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[openeuler:OLK-6.6 11017/11695] kernel/sched/isolation.c:134:46: error: use of undeclared identifier 'setup_max_cpus'
by kernel test robot 01 Aug '24

01 Aug '24

tree: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel.git OLK-6.6 head: e0427893d95be3be1bb71e10dfb53b6f732e8e42 commit: 54bee36be952f18f6a9e8303822459e89daaa336 [11017/11695] sched/isolation: Fix boot crash when maxcpus < first housekeeping CPU config: x86_64-buildonly-randconfig-002-20240801 (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20240801/202408010948.5PQBFc4s-lkp@…) compiler: clang version 18.1.5 (https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project 617a15a9eac96088ae5e9134248d8236e34b91b1) reproduce (this is a W=1 build): (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20240801/202408010948.5PQBFc4s-lkp@…) If you fix the issue in a separate patch/commit (i.e. not just a new version of the same patch/commit), kindly add following tags | Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp(a)intel.com> | Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202408010948.5PQBFc4s-lkp@intel.com/ All errors (new ones prefixed by >>): In file included from kernel/sched/build_utility.c:105: >> kernel/sched/isolation.c:134:46: error: use of undeclared identifier 'setup_max_cpus' 134 | if (first_cpu >= nr_cpu_ids || first_cpu >= setup_max_cpus) { | ^ 1 error generated. vim +/setup_max_cpus +134 kernel/sched/isolation.c 108 109 static int __init housekeeping_setup(char *str, unsigned long flags) 110 { 111 cpumask_var_t non_housekeeping_mask, housekeeping_staging; 112 unsigned int first_cpu; 113 int err = 0; 114 115 if ((flags & HK_FLAG_TICK) && !(housekeeping.flags & HK_FLAG_TICK)) { 116 if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NO_HZ_FULL)) { 117 pr_warn("Housekeeping: nohz unsupported." 118 " Build with CONFIG_NO_HZ_FULL\n"); 119 return 0; 120 } 121 } 122 123 alloc_bootmem_cpumask_var(&non_housekeeping_mask); 124 if (cpulist_parse(str, non_housekeeping_mask) < 0) { 125 pr_warn("Housekeeping: nohz_full= or isolcpus= incorrect CPU range\n"); 126 goto free_non_housekeeping_mask; 127 } 128 129 alloc_bootmem_cpumask_var(&housekeeping_staging); 130 cpumask_andnot(housekeeping_staging, 131 cpu_possible_mask, non_housekeeping_mask); 132 133 first_cpu = cpumask_first_and(cpu_present_mask, housekeeping_staging); > 134 if (first_cpu >= nr_cpu_ids || first_cpu >= setup_max_cpus) { 135 __cpumask_set_cpu(smp_processor_id(), housekeeping_staging); 136 __cpumask_clear_cpu(smp_processor_id(), non_housekeeping_mask); 137 if (!housekeeping.flags) { 138 pr_warn("Housekeeping: must include one present CPU, " 139 "using boot CPU:%d\n", smp_processor_id()); 140 } 141 } 142 143 if (cpumask_empty(non_housekeeping_mask)) 144 goto free_housekeeping_staging; 145 146 if (!housekeeping.flags) { 147 /* First setup call ("nohz_full=" or "isolcpus=") */ 148 enum hk_type type; 149 150 for_each_set_bit(type, &flags, HK_TYPE_MAX) 151 housekeeping_setup_type(type, housekeeping_staging); 152 } else { 153 /* Second setup call ("nohz_full=" after "isolcpus=" or the reverse) */ 154 enum hk_type type; 155 unsigned long iter_flags = flags & housekeeping.flags; 156 157 for_each_set_bit(type, &iter_flags, HK_TYPE_MAX) { 158 if (!cpumask_equal(housekeeping_staging, 159 housekeeping.cpumasks[type])) { 160 pr_warn("Housekeeping: nohz_full= must match isolcpus=\n"); 161 goto free_housekeeping_staging; 162 } 163 } 164 165 iter_flags = flags & ~housekeeping.flags; 166 167 for_each_set_bit(type, &iter_flags, HK_TYPE_MAX) 168 housekeeping_setup_type(type, housekeeping_staging); 169 } 170 171 if ((flags & HK_FLAG_TICK) && !(housekeeping.flags & HK_FLAG_TICK)) 172 tick_nohz_full_setup(non_housekeeping_mask); 173 174 housekeeping.flags |= flags; 175 err = 1; 176 177 free_housekeeping_staging: 178 free_bootmem_cpumask_var(housekeeping_staging); 179 free_non_housekeeping_mask: 180 free_bootmem_cpumask_var(non_housekeeping_mask); 181 182 return err; 183 } 184 -- 0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service https://github.com/intel/lkp-tests/wiki

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[openeuler:openEuler-1.0-LTS] BUILD SUCCESS 5addb4b853f44eada72e0ed14b75d3d37e94bd8c
by kernel test robot 01 Aug '24

01 Aug '24

tree/branch: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel.git openEuler-1.0-LTS branch HEAD: 5addb4b853f44eada72e0ed14b75d3d37e94bd8c !10400 Fix CVE-2024-41069 elapsed time: 731m configs tested: 26 configs skipped: 137 The following configs have been built successfully. More configs may be tested in the coming days. tested configs: arm64 allmodconfig gcc-14.1.0 arm64 allnoconfig gcc-14.1.0 arm64 defconfig gcc-14.1.0 arm64 randconfig-001-20240801 gcc-14.1.0 arm64 randconfig-002-20240801 gcc-14.1.0 arm64 randconfig-003-20240801 gcc-14.1.0 arm64 randconfig-004-20240801 gcc-14.1.0 x86_64 alldefconfig gcc-13 x86_64 allnoconfig clang-18 x86_64 allyesconfig clang-18 x86_64 buildonly-randconfig-001-20240801 clang-18 x86_64 buildonly-randconfig-002-20240801 clang-18 x86_64 buildonly-randconfig-003-20240801 clang-18 x86_64 buildonly-randconfig-004-20240801 gcc-11 x86_64 buildonly-randconfig-005-20240801 clang-18 x86_64 buildonly-randconfig-006-20240801 clang-18 x86_64 defconfig gcc-13 x86_64 randconfig-001-20240801 gcc-13 x86_64 randconfig-002-20240801 gcc-8 x86_64 randconfig-003-20240801 clang-18 x86_64 randconfig-004-20240801 gcc-8 x86_64 randconfig-005-20240801 gcc-13 x86_64 randconfig-006-20240801 gcc-13 x86_64 randconfig-011-20240801 clang-18 x86_64 randconfig-012-20240801 gcc-13 x86_64 rhel-8.3-rust clang-18 -- 0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service https://github.com/intel/lkp-tests/wiki

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[openeuler:OLK-6.6] BUILD REGRESSION e0427893d95be3be1bb71e10dfb53b6f732e8e42
by kernel test robot 01 Aug '24

01 Aug '24

tree/branch: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel.git OLK-6.6 branch HEAD: e0427893d95be3be1bb71e10dfb53b6f732e8e42 !10369 Backport 6.6.33-34 LTS patches from upstream Error/Warning reports: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202408010424.vAnjVI1d-lkp@intel.com Error/Warning: (recently discovered and may have been fixed) vgettimeofday.c:(.text+0x44): undefined reference to `__tsan_volatile_read4' vgettimeofday.c:(.text.startup+0x8): undefined reference to `__tsan_init' Error/Warning ids grouped by kconfigs: recent_errors |-- arm64-allmodconfig | `-- clang:warning:no-such-include-directory:drivers-infiniband-hw-hiroce3-include-mag |-- arm64-defconfig | |-- WARNING:modpost:vmlinux:section-mismatch-in-reference:arm_smmu_device_probe-(section:.text)-arm_smmu_v3_plat_info-(section:.init.data) | `-- drivers-char-virtio_console.c:warning:u-directive-output-may-be-truncated-writing-between-and-bytes-into-a-region-of-size-between-and |-- arm64-randconfig-003-20240801 | `-- drivers-char-virtio_console.c:warning:u-directive-output-may-be-truncated-writing-between-and-bytes-into-a-region-of-size-between-and |-- arm64-randconfig-004-20240801 | |-- vgettimeofday.c:(.text):undefined-reference-to-__tsan_volatile_read4 | `-- vgettimeofday.c:(.text.startup):undefined-reference-to-__tsan_init |-- loongarch-allmodconfig | `-- arch-loongarch-kvm-..-..-..-virt-kvm-kvm_main.c:warning:kvmalloc_array-sizes-specified-with-sizeof-in-the-earlier-argument-and-not-in-the-later-argument |-- loongarch-defconfig | |-- arch-loongarch-kvm-..-..-..-virt-kvm-kvm_main.c:warning:kvmalloc_array-sizes-specified-with-sizeof-in-the-earlier-argument-and-not-in-the-later-argument | `-- drivers-char-virtio_console.c:warning:u-directive-output-may-be-truncated-writing-between-and-bytes-into-a-region-of-size-between-and |-- loongarch-randconfig-002-20240801 | `-- drivers-char-virtio_console.c:warning:u-directive-output-may-be-truncated-writing-between-and-bytes-into-a-region-of-size-between-and `-- x86_64-allyesconfig `-- drivers-gpu-drm-amd-amdgpu-..-amdkfd-kfd_topology.c:warning:stack-frame-size-()-exceeds-limit-()-in-kfd_topology_add_device elapsed time: 727m configs tested: 17 configs skipped: 132 tested configs: arm64 allmodconfig clang-20 arm64 allnoconfig gcc-14.1.0 arm64 defconfig gcc-14.1.0 arm64 randconfig-001-20240801 clang-20 arm64 randconfig-002-20240801 clang-20 arm64 randconfig-003-20240801 gcc-14.1.0 arm64 randconfig-004-20240801 gcc-14.1.0 loongarch allmodconfig gcc-14.1.0 loongarch allnoconfig gcc-14.1.0 loongarch defconfig gcc-14.1.0 loongarch randconfig-001-20240801 gcc-14.1.0 loongarch randconfig-002-20240801 gcc-14.1.0 x86_64 alldefconfig gcc-13 x86_64 allnoconfig clang-18 x86_64 allyesconfig clang-18 x86_64 defconfig gcc-13 x86_64 rhel-8.3-rust clang-18 -- 0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service https://github.com/intel/lkp-tests/wiki

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[openeuler:OLK-6.6 701/11695] vgettimeofday.c:undefined reference to `__tsan_volatile_read4'
by kernel test robot 01 Aug '24

01 Aug '24

Hi Andrew, FYI, the error/warning still remains. tree: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel.git OLK-6.6 head: e0427893d95be3be1bb71e10dfb53b6f732e8e42 commit: f9b54a6714445cde83aeff0318cf767b3b81229d [701/11695] arm64:ilp32: add ARM64_ILP32 to Kconfig config: arm64-randconfig-004-20240801 (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20240801/202408010424.vAnjVI1d-lkp@…) compiler: aarch64-linux-gcc (GCC) 14.1.0 reproduce (this is a W=1 build): (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20240801/202408010424.vAnjVI1d-lkp@…) If you fix the issue in a separate patch/commit (i.e. not just a new version of the same patch/commit), kindly add following tags | Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp(a)intel.com> | Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202408010424.vAnjVI1d-lkp@intel.com/ All errors (new ones prefixed by >>): scripts/genksyms/parse.y: warning: 9 shift/reduce conflicts [-Wconflicts-sr] scripts/genksyms/parse.y: warning: 5 reduce/reduce conflicts [-Wconflicts-rr] scripts/genksyms/parse.y: note: rerun with option '-Wcounterexamples' to generate conflict counterexamples arch/arm64/kernel/vdso-ilp32/Makefile:90: FORCE prerequisite is missing arch/arm64/kernel/vdso-ilp32/Makefile:87: FORCE prerequisite is missing arch/arm64/kernel/vdso-ilp32/Makefile:84: FORCE prerequisite is missing arch/arm64/kernel/vdso-ilp32/Makefile:68: FORCE prerequisite is missing ld: arch/arm64/kernel/vdso-ilp32/vgettimeofday-ilp32.o: in function `__cvdso_gettimeofday_data.constprop.0': >> vgettimeofday.c:(.text+0x44): undefined reference to `__tsan_volatile_read4' ld: vgettimeofday.c:(.text+0x5c): undefined reference to `__tsan_read4' ld: vgettimeofday.c:(.text+0x84): undefined reference to `__tsan_read8' ld: vgettimeofday.c:(.text+0x90): undefined reference to `__tsan_read8' ld: vgettimeofday.c:(.text+0x9c): undefined reference to `__tsan_read8' ld: vgettimeofday.c:(.text+0xa8): undefined reference to `__tsan_read4' ld: vgettimeofday.c:(.text+0xb8): undefined reference to `__tsan_read4' ld: vgettimeofday.c:(.text+0xc8): undefined reference to `__tsan_read8' ld: vgettimeofday.c:(.text+0xd8): undefined reference to `__tsan_volatile_read4' ld: vgettimeofday.c:(.text+0x138): undefined reference to `__tsan_write4' ld: vgettimeofday.c:(.text+0x144): undefined reference to `__tsan_write4' ld: vgettimeofday.c:(.text+0x194): undefined reference to `__tsan_read4' ld: vgettimeofday.c:(.text+0x1a0): undefined reference to `__tsan_write4' ld: vgettimeofday.c:(.text+0x1ac): undefined reference to `__tsan_read4' ld: vgettimeofday.c:(.text+0x1b8): undefined reference to `__tsan_write4' ld: arch/arm64/kernel/vdso-ilp32/vgettimeofday-ilp32.o: in function `__cvdso_clock_gettime_data.constprop.0': vgettimeofday.c:(.text+0x27c): undefined reference to `__tsan_volatile_read4' ld: vgettimeofday.c:(.text+0x290): undefined reference to `__tsan_read8' ld: vgettimeofday.c:(.text+0x29c): undefined reference to `__tsan_write8' ld: vgettimeofday.c:(.text+0x2a8): undefined reference to `__tsan_read8' ld: vgettimeofday.c:(.text+0x2b4): undefined reference to `__tsan_write8' ld: vgettimeofday.c:(.text+0x2c4): undefined reference to `__tsan_volatile_read4' ld: vgettimeofday.c:(.text+0x314): undefined reference to `__tsan_volatile_read4' ld: vgettimeofday.c:(.text+0x32c): undefined reference to `__tsan_read4' ld: vgettimeofday.c:(.text+0x360): undefined reference to `__tsan_read8' ld: vgettimeofday.c:(.text+0x370): undefined reference to `__tsan_read8' ld: vgettimeofday.c:(.text+0x37c): undefined reference to `__tsan_read8' ld: vgettimeofday.c:(.text+0x388): undefined reference to `__tsan_read4' ld: vgettimeofday.c:(.text+0x398): undefined reference to `__tsan_read4' ld: vgettimeofday.c:(.text+0x3a8): undefined reference to `__tsan_read8' ld: vgettimeofday.c:(.text+0x3b8): undefined reference to `__tsan_volatile_read4' ld: vgettimeofday.c:(.text+0x418): undefined reference to `__tsan_write8' ld: vgettimeofday.c:(.text+0x424): undefined reference to `__tsan_write8' ld: arch/arm64/kernel/vdso-ilp32/vgettimeofday-ilp32.o: in function `__kernel_clock_getres': vgettimeofday.c:(.text+0x530): undefined reference to `__tsan_volatile_read4' ld: vgettimeofday.c:(.text+0x55c): undefined reference to `__tsan_write8' ld: vgettimeofday.c:(.text+0x568): undefined reference to `__tsan_write8' ld: arch/arm64/kernel/vdso-ilp32/vgettimeofday-ilp32.o: in function `_sub_I_00099_0': >> vgettimeofday.c:(.text.startup+0x8): undefined reference to `__tsan_init' collect2: error: ld returned 1 exit status make[3]: *** [arch/arm64/kernel/vdso-ilp32/Makefile:68: arch/arm64/kernel/vdso-ilp32/vdso-ilp32.so.dbg] Error 1 shuffle=953699413 make[3]: Target 'include/generated/vdso-ilp32-offsets.h' not remade because of errors. make[2]: *** [arch/arm64/Makefile:201: vdso_prepare] Error 2 shuffle=953699413 make[2]: Target 'prepare' not remade because of errors. make[1]: *** [Makefile:234: __sub-make] Error 2 shuffle=953699413 make[1]: Target 'prepare' not remade because of errors. make: *** [Makefile:234: __sub-make] Error 2 shuffle=953699413 make: Target 'prepare' not remade because of errors. -- 0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service https://github.com/intel/lkp-tests/wiki

1 0

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/1] fix CVE-2024-42155
by Hongbo Li 31 Jul '24

31 Jul '24

Fix CVE-2024-42155. Holger Dengler (1): s390/pkey: Wipe copies of protected- and secure-keys drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c | 78 ++++++++++++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 2

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1 0/1] fix CVE-2024-42155
by Hongbo Li 31 Jul '24

31 Jul '24

Fix CVE-2024-42155. Holger Dengler (1): s390/pkey: Wipe copies of protected- and secure-keys drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c | 81 ++++++++++++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 2

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/1] fix CVE-2024-42155
by Hongbo Li 31 Jul '24

31 Jul '24

Fix CVE-2024-42155. Holger Dengler (1): s390/pkey: Wipe copies of protected- and secure-keys drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c | 78 ++++++++++++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 2

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/1] fix CVE-2024-42155
by Hongbo Li 31 Jul '24

31 Jul '24

Fix CVE-2024-42155. Holger Dengler (1): s390/pkey: Wipe copies of protected- and secure-keys drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c | 80 ++++++++++++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 2

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1 0/1] fix CVE-2024-42155
by Hongbo Li 31 Jul '24

31 Jul '24

Fix CVE-2024-42155. Holger Dengler (1): s390/pkey: Wipe copies of protected- and secure-keys drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c | 81 ++++++++++++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 2

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/1] fix CVE-2024-42155
by Hongbo Li 31 Jul '24

31 Jul '24

Fix CVE-2024-42155. Holger Dengler (1): s390/pkey: Wipe copies of protected- and secure-keys drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c | 80 ++++++++++++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 2

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/5] *** SUBJECT HERE ***
by hejingxian 31 Jul '24

31 Jul '24

From: ikarosYuuki <tujipei(a)huawei.com> *** BLURB HERE *** ikarosYuuki (5): add virtcca cvm host feature pmu: enable pmu phys irq inject for cvm mm: enable swiotlb alloc for cvm share mem config: modify arm64 defconfig for cvm feature gicv3: add lpi support for cvm guest arch/arm64/Kconfig | 8 + arch/arm64/configs/openeuler_defconfig | 5 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h | 18 + arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 15 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_tmi.h | 333 ++++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_tmm.h | 30 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/set_memory.h | 1 + arch/arm64/include/asm/virtcca_cvm_guest.h | 39 + arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 4 + arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile | 1 + arch/arm64/kernel/virtcca_cvm_guest.c | 93 +++ arch/arm64/kvm/Kconfig | 6 +- arch/arm64/kvm/Makefile | 3 + arch/arm64/kvm/arch_timer.c | 92 +++ arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c | 136 +++- arch/arm64/kvm/guest.c | 8 + arch/arm64/kvm/mmio.c | 17 +- arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c | 7 + arch/arm64/kvm/pmu-emul.c | 9 + arch/arm64/kvm/psci.c | 12 +- arch/arm64/kvm/reset.c | 13 + arch/arm64/kvm/tmi.c | 141 ++++ arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-v3.c | 17 +- arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic.c | 55 +- arch/arm64/kvm/virtcca_cvm.c | 889 +++++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kvm/virtcca_cvm_exit.c | 221 +++++ arch/arm64/mm/init.c | 3 + arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c | 5 +- arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c | 3 + drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3-its.c | 231 +++++- drivers/perf/arm_pmu.c | 17 + include/kvm/arm_arch_timer.h | 4 + include/linux/kvm_host.h | 22 + include/linux/perf/arm_pmu.h | 4 + include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 13 + kernel/dma/swiotlb.c | 16 + virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 4 + 37 files changed, 2437 insertions(+), 58 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_tmi.h create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/virtcca_cvm_guest.h create mode 100644 arch/arm64/kernel/virtcca_cvm_guest.c create mode 100644 arch/arm64/kvm/tmi.c create mode 100644 arch/arm64/kvm/virtcca_cvm.c create mode 100644 arch/arm64/kvm/virtcca_cvm_exit.c -- 2.27.0

2 6

[PATCH OLK-5.10] cvm: delete dead code and resolve macro definition holes
by Ju Fu 31 Jul '24

31 Jul '24

virtcca inclusion category: feature bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I9TM0T -------------------------------- delete dead code and resolve macro definition holes Signed-off-by: Ju Fu <fuju1(a)huawei.com> --- diff -uprN itrustee_tzdriver/auth/auth_base_impl.c itrustee_tzdriver_new/auth/auth_base_impl.c --- itrustee_tzdriver/auth/auth_base_impl.c 2024-07-12 11:08:59.353629380 +0800 +++ itrustee_tzdriver_new/auth/auth_base_impl.c 2024-07-12 10:51:32.889629380 +0800 @@ -336,11 +336,25 @@ int check_teecd_auth(void) return CHECK_ACCESS_SUCC; } +int check_proxy_auth(void) +{ + int ret = check_proc_uid_path(PROXY_PATH_UID_AUTH_CTX); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + return CHECK_ACCESS_SUCC; +} #else int check_teecd_auth(void) { return 0; } + +int check_proxy_auth(void) +{ + return 0; +} #endif #ifdef CONFIG_TEE_TELEPORT_AUTH diff -uprN itrustee_tzdriver/auth/auth_base_impl.h itrustee_tzdriver_new/auth/auth_base_impl.h --- itrustee_tzdriver/auth/auth_base_impl.h 2024-07-12 11:08:59.353629380 +0800 +++ itrustee_tzdriver_new/auth/auth_base_impl.h 2024-07-12 10:51:32.885629380 +0800 @@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ void mutex_crypto_hash_lock(void); void mutex_crypto_hash_unlock(void); int check_hidl_auth(void); int check_teecd_auth(void); +int check_proxy_auth(void); #else static inline void free_shash_handle(void) @@ -100,6 +101,11 @@ int check_teecd_auth(void) { return 0; } + +int check_proxy_auth(void) +{ + return 0; +} #endif /* CLIENT_AUTH || TEECD_AUTH */ diff -uprN itrustee_tzdriver/core/agent.c itrustee_tzdriver_new/core/agent.c --- itrustee_tzdriver/core/agent.c 2024-07-12 11:08:59.357629380 +0800 +++ itrustee_tzdriver_new/core/agent.c 2024-07-12 10:51:32.865629380 +0800 @@ -298,7 +298,8 @@ int tc_ns_set_native_hash(unsigned long return ret; } -int tc_ns_late_init(unsigned long arg) +int tc_ns_late_init(const struct tc_ns_dev_file *dev_file, + unsigned long arg) { int ret = 0; struct tc_ns_smc_cmd smc_cmd = { {0}, 0 }; @@ -320,6 +321,8 @@ int tc_ns_late_init(unsigned long arg) smc_cmd.operation_h_phys = (uint64_t)mailbox_virt_to_phys((uintptr_t)&mb_pack->operation) >> ADDR_TRANS_NUM; + if (dev_file->isVM) + smc_cmd.nsid = dev_file->nsid; if (tc_ns_smc(&smc_cmd)) { ret = -EPERM; tloge("late int failed\n"); @@ -597,7 +600,8 @@ int tc_ns_wait_event(unsigned int agent_ return ret; } -int tc_ns_sync_sys_time(const struct tc_ns_client_time *tc_ns_time) +int tc_ns_sync_sys_time(const struct tc_ns_dev_file *dev_file, + const struct tc_ns_client_time *tc_ns_time) { struct tc_ns_smc_cmd smc_cmd = { {0}, 0 }; int ret = 0; @@ -623,6 +627,8 @@ int tc_ns_sync_sys_time(const struct tc_ smc_cmd.operation_phys = mailbox_virt_to_phys((uintptr_t)&mb_pack->operation); smc_cmd.operation_h_phys = (uint64_t)mailbox_virt_to_phys((uintptr_t)&mb_pack->operation) >> ADDR_TRANS_NUM; + if (dev_file && dev_file->isVM) + smc_cmd.nsid = dev_file->nsid; if (tc_ns_smc(&smc_cmd)) { tloge("tee adjust time failed, return error\n"); ret = -EPERM; @@ -632,7 +638,8 @@ int tc_ns_sync_sys_time(const struct tc_ return ret; } -int sync_system_time_from_user(const struct tc_ns_client_time *user_time) +int sync_system_time_from_user(const struct tc_ns_dev_file *dev_file, + const struct tc_ns_client_time *user_time) { int ret = 0; struct tc_ns_client_time time = { 0 }; @@ -647,7 +654,7 @@ int sync_system_time_from_user(const str return -EFAULT; } - ret = tc_ns_sync_sys_time(&time); + ret = tc_ns_sync_sys_time(dev_file, &time); if (ret != 0) tloge("sync system time from user failed, ret = 0x%x\n", ret); @@ -665,7 +672,7 @@ void sync_system_time_from_kernel(void) time.seconds = (uint32_t)kernel_time.ts.tv_sec; time.millis = (uint32_t)(kernel_time.ts.tv_nsec / MS_TO_NS); - ret = tc_ns_sync_sys_time(&time); + ret = tc_ns_sync_sys_time(NULL, &time); if (ret != 0) tloge("sync system time from kernel failed, ret = 0x%x\n", ret); @@ -949,6 +956,8 @@ int tc_ns_register_agent(struct tc_ns_de nsid = task_active_pid_ns(current)->ns.inum; if (dev_file != NULL && dev_file->nsid == 0) dev_file->nsid = nsid; + if (dev_file->isVM) + nsid = dev_file->nsid; #endif if (is_agent_already_exist(agent_id, nsid, &event_data, dev_file, &find_flag)) diff -uprN itrustee_tzdriver/core/agent.h itrustee_tzdriver_new/core/agent.h --- itrustee_tzdriver/core/agent.h 2024-07-12 11:08:59.357629380 +0800 +++ itrustee_tzdriver_new/core/agent.h 2024-07-12 10:51:32.861629380 +0800 @@ -118,7 +118,8 @@ int agent_process_work(const struct tc_n unsigned int agent_id, unsigned int nsid); int is_agent_alive(unsigned int agent_id, unsigned int nsid); int tc_ns_set_native_hash(unsigned long arg, unsigned int cmd_id); -int tc_ns_late_init(unsigned long arg); +int tc_ns_late_init(const struct tc_ns_dev_file *dev_file, + unsigned long arg); int tc_ns_register_agent(struct tc_ns_dev_file *dev_file, unsigned int agent_id, unsigned int buffer_size, void **buffer, bool user_agent); int tc_ns_unregister_agent(unsigned int agent_id, unsigned int nsid); @@ -126,7 +127,8 @@ void send_crashed_event_response_all(con int tc_ns_wait_event(unsigned int agent_id, unsigned int nsid); int tc_ns_send_event_response(unsigned int agent_id, unsigned int nsid); void send_crashed_event_response_single(const struct tc_ns_dev_file *dev_file); -int sync_system_time_from_user(const struct tc_ns_client_time *user_time); +int sync_system_time_from_user(const struct tc_ns_dev_file *dev_file, + const struct tc_ns_client_time *user_time); void sync_system_time_from_kernel(void); int tee_agent_clear_work(struct tc_ns_client_context *context, unsigned int dev_file_id); diff -uprN itrustee_tzdriver/core/gp_ops.c itrustee_tzdriver_new/core/gp_ops.c --- itrustee_tzdriver/core/gp_ops.c 2024-07-12 11:08:59.357629380 +0800 +++ itrustee_tzdriver_new/core/gp_ops.c 2024-07-12 10:51:32.845629380 +0800 @@ -231,6 +231,84 @@ int write_to_client(void __user *dest, s return 0; } +int read_from_VMclient(void *dest, size_t dest_size, + const void __user *src, size_t size, pid_t vm_pid) +{ + struct task_struct *vmp_task; + int i_rdlen; + int i_index; + int ret; + + if (!dest || !src) { + tloge("src or dest is NULL input buffer\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + + if (size > dest_size) { + tloge("size is larger than dest_size or size is 0\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + if (!size) + return 0; + + tlogv("django verbose, execute access_process_vm"); + vmp_task = get_pid_task(find_get_pid(vm_pid), PIDTYPE_PID); + if (vmp_task == NULL) { + tloge("no task for pid %d \n", vm_pid); + return -EFAULT; + } + tlogv("django verbose, task_struct * for pid %d is 0x%px", vm_pid, vmp_task); + + i_rdlen = access_process_vm(vmp_task, (unsigned long)(src), dest, size, FOLL_FORCE); + if (i_rdlen != size) { + tloge("only read %d of %ld bytes by access_process_vm \n", i_rdlen, size); + return -EFAULT; + } + tlogv("django verbose, read %d byes by access_process_vm succeed", + i_rdlen); + for (i_index = 0; i_index < 32 && i_index < size; i_index ++) { + tlogv("django verbose, *(dest + i_index) + %d) = %2.2x", + i_index, *((char*)dest + i_index)); + } + return 0; +} + +int write_to_VMclient(void __user *dest, size_t dest_size, + const void *src, size_t size, pid_t vm_pid) +{ + struct task_struct *vmp_task; + int i_wtlen; + int i_index; + int ret; + + if (!dest || !src) { + tloge("src or dest is NULL input buffer\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + + if (size > dest_size) { + tloge("size is larger than dest_size or size is 0\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + if (!size) + return 0; + + vmp_task = get_pid_task(find_get_pid(vm_pid), PIDTYPE_PID); + if (vmp_task == NULL) { + tloge("no task for pid %d \n", vm_pid); + return -EFAULT; + } + + i_wtlen = access_process_vm(vmp_task, (unsigned long)(dest), src, size, FOLL_FORCE | FOLL_WRITE); + if (i_wtlen != size) { + tloge("only write %d of %ld bytes by access_process_vm \n", i_wtlen, size); + return -EFAULT; + } + tlogv("django verbose, write %d byes by access_process_vm succeed", + i_wtlen); + return 0; +} + static bool is_input_tempmem(unsigned int param_type) { if (param_type == TEEC_MEMREF_TEMP_INPUT || @@ -240,7 +318,8 @@ static bool is_input_tempmem(unsigned in return false; } -static int update_input_data(const union tc_ns_client_param *client_param, +static int update_input_data(const struct tc_call_params *call_params, + const union tc_ns_client_param *client_param, uint32_t buffer_size, void *temp_buf, unsigned int param_type, uint8_t kernel_params) { @@ -250,11 +329,22 @@ static int update_input_data(const union buffer_addr = client_param->memref.buffer | ((uint64_t)client_param->memref.buffer_h_addr << ADDR_TRANS_NUM); - if (read_from_client(temp_buf, buffer_size, - (void *)(uintptr_t)buffer_addr, - buffer_size, kernel_params) != 0) { - tloge("copy memref buffer failed\n"); - return -EFAULT; + if (call_params->dev->isVM && !kernel_params) { + tlogd("is VM\n"); + if (read_from_VMclient(temp_buf, buffer_size, + (void *)(uintptr_t)buffer_addr, + buffer_size, call_params->dev->vmpid) != 0) { + tloge("copy memref buffer failed\n"); + return -EFAULT; + } + } else { + tlogd("is not VM\n"); + if (read_from_client(temp_buf, buffer_size, + (void *)(uintptr_t)buffer_addr, + buffer_size, kernel_params) != 0) { + tloge("copy memref buffer failed\n"); + return -EFAULT; + } } return 0; } @@ -312,7 +402,7 @@ static int alloc_for_tmp_mem(const struc op_params->local_tmpbuf[index].temp_buffer = temp_buf; op_params->local_tmpbuf[index].size = buffer_size; - if (update_input_data(client_param, buffer_size, temp_buf, + if (update_input_data(call_params, client_param, buffer_size, temp_buf, param_type, kernel_params) != 0) return -EFAULT; @@ -324,8 +414,9 @@ static int alloc_for_tmp_mem(const struc return 0; } -static int check_buffer_for_ref(uint32_t *buffer_size, - const union tc_ns_client_param *client_param, uint8_t kernel_params) +static int check_buffer_for_ref(const struct tc_call_params *call_params, + uint32_t *buffer_size, const union tc_ns_client_param *client_param, + uint8_t kernel_params) { uint64_t size_addr = client_param->memref.size_addr | ((uint64_t)client_param->memref.size_h_addr << ADDR_TRANS_NUM); @@ -416,7 +507,7 @@ static int alloc_for_ref_mem(const struc return -EINVAL; client_param = &(call_params->context->params[index]); - if (check_buffer_for_ref(&buffer_size, client_param, kernel_params) != 0) + if (check_buffer_for_ref(call_params, &buffer_size, client_param, kernel_params) != 0) return -EINVAL; op_params->mb_pack->operation.params[index].memref.buffer = 0; @@ -491,6 +582,134 @@ static int check_buffer_for_sharedmem(ui return 0; } +typedef union { + struct{ + uint64_t user_addr; + uint64_t page_num; + }block; + struct{ + uint64_t vm_page_size; + uint64_t shared_mem_size; + }share; +}struct_page_block; + +int fill_vm_shared_mem_info_block(uint64_t block_buf, uint32_t block_nums, + uint32_t offset, uint32_t buffer_size, uint64_t info_addr, uint32_t vm_page_size,pid_t vm_pid) +{ + struct pagelist_info *page_info = NULL; + struct page **host_pages = NULL; + uint64_t *phys_addr = NULL; + uint32_t host_page_num; + uint32_t i; + uint32_t j; + uint32_t k; + uint32_t block_page_total_no = 0; + struct task_struct *vmp_task; + uint32_t vm_pages_no = 0; + uint32_t host_pages_no = 0; + uint32_t host_offset = 0; + uint64_t vm_start_vaddr; + void *host_start_vaddr; + uint32_t page_total_no = 0; + uint32_t vm_pages_total_size = 0; + vmp_task = get_pid_task(find_get_pid(vm_pid), PIDTYPE_PID); + if (vmp_task == NULL) { + tloge("no task for pid %d", vm_pid); + return -EFAULT; + } + uint32_t expect_page_num = PAGE_ALIGN(buffer_size + (offset & (~PAGE_MASK))) / PAGE_SIZE; + struct_page_block *page_block = (struct_page_block *)(uintptr_t)block_buf; + for (i = 0; i < block_nums; i++){ + vm_start_vaddr = page_block[i].block.user_addr; + vm_pages_no = page_block[i].block.page_num; + + if (i==0 && vm_page_size > PAGE_SIZE) { + vm_start_vaddr += (offset & PAGE_MASK); + vm_pages_total_size = vm_pages_no * vm_page_size - (offset & PAGE_MASK); + } else { + vm_pages_total_size = vm_pages_no * vm_page_size; + } + + host_offset = ((uint32_t)(uintptr_t)vm_start_vaddr) & (~PAGE_MASK); + host_start_vaddr = (void *)(((uint64_t)vm_start_vaddr) & PAGE_MASK); + host_pages_no = PAGE_ALIGN(host_offset + vm_pages_total_size) / PAGE_SIZE; + if (i== block_nums -1 && vm_page_size > PAGE_SIZE) + host_pages_no = expect_page_num - page_total_no; + + host_pages = (struct page **)vmalloc(host_pages_no * sizeof(uint64_t)); + if (host_pages == NULL) + return -EFAULT; + tlogd("page_block[%u].block.user_addr = %llx, page_block[%u].block.page_num = %llx\n", i, vm_start_vaddr, i, vm_pages_no); + + #if (KERNEL_VERSION(6, 5, 0) <= LINUX_VERSION_CODE) + host_page_num = get_user_pages_remote(vmp_task->mm, host_start_vaddr, + (unsigned long)host_pages_no, + FOLL_FORCE, host_pages, NULL); + #elif (KERNEL_VERSION(5, 9, 0) <= LINUX_VERSION_CODE) + host_page_num = get_user_pages_remote(vmp_task->mm, host_start_vaddr, + (unsigned long)host_pages_no, + FOLL_FORCE, host_pages, + NULL, NULL); + #elif (KERNEL_VERSION(4, 10, 0) <= LINUX_VERSION_CODE) + host_page_num = get_user_pages_remote(vmp_task, vmp_task->mm, + host_start_vaddr, (unsigned long)host_pages_no, FOLL_FORCE, + host_pages, NULL, NULL); + #elif (KERNEL_VERSION(4, 9, 0) <= LINUX_VERSION_CODE) + host_page_num = get_user_pages_remote(vmp_task, vmp_task->mm, + host_start_vaddr, (unsigned long)host_pages_no, + FOLL_FORCE, host_pages, NULL); + #else + host_page_num = get_user_pages_remote(vmp_task, vmp_task->mm, + host_start_vaddr, (unsigned long)host_pages_no, + 1, 1, host_pages, NULL); + #endif + if (host_page_num != host_pages_no) { + tloge("get pages failed, page_num = %u, expect %u\n", host_page_num, host_pages_no); + if (host_page_num > 0) { + release_pages(host_pages, host_page_num); + } + vfree(host_pages); + return -EFAULT; + } + + phys_addr = (uint64_t *)(uintptr_t)info_addr + (sizeof(*page_info) / sizeof(uint64_t)); + phys_addr = (uint64_t *)((char *)phys_addr + page_total_no * sizeof(uint64_t)); + block_page_total_no = 0; + for (j = 0; j < host_pages_no; j++) { + struct page *page = NULL; + page = host_pages[j]; + if (page == NULL) { + release_pages(host_pages, host_page_num); + vfree(host_pages); + tloge("page == NULL \n"); + return -EFAULT; + } + void *host_page_phy = (uintptr_t)page_to_phys(page); + if (vm_page_size < PAGE_SIZE) { + if (j !=0) + host_offset = 0; + uint32_t litil_page_num = (PAGE_SIZE - host_offset) / vm_page_size; + uint64_t host_page_start_addr = (uint64_t)host_page_phy + host_offset; + for (k = 0; k < litil_page_num && block_page_total_no < vm_pages_no;k++) { + phys_addr[block_page_total_no++] = host_page_start_addr + k * vm_page_size; + } + } else if (vm_page_size >= PAGE_SIZE){ + phys_addr[j] = (uintptr_t)page_to_phys(page); + } + } + page_total_no += (vm_page_size >= PAGE_SIZE ? host_pages_no : vm_pages_no); + vfree(host_pages); + } + + page_info = (struct pagelist_info *)(uintptr_t)info_addr; + page_info->page_num = page_total_no; + page_info->page_size = (vm_page_size > PAGE_SIZE ? PAGE_SIZE : vm_page_size); + page_info->sharedmem_offset = offset & (~PAGE_MASK); + page_info->sharedmem_size = buffer_size; + + return 0; +} + static int transfer_shared_mem(const struct tc_call_params *call_params, struct tc_op_params *op_params, uint8_t kernel_params, uint32_t param_type, unsigned int index) @@ -499,10 +718,11 @@ static int transfer_shared_mem(const str void *start_vaddr = NULL; union tc_ns_client_param *client_param = NULL; uint32_t buffer_size; - uint32_t pages_no; + uint32_t pages_no = 0; uint32_t offset; uint32_t buff_len; uint64_t buffer_addr; + uint32_t i; if (index >= TEE_PARAM_NUM) return -EINVAL; @@ -513,19 +733,57 @@ static int transfer_shared_mem(const str buffer_addr = client_param->memref.buffer | ((uint64_t)client_param->memref.buffer_h_addr << ADDR_TRANS_NUM); - buff = (void *)(uint64_t)(buffer_addr + client_param->memref.offset); - start_vaddr = (void *)(((uint64_t)buff) & PAGE_MASK); - offset = ((uint32_t)(uintptr_t)buff) & (~PAGE_MASK); - pages_no = PAGE_ALIGN(offset + buffer_size) / PAGE_SIZE; - - buff_len = sizeof(struct pagelist_info) + (sizeof(uint64_t) * pages_no); - buff = mailbox_alloc(buff_len, MB_FLAG_ZERO); - if (buff == NULL) - return -EFAULT; - if (fill_shared_mem_info((uint64_t)start_vaddr, pages_no, offset, buffer_size, (uint64_t)buff)) { - mailbox_free(buff); - return -EFAULT; + if (call_params->dev->isVM) { + uint32_t block_buf_size = buffer_size - sizeof(struct_page_block); + void *tmp_buf = kzalloc(buffer_size, GFP_KERNEL); + if (read_from_client(tmp_buf, buffer_size, buffer_addr, buffer_size, 0)) { + tloge("copy blocks failed\n"); + return -EFAULT; + } + struct_page_block *block_buf = (struct_page_block *)((char *)tmp_buf + sizeof(struct_page_block)); + uint32_t block_nums = block_buf_size / sizeof(struct_page_block); + uint32_t share_mem_size = ((struct_page_block *)tmp_buf)->share.shared_mem_size; + uint32_t vm_page_size = ((struct_page_block *)tmp_buf)->share.vm_page_size; + + call_params->dev->vm_page_size = vm_page_size; + offset = (uint64_t)(client_param->memref.h_offset + client_param->memref.offset); + for(i = 0;i < block_nums; i++){ + pages_no += block_buf[i].block.page_num; + } + if (vm_page_size > PAGE_SIZE){ + buff = (void *)(uint64_t)(client_param->memref.h_offset + client_param->memref.offset); + pages_no = PAGE_ALIGN((((uint32_t)(uintptr_t)buff) & (~PAGE_MASK)) + share_mem_size) / PAGE_SIZE; + tlogd("page_no = %u \n", pages_no); + } + + buff_len = sizeof(struct pagelist_info) + (sizeof(uint64_t) * pages_no); + buff = mailbox_alloc(buff_len, MB_FLAG_ZERO); + if (buff == NULL) { + kfree(tmp_buf); + return -EFAULT; + } + if (fill_vm_shared_mem_info_block((uint64_t)block_buf, block_nums, offset, + share_mem_size, (uint64_t)buff, vm_page_size, call_params->dev->vmpid)) { + kfree(tmp_buf); + mailbox_free(buff); + return -EFAULT; + } + kfree(tmp_buf); + } else { + buff = (void *)(uint64_t)(buffer_addr + client_param->memref.offset); + start_vaddr = (void *)(((uint64_t)buff) & PAGE_MASK); + offset = ((uint32_t)(uintptr_t)buff) & (~PAGE_MASK); + pages_no = PAGE_ALIGN(offset + buffer_size) / PAGE_SIZE; + + buff_len = sizeof(struct pagelist_info) + (sizeof(uint64_t) * pages_no); + buff = mailbox_alloc(buff_len, MB_FLAG_ZERO); + if (buff == NULL) + return -EFAULT; + if (fill_shared_mem_info((uint64_t)start_vaddr, pages_no, offset, buffer_size, (uint64_t)buff)) { + mailbox_free(buff); + return -EFAULT; + } } op_params->local_tmpbuf[index].temp_buffer = buff; @@ -695,13 +953,24 @@ static int update_tmp_mem(const struct t if (buffer_size == 0) return 0; /* Only update the buffer when the buffer size is valid in complete case */ - if (write_to_client((void *)(uintptr_t)buffer_addr, - operation->params[index].memref.size, - op_params->local_tmpbuf[index].temp_buffer, - operation->params[index].memref.size, - call_params->dev->kernel_api) != 0) { - tloge("copy tempbuf failed\n"); - return -ENOMEM; + if (call_params->dev->isVM && !call_params->dev->kernel_api) { + if (write_to_VMclient((void *)(uintptr_t)buffer_addr, + operation->params[index].memref.size, + op_params->local_tmpbuf[index].temp_buffer, + operation->params[index].memref.size, + call_params->dev->vmpid) != 0) { + tloge("copy tempbuf failed\n"); + return -ENOMEM; + } + } else { + if (write_to_client((void *)(uintptr_t)buffer_addr, + operation->params[index].memref.size, + op_params->local_tmpbuf[index].temp_buffer, + operation->params[index].memref.size, + call_params->dev->kernel_api) != 0) { + tloge("copy tempbuf failed\n"); + return -ENOMEM; + } } return 0; } @@ -871,7 +1140,10 @@ static void free_operation_params(const #ifdef CONFIG_NOCOPY_SHAREDMEM tlogd("free_operation_params release nocopy or register shm\n"); temp_buf = local_tmpbuf[index].temp_buffer; - if (temp_buf != NULL) { + if (temp_buf != NULL && call_params->dev->isVM) { + release_vm_shared_mem_page(temp_buf, local_tmpbuf[index].size, call_params->dev->vm_page_size); + mailbox_free(temp_buf); + } else if (temp_buf != NULL && !call_params->dev->isVM) { release_shared_mem_page(temp_buf, local_tmpbuf[index].size); mailbox_free(temp_buf); } diff -uprN itrustee_tzdriver/core/gp_ops.h itrustee_tzdriver_new/core/gp_ops.h --- itrustee_tzdriver/core/gp_ops.h 2024-07-12 11:08:59.357629380 +0800 +++ itrustee_tzdriver_new/core/gp_ops.h 2024-07-12 10:51:32.841629380 +0800 @@ -28,5 +28,9 @@ int tc_client_call(const struct tc_call_ bool is_tmp_mem(uint32_t param_type); bool is_ref_mem(uint32_t param_type); bool is_val_param(uint32_t param_type); +int write_to_VMclient(void __user *dest, size_t dest_size, + const void *src, size_t size, pid_t vm_pid); +int read_from_VMclient(void *dest, size_t dest_size, + const void __user *src, size_t size, pid_t vm_pid); #endif diff -uprN itrustee_tzdriver/core/session_manager.c itrustee_tzdriver_new/core/session_manager.c --- itrustee_tzdriver/core/session_manager.c 2024-07-12 11:08:59.357629380 +0800 +++ itrustee_tzdriver_new/core/session_manager.c 2024-07-12 10:51:32.801629380 +0800 @@ -589,7 +589,7 @@ static struct tc_ns_service *tc_ref_serv } static int tc_ns_service_init(const unsigned char *uuid, uint32_t uuid_len, - struct tc_ns_service **new_service) + struct tc_ns_service **new_service, uint32_t nsid) { int ret = 0; struct tc_ns_service *service = NULL; @@ -610,7 +610,7 @@ static int tc_ns_service_init(const unsi } #ifdef CONFIG_CONFIDENTIAL_CONTAINER - service->nsid = task_active_pid_ns(current)->ns.inum; + service->nsid = nsid; #else service->nsid = PROC_PID_INIT_INO; #endif @@ -648,7 +648,11 @@ static struct tc_ns_service *find_servic struct tc_ns_service *service = NULL; bool is_full = false; #ifdef CONFIG_CONFIDENTIAL_CONTAINER - unsigned int nsid = task_active_pid_ns(current)->ns.inum; + unsigned int nsid; + if (dev_file->isVM) + nsid = dev_file->nsid; + else + nsid = task_active_pid_ns(current)->ns.inum; #else unsigned int nsid = PROC_PID_INIT_INO; #endif @@ -677,7 +681,7 @@ static struct tc_ns_service *find_servic goto add_service; } /* Create a new service if we couldn't find it in list */ - ret = tc_ns_service_init(context->uuid, UUID_LEN, &service); + ret = tc_ns_service_init(context->uuid, UUID_LEN, &service, nsid); /* unlock after init to make sure find service from all is correct */ mutex_unlock(&g_service_list_lock); if (ret != 0) { @@ -791,10 +795,19 @@ static int32_t load_image_copy_file(stru } return 0; } - if (copy_from_user(params->mb_load_mem + sizeof(load_flag), - (const void __user *)params->file_buffer + loaded_size, load_size)) { - tloge("file buf get fail\n"); - return -EFAULT; + if (params->dev_file->isVM) { + if (read_from_VMclient(params->mb_load_mem + sizeof(load_flag), + load_size, (const void __user *)(params->file_buffer + loaded_size), + load_size, (pid_t)params->dev_file->vmpid)) { + tloge("file buf get failed \n"); + return -EFAULT; + } + } else { + if (copy_from_user(params->mb_load_mem + sizeof(load_flag), + (const void __user *)(params->file_buffer + loaded_size), load_size)) { + tloge("file buf get failed \n"); + return -EFAULT; + } } return 0; } @@ -1387,10 +1400,109 @@ find_session: return ret; } +static int process_vm_ref(struct tc_ns_dev_file *dev_file, + struct tc_ns_client_context *context, unsigned long long *vm_buffers) +{ + struct tc_ns_shared_mem *shared_mem = NULL; + int index = 0; + uint32_t buffer_size; + unsigned int offset = 0; + void *buffer_addr = NULL; + void *size_addr = NULL; + unsigned long long vm_hvas[TEE_PARAM_NUM]={0}; + + if (!dev_file->isVM || !context->file_buffer) + return 0; + + if (copy_from_user(vm_hvas, context->file_buffer, context->file_size) != 0) { + tloge("copy from user failed\n"); + return -EFAULT; + } + + mutex_lock(&dev_file->shared_mem_lock); + list_for_each_entry(shared_mem, &dev_file->shared_mem_list, head) { + for (index = 0; index < TEE_PARAM_NUM; index++) { + buffer_addr = (void *)(uintptr_t)(context->params[index].memref.buffer | + ((uint64_t)context->params[index].memref.buffer_h_addr << ADDR_TRANS_NUM)); + if (shared_mem->user_addr == buffer_addr) { + buffer_addr = (void *)(uintptr_t)(shared_mem->kernel_addr); + size_addr = (void *)(uintptr_t)(context->params[index].memref.size_addr | + ((uint64_t)context->params[index].memref.size_h_addr << ADDR_TRANS_NUM)); + offset = context->params[index].memref.offset; + + if (copy_from_user(&buffer_size, size_addr, sizeof(uint32_t))) { + tloge("copy memref.size_addr failed\n"); + return -EFAULT; + } + + if (read_from_VMclient(buffer_addr + offset, buffer_size, + (uint32_t __user *)(uintptr_t)(vm_hvas[index] + offset), + buffer_size, dev_file->vmpid)) { + tloge("copy memref.buffer failed\n"); + return -EFAULT; + } + vm_buffers[index] = vm_hvas[index]; + } + } + } + mutex_unlock(&dev_file->shared_mem_lock); + return 0; +} + +static int process_vm_ref_end(struct tc_ns_dev_file *dev_file, + struct tc_ns_client_context *context, unsigned long long *vm_buffers) +{ + int ret = 0; + struct tc_ns_shared_mem *shared_mem = NULL; + int index = 0; + uint32_t buffer_size; + unsigned int offset = 0; + void *buffer_addr = NULL; + void *size_addr = NULL; + + if (!dev_file->isVM) + return 0; + + mutex_lock(&dev_file->shared_mem_lock); + list_for_each_entry(shared_mem, &dev_file->shared_mem_list, head) { + for (index = 0; index < TEE_PARAM_NUM; index++) { + buffer_addr = (void *)(uintptr_t)(context->params[index].memref.buffer | + ((uint64_t)context->params[index].memref.buffer_h_addr << ADDR_TRANS_NUM)); + if (shared_mem->user_addr == buffer_addr) { + buffer_addr = (void *)(uintptr_t)(shared_mem->kernel_addr); + size_addr = (void *)(uintptr_t)(context->params[index].memref.size_addr | + ((uint64_t)context->params[index].memref.size_h_addr << ADDR_TRANS_NUM)); + offset = context->params[index].memref.offset; + + if (copy_from_user(&buffer_size, size_addr, sizeof(uint32_t))) { + tloge("copy memref.size_addr failed\n"); + return -EFAULT; + } + + if (write_to_VMclient((void *)(uintptr_t)(vm_buffers[index] + offset), + buffer_size, (void *)(uintptr_t)(buffer_addr + offset), + buffer_size, dev_file->vmpid)) { + tloge("copy buf size failed\n"); + return -EFAULT; + } + } + } + } + mutex_unlock(&dev_file->shared_mem_lock); + return ret; +} + static int ioctl_session_send_cmd(struct tc_ns_dev_file *dev_file, struct tc_ns_client_context *context, void *argp) { int ret; + unsigned long long vm_buffers[TEE_PARAM_NUM]={0}; + + if (dev_file->isVM && + process_vm_ref(dev_file, context, vm_buffers)) { + tloge("copy from VM memref failed\n"); + return -EFAULT; + } ret = tc_ns_send_cmd(dev_file, context); if (ret != 0) @@ -1399,6 +1511,11 @@ static int ioctl_session_send_cmd(struct if (ret == 0) ret = -EFAULT; } + if (ret ==0 && dev_file->isVM && + process_vm_ref_end(dev_file, context, vm_buffers)) { + tloge("copy to VM memref failed\n"); + return -EFAULT; + } return ret; } diff -uprN itrustee_tzdriver/core/shared_mem.c itrustee_tzdriver_new/core/shared_mem.c --- itrustee_tzdriver/core/shared_mem.c 2024-07-12 11:08:59.357629380 +0800 +++ itrustee_tzdriver_new/core/shared_mem.c 2024-07-12 10:51:32.793629380 +0800 @@ -120,6 +120,36 @@ void release_shared_mem_page(uint64_t bu put_page(page); } } + + +void release_vm_shared_mem_page(uint64_t buf, uint32_t buf_size, uint32_t vm_page_size) +{ + uint32_t i; + uint64_t *phys_addr = NULL; + struct pagelist_info *page_info = NULL; + struct page *page = NULL; + struct page *last_page = NULL; + + page_info = (struct pagelist_info *)(uintptr_t)buf; + phys_addr = (uint64_t *)(uintptr_t)buf + (sizeof(*page_info) / sizeof(uint64_t)); + + if (buf_size != sizeof(*page_info) + sizeof(uint64_t) * page_info->page_num) { + tloge("bad size, cannot release page\n"); + return; + } + + for (i = 0; i < page_info->page_num; i++) { + page = (struct page *)(uintptr_t)phys_to_page(phys_addr[i]); + if (page == NULL) + continue; + if (last_page != page) { + set_bit(PG_dirty, &page->flags); + put_page(page); + } + last_page = page; + } +} + #else int fill_shared_mem_info(uint64_t start_vaddr, uint32_t pages_no, diff -uprN itrustee_tzdriver/core/shared_mem.h itrustee_tzdriver_new/core/shared_mem.h --- itrustee_tzdriver/core/shared_mem.h 2024-07-12 11:08:59.357629380 +0800 +++ itrustee_tzdriver_new/core/shared_mem.h 2024-07-12 10:51:32.789629380 +0800 @@ -64,5 +64,5 @@ void free_spi_mem(uint64_t spi_vaddr); int fill_shared_mem_info(uint64_t start_vaddr, uint32_t pages_no, uint32_t offset, uint32_t buffer_size, uint64_t info_addr); void release_shared_mem_page(uint64_t buf, uint32_t buf_size); - +void release_vm_shared_mem_page(uint64_t buf, uint32_t buf_size, uint32_t vm_page_size); #endif diff -uprN itrustee_tzdriver/core/tc_client_driver.c itrustee_tzdriver_new/core/tc_client_driver.c --- itrustee_tzdriver/core/tc_client_driver.c 2024-07-12 11:08:59.357629380 +0800 +++ itrustee_tzdriver_new/core/tc_client_driver.c 2024-07-12 10:51:32.749629380 +0800 @@ -186,6 +186,8 @@ static int tc_ns_get_tee_version(const s smc_cmd.operation_h_phys = (uint64_t)mailbox_virt_to_phys((uintptr_t)&mb_pack->operation) >> ADDR_TRANS_NUM; + if (dev_file->isVM) + smc_cmd.nsid = dev_file->nsid; if (tc_ns_smc(&smc_cmd) != 0) { ret = -EPERM; tloge("smc call returns error ret 0x%x\n", smc_cmd.ret_val); @@ -312,10 +314,14 @@ static int client_login_prepare(uint8_t static int tc_login_check(const struct tc_ns_dev_file *dev_file) { - int ret = check_teecd_auth(); - if (ret != 0) { - tloge("teec auth failed, ret %d\n", ret); - return -EACCES; + int ret; + ret = check_proxy_auth(); + if (ret) { + ret = check_teecd_auth(); + if (ret != 0) { + tloge("teec auth failed, ret %d\n", ret); + return -EACCES; + } } if (!dev_file) @@ -718,12 +724,55 @@ static int ioctl_check_is_ccos(void __us return ret; } +static int copy_buf_to_VM(unsigned int agent_id, unsigned int nsid, + unsigned long buffer_addr, unsigned int vmpid) +{ + int ret = 0; + struct smc_event_data *event_data = NULL; + + event_data = find_event_control(agent_id, nsid); + if (!event_data) + return -EINVAL; + + if (write_to_VMclient((void *)(uintptr_t)buffer_addr, + event_data->agent_buff_size, + event_data->agent_buff_kernel, + event_data->agent_buff_size, + vmpid) != 0) { + tloge("copy agent buffer failed\n"); + return -ENOMEM; + } + return ret; +} + +static int copy_buf_from_VM(unsigned int agent_id, unsigned int nsid, + unsigned long buffer_addr, unsigned int vmpid) +{ + int ret = 0; + struct smc_event_data *event_data = NULL; + + event_data = find_event_control(agent_id, nsid); + if (!event_data) + return -EINVAL; + + if (read_from_VMclient(event_data->agent_buff_kernel, + event_data->agent_buff_size, + (void *)(uintptr_t)buffer_addr, + event_data->agent_buff_size, + vmpid) != 0) { + tloge("copy agent buffer failed\n"); + return -EFAULT; + } + return ret; +} + /* ioctls for the secure storage daemon */ int public_ioctl(const struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg, bool is_from_client_node) { int ret = -EINVAL; struct tc_ns_dev_file *dev_file = NULL; uint32_t nsid = get_nsid(); + unsigned long tmp[2]; void *argp = (void __user *)(uintptr_t)arg; if (file == NULL || file->private_data == NULL) { tloge("invalid params\n"); @@ -731,18 +780,34 @@ int public_ioctl(const struct file *file } dev_file = file->private_data; #ifdef CONFIG_CONFIDENTIAL_CONTAINER - dev_file->nsid = nsid; + if (dev_file != NULL && dev_file->nsid == 0) + dev_file->nsid = nsid; + if (dev_file->isVM) + nsid = dev_file->nsid; #endif + if (dev_file->isVM) { + if (copy_from_user(tmp, (void *)(uintptr_t)arg, sizeof(tmp)) != 0) { + tloge("copy agent args failed\n"); + return -EFAULT; + } + arg = tmp[0]; + } switch (cmd) { case TC_NS_CLIENT_IOCTL_WAIT_EVENT: if (ioctl_check_agent_owner(dev_file, (unsigned int)arg, nsid) != 0) return -EINVAL; ret = tc_ns_wait_event((unsigned int)arg, nsid); + if (!ret && dev_file->isVM) { + ret = copy_buf_to_VM(tmp[0], nsid, tmp[1], dev_file->vmpid); + } break; case TC_NS_CLIENT_IOCTL_SEND_EVENT_RESPONSE: if (ioctl_check_agent_owner(dev_file, (unsigned int)arg, nsid) != 0) return -EINVAL; + if (dev_file->isVM) { + ret = copy_buf_from_VM(tmp[0], nsid, tmp[1], dev_file->vmpid); + } ret = tc_ns_send_event_response((unsigned int)arg, nsid); break; case TC_NS_CLIENT_IOCTL_REGISTER_AGENT: @@ -839,6 +904,14 @@ static int tc_client_agent_ioctl(const s return ret; } +int set_vm_flag(struct tc_ns_dev_file *dev_file, int vmid) +{ + dev_file->nsid = vmid; + dev_file->vmpid = vmid; + tlogd(" dev_file->vmpid %d\n", (int)dev_file->vmpid); + return 0; +} + void handle_cmd_prepare(unsigned int cmd) { if (cmd != TC_NS_CLIENT_IOCTL_WAIT_EVENT && @@ -858,6 +931,10 @@ static long tc_private_ioctl(struct file { int ret = -EFAULT; void *argp = (void __user *)(uintptr_t)arg; + if (cmd == TC_NS_CLIENT_IOCTL_SET_VM_FLAG) { + tlogd(" before set_vm_flag \n"); + return set_vm_flag(file->private_data, (int)arg); + } handle_cmd_prepare(cmd); switch (cmd) { case TC_NS_CLIENT_IOCTL_GET_TEE_VERSION: @@ -872,10 +949,10 @@ static long tc_private_ioctl(struct file mutex_unlock(&g_set_ca_hash_lock); break; case TC_NS_CLIENT_IOCTL_LATEINIT: - ret = tc_ns_late_init(arg); + ret = tc_ns_late_init(file->private_data, arg); break; case TC_NS_CLIENT_IOCTL_SYC_SYS_TIME: - ret = sync_system_time_from_user( + ret = sync_system_time_from_user(file->private_data, (struct tc_ns_client_time *)(uintptr_t)arg); break; default: @@ -894,6 +971,10 @@ static long tc_client_ioctl(struct file int ret = -EFAULT; void *argp = (void __user *)(uintptr_t)arg; + if (cmd == TC_NS_CLIENT_IOCTL_SET_VM_FLAG) { + tlogd(" before set_vm_flag \n"); + return set_vm_flag(file->private_data, (int)arg); + } handle_cmd_prepare(cmd); switch (cmd) { case TC_NS_CLIENT_IOCTL_SES_OPEN_REQ: @@ -925,20 +1006,30 @@ static int tc_client_open(struct inode * { int ret; struct tc_ns_dev_file *dev = NULL; + int vm = 0; (void)inode; - ret = check_teecd_auth(); - if (ret != 0) { - tloge("teec auth failed, ret %d\n", ret); - return -EACCES; + ret =check_proxy_auth(); + if (ret) { + ret = check_teecd_auth(); + if (ret != 0) { + tloge("teec auth failed, ret %d\n", ret); + return -EACCES; + } + } else { + vm = 1; } file->private_data = NULL; ret = tc_ns_client_open(&dev, TEE_REQ_FROM_USER_MODE); - if (ret == 0) + if (ret == 0) { file->private_data = dev; + if (vm) + dev->isVM = true; + } #ifdef CONFIG_TEE_REBOOT - get_teecd_pid(); + if (!vm && check_teecd_auth() == 0) + get_teecd_pid(); #endif return ret; } diff -uprN itrustee_tzdriver/core/tc_client_driver.h itrustee_tzdriver_new/core/tc_client_driver.h --- itrustee_tzdriver/core/tc_client_driver.h 2024-07-12 11:08:59.357629380 +0800 +++ itrustee_tzdriver_new/core/tc_client_driver.h 2024-07-12 10:51:32.741629380 +0800 @@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ int tc_ns_client_open(struct tc_ns_dev_f int tc_ns_client_close(struct tc_ns_dev_file *dev); int is_agent_alive(unsigned int agent_id, unsigned int nsid); int tc_ns_register_host_nsid(void); +int set_vm_flag(struct tc_ns_dev_file *dev_file, int vmid); int init_dev_node(struct dev_node *node, const char *node_name, struct class *driver_class, const struct file_operations *fops); void destory_dev_node(struct dev_node *node, struct class *driver_class); diff -uprN itrustee_tzdriver/core/tc_cvm_driver.c itrustee_tzdriver_new/core/tc_cvm_driver.c --- itrustee_tzdriver/core/tc_cvm_driver.c 2024-07-12 11:08:59.357629380 +0800 +++ itrustee_tzdriver_new/core/tc_cvm_driver.c 2024-07-12 10:51:32.737629380 +0800 @@ -104,6 +104,10 @@ static long tc_cvm_ioctl(struct file *fi { int ret = -EFAULT; void *argp = (void __user *)(uintptr_t)arg; + if (cmd == TC_NS_CLIENT_IOCTL_SET_VM_FLAG) { + tlogd(" before set_vm_flag \n"); + return set_vm_flag(file->private_data, (int)arg); + } handle_cmd_prepare(cmd); switch (cmd) { diff -uprN itrustee_tzdriver/Makefile itrustee_tzdriver_new/Makefile --- itrustee_tzdriver/Makefile 2024-07-12 11:08:59.353629380 +0800 +++ itrustee_tzdriver_new/Makefile 2024-07-12 10:51:32.641629380 +0800 @@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ EXTRA_CFLAGS += -DCONFIG_CPU_AFF_NR=0 -D EXTRA_CFLAGS += -DCONFIG_TEE_LOG_ACHIVE_PATH=\"/var/log/tee/last_teemsg\" EXTRA_CFLAGS += -DNOT_TRIGGER_AP_RESET -DLAST_TEE_MSG_ROOT_GID -DCONFIG_NOCOPY_SHAREDMEM -DCONFIG_REGISTER_SHAREDMEM -DCONFIG_TA_AFFINITY=y -DCONFIG_TA_AFFINITY_CPU_NUMS=128 EXTRA_CFLAGS += -DTEECD_PATH_UID_AUTH_CTX=\"/usr/bin/teecd:0\" +EXTRA_CFLAGS += -DPROXY_PATH_UID_AUTH_CTX=\"/usr/bin/vtz_proxy:0\" EXTRA_CFLAGS += -DCONFIG_AUTH_SUPPORT_UNAME -DCONFIG_AUTH_HASH -std=gnu99 EXTRA_CFLAGS += -DCONFIG_TEE_UPGRADE -DCONFIG_TEE_REBOOT -DCONFIG_CONFIDENTIAL_TEE EXTRA_CFLAGS += -I$(PWD)/tzdriver_internal/tee_reboot diff -uprN itrustee_tzdriver/modules.order itrustee_tzdriver_new/modules.order --- itrustee_tzdriver/modules.order 1970-01-01 08:00:00.000000000 +0800 +++ itrustee_tzdriver_new/modules.order 2024-07-12 10:54:21.957629380 +0800 @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +kernel//home/z50040113/target/itrustee_tzdriver/tzdriver.ko diff -uprN itrustee_tzdriver/tc_ns_client.h itrustee_tzdriver_new/tc_ns_client.h --- itrustee_tzdriver/tc_ns_client.h 2024-07-12 11:08:59.361629380 +0800 +++ itrustee_tzdriver_new/tc_ns_client.h 2024-07-12 10:51:32.625629380 +0800 @@ -230,6 +230,8 @@ struct tc_ns_log_pool { #define TC_NS_CLIENT_IOCTL_GET_TEE_INFO \ _IOWR(TC_NS_CLIENT_IOC_MAGIC, 26, struct tc_ns_tee_info) +#define TC_NS_CLIENT_IOCTL_SET_VM_FLAG \ + _IOWR(TC_NS_CLIENT_IOC_MAGIC, 27, int) #define TC_NS_CLIENT_IOCTL_CHECK_CCOS \ _IOWR(TC_NS_CLIENT_IOC_MAGIC, 32, unsigned int) diff -uprN itrustee_tzdriver/teek_ns_client.h itrustee_tzdriver_new/teek_ns_client.h --- itrustee_tzdriver/teek_ns_client.h 2024-07-12 11:08:59.361629380 +0800 +++ itrustee_tzdriver_new/teek_ns_client.h 2024-07-12 10:51:32.597629380 +0800 @@ -129,6 +129,9 @@ struct tc_ns_dev_file { int load_app_flag; #ifdef CONFIG_CONFIDENTIAL_CONTAINER uint32_t nsid; + uint32_t vmpid; + bool isVM; + uint32_t vm_page_size; #endif struct completion close_comp; /* for kthread close unclosed session */ #ifdef CONFIG_TEE_TELEPORT_SUPPORT diff -uprN itrustee_tzdriver/tlogger/tlogger.c itrustee_tzdriver_new/tlogger/tlogger.c --- itrustee_tzdriver/tlogger/tlogger.c 2024-07-12 11:08:59.361629380 +0800 +++ itrustee_tzdriver_new/tlogger/tlogger.c 2024-07-12 10:51:32.581629380 +0800 @@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ #define SET_TLOGCAT_STAT_BASE 7 #define GET_TLOGCAT_STAT_BASE 8 #define GET_TEE_INFO_BASE 9 +#define SET_VM_FLAG 10 /* get tee verison */ #define MAX_TEE_VERSION_LEN 256 @@ -75,6 +76,8 @@ _IO(LOGGERIOCTL, GET_TLOGCAT_STAT_BASE) #define TEELOGGER_GET_TEE_INFO \ _IOR(LOGGERIOCTL, GET_TEE_INFO_BASE, struct tc_ns_tee_info) +#define TEELOGGER_SET_VM_FLAG \ + _IOR(LOGGERIOCTL, SET_VM_FLAG, int) int g_tlogcat_f = 0; @@ -515,7 +518,7 @@ void recycle_tlogcat_processes(void) } #endif -static struct tlogger_group *get_tlogger_group(void) +static struct tlogger_group *get_tlogger_group(uint32_t vmpid) { struct tlogger_group *group = NULL; #ifdef CONFIG_CONFIDENTIAL_CONTAINER @@ -524,6 +527,9 @@ static struct tlogger_group *get_tlogger uint32_t nsid = PROC_PID_INIT_INO; #endif + if (vmpid) + nsid = vmpid; + list_for_each_entry(group, &g_reader_group_list, node) { if (group->nsid == nsid) return group; @@ -596,7 +602,7 @@ static int process_tlogger_open(struct i return -ENODEV; mutex_lock(&g_reader_group_mutex); - group = get_tlogger_group(); + group = get_tlogger_group(0); if (group == NULL) { group = kzalloc(sizeof(*group), GFP_KERNEL); if (ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR((unsigned long)(uintptr_t)group)) { @@ -808,6 +814,35 @@ static int get_teeos_version(uint32_t cm return 0; } +int set_tlog_vm_flag(struct file *file, uint32_t vmpid) +{ + struct tlogger_reader *reader = NULL; + struct tlogger_group *group = NULL; + + if (!file || !file->private_data) { + return -1; + } + + reader = file->private_data; + mutex_lock(&g_reader_group_mutex); + group = get_tlogger_group(vmpid); + if (group == NULL) { + group = kzalloc(sizeof(*group), GFP_KERNEL); + if (ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR((unsigned long)(uintptr_t)group)) { + mutex_unlock(&g_reader_group_mutex); + return -ENOMEM; + } + init_tlogger_group(group); + group->nsid = vmpid; + list_add_tail(&group->node, &g_reader_group_list); + } else { + group->reader_cnt++; + } + mutex_unlock(&g_reader_group_mutex); + reader->group = group; + return 0; +} + static long process_tlogger_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) { @@ -845,6 +880,9 @@ static long process_tlogger_ioctl(struct case TEELOGGER_GET_TEE_INFO: ret = tc_ns_get_tee_info(file, (void *)(uintptr_t)arg); break; + case TEELOGGER_SET_VM_FLAG: + ret = set_tlog_vm_flag(file, (int)arg); + break; default: tloge("ioctl error default\n"); break; @@ -1023,11 +1061,13 @@ static int write_part_log_to_msg(struct while (next_item && read_off <= read_off_end) { item_len = next_item->buffer_len + sizeof(*next_item); - write_len = kernel_write(filep, next_item->log_buffer, - next_item->real_len, pos); - if (write_len < 0) { - tloge("Failed to write last teemsg %zd\n", write_len); - return -1; + if (next_item->nsid == 0) { + write_len = kernel_write(filep, next_item->log_buffer, + next_item->real_len, pos); + if (write_len < 0) { + tloge("Failed to write last teemsg %zd\n", write_len); + return -1; + } } tlogd("Succeed to Write last teemsg, len=%zd\n", write_len);

2 3

[PATCH OLK-6.6] PCI/MSI: Fix UAF in msi_capability_init
by liwei 31 Jul '24

31 Jul '24

From: Mostafa Saleh <smostafa(a)google.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.10-rc6 commit 9eee5330656bf92f51cb1f09b2dc9f8cf975b3d1 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAGENJ CVE: CVE-2024-41096 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- KFENCE reports the following UAF: BUG: KFENCE: use-after-free read in __pci_enable_msi_range+0x2c0/0x488 Use-after-free read at 0x0000000024629571 (in kfence-#12): __pci_enable_msi_range+0x2c0/0x488 pci_alloc_irq_vectors_affinity+0xec/0x14c pci_alloc_irq_vectors+0x18/0x28 kfence-#12: 0x0000000008614900-0x00000000e06c228d, size=104, cache=kmalloc-128 allocated by task 81 on cpu 7 at 10.808142s: __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x1f0/0x2bc kmalloc_trace+0x44/0x138 msi_alloc_desc+0x3c/0x9c msi_domain_insert_msi_desc+0x30/0x78 msi_setup_msi_desc+0x13c/0x184 __pci_enable_msi_range+0x258/0x488 pci_alloc_irq_vectors_affinity+0xec/0x14c pci_alloc_irq_vectors+0x18/0x28 freed by task 81 on cpu 7 at 10.811436s: msi_domain_free_descs+0xd4/0x10c msi_domain_free_locked.part.0+0xc0/0x1d8 msi_domain_alloc_irqs_all_locked+0xb4/0xbc pci_msi_setup_msi_irqs+0x30/0x4c __pci_enable_msi_range+0x2a8/0x488 pci_alloc_irq_vectors_affinity+0xec/0x14c pci_alloc_irq_vectors+0x18/0x28 Descriptor allocation done in: __pci_enable_msi_range msi_capability_init msi_setup_msi_desc msi_insert_msi_desc msi_domain_insert_msi_desc msi_alloc_desc ... Freed in case of failure in __msi_domain_alloc_locked() __pci_enable_msi_range msi_capability_init pci_msi_setup_msi_irqs msi_domain_alloc_irqs_all_locked msi_domain_alloc_locked __msi_domain_alloc_locked => fails msi_domain_free_locked ... That failure propagates back to pci_msi_setup_msi_irqs() in msi_capability_init() which accesses the descriptor for unmasking in the error exit path. Cure it by copying the descriptor and using the copy for the error exit path unmask operation. [ tglx: Massaged change log ] Fixes: bf6e054e0e3f ("genirq/msi: Provide msi_device_populate/destroy_sysfs()") Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Mostafa Saleh <smostafa(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: Bjorn Heelgas <bhelgaas(a)google.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240624203729.1094506-1-smostafa@google.com Signed-off-by: dengquan <dengquan9(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/pci/msi/msi.c | 10 ++++++++-- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/pci/msi/msi.c b/drivers/pci/msi/msi.c index 7078200be11f..161c3ac171a3 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/msi/msi.c +++ b/drivers/pci/msi/msi.c @@ -348,7 +348,7 @@ static int msi_capability_init(struct pci_dev *dev, int nvec, struct irq_affinity *affd) { struct irq_affinity_desc *masks = NULL; - struct msi_desc *entry; + struct msi_desc *entry, desc; int ret; /* Reject multi-MSI early on irq domain enabled architectures */ @@ -373,6 +373,12 @@ static int msi_capability_init(struct pci_dev *dev, int nvec, /* All MSIs are unmasked by default; mask them all */ entry = msi_first_desc(&dev->dev, MSI_DESC_ALL); pci_msi_mask(entry, msi_multi_mask(entry)); + /* + * Copy the MSI descriptor for the error path because + * pci_msi_setup_msi_irqs() will free it for the hierarchical + * interrupt domain case. + */ + memcpy(&desc, entry, sizeof(desc)); /* Configure MSI capability structure */ ret = pci_msi_setup_msi_irqs(dev, nvec, PCI_CAP_ID_MSI); @@ -392,7 +398,7 @@ static int msi_capability_init(struct pci_dev *dev, int nvec, goto unlock; err: - pci_msi_unmask(entry, msi_multi_mask(entry)); + pci_msi_unmask(&desc, msi_multi_mask(&desc)); pci_free_msi_irqs(dev); fail: dev->msi_enabled = 0; -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] drm/amdgpu: Using uninitialized value *size when calling amdgpu_vce_cs_reloc
by Liu Chuang 31 Jul '24

31 Jul '24

From: Jesse Zhang <jesse.zhang(a)amd.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.39 commit 855ae72c20310e5402b2317fc537d911e87537ef category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAGSW7 CVE: CVE-2024-42228 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 88a9a467c548d0b3c7761b4fd54a68e70f9c0944 ] Initialize the size before calling amdgpu_vce_cs_reloc, such as case 0x03000001. V2: To really improve the handling we would actually need to have a separate value of 0xffffffff.(Christian) Signed-off-by: Jesse Zhang <jesse.zhang(a)amd.com> Suggested-by: Christian König <christian.koenig(a)amd.com> Reviewed-by: Christian König <christian.koenig(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Liu Chuang <liuchuang40(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_vce.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_vce.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_vce.c index 1904edf68407..88a3aa36b41d 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_vce.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_vce.c @@ -742,7 +742,8 @@ int amdgpu_vce_ring_parse_cs(struct amdgpu_cs_parser *p, uint32_t created = 0; uint32_t allocated = 0; uint32_t tmp, handle = 0; - uint32_t *size = &tmp; + uint32_t dummy = 0xffffffff; + uint32_t *size = &dummy; unsigned int idx; int i, r = 0; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] drm/amdgpu: Using uninitialized value *size when calling amdgpu_vce_cs_reloc
by Liu Chuang 31 Jul '24

31 Jul '24

From: Jesse Zhang <jesse.zhang(a)amd.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.10-rc1 commit 88a9a467c548d0b3c7761b4fd54a68e70f9c0944 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAGSW7 CVE: CVE-2024-42228 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… ------------------------------- Initialize the size before calling amdgpu_vce_cs_reloc, such as case 0x03000001. V2: To really improve the handling we would actually need to have a separate value of 0xffffffff.(Christian) Signed-off-by: Jesse Zhang <jesse.zhang(a)amd.com> Suggested-by: Christian König <christian.koenig(a)amd.com> Reviewed-by: Christian König <christian.koenig(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher(a)amd.com> Conflicts: drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_vce.c [adjust context conflicts] Signed-off-by: Liu Chuang <liuchuang40(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_vce.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_vce.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_vce.c index ecaa2d7483b2..0a28daa14fb1 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_vce.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_vce.c @@ -725,7 +725,8 @@ int amdgpu_vce_ring_parse_cs(struct amdgpu_cs_parser *p, uint32_t ib_idx) uint32_t created = 0; uint32_t allocated = 0; uint32_t tmp, handle = 0; - uint32_t *size = &tmp; + uint32_t dummy = 0xffffffff; + uint32_t *size = &dummy; unsigned idx; int i, r = 0; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] drm/amdgpu: Using uninitialized value *size when calling amdgpu_vce_cs_reloc
by Liu Chuang 31 Jul '24

31 Jul '24

From: Jesse Zhang <jesse.zhang(a)amd.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.10-rc1 commit 88a9a467c548d0b3c7761b4fd54a68e70f9c0944 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAGSW7 CVE: CVE-2024-42228 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… ------------------------------- Initialize the size before calling amdgpu_vce_cs_reloc, such as case 0x03000001. V2: To really improve the handling we would actually need to have a separate value of 0xffffffff.(Christian) Signed-off-by: Jesse Zhang <jesse.zhang(a)amd.com> Suggested-by: Christian König <christian.koenig(a)amd.com> Reviewed-by: Christian König <christian.koenig(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher(a)amd.com> Conflicts: drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_vce.c [adjust context conflicts] Signed-off-by: Liu Chuang <liuchuang40(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_vce.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_vce.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_vce.c index ecaa2d7483b2..0a28daa14fb1 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_vce.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_vce.c @@ -725,7 +725,8 @@ int amdgpu_vce_ring_parse_cs(struct amdgpu_cs_parser *p, uint32_t ib_idx) uint32_t created = 0; uint32_t allocated = 0; uint32_t tmp, handle = 0; - uint32_t *size = &tmp; + uint32_t dummy = 0xffffffff; + uint32_t *size = &dummy; unsigned idx; int i, r = 0; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] drm/amdgpu: Using uninitialized value *size when calling amdgpu_vce_cs_reloc
by Liu Chuang 31 Jul '24

31 Jul '24

From: Jesse Zhang <jesse.zhang(a)amd.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.10-rc1 commit 88a9a467c548d0b3c7761b4fd54a68e70f9c0944 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAGSW7 CVE: CVE-2024-42228 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… ------------------------------- Initialize the size before calling amdgpu_vce_cs_reloc, such as case 0x03000001. V2: To really improve the handling we would actually need to have a separate value of 0xffffffff.(Christian) Signed-off-by: Jesse Zhang <jesse.zhang(a)amd.com> Suggested-by: Christian König <christian.koenig(a)amd.com> Reviewed-by: Christian König <christian.koenig(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher(a)amd.com> Conflicts: drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_vce.c [adjust context conflicts] Signed-off-by: Liu Chuang <liuchuang40(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_vce.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_vce.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_vce.c index 17862b9ecccd..9c8ce75c760a 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_vce.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_vce.c @@ -714,7 +714,8 @@ int amdgpu_vce_ring_parse_cs(struct amdgpu_cs_parser *p, uint32_t ib_idx) uint32_t created = 0; uint32_t allocated = 0; uint32_t tmp, handle = 0; - uint32_t *size = &tmp; + uint32_t dummy = 0xffffffff; + uint32_t *size = &dummy; unsigned idx; int i, r = 0; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] Bluetooth: ISO: Check socket flag instead of hcon
by Liu Chuang 31 Jul '24

31 Jul '24

From: Iulia Tanasescu <iulia.tanasescu(a)nxp.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.39 commit 045669710464a21c67e690ef14698fd71857cb11 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAGRSM CVE: CVE-2024-42141 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... ------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 596b6f081336e77764ca35cfeab66d0fcdbe544e ] This fixes the following Smatch static checker warning: net/bluetooth/iso.c:1364 iso_sock_recvmsg() error: we previously assumed 'pi->conn->hcon' could be null (line 1359) net/bluetooth/iso.c 1347 static int iso_sock_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, 1348 size_t len, int flags) 1349 { 1350 struct sock *sk = sock->sk; 1351 struct iso_pinfo *pi = iso_pi(sk); 1352 1353 BT_DBG("sk %p", sk); 1354 1355 if (test_and_clear_bit(BT_SK_DEFER_SETUP, &bt_sk(sk)->flags)) { 1356 lock_sock(sk); 1357 switch (sk->sk_state) { 1358 case BT_CONNECT2: 1359 if (pi->conn->hcon && ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ If ->hcon is NULL 1360 test_bit(HCI_CONN_PA_SYNC, &pi->conn->hcon->flags)) { 1361 iso_conn_big_sync(sk); 1362 sk->sk_state = BT_LISTEN; 1363 } else { --> 1364 iso_conn_defer_accept(pi->conn->hcon); ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ then we're toast 1365 sk->sk_state = BT_CONFIG; 1366 } 1367 release_sock(sk); 1368 return 0; 1369 case BT_CONNECTED: 1370 if (test_bit(BT_SK_PA_SYNC, Fixes: fbdc4bc47268 ("Bluetooth: ISO: Use defer setup to separate PA sync and BIG sync") Signed-off-by: Iulia Tanasescu <iulia.tanasescu(a)nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Liu Chuang <liuchuang40(a)huawei.com> --- net/bluetooth/iso.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/bluetooth/iso.c b/net/bluetooth/iso.c index 05b9edb480f0..3ccba592f734 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/iso.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/iso.c @@ -1233,8 +1233,7 @@ static int iso_sock_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, lock_sock(sk); switch (sk->sk_state) { case BT_CONNECT2: - if (pi->conn->hcon && - test_bit(HCI_CONN_PA_SYNC, &pi->conn->hcon->flags)) { + if (test_bit(BT_SK_PA_SYNC, &pi->flags)) { iso_conn_big_sync(sk); sk->sk_state = BT_LISTEN; } else { -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] misc: fastrpc: Restrict untrusted app to attach to privileged PD
by Ye Bin 31 Jul '24

31 Jul '24

From: Ekansh Gupta <quic_ekangupt(a)quicinc.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.10 commit bab2f5e8fd5d2f759db26b78d9db57412888f187 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/IAGELU Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… ------------------------------------------- Untrusted application with access to only non-secure fastrpc device node can attach to root_pd or static PDs if it can make the respective init request. This can cause problems as the untrusted application can send bad requests to root_pd or static PDs. Add changes to reject attach to privileged PDs if the request is being made using non-secure fastrpc device node. Fixes: 0871561055e6 ("misc: fastrpc: Add support for audiopd") Cc: stable <stable(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ekansh Gupta <quic_ekangupt(a)quicinc.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <dmitry.baryshkov(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <srinivas.kandagatla(a)linaro.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240628114501.14310-7-srinivas.kandagatla@linaro… Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Ye Bin <yebin10(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/misc/fastrpc.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++++--- include/uapi/misc/fastrpc.h | 3 +++ 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/misc/fastrpc.c b/drivers/misc/fastrpc.c index dbd26c3b245b..8443ebc8623b 100644 --- a/drivers/misc/fastrpc.c +++ b/drivers/misc/fastrpc.c @@ -2080,6 +2080,16 @@ static int fastrpc_req_mem_map(struct fastrpc_user *fl, char __user *argp) return err; } +static int is_attach_rejected(struct fastrpc_user *fl) +{ + /* Check if the device node is non-secure */ + if (!fl->is_secure_dev) { + dev_dbg(&fl->cctx->rpdev->dev, "untrusted app trying to attach to privileged DSP PD\n"); + return -EACCES; + } + return 0; +} + static long fastrpc_device_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) { @@ -2092,13 +2102,19 @@ static long fastrpc_device_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, err = fastrpc_invoke(fl, argp); break; case FASTRPC_IOCTL_INIT_ATTACH: - err = fastrpc_init_attach(fl, ROOT_PD); + err = is_attach_rejected(fl); + if (!err) + err = fastrpc_init_attach(fl, ROOT_PD); break; case FASTRPC_IOCTL_INIT_ATTACH_SNS: - err = fastrpc_init_attach(fl, SENSORS_PD); + err = is_attach_rejected(fl); + if (!err) + err = fastrpc_init_attach(fl, SENSORS_PD); break; case FASTRPC_IOCTL_INIT_CREATE_STATIC: - err = fastrpc_init_create_static_process(fl, argp); + err = is_attach_rejected(fl); + if (!err) + err = fastrpc_init_create_static_process(fl, argp); break; case FASTRPC_IOCTL_INIT_CREATE: err = fastrpc_init_create_process(fl, argp); diff --git a/include/uapi/misc/fastrpc.h b/include/uapi/misc/fastrpc.h index f33d914d8f46..91583690bddc 100644 --- a/include/uapi/misc/fastrpc.h +++ b/include/uapi/misc/fastrpc.h @@ -8,11 +8,14 @@ #define FASTRPC_IOCTL_ALLOC_DMA_BUFF _IOWR('R', 1, struct fastrpc_alloc_dma_buf) #define FASTRPC_IOCTL_FREE_DMA_BUFF _IOWR('R', 2, __u32) #define FASTRPC_IOCTL_INVOKE _IOWR('R', 3, struct fastrpc_invoke) +/* This ioctl is only supported with secure device nodes */ #define FASTRPC_IOCTL_INIT_ATTACH _IO('R', 4) #define FASTRPC_IOCTL_INIT_CREATE _IOWR('R', 5, struct fastrpc_init_create) #define FASTRPC_IOCTL_MMAP _IOWR('R', 6, struct fastrpc_req_mmap) #define FASTRPC_IOCTL_MUNMAP _IOWR('R', 7, struct fastrpc_req_munmap) +/* This ioctl is only supported with secure device nodes */ #define FASTRPC_IOCTL_INIT_ATTACH_SNS _IO('R', 8) +/* This ioctl is only supported with secure device nodes */ #define FASTRPC_IOCTL_INIT_CREATE_STATIC _IOWR('R', 9, struct fastrpc_init_create_static) #define FASTRPC_IOCTL_MEM_MAP _IOWR('R', 10, struct fastrpc_mem_map) #define FASTRPC_IOCTL_MEM_UNMAP _IOWR('R', 11, struct fastrpc_mem_unmap) -- 2.31.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/3] 主线补丁回合
by Lin Yujun 31 Jul '24

31 Jul '24

Herve Codina (1): irqdomain: Fixed unbalanced fwnode get and put Mario Limonciello (1): cpufreq: Allow drivers to advertise boost enabled Viresh Kumar (1): cpufreq: exit() callback is optional drivers/cpufreq/cpufreq.c | 14 +++++++++----- kernel/irq/irqdomain.c | 7 ++----- 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 8

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/1] 主线补丁回合
by Lin Yujun 31 Jul '24

31 Jul '24

Herve Codina (1): irqdomain: Fixed unbalanced fwnode get and put kernel/irq/irqdomain.c | 5 +---- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 6

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/1] backport mainline patches
by Lin Yujun 31 Jul '24

31 Jul '24

Herve Codina (1): irqdomain: Fixed unbalanced fwnode get and put kernel/irq/irqdomain.c | 5 +---- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 2

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/3] backport mainline patches
by Lin Yujun 31 Jul '24

31 Jul '24

Herve Codina (1): irqdomain: Fixed unbalanced fwnode get and put Mario Limonciello (1): cpufreq: Allow drivers to advertise boost enabled Viresh Kumar (1): cpufreq: exit() callback is optional drivers/cpufreq/cpufreq.c | 14 +++++++++----- kernel/irq/irqdomain.c | 7 ++----- 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 4

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1 0/1] fix CVE-2024-42086
by Hongbo Li 31 Jul '24

31 Jul '24

Fix CVE-2024-42086. Vasileios Amoiridis (1): iio: chemical: bme680: Fix overflows in compensate() functions drivers/iio/chemical/bme680_core.c | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 2

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/1] fix CVE-2024-42086
by Hongbo Li 31 Jul '24

31 Jul '24

Fix CVE-2024-42086. Vasileios Amoiridis (1): iio: chemical: bme680: Fix overflows in compensate() functions drivers/iio/chemical/bme680_core.c | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 2

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/1] fix CVE-2024-42086
by Hongbo Li 31 Jul '24

31 Jul '24

Fix CVE-2024-42086 Vasileios Amoiridis (1): iio: chemical: bme680: Fix overflows in compensate() functions drivers/iio/chemical/bme680_core.c | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 2

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS 0/1] fix CVE-2024-42086
by Hongbo Li 31 Jul '24

31 Jul '24

Fix CVE-2024-42086. Vasileios Amoiridis (1): iio: chemical: bme680: Fix overflows in compensate() functions drivers/iio/chemical/bme680_core.c | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 2

[PATCH OLK-5.10] drm/amdgpu: Using uninitialized value *size when calling amdgpu_vce_cs_reloc
by Liu Chuang 31 Jul '24

31 Jul '24

From: Jesse Zhang <jesse.zhang(a)amd.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.10-rc1 commit 88a9a467c548d0b3c7761b4fd54a68e70f9c0944 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAGSW7 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… ------------------------------- Initialize the size before calling amdgpu_vce_cs_reloc, such as case 0x03000001. V2: To really improve the handling we would actually need to have a separate value of 0xffffffff.(Christian) Signed-off-by: Jesse Zhang <jesse.zhang(a)amd.com> Suggested-by: Christian König <christian.koenig(a)amd.com> Reviewed-by: Christian König <christian.koenig(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher(a)amd.com> Conflicts: drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_vce.c [adjust context conflicts] Signed-off-by: Liu Chuang <liuchuang40(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_vce.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_vce.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_vce.c index ecaa2d7483b2..0a28daa14fb1 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_vce.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_vce.c @@ -725,7 +725,8 @@ int amdgpu_vce_ring_parse_cs(struct amdgpu_cs_parser *p, uint32_t ib_idx) uint32_t created = 0; uint32_t allocated = 0; uint32_t tmp, handle = 0; - uint32_t *size = &tmp; + uint32_t dummy = 0xffffffff; + uint32_t *size = &dummy; unsigned idx; int i, r = 0; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] drm/amdgpu: Using uninitialized value *size when calling amdgpu_vce_cs_reloc
by Liu Chuang 31 Jul '24

31 Jul '24

From: Jesse Zhang <jesse.zhang(a)amd.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.10-rc1 commit 88a9a467c548d0b3c7761b4fd54a68e70f9c0944 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAGSW7 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… ------------------------------- Initialize the size before calling amdgpu_vce_cs_reloc, such as case 0x03000001. V2: To really improve the handling we would actually need to have a separate value of 0xffffffff.(Christian) Signed-off-by: Jesse Zhang <jesse.zhang(a)amd.com> Suggested-by: Christian König <christian.koenig(a)amd.com> Reviewed-by: Christian König <christian.koenig(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher(a)amd.com> Conflicts: drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_vce.c [adjust context conflicts] Signed-off-by: Liu Chuang <liuchuang40(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_vce.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_vce.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_vce.c index ecaa2d7483b2..0a28daa14fb1 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_vce.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_vce.c @@ -725,7 +725,8 @@ int amdgpu_vce_ring_parse_cs(struct amdgpu_cs_parser *p, uint32_t ib_idx) uint32_t created = 0; uint32_t allocated = 0; uint32_t tmp, handle = 0; - uint32_t *size = &tmp; + uint32_t dummy = 0xffffffff; + uint32_t *size = &dummy; unsigned idx; int i, r = 0; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] drm/amdgpu: Using uninitialized value *size when calling amdgpu_vce_cs_reloc
by Liu Chuang 31 Jul '24

31 Jul '24

From: Jesse Zhang <jesse.zhang(a)amd.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.39 commit 855ae72c20310e5402b2317fc537d911e87537ef category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAGSW7 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 88a9a467c548d0b3c7761b4fd54a68e70f9c0944 ] Initialize the size before calling amdgpu_vce_cs_reloc, such as case 0x03000001. V2: To really improve the handling we would actually need to have a separate value of 0xffffffff.(Christian) Signed-off-by: Jesse Zhang <jesse.zhang(a)amd.com> Suggested-by: Christian König <christian.koenig(a)amd.com> Reviewed-by: Christian König <christian.koenig(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Liu Chuang <liuchuang40(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_vce.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_vce.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_vce.c index 1904edf68407..88a3aa36b41d 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_vce.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_vce.c @@ -742,7 +742,8 @@ int amdgpu_vce_ring_parse_cs(struct amdgpu_cs_parser *p, uint32_t created = 0; uint32_t allocated = 0; uint32_t tmp, handle = 0; - uint32_t *size = &tmp; + uint32_t dummy = 0xffffffff; + uint32_t *size = &dummy; unsigned int idx; int i, r = 0; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] drm/amdgpu: Using uninitialized value *size when calling amdgpu_vce_cs_reloc
by Liu Chuang 31 Jul '24

31 Jul '24

From: Jesse Zhang <jesse.zhang(a)amd.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.10-rc1 commit 88a9a467c548d0b3c7761b4fd54a68e70f9c0944 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAGSW7 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… ------------------------------- Initialize the size before calling amdgpu_vce_cs_reloc, such as case 0x03000001. V2: To really improve the handling we would actually need to have a separate value of 0xffffffff.(Christian) Signed-off-by: Jesse Zhang <jesse.zhang(a)amd.com> Suggested-by: Christian König <christian.koenig(a)amd.com> Reviewed-by: Christian König <christian.koenig(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher(a)amd.com> Conflicts: drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_vce.c [adjust context conflicts] Signed-off-by: Liu Chuang <liuchuang40(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_vce.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_vce.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_vce.c index 17862b9ecccd..9c8ce75c760a 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_vce.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_vce.c @@ -714,7 +714,8 @@ int amdgpu_vce_ring_parse_cs(struct amdgpu_cs_parser *p, uint32_t ib_idx) uint32_t created = 0; uint32_t allocated = 0; uint32_t tmp, handle = 0; - uint32_t *size = &tmp; + uint32_t dummy = 0xffffffff; + uint32_t *size = &dummy; unsigned idx; int i, r = 0; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] ALSA: emux: improve patch ioctl data validation
by Zheng Yejian 31 Jul '24

31 Jul '24

From: Oswald Buddenhagen <oswald.buddenhagen(a)gmx.de> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.37 commit d8f5ce3cb9adf0c72e2ad6089aba02d7a32469c2 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAGEP7 CVE: CVE-2024-42097 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 89b32ccb12ae67e630c6453d778ec30a592a212f ] In load_data(), make the validation of and skipping over the main info block match that in load_guspatch(). In load_guspatch(), add checking that the specified patch length matches the actually supplied data, like load_data() already did. Signed-off-by: Oswald Buddenhagen <oswald.buddenhagen(a)gmx.de> Message-ID: <20240406064830.1029573-8-oswald.buddenhagen(a)gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai(a)suse.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Zheng Yejian <zhengyejian1(a)huawei.com> --- sound/synth/emux/soundfont.c | 17 +++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/synth/emux/soundfont.c b/sound/synth/emux/soundfont.c index 16f00097cb95..eed47e483024 100644 --- a/sound/synth/emux/soundfont.c +++ b/sound/synth/emux/soundfont.c @@ -701,7 +701,6 @@ load_data(struct snd_sf_list *sflist, const void __user *data, long count) struct snd_soundfont *sf; struct soundfont_sample_info sample_info; struct snd_sf_sample *sp; - long off; /* patch must be opened */ sf = sflist->currsf; @@ -711,12 +710,16 @@ load_data(struct snd_sf_list *sflist, const void __user *data, long count) if (is_special_type(sf->type)) return -EINVAL; + if (count < (long)sizeof(sample_info)) { + return -EINVAL; + } if (copy_from_user(&sample_info, data, sizeof(sample_info))) return -EFAULT; + data += sizeof(sample_info); + count -= sizeof(sample_info); - off = sizeof(sample_info); - - if (sample_info.size != (count-off)/2) + // SoundFont uses S16LE samples. + if (sample_info.size * 2 != count) return -EINVAL; /* Check for dup */ @@ -744,7 +747,7 @@ load_data(struct snd_sf_list *sflist, const void __user *data, long count) int rc; rc = sflist->callback.sample_new (sflist->callback.private_data, sp, sflist->memhdr, - data + off, count - off); + data, count); if (rc < 0) { sf_sample_delete(sflist, sf, sp); return rc; @@ -957,10 +960,12 @@ load_guspatch(struct snd_sf_list *sflist, const char __user *data, } if (copy_from_user(&patch, data, sizeof(patch))) return -EFAULT; - count -= sizeof(patch); data += sizeof(patch); + if ((patch.len << (patch.mode & WAVE_16_BITS ? 1 : 0)) != count) + return -EINVAL; + sf = newsf(sflist, SNDRV_SFNT_PAT_TYPE_GUS|SNDRV_SFNT_PAT_SHARED, NULL); if (sf == NULL) return -ENOMEM; -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] jffs2: Fix potential illegal address access in jffs2_free_inode
by Wang Zhaolong 31 Jul '24

31 Jul '24

From: Wang Yong <wang.yong12(a)zte.com.cn> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.10-rc1 commit af9a8730ddb6a4b2edd779ccc0aceb994d616830 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAGS1R CVE: CVE-2024-42115 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- During the stress testing of the jffs2 file system,the following abnormal printouts were found: [ 2430.649000] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0069696969696948 [ 2430.649622] Mem abort info: [ 2430.649829] ESR = 0x96000004 [ 2430.650115] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 2430.650564] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 2430.650795] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 2430.651032] FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault [ 2430.651446] Data abort info: [ 2430.651683] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004 [ 2430.652001] CM = 0, WnR = 0 [ 2430.652558] [0069696969696948] address between user and kernel address ranges [ 2430.653265] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 2430.654512] CPU: 2 PID: 20919 Comm: cat Not tainted 5.15.25-g512f31242bf6 #33 [ 2430.655008] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) [ 2430.655517] pstate: 20000005 (nzCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 2430.656142] pc : kfree+0x78/0x348 [ 2430.656630] lr : jffs2_free_inode+0x24/0x48 [ 2430.657051] sp : ffff800009eebd10 [ 2430.657355] x29: ffff800009eebd10 x28: 0000000000000001 x27: 0000000000000000 [ 2430.658327] x26: ffff000038f09d80 x25: 0080000000000000 x24: ffff800009d38000 [ 2430.658919] x23: 5a5a5a5a5a5a5a5a x22: ffff000038f09d80 x21: ffff8000084f0d14 [ 2430.659434] x20: ffff0000bf9a6ac0 x19: 0169696969696940 x18: 0000000000000000 [ 2430.659969] x17: ffff8000b6506000 x16: ffff800009eec000 x15: 0000000000004000 [ 2430.660637] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 00000001000820a1 x12: 00000000000d1b19 [ 2430.661345] x11: 0004000800000000 x10: 0000000000000001 x9 : ffff8000084f0d14 [ 2430.662025] x8 : ffff0000bf9a6b40 x7 : ffff0000bf9a6b48 x6 : 0000000003470302 [ 2430.662695] x5 : ffff00002e41dcc0 x4 : ffff0000bf9aa3b0 x3 : 0000000003470342 [ 2430.663486] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffff8000084f0d14 x0 : fffffc0000000000 [ 2430.664217] Call trace: [ 2430.664528] kfree+0x78/0x348 [ 2430.664855] jffs2_free_inode+0x24/0x48 [ 2430.665233] i_callback+0x24/0x50 [ 2430.665528] rcu_do_batch+0x1ac/0x448 [ 2430.665892] rcu_core+0x28c/0x3c8 [ 2430.666151] rcu_core_si+0x18/0x28 [ 2430.666473] __do_softirq+0x138/0x3cc [ 2430.666781] irq_exit+0xf0/0x110 [ 2430.667065] handle_domain_irq+0x6c/0x98 [ 2430.667447] gic_handle_irq+0xac/0xe8 [ 2430.667739] call_on_irq_stack+0x28/0x54 The parameter passed to kfree was 5a5a5a5a, which corresponds to the target field of the jffs_inode_info structure. It was found that all variables in the jffs_inode_info structure were 5a5a5a5a, except for the first member sem. It is suspected that these variables are not initialized because they were set to 5a5a5a5a during memory testing, which is meant to detect uninitialized memory.The sem variable is initialized in the function jffs2_i_init_once, while other members are initialized in the function jffs2_init_inode_info. The function jffs2_init_inode_info is called after iget_locked, but in the iget_locked function, the destroy_inode process is triggered, which releases the inode and consequently, the target member of the inode is not initialized.In concurrent high pressure scenarios, iget_locked may enter the destroy_inode branch as described in the code. Since the destroy_inode functionality of jffs2 only releases the target, the fix method is to set target to NULL in jffs2_i_init_once. Signed-off-by: Wang Yong <wang.yong12(a)zte.com.cn> Reviewed-by: Lu Zhongjun <lu.zhongjun(a)zte.com.cn> Reviewed-by: Yang Tao <yang.tao172(a)zte.com.cn> Cc: Xu Xin <xu.xin16(a)zte.com.cn> Cc: Yang Yang <yang.yang29(a)zte.com.cn> Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard(a)nod.at> Signed-off-by: Wang Zhaolong <wangzhaolong1(a)huawei.com> --- fs/jffs2/super.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/fs/jffs2/super.c b/fs/jffs2/super.c index f69a93ba368f..18e8eff2b9c6 100644 --- a/fs/jffs2/super.c +++ b/fs/jffs2/super.c @@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ static void jffs2_i_init_once(void *foo) struct jffs2_inode_info *f = foo; mutex_init(&f->sem); + f->target = NULL; inode_init_once(&f->vfs_inode); } -- 2.34.3

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] ALSA: emux: improve patch ioctl data validation
by Zheng Yejian 31 Jul '24

31 Jul '24

From: Oswald Buddenhagen <oswald.buddenhagen(a)gmx.de> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.221 commit d23982ea9aa438f35a8c8a6305943e98a8db90f6 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAGEP7 CVE: CVE-2024-42097 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… --------------------------- [ Upstream commit 89b32ccb12ae67e630c6453d778ec30a592a212f ] In load_data(), make the validation of and skipping over the main info block match that in load_guspatch(). In load_guspatch(), add checking that the specified patch length matches the actually supplied data, like load_data() already did. Signed-off-by: Oswald Buddenhagen <oswald.buddenhagen(a)gmx.de> Message-ID: <20240406064830.1029573-8-oswald.buddenhagen(a)gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai(a)suse.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Zheng Yejian <zhengyejian1(a)huawei.com> --- sound/synth/emux/soundfont.c | 17 +++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/synth/emux/soundfont.c b/sound/synth/emux/soundfont.c index 9ebc711afa6b..18b2d8492656 100644 --- a/sound/synth/emux/soundfont.c +++ b/sound/synth/emux/soundfont.c @@ -697,7 +697,6 @@ load_data(struct snd_sf_list *sflist, const void __user *data, long count) struct snd_soundfont *sf; struct soundfont_sample_info sample_info; struct snd_sf_sample *sp; - long off; /* patch must be opened */ if ((sf = sflist->currsf) == NULL) @@ -706,12 +705,16 @@ load_data(struct snd_sf_list *sflist, const void __user *data, long count) if (is_special_type(sf->type)) return -EINVAL; + if (count < (long)sizeof(sample_info)) { + return -EINVAL; + } if (copy_from_user(&sample_info, data, sizeof(sample_info))) return -EFAULT; + data += sizeof(sample_info); + count -= sizeof(sample_info); - off = sizeof(sample_info); - - if (sample_info.size != (count-off)/2) + // SoundFont uses S16LE samples. + if (sample_info.size * 2 != count) return -EINVAL; /* Check for dup */ @@ -738,7 +741,7 @@ load_data(struct snd_sf_list *sflist, const void __user *data, long count) int rc; rc = sflist->callback.sample_new (sflist->callback.private_data, sp, sflist->memhdr, - data + off, count - off); + data, count); if (rc < 0) { sf_sample_delete(sflist, sf, sp); return rc; @@ -951,10 +954,12 @@ load_guspatch(struct snd_sf_list *sflist, const char __user *data, } if (copy_from_user(&patch, data, sizeof(patch))) return -EFAULT; - count -= sizeof(patch); data += sizeof(patch); + if ((patch.len << (patch.mode & WAVE_16_BITS ? 1 : 0)) != count) + return -EINVAL; + sf = newsf(sflist, SNDRV_SFNT_PAT_TYPE_GUS|SNDRV_SFNT_PAT_SHARED, NULL); if (sf == NULL) return -ENOMEM; -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] jffs2: Fix potential illegal address access in jffs2_free_inode
by Wang Zhaolong 31 Jul '24

31 Jul '24

From: Wang Yong <wang.yong12(a)zte.com.cn> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.10-rc1 commit af9a8730ddb6a4b2edd779ccc0aceb994d616830 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAGS1R CVE: CVE-2024-42115 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- During the stress testing of the jffs2 file system,the following abnormal printouts were found: [ 2430.649000] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0069696969696948 [ 2430.649622] Mem abort info: [ 2430.649829] ESR = 0x96000004 [ 2430.650115] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 2430.650564] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 2430.650795] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 2430.651032] FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault [ 2430.651446] Data abort info: [ 2430.651683] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004 [ 2430.652001] CM = 0, WnR = 0 [ 2430.652558] [0069696969696948] address between user and kernel address ranges [ 2430.653265] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 2430.654512] CPU: 2 PID: 20919 Comm: cat Not tainted 5.15.25-g512f31242bf6 #33 [ 2430.655008] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) [ 2430.655517] pstate: 20000005 (nzCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 2430.656142] pc : kfree+0x78/0x348 [ 2430.656630] lr : jffs2_free_inode+0x24/0x48 [ 2430.657051] sp : ffff800009eebd10 [ 2430.657355] x29: ffff800009eebd10 x28: 0000000000000001 x27: 0000000000000000 [ 2430.658327] x26: ffff000038f09d80 x25: 0080000000000000 x24: ffff800009d38000 [ 2430.658919] x23: 5a5a5a5a5a5a5a5a x22: ffff000038f09d80 x21: ffff8000084f0d14 [ 2430.659434] x20: ffff0000bf9a6ac0 x19: 0169696969696940 x18: 0000000000000000 [ 2430.659969] x17: ffff8000b6506000 x16: ffff800009eec000 x15: 0000000000004000 [ 2430.660637] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 00000001000820a1 x12: 00000000000d1b19 [ 2430.661345] x11: 0004000800000000 x10: 0000000000000001 x9 : ffff8000084f0d14 [ 2430.662025] x8 : ffff0000bf9a6b40 x7 : ffff0000bf9a6b48 x6 : 0000000003470302 [ 2430.662695] x5 : ffff00002e41dcc0 x4 : ffff0000bf9aa3b0 x3 : 0000000003470342 [ 2430.663486] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffff8000084f0d14 x0 : fffffc0000000000 [ 2430.664217] Call trace: [ 2430.664528] kfree+0x78/0x348 [ 2430.664855] jffs2_free_inode+0x24/0x48 [ 2430.665233] i_callback+0x24/0x50 [ 2430.665528] rcu_do_batch+0x1ac/0x448 [ 2430.665892] rcu_core+0x28c/0x3c8 [ 2430.666151] rcu_core_si+0x18/0x28 [ 2430.666473] __do_softirq+0x138/0x3cc [ 2430.666781] irq_exit+0xf0/0x110 [ 2430.667065] handle_domain_irq+0x6c/0x98 [ 2430.667447] gic_handle_irq+0xac/0xe8 [ 2430.667739] call_on_irq_stack+0x28/0x54 The parameter passed to kfree was 5a5a5a5a, which corresponds to the target field of the jffs_inode_info structure. It was found that all variables in the jffs_inode_info structure were 5a5a5a5a, except for the first member sem. It is suspected that these variables are not initialized because they were set to 5a5a5a5a during memory testing, which is meant to detect uninitialized memory.The sem variable is initialized in the function jffs2_i_init_once, while other members are initialized in the function jffs2_init_inode_info. The function jffs2_init_inode_info is called after iget_locked, but in the iget_locked function, the destroy_inode process is triggered, which releases the inode and consequently, the target member of the inode is not initialized.In concurrent high pressure scenarios, iget_locked may enter the destroy_inode branch as described in the code. Since the destroy_inode functionality of jffs2 only releases the target, the fix method is to set target to NULL in jffs2_i_init_once. Signed-off-by: Wang Yong <wang.yong12(a)zte.com.cn> Reviewed-by: Lu Zhongjun <lu.zhongjun(a)zte.com.cn> Reviewed-by: Yang Tao <yang.tao172(a)zte.com.cn> Cc: Xu Xin <xu.xin16(a)zte.com.cn> Cc: Yang Yang <yang.yang29(a)zte.com.cn> Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard(a)nod.at> Signed-off-by: Wang Zhaolong <wangzhaolong1(a)huawei.com> --- fs/jffs2/super.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/fs/jffs2/super.c b/fs/jffs2/super.c index f69a93ba368f..18e8eff2b9c6 100644 --- a/fs/jffs2/super.c +++ b/fs/jffs2/super.c @@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ static void jffs2_i_init_once(void *foo) struct jffs2_inode_info *f = foo; mutex_init(&f->sem); + f->target = NULL; inode_init_once(&f->vfs_inode); } -- 2.34.3

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] jffs2: Fix potential illegal address access in jffs2_free_inode
by Wang Zhaolong 31 Jul '24

31 Jul '24

From: Wang Yong <wang.yong12(a)zte.com.cn> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.10-rc1 commit af9a8730ddb6a4b2edd779ccc0aceb994d616830 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAGS1R CVE: CVE-2024-42115 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- During the stress testing of the jffs2 file system,the following abnormal printouts were found: [ 2430.649000] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0069696969696948 [ 2430.649622] Mem abort info: [ 2430.649829] ESR = 0x96000004 [ 2430.650115] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 2430.650564] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 2430.650795] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 2430.651032] FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault [ 2430.651446] Data abort info: [ 2430.651683] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004 [ 2430.652001] CM = 0, WnR = 0 [ 2430.652558] [0069696969696948] address between user and kernel address ranges [ 2430.653265] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 2430.654512] CPU: 2 PID: 20919 Comm: cat Not tainted 5.15.25-g512f31242bf6 #33 [ 2430.655008] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) [ 2430.655517] pstate: 20000005 (nzCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 2430.656142] pc : kfree+0x78/0x348 [ 2430.656630] lr : jffs2_free_inode+0x24/0x48 [ 2430.657051] sp : ffff800009eebd10 [ 2430.657355] x29: ffff800009eebd10 x28: 0000000000000001 x27: 0000000000000000 [ 2430.658327] x26: ffff000038f09d80 x25: 0080000000000000 x24: ffff800009d38000 [ 2430.658919] x23: 5a5a5a5a5a5a5a5a x22: ffff000038f09d80 x21: ffff8000084f0d14 [ 2430.659434] x20: ffff0000bf9a6ac0 x19: 0169696969696940 x18: 0000000000000000 [ 2430.659969] x17: ffff8000b6506000 x16: ffff800009eec000 x15: 0000000000004000 [ 2430.660637] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 00000001000820a1 x12: 00000000000d1b19 [ 2430.661345] x11: 0004000800000000 x10: 0000000000000001 x9 : ffff8000084f0d14 [ 2430.662025] x8 : ffff0000bf9a6b40 x7 : ffff0000bf9a6b48 x6 : 0000000003470302 [ 2430.662695] x5 : ffff00002e41dcc0 x4 : ffff0000bf9aa3b0 x3 : 0000000003470342 [ 2430.663486] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffff8000084f0d14 x0 : fffffc0000000000 [ 2430.664217] Call trace: [ 2430.664528] kfree+0x78/0x348 [ 2430.664855] jffs2_free_inode+0x24/0x48 [ 2430.665233] i_callback+0x24/0x50 [ 2430.665528] rcu_do_batch+0x1ac/0x448 [ 2430.665892] rcu_core+0x28c/0x3c8 [ 2430.666151] rcu_core_si+0x18/0x28 [ 2430.666473] __do_softirq+0x138/0x3cc [ 2430.666781] irq_exit+0xf0/0x110 [ 2430.667065] handle_domain_irq+0x6c/0x98 [ 2430.667447] gic_handle_irq+0xac/0xe8 [ 2430.667739] call_on_irq_stack+0x28/0x54 The parameter passed to kfree was 5a5a5a5a, which corresponds to the target field of the jffs_inode_info structure. It was found that all variables in the jffs_inode_info structure were 5a5a5a5a, except for the first member sem. It is suspected that these variables are not initialized because they were set to 5a5a5a5a during memory testing, which is meant to detect uninitialized memory.The sem variable is initialized in the function jffs2_i_init_once, while other members are initialized in the function jffs2_init_inode_info. The function jffs2_init_inode_info is called after iget_locked, but in the iget_locked function, the destroy_inode process is triggered, which releases the inode and consequently, the target member of the inode is not initialized.In concurrent high pressure scenarios, iget_locked may enter the destroy_inode branch as described in the code. Since the destroy_inode functionality of jffs2 only releases the target, the fix method is to set target to NULL in jffs2_i_init_once. Signed-off-by: Wang Yong <wang.yong12(a)zte.com.cn> Reviewed-by: Lu Zhongjun <lu.zhongjun(a)zte.com.cn> Reviewed-by: Yang Tao <yang.tao172(a)zte.com.cn> Cc: Xu Xin <xu.xin16(a)zte.com.cn> Cc: Yang Yang <yang.yang29(a)zte.com.cn> Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard(a)nod.at> Signed-off-by: Wang Zhaolong <wangzhaolong1(a)huawei.com> --- fs/jffs2/super.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/fs/jffs2/super.c b/fs/jffs2/super.c index f69a93ba368f..18e8eff2b9c6 100644 --- a/fs/jffs2/super.c +++ b/fs/jffs2/super.c @@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ static void jffs2_i_init_once(void *foo) struct jffs2_inode_info *f = foo; mutex_init(&f->sem); + f->target = NULL; inode_init_once(&f->vfs_inode); } -- 2.34.3

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] ALSA: emux: improve patch ioctl data validation
by Zheng Yejian 31 Jul '24

31 Jul '24

From: Oswald Buddenhagen <oswald.buddenhagen(a)gmx.de> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.221 commit d23982ea9aa438f35a8c8a6305943e98a8db90f6 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAGEP7 CVE: CVE-2024-42097 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… --------------------------- [ Upstream commit 89b32ccb12ae67e630c6453d778ec30a592a212f ] In load_data(), make the validation of and skipping over the main info block match that in load_guspatch(). In load_guspatch(), add checking that the specified patch length matches the actually supplied data, like load_data() already did. Signed-off-by: Oswald Buddenhagen <oswald.buddenhagen(a)gmx.de> Message-ID: <20240406064830.1029573-8-oswald.buddenhagen(a)gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai(a)suse.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Zheng Yejian <zhengyejian1(a)huawei.com> --- sound/synth/emux/soundfont.c | 17 +++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/synth/emux/soundfont.c b/sound/synth/emux/soundfont.c index 9ebc711afa6b..18b2d8492656 100644 --- a/sound/synth/emux/soundfont.c +++ b/sound/synth/emux/soundfont.c @@ -697,7 +697,6 @@ load_data(struct snd_sf_list *sflist, const void __user *data, long count) struct snd_soundfont *sf; struct soundfont_sample_info sample_info; struct snd_sf_sample *sp; - long off; /* patch must be opened */ if ((sf = sflist->currsf) == NULL) @@ -706,12 +705,16 @@ load_data(struct snd_sf_list *sflist, const void __user *data, long count) if (is_special_type(sf->type)) return -EINVAL; + if (count < (long)sizeof(sample_info)) { + return -EINVAL; + } if (copy_from_user(&sample_info, data, sizeof(sample_info))) return -EFAULT; + data += sizeof(sample_info); + count -= sizeof(sample_info); - off = sizeof(sample_info); - - if (sample_info.size != (count-off)/2) + // SoundFont uses S16LE samples. + if (sample_info.size * 2 != count) return -EINVAL; /* Check for dup */ @@ -738,7 +741,7 @@ load_data(struct snd_sf_list *sflist, const void __user *data, long count) int rc; rc = sflist->callback.sample_new (sflist->callback.private_data, sp, sflist->memhdr, - data + off, count - off); + data, count); if (rc < 0) { sf_sample_delete(sflist, sf, sp); return rc; @@ -951,10 +954,12 @@ load_guspatch(struct snd_sf_list *sflist, const char __user *data, } if (copy_from_user(&patch, data, sizeof(patch))) return -EFAULT; - count -= sizeof(patch); data += sizeof(patch); + if ((patch.len << (patch.mode & WAVE_16_BITS ? 1 : 0)) != count) + return -EINVAL; + sf = newsf(sflist, SNDRV_SFNT_PAT_TYPE_GUS|SNDRV_SFNT_PAT_SHARED, NULL); if (sf == NULL) return -ENOMEM; -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] jffs2: Fix potential illegal address access in jffs2_free_inode
by Wang Zhaolong 31 Jul '24

31 Jul '24

From: Wang Yong <wang.yong12(a)zte.com.cn> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.10-rc1 commit af9a8730ddb6a4b2edd779ccc0aceb994d616830 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAGS1R CVE: CVE-2024-42115 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- During the stress testing of the jffs2 file system,the following abnormal printouts were found: [ 2430.649000] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0069696969696948 [ 2430.649622] Mem abort info: [ 2430.649829] ESR = 0x96000004 [ 2430.650115] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 2430.650564] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 2430.650795] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 2430.651032] FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault [ 2430.651446] Data abort info: [ 2430.651683] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004 [ 2430.652001] CM = 0, WnR = 0 [ 2430.652558] [0069696969696948] address between user and kernel address ranges [ 2430.653265] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 2430.654512] CPU: 2 PID: 20919 Comm: cat Not tainted 5.15.25-g512f31242bf6 #33 [ 2430.655008] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) [ 2430.655517] pstate: 20000005 (nzCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 2430.656142] pc : kfree+0x78/0x348 [ 2430.656630] lr : jffs2_free_inode+0x24/0x48 [ 2430.657051] sp : ffff800009eebd10 [ 2430.657355] x29: ffff800009eebd10 x28: 0000000000000001 x27: 0000000000000000 [ 2430.658327] x26: ffff000038f09d80 x25: 0080000000000000 x24: ffff800009d38000 [ 2430.658919] x23: 5a5a5a5a5a5a5a5a x22: ffff000038f09d80 x21: ffff8000084f0d14 [ 2430.659434] x20: ffff0000bf9a6ac0 x19: 0169696969696940 x18: 0000000000000000 [ 2430.659969] x17: ffff8000b6506000 x16: ffff800009eec000 x15: 0000000000004000 [ 2430.660637] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 00000001000820a1 x12: 00000000000d1b19 [ 2430.661345] x11: 0004000800000000 x10: 0000000000000001 x9 : ffff8000084f0d14 [ 2430.662025] x8 : ffff0000bf9a6b40 x7 : ffff0000bf9a6b48 x6 : 0000000003470302 [ 2430.662695] x5 : ffff00002e41dcc0 x4 : ffff0000bf9aa3b0 x3 : 0000000003470342 [ 2430.663486] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffff8000084f0d14 x0 : fffffc0000000000 [ 2430.664217] Call trace: [ 2430.664528] kfree+0x78/0x348 [ 2430.664855] jffs2_free_inode+0x24/0x48 [ 2430.665233] i_callback+0x24/0x50 [ 2430.665528] rcu_do_batch+0x1ac/0x448 [ 2430.665892] rcu_core+0x28c/0x3c8 [ 2430.666151] rcu_core_si+0x18/0x28 [ 2430.666473] __do_softirq+0x138/0x3cc [ 2430.666781] irq_exit+0xf0/0x110 [ 2430.667065] handle_domain_irq+0x6c/0x98 [ 2430.667447] gic_handle_irq+0xac/0xe8 [ 2430.667739] call_on_irq_stack+0x28/0x54 The parameter passed to kfree was 5a5a5a5a, which corresponds to the target field of the jffs_inode_info structure. It was found that all variables in the jffs_inode_info structure were 5a5a5a5a, except for the first member sem. It is suspected that these variables are not initialized because they were set to 5a5a5a5a during memory testing, which is meant to detect uninitialized memory.The sem variable is initialized in the function jffs2_i_init_once, while other members are initialized in the function jffs2_init_inode_info. The function jffs2_init_inode_info is called after iget_locked, but in the iget_locked function, the destroy_inode process is triggered, which releases the inode and consequently, the target member of the inode is not initialized.In concurrent high pressure scenarios, iget_locked may enter the destroy_inode branch as described in the code. Since the destroy_inode functionality of jffs2 only releases the target, the fix method is to set target to NULL in jffs2_i_init_once. Signed-off-by: Wang Yong <wang.yong12(a)zte.com.cn> Reviewed-by: Lu Zhongjun <lu.zhongjun(a)zte.com.cn> Reviewed-by: Yang Tao <yang.tao172(a)zte.com.cn> Cc: Xu Xin <xu.xin16(a)zte.com.cn> Cc: Yang Yang <yang.yang29(a)zte.com.cn> Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard(a)nod.at> Signed-off-by: Wang Zhaolong <wangzhaolong1(a)huawei.com> --- fs/jffs2/super.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/fs/jffs2/super.c b/fs/jffs2/super.c index 4b3f0fcdeab5..d433d0899a1a 100644 --- a/fs/jffs2/super.c +++ b/fs/jffs2/super.c @@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ static void jffs2_i_init_once(void *foo) struct jffs2_inode_info *f = foo; mutex_init(&f->sem); + f->target = NULL; inode_init_once(&f->vfs_inode); } -- 2.34.3

2 1

openEuler Kernel SIG双周例会
by openEuler conference 31 Jul '24

31 Jul '24

您好！ Kernel 邀请您参加 2024-08-02 14:00 召开的WeLink会议(自动录制) 会议主题：openEuler Kernel SIG双周例会会议内容： 1. 进展update 2. 议题征集中（新增议题可直接回复此邮件申报，或直接填至会议纪要看板）会议链接：https://meeting.huaweicloud.com:36443/#/j/983058635 会议纪要：https://etherpad.openeuler.org/p/Kernel-meetings 更多资讯尽在：https://www.openeuler.org/zh/ Hello! Kernel invites you to attend the WeLink conference(auto recording) will be held at 2024-08-02 14:00, The subject of the conference is openEuler Kernel SIG双周例会, Summary: 1. 进展update 2. 议题征集中（新增议题可直接回复此邮件申报，或直接填至会议纪要看板） You can join the meeting at https://meeting.huaweicloud.com:36443/#/j/983058635. Add topics at https://etherpad.openeuler.org/p/Kernel-meetings. More information: https://www.openeuler.org/en/

1 0

[PATCH OLK-6.6] Bluetooth: ISO: Check socket flag instead of hcon
by Liu Chuang 31 Jul '24

31 Jul '24

From: Iulia Tanasescu <iulia.tanasescu(a)nxp.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.39 commit 045669710464a21c67e690ef14698fd71857cb11 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAGRSM Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… ------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 596b6f081336e77764ca35cfeab66d0fcdbe544e ] This fixes the following Smatch static checker warning: net/bluetooth/iso.c:1364 iso_sock_recvmsg() error: we previously assumed 'pi->conn->hcon' could be null (line 1359) net/bluetooth/iso.c 1347 static int iso_sock_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, 1348 size_t len, int flags) 1349 { 1350 struct sock *sk = sock->sk; 1351 struct iso_pinfo *pi = iso_pi(sk); 1352 1353 BT_DBG("sk %p", sk); 1354 1355 if (test_and_clear_bit(BT_SK_DEFER_SETUP, &bt_sk(sk)->flags)) { 1356 lock_sock(sk); 1357 switch (sk->sk_state) { 1358 case BT_CONNECT2: 1359 if (pi->conn->hcon && ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ If ->hcon is NULL 1360 test_bit(HCI_CONN_PA_SYNC, &pi->conn->hcon->flags)) { 1361 iso_conn_big_sync(sk); 1362 sk->sk_state = BT_LISTEN; 1363 } else { --> 1364 iso_conn_defer_accept(pi->conn->hcon); ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ then we're toast 1365 sk->sk_state = BT_CONFIG; 1366 } 1367 release_sock(sk); 1368 return 0; 1369 case BT_CONNECTED: 1370 if (test_bit(BT_SK_PA_SYNC, Fixes: fbdc4bc47268 ("Bluetooth: ISO: Use defer setup to separate PA sync and BIG sync") Signed-off-by: Iulia Tanasescu <iulia.tanasescu(a)nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Liu Chuang <liuchuang40(a)huawei.com> --- net/bluetooth/iso.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/bluetooth/iso.c b/net/bluetooth/iso.c index 05b9edb480f0..3ccba592f734 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/iso.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/iso.c @@ -1233,8 +1233,7 @@ static int iso_sock_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, lock_sock(sk); switch (sk->sk_state) { case BT_CONNECT2: - if (pi->conn->hcon && - test_bit(HCI_CONN_PA_SYNC, &pi->conn->hcon->flags)) { + if (test_bit(BT_SK_PA_SYNC, &pi->flags)) { iso_conn_big_sync(sk); sk->sk_state = BT_LISTEN; } else { -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS v2] xfrm6: check ip6_dst_idev() return value in xfrm6_get_saddr()
by Dong Chenchen 31 Jul '24

31 Jul '24

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> stable inclusion from stable-v4.19.317 commit c71761292d4d002a8eccb57b86792c4e3b3eb3c7 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAD0D8 CVE: CVE-2024-40959 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit d46401052c2d5614da8efea5788532f0401cb164 ] ip6_dst_idev() can return NULL, xfrm6_get_saddr() must act accordingly. syzbot reported: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] CPU: 1 PID: 12 Comm: kworker/u8:1 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc2-syzkaller-00383-gb8481381d4e2 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/02/2024 Workqueue: wg-kex-wg1 wg_packet_handshake_send_worker RIP: 0010:xfrm6_get_saddr+0x93/0x130 net/ipv6/xfrm6_policy.c:64 Code: df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 97 00 00 00 4c 8b ab d8 00 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 89 ea 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 86 00 00 00 4d 8b 6d 00 e8 ca 13 47 01 48 b8 00 RSP: 0018:ffffc90000117378 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff88807b079dc0 RCX: ffffffff89a0d6d7 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff89a0d6e9 RDI: ffff88807b079e98 RBP: ffff88807ad73248 R08: 0000000000000007 R09: fffffffffffff000 R10: ffff88807b079dc0 R11: 0000000000000007 R12: ffffc90000117480 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9300000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f4586d00440 CR3: 0000000079042000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> xfrm_get_saddr net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:2452 [inline] xfrm_tmpl_resolve_one net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:2481 [inline] xfrm_tmpl_resolve+0xa26/0xf10 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:2541 xfrm_resolve_and_create_bundle+0x140/0x2570 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:2835 xfrm_bundle_lookup net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:3070 [inline] xfrm_lookup_with_ifid+0x4d1/0x1e60 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:3201 xfrm_lookup net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:3298 [inline] xfrm_lookup_route+0x3b/0x200 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:3309 ip6_dst_lookup_flow+0x15c/0x1d0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1256 send6+0x611/0xd20 drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c:139 wg_socket_send_skb_to_peer+0xf9/0x220 drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c:178 wg_socket_send_buffer_to_peer+0x12b/0x190 drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c:200 wg_packet_send_handshake_initiation+0x227/0x360 drivers/net/wireguard/send.c:40 wg_packet_handshake_send_worker+0x1c/0x30 drivers/net/wireguard/send.c:51 process_one_work+0x9fb/0x1b60 kernel/workqueue.c:3231 process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3312 [inline] worker_thread+0x6c8/0xf70 kernel/workqueue.c:3393 kthread+0x2c1/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:389 ret_from_fork+0x45/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller(a)googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern(a)kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240615154231.234442-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- net/ipv6/xfrm6_policy.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ipv6/xfrm6_policy.c b/net/ipv6/xfrm6_policy.c index cfe650cddeb6..32b874fa4119 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/xfrm6_policy.c +++ b/net/ipv6/xfrm6_policy.c @@ -60,12 +60,18 @@ static int xfrm6_get_saddr(struct net *net, int oif, { struct dst_entry *dst; struct net_device *dev; + struct inet6_dev *idev; dst = xfrm6_dst_lookup(net, 0, oif, NULL, daddr, mark); if (IS_ERR(dst)) return -EHOSTUNREACH; - dev = ip6_dst_idev(dst)->dev; + idev = ip6_dst_idev(dst); + if (!idev) { + dst_release(dst); + return -EHOSTUNREACH; + } + dev = idev->dev; ipv6_dev_get_saddr(dev_net(dev), dev, &daddr->in6, 0, &saddr->in6); dst_release(dst); return 0; -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] ALSA: emux: improve patch ioctl data validation
by Zheng Yejian 31 Jul '24

31 Jul '24

From: Oswald Buddenhagen <oswald.buddenhagen(a)gmx.de> stable inclusion from stable-v4.19.317 commit 40d7def67841343c10f8642a41031fecbb248bab category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAGEP7 CVE: CVE-2024-42097 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… --------------------------- [ Upstream commit 89b32ccb12ae67e630c6453d778ec30a592a212f ] In load_data(), make the validation of and skipping over the main info block match that in load_guspatch(). In load_guspatch(), add checking that the specified patch length matches the actually supplied data, like load_data() already did. Signed-off-by: Oswald Buddenhagen <oswald.buddenhagen(a)gmx.de> Message-ID: <20240406064830.1029573-8-oswald.buddenhagen(a)gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai(a)suse.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Zheng Yejian <zhengyejian1(a)huawei.com> --- sound/synth/emux/soundfont.c | 17 +++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/synth/emux/soundfont.c b/sound/synth/emux/soundfont.c index 31a4ea94830e..235b16af6083 100644 --- a/sound/synth/emux/soundfont.c +++ b/sound/synth/emux/soundfont.c @@ -710,7 +710,6 @@ load_data(struct snd_sf_list *sflist, const void __user *data, long count) struct snd_soundfont *sf; struct soundfont_sample_info sample_info; struct snd_sf_sample *sp; - long off; /* patch must be opened */ if ((sf = sflist->currsf) == NULL) @@ -719,12 +718,16 @@ load_data(struct snd_sf_list *sflist, const void __user *data, long count) if (is_special_type(sf->type)) return -EINVAL; + if (count < (long)sizeof(sample_info)) { + return -EINVAL; + } if (copy_from_user(&sample_info, data, sizeof(sample_info))) return -EFAULT; + data += sizeof(sample_info); + count -= sizeof(sample_info); - off = sizeof(sample_info); - - if (sample_info.size != (count-off)/2) + // SoundFont uses S16LE samples. + if (sample_info.size * 2 != count) return -EINVAL; /* Check for dup */ @@ -751,7 +754,7 @@ load_data(struct snd_sf_list *sflist, const void __user *data, long count) int rc; rc = sflist->callback.sample_new (sflist->callback.private_data, sp, sflist->memhdr, - data + off, count - off); + data, count); if (rc < 0) { sf_sample_delete(sflist, sf, sp); return rc; @@ -962,10 +965,12 @@ load_guspatch(struct snd_sf_list *sflist, const char __user *data, } if (copy_from_user(&patch, data, sizeof(patch))) return -EFAULT; - count -= sizeof(patch); data += sizeof(patch); + if ((patch.len << (patch.mode & WAVE_16_BITS ? 1 : 0)) != count) + return -EINVAL; + sf = newsf(sflist, SNDRV_SFNT_PAT_TYPE_GUS|SNDRV_SFNT_PAT_SHARED, NULL); if (sf == NULL) return -ENOMEM; -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/3] Make cpuset.cpus.exclusive independent of cpuset.cpus
by Chen Ridong 31 Jul '24

31 Jul '24

*** BLURB HERE *** Waiman Long (3): cgroup/cpuset: Documentation update for partition cgroup/cpuset: Delay setting of CS_CPU_EXCLUSIVE until valid partition cgroup/cpuset: Make cpuset.cpus.exclusive independent of cpuset.cpus Documentation/admin-guide/cgroup-v2.rst | 127 ++++++++++++++++++------ kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c | 103 ++++++++++++++----- 2 files changed, 171 insertions(+), 59 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 4

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] io_uring: fix possible deadlock in io_register_iowq_max_workers()
by Wang Zhaolong 31 Jul '24

31 Jul '24

From: Hagar Hemdan <hagarhem(a)amazon.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.10-rc3 commit 73254a297c2dd094abec7c9efee32455ae875bdf category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAGEK8 CVE: CVE-2024-41080 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- The io_register_iowq_max_workers() function calls io_put_sq_data(), which acquires the sqd->lock without releasing the uring_lock. Similar to the commit 009ad9f0c6ee ("io_uring: drop ctx->uring_lock before acquiring sqd->lock"), this can lead to a potential deadlock situation. To resolve this issue, the uring_lock is released before calling io_put_sq_data(), and then it is re-acquired after the function call. This change ensures that the locks are acquired in the correct order, preventing the possibility of a deadlock. Suggested-by: Maximilian Heyne <mheyne(a)amazon.de> Signed-off-by: Hagar Hemdan <hagarhem(a)amazon.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240604130527.3597-1-hagarhem@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk> Conflicts: io_uring/io_uring.c io_uring/register.c [Commit c43203154d8ac moves related functions from io_uring/io_uring.c to io_uring/register.c.] Signed-off-by: Wang Zhaolong <wangzhaolong1(a)huawei.com> --- io_uring/io_uring.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/io_uring/io_uring.c b/io_uring/io_uring.c index 5979f0fc28b2..40bd1406976c 100644 --- a/io_uring/io_uring.c +++ b/io_uring/io_uring.c @@ -4340,8 +4340,10 @@ static __cold int io_register_iowq_max_workers(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, } if (sqd) { + mutex_unlock(&ctx->uring_lock); mutex_unlock(&sqd->lock); io_put_sq_data(sqd); + mutex_lock(&ctx->uring_lock); } if (copy_to_user(arg, new_count, sizeof(new_count))) @@ -4366,8 +4368,10 @@ static __cold int io_register_iowq_max_workers(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, return 0; err: if (sqd) { + mutex_unlock(&ctx->uring_lock); mutex_unlock(&sqd->lock); io_put_sq_data(sqd); + mutex_lock(&ctx->uring_lock); } return ret; } -- 2.34.3

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] io_uring: fix possible deadlock in io_register_iowq_max_workers()
by Wang Zhaolong 31 Jul '24

31 Jul '24

From: Hagar Hemdan <hagarhem(a)amazon.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.10-rc3 commit 73254a297c2dd094abec7c9efee32455ae875bdf category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAGEK8 CVE: CVE-2024-41080 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- The io_register_iowq_max_workers() function calls io_put_sq_data(), which acquires the sqd->lock without releasing the uring_lock. Similar to the commit 009ad9f0c6ee ("io_uring: drop ctx->uring_lock before acquiring sqd->lock"), this can lead to a potential deadlock situation. To resolve this issue, the uring_lock is released before calling io_put_sq_data(), and then it is re-acquired after the function call. This change ensures that the locks are acquired in the correct order, preventing the possibility of a deadlock. Suggested-by: Maximilian Heyne <mheyne(a)amazon.de> Signed-off-by: Hagar Hemdan <hagarhem(a)amazon.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240604130527.3597-1-hagarhem@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk> Conflicts: io_uring/io_uring.c io_uring/register.c [Commit c43203154d8ac moves related functions from io_uring/io_uring.c to io_uring/register.c.] Signed-off-by: Wang Zhaolong <wangzhaolong1(a)huawei.com> --- io_uring/io_uring.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/io_uring/io_uring.c b/io_uring/io_uring.c index 5979f0fc28b2..40bd1406976c 100644 --- a/io_uring/io_uring.c +++ b/io_uring/io_uring.c @@ -4340,8 +4340,10 @@ static __cold int io_register_iowq_max_workers(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, } if (sqd) { + mutex_unlock(&ctx->uring_lock); mutex_unlock(&sqd->lock); io_put_sq_data(sqd); + mutex_lock(&ctx->uring_lock); } if (copy_to_user(arg, new_count, sizeof(new_count))) @@ -4366,8 +4368,10 @@ static __cold int io_register_iowq_max_workers(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, return 0; err: if (sqd) { + mutex_unlock(&ctx->uring_lock); mutex_unlock(&sqd->lock); io_put_sq_data(sqd); + mutex_lock(&ctx->uring_lock); } return ret; } -- 2.34.3

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] null_blk: fix validation of block size
by Zeng Heng 31 Jul '24

31 Jul '24

From: Andreas Hindborg <a.hindborg(a)samsung.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.42 commit 08f03186b96e25e3154916a2e70732557c770ea7 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAGEMW CVE: CVE-2024-41077 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… --------------------------- [ Upstream commit c462ecd659b5fce731f1d592285832fd6ad54053 ] Block size should be between 512 and PAGE_SIZE and be a power of 2. The current check does not validate this, so update the check. Without this patch, null_blk would Oops due to a null pointer deref when loaded with bs=1536 [1]. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/87wmn8mocd.fsf@metaspace.dk/ Signed-off-by: Andreas Hindborg <a.hindborg(a)samsung.com> Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei(a)redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240603192645.977968-1-nmi@metaspace.dk [axboe: remove unnecessary braces and != 0 check] Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Zeng Heng <zengheng4(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/block/null_blk/main.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/block/null_blk/main.c b/drivers/block/null_blk/main.c index c70c1b9caf2f..644f86eef744 100644 --- a/drivers/block/null_blk/main.c +++ b/drivers/block/null_blk/main.c @@ -2029,8 +2029,8 @@ static int null_validate_conf(struct nullb_device *dev) return -EINVAL; } - dev->blocksize = round_down(dev->blocksize, 512); - dev->blocksize = clamp_t(unsigned int, dev->blocksize, 512, 4096); + if (blk_validate_block_size(dev->blocksize)) + return -EINVAL; if (dev->queue_mode == NULL_Q_MQ && dev->use_per_node_hctx) { if (dev->submit_queues != nr_online_nodes) -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] null_blk: fix validation of block size
by Zeng Heng 31 Jul '24

31 Jul '24

From: Andreas Hindborg <a.hindborg(a)samsung.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.223 commit 9625afe1dd4a158a14bb50f81af9e2dac634c0b1 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAGEMW CVE: CVE-2024-41077 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… --------------------------- [ Upstream commit c462ecd659b5fce731f1d592285832fd6ad54053 ] Block size should be between 512 and PAGE_SIZE and be a power of 2. The current check does not validate this, so update the check. Without this patch, null_blk would Oops due to a null pointer deref when loaded with bs=1536 [1]. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/87wmn8mocd.fsf@metaspace.dk/ Signed-off-by: Andreas Hindborg <a.hindborg(a)samsung.com> Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei(a)redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240603192645.977968-1-nmi@metaspace.dk [axboe: remove unnecessary braces and != 0 check] Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Zeng Heng <zengheng4(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/block/null_blk/main.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/block/null_blk/main.c b/drivers/block/null_blk/main.c index 91c8412442d0..8ecabf025512 100644 --- a/drivers/block/null_blk/main.c +++ b/drivers/block/null_blk/main.c @@ -1756,8 +1756,8 @@ static int null_validate_conf(struct nullb_device *dev) return -EINVAL; } - dev->blocksize = round_down(dev->blocksize, 512); - dev->blocksize = clamp_t(unsigned int, dev->blocksize, 512, 4096); + if (blk_validate_block_size(dev->blocksize)) + return -EINVAL; if (dev->queue_mode == NULL_Q_MQ && dev->use_per_node_hctx) { if (dev->submit_queues != nr_online_nodes) -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] null_blk: fix validation of block size
by Zeng Heng 31 Jul '24

31 Jul '24

From: Andreas Hindborg <a.hindborg(a)samsung.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.223 commit 9625afe1dd4a158a14bb50f81af9e2dac634c0b1 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAGEMW CVE: CVE-2024-41077 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… --------------------------- [ Upstream commit c462ecd659b5fce731f1d592285832fd6ad54053 ] Block size should be between 512 and PAGE_SIZE and be a power of 2. The current check does not validate this, so update the check. Without this patch, null_blk would Oops due to a null pointer deref when loaded with bs=1536 [1]. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/87wmn8mocd.fsf@metaspace.dk/ Signed-off-by: Andreas Hindborg <a.hindborg(a)samsung.com> Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei(a)redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240603192645.977968-1-nmi@metaspace.dk [axboe: remove unnecessary braces and != 0 check] Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: drivers/block/null_blk/main.c [The conflicts were due to not backport some unnecessary patch.] Signed-off-by: Zeng Heng <zengheng4(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/block/null_blk/main.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/block/null_blk/main.c b/drivers/block/null_blk/main.c index 209b95f88839..c36e8a4f805b 100644 --- a/drivers/block/null_blk/main.c +++ b/drivers/block/null_blk/main.c @@ -1751,8 +1751,8 @@ static int null_init_tag_set(struct nullb *nullb, struct blk_mq_tag_set *set) static int null_validate_conf(struct nullb_device *dev) { - dev->blocksize = round_down(dev->blocksize, 512); - dev->blocksize = clamp_t(unsigned int, dev->blocksize, 512, 4096); + if (blk_validate_block_size(dev->blocksize)) + return -EINVAL; if (dev->queue_mode == NULL_Q_MQ && dev->use_per_node_hctx) { if (dev->submit_queues != nr_online_nodes) -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] io_uring: fix possible deadlock in io_register_iowq_max_workers()
by Wang Zhaolong 31 Jul '24

31 Jul '24

From: Hagar Hemdan <hagarhem(a)amazon.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.10-rc3 commit 73254a297c2dd094abec7c9efee32455ae875bdf category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAGEK8 CVE: CVE-2024-41080 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- The io_register_iowq_max_workers() function calls io_put_sq_data(), which acquires the sqd->lock without releasing the uring_lock. Similar to the commit 009ad9f0c6ee ("io_uring: drop ctx->uring_lock before acquiring sqd->lock"), this can lead to a potential deadlock situation. To resolve this issue, the uring_lock is released before calling io_put_sq_data(), and then it is re-acquired after the function call. This change ensures that the locks are acquired in the correct order, preventing the possibility of a deadlock. Suggested-by: Maximilian Heyne <mheyne(a)amazon.de> Signed-off-by: Hagar Hemdan <hagarhem(a)amazon.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240604130527.3597-1-hagarhem@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk> Conflicts: io_uring/io_uring.c io_uring/register.c [Commit c43203154d8ac moves related functions from io_uring/io_uring.c to io_uring/register.c.] Signed-off-by: Wang Zhaolong <wangzhaolong1(a)huawei.com> --- io_uring/io_uring.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/io_uring/io_uring.c b/io_uring/io_uring.c index 5979f0fc28b2..40bd1406976c 100644 --- a/io_uring/io_uring.c +++ b/io_uring/io_uring.c @@ -4340,8 +4340,10 @@ static __cold int io_register_iowq_max_workers(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, } if (sqd) { + mutex_unlock(&ctx->uring_lock); mutex_unlock(&sqd->lock); io_put_sq_data(sqd); + mutex_lock(&ctx->uring_lock); } if (copy_to_user(arg, new_count, sizeof(new_count))) @@ -4366,8 +4368,10 @@ static __cold int io_register_iowq_max_workers(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, return 0; err: if (sqd) { + mutex_unlock(&ctx->uring_lock); mutex_unlock(&sqd->lock); io_put_sq_data(sqd); + mutex_lock(&ctx->uring_lock); } return ret; } -- 2.34.3

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] xfrm6: check ip6_dst_idev() return value in xfrm6_get_saddr()
by Dong Chenchen 31 Jul '24

31 Jul '24

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> [ Upstream commit d46401052c2d5614da8efea5788532f0401cb164 ] ip6_dst_idev() can return NULL, xfrm6_get_saddr() must act accordingly. syzbot reported: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] CPU: 1 PID: 12 Comm: kworker/u8:1 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc2-syzkaller-00383-gb8481381d4e2 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/02/2024 Workqueue: wg-kex-wg1 wg_packet_handshake_send_worker RIP: 0010:xfrm6_get_saddr+0x93/0x130 net/ipv6/xfrm6_policy.c:64 Code: df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 97 00 00 00 4c 8b ab d8 00 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 89 ea 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 86 00 00 00 4d 8b 6d 00 e8 ca 13 47 01 48 b8 00 RSP: 0018:ffffc90000117378 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff88807b079dc0 RCX: ffffffff89a0d6d7 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff89a0d6e9 RDI: ffff88807b079e98 RBP: ffff88807ad73248 R08: 0000000000000007 R09: fffffffffffff000 R10: ffff88807b079dc0 R11: 0000000000000007 R12: ffffc90000117480 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9300000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f4586d00440 CR3: 0000000079042000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> xfrm_get_saddr net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:2452 [inline] xfrm_tmpl_resolve_one net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:2481 [inline] xfrm_tmpl_resolve+0xa26/0xf10 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:2541 xfrm_resolve_and_create_bundle+0x140/0x2570 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:2835 xfrm_bundle_lookup net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:3070 [inline] xfrm_lookup_with_ifid+0x4d1/0x1e60 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:3201 xfrm_lookup net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:3298 [inline] xfrm_lookup_route+0x3b/0x200 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:3309 ip6_dst_lookup_flow+0x15c/0x1d0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1256 send6+0x611/0xd20 drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c:139 wg_socket_send_skb_to_peer+0xf9/0x220 drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c:178 wg_socket_send_buffer_to_peer+0x12b/0x190 drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c:200 wg_packet_send_handshake_initiation+0x227/0x360 drivers/net/wireguard/send.c:40 wg_packet_handshake_send_worker+0x1c/0x30 drivers/net/wireguard/send.c:51 process_one_work+0x9fb/0x1b60 kernel/workqueue.c:3231 process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3312 [inline] worker_thread+0x6c8/0xf70 kernel/workqueue.c:3393 kthread+0x2c1/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:389 ret_from_fork+0x45/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller(a)googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern(a)kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240615154231.234442-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- net/ipv6/xfrm6_policy.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ipv6/xfrm6_policy.c b/net/ipv6/xfrm6_policy.c index cfe650cddeb6..32b874fa4119 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/xfrm6_policy.c +++ b/net/ipv6/xfrm6_policy.c @@ -60,12 +60,18 @@ static int xfrm6_get_saddr(struct net *net, int oif, { struct dst_entry *dst; struct net_device *dev; + struct inet6_dev *idev; dst = xfrm6_dst_lookup(net, 0, oif, NULL, daddr, mark); if (IS_ERR(dst)) return -EHOSTUNREACH; - dev = ip6_dst_idev(dst)->dev; + idev = ip6_dst_idev(dst); + if (!idev) { + dst_release(dst); + return -EHOSTUNREACH; + } + dev = idev->dev; ipv6_dev_get_saddr(dev_net(dev), dev, &daddr->in6, 0, &saddr->in6); dst_release(dst); return 0; -- 2.25.1

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