's causing a UAF. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-by: GangMin Kim <km.kim1503(a)gmail.com> Tested-by: Victor Nogueira <victor(a)mojatatu.com> Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs(a)mojatatu.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260114160243.913069-2-jhs@mojatatu.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- net/sched/sch_teql.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/sched/sch_teql.c b/net/sched/sch_teql.c index 163364124691..18d219546cc2 100644 --- a/net/sched/sch_teql.c +++ b/net/sched/sch_teql.c @@ -183,6 +183,11 @@ static int teql_qdisc_init(struct Qdisc *sch, struct nlattr *opt, if (m->dev == dev) return -ELOOP; + if (sch->parent != TC_H_ROOT) { + NL_SET_ERR_MSG_MOD(extack, "teql can only be used as root"); + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + } + q->m = m; skb_queue_head_init(&q->q); -- 2.43.0

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[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] lib/crypto: chacha: Zeroize permuted_state before it leaves scope
by Yi Yang 02 Jun '26

02 Jun '26

From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)kernel.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.0-rc7 commit e5046823f8fa3677341b541a25af2fcb99a5b1e0 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14894 CVE: CVE-2026-43336 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Since the ChaCha permutation is invertible, the local variable 'permuted_state' is sufficient to compute the original 'state', and thus the key, even after the permutation has been done. While the kernel is quite inconsistent about zeroizing secrets on the stack (and some prominent userspace crypto libraries don't bother at all since it's not guaranteed to work anyway), the kernel does try to do it as a best practice, especially in cases involving the RNG. Thus, explicitly zeroize 'permuted_state' before it goes out of scope. Fixes: c08d0e647305 ("crypto: chacha20 - Add a generic ChaCha20 stream cipher implementation") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb(a)kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260326032920.39408-1-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: lib/chacha20.c lib/crypto/chacha-block-generic.c [Commit 1ca1b917940c ("crypto: chacha20-generic - refactor to allow varying number of rounds") was not merged. File name change.] Signed-off-by: Yi Yang <yiyang13(a)huawei.com> --- lib/chacha20.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/lib/chacha20.c b/lib/chacha20.c index d907fec6a9ed..d78cf2e6c360 100644 --- a/lib/chacha20.c +++ b/lib/chacha20.c @@ -70,5 +70,7 @@ void chacha20_block(u32 *state, u8 *stream) put_unaligned_le32(x[i] + state[i], &stream[i * sizeof(u32)]); state[12]++; + + memzero_explicit(x, sizeof(x)); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(chacha20_block); -- 2.25.1

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