- Kernel - mailweb.openeuler.org

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] ipvs: fix ipv4 null-ptr-deref in route error path
by superdcc97＠163.com 02 Jun '26

02 Jun '26

From: Slavin Liu <slavin452(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.19-rc2 commit ad891bb3d079a46a821bf2b8867854645191bab0 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13366 CVE: CVE-2025-68813 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- The IPv4 code path in __ip_vs_get_out_rt() calls dst_link_failure() without ensuring skb->dev is set, leading to a NULL pointer dereference in fib_compute_spec_dst() when ipv4_link_failure() attempts to send ICMP destination unreachable messages. The issue emerged after commit ed0de45a1008 ("ipv4: recompile ip options in ipv4_link_failure") started calling __ip_options_compile() from ipv4_link_failure(). This code path eventually calls fib_compute_spec_dst() which dereferences skb->dev. An attempt was made to fix the NULL skb->dev dereference in commit 0113d9c9d1cc ("ipv4: fix null-deref in ipv4_link_failure"), but it only addressed the immediate dev_net(skb->dev) dereference by using a fallback device. The fix was incomplete because fib_compute_spec_dst() later in the call chain still accesses skb->dev directly, which remains NULL when IPVS calls dst_link_failure(). The crash occurs when: 1. IPVS processes a packet in NAT mode with a misconfigured destination 2. Route lookup fails in __ip_vs_get_out_rt() before establishing a route 3. The error path calls dst_link_failure(skb) with skb->dev == NULL 4. ipv4_link_failure() → ipv4_send_dest_unreach() → __ip_options_compile() → fib_compute_spec_dst() 5. fib_compute_spec_dst() dereferences NULL skb->dev Apply the same fix used for IPv6 in commit 326bf17ea5d4 ("ipvs: fix ipv6 route unreach panic"): set skb->dev from skb_dst(skb)->dev before calling dst_link_failure(). KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000328-0x000000000000032f] CPU: 1 PID: 12732 Comm: syz.1.3469 Not tainted 6.6.114 #2 RIP: 0010:__in_dev_get_rcu include/linux/inetdevice.h:233 RIP: 0010:fib_compute_spec_dst+0x17a/0x9f0 net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c:285 Call Trace: <TASK> spec_dst_fill net/ipv4/ip_options.c:232 spec_dst_fill net/ipv4/ip_options.c:229 __ip_options_compile+0x13a1/0x17d0 net/ipv4/ip_options.c:330 ipv4_send_dest_unreach net/ipv4/route.c:1252 ipv4_link_failure+0x702/0xb80 net/ipv4/route.c:1265 dst_link_failure include/net/dst.h:437 __ip_vs_get_out_rt+0x15fd/0x19e0 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_xmit.c:412 ip_vs_nat_xmit+0x1d8/0xc80 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_xmit.c:764 Fixes: ed0de45a1008 ("ipv4: recompile ip options in ipv4_link_failure") Signed-off-by: Slavin Liu <slavin452(a)gmail.com> Acked-by: Julian Anastasov <ja(a)ssi.bg> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw(a)strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_xmit.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_xmit.c b/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_xmit.c index 11f7c546e57b..755644734145 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_xmit.c +++ b/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_xmit.c @@ -409,6 +409,9 @@ __ip_vs_get_out_rt(struct netns_ipvs *ipvs, int skb_af, struct sk_buff *skb, return -1; err_unreach: + if (!skb->dev) + skb->dev = skb_dst(skb)->dev; + dst_link_failure(skb); return -1; } -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] mm/vmscan: fix wrong callback in shrinker_v2_to_v1_scan_objects()
by Qi Xi 02 Jun '26

02 Jun '26

hulk inclusion category: feature bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/15059 CVE: NA --------------------------- Fixes the incorrect callback invocation that would cause shrinker behavior mismatch when adapting v2 shrinkers to v1 interface. Fixes: 0dabf4e3ac0f ("mm/shrinker: Implementation of register_shrinker() and unregister_shrinker()") Signed-off-by: Qi Xi <xiqi5703(a)163.com> --- mm/vmscan.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/mm/vmscan.c b/mm/vmscan.c index cf6b9e6dc8cd..305aa6b3cd84 100644 --- a/mm/vmscan.c +++ b/mm/vmscan.c @@ -7623,7 +7623,7 @@ static unsigned long shrinker_v2_to_v1_scan_objects(struct shrinker_v2 *shk_v2, struct shrink_control *sc) { if (shk_v2->v1) - return shk_v2->v1->count_objects(shk_v2->v1, sc); + return shk_v2->v1->scan_objects(shk_v2->v1, sc); return SHRINK_EMPTY; } -- 2.53.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] net: ks8851: Reinstate disabling of BHs around IRQ handler
by Zhang Qilong 02 Jun '26

02 Jun '26

From: Marek Vasut <marex(a)nabladev.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.140 commit 640a7631d31db87d5fa1b34cea44a99b6e78854b category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/15276 CVE: CVE-2026-46031 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 5c9fcac3c872224316714d0d8914d9af16c76a6d upstream. If the driver executes ks8851_irq() AND a TX packet has been sent, then the driver enables TX queue via netif_wake_queue() which schedules TX softirq to queue packets for this device. If CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT=y is set AND a packet has also been received by the MAC, then ks8851_rx_pkts() calls netdev_alloc_skb_ip_align() to allocate SKBs for the received packets. If netdev_alloc_skb_ip_align() is called with BH enabled, then local_bh_enable() at the end of netdev_alloc_skb_ip_align() will trigger the pending softirq processing, which may ultimately call the .xmit callback ks8851_start_xmit_par(). The ks8851_start_xmit_par() will try to lock struct ks8851_net_par .lock spinlock, which is already locked by ks8851_irq() from which ks8851_start_xmit_par() was called. This leads to a deadlock, which is reported by the kernel, including a trace listed below. If CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT is not set, then since commit 0913ec336a6c0 ("net: ks8851: Fix deadlock with the SPI chip variant") the deadlock can also be triggered without received packet in the RX FIFO. The pending softirqs will be processed on return from spin_unlock_bh(&ks->statelock) in ks8851_irq(), which triggers the deadlock as well. Fix the problem by disabling BH around critical sections, including the IRQ handler, thus preventing the net_tx_action() softirq from triggering during these critical sections. The net_tx_action() softirq is triggered once BH are re-enabled and at the end of the IRQ handler, once all the other IRQ handler actions have been completed. __schedule from schedule_rtlock+0x1c/0x34 schedule_rtlock from rtlock_slowlock_locked+0x548/0x904 rtlock_slowlock_locked from rt_spin_lock+0x60/0x9c rt_spin_lock from ks8851_start_xmit_par+0x74/0x1a8 ks8851_start_xmit_par from netdev_start_xmit+0x20/0x44 netdev_start_xmit from dev_hard_start_xmit+0xd0/0x188 dev_hard_start_xmit from sch_direct_xmit+0xb8/0x25c sch_direct_xmit from __qdisc_run+0x1f8/0x4ec __qdisc_run from qdisc_run+0x1c/0x28 qdisc_run from net_tx_action+0x1f0/0x268 net_tx_action from handle_softirqs+0x1a4/0x270 handle_softirqs from __local_bh_enable_ip+0xcc/0xe0 __local_bh_enable_ip from __alloc_skb+0xd8/0x128 __alloc_skb from __netdev_alloc_skb+0x3c/0x19c __netdev_alloc_skb from ks8851_irq+0x388/0x4d4 ks8851_irq from irq_thread_fn+0x24/0x64 irq_thread_fn from irq_thread+0x178/0x28c irq_thread from kthread+0x12c/0x138 kthread from ret_from_fork+0x14/0x28 Reviewed-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy(a)linutronix.de> Fixes: e0863634bf9f ("net: ks8851: Queue RX packets in IRQ handler instead of disabling BHs") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marek Vasut <marex(a)nabladev.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260415231020.455298-1-marex@nabladev.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Zhang Qilong <zhangqilong3(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/net/ethernet/micrel/ks8851.h | 6 +- drivers/net/ethernet/micrel/ks8851_common.c | 64 +++++++++------------ drivers/net/ethernet/micrel/ks8851_par.c | 15 ++--- drivers/net/ethernet/micrel/ks8851_spi.c | 11 ++-- 4 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 58 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/micrel/ks8851.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/micrel/ks8851.h index 31f75b4a67fd..b795a3a60571 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/micrel/ks8851.h +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/micrel/ks8851.h @@ -406,14 +406,12 @@ struct ks8851_net { struct regulator *vdd_reg; struct regulator *vdd_io; struct gpio_desc *gpio; struct mii_bus *mii_bus; - void (*lock)(struct ks8851_net *ks, - unsigned long *flags); - void (*unlock)(struct ks8851_net *ks, - unsigned long *flags); + void (*lock)(struct ks8851_net *ks); + void (*unlock)(struct ks8851_net *ks); unsigned int (*rdreg16)(struct ks8851_net *ks, unsigned int reg); void (*wrreg16)(struct ks8851_net *ks, unsigned int reg, unsigned int val); void (*rdfifo)(struct ks8851_net *ks, u8 *buff, diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/micrel/ks8851_common.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/micrel/ks8851_common.c index 7fa1820db9cc..8e06656a06c1 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/micrel/ks8851_common.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/micrel/ks8851_common.c @@ -26,29 +26,27 @@ #include "ks8851.h" /** * ks8851_lock - register access lock * @ks: The chip state - * @flags: Spinlock flags * * Claim chip register access lock */ -static void ks8851_lock(struct ks8851_net *ks, unsigned long *flags) +static void ks8851_lock(struct ks8851_net *ks) { - ks->lock(ks, flags); + ks->lock(ks); } /** * ks8851_unlock - register access unlock * @ks: The chip state - * @flags: Spinlock flags * * Release chip register access lock */ -static void ks8851_unlock(struct ks8851_net *ks, unsigned long *flags) +static void ks8851_unlock(struct ks8851_net *ks) { - ks->unlock(ks, flags); + ks->unlock(ks); } /** * ks8851_wrreg16 - write 16bit register value to chip * @ks: The chip state @@ -127,15 +125,14 @@ static void ks8851_set_powermode(struct ks8851_net *ks, unsigned pwrmode) * shutdown the RXQ process whilst setting this. */ static int ks8851_write_mac_addr(struct net_device *dev) { struct ks8851_net *ks = netdev_priv(dev); - unsigned long flags; u16 val; int i; - ks8851_lock(ks, &flags); + ks8851_lock(ks); /* * Wake up chip in case it was powered off when stopped; otherwise, * the first write to the MAC address does not take effect. */ @@ -147,11 +144,11 @@ static int ks8851_write_mac_addr(struct net_device *dev) } if (!netif_running(dev)) ks8851_set_powermode(ks, PMECR_PM_SOFTDOWN); - ks8851_unlock(ks, &flags); + ks8851_unlock(ks); return 0; } /** @@ -161,25 +158,24 @@ static int ks8851_write_mac_addr(struct net_device *dev) * Update our copy of the KS8851 MAC address from the registers of @dev. */ static void ks8851_read_mac_addr(struct net_device *dev) { struct ks8851_net *ks = netdev_priv(dev); - unsigned long flags; u8 addr[ETH_ALEN]; u16 reg; int i; - ks8851_lock(ks, &flags); + ks8851_lock(ks); for (i = 0; i < ETH_ALEN; i += 2) { reg = ks8851_rdreg16(ks, KS_MAR(i)); addr[i] = reg >> 8; addr[i + 1] = reg & 0xff; } eth_hw_addr_set(dev, addr); - ks8851_unlock(ks, &flags); + ks8851_unlock(ks); } /** * ks8851_init_mac - initialise the mac address * @ks: The device structure @@ -326,15 +322,14 @@ static void ks8851_rx_pkts(struct ks8851_net *ks, struct sk_buff_head *rxq) */ static irqreturn_t ks8851_irq(int irq, void *_ks) { struct ks8851_net *ks = _ks; struct sk_buff_head rxq; - unsigned long flags; unsigned int status; struct sk_buff *skb; - ks8851_lock(ks, &flags); + ks8851_lock(ks); status = ks8851_rdreg16(ks, KS_ISR); ks8851_wrreg16(ks, KS_ISR, status); netif_dbg(ks, intr, ks->netdev, @@ -387,11 +382,11 @@ static irqreturn_t ks8851_irq(int irq, void *_ks) ks8851_wrreg16(ks, KS_RXCR2, rxc->rxcr2); ks8851_wrreg16(ks, KS_RXCR1, rxc->rxcr1); } - ks8851_unlock(ks, &flags); + ks8851_unlock(ks); if (status & IRQ_LCI) mii_check_link(&ks->mii); if (status & IRQ_RXI) @@ -419,11 +414,10 @@ static void ks8851_flush_tx_work(struct ks8851_net *ks) * 'ifconfig up' on the device. */ static int ks8851_net_open(struct net_device *dev) { struct ks8851_net *ks = netdev_priv(dev); - unsigned long flags; int ret; ret = request_threaded_irq(dev->irq, NULL, ks8851_irq, IRQF_TRIGGER_LOW | IRQF_ONESHOT, dev->name, ks); @@ -432,11 +426,11 @@ static int ks8851_net_open(struct net_device *dev) return ret; } /* lock the card, even if we may not actually be doing anything * else at the moment */ - ks8851_lock(ks, &flags); + ks8851_lock(ks); netif_dbg(ks, ifup, ks->netdev, "opening\n"); /* bring chip out of any power saving mode it was in */ ks8851_set_powermode(ks, PMECR_PM_NORMAL); @@ -485,11 +479,11 @@ static int ks8851_net_open(struct net_device *dev) ks->tx_space = ks8851_rdreg16(ks, KS_TXMIR); netif_start_queue(ks->netdev); netif_dbg(ks, ifup, ks->netdev, "network device up\n"); - ks8851_unlock(ks, &flags); + ks8851_unlock(ks); mii_check_link(&ks->mii); return 0; } /** @@ -501,36 +495,35 @@ static int ks8851_net_open(struct net_device *dev) * power state whilst it is not being used. */ static int ks8851_net_stop(struct net_device *dev) { struct ks8851_net *ks = netdev_priv(dev); - unsigned long flags; netif_info(ks, ifdown, dev, "shutting down\n"); netif_stop_queue(dev); - ks8851_lock(ks, &flags); + ks8851_lock(ks); /* turn off the IRQs and ack any outstanding */ ks8851_wrreg16(ks, KS_IER, 0x0000); ks8851_wrreg16(ks, KS_ISR, 0xffff); - ks8851_unlock(ks, &flags); + ks8851_unlock(ks); /* stop any outstanding work */ ks8851_flush_tx_work(ks); flush_work(&ks->rxctrl_work); - ks8851_lock(ks, &flags); + ks8851_lock(ks); /* shutdown RX process */ ks8851_wrreg16(ks, KS_RXCR1, 0x0000); /* shutdown TX process */ ks8851_wrreg16(ks, KS_TXCR, 0x0000); /* set powermode to soft power down to save power */ ks8851_set_powermode(ks, PMECR_PM_SOFTDOWN); - ks8851_unlock(ks, &flags); + ks8851_unlock(ks); /* ensure any queued tx buffers are dumped */ while (!skb_queue_empty(&ks->txq)) { struct sk_buff *txb = skb_dequeue(&ks->txq); @@ -580,18 +573,17 @@ static netdev_tx_t ks8851_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, * complete. The interrupt handler then writes the new values into the chip. */ static void ks8851_rxctrl_work(struct work_struct *work) { struct ks8851_net *ks = container_of(work, struct ks8851_net, rxctrl_work); - unsigned long flags; - ks8851_lock(ks, &flags); + ks8851_lock(ks); /* need to shutdown RXQ before modifying filter parameters */ ks8851_wrreg16(ks, KS_RXCR1, 0x00); - ks8851_unlock(ks, &flags); + ks8851_unlock(ks); } static void ks8851_set_rx_mode(struct net_device *dev) { struct ks8851_net *ks = netdev_priv(dev); @@ -794,11 +786,10 @@ static void ks8851_eeprom_release(struct ks8851_net *ks) static int ks8851_set_eeprom(struct net_device *dev, struct ethtool_eeprom *ee, u8 *data) { struct ks8851_net *ks = netdev_priv(dev); int offset = ee->offset; - unsigned long flags; int len = ee->len; u16 tmp; /* currently only support byte writing */ if (len != 1) @@ -808,11 +799,11 @@ static int ks8851_set_eeprom(struct net_device *dev, return -EINVAL; if (!(ks->rc_ccr & CCR_EEPROM)) return -ENOENT; - ks8851_lock(ks, &flags); + ks8851_lock(ks); ks8851_eeprom_claim(ks); eeprom_93cx6_wren(&ks->eeprom, true); @@ -831,39 +822,38 @@ static int ks8851_set_eeprom(struct net_device *dev, eeprom_93cx6_write(&ks->eeprom, offset/2, tmp); eeprom_93cx6_wren(&ks->eeprom, false); ks8851_eeprom_release(ks); - ks8851_unlock(ks, &flags); + ks8851_unlock(ks); return 0; } static int ks8851_get_eeprom(struct net_device *dev, struct ethtool_eeprom *ee, u8 *data) { struct ks8851_net *ks = netdev_priv(dev); int offset = ee->offset; - unsigned long flags; int len = ee->len; /* must be 2 byte aligned */ if (len & 1 || offset & 1) return -EINVAL; if (!(ks->rc_ccr & CCR_EEPROM)) return -ENOENT; - ks8851_lock(ks, &flags); + ks8851_lock(ks); ks8851_eeprom_claim(ks); ee->magic = KS_EEPROM_MAGIC; eeprom_93cx6_multiread(&ks->eeprom, offset/2, (__le16 *)data, len/2); ks8851_eeprom_release(ks); - ks8851_unlock(ks, &flags); + ks8851_unlock(ks); return 0; } static int ks8851_get_eeprom_len(struct net_device *dev) @@ -918,21 +908,20 @@ static int ks8851_phy_reg(int reg) } static int ks8851_phy_read_common(struct net_device *dev, int phy_addr, int reg) { struct ks8851_net *ks = netdev_priv(dev); - unsigned long flags; int result; int ksreg; ksreg = ks8851_phy_reg(reg); if (ksreg < 0) return ksreg; - ks8851_lock(ks, &flags); + ks8851_lock(ks); result = ks8851_rdreg16(ks, ksreg); - ks8851_unlock(ks, &flags); + ks8851_unlock(ks); return result; } /** @@ -963,18 +952,17 @@ static int ks8851_phy_read(struct net_device *dev, int phy_addr, int reg) static void ks8851_phy_write(struct net_device *dev, int phy, int reg, int value) { struct ks8851_net *ks = netdev_priv(dev); - unsigned long flags; int ksreg; ksreg = ks8851_phy_reg(reg); if (ksreg >= 0) { - ks8851_lock(ks, &flags); + ks8851_lock(ks); ks8851_wrreg16(ks, ksreg, value); - ks8851_unlock(ks, &flags); + ks8851_unlock(ks); } } static int ks8851_mdio_read(struct mii_bus *bus, int phy_id, int reg) { diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/micrel/ks8851_par.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/micrel/ks8851_par.c index 96fb0ffcedb9..7f16ee5a91e2 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/micrel/ks8851_par.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/micrel/ks8851_par.c @@ -53,33 +53,31 @@ struct ks8851_net_par { #define to_ks8851_par(ks) container_of((ks), struct ks8851_net_par, ks8851) /** * ks8851_lock_par - register access lock * @ks: The chip state - * @flags: Spinlock flags * * Claim chip register access lock */ -static void ks8851_lock_par(struct ks8851_net *ks, unsigned long *flags) +static void ks8851_lock_par(struct ks8851_net *ks) { struct ks8851_net_par *ksp = to_ks8851_par(ks); - spin_lock_irqsave(&ksp->lock, *flags); + spin_lock_bh(&ksp->lock); } /** * ks8851_unlock_par - register access unlock * @ks: The chip state - * @flags: Spinlock flags * * Release chip register access lock */ -static void ks8851_unlock_par(struct ks8851_net *ks, unsigned long *flags) +static void ks8851_unlock_par(struct ks8851_net *ks) { struct ks8851_net_par *ksp = to_ks8851_par(ks); - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ksp->lock, *flags); + spin_unlock_bh(&ksp->lock); } /** * ks_check_endian - Check whether endianness of the bus is correct * @ks : The chip information @@ -231,19 +229,18 @@ static unsigned int ks8851_rdreg16_par_txqcr(struct ks8851_net *ks) static netdev_tx_t ks8851_start_xmit_par(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev) { struct ks8851_net *ks = netdev_priv(dev); netdev_tx_t ret = NETDEV_TX_OK; - unsigned long flags; unsigned int txqcr; u16 txmir; int err; netif_dbg(ks, tx_queued, ks->netdev, "%s: skb %p, %d@%p\n", __func__, skb, skb->len, skb->data); - ks8851_lock_par(ks, &flags); + ks8851_lock_par(ks); txmir = ks8851_rdreg16_par(ks, KS_TXMIR) & 0x1fff; if (likely(txmir >= skb->len + 12)) { ks8851_wrreg16_par(ks, KS_RXQCR, ks->rc_rxqcr | RXQCR_SDA); @@ -260,11 +257,11 @@ static netdev_tx_t ks8851_start_xmit_par(struct sk_buff *skb, ks8851_done_tx(ks, skb); } else { ret = NETDEV_TX_BUSY; } - ks8851_unlock_par(ks, &flags); + ks8851_unlock_par(ks); return ret; } static int ks8851_probe_par(struct platform_device *pdev) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/micrel/ks8851_spi.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/micrel/ks8851_spi.c index e33a5e7beb39..50afe8c11178 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/micrel/ks8851_spi.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/micrel/ks8851_spi.c @@ -71,29 +71,27 @@ struct ks8851_net_spi { (BYTE_EN(_byteen) | (_reg) << (8 + 2) | (_reg) >> 6) /** * ks8851_lock_spi - register access lock * @ks: The chip state - * @flags: Spinlock flags * * Claim chip register access lock */ -static void ks8851_lock_spi(struct ks8851_net *ks, unsigned long *flags) +static void ks8851_lock_spi(struct ks8851_net *ks) { struct ks8851_net_spi *kss = to_ks8851_spi(ks); mutex_lock(&kss->lock); } /** * ks8851_unlock_spi - register access unlock * @ks: The chip state - * @flags: Spinlock flags * * Release chip register access lock */ -static void ks8851_unlock_spi(struct ks8851_net *ks, unsigned long *flags) +static void ks8851_unlock_spi(struct ks8851_net *ks) { struct ks8851_net_spi *kss = to_ks8851_spi(ks); mutex_unlock(&kss->lock); } @@ -309,19 +307,18 @@ static void ks8851_tx_work(struct work_struct *work) { unsigned int dequeued_len = 0; struct ks8851_net_spi *kss; unsigned short tx_space; struct ks8851_net *ks; - unsigned long flags; struct sk_buff *txb; bool last; kss = container_of(work, struct ks8851_net_spi, tx_work); ks = &kss->ks8851; last = skb_queue_empty(&ks->txq); - ks8851_lock_spi(ks, &flags); + ks8851_lock_spi(ks); while (!last) { txb = skb_dequeue(&ks->txq); last = skb_queue_empty(&ks->txq); @@ -343,11 +340,11 @@ static void ks8851_tx_work(struct work_struct *work) spin_lock_bh(&ks->statelock); ks->queued_len -= dequeued_len; ks->tx_space = tx_space; spin_unlock_bh(&ks->statelock); - ks8851_unlock_spi(ks, &flags); + ks8851_unlock_spi(ks); } /** * ks8851_flush_tx_work_spi - flush outstanding TX work * @ks: The device state -- 2.43.0

2 2

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS 0/2] CVE-2026-46043
by Xia Fukun 02 Jun '26

02 Jun '26

Fix 2 CVE patches CVE-2026-46043 CVE-2026-46133 Michael Bommarito (1): RDMA/rxe: Reject unknown opcodes before ICRC processing hkbinbin (1): RDMA/rxe: Validate pad and ICRC before payload_size() in rxe_rcv drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_recv.c | 14 +++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) -- 2.34.1

2 3

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/2] CVE-2026-46181
by Cai Xinchen 02 Jun '26

02 Jun '26

CVE-2026-46181 Jason Gunthorpe (1): RDMA/mlx4: Fix mis-use of RCU in mlx4_srq_event() Suren Baghdasaryan (1): refcount: provide ops for cases when object's memory can be reused Documentation/core-api/refcount-vs-atomic.rst | 37 +++++- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/srq.c | 13 ++- include/linux/refcount.h | 106 ++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/slab.h | 9 ++ 4 files changed, 153 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) -- 2.18.0.huawei.25

2 3

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/3] CVEs
by Liu Kai 02 Jun '26

02 Jun '26

CVEs Michael Bommarito (1): RDMA/rxe: Reject unknown opcodes before ICRC processing Shuvam Pandey (1): Bluetooth: hci_event: fix potential UAF in SSP passkey handlers hkbinbin (1): RDMA/rxe: Validate pad and ICRC before payload_size() in rxe_rcv drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_recv.c | 14 +++++++++++++- net/bluetooth/hci_event.c | 18 ++++++++++++++---- 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 4

[PATCH OLK-6.6] net: usb: catc: enable basic endpoint checking
by Zhang Qilong 02 Jun '26

02 Jun '26

From: Ziyi Guo <n7l8m4(a)u.northwestern.edu> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.128 commit 163d04897e57633c5d2e69734e4e4b22bb63f50d category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/15162 CVE: CVE-2026-45923 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 9e7021d2aeae57c323a6f722ed7915686cdcc123 ] catc_probe() fills three URBs with hardcoded endpoint pipes without verifying the endpoint descriptors: - usb_sndbulkpipe(usbdev, 1) and usb_rcvbulkpipe(usbdev, 1) for TX/RX - usb_rcvintpipe(usbdev, 2) for interrupt status A malformed USB device can present these endpoints with transfer types that differ from what the driver assumes. Add a catc_usb_ep enum for endpoint numbers, replacing magic constants throughout. Add usb_check_bulk_endpoints() and usb_check_int_endpoints() calls after usb_set_interface() to verify endpoint types before use, rejecting devices with mismatched descriptors at probe time. Similar to - commit 90b7f2961798 ("net: usb: rtl8150: enable basic endpoint checking") which fixed the issue in rtl8150. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Suggested-by: Simon Horman <horms(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ziyi Guo <n7l8m4(a)u.northwestern.edu> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260212214154.3609844-1-n7l8m4@u.northwestern.edu Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Zhang Qilong <zhangqilong3(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/net/usb/catc.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/catc.c b/drivers/net/usb/catc.c index ff439ef535ac..98346cb4ece0 100644 --- a/drivers/net/usb/catc.c +++ b/drivers/net/usb/catc.c @@ -62,10 +62,20 @@ static const char driver_name[] = "catc"; #define RX_MAX_BURST 15 /* Max packets per rx buffer (> 0, < 16) */ #define TX_MAX_BURST 15 /* Max full sized packets per tx buffer (> 0) */ #define CTRL_QUEUE 16 /* Max control requests in flight (power of two) */ #define RX_PKT_SZ 1600 /* Max size of receive packet for F5U011 */ +/* + * USB endpoints. + */ + +enum catc_usb_ep { + CATC_USB_EP_CONTROL = 0, + CATC_USB_EP_BULK = 1, + CATC_USB_EP_INT_IN = 2, +}; + /* * Control requests. */ enum control_requests { @@ -770,10 +780,17 @@ static int catc_probe(struct usb_interface *intf, const struct usb_device_id *id struct net_device *netdev; struct catc *catc; u8 broadcast[ETH_ALEN]; u8 *macbuf; int pktsz, ret = -ENOMEM; + static const u8 bulk_ep_addr[] = { + CATC_USB_EP_BULK | USB_DIR_OUT, + CATC_USB_EP_BULK | USB_DIR_IN, + 0}; + static const u8 int_ep_addr[] = { + CATC_USB_EP_INT_IN | USB_DIR_IN, + 0}; macbuf = kmalloc(ETH_ALEN, GFP_KERNEL); if (!macbuf) goto error; @@ -782,10 +799,18 @@ static int catc_probe(struct usb_interface *intf, const struct usb_device_id *id dev_err(dev, "Can't set altsetting 1.\n"); ret = -EIO; goto fail_mem; } + /* Verify that all required endpoints are present */ + if (!usb_check_bulk_endpoints(intf, bulk_ep_addr) || + !usb_check_int_endpoints(intf, int_ep_addr)) { + dev_err(dev, "Missing or invalid endpoints\n"); + ret = -ENODEV; + goto fail_mem; + } + netdev = alloc_etherdev(sizeof(struct catc)); if (!netdev) goto fail_mem; catc = netdev_priv(netdev); @@ -826,18 +851,18 @@ static int catc_probe(struct usb_interface *intf, const struct usb_device_id *id } usb_fill_control_urb(catc->ctrl_urb, usbdev, usb_sndctrlpipe(usbdev, 0), NULL, NULL, 0, catc_ctrl_done, catc); - usb_fill_bulk_urb(catc->tx_urb, usbdev, usb_sndbulkpipe(usbdev, 1), - NULL, 0, catc_tx_done, catc); + usb_fill_bulk_urb(catc->tx_urb, usbdev, usb_sndbulkpipe(usbdev, CATC_USB_EP_BULK), + NULL, 0, catc_tx_done, catc); - usb_fill_bulk_urb(catc->rx_urb, usbdev, usb_rcvbulkpipe(usbdev, 1), - catc->rx_buf, pktsz, catc_rx_done, catc); + usb_fill_bulk_urb(catc->rx_urb, usbdev, usb_rcvbulkpipe(usbdev, CATC_USB_EP_BULK), + catc->rx_buf, pktsz, catc_rx_done, catc); - usb_fill_int_urb(catc->irq_urb, usbdev, usb_rcvintpipe(usbdev, 2), - catc->irq_buf, 2, catc_irq_done, catc, 1); + usb_fill_int_urb(catc->irq_urb, usbdev, usb_rcvintpipe(usbdev, CATC_USB_EP_INT_IN), + catc->irq_buf, 2, catc_irq_done, catc, 1); if (!catc->is_f5u011) { u32 *buf; int i; -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] bpf mainline
by Pu Lehui 02 Jun '26

02 Jun '26

Daniel Borkmann (2): bpf: Drop pkt_end markers on arithmetic to prevent is_pkt_ptr_branch_taken selftests/bpf: Add test for stale pkt range after scalar arithmetic kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 22 +++++++ .../bpf/progs/verifier_direct_packet_access.c | 61 +++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 83 insertions(+) -- 2.34.1

2 3

[PATCH OLK-5.10] sctp: revalidate list cursor after sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc() in SCTP_SENDALL
by Ze Zuo 02 Jun '26

02 Jun '26

From: Ben Morris <bmorris(a)anthropic.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.140 commit 1bfb06ecb00f7fdf35dba8e8f2877346cbe5e078 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15482 CVE: CVE-2026-46227 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit abb5f36771cc4c05899b34000829a787572a8817 upstream. The SCTP_SENDALL path in sctp_sendmsg() iterates ep->asocs with list_for_each_entry_safe(), which caches the next entry in @tmp before the loop body runs. The body calls sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc(), which may drop the socket lock inside sctp_wait_for_sndbuf(). While the lock is dropped, another thread can SCTP_SOCKOPT_PEELOFF the association cached in @tmp, migrating it to a new endpoint via sctp_sock_migrate() (list_del_init() + list_add_tail() to newep->asocs), and optionally close the new socket which frees the association via kfree_rcu(). The cached @tmp can also be freed by a network ABORT for that association, processed in softirq while the lock is dropped. sctp_wait_for_sndbuf() revalidates @asoc (the current entry) on re-lock via the "sk != asoc->base.sk" and "asoc->base.dead" checks, but nothing revalidates @tmp. After a successful return, the iterator advances to the stale @tmp, yielding either a use-after-free (if the peeled socket was closed) or a list-walk onto the new endpoint's list head (type confusion of &newep->asocs as a struct sctp_association *). Both are reachable from CapEff=0; the type-confusion path gives controlled indirect call via the outqueue.sched->init_sid pointer. Fix by re-deriving @tmp from @asoc after sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc() returns. @asoc is known to still be on ep->asocs at that point: the only callers that list_del an association from ep->asocs are sctp_association_free() (which sets asoc->base.dead) and sctp_assoc_migrate() (which changes asoc->base.sk), and sctp_wait_for_sndbuf() checks both under the lock before any successful return; a tripped check propagates as err < 0 and the loop bails before the re-derive. The SCTP_ABORT path in sctp_sendmsg_check_sflags() returns 0 and the loop hits 'continue' before sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc() is ever called, so the @tmp cached by list_for_each_entry_safe() still covers the lock-held free that ba59fb027307 ("sctp: walk the list of asoc safely") was added for. Fixes: 4910280503f3 ("sctp: add support for snd flag SCTP_SENDALL process in sendmsg") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ben Morris <bmorris(a)anthropic.com> Acked-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin(a)gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260508001455.3137-1-joycathacker@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Ze Zuo <zuoze1(a)huawei.com> --- net/sctp/socket.c | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/sctp/socket.c b/net/sctp/socket.c index 279d5e9421d3..b9e8056c23fd 100644 --- a/net/sctp/socket.c +++ b/net/sctp/socket.c @@ -1988,6 +1988,15 @@ static int sctp_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t msg_len) goto out_unlock; iov_iter_revert(&msg->msg_iter, err); + + /* sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc() may have released the socket + * lock (sctp_wait_for_sndbuf), during which other + * associations on ep->asocs could have been peeled + * off or freed. @asoc itself is revalidated by the + * base.dead and base.sk checks in sctp_wait_for_sndbuf, + * so re-derive the cached cursor from it. + */ + tmp = list_next_entry(asoc, asocs); } goto out_unlock; -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] sctp: revalidate list cursor after sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc() in SCTP_SENDALL
by Ze Zuo 02 Jun '26

02 Jun '26

From: Ben Morris <bmorris(a)anthropic.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.140 commit 1bfb06ecb00f7fdf35dba8e8f2877346cbe5e078 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15482 CVE: CVE-2026-46227 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit abb5f36771cc4c05899b34000829a787572a8817 upstream. The SCTP_SENDALL path in sctp_sendmsg() iterates ep->asocs with list_for_each_entry_safe(), which caches the next entry in @tmp before the loop body runs. The body calls sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc(), which may drop the socket lock inside sctp_wait_for_sndbuf(). While the lock is dropped, another thread can SCTP_SOCKOPT_PEELOFF the association cached in @tmp, migrating it to a new endpoint via sctp_sock_migrate() (list_del_init() + list_add_tail() to newep->asocs), and optionally close the new socket which frees the association via kfree_rcu(). The cached @tmp can also be freed by a network ABORT for that association, processed in softirq while the lock is dropped. sctp_wait_for_sndbuf() revalidates @asoc (the current entry) on re-lock via the "sk != asoc->base.sk" and "asoc->base.dead" checks, but nothing revalidates @tmp. After a successful return, the iterator advances to the stale @tmp, yielding either a use-after-free (if the peeled socket was closed) or a list-walk onto the new endpoint's list head (type confusion of &newep->asocs as a struct sctp_association *). Both are reachable from CapEff=0; the type-confusion path gives controlled indirect call via the outqueue.sched->init_sid pointer. Fix by re-deriving @tmp from @asoc after sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc() returns. @asoc is known to still be on ep->asocs at that point: the only callers that list_del an association from ep->asocs are sctp_association_free() (which sets asoc->base.dead) and sctp_assoc_migrate() (which changes asoc->base.sk), and sctp_wait_for_sndbuf() checks both under the lock before any successful return; a tripped check propagates as err < 0 and the loop bails before the re-derive. The SCTP_ABORT path in sctp_sendmsg_check_sflags() returns 0 and the loop hits 'continue' before sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc() is ever called, so the @tmp cached by list_for_each_entry_safe() still covers the lock-held free that ba59fb027307 ("sctp: walk the list of asoc safely") was added for. Fixes: 4910280503f3 ("sctp: add support for snd flag SCTP_SENDALL process in sendmsg") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ben Morris <bmorris(a)anthropic.com> Acked-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin(a)gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260508001455.3137-1-joycathacker@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Ze Zuo <zuoze1(a)huawei.com> --- net/sctp/socket.c | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/sctp/socket.c b/net/sctp/socket.c index e6ac0bc410a7..3ee77f7cf3f7 100644 --- a/net/sctp/socket.c +++ b/net/sctp/socket.c @@ -2111,6 +2111,15 @@ static int sctp_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t msg_len) goto out_unlock; iov_iter_revert(&msg->msg_iter, err); + + /* sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc() may have released the socket + * lock (sctp_wait_for_sndbuf), during which other + * associations on ep->asocs could have been peeled + * off or freed. @asoc itself is revalidated by the + * base.dead and base.sk checks in sctp_wait_for_sndbuf, + * so re-derive the cached cursor from it. + */ + tmp = list_next_entry(asoc, asocs); } goto out_unlock; -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] mm/page_alloc: clear page->private in free_pages_prepare()
by Ze Zuo 02 Jun '26

02 Jun '26

From: Mikhail Gavrilov <mikhail.v.gavrilov(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.0-rc1 commit ac1ea219590c09572ed5992dc233bbf7bb70fef9 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14860 CVE: CVE-2026-43303 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Several subsystems (slub, shmem, ttm, etc.) use page->private but don't clear it before freeing pages. When these pages are later allocated as high-order pages and split via split_page(), tail pages retain stale page->private values. This causes a use-after-free in the swap subsystem. The swap code uses page->private to track swap count continuations, assuming freshly allocated pages have page->private == 0. When stale values are present, swap_count_continued() incorrectly assumes the continuation list is valid and iterates over uninitialized page->lru containing LIST_POISON values, causing a crash: KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range [0xdead000000000100-0xdead000000000107] RIP: 0010:__do_sys_swapoff+0x1151/0x1860 Fix this by clearing page->private in free_pages_prepare(), ensuring all freed pages have clean state regardless of previous use. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20260207173615.146159-1-mikhail.v.gavrilov@gmail.… Fixes: 3b8000ae185c ("mm/vmalloc: huge vmalloc backing pages should be split rather than compound") Signed-off-by: Mikhail Gavrilov <mikhail.v.gavrilov(a)gmail.com> Suggested-by: Zi Yan <ziy(a)nvidia.com> Acked-by: Zi Yan <ziy(a)nvidia.com> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand (Arm) <david(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka(a)suse.cz> Cc: Brendan Jackman <jackmanb(a)google.com> Cc: Chris Li <chrisl(a)kernel.org> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd(a)google.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes(a)cmpxchg.org> Cc: Kairui Song <ryncsn(a)gmail.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy(a)infradead.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko(a)suse.com> Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin(a)gmail.com> Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb(a)google.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> Conflicts: mm/page_alloc.c [Context conflicts due not merge commit 53fbef56e07d ("mm: introduce memdesc_flags_t").] Signed-off-by: Ze Zuo <zuoze1(a)huawei.com> --- mm/page_alloc.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/mm/page_alloc.c b/mm/page_alloc.c index f576e0d7ee39..645bcf7213b7 100644 --- a/mm/page_alloc.c +++ b/mm/page_alloc.c @@ -1152,6 +1152,7 @@ __always_inline bool free_pages_prepare(struct page *page, page_cpupid_reset_last(page); page->flags &= ~PAGE_FLAGS_CHECK_AT_PREP; + page->private = 0; reset_page_owner(page, order); page_table_check_free(page, order); -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] crypto: authencesn - reject short ahash digests during instance creation
by Cui GaoSheng 02 Jun '26

02 Jun '26

From: Yucheng Lu <kanolyc(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.258 commit 77f59fb2d3aa33e90ec6cbbf45dcfb20ab82b1a9 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15279 CVE: CVE-2026-46033 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 5db6ef9847717329f12c5ea8aba7e9f588a980c0 upstream. authencesn requires either a zero authsize or an authsize of at least 4 bytes because the ESN encrypt/decrypt paths always move 4 bytes of high-order sequence number data at the end of the authenticated data. While crypto_authenc_esn_setauthsize() already rejects explicit non-zero authsizes in the range 1..3, crypto_authenc_esn_create() still copied auth->digestsize into inst->alg.maxauthsize without validating it. The AEAD core then initialized the tfm's default authsize from that value. As a result, selecting an ahash with digest size 1..3, such as cbcmac(cipher_null), exposed authencesn instances whose default authsize was invalid even though setauthsize() would have rejected the same value. AF_ALG could then trigger the ESN tail handling with a too-short tag and hit an out-of-bounds access. Reject authencesn instances whose ahash digest size is in the invalid non-zero range 1..3 so that no tfm can inherit an unsupported default authsize. Fixes: f15f05b0a5de ("crypto: ccm - switch to separate cbcmac driver") Cc: stable(a)kernel.org Reported-by: Yifan Wu <yifanwucs(a)gmail.com> Reported-by: Juefei Pu <tomapufckgml(a)gmail.com> Co-developed-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098(a)gmail.com> Suggested-by: Xin Liu <bird(a)lzu.edu.cn> Tested-by: Yuhang Zheng <z1652074432(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Yucheng Lu <kanolyc(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Ren Wei <n05ec(a)lzu.edu.cn> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Conflicts: crypto/authencesn.c [ Context conflicts. ] Signed-off-by: Cui GaoSheng <cuigaosheng1(a)huawei.com> --- crypto/authencesn.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/crypto/authencesn.c b/crypto/authencesn.c index f6ffa16a74ef..318fc75d326b 100644 --- a/crypto/authencesn.c +++ b/crypto/authencesn.c @@ -427,6 +427,11 @@ static int crypto_authenc_esn_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, goto err_free_inst; crypto_set_skcipher_spawn(&ctx->enc, aead_crypto_instance(inst)); + if (auth->digestsize > 0 && auth->digestsize < 4) { + err = -EINVAL; + goto err_free_inst; + } + err = crypto_grab_skcipher(&ctx->enc, enc_name, 0, crypto_requires_sync(algt->type, algt->mask)); -- 2.34.1

2 2

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] net/mlx5e: Fix DMA FIFO desync on error CQE SQ recovery
by Cui GaoSheng 02 Jun '26

02 Jun '26

From: Gal Pressman <gal(a)nvidia.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.253 commit 821f85d619f7f22cda7b9d7de89cf5eeb1d11544 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15024 CVE: CVE-2026-43466 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 1633111d69053512d099658d4a05fc736fab36b0 ] In case of a TX error CQE, a recovery flow is triggered, mlx5e_reset_txqsq_cc_pc() resets dma_fifo_cc to 0 but not dma_fifo_pc, desyncing the DMA FIFO producer and consumer. After recovery, the producer pushes new DMA entries at the old dma_fifo_pc, while the consumer reads from position 0. This causes us to unmap stale DMA addresses from before the recovery. The DMA FIFO is a purely software construct with no HW counterpart. At the point of reset, all WQEs have been flushed so dma_fifo_cc is already equal to dma_fifo_pc. There is no need to reset either counter, similar to how skb_fifo pc/cc are untouched. Remove the 'dma_fifo_cc = 0' reset. This fixes the following WARNING: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at drivers/iommu/dma-iommu.c:1240 iommu_dma_unmap_page+0x79/0x90 Modules linked in: mlx5_vdpa vringh vdpa bonding mlx5_ib mlx5_vfio_pci ipip mlx5_fwctl tunnel4 mlx5_core ib_ipoib geneve ip6_gre ip_gre gre nf_tables ip6_tunnel rdma_ucm ib_uverbs ib_umad vfio_pci vfio_pci_core act_mirred act_skbedit act_vlan vhost_net vhost tap ip6table_mangle ip6table_nat ip6table_filter ip6_tables iptable_mangle cls_matchall nfnetlink_cttimeout act_gact cls_flower sch_ingress vhost_iotlb iptable_raw tunnel6 vfio_iommu_type1 vfio openvswitch nsh rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss oid_registry xt_conntrack xt_MASQUERADE nf_conntrack_netlink nfnetlink iptable_nat nf_nat xt_addrtype br_netfilter overlay zram zsmalloc rpcrdma ib_iser libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core fuse [last unloaded: nf_tables] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc5_for_upstream_min_debug_2024_12_30_21_33 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:iommu_dma_unmap_page+0x79/0x90 Code: 2b 4d 3b 21 72 26 4d 3b 61 08 73 20 49 89 d8 44 89 f9 5b 4c 89 f2 4c 89 e6 48 89 ef 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f e9 c7 ae 9e ff <0f> 0b 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 Call Trace: <IRQ> ? __warn+0x7d/0x110 ? iommu_dma_unmap_page+0x79/0x90 ? report_bug+0x16d/0x180 ? handle_bug+0x4f/0x90 ? exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x70 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20 ? iommu_dma_unmap_page+0x79/0x90 ? iommu_dma_unmap_page+0x2e/0x90 dma_unmap_page_attrs+0x10d/0x1b0 mlx5e_tx_wi_dma_unmap+0xbe/0x120 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_poll_tx_cq+0x16d/0x690 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_napi_poll+0x8b/0xac0 [mlx5_core] __napi_poll+0x24/0x190 net_rx_action+0x32a/0x3b0 ? mlx5_eq_comp_int+0x7e/0x270 [mlx5_core] ? notifier_call_chain+0x35/0xa0 handle_softirqs+0xc9/0x270 irq_exit_rcu+0x71/0xd0 common_interrupt+0x7f/0xa0 </IRQ> <TASK> asm_common_interrupt+0x22/0x40 Fixes: db75373c91b0 ("net/mlx5e: Recover Send Queue (SQ) from error state") Signed-off-by: Gal Pressman <gal(a)nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Dragos Tatulea <dtatulea(a)nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt(a)nvidia.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260305142634.1813208-4-tariqt@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/reporter_tx.c drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c [ Context conflict. ] Signed-off-by: Cui GaoSheng <cuigaosheng1(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c index 51edc507b7b5..2e27f41a97b5 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c @@ -1346,7 +1346,6 @@ static void mlx5e_reset_txqsq_cc_pc(struct mlx5e_txqsq *sq) "SQ 0x%x: cc (0x%x) != pc (0x%x)\n", sq->sqn, sq->cc, sq->pc); sq->cc = 0; - sq->dma_fifo_cc = 0; sq->pc = 0; } -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/2] CVE-2026-46181
by Cai Xinchen 02 Jun '26

02 Jun '26

CVE-2026-46181 Jason Gunthorpe (1): RDMA/mlx4: Fix mis-use of RCU in mlx4_srq_event() Suren Baghdasaryan (1): refcount: provide ops for cases when object's memory can be reused Documentation/core-api/refcount-vs-atomic.rst | 37 +++++- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/srq.c | 13 ++- include/linux/refcount.h | 106 ++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/slab.h | 9 ++ 4 files changed, 153 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) -- 2.18.0.huawei.25

1 2

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/2] CVE-2026-46181
by Cai Xinchen 02 Jun '26

02 Jun '26

CVE-2026-46181 Jason Gunthorpe (1): RDMA/mlx4: Fix mis-use of RCU in mlx4_srq_event() Suren Baghdasaryan (1): refcount: provide ops for cases when object's memory can be reused Documentation/core-api/refcount-vs-atomic.rst | 37 +++++- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/srq.c | 13 ++- include/linux/refcount.h | 106 ++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/slab.h | 9 ++ 4 files changed, 153 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) -- 2.18.0.huawei.25

2 3

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/1] CVE-2026-43201
by Liu Mingrui 02 Jun '26

02 Jun '26

CVE-2026-43201 Mauro Carvalho Chehab (1): APEI/GHES: ARM processor Error: don't go past allocated memory drivers/acpi/apei/ghes.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- drivers/ras/ras.c | 6 +++++- 2 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 3

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] CVE-2026-46181
by Cai Xinchen 02 Jun '26

02 Jun '26

CVE-2026-46181 Jason Gunthorpe (1): RDMA/mlx4: Fix mis-use of RCU in mlx4_srq_event() Suren Baghdasaryan (1): refcount: provide ops for cases when object's memory can be reused Documentation/RCU/whatisRCU.rst | 10 ++ Documentation/core-api/refcount-vs-atomic.rst | 37 +++++- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/srq.c | 13 ++- include/linux/refcount.h | 106 ++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/slab.h | 9 ++ 5 files changed, 163 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 3

[PATCH OLK-6.6] mm/vmscan: fix wrong callback in shrinker_v2_to_v1_scan_objects()
by Qi Xi 02 Jun '26

02 Jun '26

hulk inclusion category: feature bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/15059 CVE: NA --------------------------- Fixes the incorrect callback invocation that would cause shrinker behavior mismatch when adapting v2 shrinkers to v1 interface. Signed-off-by: Qi Xi <xiqi5703(a)163.com> --- mm/vmscan.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/mm/vmscan.c b/mm/vmscan.c index cf6b9e6dc8cd..305aa6b3cd84 100644 --- a/mm/vmscan.c +++ b/mm/vmscan.c @@ -7623,7 +7623,7 @@ static unsigned long shrinker_v2_to_v1_scan_objects(struct shrinker_v2 *shk_v2, struct shrink_control *sc) { if (shk_v2->v1) - return shk_v2->v1->count_objects(shk_v2->v1, sc); + return shk_v2->v1->scan_objects(shk_v2->v1, sc); return SHRINK_EMPTY; } -- 2.53.0

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] ext4: don't set EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CONVERT when splitting before submitting I/O
by Zizhi Wo 02 Jun '26

02 Jun '26

From: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang(a)huawei.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.253 commit 77e407967cd872cd75d7e4a691908e49c8e6b4d4 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15236 CVE: CVE-2026-45985 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit feaf2a80e78f89ee8a3464126077ba8683b62791 ] When allocating blocks during within-EOF DIO and writeback with dioread_nolock enabled, EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_PRE_IO was set to split an existing large unwritten extent. However, EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CONVERT was set when calling ext4_split_convert_extents(), which may potentially result in stale data issues. Assume we have an unwritten extent, and then DIO writes the second half. [UUUUUUUUUUUUUUUU] on-disk extent U: unwritten extent [UUUUUUUUUUUUUUUU] extent status tree |<- ->| ----> dio write this range First, ext4_iomap_alloc() call ext4_map_blocks() with EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_PRE_IO, EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_UNWRIT_EXT and EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CREATE flags set. ext4_map_blocks() find this extent and call ext4_split_convert_extents() with EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CONVERT and the above flags set. Then, ext4_split_convert_extents() calls ext4_split_extent() with EXT4_EXT_MAY_ZEROOUT, EXT4_EXT_MARK_UNWRIT2 and EXT4_EXT_DATA_VALID2 flags set, and it calls ext4_split_extent_at() to split the second half with EXT4_EXT_DATA_VALID2, EXT4_EXT_MARK_UNWRIT1, EXT4_EXT_MAY_ZEROOUT and EXT4_EXT_MARK_UNWRIT2 flags set. However, ext4_split_extent_at() failed to insert extent since a temporary lack -ENOSPC. It zeroes out the first half but convert the entire on-disk extent to written since the EXT4_EXT_DATA_VALID2 flag set, but left the second half as unwritten in the extent status tree. [0000000000SSSSSS] data S: stale data, 0: zeroed [WWWWWWWWWWWWWWWW] on-disk extent W: written extent [WWWWWWWWWWUUUUUU] extent status tree Finally, if the DIO failed to write data to the disk, the stale data in the second half will be exposed once the cached extent entry is gone. Fix this issue by not passing EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CONVERT when splitting an unwritten extent before submitting I/O, and make ext4_split_convert_extents() to zero out the entire extent range to zero for this case, and also mark the extent in the extent status tree for consistency. Fixes: b8a8684502a0 ("ext4: Introduce FALLOC_FL_ZERO_RANGE flag for fallocate") Signed-off-by: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Ojaswin Mujoo <ojaswin(a)linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1(a)huawei.com> Cc: stable(a)kernel.org Message-ID: <20251129103247.686136-4-yi.zhang(a)huaweicloud.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso(a)mit.edu> [ different function signatures ] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Conflicts: fs/ext4/extents.c [Because of commit 779e26517b36 ("ext4: clean up GET_BLOCKS_PRE_IO error handling") not merged, not affect this patch.] Signed-off-by: Zizhi Wo <wozizhi(a)huawei.com> --- fs/ext4/extents.c | 12 ++++++++---- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/extents.c b/fs/ext4/extents.c index 5f2654bfe2f1..bddc00996306 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/extents.c +++ b/fs/ext4/extents.c @@ -3872,15 +3872,19 @@ static int ext4_split_convert_extents(handle_t *handle, ee_len = ext4_ext_get_actual_len(ex); /* Convert to unwritten */ if (flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CONVERT_UNWRITTEN) { split_flag |= EXT4_EXT_DATA_VALID1; - /* Convert to initialized */ - } else if (flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CONVERT) { + /* Split the existing unwritten extent */ + } else if (flags & (EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_UNWRIT_EXT | + EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CONVERT)) { split_flag |= ee_block + ee_len <= eof_block ? EXT4_EXT_MAY_ZEROOUT : 0; - split_flag |= (EXT4_EXT_MARK_UNWRIT2 | EXT4_EXT_DATA_VALID2); + split_flag |= EXT4_EXT_MARK_UNWRIT2; + /* Convert to initialized */ + if (flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CONVERT) + split_flag |= EXT4_EXT_DATA_VALID2; } flags |= EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_PRE_IO; return ext4_split_extent(handle, inode, ppath, map, split_flag, flags); } @@ -4207,11 +4211,11 @@ ext4_ext_handle_unwritten_extents(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode, allocated, newblock); /* get_block() before submit the IO, split the extent */ if (flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_PRE_IO) { ret = ext4_split_convert_extents(handle, inode, map, ppath, - flags | EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CONVERT); + flags); if (ret <= 0) goto out; map->m_flags |= EXT4_MAP_UNWRITTEN; goto out; } -- 2.52.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] bpf: Drop pkt_end markers on arithmetic to prevent is_pkt_ptr_branch_taken
by Pu Lehui 02 Jun '26

02 Jun '26

From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.1-rc1 commit 9f118095dd341885dbc3f1cd6a028414da099aba category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/9180 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- When a pkt pointer acquires AT_PKT_END or BEYOND_PKT_END range from a comparison, and then, known-constant arithmetic is performed, adjust_ptr_min_max_vals() copies the stale range via dst_reg->raw = ptr_reg->raw without clearing the negative reg->range sentinel values. This lets is_pkt_ptr_branch_taken() choose one branch direction and skip going through the other. Fix this by clearing negative pkt range values (that is, AT_PKT_END and BEYOND_PKT_END) after arithmetic on pkt pointers. This ensures is_pkt_ptr_branch_taken() returns unknown and both branches are properly verified. Fixes: 6d94e741a8ff ("bpf: Support for pointers beyond pkt_end.") Reported-by: STAR Labs SG <info(a)starlabs.sg> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260409155016.536608-1-daniel@iogearbox.net Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: kernel/bpf/verifier.c [Not merged commit 022ac0750883] Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui <pulehui(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 7ad363512643..9894c45aeb0c 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -12912,9 +12912,16 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off; dst_reg->raw = ptr_reg->raw; if (reg_is_pkt_pointer(ptr_reg)) { - dst_reg->id = ++env->id_gen; - /* something was added to pkt_ptr, set range to zero */ - memset(&dst_reg->raw, 0, sizeof(dst_reg->raw)); + if (!known) + dst_reg->id = ++env->id_gen; + /* + * Clear range for unknown addends since we can't know + * where the pkt pointer ended up. Also clear AT_PKT_END / + * BEYOND_PKT_END from prior comparison as any pointer + * arithmetic invalidates them. + */ + if (!known || dst_reg->range < 0) + memset(&dst_reg->raw, 0, sizeof(dst_reg->raw)); } break; case BPF_SUB: @@ -12971,9 +12978,16 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off; dst_reg->raw = ptr_reg->raw; if (reg_is_pkt_pointer(ptr_reg)) { - dst_reg->id = ++env->id_gen; - /* something was added to pkt_ptr, set range to zero */ - if (smin_val < 0) + if (!known) + dst_reg->id = ++env->id_gen; + /* + * Clear range if the subtrahend may be negative since + * pkt pointer could move past its bounds. A positive + * subtrahend moves it backwards keeping positive range + * intact. Also clear AT_PKT_END / BEYOND_PKT_END from + * prior comparison as arithmetic invalidates them. + */ + if ((!known && smin_val < 0) || dst_reg->range < 0) memset(&dst_reg->raw, 0, sizeof(dst_reg->raw)); } break; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] drm/amdkfd: Fix watch_id bounds checking in debug address watch v2
by Jiacheng Yu 02 Jun '26

02 Jun '26

From: Srinivasan Shanmugam <srinivasan.shanmugam(a)amd.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.0-rc1 commit 5a19302cab5cec7ae7f1a60c619951e6c17d8742 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15122 CVE: CVE-2026-45878 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- The address watch clear code receives watch_id as an unsigned value (u32), but some helper functions were using a signed int and checked bits by shifting with watch_id. If a very large watch_id is passed from userspace, it can be converted to a negative value. This can cause invalid shifts and may access memory outside the watch_points array. drm/amdkfd: Fix watch_id bounds checking in debug address watch v2 Fix this by checking that watch_id is within MAX_WATCH_ADDRESSES before using it. Also use BIT(watch_id) to test and clear bits safely. This keeps the behavior unchanged for valid watch IDs and avoids undefined behavior for invalid ones. Fixes the below: drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/../amdkfd/kfd_debug.c:448 kfd_dbg_trap_clear_dev_address_watch() error: buffer overflow 'pdd->watch_points' 4 <= u32max user_rl='0-3,2147483648-u32max' uncapped drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/../amdkfd/kfd_debug.c 433 int kfd_dbg_trap_clear_dev_address_watch(struct kfd_process_device *pdd, 434 uint32_t watch_id) 435 { 436 int r; 437 438 if (!kfd_dbg_owns_dev_watch_id(pdd, watch_id)) kfd_dbg_owns_dev_watch_id() doesn't check for negative values so if watch_id is larger than INT_MAX it leads to a buffer overflow. (Negative shifts are undefined). 439 return -EINVAL; 440 441 if (!pdd->dev->kfd->shared_resources.enable_mes) { 442 r = debug_lock_and_unmap(pdd->dev->dqm); 443 if (r) 444 return r; 445 } 446 447 amdgpu_gfx_off_ctrl(pdd->dev->adev, false); --> 448 pdd->watch_points[watch_id] = pdd->dev->kfd2kgd->clear_address_watch( 449 pdd->dev->adev, 450 watch_id); v2: (as per, Jonathan Kim) - Add early watch_id >= MAX_WATCH_ADDRESSES validation in the set path to match the clear path. - Drop the redundant bounds check in kfd_dbg_owns_dev_watch_id(). Fixes: e0f85f4690d0 ("drm/amdkfd: add debug set and clear address watch points operation") Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter(a)linaro.org> Cc: Jonathan Kim <jonathan.kim(a)amd.com> Cc: Felix Kuehling <felix.kuehling(a)amd.com> Cc: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher(a)amd.com> Cc: Christian König <christian.koenig(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Srinivasan Shanmugam <srinivasan.shanmugam(a)amd.com> Reviewed-by: Jonathan Kim <jonathan.kim(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher(a)amd.com> Conflicts: drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_debug.c [Context conflicts.] Signed-off-by: Jiacheng Yu <yujiacheng3(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_debug.c | 20 ++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_debug.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_debug.c index 9c32c64c407f..cd1d92d5cb30 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_debug.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_debug.c @@ -400,27 +400,25 @@ static int kfd_dbg_get_dev_watch_id(struct kfd_process_device *pdd, int *watch_i return -ENOMEM; } -static void kfd_dbg_clear_dev_watch_id(struct kfd_process_device *pdd, int watch_id) +static void kfd_dbg_clear_dev_watch_id(struct kfd_process_device *pdd, u32 watch_id) { spin_lock(&pdd->dev->kfd->watch_points_lock); /* process owns device watch point so safe to clear */ - if ((pdd->alloc_watch_ids >> watch_id) & 0x1) { - pdd->alloc_watch_ids &= ~(0x1 << watch_id); - pdd->dev->kfd->alloc_watch_ids &= ~(0x1 << watch_id); + if (pdd->alloc_watch_ids & BIT(watch_id)) { + pdd->alloc_watch_ids &= ~BIT(watch_id); + pdd->dev->kfd->alloc_watch_ids &= ~BIT(watch_id); } spin_unlock(&pdd->dev->kfd->watch_points_lock); } -static bool kfd_dbg_owns_dev_watch_id(struct kfd_process_device *pdd, int watch_id) +static bool kfd_dbg_owns_dev_watch_id(struct kfd_process_device *pdd, u32 watch_id) { bool owns_watch_id = false; spin_lock(&pdd->dev->kfd->watch_points_lock); - owns_watch_id = watch_id < MAX_WATCH_ADDRESSES && - ((pdd->alloc_watch_ids >> watch_id) & 0x1); - + owns_watch_id = pdd->alloc_watch_ids & BIT(watch_id); spin_unlock(&pdd->dev->kfd->watch_points_lock); return owns_watch_id; @@ -431,6 +429,9 @@ int kfd_dbg_trap_clear_dev_address_watch(struct kfd_process_device *pdd, { int r; + if (watch_id >= MAX_WATCH_ADDRESSES) + return -EINVAL; + if (!kfd_dbg_owns_dev_watch_id(pdd, watch_id)) return -EINVAL; @@ -468,6 +469,9 @@ int kfd_dbg_trap_set_dev_address_watch(struct kfd_process_device *pdd, if (r) return r; + if (*watch_id >= MAX_WATCH_ADDRESSES) + return -EINVAL; + if (!pdd->dev->kfd->shared_resources.enable_mes) { r = debug_lock_and_unmap(pdd->dev->dqm); if (r) { -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] drm/amdgpu: Fix memory leak in amdgpu_acpi_enumerate_xcc()
by Jiacheng Yu 02 Jun '26

02 Jun '26

From: Zilin Guan <zilin(a)seu.edu.cn> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.0-rc1 commit c9be63d565789b56ca7b0197e2cb78a3671f95a8 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15186 CVE: CVE-2026-45947 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- In amdgpu_acpi_enumerate_xcc(), if amdgpu_acpi_dev_init() returns -ENOMEM, the function returns directly without releasing the allocated xcc_info, resulting in a memory leak. Fix this by ensuring that xcc_info is properly freed in the error paths. Compile tested only. Issue found using a prototype static analysis tool and code review. Fixes: 4d5275ab0b18 ("drm/amdgpu: Add parsing of acpi xcc objects") Reviewed-by: Lijo Lazar <lijo.lazar(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Zilin Guan <zilin(a)seu.edu.cn> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Jiacheng Yu <yujiacheng3(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_acpi.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_acpi.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_acpi.c index 8b2f2b921d9d..7730e5644493 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_acpi.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_acpi.c @@ -1128,8 +1128,10 @@ static int amdgpu_acpi_enumerate_xcc(void) if (!dev_info) ret = amdgpu_acpi_dev_init(&dev_info, xcc_info, bdf); - if (ret == -ENOMEM) + if (ret == -ENOMEM) { + kfree(xcc_info); return ret; + } if (!dev_info) { kfree(xcc_info); -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] drm/nouveau: fix u32 overflow in pushbuf reloc bounds check
by Jiacheng Yu 02 Jun '26

02 Jun '26

From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.1-rc1 commit 2fc87d37be1b730a149b035f9375fdb8cc5333a5 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15257 CVE: CVE-2026-46006 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- nouveau_gem_pushbuf_reloc_apply() validates each relocation with if (r->reloc_bo_offset + 4 > nvbo->bo.base.size) but reloc_bo_offset is __u32 (uapi/drm/nouveau_drm.h) and the integer literal 4 promotes to unsigned int, so the addition is performed in 32 bits and wraps before the comparison against the size_t bo size. Cast to u64 so the addition happens in 64-bit arithmetic. Cc: Lyude Paul <lyude(a)redhat.com> Cc: Danilo Krummrich <dakr(a)kernel.org> Cc: Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Maxime Ripard <mripard(a)kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann(a)suse.de> Cc: David Airlie <airlied(a)gmail.com> Cc: Simona Vetter <simona(a)ffwll.ch> Reported-by: Anthropic Cc: stable <stable(a)kernel.org> Assisted-by: gkh_clanker_t1000 Fixes: a1606a9596e5 ("drm/nouveau: new gem pushbuf interface, bump to 0.0.16") Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> [ Add Fixes: tag. - Danilo ] Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich <dakr(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jiacheng Yu <yujiacheng3(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_gem.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_gem.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_gem.c index cd97df690335..e8ce33c89548 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_gem.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_gem.c @@ -679,7 +679,7 @@ nouveau_gem_pushbuf_reloc_apply(struct nouveau_cli *cli, } nvbo = (void *)(unsigned long)bo[r->reloc_bo_index].user_priv; - if (unlikely(r->reloc_bo_offset + 4 > + if (unlikely((u64)r->reloc_bo_offset + 4 > nvbo->bo.base.size)) { NV_PRINTK(err, cli, "reloc outside of bo\n"); ret = -EINVAL; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] drm/nouveau: fix u32 overflow in pushbuf reloc bounds check
by Jiacheng Yu 02 Jun '26

02 Jun '26

From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.1-rc1 commit 2fc87d37be1b730a149b035f9375fdb8cc5333a5 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15257 CVE: CVE-2026-46006 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- nouveau_gem_pushbuf_reloc_apply() validates each relocation with if (r->reloc_bo_offset + 4 > nvbo->bo.base.size) but reloc_bo_offset is __u32 (uapi/drm/nouveau_drm.h) and the integer literal 4 promotes to unsigned int, so the addition is performed in 32 bits and wraps before the comparison against the size_t bo size. Cast to u64 so the addition happens in 64-bit arithmetic. Cc: Lyude Paul <lyude(a)redhat.com> Cc: Danilo Krummrich <dakr(a)kernel.org> Cc: Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Maxime Ripard <mripard(a)kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann(a)suse.de> Cc: David Airlie <airlied(a)gmail.com> Cc: Simona Vetter <simona(a)ffwll.ch> Reported-by: Anthropic Cc: stable <stable(a)kernel.org> Assisted-by: gkh_clanker_t1000 Fixes: a1606a9596e5 ("drm/nouveau: new gem pushbuf interface, bump to 0.0.16") Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> [ Add Fixes: tag. - Danilo ] Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich <dakr(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_gem.c [Contest conflicts.] Signed-off-by: Jiacheng Yu <yujiacheng3(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_gem.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_gem.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_gem.c index b56524d343c3..177d53a44910 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_gem.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_gem.c @@ -633,7 +633,7 @@ nouveau_gem_pushbuf_reloc_apply(struct nouveau_cli *cli, } nvbo = (void *)(unsigned long)bo[r->reloc_bo_index].user_priv; - if (unlikely(r->reloc_bo_offset + 4 > + if (unlikely((u64)r->reloc_bo_offset + 4 > nvbo->bo.mem.num_pages << PAGE_SHIFT)) { NV_PRINTK(err, cli, "reloc outside of bo\n"); ret = -EINVAL; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6 00/34] perf arm-spe: Extend branch operations
by Yushan Wang 02 Jun '26

02 Jun '26

From: Ying Jiang <jiangying44(a)h-partners.com> In Arm ARM (ARM DDI 0487, L.a), the section "D18.2.7 Operation Type packet", the branch subclass is extended for Call Return (CR), Guarded control stack data access (GCS). This commit adds support CR and GCS operations. The IND (indirect) operation is defined only in bit [1], its macro is updated accordingly. Move the COND (Conditional) macro into the same group with other operations for better maintenance. Anshuman Khandual (9): arm64: Handle BRBE booting requirements arm64/sysreg: Update register fields for ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1 arm64/sysreg: Add register fields for HDFGRTR2_EL2 arm64/sysreg: Add register fields for HDFGWTR2_EL2 arm64/sysreg: Add register fields for HFGITR2_EL2 arm64/sysreg: Add register fields for HFGRTR2_EL2 arm64/sysreg: Add register fields for HFGWTR2_EL2 arm64/sysreg: Update ID_DFR0_EL1 register fields arm64/boot: Enable EL2 requirements for FEAT_PMUv3p9 Dave Martin (1): arm64: el2_setup.h: Rename some labels to be more diff-friendly James Clark (12): perf: arm_spe: Add format option for discard mode arm64: sysreg: Add new PMSFCR_EL1 fields and PMSDSFR_EL1 register perf: arm_spe: Support FEAT_SPEv1p4 filters perf: arm_spe: Add support for FEAT_SPE_EFT extended filtering arm64/boot: Factor out a macro to check SPE version arm64/boot: Enable EL2 requirements for SPE_FEAT_FDS KVM: arm64: Add trap configs for PMSDSFR_EL1 perf: Add perf_event_attr::config4 perf: arm_spe: Add support for filtering on data source tools headers UAPI: Sync linux/perf_event.h with the kernel sources perf tools: Add support for perf_event_attr::config4 perf docs: arm-spe: Document new SPE filtering features Leo Yan (1): perf: arm_spe: Expose event filter Marc Zyngier (5): KVM: arm64: Shave a few bytes from the EL2 idmap code arm64/sysreg: Allow a 'Mapping' descriptor for system registers arm64: sysreg: Add registers trapped by HDFG{R,W}TR2_EL2 KVM: arm64: nv: Add include containing the VNCR_EL2 offsets arm64: sysreg: Update PMSIDR_EL1 description Rob Herring (Arm) (5): arm64: el2_setup.h: Make __init_el2_fgt labels consistent, again perf/arm_pmuv3: Add PMUv3.9 per counter EL0 access control perf: arm_pmu: Use of_property_present() perf: arm_pmu: Remove event index to counter remapping ARM: pmuv3: Add missing write_pmuacr() Yushan Wang (1): Revert "arm64/boot: Enable EL2 requirements for BRBE" Documentation/arch/arm64/booting.rst | 75 +++- arch/arm/include/asm/arm_pmuv3.h | 2 + arch/arm64/include/asm/el2_setup.h | 130 +++--- arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_asm.h | 1 + arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h | 19 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/vncr_mapping.h | 105 +++++ arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 1 + arch/arm64/kvm/emulate-nested.c | 1 + arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-init.S | 52 ++- arch/arm64/kvm/pmu-emul.c | 6 +- arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c | 1 + arch/arm64/tools/gen-sysreg.awk | 2 +- arch/arm64/tools/sysreg | 502 +++++++++++++++++++++- drivers/perf/apple_m1_cpu_pmu.c | 4 +- drivers/perf/arm_pmu.c | 11 +- drivers/perf/arm_pmu_platform.c | 2 +- drivers/perf/arm_pmuv3.c | 61 +-- drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c | 170 +++++++- include/linux/perf/arm_pmu.h | 2 +- include/linux/perf/arm_pmuv3.h | 1 + include/uapi/linux/perf_event.h | 5 + tools/include/uapi/linux/perf_event.h | 2 + tools/perf/Documentation/perf-arm-spe.txt | 103 ++++- tools/perf/tests/parse-events.c | 14 +- tools/perf/util/parse-events.c | 11 + tools/perf/util/parse-events.h | 1 + tools/perf/util/parse-events.l | 1 + tools/perf/util/pmu.c | 3 + tools/perf/util/pmu.h | 1 + 29 files changed, 1099 insertions(+), 190 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/vncr_mapping.h -- 2.33.0

1 34

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/6] add min_slice and sched_runtime
by Chen Jinghuang 01 Jun '26

01 Jun '26

*** BLURB HERE *** Chen Jinghuang (1): sched: Fix kabi breakage in struct sched_entity Omar Sandoval (1): sched/eevdf: Fix se->slice being set to U64_MAX and resulting crash Peter Zijlstra (3): sched/eevdf: Use sched_attr::sched_runtime to set request/slice suggestion sched/fair: Re-organize dequeue_task_fair() sched/eevdf: Propagate min_slice up the cgroup hierarchy Tianchen Ding (1): sched/eevdf: Force propagating min_slice of cfs_rq when {en,de}queue tasks include/linux/sched.h | 5 +- kernel/sched/core.c | 4 +- kernel/sched/debug.c | 3 +- kernel/sched/fair.c | 131 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- kernel/sched/syscalls.c | 29 +++++++-- 5 files changed, 137 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 7

[PATCH OLK-6.6] sched/cputime: Fix time overflow in cputime_adjust()
by Xia Fukun 01 Jun '26

01 Jun '26

hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/8331 ------------------ When a process has hundreds of threads and runs for an extended period, the aggregated stime or utime of its thread group can become extremely large. Accessing /proc/xx/stat then triggers a divide error like the following: divide error: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 273 PID: 4619 Comm: ... Tainted: 5.10.0 x86_64 RIP: 0010:cputime_adjust+0x55/0xb0 RSP: 0018:ffffae408e07bbc8 EFLAGS: 00010807 ... Call Trace: thread_group_cputime_adjusted+0x4b/0x70 do_task_stat+0x2d8/0xdc0 This is due to overflow in stime + utime, which causes mul_u64_u64_div_u64() to trigger a divide error. Add overflow detection logic and, upon overflow, right-shift the values before computation. This fixes the issue while preserving the original calculation semantics. Fixes: 3dc167ba5729 ("sched/cputime: Improve cputime_adjust()") Signed-off-by: Xia Fukun <xiafukun(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/sched/cputime.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/sched/cputime.c b/kernel/sched/cputime.c index e560426f23bd..773b9411007c 100644 --- a/kernel/sched/cputime.c +++ b/kernel/sched/cputime.c @@ -564,6 +564,7 @@ void cputime_adjust(struct task_cputime *curr, struct prev_cputime *prev, u64 *ut, u64 *st) { u64 rtime, stime, utime; + u64 s, u, sum; unsigned long flags; /* Serialize concurrent callers such that we can honour our guarantees */ @@ -599,7 +600,23 @@ void cputime_adjust(struct task_cputime *curr, struct prev_cputime *prev, goto update; } - stime = mul_u64_u64_div_u64(stime, rtime, stime + utime); + s = stime; + u = utime; + sum = s + u; + + /* + * Detect unsigned overflow: if sum < either operand, + * overflow occurred. A single right shift is sufficient + * to guarantee that the new sum won't overflow. + */ + if (unlikely(sum < s)) { + s >>= 1; + u >>= 1; + sum = s + u; + stime = mul_u64_u64_div_u64(s, rtime, sum); + } else { + stime = mul_u64_u64_div_u64(stime, rtime, stime + utime); + } /* * Because mul_u64_u64_div_u64() can approximate on some * achitectures; enforce the constraint that: a*b/(b+c) <= a. -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] netfilter: x_tables: guard option walkers against 1-byte tail reads
by superdcc97＠163.com 01 Jun '26

01 Jun '26

From: David Dull <monderasdor(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.130 commit 9b94f0e42ed248eb31929da84ed9f5310d7ff540 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15010 CVE: CVE-2026-43452 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit cfe770220ac2dbd3e104c6b45094037455da81d4 ] When the last byte of options is a non-single-byte option kind, walkers that advance with i += op[i + 1] ? : 1 can read op[i + 1] past the end of the option area. Add an explicit i == optlen - 1 check before dereferencing op[i + 1] in xt_tcpudp and xt_dccp option walkers. Fixes: 2e4e6a17af35 ("[NETFILTER] x_tables: Abstraction layer for {ip,ip6,arp}_tables") Signed-off-by: David Dull <monderasdor(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw(a)strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- net/netfilter/xt_dccp.c | 4 ++-- net/netfilter/xt_tcpudp.c | 6 ++++-- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_dccp.c b/net/netfilter/xt_dccp.c index e5a13ecbe67a..037ab93e25d0 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/xt_dccp.c +++ b/net/netfilter/xt_dccp.c @@ -62,10 +62,10 @@ dccp_find_option(u_int8_t option, return true; } - if (op[i] < 2) + if (op[i] < 2 || i == optlen - 1) i++; else - i += op[i+1]?:1; + i += op[i + 1] ? : 1; } spin_unlock_bh(&dccp_buflock); diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_tcpudp.c b/net/netfilter/xt_tcpudp.c index e8991130a3de..f76cf18f1a24 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/xt_tcpudp.c +++ b/net/netfilter/xt_tcpudp.c @@ -59,8 +59,10 @@ tcp_find_option(u_int8_t option, for (i = 0; i < optlen; ) { if (op[i] == option) return !invert; - if (op[i] < 2) i++; - else i += op[i+1]?:1; + if (op[i] < 2 || i == optlen - 1) + i++; + else + i += op[i + 1] ? : 1; } return invert; -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] sched/cputime: Fix time overflow in cputime_adjust()
by Xia Fukun 01 Jun '26

01 Jun '26

hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/8331 ------------------ When a process has hundreds of threads and runs for an extended period, the aggregated stime or utime of its thread group can become extremely large. Accessing /proc/xx/stat then triggers a divide error like the following: divide error: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 273 PID: 4619 Comm: ... Tainted: 5.10.0 x86_64 RIP: 0010:cputime_adjust+0x55/0xb0 RSP: 0018:ffffae408e07bbc8 EFLAGS: 00010807 ... Call Trace: thread_group_cputime_adjusted+0x4b/0x70 do_task_stat+0x2d8/0xdc0 This is due to overflow in stime + utime, which causes mul_u64_u64_div_u64() to trigger a divide error. Add overflow detection logic and, upon overflow, right-shift the values before computation. This fixes the issue while preserving the original calculation semantics. Fixes: 3dc167ba5729 ("sched/cputime: Improve cputime_adjust()") Signed-off-by: Xia Fukun <xiafukun(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/sched/cputime.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/sched/cputime.c b/kernel/sched/cputime.c index f03b3af2fb79..38cb82382730 100644 --- a/kernel/sched/cputime.c +++ b/kernel/sched/cputime.c @@ -543,6 +543,7 @@ void cputime_adjust(struct task_cputime *curr, struct prev_cputime *prev, u64 *ut, u64 *st) { u64 rtime, stime, utime; + u64 s, u, sum; unsigned long flags; /* Serialize concurrent callers such that we can honour our guarantees */ @@ -578,7 +579,23 @@ void cputime_adjust(struct task_cputime *curr, struct prev_cputime *prev, goto update; } - stime = mul_u64_u64_div_u64(stime, rtime, stime + utime); + s = stime; + u = utime; + sum = s + u; + + /* + * Detect unsigned overflow: if sum < either operand, + * overflow occurred. A single right shift is sufficient + * to guarantee that the new sum won't overflow. + */ + if (unlikely(sum < s)) { + s >>= 1; + u >>= 1; + sum = s + u; + stime = mul_u64_u64_div_u64(s, rtime, sum); + } else { + stime = mul_u64_u64_div_u64(stime, rtime, stime + utime); + } /* * Because mul_u64_u64_div_u64() can approximate on some * achitectures; enforce the constraint that: a*b/(b+c) <= a. -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] netfilter: x_tables: guard option walkers against 1-byte tail reads
by superdcc97＠163.com 01 Jun '26

01 Jun '26

From: David Dull <monderasdor(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.253 commit c2a445367a496a3c25dbc940c10c8bd1cfd4c14a category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15010 CVE: CVE-2026-43452 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit cfe770220ac2dbd3e104c6b45094037455da81d4 ] When the last byte of options is a non-single-byte option kind, walkers that advance with i += op[i + 1] ? : 1 can read op[i + 1] past the end of the option area. Add an explicit i == optlen - 1 check before dereferencing op[i + 1] in xt_tcpudp and xt_dccp option walkers. Fixes: 2e4e6a17af35 ("[NETFILTER] x_tables: Abstraction layer for {ip,ip6,arp}_tables") Signed-off-by: David Dull <monderasdor(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw(a)strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- net/netfilter/xt_dccp.c | 4 ++-- net/netfilter/xt_tcpudp.c | 6 ++++-- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_dccp.c b/net/netfilter/xt_dccp.c index e5a13ecbe67a..037ab93e25d0 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/xt_dccp.c +++ b/net/netfilter/xt_dccp.c @@ -62,10 +62,10 @@ dccp_find_option(u_int8_t option, return true; } - if (op[i] < 2) + if (op[i] < 2 || i == optlen - 1) i++; else - i += op[i+1]?:1; + i += op[i + 1] ? : 1; } spin_unlock_bh(&dccp_buflock); diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_tcpudp.c b/net/netfilter/xt_tcpudp.c index 11ec2abf0c72..73f50dc01b19 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/xt_tcpudp.c +++ b/net/netfilter/xt_tcpudp.c @@ -56,8 +56,10 @@ tcp_find_option(u_int8_t option, for (i = 0; i < optlen; ) { if (op[i] == option) return !invert; - if (op[i] < 2) i++; - else i += op[i+1]?:1; + if (op[i] < 2 || i == optlen - 1) + i++; + else + i += op[i + 1] ? : 1; } return invert; -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] netfilter: x_tables: guard option walkers against 1-byte tail reads
by superdcc97＠163.com 01 Jun '26

01 Jun '26

From: David Dull <monderasdor(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.0-rc4 commit cfe770220ac2dbd3e104c6b45094037455da81d4 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15010 CVE: CVE-2026-43452 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- When the last byte of options is a non-single-byte option kind, walkers that advance with i += op[i + 1] ? : 1 can read op[i + 1] past the end of the option area. Add an explicit i == optlen - 1 check before dereferencing op[i + 1] in xt_tcpudp and xt_dccp option walkers. Fixes: 2e4e6a17af35 ("[NETFILTER] x_tables: Abstraction layer for {ip,ip6,arp}_tables") Signed-off-by: David Dull <monderasdor(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw(a)strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- net/netfilter/xt_dccp.c | 4 ++-- net/netfilter/xt_tcpudp.c | 6 ++++-- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_dccp.c b/net/netfilter/xt_dccp.c index b63d2a3d80ba..b74f6b76d3ca 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/xt_dccp.c +++ b/net/netfilter/xt_dccp.c @@ -65,10 +65,10 @@ dccp_find_option(u_int8_t option, return true; } - if (op[i] < 2) + if (op[i] < 2 || i == optlen - 1) i++; else - i += op[i+1]?:1; + i += op[i + 1] ? : 1; } spin_unlock_bh(&dccp_buflock); diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_tcpudp.c b/net/netfilter/xt_tcpudp.c index ade024c90f4f..8d620f84795d 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/xt_tcpudp.c +++ b/net/netfilter/xt_tcpudp.c @@ -55,8 +55,10 @@ tcp_find_option(u_int8_t option, for (i = 0; i < optlen; ) { if (op[i] == option) return !invert; - if (op[i] < 2) i++; - else i += op[i+1]?:1; + if (op[i] < 2 || i == optlen - 1) + i++; + else + i += op[i + 1] ? : 1; } return invert; -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] xfrm: Wait for RCU readers during policy netns exit
by superdcc97＠163.com 01 Jun '26

01 Jun '26

From: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert(a)secunet.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.1-rc1 commit 069daad4f2ae9c5c108131995529d5f02392c446 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14643 CVE: CVE-2026-43091 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- xfrm_policy_fini() frees the policy_bydst hash tables after flushing the policy work items and deleting all policies, but it does not wait for concurrent RCU readers to leave their read-side critical sections first. The policy_bydst tables are published via rcu_assign_pointer() and are looked up through rcu_dereference_check(), so netns teardown must also wait for an RCU grace period before freeing the table memory. Fix this by adding synchronize_rcu() before freeing the policy hash tables. Fixes: e1e551bc5630 ("xfrm: policy: prepare policy_bydst hash for rcu lookups") Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert(a)secunet.com> Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal <fw(a)strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c index f0c4571b128a..5d635f005ab7 100644 --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c @@ -2884,6 +2884,8 @@ static void xfrm_policy_fini(struct net *net) #endif xfrm_policy_flush(net, XFRM_POLICY_TYPE_MAIN, false); + synchronize_rcu(); + WARN_ON(!list_empty(&net->xfrm.policy_all)); for (dir = 0; dir < XFRM_POLICY_MAX; dir++) { -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] ALSA: control: Validate buf_len before strnlen() in snd_ctl_elem_init_enum_names()
by Zhang Yuwei 01 Jun '26

01 Jun '26

From: Ziqing Chen <chenziqing(a)xiaomi.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.140 commit 1fbe46d2b72754d8bd580e13e59ccb5d3d0e8cb0 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15330 CVE: CVE-2026-46088 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit e0da8a8cac74f4b9f577979d131f0d2b88a84487 upstream. snd_ctl_elem_init_enum_names() advances pointer p through the names buffer while decrementing buf_len. If buf_len reaches zero but items remain, the next iteration calls strnlen(p, 0). While strnlen(p, 0) returns 0 and would hit the existing name_len == 0 error path, CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE's fortified strnlen() first checks maxlen against __builtin_dynamic_object_size(). When Clang loses track of p's object size inside the loop, this triggers a BRK exception panic before the return value is examined. Add a buf_len == 0 guard at the loop entry to prevent calling fortified strnlen() on an exhausted buffer. Found by kernel fuzz testing through Xiaomi Smartphone. Fixes: 8d448162bda5 ("ALSA: control: add support for ENUMERATED user space controls") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ziqing Chen <chenziqing(a)xiaomi.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260414132437.261304-1-chenziqing@xiaomi.com Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai(a)suse.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Yuan Can <yuancan(a)huawei.com> Conflicts: sound/core/control.c [context conflict] Signed-off-by: Zhang Yuwei <zhangyuwei20(a)huawei.com> --- sound/core/control.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/sound/core/control.c b/sound/core/control.c index 732eb515d2f5..640bafb6605a 100644 --- a/sound/core/control.c +++ b/sound/core/control.c @@ -1387,6 +1387,10 @@ static int snd_ctl_elem_init_enum_names(struct user_element *ue) buf_len = ue->info.value.enumerated.names_length; p = names; for (i = 0; i < ue->info.value.enumerated.items; ++i) { + if (buf_len == 0) { + kvfree(names); + return -EINVAL; + } name_len = strnlen(p, buf_len); if (name_len == 0 || name_len >= 64 || name_len == buf_len) { kvfree(names); -- 2.22.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] netfilter: nfnetlink_cthelper: fix OOB read in nfnl_cthelper_dump_table()
by superdcc97＠163.com 01 Jun '26

01 Jun '26

From: Hyunwoo Kim <imv4bel(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.253 commit 0605e1985a95d4334a67869aee45a47e82301abf category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15008 CVE: CVE-2026-43450 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 6dcee8496d53165b2d8a5909b3050b62ae71fe89 ] nfnl_cthelper_dump_table() has a 'goto restart' that jumps to a label inside the for loop body. When the "last" helper saved in cb->args[1] is deleted between dump rounds, every entry fails the (cur != last) check, so cb->args[1] is never cleared. The for loop finishes with cb->args[0] == nf_ct_helper_hsize, and the 'goto restart' jumps back into the loop body bypassing the bounds check, causing an 8-byte out-of-bounds read on nf_ct_helper_hash[nf_ct_helper_hsize]. The 'goto restart' block was meant to re-traverse the current bucket when "last" is no longer found, but it was placed after the for loop instead of inside it. Move the block into the for loop body so that the restart only occurs while cb->args[0] is still within bounds. BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nfnl_cthelper_dump_table+0x9f/0x1b0 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888104ca3000 by task poc_cthelper/131 Call Trace: nfnl_cthelper_dump_table+0x9f/0x1b0 netlink_dump+0x333/0x880 netlink_recvmsg+0x3e2/0x4b0 sock_recvmsg+0xde/0xf0 __sys_recvfrom+0x150/0x200 __x64_sys_recvfrom+0x76/0x90 do_syscall_64+0xc3/0x6e0 Allocated by task 1: __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x21b/0x700 nf_ct_alloc_hashtable+0x65/0xd0 nf_conntrack_helper_init+0x21/0x60 nf_conntrack_init_start+0x18d/0x300 nf_conntrack_standalone_init+0x12/0xc0 Fixes: 12f7a505331e ("netfilter: add user-space connection tracking helper infrastructure") Signed-off-by: Hyunwoo Kim <imv4bel(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw(a)strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_cthelper.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_cthelper.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_cthelper.c index 3134df2423e9..10201a58d15e 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_cthelper.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_cthelper.c @@ -601,10 +601,10 @@ nfnl_cthelper_dump_table(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb) goto out; } } - } - if (cb->args[1]) { - cb->args[1] = 0; - goto restart; + if (cb->args[1]) { + cb->args[1] = 0; + goto restart; + } } out: rcu_read_unlock(); -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-24.03-LTS_SP3 0/5] add min_slice and sched_attr::sched_runtime
by Chen Jinghuang 01 Jun '26

01 Jun '26

*** BLURB HERE *** Chen Jinghuang (1): sched: Fix kabi breakage in struct sched_entity and sched_class Peter Zijlstra (4): sched/eevdf: Use sched_attr::sched_runtime to set request/slice suggestion sched: Allow sched_class::dequeue_task() to fail sched/fair: Re-organize dequeue_task_fair() sched/eevdf: Propagate min_slice up the cgroup hierarchy include/linux/sched.h | 5 +- kernel/sched/core.c | 11 +++- kernel/sched/deadline.c | 4 +- kernel/sched/debug.c | 3 +- kernel/sched/fair.c | 128 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- kernel/sched/idle.c | 3 +- kernel/sched/rt.c | 4 +- kernel/sched/sched.h | 3 +- kernel/sched/stop_task.c | 3 +- 9 files changed, 129 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

1 7

[PATCH OLK-6.6] KVM: nSVM: Triple fault if restore host CR3 fails on nested #VMEXIT
by Zhang Kunbo 01 Jun '26

01 Jun '26

From: Yosry Ahmed <yosry(a)kernel.org> stable inclusion from stable-v7.0.4 commit 9a738cf170a4a2332ea3a15e23ec65b5757fe4a1 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15277 CVE: CVE-2026-46032 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 5d291ef0585ed880ed4dd71ea1a5965e0a65fb53 upstream. If loading L1's CR3 fails on a nested #VMEXIT, nested_svm_vmexit() returns an error code that is ignored by most callers, and continues to run L1 with corrupted state. A sane recovery is not possible in this case, and HW behavior is to cause a shutdown. Inject a triple fault instead, and do not return early from nested_svm_vmexit(). Continue cleaning up the vCPU state (e.g. clear pending exceptions), to handle the failure as gracefully as possible. From the APM: Upon #VMEXIT, the processor performs the following actions in order to return to the host execution context: ... if (illegal host state loaded, or exception while loading host state) shutdown else execute first host instruction following the VMRUN Remove the return value of nested_svm_vmexit(), which is mostly unchecked anyway. Fixes: d82aaef9c88a ("KVM: nSVM: use nested_svm_load_cr3() on guest->host switch") CC: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Yosry Ahmed <yosry(a)kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260303003421.2185681-10-yosry@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Conflicts: arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h [context conflicts] Signed-off-by: Zhang Kunbo <zhangkunbo(a)huawei.com> --- arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c | 10 +++------- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 11 ++--------- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 6 +++--- 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c index f47242a1e602..daea197d8aee 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c @@ -968,14 +968,13 @@ void svm_copy_vmloadsave_state(struct vmcb *to_vmcb, struct vmcb *from_vmcb) to_vmcb->save.sysenter_eip = from_vmcb->save.sysenter_eip; } -int nested_svm_vmexit(struct vcpu_svm *svm) +void nested_svm_vmexit(struct vcpu_svm *svm) { struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu; struct vmcb *vmcb01 = svm->vmcb01.ptr; struct vmcb *vmcb02 = svm->nested.vmcb02.ptr; struct vmcb *vmcb12; struct kvm_host_map map; - int rc; rc = kvm_vcpu_map(vcpu, gpa_to_gfn(svm->nested.vmcb12_gpa), &map); if (rc) { @@ -1136,9 +1135,8 @@ int nested_svm_vmexit(struct vcpu_svm *svm) nested_svm_uninit_mmu_context(vcpu); - rc = nested_svm_load_cr3(vcpu, vmcb01->save.cr3, false, true); - if (rc) - return 1; + if (nested_svm_load_cr3(vcpu, vmcb01->save.cr3, false, true)) + kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_TRIPLE_FAULT, vcpu); /* * Drop what we picked up for L2 via svm_complete_interrupts() so it @@ -1163,8 +1161,6 @@ int nested_svm_vmexit(struct vcpu_svm *svm) */ if (kvm_apicv_activated(vcpu->kvm)) __kvm_vcpu_update_apicv(vcpu); - - return 0; } static void nested_svm_triple_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c index ad25a6995ee6..30f25ee08df7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c @@ -2402,13 +2402,9 @@ static int emulate_svm_instr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int opcode) [SVM_INSTR_VMSAVE] = vmsave_interception, }; struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu); - int ret; if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) { - /* Returns '1' or -errno on failure, '0' on success. */ - ret = nested_svm_simple_vmexit(svm, guest_mode_exit_codes[opcode]); - if (ret) - return ret; + nested_svm_simple_vmexit(svm, guest_mode_exit_codes[opcode]); return 1; } return svm_instr_handlers[opcode](vcpu); @@ -4768,7 +4764,6 @@ static int svm_enter_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, union kvm_smram *smram) { struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu); struct kvm_host_map map_save; - int ret; if (!is_guest_mode(vcpu)) return 0; @@ -4788,9 +4783,7 @@ static int svm_enter_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, union kvm_smram *smram) svm->vmcb->save.rsp = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RSP]; svm->vmcb->save.rip = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RIP]; - ret = nested_svm_simple_vmexit(svm, SVM_EXIT_SW); - if (ret) - return ret; + nested_svm_simple_vmexit(svm, SVM_EXIT_SW); /* * KVM uses VMCB01 to store L1 host state while L2 runs but diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h index 565d6e1355f6..aa3f87cb1f23 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h @@ -604,15 +604,15 @@ int nested_svm_vmrun(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); void svm_copy_vmrun_state(struct vmcb_save_area *to_save, struct vmcb_save_area *from_save); void svm_copy_vmloadsave_state(struct vmcb *to_vmcb, struct vmcb *from_vmcb); -int nested_svm_vmexit(struct vcpu_svm *svm); +void nested_svm_vmexit(struct vcpu_svm *svm); -static inline int nested_svm_simple_vmexit(struct vcpu_svm *svm, u32 exit_code) +static inline void nested_svm_simple_vmexit(struct vcpu_svm *svm, u32 exit_code) { svm->vmcb->control.exit_code = exit_code; svm->vmcb->control.exit_code_hi = 0; svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_1 = 0; svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_2 = 0; - return nested_svm_vmexit(svm); + nested_svm_vmexit(svm); } int nested_svm_exit_handled(struct vcpu_svm *svm); -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] net: usb: pegasus: enable basic endpoint checking
by Wupeng Ma 01 Jun '26

01 Jun '26

From: Ziyi Guo <n7l8m4(a)u.northwestern.edu> stable inclusion from stable-v6.12.75 commit 67ba6b13dbcaf45681fb6758794c5ac5fa589a6c category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14703 CVE: CVE-2026-43156 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 3d7e6ce34f4fcc7083510c28b17a7c36462a25d4 ] pegasus_probe() fills URBs with hardcoded endpoint pipes without verifying the endpoint descriptors: - usb_rcvbulkpipe(dev, 1) for RX data - usb_sndbulkpipe(dev, 2) for TX data - usb_rcvintpipe(dev, 3) for status interrupts A malformed USB device can present these endpoints with transfer types that differ from what the driver assumes. Add a pegasus_usb_ep enum for endpoint numbers, replacing magic constants throughout. Add usb_check_bulk_endpoints() and usb_check_int_endpoints() calls before any resource allocation to verify endpoint types before use, rejecting devices with mismatched descriptors at probe time, and avoid triggering assertion. Similar fix to - commit 90b7f2961798 ("net: usb: rtl8150: enable basic endpoint checking") - commit 9e7021d2aeae ("net: usb: catc: enable basic endpoint checking") Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Ziyi Guo <n7l8m4(a)u.northwestern.edu> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms(a)kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260222050633.410165-1-n7l8m4@u.northwestern.edu Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Wupeng Ma <mawupeng1(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/net/usb/pegasus.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/pegasus.c b/drivers/net/usb/pegasus.c index 7cc949460edc9..475b066081c7f 100644 --- a/drivers/net/usb/pegasus.c +++ b/drivers/net/usb/pegasus.c @@ -31,6 +31,17 @@ static const char driver_name[] = "pegasus"; BMSR_100FULL | BMSR_ANEGCAPABLE) #define CARRIER_CHECK_DELAY (2 * HZ) +/* + * USB endpoints. + */ + +enum pegasus_usb_ep { + PEGASUS_USB_EP_CONTROL = 0, + PEGASUS_USB_EP_BULK_IN = 1, + PEGASUS_USB_EP_BULK_OUT = 2, + PEGASUS_USB_EP_INT_IN = 3, +}; + static bool loopback; static bool mii_mode; static char *devid; @@ -545,7 +556,7 @@ static void read_bulk_callback(struct urb *urb) goto tl_sched; goon: usb_fill_bulk_urb(pegasus->rx_urb, pegasus->usb, - usb_rcvbulkpipe(pegasus->usb, 1), + usb_rcvbulkpipe(pegasus->usb, PEGASUS_USB_EP_BULK_IN), pegasus->rx_skb->data, PEGASUS_MTU, read_bulk_callback, pegasus); rx_status = usb_submit_urb(pegasus->rx_urb, GFP_ATOMIC); @@ -585,7 +596,7 @@ static void rx_fixup(struct tasklet_struct *t) return; } usb_fill_bulk_urb(pegasus->rx_urb, pegasus->usb, - usb_rcvbulkpipe(pegasus->usb, 1), + usb_rcvbulkpipe(pegasus->usb, PEGASUS_USB_EP_BULK_IN), pegasus->rx_skb->data, PEGASUS_MTU, read_bulk_callback, pegasus); try_again: @@ -713,7 +724,7 @@ static netdev_tx_t pegasus_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, ((__le16 *) pegasus->tx_buff)[0] = cpu_to_le16(l16); skb_copy_from_linear_data(skb, pegasus->tx_buff + 2, skb->len); usb_fill_bulk_urb(pegasus->tx_urb, pegasus->usb, - usb_sndbulkpipe(pegasus->usb, 2), + usb_sndbulkpipe(pegasus->usb, PEGASUS_USB_EP_BULK_OUT), pegasus->tx_buff, count, write_bulk_callback, pegasus); if ((res = usb_submit_urb(pegasus->tx_urb, GFP_ATOMIC))) { @@ -851,7 +862,7 @@ static int pegasus_open(struct net_device *net) set_registers(pegasus, EthID, 6, net->dev_addr); usb_fill_bulk_urb(pegasus->rx_urb, pegasus->usb, - usb_rcvbulkpipe(pegasus->usb, 1), + usb_rcvbulkpipe(pegasus->usb, PEGASUS_USB_EP_BULK_IN), pegasus->rx_skb->data, PEGASUS_MTU, read_bulk_callback, pegasus); if ((res = usb_submit_urb(pegasus->rx_urb, GFP_KERNEL))) { @@ -862,7 +873,7 @@ static int pegasus_open(struct net_device *net) } usb_fill_int_urb(pegasus->intr_urb, pegasus->usb, - usb_rcvintpipe(pegasus->usb, 3), + usb_rcvintpipe(pegasus->usb, PEGASUS_USB_EP_INT_IN), pegasus->intr_buff, sizeof(pegasus->intr_buff), intr_callback, pegasus, pegasus->intr_interval); if ((res = usb_submit_urb(pegasus->intr_urb, GFP_KERNEL))) { @@ -1147,10 +1158,24 @@ static int pegasus_probe(struct usb_interface *intf, pegasus_t *pegasus; int dev_index = id - pegasus_ids; int res = -ENOMEM; + static const u8 bulk_ep_addr[] = { + PEGASUS_USB_EP_BULK_IN | USB_DIR_IN, + PEGASUS_USB_EP_BULK_OUT | USB_DIR_OUT, + 0}; + static const u8 int_ep_addr[] = { + PEGASUS_USB_EP_INT_IN | USB_DIR_IN, + 0}; if (pegasus_blacklisted(dev)) return -ENODEV; + /* Verify that all required endpoints are present */ + if (!usb_check_bulk_endpoints(intf, bulk_ep_addr) || + !usb_check_int_endpoints(intf, int_ep_addr)) { + dev_err(&intf->dev, "Missing or invalid endpoints\n"); + return -ENODEV; + } + net = alloc_etherdev(sizeof(struct pegasus)); if (!net) goto out; -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] mm/damon/sysfs-schemes: protect memcg_path kfree() with damon_sysfs_lock
by Wupeng Ma 01 Jun '26

01 Jun '26

From: SeongJae Park <sj(a)kernel.org> stable inclusion from stable-v6.12.88 commit c88802d0e8edd14b6cd2daf3000f99adbc4c85c5 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15373 CVE: CVE-2026-46121 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 1e68eb96e8beb1abefd12dd22c5637795d8a877e upstream. Patch series "mm/damon/sysfs-schemes: fix use-after-free for [memcg_]path". Reads of 'memcg_path' and 'path' files in DAMON sysfs interface could race with their writes, results in use-after-free. Fix those. This patch (of 2): damon_sysfs_scheme_filter->mmecg_path can be read and written by users, via DAMON sysfs memcg_path file. It can also be indirectly read, for the parameters {on,off}line committing to DAMON. The reads for parameters committing are protected by damon_sysfs_lock to avoid the sysfs files being destroyed while any of the parameters are being read. But the user-driven direct reads and writes are not protected by any lock, while the write is deallocating the memcg_path-pointing buffer. As a result, the readers could read the already freed buffer (user-after-free). Note that the user-reads don't race when the same open file is used by the writer, due to kernfs's open file locking. Nonetheless, doing the reads and writes with separate open files would be common. Fix it by protecting both the user-direct reads and writes with damon_sysfs_lock. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260423150253.111520-1-sj@kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260423150253.111520-2-sj@kernel.org Fixes: 4f489fe6afb3 ("mm/damon/sysfs-schemes: free old damon_sysfs_scheme_filter->memcg_path on write") Co-developed-by: Junxi Qian <qjx1298677004(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junxi Qian <qjx1298677004(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: SeongJae Park <sj(a)kernel.org> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # 6.16.x Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Wupeng Ma <mawupeng1(a)huawei.com> --- mm/damon/sysfs-schemes.c | 12 +++++++++++- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/mm/damon/sysfs-schemes.c b/mm/damon/sysfs-schemes.c index 13229cf9c7d1f..1c1662db8f80f 100644 --- a/mm/damon/sysfs-schemes.c +++ b/mm/damon/sysfs-schemes.c @@ -360,9 +360,14 @@ static ssize_t memcg_path_show(struct kobject *kobj, { struct damon_sysfs_scheme_filter *filter = container_of(kobj, struct damon_sysfs_scheme_filter, kobj); + int len; - return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", + if (!mutex_trylock(&damon_sysfs_lock)) + return -EBUSY; + len = sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", filter->memcg_path ? filter->memcg_path : ""); + mutex_unlock(&damon_sysfs_lock); + return len; } static ssize_t memcg_path_store(struct kobject *kobj, @@ -376,8 +381,13 @@ static ssize_t memcg_path_store(struct kobject *kobj, return -ENOMEM; strscpy(path, buf, count + 1); + if (!mutex_trylock(&damon_sysfs_lock)) { + kfree(path); + return -EBUSY; + } kfree(filter->memcg_path); filter->memcg_path = path; + mutex_unlock(&damon_sysfs_lock); return count; } -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] netfilter: nfnetlink_cthelper: fix OOB read in nfnl_cthelper_dump_table()
by superdcc97＠163.com 01 Jun '26

01 Jun '26

From: Hyunwoo Kim <imv4bel(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.0-rc4 commit 6dcee8496d53165b2d8a5909b3050b62ae71fe89 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15008 CVE: CVE-2026-43450 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- nfnl_cthelper_dump_table() has a 'goto restart' that jumps to a label inside the for loop body. When the "last" helper saved in cb->args[1] is deleted between dump rounds, every entry fails the (cur != last) check, so cb->args[1] is never cleared. The for loop finishes with cb->args[0] == nf_ct_helper_hsize, and the 'goto restart' jumps back into the loop body bypassing the bounds check, causing an 8-byte out-of-bounds read on nf_ct_helper_hash[nf_ct_helper_hsize]. The 'goto restart' block was meant to re-traverse the current bucket when "last" is no longer found, but it was placed after the for loop instead of inside it. Move the block into the for loop body so that the restart only occurs while cb->args[0] is still within bounds. BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nfnl_cthelper_dump_table+0x9f/0x1b0 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888104ca3000 by task poc_cthelper/131 Call Trace: nfnl_cthelper_dump_table+0x9f/0x1b0 netlink_dump+0x333/0x880 netlink_recvmsg+0x3e2/0x4b0 sock_recvmsg+0xde/0xf0 __sys_recvfrom+0x150/0x200 __x64_sys_recvfrom+0x76/0x90 do_syscall_64+0xc3/0x6e0 Allocated by task 1: __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x21b/0x700 nf_ct_alloc_hashtable+0x65/0xd0 nf_conntrack_helper_init+0x21/0x60 nf_conntrack_init_start+0x18d/0x300 nf_conntrack_standalone_init+0x12/0xc0 Fixes: 12f7a505331e ("netfilter: add user-space connection tracking helper infrastructure") Signed-off-by: Hyunwoo Kim <imv4bel(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw(a)strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_cthelper.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_cthelper.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_cthelper.c index c8b0f1122c44..3ce818aa37d8 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_cthelper.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_cthelper.c @@ -608,10 +608,10 @@ nfnl_cthelper_dump_table(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb) goto out; } } - } - if (cb->args[1]) { - cb->args[1] = 0; - goto restart; + if (cb->args[1]) { + cb->args[1] = 0; + goto restart; + } } out: rcu_read_unlock(); -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-24.03-LTS_SP3 0/5] add min_slice and sched_attr::sched_runtime
by Chen Jinghuang 01 Jun '26

01 Jun '26

*** BLURB HERE *** Chen Jinghuang (1): sched: Fix kabi breakage in struct sched_entity and sched_class Peter Zijlstra (4): sched/eevdf: Use sched_attr::sched_runtime to set request/slice suggestion sched: Allow sched_class::dequeue_task() to fail sched/fair: Re-organize dequeue_task_fair() sched/eevdf: Propagate min_slice up the cgroup hierarchy include/linux/sched.h | 5 +- kernel/sched/core.c | 11 +++- kernel/sched/deadline.c | 4 +- kernel/sched/debug.c | 3 +- kernel/sched/fair.c | 128 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- kernel/sched/idle.c | 3 +- kernel/sched/rt.c | 4 +- kernel/sched/sched.h | 3 +- kernel/sched/stop_task.c | 3 +- 9 files changed, 129 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

1 5

[PATCH OLK-6.6] netfilter: nfnetlink_cthelper: fix OOB read in nfnl_cthelper_dump_table()
by superdcc97＠163.com 01 Jun '26

01 Jun '26

From: Hyunwoo Kim <imv4bel(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.130 commit 4a1f6ee69267a5f524102c028981410eeacfa3da category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15008 CVE: CVE-2026-43450 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 6dcee8496d53165b2d8a5909b3050b62ae71fe89 ] nfnl_cthelper_dump_table() has a 'goto restart' that jumps to a label inside the for loop body. When the "last" helper saved in cb->args[1] is deleted between dump rounds, every entry fails the (cur != last) check, so cb->args[1] is never cleared. The for loop finishes with cb->args[0] == nf_ct_helper_hsize, and the 'goto restart' jumps back into the loop body bypassing the bounds check, causing an 8-byte out-of-bounds read on nf_ct_helper_hash[nf_ct_helper_hsize]. The 'goto restart' block was meant to re-traverse the current bucket when "last" is no longer found, but it was placed after the for loop instead of inside it. Move the block into the for loop body so that the restart only occurs while cb->args[0] is still within bounds. BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nfnl_cthelper_dump_table+0x9f/0x1b0 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888104ca3000 by task poc_cthelper/131 Call Trace: nfnl_cthelper_dump_table+0x9f/0x1b0 netlink_dump+0x333/0x880 netlink_recvmsg+0x3e2/0x4b0 sock_recvmsg+0xde/0xf0 __sys_recvfrom+0x150/0x200 __x64_sys_recvfrom+0x76/0x90 do_syscall_64+0xc3/0x6e0 Allocated by task 1: __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x21b/0x700 nf_ct_alloc_hashtable+0x65/0xd0 nf_conntrack_helper_init+0x21/0x60 nf_conntrack_init_start+0x18d/0x300 nf_conntrack_standalone_init+0x12/0xc0 Fixes: 12f7a505331e ("netfilter: add user-space connection tracking helper infrastructure") Signed-off-by: Hyunwoo Kim <imv4bel(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw(a)strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_cthelper.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_cthelper.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_cthelper.c index 97248963a7d3..71a248cca746 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_cthelper.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_cthelper.c @@ -603,10 +603,10 @@ nfnl_cthelper_dump_table(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb) goto out; } } - } - if (cb->args[1]) { - cb->args[1] = 0; - goto restart; + if (cb->args[1]) { + cb->args[1] = 0; + goto restart; + } } out: rcu_read_unlock(); -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] iommu/amd: serialize sequence allocation under concurrent TLB invalidations
by Zhang Yuwei 01 Jun '26

01 Jun '26

From: Ankit Soni <Ankit.Soni(a)amd.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.128 commit 9e249c48412828e807afddc21527eb734dc9bd3d category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14766 CVE: CVE-2026-43220 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- With concurrent TLB invalidations, completion wait randomly gets timed out because cmd_sem_val was incremented outside the IOMMU spinlock, allowing CMD_COMPL_WAIT commands to be queued out of sequence and breaking the ordering assumption in wait_on_sem(). Move the cmd_sem_val increment under iommu->lock so completion sequence allocation is serialized with command queuing. And remove the unnecessary return. Fixes: d2a0cac10597 ("iommu/amd: move wait_on_sem() out of spinlock") Tested-by: Srikanth Aithal <sraithal(a)amd.com> Reported-by: Srikanth Aithal <sraithal(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Ankit Soni <Ankit.Soni(a)amd.com> Reviewed-by: Vasant Hegde <vasant.hegde(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <joerg.roedel(a)amd.com> Conflicts: drivers/iommu/amd/amd_iommu_types.h drivers/iommu/amd/iommu.c [commit 7d0f5fd3e4d68 merged] Signed-off-by: Zhang Yuwei <zhangyuwei20(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/iommu/amd/amd_iommu_types.h | 2 +- drivers/iommu/amd/init.c | 2 +- drivers/iommu/amd/iommu.c | 17 ++++++++++++----- 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/iommu/amd/amd_iommu_types.h b/drivers/iommu/amd/amd_iommu_types.h index 8f77221b68c4..1d25dba50d8c 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/amd/amd_iommu_types.h +++ b/drivers/iommu/amd/amd_iommu_types.h @@ -776,7 +776,7 @@ struct amd_iommu { u32 flags; volatile u64 *cmd_sem; - atomic64_t cmd_sem_val; + u64 cmd_sem_val; #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_IOMMU_DEBUGFS /* DebugFS Info */ diff --git a/drivers/iommu/amd/init.c b/drivers/iommu/amd/init.c index 62b1676c10c3..67f431da43a6 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/amd/init.c +++ b/drivers/iommu/amd/init.c @@ -1810,7 +1810,7 @@ static int __init init_iommu_one(struct amd_iommu *iommu, struct ivhd_header *h, iommu->pci_seg = pci_seg; raw_spin_lock_init(&iommu->lock); - atomic64_set(&iommu->cmd_sem_val, 0); + iommu->cmd_sem_val = 0; /* Add IOMMU to internal data structures */ list_add_tail(&iommu->list, &amd_iommu_list); diff --git a/drivers/iommu/amd/iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/amd/iommu.c index 05cf1d8f2e15..be92a5af96bd 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/amd/iommu.c +++ b/drivers/iommu/amd/iommu.c @@ -1261,6 +1261,12 @@ static int iommu_queue_command(struct amd_iommu *iommu, struct iommu_cmd *cmd) return iommu_queue_command_sync(iommu, cmd, true); } +static u64 get_cmdsem_val(struct amd_iommu *iommu) +{ + lockdep_assert_held(&iommu->lock); + return ++iommu->cmd_sem_val; +} + /* * This function queues a completion wait command into the command * buffer of an IOMMU @@ -1275,11 +1281,11 @@ static int iommu_completion_wait(struct amd_iommu *iommu) if (!iommu->need_sync) return 0; - data = atomic64_add_return(1, &iommu->cmd_sem_val); - build_completion_wait(&cmd, iommu, data); - raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&iommu->lock, flags); + data = get_cmdsem_val(iommu); + build_completion_wait(&cmd, iommu, data); + ret = __iommu_queue_command_sync(iommu, &cmd, false); if (ret) goto out_unlock; @@ -3093,10 +3099,11 @@ static void iommu_flush_irt_and_complete(struct amd_iommu *iommu, u16 devid) return; build_inv_irt(&cmd, devid); - data = atomic64_add_return(1, &iommu->cmd_sem_val); - build_completion_wait(&cmd2, iommu, data); raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&iommu->lock, flags); + data = get_cmdsem_val(iommu); + build_completion_wait(&cmd2, iommu, data); + ret = __iommu_queue_command_sync(iommu, &cmd, true); if (ret) goto out; -- 2.22.0

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] netfilter: ctnetlink: ensure safe access to master conntrack
by superdcc97＠163.com 01 Jun '26

01 Jun '26

From: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.0-rc6 commit bffcaad9afdfe45d7fc777397d3b83c1e3ebffe5 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14619 CVE: CVE-2026-43116 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Holding reference on the expectation is not sufficient, the master conntrack object can just go away, making exp->master invalid. To access exp->master safely: - Grab the nf_conntrack_expect_lock, this gets serialized with clean_from_lists() which also holds this lock when the master conntrack goes away. - Hold reference on master conntrack via nf_conntrack_find_get(). Not so easy since the master tuple to look up for the master conntrack is not available in the existing problematic paths. This patch goes for extending the nf_conntrack_expect_lock section to address this issue for simplicity, in the cases that are described below this is just slightly extending the lock section. The add expectation command already holds a reference to the master conntrack from ctnetlink_create_expect(). However, the delete expectation command needs to grab the spinlock before looking up for the expectation. Expand the existing spinlock section to address this to cover the expectation lookup. Note that, the nf_ct_expect_iterate_net() calls already grabs the spinlock while iterating over the expectation table, which is correct. The get expectation command needs to grab the spinlock to ensure master conntrack does not go away. This also expands the existing spinlock section to cover the expectation lookup too. I needed to move the netlink skb allocation out of the spinlock to keep it GFP_KERNEL. For the expectation events, the IPEXP_DESTROY event is already delivered under the spinlock, just move the delivery of IPEXP_NEW under the spinlock too because the master conntrack event cache is reached through exp->master. While at it, add lockdep notations to help identify what codepaths need to grab the spinlock. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw(a)strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> --- include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.h | 5 ++++ net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_ecache.c | 2 ++ net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_expect.c | 10 +++++++- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 30 +++++++++++++++-------- 4 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.h b/include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.h index 4e3fff9f929b..7e12d5b27249 100644 --- a/include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.h +++ b/include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.h @@ -81,4 +81,9 @@ void nf_conntrack_lock(spinlock_t *lock); extern spinlock_t nf_conntrack_expect_lock; +static inline void lockdep_nfct_expect_lock_held(void) +{ + lockdep_assert_held(&nf_conntrack_expect_lock); +} + #endif /* _NF_CONNTRACK_CORE_H */ diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_ecache.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_ecache.c index c11822a7d2bf..c8b4c0c15767 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_ecache.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_ecache.c @@ -238,6 +238,8 @@ void nf_ct_expect_event_report(enum ip_conntrack_expect_events event, struct nf_exp_event_notifier *notify; struct nf_conntrack_ecache *e; + lockdep_nfct_expect_lock_held(); + rcu_read_lock(); notify = rcu_dereference(net->ct.nf_expect_event_cb); if (!notify) diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_expect.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_expect.c index 27b84231db10..a8dcb4e44d5f 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_expect.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_expect.c @@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ void nf_ct_unlink_expect_report(struct nf_conntrack_expect *exp, struct nf_conn_help *master_help = nfct_help(exp->master); struct net *net = nf_ct_exp_net(exp); + lockdep_nfct_expect_lock_held(); WARN_ON(!master_help); WARN_ON(timer_pending(&exp->timeout)); @@ -105,6 +106,8 @@ nf_ct_exp_equal(const struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple, bool nf_ct_remove_expect(struct nf_conntrack_expect *exp) { + lockdep_nfct_expect_lock_held(); + if (del_timer(&exp->timeout)) { nf_ct_unlink_expect(exp); nf_ct_expect_put(exp); @@ -162,6 +165,8 @@ nf_ct_find_expectation(struct net *net, struct nf_conntrack_expect *i, *exp = NULL; unsigned int h; + lockdep_nfct_expect_lock_held(); + if (!net->ct.expect_count) return NULL; @@ -414,6 +419,8 @@ static inline int __nf_ct_expect_check(struct nf_conntrack_expect *expect) unsigned int h; int ret = 0; + lockdep_nfct_expect_lock_held(); + if (!master_help) { ret = -ESHUTDOWN; goto out; @@ -467,8 +474,9 @@ int nf_ct_expect_related_report(struct nf_conntrack_expect *expect, nf_ct_expect_insert(expect); - spin_unlock_bh(&nf_conntrack_expect_lock); nf_ct_expect_event_report(IPEXP_NEW, expect, portid, report); + spin_unlock_bh(&nf_conntrack_expect_lock); + return 0; out: spin_unlock_bh(&nf_conntrack_expect_lock); diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c index 331839218a1c..203a5d059b20 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c @@ -3056,31 +3056,37 @@ static int ctnetlink_get_expect(struct net *net, struct sock *ctnl, if (err < 0) return err; + err = -ENOMEM; + skb2 = nlmsg_new(NLMSG_DEFAULT_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); + if (skb2 == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; + + spin_lock_bh(&nf_conntrack_expect_lock); exp = nf_ct_expect_find_get(net, &zone, &tuple); - if (!exp) + if (!exp) { + spin_unlock_bh(&nf_conntrack_expect_lock); + kfree_skb(skb2); return -ENOENT; + } if (cda[CTA_EXPECT_ID]) { __be32 id = nla_get_be32(cda[CTA_EXPECT_ID]); if (id != nf_expect_get_id(exp)) { nf_ct_expect_put(exp); + spin_unlock_bh(&nf_conntrack_expect_lock); + kfree_skb(skb2); return -ENOENT; } } - err = -ENOMEM; - skb2 = nlmsg_new(NLMSG_DEFAULT_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); - if (skb2 == NULL) { - nf_ct_expect_put(exp); - goto out; - } - rcu_read_lock(); err = ctnetlink_exp_fill_info(skb2, NETLINK_CB(skb).portid, nlh->nlmsg_seq, IPCTNL_MSG_EXP_NEW, exp); rcu_read_unlock(); nf_ct_expect_put(exp); + spin_unlock_bh(&nf_conntrack_expect_lock); + if (err <= 0) goto free; @@ -3135,22 +3141,26 @@ static int ctnetlink_del_expect(struct net *net, struct sock *ctnl, if (err < 0) return err; + spin_lock_bh(&nf_conntrack_expect_lock); + /* bump usage count to 2 */ exp = nf_ct_expect_find_get(net, &zone, &tuple); - if (!exp) + if (!exp) { + spin_unlock_bh(&nf_conntrack_expect_lock); return -ENOENT; + } if (cda[CTA_EXPECT_ID]) { __be32 id = nla_get_be32(cda[CTA_EXPECT_ID]); if (id != nf_expect_get_id(exp)) { nf_ct_expect_put(exp); + spin_unlock_bh(&nf_conntrack_expect_lock); return -ENOENT; } } /* after list removal, usage count == 1 */ - spin_lock_bh(&nf_conntrack_expect_lock); if (del_timer(&exp->timeout)) { nf_ct_unlink_expect_report(exp, NETLINK_CB(skb).portid, nlmsg_report(nlh)); -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] iommu/amd: serialize sequence allocation under concurrent TLB invalidations
by Zhang Yuwei 01 Jun '26

01 Jun '26

From: Ankit Soni <Ankit.Soni(a)amd.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.128 commit 9e249c48412828e807afddc21527eb734dc9bd3d category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14766 CVE: CVE-2026-43220 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- With concurrent TLB invalidations, completion wait randomly gets timed out because cmd_sem_val was incremented outside the IOMMU spinlock, allowing CMD_COMPL_WAIT commands to be queued out of sequence and breaking the ordering assumption in wait_on_sem(). Move the cmd_sem_val increment under iommu->lock so completion sequence allocation is serialized with command queuing. And remove the unnecessary return. Fixes: d2a0cac10597 ("iommu/amd: move wait_on_sem() out of spinlock") Tested-by: Srikanth Aithal <sraithal(a)amd.com> Reported-by: Srikanth Aithal <sraithal(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Ankit Soni <Ankit.Soni(a)amd.com> Reviewed-by: Vasant Hegde <vasant.hegde(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <joerg.roedel(a)amd.com> Conflicts: drivers/iommu/amd/amd_iommu_types.h drivers/iommu/amd/iommu.c [commit 7d0f5fd3e4d68 merged] Signed-off-by: Zhang Yuwei <zhangyuwei20(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/iommu/amd/amd_iommu_types.h | 2 +- drivers/iommu/amd/init.c | 2 +- drivers/iommu/amd/iommu.c | 15 ++++++++++++--- 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/iommu/amd/amd_iommu_types.h b/drivers/iommu/amd/amd_iommu_types.h index 8f77221b68c4..1d25dba50d8c 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/amd/amd_iommu_types.h +++ b/drivers/iommu/amd/amd_iommu_types.h @@ -776,7 +776,7 @@ struct amd_iommu { u32 flags; volatile u64 *cmd_sem; - atomic64_t cmd_sem_val; + u64 cmd_sem_val; #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_IOMMU_DEBUGFS /* DebugFS Info */ diff --git a/drivers/iommu/amd/init.c b/drivers/iommu/amd/init.c index 62b1676c10c3..67f431da43a6 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/amd/init.c +++ b/drivers/iommu/amd/init.c @@ -1810,7 +1810,7 @@ static int __init init_iommu_one(struct amd_iommu *iommu, struct ivhd_header *h, iommu->pci_seg = pci_seg; raw_spin_lock_init(&iommu->lock); - atomic64_set(&iommu->cmd_sem_val, 0); + iommu->cmd_sem_val = 0; /* Add IOMMU to internal data structures */ list_add_tail(&iommu->list, &amd_iommu_list); diff --git a/drivers/iommu/amd/iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/amd/iommu.c index 05cf1d8f2e15..7f8f28484952 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/amd/iommu.c +++ b/drivers/iommu/amd/iommu.c @@ -1261,6 +1261,12 @@ static int iommu_queue_command(struct amd_iommu *iommu, struct iommu_cmd *cmd) return iommu_queue_command_sync(iommu, cmd, true); } +static u64 get_cmdsem_val(struct amd_iommu *iommu) +{ + lockdep_assert_held(&iommu->lock); + return ++iommu->cmd_sem_val; +} + /* * This function queues a completion wait command into the command * buffer of an IOMMU @@ -1275,11 +1281,11 @@ static int iommu_completion_wait(struct amd_iommu *iommu) if (!iommu->need_sync) return 0; - data = atomic64_add_return(1, &iommu->cmd_sem_val); - build_completion_wait(&cmd, iommu, data); - raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&iommu->lock, flags); + data = get_cmdsem_val(iommu); + build_completion_wait(&cmd, iommu, data); + ret = __iommu_queue_command_sync(iommu, &cmd, false); if (ret) goto out_unlock; @@ -3097,6 +3103,9 @@ static void iommu_flush_irt_and_complete(struct amd_iommu *iommu, u16 devid) build_completion_wait(&cmd2, iommu, data); raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&iommu->lock, flags); + data = get_cmdsem_val(iommu); + build_completion_wait(&cmd2, iommu, data); + ret = __iommu_queue_command_sync(iommu, &cmd, true); if (ret) goto out; -- 2.22.0

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] netfilter: nft_ct: drop pending enqueued packets on removal
by superdcc97＠163.com 01 Jun '26

01 Jun '26

From: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.0-rc5 commit 36eae0956f659e48d5366d9b083d9417f3263ddc category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14592 CVE: CVE-2026-43060 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Packets sitting in nfqueue might hold a reference to: - templates that specify the conntrack zone, because a percpu area is used and module removal is possible. - conntrack timeout policies and helper, where object removal leave a stale reference. Since these objects can just go away, drop enqueued packets to avoid stale reference to them. If there is a need for finer grain removal, this logic can be revisited to make selective packet drop upon dependencies. Fixes: 7e0b2b57f01d ("netfilter: nft_ct: add ct timeout support") Reported-by: Yiming Qian <yimingqian591(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw(a)strlen.de> Conflicts: net/netfilter/nft_ct.c [openEuler-1.0-LTS nft_ct.c differs from mainline: - lacks nft_ct_pcpu_mutex (introduced by commit e3245a7b7b34) - NFT_CT_ZONE case missing break statement - nf_ct_l4proto_put() present in nft_ct_timeout_obj_destroy() Adapted manually without introducing unsupported symbols] Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- net/netfilter/nft_ct.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_ct.c b/net/netfilter/nft_ct.c index 5dd87748afa8..b17604b5b48b 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nft_ct.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_ct.c @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ #include <net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_labels.h> #include <net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_timeout.h> #include <net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_l4proto.h> +#include "nf_internals.h" struct nft_ct { enum nft_ct_keys key:8; @@ -514,6 +515,7 @@ static void __nft_ct_set_destroy(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, struct nft_ct *priv) #endif #ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_ZONES case NFT_CT_ZONE: + nf_queue_nf_hook_drop(ctx->net); if (--nft_ct_pcpu_template_refcnt == 0) nft_ct_tmpl_put_pcpu(); #endif @@ -900,6 +902,7 @@ static void nft_ct_timeout_obj_destroy(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, struct nft_ct_timeout_obj *priv = nft_obj_data(obj); struct nf_ct_timeout *timeout = priv->timeout; + nf_queue_nf_hook_drop(ctx->net); nf_ct_untimeout(ctx->net, timeout); nf_ct_l4proto_put(timeout->l4proto); nf_ct_netns_put(ctx->net, ctx->family); @@ -1033,6 +1036,7 @@ static void nft_ct_helper_obj_destroy(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, { struct nft_ct_helper_obj *priv = nft_obj_data(obj); + nf_queue_nf_hook_drop(ctx->net); if (priv->helper4) nf_conntrack_helper_put(priv->helper4); if (priv->helper6) -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] iommu/amd: serialize sequence allocation under concurrent TLB invalidations
by Zhang Yuwei 01 Jun '26

01 Jun '26

From: Ankit Soni <Ankit.Soni(a)amd.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.128 commit 9e249c48412828e807afddc21527eb734dc9bd3d category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14766 CVE: CVE-2026-43220 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- With concurrent TLB invalidations, completion wait randomly gets timed out because cmd_sem_val was incremented outside the IOMMU spinlock, allowing CMD_COMPL_WAIT commands to be queued out of sequence and breaking the ordering assumption in wait_on_sem(). Move the cmd_sem_val increment under iommu->lock so completion sequence allocation is serialized with command queuing. And remove the unnecessary return. Fixes: d2a0cac10597 ("iommu/amd: move wait_on_sem() out of spinlock") Tested-by: Srikanth Aithal <sraithal(a)amd.com> Reported-by: Srikanth Aithal <sraithal(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Ankit Soni <Ankit.Soni(a)amd.com> Reviewed-by: Vasant Hegde <vasant.hegde(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <joerg.roedel(a)amd.com> Conflicts: drivers/iommu/amd/amd_iommu_types.h drivers/iommu/amd/iommu.c [commit 7d0f5fd3e4d68 merged] Signed-off-by: Zhang Yuwei <zhangyuwei20(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/iommu/amd/amd_iommu_types.h | 2 +- drivers/iommu/amd/init.c | 2 +- drivers/iommu/amd/iommu.c | 15 ++++++++++++--- 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/iommu/amd/amd_iommu_types.h b/drivers/iommu/amd/amd_iommu_types.h index 8f77221b68c4..1d25dba50d8c 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/amd/amd_iommu_types.h +++ b/drivers/iommu/amd/amd_iommu_types.h @@ -776,7 +776,7 @@ struct amd_iommu { u32 flags; volatile u64 *cmd_sem; - atomic64_t cmd_sem_val; + u64 cmd_sem_val; #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_IOMMU_DEBUGFS /* DebugFS Info */ diff --git a/drivers/iommu/amd/init.c b/drivers/iommu/amd/init.c index 62b1676c10c3..67f431da43a6 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/amd/init.c +++ b/drivers/iommu/amd/init.c @@ -1810,7 +1810,7 @@ static int __init init_iommu_one(struct amd_iommu *iommu, struct ivhd_header *h, iommu->pci_seg = pci_seg; raw_spin_lock_init(&iommu->lock); - atomic64_set(&iommu->cmd_sem_val, 0); + iommu->cmd_sem_val = 0; /* Add IOMMU to internal data structures */ list_add_tail(&iommu->list, &amd_iommu_list); diff --git a/drivers/iommu/amd/iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/amd/iommu.c index 05cf1d8f2e15..7f8f28484952 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/amd/iommu.c +++ b/drivers/iommu/amd/iommu.c @@ -1261,6 +1261,12 @@ static int iommu_queue_command(struct amd_iommu *iommu, struct iommu_cmd *cmd) return iommu_queue_command_sync(iommu, cmd, true); } +static u64 get_cmdsem_val(struct amd_iommu *iommu) +{ + lockdep_assert_held(&iommu->lock); + return ++iommu->cmd_sem_val; +} + /* * This function queues a completion wait command into the command * buffer of an IOMMU @@ -1275,11 +1281,11 @@ static int iommu_completion_wait(struct amd_iommu *iommu) if (!iommu->need_sync) return 0; - data = atomic64_add_return(1, &iommu->cmd_sem_val); - build_completion_wait(&cmd, iommu, data); - raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&iommu->lock, flags); + data = get_cmdsem_val(iommu); + build_completion_wait(&cmd, iommu, data); + ret = __iommu_queue_command_sync(iommu, &cmd, false); if (ret) goto out_unlock; @@ -3097,6 +3103,9 @@ static void iommu_flush_irt_and_complete(struct amd_iommu *iommu, u16 devid) build_completion_wait(&cmd2, iommu, data); raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&iommu->lock, flags); + data = get_cmdsem_val(iommu); + build_completion_wait(&cmd2, iommu, data); + ret = __iommu_queue_command_sync(iommu, &cmd, true); if (ret) goto out; -- 2.22.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] KVM: nSVM: Raise #UD if unhandled VMMCALL isn't intercepted by L1
by Zhang Kunbo 01 Jun '26

01 Jun '26

From: Kevin Cheng <chengkev(a)google.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.12.86 commit 924d721fae95687acedbaf624a094ed0e8b67104 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15318 CVE: CVE-2026-46076 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit c36991c6f8d2ab56ee67aff04e3c357f45cfc76c upstream. Explicitly synthesize a #UD for VMMCALL if L2 is active, L1 does NOT want to intercept VMMCALL, nested_svm_l2_tlb_flush_enabled() is true, and the hypercall is something other than one of the supported Hyper-V hypercalls. When all of the above conditions are met, KVM will intercept VMMCALL but never forward it to L1, i.e. will let L2 make hypercalls as if it were L1. The TLFS says a whole lot of nothing about this scenario, so go with the architectural behavior, which says that VMMCALL #UDs if it's not intercepted. Opportunistically do a 2-for-1 stub trade by stub-ifying the new API instead of the helpers it uses. The last remaining "single" stub will soon be dropped as well. Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com> Fixes: 3f4a812edf5c ("KVM: nSVM: hyper-v: Enable L2 TLB flush") Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets(a)redhat.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kevin Cheng <chengkev(a)google.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260228033328.2285047-5-chengkev@google.com [sean: rewrite changelog and comment, tag for stable, remove defunct stubs] Reviewed-by: Yosry Ahmed <yosry(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets(a)redhat.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260304002223.1105129-2-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Zhang Kunbo <zhangkunbo(a)huawei.com> --- arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.h | 8 -------- arch/x86/kvm/svm/hyperv.h | 11 +++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c | 4 +--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++++- 4 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.h b/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.h index a643e11c894d..a0c5f6165b2c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.h @@ -277,14 +277,6 @@ static inline bool kvm_hv_has_stimer_pending(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { return false; } -static inline bool kvm_hv_is_tlb_flush_hcall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) -{ - return false; -} -static inline bool guest_hv_cpuid_has_l2_tlb_flush(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) -{ - return false; -} static inline int kvm_hv_verify_vp_assist(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { return 0; diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/hyperv.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/hyperv.h index d3f8bfc05832..9af03970d40c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/hyperv.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/hyperv.h @@ -41,6 +41,13 @@ static inline bool nested_svm_l2_tlb_flush_enabled(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) return hv_vcpu->vp_assist_page.nested_control.features.directhypercall; } +static inline bool nested_svm_is_l2_tlb_flush_hcall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + return guest_hv_cpuid_has_l2_tlb_flush(vcpu) && + nested_svm_l2_tlb_flush_enabled(vcpu) && + kvm_hv_is_tlb_flush_hcall(vcpu); +} + void svm_hv_inject_synthetic_vmexit_post_tlb_flush(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); #else /* CONFIG_KVM_HYPERV */ static inline void nested_svm_hv_update_vm_vp_ids(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {} @@ -48,6 +55,10 @@ static inline bool nested_svm_l2_tlb_flush_enabled(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { return false; } +static inline bool nested_svm_is_l2_tlb_flush_hcall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + return false; +} static inline void svm_hv_inject_synthetic_vmexit_post_tlb_flush(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {} #endif /* CONFIG_KVM_HYPERV */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c index f47242a1e602..319f73df03ba 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c @@ -1521,9 +1521,7 @@ int nested_svm_exit_special(struct vcpu_svm *svm) } case SVM_EXIT_VMMCALL: /* Hyper-V L2 TLB flush hypercall is handled by L0 */ - if (guest_hv_cpuid_has_l2_tlb_flush(vcpu) && - nested_svm_l2_tlb_flush_enabled(vcpu) && - kvm_hv_is_tlb_flush_hcall(vcpu)) + if (nested_svm_is_l2_tlb_flush_hcall(vcpu)) return NESTED_EXIT_HOST; break; default: diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c index ad25a6995ee6..433bbaf6ed66 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c @@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ #include "svm.h" #include "svm_ops.h" +#include "hyperv.h" #include "kvm_onhyperv.h" #include "svm_onhyperv.h" @@ -3350,6 +3351,22 @@ static int invpcid_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) return kvm_handle_invpcid(vcpu, type, gva); } +static int vmmcall_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + /* + * Inject a #UD if L2 is active and the VMMCALL isn't a Hyper-V TLB + * hypercall, as VMMCALL #UDs if it's not intercepted, and this path is + * reachable if and only if L1 doesn't want to intercept VMMCALL or has + * enabled L0 (KVM) handling of Hyper-V L2 TLB flush hypercalls. + */ + if (is_guest_mode(vcpu) && !nested_svm_is_l2_tlb_flush_hcall(vcpu)) { + kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR); + return 1; + } + + return kvm_emulate_hypercall(vcpu); +} + static int (*const svm_exit_handlers[])(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) = { [SVM_EXIT_READ_CR0] = cr_interception, [SVM_EXIT_READ_CR3] = cr_interception, @@ -3400,7 +3417,7 @@ static int (*const svm_exit_handlers[])(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) = { [SVM_EXIT_TASK_SWITCH] = task_switch_interception, [SVM_EXIT_SHUTDOWN] = shutdown_interception, [SVM_EXIT_VMRUN] = vmrun_interception, - [SVM_EXIT_VMMCALL] = kvm_emulate_hypercall, + [SVM_EXIT_VMMCALL] = vmmcall_interception, [SVM_EXIT_VMLOAD] = vmload_interception, [SVM_EXIT_VMSAVE] = vmsave_interception, [SVM_EXIT_STGI] = stgi_interception, -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] Disable userswap by default
by Wupeng Ma 01 Jun '26

01 Jun '26

Disable userswap by default. Wupeng Ma (2): mm/userswap: remove boot param openeuler_defconfig: disable CONFIG_USERSWAP by default arch/arm64/configs/openeuler_defconfig | 2 +- arch/x86/configs/openeuler_defconfig | 2 +- mm/userswap.c | 7 ------- 3 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) -- 2.43.0

2 3

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/2] CVE-2026-31759
by Liu Mingrui 01 Jun '26

01 Jun '26

CVE-2026-31759 Felix Gu (1): usb: ulpi: fix memory leak on ulpi_register() error paths Guangshuo Li (1): usb: ulpi: fix double free in ulpi_register_interface() error path drivers/usb/common/ulpi.c | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 3

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] CVE-2026-31759
by Liu Mingrui 01 Jun '26

01 Jun '26

CVE-2026-31759 Felix Gu (1): usb: ulpi: fix memory leak on ulpi_register() error paths Guangshuo Li (1): usb: ulpi: fix double free in ulpi_register_interface() error path drivers/usb/common/ulpi.c | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 3