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[PATCH OLK-6.6] RDMA/rxe: Fix seg fault in rxe_comp_queue_pkt
by Liu Jian 27 Jun '24

27 Jun '24

From: Bob Pearson <rpearsonhpe(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.33 commit 21b4c6d4d89030fd4657a8e7c8110fd941049794 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IA72Y8 CVE: CVE-2024-38544 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… --------------------------- [ Upstream commit 2b23b6097303ed0ba5f4bc036a1c07b6027af5c6 ] In rxe_comp_queue_pkt() an incoming response packet skb is enqueued to the resp_pkts queue and then a decision is made whether to run the completer task inline or schedule it. Finally the skb is dereferenced to bump a 'hw' performance counter. This is wrong because if the completer task is already running in a separate thread it may have already processed the skb and freed it which can cause a seg fault. This has been observed infrequently in testing at high scale. This patch fixes this by changing the order of enqueuing the packet until after the counter is accessed. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240329145513.35381-4-rpearsonhpe@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Bob Pearson <rpearsonhpe(a)gmail.com> Fixes: 0b1e5b99a48b ("IB/rxe: Add port protocol stats") Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg(a)nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Liu Jian <liujian56(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_comp.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_comp.c b/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_comp.c index d0bdc2d8adc8..acd2172bf092 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_comp.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_comp.c @@ -131,12 +131,12 @@ void rxe_comp_queue_pkt(struct rxe_qp *qp, struct sk_buff *skb) { int must_sched; - skb_queue_tail(&qp->resp_pkts, skb); - - must_sched = skb_queue_len(&qp->resp_pkts) > 1; + must_sched = skb_queue_len(&qp->resp_pkts) > 0; if (must_sched != 0) rxe_counter_inc(SKB_TO_PKT(skb)->rxe, RXE_CNT_COMPLETER_SCHED); + skb_queue_tail(&qp->resp_pkts, skb); + if (must_sched) rxe_sched_task(&qp->comp.task); else -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] drm: vc4: Fix possible null pointer dereference
by Ze Zuo 27 Jun '24

27 Jun '24

From: Aleksandr Mishin <amishin(a)t-argos.ru> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.219 commit 2d9adecc88ab678785b581ab021f039372c324cb category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IA6SGI CVE: CVE-2024-38546 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit c534b63bede6cb987c2946ed4d0b0013a52c5ba7 ] In vc4_hdmi_audio_init() of_get_address() may return NULL which is later dereferenced. Fix this bug by adding NULL check. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE. Fixes: bb7d78568814 ("drm/vc4: Add HDMI audio support") Signed-off-by: Aleksandr Mishin <amishin(a)t-argos.ru> Signed-off-by: Maxime Ripard <mripard(a)kernel.org> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20240409075622.11783-1-amishi… Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_hdmi.c [Fix context] Signed-off-by: Ze Zuo <zuoze1(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_hdmi.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_hdmi.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_hdmi.c index fd5522fd179e..b187a46cc4bc 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_hdmi.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_hdmi.c @@ -1086,6 +1086,8 @@ static int vc4_hdmi_audio_init(struct vc4_hdmi *hdmi) * This VC/MMU should probably be exposed to avoid this kind of hacks. */ addr = of_get_address(dev->of_node, 1, NULL, NULL); + if (!addr) + return -EINVAL; hdmi->audio.dma_data.addr = be32_to_cpup(addr) + VC4_HD_MAI_DATA; hdmi->audio.dma_data.addr_width = DMA_SLAVE_BUSWIDTH_4_BYTES; hdmi->audio.dma_data.maxburst = 2; -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/3] blk-throttle: check for overflow in calculate_bytes_allowed
by Li Lingfeng 27 Jun '24

27 Jun '24

Check for overflow in calculate_bytes_allowed. Khazhismel Kumykov (1): blk-throttle: check for overflow in calculate_bytes_allowed Yu Kuai (2): blk-throttle: factor out code to calculate ios/bytes_allowed blk-throttle: use calculate_io/bytes_allowed() for throtl_trim_slice() block/blk-throttle.c | 97 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------- 1 file changed, 55 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-) -- 2.31.1

2 4

[PATCH OLK-6.6] ftrace: Fix possible use-after-free issue in ftrace_location()
by Zheng Yejian 27 Jun '24

27 Jun '24

stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.33 commit 7b4881da5b19f65709f5c18c1a4d8caa2e496461 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IA6S5H CVE: CVE-2024-38588 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit e60b613df8b6253def41215402f72986fee3fc8d upstream. KASAN reports a bug: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ftrace_location+0x90/0x120 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888141d40010 by task insmod/424 CPU: 8 PID: 424 Comm: insmod Tainted: G W 6.9.0-rc2+ [...] Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0xa0 print_report+0xcf/0x610 kasan_report+0xb5/0xe0 ftrace_location+0x90/0x120 register_kprobe+0x14b/0xa40 kprobe_init+0x2d/0xff0 [kprobe_example] do_one_initcall+0x8f/0x2d0 do_init_module+0x13a/0x3c0 load_module+0x3082/0x33d0 init_module_from_file+0xd2/0x130 __x64_sys_finit_module+0x306/0x440 do_syscall_64+0x68/0x140 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x71/0x79 The root cause is that, in lookup_rec(), ftrace record of some address is being searched in ftrace pages of some module, but those ftrace pages at the same time is being freed in ftrace_release_mod() as the corresponding module is being deleted: CPU1 | CPU2 register_kprobes() { | delete_module() { check_kprobe_address_safe() { | arch_check_ftrace_location() { | ftrace_location() { | lookup_rec() // USE! | ftrace_release_mod() // Free! To fix this issue: 1. Hold rcu lock as accessing ftrace pages in ftrace_location_range(); 2. Use ftrace_location_range() instead of lookup_rec() in ftrace_location(); 3. Call synchronize_rcu() before freeing any ftrace pages both in ftrace_process_locs()/ftrace_release_mod()/ftrace_free_mem(). Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20240509192859.1273558-1-zhengye… Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: <mhiramat(a)kernel.org> Cc: <mark.rutland(a)arm.com> Cc: <mathieu.desnoyers(a)efficios.com> Fixes: ae6aa16fdc16 ("kprobes: introduce ftrace based optimization") Suggested-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt(a)goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Zheng Yejian <zhengyejian1(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt(a)goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: ZhangPeng <zhangpeng362(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Yejian <zhengyejian1(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/trace/ftrace.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/trace/ftrace.c b/kernel/trace/ftrace.c index 83ba342aef31..2f80239348f5 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/ftrace.c +++ b/kernel/trace/ftrace.c @@ -1595,12 +1595,15 @@ static struct dyn_ftrace *lookup_rec(unsigned long start, unsigned long end) unsigned long ftrace_location_range(unsigned long start, unsigned long end) { struct dyn_ftrace *rec; + unsigned long ip = 0; + rcu_read_lock(); rec = lookup_rec(start, end); if (rec) - return rec->ip; + ip = rec->ip; + rcu_read_unlock(); - return 0; + return ip; } /** @@ -1613,25 +1616,22 @@ unsigned long ftrace_location_range(unsigned long start, unsigned long end) */ unsigned long ftrace_location(unsigned long ip) { - struct dyn_ftrace *rec; + unsigned long loc; unsigned long offset; unsigned long size; - rec = lookup_rec(ip, ip); - if (!rec) { + loc = ftrace_location_range(ip, ip); + if (!loc) { if (!kallsyms_lookup_size_offset(ip, &size, &offset)) goto out; /* map sym+0 to __fentry__ */ if (!offset) - rec = lookup_rec(ip, ip + size - 1); + loc = ftrace_location_range(ip, ip + size - 1); } - if (rec) - return rec->ip; - out: - return 0; + return loc; } /** @@ -6593,6 +6593,8 @@ static int ftrace_process_locs(struct module *mod, /* We should have used all pages unless we skipped some */ if (pg_unuse) { WARN_ON(!skipped); + /* Need to synchronize with ftrace_location_range() */ + synchronize_rcu(); ftrace_free_pages(pg_unuse); } return ret; @@ -6806,6 +6808,9 @@ void ftrace_release_mod(struct module *mod) out_unlock: mutex_unlock(&ftrace_lock); + /* Need to synchronize with ftrace_location_range() */ + if (tmp_page) + synchronize_rcu(); for (pg = tmp_page; pg; pg = tmp_page) { /* Needs to be called outside of ftrace_lock */ @@ -7139,6 +7144,7 @@ void ftrace_free_mem(struct module *mod, void *start_ptr, void *end_ptr) unsigned long start = (unsigned long)(start_ptr); unsigned long end = (unsigned long)(end_ptr); struct ftrace_page **last_pg = &ftrace_pages_start; + struct ftrace_page *tmp_page = NULL; struct ftrace_page *pg; struct dyn_ftrace *rec; struct dyn_ftrace key; @@ -7180,12 +7186,8 @@ void ftrace_free_mem(struct module *mod, void *start_ptr, void *end_ptr) ftrace_update_tot_cnt--; if (!pg->index) { *last_pg = pg->next; - if (pg->records) { - free_pages((unsigned long)pg->records, pg->order); - ftrace_number_of_pages -= 1 << pg->order; - } - ftrace_number_of_groups--; - kfree(pg); + pg->next = tmp_page; + tmp_page = pg; pg = container_of(last_pg, struct ftrace_page, next); if (!(*last_pg)) ftrace_pages = pg; @@ -7202,6 +7204,11 @@ void ftrace_free_mem(struct module *mod, void *start_ptr, void *end_ptr) clear_func_from_hashes(func); kfree(func); } + /* Need to synchronize with ftrace_location_range() */ + if (tmp_page) { + synchronize_rcu(); + ftrace_free_pages(tmp_page); + } } void __init ftrace_free_init_mem(void) -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] cifs: fix pagecache leak when do writepages
by Yang Erkun 27 Jun '24

27 Jun '24

hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/IA8BHB CVE: NA -------------------------------- After commit f3dc1bdb6b0b("cifs: Fix writeback data corruption"), the writepages for cifs will find all folio needed writepage with two phase. The first folio will be found in cifs_writepages_begin, and the latter various folios will be found in cifs_extend_writeback. All those will first get folio, and for normal case, once we set page writeback and after do really write, we should put the reference, folio found in cifs_extend_writeback do this with folio_batch_release. But the folio found in cifs_writepages_begin never get the chance do it. And every writepages call, we will leak a folio(found this problem while do xfstests over cifs, the latter show that we will leak about 600M+ every we run generic/074). echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches ; cat /proc/meminfo | grep file Active(file): 34092 kB Inactive(file): 176192 kB ./check generic/074 (smb v1) ... generic/074 50s ... 53s Ran: generic/074 Passed all 1 tests echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches ; cat /proc/meminfo | grep file Active(file): 35036 kB Inactive(file): 854708 kB Besides, the exist path seem never handle this folio correctly, fix it too with this patch. The problem does not exist in mainline since writepages path for cifs has changed to netfs(3ee1a1fc3981 ("cifs: Cut over to using netfslib")). It's had to backport all related change, so try fix this problem with this single patch. Fixes: f3dc1bdb6b0b ("cifs: Fix writeback data corruption") Cc: stable(a)kernel.org # v6.6~6.9 Signed-off-by: Yang Erkun <yangerkun(a)huawei.com> --- fs/smb/client/file.c | 16 +++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/smb/client/file.c b/fs/smb/client/file.c index 7ea8c3cf70f6..058c2be86e97 100644 --- a/fs/smb/client/file.c +++ b/fs/smb/client/file.c @@ -2856,17 +2856,21 @@ static ssize_t cifs_write_back_from_locked_folio(struct address_space *mapping, rc = cifs_get_writable_file(CIFS_I(inode), FIND_WR_ANY, &cfile); if (rc) { cifs_dbg(VFS, "No writable handle in writepages rc=%d\n", rc); + folio_unlock(folio); goto err_xid; } rc = server->ops->wait_mtu_credits(server, cifs_sb->ctx->wsize, &wsize, credits); - if (rc != 0) + if (rc != 0) { + folio_unlock(folio); goto err_close; + } wdata = cifs_writedata_alloc(cifs_writev_complete); if (!wdata) { rc = -ENOMEM; + folio_unlock(folio); goto err_uncredit; } @@ -3013,17 +3017,22 @@ static ssize_t cifs_writepages_begin(struct address_space *mapping, lock_again: if (wbc->sync_mode != WB_SYNC_NONE) { ret = folio_lock_killable(folio); - if (ret < 0) + if (ret < 0) { + folio_put(folio); return ret; + } } else { - if (!folio_trylock(folio)) + if (!folio_trylock(folio)) { + folio_put(folio); goto search_again; + } } if (folio->mapping != mapping || !folio_test_dirty(folio)) { start += folio_size(folio); folio_unlock(folio); + folio_put(folio); goto search_again; } @@ -3053,6 +3062,7 @@ static ssize_t cifs_writepages_begin(struct address_space *mapping, out: if (ret > 0) *_start = start + ret; + folio_put(folio); return ret; } -- 2.39.2

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/1] Revert "fs: Use CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION() when
by Zheng Zengkai 27 Jun '24

27 Jun '24

Revert "fs: Use CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION() when kernel bugs are detected" Zheng Zengkai (1): Revert "fs: Use CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION() when kernel bugs are detected" fs/open.c | 5 ++--- fs/super.c | 21 ++++----------------- include/linux/poison.h | 3 --- 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) -- 2.20.1

2 2

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/4] Enable SIS_UTIL for arm64 and optimize load_balance
by Zheng Zengkai 27 Jun '24

27 Jun '24

Enable SIS_UTIL for arm64 and fix numa imbalance in load_balance. Zhang Qiao (2): sched/numa: Fix numa imbalance in load_balance() config: Disable COBFIG_ARCH_CUSTOM_NUMA_DISTANCE for arm64 Zheng Zengkai (2): Revert "sched: ARM64 enables SIS_PROP and disables SIS_UTIL"" Revert "Revert "sched/fair:ARM64 enables SIS_UTIL and disables SIS_PROP"" arch/arm64/configs/openeuler_defconfig | 2 +- kernel/sched/fair.c | 10 ++++++---- kernel/sched/features.h | 5 +++++ 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) -- 2.20.1

2 5

[PATCH OLK-6.6] usb: gadget: u_audio: Fix race condition use of controls after free during gadget unbind.
by Tengda Wu 27 Jun '24

27 Jun '24

From: Chris Wulff <Chris.Wulff(a)biamp.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.33 commit 453d3fa9266e53f85377b911c19b9a4563fa88c0 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IA7D24 CVE: CVE-2024-38628 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 1b739388aa3f8dfb63a9fca777e6dfa6912d0464 ] Hang on to the control IDs instead of pointers since those are correctly handled with locks. Fixes: 8fe9a03f4331 ("usb: gadget: u_audio: Rate ctl notifies about current srate (0=stopped)") Fixes: c565ad07ef35 ("usb: gadget: u_audio: Support multiple sampling rates") Fixes: 02de698ca812 ("usb: gadget: u_audio: add bi-directional volume and mute support") Signed-off-by: Chris Wulff <chris.wulff(a)biamp.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/stable/CO1PR17MB5419C2BF44D400E4E620C1ADE1172%40CO1… Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CO1PR17MB5419C2BF44D400E4E620C1ADE1172@CO1PR17MB5… Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Tengda Wu <wutengda2(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_audio.c | 19 +++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_audio.c b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_audio.c index 4a42574b4a7f..c8e8154c59f5 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_audio.c +++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_audio.c @@ -57,13 +57,13 @@ struct uac_rtd_params { /* Volume/Mute controls and their state */ int fu_id; /* Feature Unit ID */ - struct snd_kcontrol *snd_kctl_volume; - struct snd_kcontrol *snd_kctl_mute; + struct snd_ctl_elem_id snd_kctl_volume_id; + struct snd_ctl_elem_id snd_kctl_mute_id; s16 volume_min, volume_max, volume_res; s16 volume; int mute; - struct snd_kcontrol *snd_kctl_rate; /* read-only current rate */ + struct snd_ctl_elem_id snd_kctl_rate_id; /* read-only current rate */ int srate; /* selected samplerate */ int active; /* playback/capture running */ @@ -494,14 +494,13 @@ static inline void free_ep_fback(struct uac_rtd_params *prm, struct usb_ep *ep) static void set_active(struct uac_rtd_params *prm, bool active) { // notifying through the Rate ctrl - struct snd_kcontrol *kctl = prm->snd_kctl_rate; unsigned long flags; spin_lock_irqsave(&prm->lock, flags); if (prm->active != active) { prm->active = active; snd_ctl_notify(prm->uac->card, SNDRV_CTL_EVENT_MASK_VALUE, - &kctl->id); + &prm->snd_kctl_rate_id); } spin_unlock_irqrestore(&prm->lock, flags); } @@ -807,7 +806,7 @@ int u_audio_set_volume(struct g_audio *audio_dev, int playback, s16 val) if (change) snd_ctl_notify(uac->card, SNDRV_CTL_EVENT_MASK_VALUE, - &prm->snd_kctl_volume->id); + &prm->snd_kctl_volume_id); return 0; } @@ -856,7 +855,7 @@ int u_audio_set_mute(struct g_audio *audio_dev, int playback, int val) if (change) snd_ctl_notify(uac->card, SNDRV_CTL_EVENT_MASK_VALUE, - &prm->snd_kctl_mute->id); + &prm->snd_kctl_mute_id); return 0; } @@ -1331,7 +1330,7 @@ int g_audio_setup(struct g_audio *g_audio, const char *pcm_name, err = snd_ctl_add(card, kctl); if (err < 0) goto snd_fail; - prm->snd_kctl_mute = kctl; + prm->snd_kctl_mute_id = kctl->id; prm->mute = 0; } @@ -1359,7 +1358,7 @@ int g_audio_setup(struct g_audio *g_audio, const char *pcm_name, err = snd_ctl_add(card, kctl); if (err < 0) goto snd_fail; - prm->snd_kctl_volume = kctl; + prm->snd_kctl_volume_id = kctl->id; prm->volume = fu->volume_max; prm->volume_max = fu->volume_max; prm->volume_min = fu->volume_min; @@ -1383,7 +1382,7 @@ int g_audio_setup(struct g_audio *g_audio, const char *pcm_name, err = snd_ctl_add(card, kctl); if (err < 0) goto snd_fail; - prm->snd_kctl_rate = kctl; + prm->snd_kctl_rate_id = kctl->id; } strscpy(card->driver, card_name, sizeof(card->driver)); -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS 0/1] CVE-2024-38587
by Chen Ridong 27 Jun '24

27 Jun '24

*** BLURB HERE *** Dan Carpenter (1): speakup: Fix sizeof() vs ARRAY_SIZE() bug drivers/staging/speakup/main.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) -- 2.34.1

2 2

[PATCH OLK-5.10] um: Add winch to winch_handlers before registering winch IRQ
by Chen Zhongjin 26 Jun '24

26 Jun '24

From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu(a)huawei.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.219 commit 351d1a64544944b44732f6a64ed65573b00b9e14 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IA7YJR CVE: CVE-2024-39292 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit a0fbbd36c156b9f7b2276871d499c9943dfe5101 ] Registering a winch IRQ is racy, an interrupt may occur before the winch is added to the winch_handlers list. If that happens, register_winch_irq() adds to that list a winch that is scheduled to be (or has already been) freed, causing a panic later in winch_cleanup(). Avoid the race by adding the winch to the winch_handlers list before registering the IRQ, and rolling back if um_request_irq() fails. Fixes: 42a359e31a0e ("uml: SIGIO support cleanup") Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Johannes Berg <johannes(a)sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard(a)nod.at> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Chen Zhongjin <chenzhongjin(a)huawei.com> --- arch/um/drivers/line.c | 14 ++++++++------ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/um/drivers/line.c b/arch/um/drivers/line.c index 14ad9f495fe6..37e96ba0f5fb 100644 --- a/arch/um/drivers/line.c +++ b/arch/um/drivers/line.c @@ -668,24 +668,26 @@ void register_winch_irq(int fd, int tty_fd, int pid, struct tty_port *port, goto cleanup; } - *winch = ((struct winch) { .list = LIST_HEAD_INIT(winch->list), - .fd = fd, + *winch = ((struct winch) { .fd = fd, .tty_fd = tty_fd, .pid = pid, .port = port, .stack = stack }); + spin_lock(&winch_handler_lock); + list_add(&winch->list, &winch_handlers); + spin_unlock(&winch_handler_lock); + if (um_request_irq(WINCH_IRQ, fd, IRQ_READ, winch_interrupt, IRQF_SHARED, "winch", winch) < 0) { printk(KERN_ERR "register_winch_irq - failed to register " "IRQ\n"); + spin_lock(&winch_handler_lock); + list_del(&winch->list); + spin_unlock(&winch_handler_lock); goto out_free; } - spin_lock(&winch_handler_lock); - list_add(&winch->list, &winch_handlers); - spin_unlock(&winch_handler_lock); - return; out_free: -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS v2] watchdog: cpu5wdt.c: Fix use-after-free bug caused by cpu5wdt_trigger
by Xiongfeng Wang 26 Jun '24

26 Jun '24

From: Duoming Zhou <duoming(a)zju.edu.cn> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.10-rc1 commit 573601521277119f2e2ba5f28ae6e87fc594f4d4 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IA7D7P CVE: CVE-2024-38630 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- When the cpu5wdt module is removing, the origin code uses del_timer() to de-activate the timer. If the timer handler is running, del_timer() could not stop it and will return directly. If the port region is released by release_region() and then the timer handler cpu5wdt_trigger() calls outb() to write into the region that is released, the use-after-free bug will happen. Change del_timer() to timer_shutdown_sync() in order that the timer handler could be finished before the port region is released. Fixes: e09d9c3e9f85 ("watchdog: cpu5wdt.c: add missing del_timer call") Signed-off-by: Duoming Zhou <duoming(a)zju.edu.cn> Reviewed-by: Guenter Roeck <linux(a)roeck-us.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240324140444.119584-1-duoming@zju.edu.cn Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux(a)roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by: Wim Van Sebroeck <wim(a)linux-watchdog.org> conflict: drivers/watchdog/cpu5wdt.c [wxf: use del_timer_sync() rather than timer_shutdown_sync(), because the later function is not introduced.] Signed-off-by: Xiongfeng Wang <wangxiongfeng2(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/watchdog/cpu5wdt.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/watchdog/cpu5wdt.c b/drivers/watchdog/cpu5wdt.c index 6cfb102c397c..5d1dd4d72c0f 100644 --- a/drivers/watchdog/cpu5wdt.c +++ b/drivers/watchdog/cpu5wdt.c @@ -265,7 +265,7 @@ static void cpu5wdt_exit(void) if (cpu5wdt_device.queue) { cpu5wdt_device.queue = 0; wait_for_completion(&cpu5wdt_device.stop); - del_timer(&cpu5wdt_device.timer); + del_timer_sync(&cpu5wdt_device.timer); } misc_deregister(&cpu5wdt_misc); -- 2.20.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] netrom: fix possible dead-lock in nr_rt_ioctl()
by Pu Lehui 26 Jun '24

26 Jun '24

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.33 commit f28bdc2ee5d9300cc77bd3d97b5b3cdd14960fd8 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IA6SHC CVE: CVE-2024-38589 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit e03e7f20ebf7e1611d40d1fdc1bde900fd3335f6 ] syzbot loves netrom, and found a possible deadlock in nr_rt_ioctl [1] Make sure we always acquire nr_node_list_lock before nr_node_lock(nr_node) [1] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.9.0-rc7-syzkaller-02147-g654de42f3fc6 #0 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ syz-executor350/5129 is trying to acquire lock: ffff8880186e2070 (&nr_node->node_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline] ffff8880186e2070 (&nr_node->node_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_node_lock include/net/netrom.h:152 [inline] ffff8880186e2070 (&nr_node->node_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_dec_obs net/netrom/nr_route.c:464 [inline] ffff8880186e2070 (&nr_node->node_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_rt_ioctl+0x1bb/0x1090 net/netrom/nr_route.c:697 but task is already holding lock: ffffffff8f7053b8 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline] ffffffff8f7053b8 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_dec_obs net/netrom/nr_route.c:462 [inline] ffffffff8f7053b8 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_rt_ioctl+0x10a/0x1090 net/netrom/nr_route.c:697 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}: lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754 __raw_spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:126 [inline] _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x35/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:178 spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline] nr_remove_node net/netrom/nr_route.c:299 [inline] nr_del_node+0x4b4/0x820 net/netrom/nr_route.c:355 nr_rt_ioctl+0xa95/0x1090 net/netrom/nr_route.c:683 sock_do_ioctl+0x158/0x460 net/socket.c:1222 sock_ioctl+0x629/0x8e0 net/socket.c:1341 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:904 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:890 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f -> #0 (&nr_node->node_lock){+...}-{2:2}: check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline] validate_chain+0x18cb/0x58e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869 __lock_acquire+0x1346/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137 lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754 __raw_spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:126 [inline] _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x35/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:178 spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline] nr_node_lock include/net/netrom.h:152 [inline] nr_dec_obs net/netrom/nr_route.c:464 [inline] nr_rt_ioctl+0x1bb/0x1090 net/netrom/nr_route.c:697 sock_do_ioctl+0x158/0x460 net/socket.c:1222 sock_ioctl+0x629/0x8e0 net/socket.c:1341 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:904 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:890 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(nr_node_list_lock); lock(&nr_node->node_lock); lock(nr_node_list_lock); lock(&nr_node->node_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 1 lock held by syz-executor350/5129: #0: ffffffff8f7053b8 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline] #0: ffffffff8f7053b8 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_dec_obs net/netrom/nr_route.c:462 [inline] #0: ffffffff8f7053b8 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_rt_ioctl+0x10a/0x1090 net/netrom/nr_route.c:697 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 5129 Comm: syz-executor350 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc7-syzkaller-02147-g654de42f3fc6 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/02/2024 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:114 check_noncircular+0x36a/0x4a0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2187 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline] validate_chain+0x18cb/0x58e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869 __lock_acquire+0x1346/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137 lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754 __raw_spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:126 [inline] _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x35/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:178 spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline] nr_node_lock include/net/netrom.h:152 [inline] nr_dec_obs net/netrom/nr_route.c:464 [inline] nr_rt_ioctl+0x1bb/0x1090 net/netrom/nr_route.c:697 sock_do_ioctl+0x158/0x460 net/socket.c:1222 sock_ioctl+0x629/0x8e0 net/socket.c:1341 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:904 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:890 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller(a)googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms(a)kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240515142934.3708038-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui <pulehui(a)huawei.com> --- net/netrom/nr_route.c | 19 +++++++------------ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/netrom/nr_route.c b/net/netrom/nr_route.c index 70480869ad1c..bd2b17b219ae 100644 --- a/net/netrom/nr_route.c +++ b/net/netrom/nr_route.c @@ -285,22 +285,14 @@ static int __must_check nr_add_node(ax25_address *nr, const char *mnemonic, return 0; } -static inline void __nr_remove_node(struct nr_node *nr_node) +static void nr_remove_node_locked(struct nr_node *nr_node) { + lockdep_assert_held(&nr_node_list_lock); + hlist_del_init(&nr_node->node_node); nr_node_put(nr_node); } -#define nr_remove_node_locked(__node) \ - __nr_remove_node(__node) - -static void nr_remove_node(struct nr_node *nr_node) -{ - spin_lock_bh(&nr_node_list_lock); - __nr_remove_node(nr_node); - spin_unlock_bh(&nr_node_list_lock); -} - static inline void __nr_remove_neigh(struct nr_neigh *nr_neigh) { hlist_del_init(&nr_neigh->neigh_node); @@ -339,6 +331,7 @@ static int nr_del_node(ax25_address *callsign, ax25_address *neighbour, struct n return -EINVAL; } + spin_lock_bh(&nr_node_list_lock); nr_node_lock(nr_node); for (i = 0; i < nr_node->count; i++) { if (nr_node->routes[i].neighbour == nr_neigh) { @@ -352,7 +345,7 @@ static int nr_del_node(ax25_address *callsign, ax25_address *neighbour, struct n nr_node->count--; if (nr_node->count == 0) { - nr_remove_node(nr_node); + nr_remove_node_locked(nr_node); } else { switch (i) { case 0: @@ -367,12 +360,14 @@ static int nr_del_node(ax25_address *callsign, ax25_address *neighbour, struct n nr_node_put(nr_node); } nr_node_unlock(nr_node); + spin_unlock_bh(&nr_node_list_lock); return 0; } } nr_neigh_put(nr_neigh); nr_node_unlock(nr_node); + spin_unlock_bh(&nr_node_list_lock); nr_node_put(nr_node); return -EINVAL; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] netfilter: nf_tables: flush pending destroy work before exit_net release
by Dong Chenchen 26 Jun '24

26 Jun '24

From: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.215 commit 46c4481938e2ca62343b16ea83ab28f4c1733d31 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9QG95 CVE: CVE-2024-35899 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 24cea9677025e0de419989ecb692acd4bb34cac2 upstream. Similar to 2c9f0293280e ("netfilter: nf_tables: flush pending destroy work before netlink notifier") to address a race between exit_net and the destroy workqueue. The trace below shows an element to be released via destroy workqueue while exit_net path (triggered via module removal) has already released the set that is used in such transaction. [ 1360.547789] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in nf_tables_trans_destroy_work+0x3f5/0x590 [nf_tables] [ 1360.547861] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888140500cc0 by task kworker/4:1/152465 [ 1360.547870] CPU: 4 PID: 152465 Comm: kworker/4:1 Not tainted 6.8.0+ #359 [ 1360.547882] Workqueue: events nf_tables_trans_destroy_work [nf_tables] [ 1360.547984] Call Trace: [ 1360.547991] <TASK> [ 1360.547998] dump_stack_lvl+0x53/0x70 [ 1360.548014] print_report+0xc4/0x610 [ 1360.548026] ? __virt_addr_valid+0xba/0x160 [ 1360.548040] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10 [ 1360.548054] ? nf_tables_trans_destroy_work+0x3f5/0x590 [nf_tables] [ 1360.548176] kasan_report+0xae/0xe0 [ 1360.548189] ? nf_tables_trans_destroy_work+0x3f5/0x590 [nf_tables] [ 1360.548312] nf_tables_trans_destroy_work+0x3f5/0x590 [nf_tables] [ 1360.548447] ? __pfx_nf_tables_trans_destroy_work+0x10/0x10 [nf_tables] [ 1360.548577] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x18/0x30 [ 1360.548591] process_one_work+0x2f1/0x670 [ 1360.548610] worker_thread+0x4d3/0x760 [ 1360.548627] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 1360.548640] kthread+0x16b/0x1b0 [ 1360.548653] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 1360.548665] ret_from_fork+0x2f/0x50 [ 1360.548679] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 1360.548690] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 1360.548707] </TASK> [ 1360.548719] Allocated by task 192061: [ 1360.548726] kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40 [ 1360.548739] kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 [ 1360.548750] __kasan_kmalloc+0x8f/0xa0 [ 1360.548760] __kmalloc_node+0x1f1/0x450 [ 1360.548771] nf_tables_newset+0x10c7/0x1b50 [nf_tables] [ 1360.548883] nfnetlink_rcv_batch+0xbc4/0xdc0 [nfnetlink] [ 1360.548909] nfnetlink_rcv+0x1a8/0x1e0 [nfnetlink] [ 1360.548927] netlink_unicast+0x367/0x4f0 [ 1360.548935] netlink_sendmsg+0x34b/0x610 [ 1360.548944] ____sys_sendmsg+0x4d4/0x510 [ 1360.548953] ___sys_sendmsg+0xc9/0x120 [ 1360.548961] __sys_sendmsg+0xbe/0x140 [ 1360.548971] do_syscall_64+0x55/0x120 [ 1360.548982] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x55/0x5d [ 1360.548994] Freed by task 192222: [ 1360.548999] kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40 [ 1360.549009] kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 [ 1360.549019] kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60 [ 1360.549028] poison_slab_object+0x100/0x180 [ 1360.549036] __kasan_slab_free+0x14/0x30 [ 1360.549042] kfree+0xb6/0x260 [ 1360.549049] __nft_release_table+0x473/0x6a0 [nf_tables] [ 1360.549131] nf_tables_exit_net+0x170/0x240 [nf_tables] [ 1360.549221] ops_exit_list+0x50/0xa0 [ 1360.549229] free_exit_list+0x101/0x140 [ 1360.549236] unregister_pernet_operations+0x107/0x160 [ 1360.549245] unregister_pernet_subsys+0x1c/0x30 [ 1360.549254] nf_tables_module_exit+0x43/0x80 [nf_tables] [ 1360.549345] __do_sys_delete_module+0x253/0x370 [ 1360.549352] do_syscall_64+0x55/0x120 [ 1360.549360] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x55/0x5d (gdb) list *__nft_release_table+0x473 0x1e033 is in __nft_release_table (net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:11354). 11349 list_for_each_entry_safe(flowtable, nf, &table->flowtables, list) { 11350 list_del(&flowtable->list); 11351 nft_use_dec(&table->use); 11352 nf_tables_flowtable_destroy(flowtable); 11353 } 11354 list_for_each_entry_safe(set, ns, &table->sets, list) { 11355 list_del(&set->list); 11356 nft_use_dec(&table->use); 11357 if (set->flags & (NFT_SET_MAP | NFT_SET_OBJECT)) 11358 nft_map_deactivate(&ctx, set); (gdb) [ 1360.549372] Last potentially related work creation: [ 1360.549376] kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40 [ 1360.549384] __kasan_record_aux_stack+0x9b/0xb0 [ 1360.549392] __queue_work+0x3fb/0x780 [ 1360.549399] queue_work_on+0x4f/0x60 [ 1360.549407] nft_rhash_remove+0x33b/0x340 [nf_tables] [ 1360.549516] nf_tables_commit+0x1c6a/0x2620 [nf_tables] [ 1360.549625] nfnetlink_rcv_batch+0x728/0xdc0 [nfnetlink] [ 1360.549647] nfnetlink_rcv+0x1a8/0x1e0 [nfnetlink] [ 1360.549671] netlink_unicast+0x367/0x4f0 [ 1360.549680] netlink_sendmsg+0x34b/0x610 [ 1360.549690] ____sys_sendmsg+0x4d4/0x510 [ 1360.549697] ___sys_sendmsg+0xc9/0x120 [ 1360.549706] __sys_sendmsg+0xbe/0x140 [ 1360.549715] do_syscall_64+0x55/0x120 [ 1360.549725] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x55/0x5d Fixes: 0935d5588400 ("netfilter: nf_tables: asynchronous release") Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c index 8ffaafc06581..5cd244528e20 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c @@ -9851,6 +9851,7 @@ static void __exit nf_tables_module_exit(void) unregister_netdevice_notifier(&nf_tables_flowtable_notifier); nft_chain_filter_fini(); nft_chain_route_fini(); + nf_tables_trans_destroy_flush_work(); unregister_pernet_subsys(&nf_tables_net_ops); cancel_work_sync(&trans_gc_work); cancel_work_sync(&trans_destroy_work); -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] um: Add winch to winch_handlers before registering winch IRQ
by Chen Zhongjin 26 Jun '24

26 Jun '24

From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu(a)huawei.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.10-rc1 commit a0fbbd36c156b9f7b2276871d499c9943dfe5101 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IA7YJR CVE: CVE-2024-39292 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- Registering a winch IRQ is racy, an interrupt may occur before the winch is added to the winch_handlers list. If that happens, register_winch_irq() adds to that list a winch that is scheduled to be (or has already been) freed, causing a panic later in winch_cleanup(). Avoid the race by adding the winch to the winch_handlers list before registering the IRQ, and rolling back if um_request_irq() fails. Fixes: 42a359e31a0e ("uml: SIGIO support cleanup") Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Johannes Berg <johannes(a)sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard(a)nod.at> --- arch/um/drivers/line.c | 14 ++++++++------ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/um/drivers/line.c b/arch/um/drivers/line.c index 14ad9f495fe6..37e96ba0f5fb 100644 --- a/arch/um/drivers/line.c +++ b/arch/um/drivers/line.c @@ -668,24 +668,26 @@ void register_winch_irq(int fd, int tty_fd, int pid, struct tty_port *port, goto cleanup; } - *winch = ((struct winch) { .list = LIST_HEAD_INIT(winch->list), - .fd = fd, + *winch = ((struct winch) { .fd = fd, .tty_fd = tty_fd, .pid = pid, .port = port, .stack = stack }); + spin_lock(&winch_handler_lock); + list_add(&winch->list, &winch_handlers); + spin_unlock(&winch_handler_lock); + if (um_request_irq(WINCH_IRQ, fd, IRQ_READ, winch_interrupt, IRQF_SHARED, "winch", winch) < 0) { printk(KERN_ERR "register_winch_irq - failed to register " "IRQ\n"); + spin_lock(&winch_handler_lock); + list_del(&winch->list); + spin_unlock(&winch_handler_lock); goto out_free; } - spin_lock(&winch_handler_lock); - list_add(&winch->list, &winch_handlers); - spin_unlock(&winch_handler_lock); - return; out_free: -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] netfilter: nf_tables: flush pending destroy work before exit_net release
by Dong Chenchen 26 Jun '24

26 Jun '24

From: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.215 commit 46c4481938e2ca62343b16ea83ab28f4c1733d31 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9QG95 CVE: CVE-2024-35899 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 24cea9677025e0de419989ecb692acd4bb34cac2 upstream. Similar to 2c9f0293280e ("netfilter: nf_tables: flush pending destroy work before netlink notifier") to address a race between exit_net and the destroy workqueue. The trace below shows an element to be released via destroy workqueue while exit_net path (triggered via module removal) has already released the set that is used in such transaction. [ 1360.547789] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in nf_tables_trans_destroy_work+0x3f5/0x590 [nf_tables] [ 1360.547861] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888140500cc0 by task kworker/4:1/152465 [ 1360.547870] CPU: 4 PID: 152465 Comm: kworker/4:1 Not tainted 6.8.0+ #359 [ 1360.547882] Workqueue: events nf_tables_trans_destroy_work [nf_tables] [ 1360.547984] Call Trace: [ 1360.547991] <TASK> [ 1360.547998] dump_stack_lvl+0x53/0x70 [ 1360.548014] print_report+0xc4/0x610 [ 1360.548026] ? __virt_addr_valid+0xba/0x160 [ 1360.548040] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10 [ 1360.548054] ? nf_tables_trans_destroy_work+0x3f5/0x590 [nf_tables] [ 1360.548176] kasan_report+0xae/0xe0 [ 1360.548189] ? nf_tables_trans_destroy_work+0x3f5/0x590 [nf_tables] [ 1360.548312] nf_tables_trans_destroy_work+0x3f5/0x590 [nf_tables] [ 1360.548447] ? __pfx_nf_tables_trans_destroy_work+0x10/0x10 [nf_tables] [ 1360.548577] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x18/0x30 [ 1360.548591] process_one_work+0x2f1/0x670 [ 1360.548610] worker_thread+0x4d3/0x760 [ 1360.548627] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 1360.548640] kthread+0x16b/0x1b0 [ 1360.548653] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 1360.548665] ret_from_fork+0x2f/0x50 [ 1360.548679] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 1360.548690] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 1360.548707] </TASK> [ 1360.548719] Allocated by task 192061: [ 1360.548726] kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40 [ 1360.548739] kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 [ 1360.548750] __kasan_kmalloc+0x8f/0xa0 [ 1360.548760] __kmalloc_node+0x1f1/0x450 [ 1360.548771] nf_tables_newset+0x10c7/0x1b50 [nf_tables] [ 1360.548883] nfnetlink_rcv_batch+0xbc4/0xdc0 [nfnetlink] [ 1360.548909] nfnetlink_rcv+0x1a8/0x1e0 [nfnetlink] [ 1360.548927] netlink_unicast+0x367/0x4f0 [ 1360.548935] netlink_sendmsg+0x34b/0x610 [ 1360.548944] ____sys_sendmsg+0x4d4/0x510 [ 1360.548953] ___sys_sendmsg+0xc9/0x120 [ 1360.548961] __sys_sendmsg+0xbe/0x140 [ 1360.548971] do_syscall_64+0x55/0x120 [ 1360.548982] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x55/0x5d [ 1360.548994] Freed by task 192222: [ 1360.548999] kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40 [ 1360.549009] kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 [ 1360.549019] kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60 [ 1360.549028] poison_slab_object+0x100/0x180 [ 1360.549036] __kasan_slab_free+0x14/0x30 [ 1360.549042] kfree+0xb6/0x260 [ 1360.549049] __nft_release_table+0x473/0x6a0 [nf_tables] [ 1360.549131] nf_tables_exit_net+0x170/0x240 [nf_tables] [ 1360.549221] ops_exit_list+0x50/0xa0 [ 1360.549229] free_exit_list+0x101/0x140 [ 1360.549236] unregister_pernet_operations+0x107/0x160 [ 1360.549245] unregister_pernet_subsys+0x1c/0x30 [ 1360.549254] nf_tables_module_exit+0x43/0x80 [nf_tables] [ 1360.549345] __do_sys_delete_module+0x253/0x370 [ 1360.549352] do_syscall_64+0x55/0x120 [ 1360.549360] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x55/0x5d (gdb) list *__nft_release_table+0x473 0x1e033 is in __nft_release_table (net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:11354). 11349 list_for_each_entry_safe(flowtable, nf, &table->flowtables, list) { 11350 list_del(&flowtable->list); 11351 nft_use_dec(&table->use); 11352 nf_tables_flowtable_destroy(flowtable); 11353 } 11354 list_for_each_entry_safe(set, ns, &table->sets, list) { 11355 list_del(&set->list); 11356 nft_use_dec(&table->use); 11357 if (set->flags & (NFT_SET_MAP | NFT_SET_OBJECT)) 11358 nft_map_deactivate(&ctx, set); (gdb) [ 1360.549372] Last potentially related work creation: [ 1360.549376] kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40 [ 1360.549384] __kasan_record_aux_stack+0x9b/0xb0 [ 1360.549392] __queue_work+0x3fb/0x780 [ 1360.549399] queue_work_on+0x4f/0x60 [ 1360.549407] nft_rhash_remove+0x33b/0x340 [nf_tables] [ 1360.549516] nf_tables_commit+0x1c6a/0x2620 [nf_tables] [ 1360.549625] nfnetlink_rcv_batch+0x728/0xdc0 [nfnetlink] [ 1360.549647] nfnetlink_rcv+0x1a8/0x1e0 [nfnetlink] [ 1360.549671] netlink_unicast+0x367/0x4f0 [ 1360.549680] netlink_sendmsg+0x34b/0x610 [ 1360.549690] ____sys_sendmsg+0x4d4/0x510 [ 1360.549697] ___sys_sendmsg+0xc9/0x120 [ 1360.549706] __sys_sendmsg+0xbe/0x140 [ 1360.549715] do_syscall_64+0x55/0x120 [ 1360.549725] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x55/0x5d Fixes: 0935d5588400 ("netfilter: nf_tables: asynchronous release") Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c index 8ffaafc06581..5cd244528e20 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c @@ -9851,6 +9851,7 @@ static void __exit nf_tables_module_exit(void) unregister_netdevice_notifier(&nf_tables_flowtable_notifier); nft_chain_filter_fini(); nft_chain_route_fini(); + nf_tables_trans_destroy_flush_work(); unregister_pernet_subsys(&nf_tables_net_ops); cancel_work_sync(&trans_gc_work); cancel_work_sync(&trans_destroy_work); -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] ipv6: fix race condition between ipv6_get_ifaddr and ipv6_del_addr
by Dong Chenchen 26 Jun '24

26 Jun '24

From: Jiri Benc <jbenc(a)redhat.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.216 commit 3fb02ec57ead2891a2306af8c51a306bc5945e70 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9QRPL CVE: CVE-2024-35969 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 7633c4da919ad51164acbf1aa322cc1a3ead6129 ] Although ipv6_get_ifaddr walks inet6_addr_lst under the RCU lock, it still means hlist_for_each_entry_rcu can return an item that got removed from the list. The memory itself of such item is not freed thanks to RCU but nothing guarantees the actual content of the memory is sane. In particular, the reference count can be zero. This can happen if ipv6_del_addr is called in parallel. ipv6_del_addr removes the entry from inet6_addr_lst (hlist_del_init_rcu(&ifp->addr_lst)) and drops all references (__in6_ifa_put(ifp) + in6_ifa_put(ifp)). With bad enough timing, this can happen: 1. In ipv6_get_ifaddr, hlist_for_each_entry_rcu returns an entry. 2. Then, the whole ipv6_del_addr is executed for the given entry. The reference count drops to zero and kfree_rcu is scheduled. 3. ipv6_get_ifaddr continues and tries to increments the reference count (in6_ifa_hold). 4. The rcu is unlocked and the entry is freed. 5. The freed entry is returned. Prevent increasing of the reference count in such case. The name in6_ifa_hold_safe is chosen to mimic the existing fib6_info_hold_safe. [ 41.506330] refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free. [ 41.506760] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 595 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xa5/0x130 [ 41.507413] Modules linked in: veth bridge stp llc [ 41.507821] CPU: 0 PID: 595 Comm: python3 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc2.main-00208-g49563be82afa #14 [ 41.508479] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996) [ 41.509163] RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xa5/0x130 [ 41.509586] Code: ad ff 90 0f 0b 90 90 c3 cc cc cc cc 80 3d c0 30 ad 01 00 75 a0 c6 05 b7 30 ad 01 01 90 48 c7 c7 38 cc 7a 8c e8 cc 18 ad ff 90 <0f> 0b 90 90 c3 cc cc cc cc 80 3d 98 30 ad 01 00 0f 85 75 ff ff ff [ 41.510956] RSP: 0018:ffffbda3c026baf0 EFLAGS: 00010282 [ 41.511368] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9e9c46914800 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 41.511910] RDX: ffff9e9c7ec29c00 RSI: ffff9e9c7ec1c900 RDI: ffff9e9c7ec1c900 [ 41.512445] RBP: ffff9e9c43660c9c R08: 0000000000009ffb R09: 00000000ffffdfff [ 41.512998] R10: 00000000ffffdfff R11: ffffffff8ca58a40 R12: ffff9e9c4339a000 [ 41.513534] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff9e9c438a0000 R15: ffffbda3c026bb48 [ 41.514086] FS: 00007fbc4cda1740(0000) GS:ffff9e9c7ec00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 41.514726] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 41.515176] CR2: 000056233b337d88 CR3: 000000000376e006 CR4: 0000000000370ef0 [ 41.515713] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 41.516252] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 41.516799] Call Trace: [ 41.517037] <TASK> [ 41.517249] ? __warn+0x7b/0x120 [ 41.517535] ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xa5/0x130 [ 41.517923] ? report_bug+0x164/0x190 [ 41.518240] ? handle_bug+0x3d/0x70 [ 41.518541] ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70 [ 41.520972] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 [ 41.521325] ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xa5/0x130 [ 41.521708] ipv6_get_ifaddr+0xda/0xe0 [ 41.522035] inet6_rtm_getaddr+0x342/0x3f0 [ 41.522376] ? __pfx_inet6_rtm_getaddr+0x10/0x10 [ 41.522758] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x334/0x3d0 [ 41.523102] ? netlink_unicast+0x30f/0x390 [ 41.523445] ? __pfx_rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10 [ 41.523832] netlink_rcv_skb+0x53/0x100 [ 41.524157] netlink_unicast+0x23b/0x390 [ 41.524484] netlink_sendmsg+0x1f2/0x440 [ 41.524826] __sys_sendto+0x1d8/0x1f0 [ 41.525145] __x64_sys_sendto+0x1f/0x30 [ 41.525467] do_syscall_64+0xa5/0x1b0 [ 41.525794] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0x7a [ 41.526213] RIP: 0033:0x7fbc4cfcea9a [ 41.526528] Code: d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b8 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 41 89 ca 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 15 b8 2c 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 7e c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 54 48 83 ec 30 44 89 [ 41.527942] RSP: 002b:00007ffcf54012a8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c [ 41.528593] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffcf5401368 RCX: 00007fbc4cfcea9a [ 41.529173] RDX: 000000000000002c RSI: 00007fbc4b9d9bd0 RDI: 0000000000000005 [ 41.529786] RBP: 00007fbc4bafb040 R08: 00007ffcf54013e0 R09: 000000000000000c [ 41.530375] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 41.530977] R13: ffffffffc4653600 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 00007fbc4ca85d1b [ 41.531573] </TASK> Fixes: 5c578aedcb21d ("IPv6: convert addrconf hash list to RCU") Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jiri Benc <jbenc(a)redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/8ab821e36073a4a406c50ec83c9e8dc586c539e4.17125858… Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- include/net/addrconf.h | 4 ++++ net/ipv6/addrconf.c | 7 ++++--- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/addrconf.h b/include/net/addrconf.h index edba74a53683..a24c65e9a994 100644 --- a/include/net/addrconf.h +++ b/include/net/addrconf.h @@ -429,6 +429,10 @@ static inline void in6_ifa_hold(struct inet6_ifaddr *ifp) refcount_inc(&ifp->refcnt); } +static inline bool in6_ifa_hold_safe(struct inet6_ifaddr *ifp) +{ + return refcount_inc_not_zero(&ifp->refcnt); +} /* * compute link-local solicited-node multicast address diff --git a/net/ipv6/addrconf.c b/net/ipv6/addrconf.c index 5e42149b954f..821aa81dec47 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/addrconf.c +++ b/net/ipv6/addrconf.c @@ -2033,9 +2033,10 @@ struct inet6_ifaddr *ipv6_get_ifaddr(struct net *net, const struct in6_addr *add if (ipv6_addr_equal(&ifp->addr, addr)) { if (!dev || ifp->idev->dev == dev || !(ifp->scope&(IFA_LINK|IFA_HOST) || strict)) { - result = ifp; - in6_ifa_hold(ifp); - break; + if (in6_ifa_hold_safe(ifp)) { + result = ifp; + break; + } } } } -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] ipv6: fix race condition between ipv6_get_ifaddr and ipv6_del_addr
by Dong Chenchen 26 Jun '24

26 Jun '24

From: Jiri Benc <jbenc(a)redhat.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.216 commit 3fb02ec57ead2891a2306af8c51a306bc5945e70 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9QRPL CVE: CVE-2024-35969 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 7633c4da919ad51164acbf1aa322cc1a3ead6129 ] Although ipv6_get_ifaddr walks inet6_addr_lst under the RCU lock, it still means hlist_for_each_entry_rcu can return an item that got removed from the list. The memory itself of such item is not freed thanks to RCU but nothing guarantees the actual content of the memory is sane. In particular, the reference count can be zero. This can happen if ipv6_del_addr is called in parallel. ipv6_del_addr removes the entry from inet6_addr_lst (hlist_del_init_rcu(&ifp->addr_lst)) and drops all references (__in6_ifa_put(ifp) + in6_ifa_put(ifp)). With bad enough timing, this can happen: 1. In ipv6_get_ifaddr, hlist_for_each_entry_rcu returns an entry. 2. Then, the whole ipv6_del_addr is executed for the given entry. The reference count drops to zero and kfree_rcu is scheduled. 3. ipv6_get_ifaddr continues and tries to increments the reference count (in6_ifa_hold). 4. The rcu is unlocked and the entry is freed. 5. The freed entry is returned. Prevent increasing of the reference count in such case. The name in6_ifa_hold_safe is chosen to mimic the existing fib6_info_hold_safe. [ 41.506330] refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free. [ 41.506760] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 595 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xa5/0x130 [ 41.507413] Modules linked in: veth bridge stp llc [ 41.507821] CPU: 0 PID: 595 Comm: python3 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc2.main-00208-g49563be82afa #14 [ 41.508479] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996) [ 41.509163] RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xa5/0x130 [ 41.509586] Code: ad ff 90 0f 0b 90 90 c3 cc cc cc cc 80 3d c0 30 ad 01 00 75 a0 c6 05 b7 30 ad 01 01 90 48 c7 c7 38 cc 7a 8c e8 cc 18 ad ff 90 <0f> 0b 90 90 c3 cc cc cc cc 80 3d 98 30 ad 01 00 0f 85 75 ff ff ff [ 41.510956] RSP: 0018:ffffbda3c026baf0 EFLAGS: 00010282 [ 41.511368] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9e9c46914800 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 41.511910] RDX: ffff9e9c7ec29c00 RSI: ffff9e9c7ec1c900 RDI: ffff9e9c7ec1c900 [ 41.512445] RBP: ffff9e9c43660c9c R08: 0000000000009ffb R09: 00000000ffffdfff [ 41.512998] R10: 00000000ffffdfff R11: ffffffff8ca58a40 R12: ffff9e9c4339a000 [ 41.513534] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff9e9c438a0000 R15: ffffbda3c026bb48 [ 41.514086] FS: 00007fbc4cda1740(0000) GS:ffff9e9c7ec00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 41.514726] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 41.515176] CR2: 000056233b337d88 CR3: 000000000376e006 CR4: 0000000000370ef0 [ 41.515713] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 41.516252] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 41.516799] Call Trace: [ 41.517037] <TASK> [ 41.517249] ? __warn+0x7b/0x120 [ 41.517535] ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xa5/0x130 [ 41.517923] ? report_bug+0x164/0x190 [ 41.518240] ? handle_bug+0x3d/0x70 [ 41.518541] ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70 [ 41.520972] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 [ 41.521325] ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xa5/0x130 [ 41.521708] ipv6_get_ifaddr+0xda/0xe0 [ 41.522035] inet6_rtm_getaddr+0x342/0x3f0 [ 41.522376] ? __pfx_inet6_rtm_getaddr+0x10/0x10 [ 41.522758] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x334/0x3d0 [ 41.523102] ? netlink_unicast+0x30f/0x390 [ 41.523445] ? __pfx_rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10 [ 41.523832] netlink_rcv_skb+0x53/0x100 [ 41.524157] netlink_unicast+0x23b/0x390 [ 41.524484] netlink_sendmsg+0x1f2/0x440 [ 41.524826] __sys_sendto+0x1d8/0x1f0 [ 41.525145] __x64_sys_sendto+0x1f/0x30 [ 41.525467] do_syscall_64+0xa5/0x1b0 [ 41.525794] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0x7a [ 41.526213] RIP: 0033:0x7fbc4cfcea9a [ 41.526528] Code: d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b8 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 41 89 ca 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 15 b8 2c 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 7e c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 54 48 83 ec 30 44 89 [ 41.527942] RSP: 002b:00007ffcf54012a8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c [ 41.528593] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffcf5401368 RCX: 00007fbc4cfcea9a [ 41.529173] RDX: 000000000000002c RSI: 00007fbc4b9d9bd0 RDI: 0000000000000005 [ 41.529786] RBP: 00007fbc4bafb040 R08: 00007ffcf54013e0 R09: 000000000000000c [ 41.530375] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 41.530977] R13: ffffffffc4653600 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 00007fbc4ca85d1b [ 41.531573] </TASK> Fixes: 5c578aedcb21d ("IPv6: convert addrconf hash list to RCU") Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jiri Benc <jbenc(a)redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/8ab821e36073a4a406c50ec83c9e8dc586c539e4.17125858… Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- include/net/addrconf.h | 4 ++++ net/ipv6/addrconf.c | 7 ++++--- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/addrconf.h b/include/net/addrconf.h index edba74a53683..a24c65e9a994 100644 --- a/include/net/addrconf.h +++ b/include/net/addrconf.h @@ -429,6 +429,10 @@ static inline void in6_ifa_hold(struct inet6_ifaddr *ifp) refcount_inc(&ifp->refcnt); } +static inline bool in6_ifa_hold_safe(struct inet6_ifaddr *ifp) +{ + return refcount_inc_not_zero(&ifp->refcnt); +} /* * compute link-local solicited-node multicast address diff --git a/net/ipv6/addrconf.c b/net/ipv6/addrconf.c index a2bdefcd2b30..23c20dc39ca8 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/addrconf.c +++ b/net/ipv6/addrconf.c @@ -2031,9 +2031,10 @@ struct inet6_ifaddr *ipv6_get_ifaddr(struct net *net, const struct in6_addr *add if (ipv6_addr_equal(&ifp->addr, addr)) { if (!dev || ifp->idev->dev == dev || !(ifp->scope&(IFA_LINK|IFA_HOST) || strict)) { - result = ifp; - in6_ifa_hold(ifp); - break; + if (in6_ifa_hold_safe(ifp)) { + result = ifp; + break; + } } } } -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] netrom: fix possible dead-lock in nr_rt_ioctl()
by Pu Lehui 26 Jun '24

26 Jun '24

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> stable inclusion from stable-v4.19.316 commit b9d663fbf74290cb68fbc66ae4367bd56837ad1d category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IA6SHC CVE: CVE-2024-38589 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit e03e7f20ebf7e1611d40d1fdc1bde900fd3335f6 ] syzbot loves netrom, and found a possible deadlock in nr_rt_ioctl [1] Make sure we always acquire nr_node_list_lock before nr_node_lock(nr_node) [1] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.9.0-rc7-syzkaller-02147-g654de42f3fc6 #0 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ syz-executor350/5129 is trying to acquire lock: ffff8880186e2070 (&nr_node->node_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline] ffff8880186e2070 (&nr_node->node_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_node_lock include/net/netrom.h:152 [inline] ffff8880186e2070 (&nr_node->node_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_dec_obs net/netrom/nr_route.c:464 [inline] ffff8880186e2070 (&nr_node->node_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_rt_ioctl+0x1bb/0x1090 net/netrom/nr_route.c:697 but task is already holding lock: ffffffff8f7053b8 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline] ffffffff8f7053b8 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_dec_obs net/netrom/nr_route.c:462 [inline] ffffffff8f7053b8 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_rt_ioctl+0x10a/0x1090 net/netrom/nr_route.c:697 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}: lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754 __raw_spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:126 [inline] _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x35/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:178 spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline] nr_remove_node net/netrom/nr_route.c:299 [inline] nr_del_node+0x4b4/0x820 net/netrom/nr_route.c:355 nr_rt_ioctl+0xa95/0x1090 net/netrom/nr_route.c:683 sock_do_ioctl+0x158/0x460 net/socket.c:1222 sock_ioctl+0x629/0x8e0 net/socket.c:1341 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:904 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:890 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f -> #0 (&nr_node->node_lock){+...}-{2:2}: check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline] validate_chain+0x18cb/0x58e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869 __lock_acquire+0x1346/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137 lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754 __raw_spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:126 [inline] _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x35/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:178 spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline] nr_node_lock include/net/netrom.h:152 [inline] nr_dec_obs net/netrom/nr_route.c:464 [inline] nr_rt_ioctl+0x1bb/0x1090 net/netrom/nr_route.c:697 sock_do_ioctl+0x158/0x460 net/socket.c:1222 sock_ioctl+0x629/0x8e0 net/socket.c:1341 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:904 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:890 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(nr_node_list_lock); lock(&nr_node->node_lock); lock(nr_node_list_lock); lock(&nr_node->node_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 1 lock held by syz-executor350/5129: #0: ffffffff8f7053b8 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline] #0: ffffffff8f7053b8 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_dec_obs net/netrom/nr_route.c:462 [inline] #0: ffffffff8f7053b8 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_rt_ioctl+0x10a/0x1090 net/netrom/nr_route.c:697 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 5129 Comm: syz-executor350 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc7-syzkaller-02147-g654de42f3fc6 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/02/2024 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:114 check_noncircular+0x36a/0x4a0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2187 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline] validate_chain+0x18cb/0x58e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869 __lock_acquire+0x1346/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137 lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754 __raw_spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:126 [inline] _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x35/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:178 spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline] nr_node_lock include/net/netrom.h:152 [inline] nr_dec_obs net/netrom/nr_route.c:464 [inline] nr_rt_ioctl+0x1bb/0x1090 net/netrom/nr_route.c:697 sock_do_ioctl+0x158/0x460 net/socket.c:1222 sock_ioctl+0x629/0x8e0 net/socket.c:1341 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:904 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:890 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller(a)googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms(a)kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240515142934.3708038-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui <pulehui(a)huawei.com> --- net/netrom/nr_route.c | 19 +++++++------------ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/netrom/nr_route.c b/net/netrom/nr_route.c index b76aa668a94b..ee2e35cd7352 100644 --- a/net/netrom/nr_route.c +++ b/net/netrom/nr_route.c @@ -286,22 +286,14 @@ static int __must_check nr_add_node(ax25_address *nr, const char *mnemonic, return 0; } -static inline void __nr_remove_node(struct nr_node *nr_node) +static void nr_remove_node_locked(struct nr_node *nr_node) { + lockdep_assert_held(&nr_node_list_lock); + hlist_del_init(&nr_node->node_node); nr_node_put(nr_node); } -#define nr_remove_node_locked(__node) \ - __nr_remove_node(__node) - -static void nr_remove_node(struct nr_node *nr_node) -{ - spin_lock_bh(&nr_node_list_lock); - __nr_remove_node(nr_node); - spin_unlock_bh(&nr_node_list_lock); -} - static inline void __nr_remove_neigh(struct nr_neigh *nr_neigh) { hlist_del_init(&nr_neigh->neigh_node); @@ -340,6 +332,7 @@ static int nr_del_node(ax25_address *callsign, ax25_address *neighbour, struct n return -EINVAL; } + spin_lock_bh(&nr_node_list_lock); nr_node_lock(nr_node); for (i = 0; i < nr_node->count; i++) { if (nr_node->routes[i].neighbour == nr_neigh) { @@ -353,7 +346,7 @@ static int nr_del_node(ax25_address *callsign, ax25_address *neighbour, struct n nr_node->count--; if (nr_node->count == 0) { - nr_remove_node(nr_node); + nr_remove_node_locked(nr_node); } else { switch (i) { case 0: @@ -367,12 +360,14 @@ static int nr_del_node(ax25_address *callsign, ax25_address *neighbour, struct n nr_node_put(nr_node); } nr_node_unlock(nr_node); + spin_unlock_bh(&nr_node_list_lock); return 0; } } nr_neigh_put(nr_neigh); nr_node_unlock(nr_node); + spin_unlock_bh(&nr_node_list_lock); nr_node_put(nr_node); return -EINVAL; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] netrom: fix possible dead-lock in nr_rt_ioctl()
by Pu Lehui 26 Jun '24

26 Jun '24

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.219 commit b117e5b4f27c2c9076561b6be450a9619f0b79de category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IA6SHC CVE: CVE-2024-38589 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit e03e7f20ebf7e1611d40d1fdc1bde900fd3335f6 ] syzbot loves netrom, and found a possible deadlock in nr_rt_ioctl [1] Make sure we always acquire nr_node_list_lock before nr_node_lock(nr_node) [1] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.9.0-rc7-syzkaller-02147-g654de42f3fc6 #0 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ syz-executor350/5129 is trying to acquire lock: ffff8880186e2070 (&nr_node->node_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline] ffff8880186e2070 (&nr_node->node_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_node_lock include/net/netrom.h:152 [inline] ffff8880186e2070 (&nr_node->node_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_dec_obs net/netrom/nr_route.c:464 [inline] ffff8880186e2070 (&nr_node->node_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_rt_ioctl+0x1bb/0x1090 net/netrom/nr_route.c:697 but task is already holding lock: ffffffff8f7053b8 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline] ffffffff8f7053b8 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_dec_obs net/netrom/nr_route.c:462 [inline] ffffffff8f7053b8 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_rt_ioctl+0x10a/0x1090 net/netrom/nr_route.c:697 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}: lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754 __raw_spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:126 [inline] _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x35/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:178 spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline] nr_remove_node net/netrom/nr_route.c:299 [inline] nr_del_node+0x4b4/0x820 net/netrom/nr_route.c:355 nr_rt_ioctl+0xa95/0x1090 net/netrom/nr_route.c:683 sock_do_ioctl+0x158/0x460 net/socket.c:1222 sock_ioctl+0x629/0x8e0 net/socket.c:1341 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:904 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:890 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f -> #0 (&nr_node->node_lock){+...}-{2:2}: check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline] validate_chain+0x18cb/0x58e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869 __lock_acquire+0x1346/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137 lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754 __raw_spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:126 [inline] _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x35/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:178 spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline] nr_node_lock include/net/netrom.h:152 [inline] nr_dec_obs net/netrom/nr_route.c:464 [inline] nr_rt_ioctl+0x1bb/0x1090 net/netrom/nr_route.c:697 sock_do_ioctl+0x158/0x460 net/socket.c:1222 sock_ioctl+0x629/0x8e0 net/socket.c:1341 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:904 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:890 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(nr_node_list_lock); lock(&nr_node->node_lock); lock(nr_node_list_lock); lock(&nr_node->node_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 1 lock held by syz-executor350/5129: #0: ffffffff8f7053b8 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline] #0: ffffffff8f7053b8 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_dec_obs net/netrom/nr_route.c:462 [inline] #0: ffffffff8f7053b8 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_rt_ioctl+0x10a/0x1090 net/netrom/nr_route.c:697 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 5129 Comm: syz-executor350 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc7-syzkaller-02147-g654de42f3fc6 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/02/2024 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:114 check_noncircular+0x36a/0x4a0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2187 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline] validate_chain+0x18cb/0x58e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869 __lock_acquire+0x1346/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137 lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754 __raw_spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:126 [inline] _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x35/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:178 spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline] nr_node_lock include/net/netrom.h:152 [inline] nr_dec_obs net/netrom/nr_route.c:464 [inline] nr_rt_ioctl+0x1bb/0x1090 net/netrom/nr_route.c:697 sock_do_ioctl+0x158/0x460 net/socket.c:1222 sock_ioctl+0x629/0x8e0 net/socket.c:1341 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:904 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:890 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller(a)googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms(a)kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240515142934.3708038-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui <pulehui(a)huawei.com> --- net/netrom/nr_route.c | 19 +++++++------------ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/netrom/nr_route.c b/net/netrom/nr_route.c index 78da5eab252a..103814bf97c8 100644 --- a/net/netrom/nr_route.c +++ b/net/netrom/nr_route.c @@ -284,22 +284,14 @@ static int __must_check nr_add_node(ax25_address *nr, const char *mnemonic, return 0; } -static inline void __nr_remove_node(struct nr_node *nr_node) +static void nr_remove_node_locked(struct nr_node *nr_node) { + lockdep_assert_held(&nr_node_list_lock); + hlist_del_init(&nr_node->node_node); nr_node_put(nr_node); } -#define nr_remove_node_locked(__node) \ - __nr_remove_node(__node) - -static void nr_remove_node(struct nr_node *nr_node) -{ - spin_lock_bh(&nr_node_list_lock); - __nr_remove_node(nr_node); - spin_unlock_bh(&nr_node_list_lock); -} - static inline void __nr_remove_neigh(struct nr_neigh *nr_neigh) { hlist_del_init(&nr_neigh->neigh_node); @@ -338,6 +330,7 @@ static int nr_del_node(ax25_address *callsign, ax25_address *neighbour, struct n return -EINVAL; } + spin_lock_bh(&nr_node_list_lock); nr_node_lock(nr_node); for (i = 0; i < nr_node->count; i++) { if (nr_node->routes[i].neighbour == nr_neigh) { @@ -351,7 +344,7 @@ static int nr_del_node(ax25_address *callsign, ax25_address *neighbour, struct n nr_node->count--; if (nr_node->count == 0) { - nr_remove_node(nr_node); + nr_remove_node_locked(nr_node); } else { switch (i) { case 0: @@ -365,12 +358,14 @@ static int nr_del_node(ax25_address *callsign, ax25_address *neighbour, struct n nr_node_put(nr_node); } nr_node_unlock(nr_node); + spin_unlock_bh(&nr_node_list_lock); return 0; } } nr_neigh_put(nr_neigh); nr_node_unlock(nr_node); + spin_unlock_bh(&nr_node_list_lock); nr_node_put(nr_node); return -EINVAL; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] netrom: fix possible dead-lock in nr_rt_ioctl()
by Pu Lehui 26 Jun '24

26 Jun '24

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.219 commit b117e5b4f27c2c9076561b6be450a9619f0b79de category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IA6SHC CVE: CVE-2024-38589 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit e03e7f20ebf7e1611d40d1fdc1bde900fd3335f6 ] syzbot loves netrom, and found a possible deadlock in nr_rt_ioctl [1] Make sure we always acquire nr_node_list_lock before nr_node_lock(nr_node) [1] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.9.0-rc7-syzkaller-02147-g654de42f3fc6 #0 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ syz-executor350/5129 is trying to acquire lock: ffff8880186e2070 (&nr_node->node_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline] ffff8880186e2070 (&nr_node->node_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_node_lock include/net/netrom.h:152 [inline] ffff8880186e2070 (&nr_node->node_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_dec_obs net/netrom/nr_route.c:464 [inline] ffff8880186e2070 (&nr_node->node_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_rt_ioctl+0x1bb/0x1090 net/netrom/nr_route.c:697 but task is already holding lock: ffffffff8f7053b8 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline] ffffffff8f7053b8 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_dec_obs net/netrom/nr_route.c:462 [inline] ffffffff8f7053b8 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_rt_ioctl+0x10a/0x1090 net/netrom/nr_route.c:697 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}: lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754 __raw_spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:126 [inline] _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x35/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:178 spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline] nr_remove_node net/netrom/nr_route.c:299 [inline] nr_del_node+0x4b4/0x820 net/netrom/nr_route.c:355 nr_rt_ioctl+0xa95/0x1090 net/netrom/nr_route.c:683 sock_do_ioctl+0x158/0x460 net/socket.c:1222 sock_ioctl+0x629/0x8e0 net/socket.c:1341 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:904 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:890 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f -> #0 (&nr_node->node_lock){+...}-{2:2}: check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline] validate_chain+0x18cb/0x58e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869 __lock_acquire+0x1346/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137 lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754 __raw_spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:126 [inline] _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x35/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:178 spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline] nr_node_lock include/net/netrom.h:152 [inline] nr_dec_obs net/netrom/nr_route.c:464 [inline] nr_rt_ioctl+0x1bb/0x1090 net/netrom/nr_route.c:697 sock_do_ioctl+0x158/0x460 net/socket.c:1222 sock_ioctl+0x629/0x8e0 net/socket.c:1341 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:904 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:890 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(nr_node_list_lock); lock(&nr_node->node_lock); lock(nr_node_list_lock); lock(&nr_node->node_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 1 lock held by syz-executor350/5129: #0: ffffffff8f7053b8 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline] #0: ffffffff8f7053b8 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_dec_obs net/netrom/nr_route.c:462 [inline] #0: ffffffff8f7053b8 (nr_node_list_lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: nr_rt_ioctl+0x10a/0x1090 net/netrom/nr_route.c:697 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 5129 Comm: syz-executor350 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc7-syzkaller-02147-g654de42f3fc6 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/02/2024 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:114 check_noncircular+0x36a/0x4a0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2187 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline] validate_chain+0x18cb/0x58e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869 __lock_acquire+0x1346/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137 lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754 __raw_spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:126 [inline] _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x35/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:178 spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline] nr_node_lock include/net/netrom.h:152 [inline] nr_dec_obs net/netrom/nr_route.c:464 [inline] nr_rt_ioctl+0x1bb/0x1090 net/netrom/nr_route.c:697 sock_do_ioctl+0x158/0x460 net/socket.c:1222 sock_ioctl+0x629/0x8e0 net/socket.c:1341 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:904 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:890 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller(a)googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms(a)kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240515142934.3708038-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui <pulehui(a)huawei.com> --- net/netrom/nr_route.c | 19 +++++++------------ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/netrom/nr_route.c b/net/netrom/nr_route.c index 78da5eab252a..103814bf97c8 100644 --- a/net/netrom/nr_route.c +++ b/net/netrom/nr_route.c @@ -284,22 +284,14 @@ static int __must_check nr_add_node(ax25_address *nr, const char *mnemonic, return 0; } -static inline void __nr_remove_node(struct nr_node *nr_node) +static void nr_remove_node_locked(struct nr_node *nr_node) { + lockdep_assert_held(&nr_node_list_lock); + hlist_del_init(&nr_node->node_node); nr_node_put(nr_node); } -#define nr_remove_node_locked(__node) \ - __nr_remove_node(__node) - -static void nr_remove_node(struct nr_node *nr_node) -{ - spin_lock_bh(&nr_node_list_lock); - __nr_remove_node(nr_node); - spin_unlock_bh(&nr_node_list_lock); -} - static inline void __nr_remove_neigh(struct nr_neigh *nr_neigh) { hlist_del_init(&nr_neigh->neigh_node); @@ -338,6 +330,7 @@ static int nr_del_node(ax25_address *callsign, ax25_address *neighbour, struct n return -EINVAL; } + spin_lock_bh(&nr_node_list_lock); nr_node_lock(nr_node); for (i = 0; i < nr_node->count; i++) { if (nr_node->routes[i].neighbour == nr_neigh) { @@ -351,7 +344,7 @@ static int nr_del_node(ax25_address *callsign, ax25_address *neighbour, struct n nr_node->count--; if (nr_node->count == 0) { - nr_remove_node(nr_node); + nr_remove_node_locked(nr_node); } else { switch (i) { case 0: @@ -365,12 +358,14 @@ static int nr_del_node(ax25_address *callsign, ax25_address *neighbour, struct n nr_node_put(nr_node); } nr_node_unlock(nr_node); + spin_unlock_bh(&nr_node_list_lock); return 0; } } nr_neigh_put(nr_neigh); nr_node_unlock(nr_node); + spin_unlock_bh(&nr_node_list_lock); nr_node_put(nr_node); return -EINVAL; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] smb: client: fix deadlock in smb2_find_smb_tcon()
by Wang Zhaolong 26 Jun '24

26 Jun '24

From: Enzo Matsumiya <ematsumiya(a)suse.de> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.10-rc3 commit 02c418774f76a0a36a6195c9dbf8971eb4130a15 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IA8AFZ CVE: CVE-2024-39468 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Unlock cifs_tcp_ses_lock before calling cifs_put_smb_ses() to avoid such deadlock. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Enzo Matsumiya <ematsumiya(a)suse.de> Reviewed-by: Shyam Prasad N <sprasad(a)microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Paulo Alcantara (Red Hat) <pc(a)manguebit.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench(a)microsoft.com> --- fs/smb/client/smb2transport.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/smb/client/smb2transport.c b/fs/smb/client/smb2transport.c index 8f346aafc4cf..4ca04e62a993 100644 --- a/fs/smb/client/smb2transport.c +++ b/fs/smb/client/smb2transport.c @@ -216,8 +216,8 @@ smb2_find_smb_tcon(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, __u64 ses_id, __u32 tid) } tcon = smb2_find_smb_sess_tcon_unlocked(ses, tid); if (!tcon) { - cifs_put_smb_ses(ses); spin_unlock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock); + cifs_put_smb_ses(ses); return NULL; } spin_unlock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock); -- 2.34.3

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] thermal/drivers/qcom/lmh: Check for SCM availability at probe
by Zheng Yejian 26 Jun '24

26 Jun '24

From: Konrad Dybcio <konrad.dybcio(a)linaro.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.10-rc1 commit d9d3490c48df572edefc0b64655259eefdcbb9be category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IA8AE9 CVE: CVE-2024-39466 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… --------------------------- Up until now, the necessary scm availability check has not been performed, leading to possible null pointer dereferences (which did happen for me on RB1). Fix that. Fixes: 53bca371cdf7 ("thermal/drivers/qcom: Add support for LMh driver") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <dmitry.baryshkov(a)linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Bjorn Andersson <andersson(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Konrad Dybcio <konrad.dybcio(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano(a)linaro.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240308-topic-rb1_lmh-v2-2-bac3914b0fe3@linaro.o… Signed-off-by: Zheng Yejian <zhengyejian(a)huaweicloud.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Yejian <zhengyejian1(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/thermal/qcom/lmh.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/thermal/qcom/lmh.c b/drivers/thermal/qcom/lmh.c index f6edb12ec004..5225b3621a56 100644 --- a/drivers/thermal/qcom/lmh.c +++ b/drivers/thermal/qcom/lmh.c @@ -95,6 +95,9 @@ static int lmh_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) unsigned int enable_alg; u32 node_id; + if (!qcom_scm_is_available()) + return -EPROBE_DEFER; + lmh_data = devm_kzalloc(dev, sizeof(*lmh_data), GFP_KERNEL); if (!lmh_data) return -ENOMEM; -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] netlabel: fix out-of-bounds memory accesses
by Yue Haibing 26 Jun '24

26 Jun '24

From: Wang Yufen <wangyufen(a)huawei.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.18-rc1 commit f22881de730ebd472e15bcc2c0d1d46e36a87b9c category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/IA8H5C CVE: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… --------------------------- In calipso_map_cat_ntoh(), in the for loop, if the return value of netlbl_bitmap_walk() is equal to (net_clen_bits - 1), when netlbl_bitmap_walk() is called next time, out-of-bounds memory accesses of bitmap[byte_offset] occurs. The bug was found during fuzzing. The following is the fuzzing report BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in netlbl_bitmap_walk+0x3c/0xd0 Read of size 1 at addr ffffff8107bf6f70 by task err_OH/252 CPU: 7 PID: 252 Comm: err_OH Not tainted 5.17.0-rc7+ #17 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x21c/0x230 show_stack+0x1c/0x60 dump_stack_lvl+0x64/0x7c print_address_description.constprop.0+0x70/0x2d0 __kasan_report+0x158/0x16c kasan_report+0x74/0x120 __asan_load1+0x80/0xa0 netlbl_bitmap_walk+0x3c/0xd0 calipso_opt_getattr+0x1a8/0x230 calipso_sock_getattr+0x218/0x340 calipso_sock_getattr+0x44/0x60 netlbl_sock_getattr+0x44/0x80 selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt+0x138/0x170 selinux_socket_setsockopt+0x4c/0x60 security_socket_setsockopt+0x4c/0x90 __sys_setsockopt+0xbc/0x2b0 __arm64_sys_setsockopt+0x6c/0x84 invoke_syscall+0x64/0x190 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x88/0x200 do_el0_svc+0x88/0xa0 el0_svc+0x128/0x1b0 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x9c/0x120 el0t_64_sync+0x16c/0x170 Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Wang Yufen <wangyufen(a)huawei.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Yue Haibing <yuehaibing(a)huawei.com> --- net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c index 15fe2120b310..c82a9054a6ca 100644 --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c @@ -899,6 +899,8 @@ int netlbl_bitmap_walk(const unsigned char *bitmap, u32 bitmap_len, unsigned char bitmask; unsigned char byte; + if (offset >= bitmap_len) + return -1; byte_offset = offset / 8; byte = bitmap[byte_offset]; bit_spot = offset; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] fs/ntfs3: Check 'folio' pointer for NULL
by Wang Zhaolong 26 Jun '24

26 Jun '24

From: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich(a)paragon-software.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.10-rc1 commit 1cd6c96219c429ebcfa8e79a865277376c563803 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IA7D7V CVE: CVE-2024-38625 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- It can be NULL if bmap is called. Fixes: 82cae269cfa95 ("fs/ntfs3: Add initialization of super block") Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich(a)paragon-software.com> Signed-off-by: Wang Zhaolong <wangzhaolong1(a)huawei.com> --- fs/ntfs3/inode.c | 17 +++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ntfs3/inode.c b/fs/ntfs3/inode.c index 34f2e16f3f5b..e9314778a9d0 100644 --- a/fs/ntfs3/inode.c +++ b/fs/ntfs3/inode.c @@ -570,13 +570,18 @@ static noinline int ntfs_get_block_vbo(struct inode *inode, u64 vbo, clear_buffer_uptodate(bh); if (is_resident(ni)) { - ni_lock(ni); - err = attr_data_read_resident(ni, &folio->page); - ni_unlock(ni); - - if (!err) - set_buffer_uptodate(bh); + bh->b_blocknr = RESIDENT_LCN; bh->b_size = block_size; + if (!folio) { + err = 0; + } else { + ni_lock(ni); + err = attr_data_read_resident(ni, &folio->page); + ni_unlock(ni); + + if (!err) + set_buffer_uptodate(bh); + } return err; } -- 2.34.3

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] fs/ntfs3: Check 'folio' pointer for NULL
by Wang Zhaolong 26 Jun '24

26 Jun '24

From: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich(a)paragon-software.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.10-rc1 commit 1cd6c96219c429ebcfa8e79a865277376c563803 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IA7D7V CVE: CVE-2024-38625 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- It can be NULL if bmap is called. Fixes: 82cae269cfa95 ("fs/ntfs3: Add initialization of super block") Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich(a)paragon-software.com> Conflicts: fs/ntfs3/inode.c [Page has not converted to a folio yet, and the alternative boot feature has not been merged.] Signed-off-by: Wang Zhaolong <wangzhaolong1(a)huawei.com> --- fs/ntfs3/inode.c | 16 ++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ntfs3/inode.c b/fs/ntfs3/inode.c index 9bafa3c7a5ff..97caf47507d0 100644 --- a/fs/ntfs3/inode.c +++ b/fs/ntfs3/inode.c @@ -565,13 +565,17 @@ static noinline int ntfs_get_block_vbo(struct inode *inode, u64 vbo, } if (is_resident(ni)) { - ni_lock(ni); - err = attr_data_read_resident(ni, page); - ni_unlock(ni); - - if (!err) - set_buffer_uptodate(bh); bh->b_size = block_size; + if (!page) { + err = 0; + } else { + ni_lock(ni); + err = attr_data_read_resident(ni, page); + ni_unlock(ni); + + if (!err) + set_buffer_uptodate(bh); + } return err; } -- 2.34.3

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] fs/ntfs3: Check 'folio' pointer for NULL
by Wang Zhaolong 26 Jun '24

26 Jun '24

From: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich(a)paragon-software.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.10-rc1 commit 1cd6c96219c429ebcfa8e79a865277376c563803 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IA7D7V CVE: CVE-2024-38625 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- It can be NULL if bmap is called. Fixes: 82cae269cfa95 ("fs/ntfs3: Add initialization of super block") Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich(a)paragon-software.com> Conflicts: fs/ntfs3/inode.c [Page has not converted to a folio yet, and the alternative boot feature has not been merged.] Signed-off-by: Wang Zhaolong <wangzhaolong1(a)huawei.com> --- fs/ntfs3/inode.c | 16 ++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ntfs3/inode.c b/fs/ntfs3/inode.c index 9bafa3c7a5ff..97caf47507d0 100644 --- a/fs/ntfs3/inode.c +++ b/fs/ntfs3/inode.c @@ -565,13 +565,17 @@ static noinline int ntfs_get_block_vbo(struct inode *inode, u64 vbo, } if (is_resident(ni)) { - ni_lock(ni); - err = attr_data_read_resident(ni, page); - ni_unlock(ni); - - if (!err) - set_buffer_uptodate(bh); bh->b_size = block_size; + if (!page) { + err = 0; + } else { + ni_lock(ni); + err = attr_data_read_resident(ni, page); + ni_unlock(ni); + + if (!err) + set_buffer_uptodate(bh); + } return err; } -- 2.34.3

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6 v2 0/2] CVE-2024-38610
by Xiongfeng Wang 26 Jun '24

26 Jun '24

Christoph Hellwig (1): virt: acrn: stop using follow_pfn David Hildenbrand (1): drivers/virt/acrn: fix PFNMAP PTE checks in acrn_vm_ram_map() drivers/virt/acrn/mm.c | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 49 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) -- 2.20.1

2 3

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] fs/ntfs3: Use 64 bit variable to avoid 32 bit overflow
by Wang Zhaolong 26 Jun '24

26 Jun '24

From: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich(a)paragon-software.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.10-rc1 commit e931f6b630ffb22d66caab202a52aa8cbb10c649 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IA7D1W CVE: CVE-2024-38624 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- For example, in the expression: vbo = 2 * vbo + skip Fixes: b46acd6a6a627 ("fs/ntfs3: Add NTFS journal") Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich(a)paragon-software.com> Conflicts: fs/ntfs3/fslog.c [The `r_page` allocation position is changed] Signed-off-by: Wang Zhaolong <wangzhaolong1(a)huawei.com> --- fs/ntfs3/fslog.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/ntfs3/fslog.c b/fs/ntfs3/fslog.c index 6489953d4617..e6e38d4c582f 100644 --- a/fs/ntfs3/fslog.c +++ b/fs/ntfs3/fslog.c @@ -1179,7 +1179,8 @@ static int read_log_page(struct ntfs_log *log, u32 vbo, static int log_read_rst(struct ntfs_log *log, u32 l_size, bool first, struct restart_info *info) { - u32 skip, vbo; + u32 skip; + u64 vbo; struct RESTART_HDR *r_page = kmalloc(DefaultLogPageSize, GFP_NOFS); if (!r_page) -- 2.34.3

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] fs/ntfs3: Use 64 bit variable to avoid 32 bit overflow
by Wang Zhaolong 26 Jun '24

26 Jun '24

From: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich(a)paragon-software.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.10-rc1 commit e931f6b630ffb22d66caab202a52aa8cbb10c649 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IA7D1W CVE: CVE-2024-38624 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- For example, in the expression: vbo = 2 * vbo + skip Fixes: b46acd6a6a627 ("fs/ntfs3: Add NTFS journal") Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich(a)paragon-software.com> Conflicts: fs/ntfs3/fslog.c [The `r_page` allocation position is changed] Signed-off-by: Wang Zhaolong <wangzhaolong1(a)huawei.com> --- fs/ntfs3/fslog.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/ntfs3/fslog.c b/fs/ntfs3/fslog.c index 6489953d4617..e6e38d4c582f 100644 --- a/fs/ntfs3/fslog.c +++ b/fs/ntfs3/fslog.c @@ -1179,7 +1179,8 @@ static int read_log_page(struct ntfs_log *log, u32 vbo, static int log_read_rst(struct ntfs_log *log, u32 l_size, bool first, struct restart_info *info) { - u32 skip, vbo; + u32 skip; + u64 vbo; struct RESTART_HDR *r_page = kmalloc(DefaultLogPageSize, GFP_NOFS); if (!r_page) -- 2.34.3

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] fs/ntfs3: Use 64 bit variable to avoid 32 bit overflow
by Wang Zhaolong 26 Jun '24

26 Jun '24

From: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich(a)paragon-software.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.10-rc1 commit e931f6b630ffb22d66caab202a52aa8cbb10c649 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IA7D1W CVE: CVE-2024-38624 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- For example, in the expression: vbo = 2 * vbo + skip Fixes: b46acd6a6a627 ("fs/ntfs3: Add NTFS journal") Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich(a)paragon-software.com> Signed-off-by: Wang Zhaolong <wangzhaolong1(a)huawei.com> --- fs/ntfs3/fslog.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/ntfs3/fslog.c b/fs/ntfs3/fslog.c index 855519713bf7..4085fe30bf48 100644 --- a/fs/ntfs3/fslog.c +++ b/fs/ntfs3/fslog.c @@ -1184,7 +1184,8 @@ static int read_log_page(struct ntfs_log *log, u32 vbo, static int log_read_rst(struct ntfs_log *log, bool first, struct restart_info *info) { - u32 skip, vbo; + u32 skip; + u64 vbo; struct RESTART_HDR *r_page = NULL; /* Determine which restart area we are looking for. */ -- 2.34.3

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] watchdog: cpu5wdt.c: Fix use-after-free bug caused by cpu5wdt_trigger
by Xiongfeng Wang 26 Jun '24

26 Jun '24

From: Duoming Zhou <duoming(a)zju.edu.cn> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.10-rc1 commit 573601521277119f2e2ba5f28ae6e87fc594f4d4 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IA7D7P CVE: CVE-2024-38630 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- When the cpu5wdt module is removing, the origin code uses del_timer() to de-activate the timer. If the timer handler is running, del_timer() could not stop it and will return directly. If the port region is released by release_region() and then the timer handler cpu5wdt_trigger() calls outb() to write into the region that is released, the use-after-free bug will happen. Change del_timer() to timer_shutdown_sync() in order that the timer handler could be finished before the port region is released. Fixes: e09d9c3e9f85 ("watchdog: cpu5wdt.c: add missing del_timer call") Signed-off-by: Duoming Zhou <duoming(a)zju.edu.cn> Reviewed-by: Guenter Roeck <linux(a)roeck-us.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240324140444.119584-1-duoming@zju.edu.cn Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux(a)roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by: Wim Van Sebroeck <wim(a)linux-watchdog.org> Signed-off-by: Xiongfeng Wang <wangxiongfeng2(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/watchdog/cpu5wdt.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/watchdog/cpu5wdt.c b/drivers/watchdog/cpu5wdt.c index 6cfb102c397c..6756a8e3eaed 100644 --- a/drivers/watchdog/cpu5wdt.c +++ b/drivers/watchdog/cpu5wdt.c @@ -265,7 +265,7 @@ static void cpu5wdt_exit(void) if (cpu5wdt_device.queue) { cpu5wdt_device.queue = 0; wait_for_completion(&cpu5wdt_device.stop); - del_timer(&cpu5wdt_device.timer); + timer_shutdown_sync(&cpu5wdt_device.timer); } misc_deregister(&cpu5wdt_misc); -- 2.20.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] watchdog: cpu5wdt.c: Fix use-after-free bug caused by cpu5wdt_trigger
by Xiongfeng Wang 26 Jun '24

26 Jun '24

From: Duoming Zhou <duoming(a)zju.edu.cn> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.10-rc1 commit 573601521277119f2e2ba5f28ae6e87fc594f4d4 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IA7D7P CVE: CVE-2024-38630 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- When the cpu5wdt module is removing, the origin code uses del_timer() to de-activate the timer. If the timer handler is running, del_timer() could not stop it and will return directly. If the port region is released by release_region() and then the timer handler cpu5wdt_trigger() calls outb() to write into the region that is released, the use-after-free bug will happen. Change del_timer() to timer_shutdown_sync() in order that the timer handler could be finished before the port region is released. Fixes: e09d9c3e9f85 ("watchdog: cpu5wdt.c: add missing del_timer call") Signed-off-by: Duoming Zhou <duoming(a)zju.edu.cn> Reviewed-by: Guenter Roeck <linux(a)roeck-us.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240324140444.119584-1-duoming@zju.edu.cn Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux(a)roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by: Wim Van Sebroeck <wim(a)linux-watchdog.org> Signed-off-by: Xiongfeng Wang <wangxiongfeng2(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/watchdog/cpu5wdt.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/watchdog/cpu5wdt.c b/drivers/watchdog/cpu5wdt.c index 9867a3a936df..91adfb55c972 100644 --- a/drivers/watchdog/cpu5wdt.c +++ b/drivers/watchdog/cpu5wdt.c @@ -252,7 +252,7 @@ static void cpu5wdt_exit(void) if (cpu5wdt_device.queue) { cpu5wdt_device.queue = 0; wait_for_completion(&cpu5wdt_device.stop); - del_timer(&cpu5wdt_device.timer); + timer_shutdown_sync(&cpu5wdt_device.timer); } misc_deregister(&cpu5wdt_misc); -- 2.20.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] xfs: fix unlink vs cluster buffer instantiation race
by Long Li 26 Jun '24

26 Jun '24

From: Dave Chinner <dchinner(a)redhat.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.10-rc2 commit 348a1983cf4cf5099fc398438a968443af4c9f65 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/IA8F77 CVE: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Luis has been reporting an assert failure when freeing an inode cluster during inode inactivation for a while. The assert looks like: XFS: Assertion failed: bp->b_flags & XBF_DONE, file: fs/xfs/xfs_trans_buf.c, line: 241 ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/xfs/xfs_message.c:102! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 4 PID: 73 Comm: kworker/4:1 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc1 #4 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 Workqueue: xfs-inodegc/loop5 xfs_inodegc_worker [xfs] RIP: 0010:assfail (fs/xfs/xfs_message.c:102) xfs RSP: 0018:ffff88810188f7f0 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88816e748250 RCX: 1ffffffff844b0e7 RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: ffff88810188f558 RDI: ffffffffc2431fa0 RBP: 1ffff11020311f01 R08: 0000000042431f9f R09: ffffed1020311e9b R10: ffff88810188f4df R11: ffffffffac725d70 R12: ffff88817a3f4000 R13: ffff88812182f000 R14: ffff88810188f998 R15: ffffffffc2423f80 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8881c8400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000055fe9d0f109c CR3: 000000014426c002 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe07f0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> xfs_trans_read_buf_map (fs/xfs/xfs_trans_buf.c:241 (discriminator 1)) xfs xfs_imap_to_bp (fs/xfs/xfs_trans.h:210 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_inode_buf.c:138) xfs xfs_inode_item_precommit (fs/xfs/xfs_inode_item.c:145) xfs xfs_trans_run_precommits (fs/xfs/xfs_trans.c:931) xfs __xfs_trans_commit (fs/xfs/xfs_trans.c:966) xfs xfs_inactive_ifree (fs/xfs/xfs_inode.c:1811) xfs xfs_inactive (fs/xfs/xfs_inode.c:2013) xfs xfs_inodegc_worker (fs/xfs/xfs_icache.c:1841 fs/xfs/xfs_icache.c:1886) xfs process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3231) worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3306 (discriminator 2) kernel/workqueue.c:3393 (discriminator 2)) kthread (kernel/kthread.c:389) ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147) ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:257) </TASK> And occurs when the the inode precommit handlers is attempt to look up the inode cluster buffer to attach the inode for writeback. The trail of logic that I can reconstruct is as follows. 1. the inode is clean when inodegc runs, so it is not attached to a cluster buffer when precommit runs. 2. #1 implies the inode cluster buffer may be clean and not pinned by dirty inodes when inodegc runs. 3. #2 implies that the inode cluster buffer can be reclaimed by memory pressure at any time. 4. The assert failure implies that the cluster buffer was attached to the transaction, but not marked done. It had been accessed earlier in the transaction, but not marked done. 5. #4 implies the cluster buffer has been invalidated (i.e. marked stale). 6. #5 implies that the inode cluster buffer was instantiated uninitialised in the transaction in xfs_ifree_cluster(), which only instantiates the buffers to invalidate them and never marks them as done. Given factors 1-3, this issue is highly dependent on timing and environmental factors. Hence the issue can be very difficult to reproduce in some situations, but highly reliable in others. Luis has an environment where it can be reproduced easily by g/531 but, OTOH, I've reproduced it only once in ~2000 cycles of g/531. I think the fix is to have xfs_ifree_cluster() set the XBF_DONE flag on the cluster buffers, even though they may not be initialised. The reasons why I think this is safe are: 1. A buffer cache lookup hit on a XBF_STALE buffer will clear the XBF_DONE flag. Hence all future users of the buffer know they have to re-initialise the contents before use and mark it done themselves. 2. xfs_trans_binval() sets the XFS_BLI_STALE flag, which means the buffer remains locked until the journal commit completes and the buffer is unpinned. Hence once marked XBF_STALE/XFS_BLI_STALE by xfs_ifree_cluster(), the only context that can access the freed buffer is the currently running transaction. 3. #2 implies that future buffer lookups in the currently running transaction will hit the transaction match code and not the buffer cache. Hence XBF_STALE and XFS_BLI_STALE will not be cleared unless the transaction initialises and logs the buffer with valid contents again. At which point, the buffer will be marked marked XBF_DONE again, so having XBF_DONE already set on the stale buffer is a moot point. 4. #2 also implies that any concurrent access to that cluster buffer will block waiting on the buffer lock until the inode cluster has been fully freed and is no longer an active inode cluster buffer. 5. #4 + #1 means that any future user of the disk range of that buffer will always see the range of disk blocks covered by the cluster buffer as not done, and hence must initialise the contents themselves. 6. Setting XBF_DONE in xfs_ifree_cluster() then means the unlinked inode precommit code will see a XBF_DONE buffer from the transaction match as it expects. It can then attach the stale but newly dirtied inode to the stale but newly dirtied cluster buffer without unexpected failures. The stale buffer will then sail through the journal and do the right thing with the attached stale inode during unpin. Hence the fix is just one line of extra code. The explanation of why we have to set XBF_DONE in xfs_ifree_cluster, OTOH, is long and complex.... Fixes: 82842fee6e59 ("xfs: fix AGF vs inode cluster buffer deadlock") Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner(a)redhat.com> Tested-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch(a)lst.de> Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Chandan Babu R <chandanbabu(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Long Li <leo.lilong(a)huawei.com> --- fs/xfs/xfs_inode.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/xfs/xfs_inode.c b/fs/xfs/xfs_inode.c index 2546f291e7cd..19c8df069b75 100644 --- a/fs/xfs/xfs_inode.c +++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_inode.c @@ -2318,11 +2318,26 @@ xfs_ifree_cluster( * This buffer may not have been correctly initialised as we * didn't read it from disk. That's not important because we are * only using to mark the buffer as stale in the log, and to - * attach stale cached inodes on it. That means it will never be - * dispatched for IO. If it is, we want to know about it, and we - * want it to fail. We can acheive this by adding a write - * verifier to the buffer. + * attach stale cached inodes on it. + * + * For the inode that triggered the cluster freeing, this + * attachment may occur in xfs_inode_item_precommit() after we + * have marked this buffer stale. If this buffer was not in + * memory before xfs_ifree_cluster() started, it will not be + * marked XBF_DONE and this will cause problems later in + * xfs_inode_item_precommit() when we trip over a (stale, !done) + * buffer to attached to the transaction. + * + * Hence we have to mark the buffer as XFS_DONE here. This is + * safe because we are also marking the buffer as XBF_STALE and + * XFS_BLI_STALE. That means it will never be dispatched for + * IO and it won't be unlocked until the cluster freeing has + * been committed to the journal and the buffer unpinned. If it + * is written, we want to know about it, and we want it to + * fail. We can acheive this by adding a write verifier to the + * buffer. */ + bp->b_flags |= XBF_DONE; bp->b_ops = &xfs_inode_buf_ops; /* -- 2.39.2

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] watchdog: cpu5wdt.c: Fix use-after-free bug caused by cpu5wdt_trigger
by Xiongfeng Wang 26 Jun '24

26 Jun '24

From: Duoming Zhou <duoming(a)zju.edu.cn> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.10-rc1 commit 573601521277119f2e2ba5f28ae6e87fc594f4d4 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IA7D7P CVE: CVE-2024-38630 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- When the cpu5wdt module is removing, the origin code uses del_timer() to de-activate the timer. If the timer handler is running, del_timer() could not stop it and will return directly. If the port region is released by release_region() and then the timer handler cpu5wdt_trigger() calls outb() to write into the region that is released, the use-after-free bug will happen. Change del_timer() to timer_shutdown_sync() in order that the timer handler could be finished before the port region is released. Fixes: e09d9c3e9f85 ("watchdog: cpu5wdt.c: add missing del_timer call") Signed-off-by: Duoming Zhou <duoming(a)zju.edu.cn> Reviewed-by: Guenter Roeck <linux(a)roeck-us.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240324140444.119584-1-duoming@zju.edu.cn Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux(a)roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by: Wim Van Sebroeck <wim(a)linux-watchdog.org> Signed-off-by: Xiongfeng Wang <wangxiongfeng2(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/watchdog/cpu5wdt.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/watchdog/cpu5wdt.c b/drivers/watchdog/cpu5wdt.c index 688b112e712b..9f279c0e13a6 100644 --- a/drivers/watchdog/cpu5wdt.c +++ b/drivers/watchdog/cpu5wdt.c @@ -252,7 +252,7 @@ static void cpu5wdt_exit(void) if (cpu5wdt_device.queue) { cpu5wdt_device.queue = 0; wait_for_completion(&cpu5wdt_device.stop); - del_timer(&cpu5wdt_device.timer); + timer_shutdown_sync(&cpu5wdt_device.timer); } misc_deregister(&cpu5wdt_misc); -- 2.20.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] watchdog: cpu5wdt.c: Fix use-after-free bug caused by cpu5wdt_trigger
by Xiongfeng Wang 26 Jun '24

26 Jun '24

From: Duoming Zhou <duoming(a)zju.edu.cn> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.10-rc1 commit 573601521277119f2e2ba5f28ae6e87fc594f4d4 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IA7D7P CVE: CVE-2024-38630 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- When the cpu5wdt module is removing, the origin code uses del_timer() to de-activate the timer. If the timer handler is running, del_timer() could not stop it and will return directly. If the port region is released by release_region() and then the timer handler cpu5wdt_trigger() calls outb() to write into the region that is released, the use-after-free bug will happen. Change del_timer() to timer_shutdown_sync() in order that the timer handler could be finished before the port region is released. Fixes: e09d9c3e9f85 ("watchdog: cpu5wdt.c: add missing del_timer call") Signed-off-by: Duoming Zhou <duoming(a)zju.edu.cn> Reviewed-by: Guenter Roeck <linux(a)roeck-us.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240324140444.119584-1-duoming@zju.edu.cn Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux(a)roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by: Wim Van Sebroeck <wim(a)linux-watchdog.org> Signed-off-by: Xiongfeng Wang <wangxiongfeng2(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/watchdog/cpu5wdt.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/watchdog/cpu5wdt.c b/drivers/watchdog/cpu5wdt.c index 9867a3a936df..91adfb55c972 100644 --- a/drivers/watchdog/cpu5wdt.c +++ b/drivers/watchdog/cpu5wdt.c @@ -252,7 +252,7 @@ static void cpu5wdt_exit(void) if (cpu5wdt_device.queue) { cpu5wdt_device.queue = 0; wait_for_completion(&cpu5wdt_device.stop); - del_timer(&cpu5wdt_device.timer); + timer_shutdown_sync(&cpu5wdt_device.timer); } misc_deregister(&cpu5wdt_misc); -- 2.20.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] blk-wbt: don't throttle swap writes in direct reclaim
by Baokun Li 26 Jun '24

26 Jun '24

maillist inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/IA8D5J Reference: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240604030522.3686177-1-libaokun@huaweicloud.com/ -------------------------------- Now we avoid throttling swap writes by determining whether the current process is kswapd (aka current_is_kswapd()), but swap writes can come from either kswapd or direct reclaim, so the swap writes from direct reclaim will still be throttled. When a process holds a lock to allocate a free page, and enters direct reclaim because there is no free memory, then it might trigger a hung due to the wbt throttling that causes other processes to fail to get the lock. Both kswapd and direct reclaim set the REQ_SWAP flag, so use REQ_SWAP instead of current_is_kswapd() to avoid throttling swap writes. Also renamed WBT_KSWAPD to WBT_SWAP and WBT_RWQ_KSWAPD to WBT_RWQ_SWAP. Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Yu Kuai <yukuai3(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1(a)huawei.com> --- block/blk-wbt.c | 18 +++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/block/blk-wbt.c b/block/blk-wbt.c index f8fda9cf583e..296cdfea7c2a 100644 --- a/block/blk-wbt.c +++ b/block/blk-wbt.c @@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ enum wbt_flags { WBT_TRACKED = 1, /* write, tracked for throttling */ WBT_READ = 2, /* read */ - WBT_KSWAPD = 4, /* write, from kswapd */ + WBT_SWAP = 4, /* write, from swap_writepage() */ WBT_DISCARD = 8, /* discard */ WBT_NR_BITS = 4, /* number of bits */ @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ enum wbt_flags { enum { WBT_RWQ_BG = 0, - WBT_RWQ_KSWAPD, + WBT_RWQ_SWAP, WBT_RWQ_DISCARD, WBT_NUM_RWQ, }; @@ -173,8 +173,8 @@ static bool wb_recent_wait(struct rq_wb *rwb) static inline struct rq_wait *get_rq_wait(struct rq_wb *rwb, enum wbt_flags wb_acct) { - if (wb_acct & WBT_KSWAPD) - return &rwb->rq_wait[WBT_RWQ_KSWAPD]; + if (wb_acct & WBT_SWAP) + return &rwb->rq_wait[WBT_RWQ_SWAP]; else if (wb_acct & WBT_DISCARD) return &rwb->rq_wait[WBT_RWQ_DISCARD]; @@ -529,7 +529,7 @@ static bool close_io(struct rq_wb *rwb) time_before(now, rwb->last_comp + HZ / 10); } -#define REQ_HIPRIO (REQ_SYNC | REQ_META | REQ_PRIO) +#define REQ_HIPRIO (REQ_SYNC | REQ_META | REQ_PRIO | REQ_SWAP) static inline unsigned int get_limit(struct rq_wb *rwb, blk_opf_t opf) { @@ -540,13 +540,13 @@ static inline unsigned int get_limit(struct rq_wb *rwb, blk_opf_t opf) /* * At this point we know it's a buffered write. If this is - * kswapd trying to free memory, or REQ_SYNC is set, then + * swap trying to free memory, or REQ_SYNC is set, then * it's WB_SYNC_ALL writeback, and we'll use the max limit for * that. If the write is marked as a background write, then use * the idle limit, or go to normal if we haven't had competing * IO for a bit. */ - if ((opf & REQ_HIPRIO) || wb_recent_wait(rwb) || current_is_kswapd()) + if ((opf & REQ_HIPRIO) || wb_recent_wait(rwb)) limit = rwb->rq_depth.max_depth; else if ((opf & REQ_BACKGROUND) || close_io(rwb)) { /* @@ -623,8 +623,8 @@ static enum wbt_flags bio_to_wbt_flags(struct rq_wb *rwb, struct bio *bio) if (bio_op(bio) == REQ_OP_READ) { flags = WBT_READ; } else if (wbt_should_throttle(bio)) { - if (current_is_kswapd()) - flags |= WBT_KSWAPD; + if (bio->bi_opf & REQ_SWAP) + flags |= WBT_SWAP; if (bio_op(bio) == REQ_OP_DISCARD) flags |= WBT_DISCARD; flags |= WBT_TRACKED; -- 2.31.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] CVE-2024-38610
by Xiongfeng Wang 26 Jun '24

26 Jun '24

Christoph Hellwig (1): virt: acrn: stop using follow_pfn David Hildenbrand (1): drivers/virt/acrn: fix PFNMAP PTE checks in acrn_vm_ram_map() drivers/virt/acrn/mm.c | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 49 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) -- 2.20.1

2 3

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] um: Add winch to winch_handlers before registering winch IRQ
by Chen Zhongjin 26 Jun '24

26 Jun '24

From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu(a)huawei.com> stable inclusion from stable-v4.19.316 commit 66ea9a7c6824821476914bed21a476cd20094f33 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IA7YJR CVE: CVE-2024-39292 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit a0fbbd36c156b9f7b2276871d499c9943dfe5101 ] Registering a winch IRQ is racy, an interrupt may occur before the winch is added to the winch_handlers list. If that happens, register_winch_irq() adds to that list a winch that is scheduled to be (or has already been) freed, causing a panic later in winch_cleanup(). Avoid the race by adding the winch to the winch_handlers list before registering the IRQ, and rolling back if um_request_irq() fails. Fixes: 42a359e31a0e ("uml: SIGIO support cleanup") Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Johannes Berg <johannes(a)sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard(a)nod.at> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Chen Zhongjin <chenzhongjin(a)huawei.com> --- arch/um/drivers/line.c | 14 ++++++++------ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/um/drivers/line.c b/arch/um/drivers/line.c index 7e524efed584..71e26488dfde 100644 --- a/arch/um/drivers/line.c +++ b/arch/um/drivers/line.c @@ -683,24 +683,26 @@ void register_winch_irq(int fd, int tty_fd, int pid, struct tty_port *port, goto cleanup; } - *winch = ((struct winch) { .list = LIST_HEAD_INIT(winch->list), - .fd = fd, + *winch = ((struct winch) { .fd = fd, .tty_fd = tty_fd, .pid = pid, .port = port, .stack = stack }); + spin_lock(&winch_handler_lock); + list_add(&winch->list, &winch_handlers); + spin_unlock(&winch_handler_lock); + if (um_request_irq(WINCH_IRQ, fd, IRQ_READ, winch_interrupt, IRQF_SHARED, "winch", winch) < 0) { printk(KERN_ERR "register_winch_irq - failed to register " "IRQ\n"); + spin_lock(&winch_handler_lock); + list_del(&winch->list); + spin_unlock(&winch_handler_lock); goto out_free; } - spin_lock(&winch_handler_lock); - list_add(&winch->list, &winch_handlers); - spin_unlock(&winch_handler_lock); - return; out_free: -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS 0/2] CVE-2021-47434
by Yuan Can 26 Jun '24

26 Jun '24

Mathias Nyman (1): xhci: Fix commad ring abort, write all 64 bits to CRCR register. Pavankumar Kondeti (1): xhci: Fix command ring pointer corruption while aborting a command drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) -- 2.17.1

2 3

[PATCH OLK-5.10] net/mlx5: Add a timeout to acquire the command queue semaphore
by Zhengchao Shao 26 Jun '24

26 Jun '24

From: Akiva Goldberger <agoldberger(a)nvidia.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.10-rc1 commit 485d65e1357123a697c591a5aeb773994b247ad7 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IA6S89 CVE: CVE-2024-38556 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Prevent forced completion handling on an entry that has not yet been assigned an index, causing an out of bounds access on idx = -22. Instead of waiting indefinitely for the sem, blocking flow now waits for index to be allocated or a sem acquisition timeout before beginning the timer for FW completion. Kernel log example: mlx5_core 0000:06:00.0: wait_func_handle_exec_timeout:1128:(pid 185911): cmd[-22]: CREATE_UCTX(0xa04) No done completion Fixes: 8e715cd613a1 ("net/mlx5: Set command entry semaphore up once got index free") Signed-off-by: Akiva Goldberger <agoldberger(a)nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Moshe Shemesh <moshe(a)nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt(a)nvidia.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240509112951.590184-5-tariqt@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/cmd.c [The conflict occurs because the commit 5945e1adeab5("net/mlx5: Read timeout values from init segment") and 58db72869a9f("net/mlx5: Re-organize mlx5_cmd struct") and 8f5100da56b3("net/mlx5e: Fix a race in command alloc flow") and 7cb5eb937231("net/mlx5: Introduce and use opcode getter in command interface") and f086470122d5("net/mlx5: cmdif, Return value improvements") are not merged. MLX5_CMD_TIMEOUT_MSEC is used for timeout and cannot be configured by users. struct mlx5_cmd does not contain the var variable and directly references to sem.] Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/cmd.c | 36 +++++++++++++++---- include/linux/mlx5/driver.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/cmd.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/cmd.c index bb1dba03de7c..f1478c6ec765 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/cmd.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/cmd.c @@ -900,18 +900,30 @@ static void cmd_work_handler(struct work_struct *work) struct mlx5_cmd_work_ent *ent = container_of(work, struct mlx5_cmd_work_ent, work); struct mlx5_cmd *cmd = ent->cmd; struct mlx5_core_dev *dev = container_of(cmd, struct mlx5_core_dev, cmd); - unsigned long cb_timeout = msecs_to_jiffies(MLX5_CMD_TIMEOUT_MSEC); + unsigned long timeout = msecs_to_jiffies(MLX5_CMD_TIMEOUT_MSEC); struct mlx5_cmd_layout *lay; - struct semaphore *sem; unsigned long flags; bool poll_cmd = ent->polling; int alloc_ret; int cmd_mode; complete(&ent->handling); - sem = ent->page_queue ? &cmd->pages_sem : &cmd->sem; - down(sem); if (!ent->page_queue) { + if (down_timeout(&cmd->sem, timeout)) { + mlx5_core_warn(dev, "%s(0x%x) timed out while waiting for a slot.\n", + mlx5_command_str(ent->op), ent->op); + if (ent->callback) { + ent->callback(-EBUSY, ent->context); + mlx5_free_cmd_msg(dev, ent->out); + free_msg(dev, ent->in); + cmd_ent_put(ent); + } else { + ent->ret = -EBUSY; + complete(&ent->done); + } + complete(&ent->slotted); + return; + } alloc_ret = cmd_alloc_index(cmd); if (alloc_ret < 0) { mlx5_core_err_rl(dev, "failed to allocate command entry\n"); @@ -924,11 +936,12 @@ static void cmd_work_handler(struct work_struct *work) ent->ret = -EAGAIN; complete(&ent->done); } - up(sem); + up(&cmd->sem); return; } ent->idx = alloc_ret; } else { + down(&cmd->pages_sem); ent->idx = cmd->max_reg_cmds; spin_lock_irqsave(&cmd->alloc_lock, flags); clear_bit(ent->idx, &cmd->bitmask); @@ -936,6 +949,8 @@ static void cmd_work_handler(struct work_struct *work) } cmd->ent_arr[ent->idx] = ent; + + complete(&ent->slotted); lay = get_inst(cmd, ent->idx); ent->lay = lay; memset(lay, 0, sizeof(*lay)); @@ -955,7 +970,7 @@ static void cmd_work_handler(struct work_struct *work) ent->ts1 = ktime_get_ns(); cmd_mode = cmd->mode; - if (ent->callback && schedule_delayed_work(&ent->cb_timeout_work, cb_timeout)) + if (ent->callback && schedule_delayed_work(&ent->cb_timeout_work, timeout)) cmd_ent_get(ent); set_bit(MLX5_CMD_ENT_STATE_PENDING_COMP, &ent->state); @@ -1056,6 +1071,9 @@ static int wait_func(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev, struct mlx5_cmd_work_ent *ent) ent->ret = -ECANCELED; goto out_err; } + + wait_for_completion(&ent->slotted); + if (cmd->mode == CMD_MODE_POLLING || ent->polling) wait_for_completion(&ent->done); else if (!wait_for_completion_timeout(&ent->done, timeout)) @@ -1072,6 +1090,9 @@ static int wait_func(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev, struct mlx5_cmd_work_ent *ent) mlx5_core_warn(dev, "%s(0x%x) canceled on out of queue timeout.\n", mlx5_command_str(msg_to_opcode(ent->in)), msg_to_opcode(ent->in)); + } else if (err == -EBUSY) { + mlx5_core_warn(dev, "%s(0x%x) timeout while waiting for command semaphore.\n", + mlx5_command_str(ent->op), ent->op); } mlx5_core_dbg(dev, "err %d, delivery status %s(%d)\n", err, deliv_status_to_str(ent->status), ent->status); @@ -1113,6 +1134,7 @@ static int mlx5_cmd_invoke(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev, struct mlx5_cmd_msg *in, ent->polling = force_polling; init_completion(&ent->handling); + init_completion(&ent->slotted); if (!callback) init_completion(&ent->done); @@ -1130,7 +1152,7 @@ static int mlx5_cmd_invoke(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev, struct mlx5_cmd_msg *in, goto out; /* mlx5_cmd_comp_handler() will put(ent) */ err = wait_func(dev, ent); - if (err == -ETIMEDOUT || err == -ECANCELED) + if (err == -ETIMEDOUT || err == -ECANCELED || err == -EBUSY) goto out_free; ds = ent->ts2 - ent->ts1; diff --git a/include/linux/mlx5/driver.h b/include/linux/mlx5/driver.h index 2cd89af4dbf6..63feb2878c7a 100644 --- a/include/linux/mlx5/driver.h +++ b/include/linux/mlx5/driver.h @@ -762,6 +762,7 @@ struct mlx5_cmd_work_ent { void *context; int idx; struct completion handling; + struct completion slotted; struct completion done; struct mlx5_cmd *cmd; struct work_struct work; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] net/mlx5: Add a timeout to acquire the command queue semaphore
by Zhengchao Shao 26 Jun '24

26 Jun '24

From: Akiva Goldberger <agoldberger(a)nvidia.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.10-rc1 commit 485d65e1357123a697c591a5aeb773994b247ad7 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IA6S89 CVE: CVE-2024-38556 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Prevent forced completion handling on an entry that has not yet been assigned an index, causing an out of bounds access on idx = -22. Instead of waiting indefinitely for the sem, blocking flow now waits for index to be allocated or a sem acquisition timeout before beginning the timer for FW completion. Kernel log example: mlx5_core 0000:06:00.0: wait_func_handle_exec_timeout:1128:(pid 185911): cmd[-22]: CREATE_UCTX(0xa04) No done completion Fixes: 8e715cd613a1 ("net/mlx5: Set command entry semaphore up once got index free") Signed-off-by: Akiva Goldberger <agoldberger(a)nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Moshe Shemesh <moshe(a)nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt(a)nvidia.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240509112951.590184-5-tariqt@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/cmd.c [The conflict occurs because the commit 5945e1adeab5("net/mlx5: Read timeout values from init segment") and 58db72869a9f("net/mlx5: Re-organize mlx5_cmd struct") and 8f5100da56b3("net/mlx5e: Fix a race in command alloc flow") and 7cb5eb937231("net/mlx5: Introduce and use opcode getter in command interface") and f086470122d5("net/mlx5: cmdif, Return value improvements") are not merged. MLX5_CMD_TIMEOUT_MSEC is used for timeout and cannot be configured by users. struct mlx5_cmd does not contain the var variable and directly references to sem.] Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/cmd.c | 36 +++++++++++++++---- include/linux/mlx5/driver.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/cmd.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/cmd.c index fb196d312548..6c7efba80c97 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/cmd.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/cmd.c @@ -900,18 +900,30 @@ static void cmd_work_handler(struct work_struct *work) struct mlx5_cmd_work_ent *ent = container_of(work, struct mlx5_cmd_work_ent, work); struct mlx5_cmd *cmd = ent->cmd; struct mlx5_core_dev *dev = container_of(cmd, struct mlx5_core_dev, cmd); - unsigned long cb_timeout = msecs_to_jiffies(MLX5_CMD_TIMEOUT_MSEC); + unsigned long timeout = msecs_to_jiffies(MLX5_CMD_TIMEOUT_MSEC); struct mlx5_cmd_layout *lay; - struct semaphore *sem; unsigned long flags; bool poll_cmd = ent->polling; int alloc_ret; int cmd_mode; complete(&ent->handling); - sem = ent->page_queue ? &cmd->pages_sem : &cmd->sem; - down(sem); if (!ent->page_queue) { + if (down_timeout(&cmd->sem, timeout)) { + mlx5_core_warn(dev, "%s(0x%x) timed out while waiting for a slot.\n", + mlx5_command_str(ent->op), ent->op); + if (ent->callback) { + ent->callback(-EBUSY, ent->context); + mlx5_free_cmd_msg(dev, ent->out); + free_msg(dev, ent->in); + cmd_ent_put(ent); + } else { + ent->ret = -EBUSY; + complete(&ent->done); + } + complete(&ent->slotted); + return; + } alloc_ret = cmd_alloc_index(cmd); if (alloc_ret < 0) { mlx5_core_err_rl(dev, "failed to allocate command entry\n"); @@ -924,11 +936,12 @@ static void cmd_work_handler(struct work_struct *work) ent->ret = -EAGAIN; complete(&ent->done); } - up(sem); + up(&cmd->sem); return; } ent->idx = alloc_ret; } else { + down(&cmd->pages_sem); ent->idx = cmd->max_reg_cmds; spin_lock_irqsave(&cmd->alloc_lock, flags); clear_bit(ent->idx, &cmd->bitmask); @@ -936,6 +949,8 @@ static void cmd_work_handler(struct work_struct *work) } cmd->ent_arr[ent->idx] = ent; + + complete(&ent->slotted); lay = get_inst(cmd, ent->idx); ent->lay = lay; memset(lay, 0, sizeof(*lay)); @@ -955,7 +970,7 @@ static void cmd_work_handler(struct work_struct *work) ent->ts1 = ktime_get_ns(); cmd_mode = cmd->mode; - if (ent->callback && schedule_delayed_work(&ent->cb_timeout_work, cb_timeout)) + if (ent->callback && schedule_delayed_work(&ent->cb_timeout_work, timeout)) cmd_ent_get(ent); set_bit(MLX5_CMD_ENT_STATE_PENDING_COMP, &ent->state); @@ -1056,6 +1071,9 @@ static int wait_func(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev, struct mlx5_cmd_work_ent *ent) ent->ret = -ECANCELED; goto out_err; } + + wait_for_completion(&ent->slotted); + if (cmd->mode == CMD_MODE_POLLING || ent->polling) wait_for_completion(&ent->done); else if (!wait_for_completion_timeout(&ent->done, timeout)) @@ -1072,6 +1090,9 @@ static int wait_func(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev, struct mlx5_cmd_work_ent *ent) mlx5_core_warn(dev, "%s(0x%x) canceled on out of queue timeout.\n", mlx5_command_str(msg_to_opcode(ent->in)), msg_to_opcode(ent->in)); + } else if (err == -EBUSY) { + mlx5_core_warn(dev, "%s(0x%x) timeout while waiting for command semaphore.\n", + mlx5_command_str(ent->op), ent->op); } mlx5_core_dbg(dev, "err %d, delivery status %s(%d)\n", err, deliv_status_to_str(ent->status), ent->status); @@ -1113,6 +1134,7 @@ static int mlx5_cmd_invoke(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev, struct mlx5_cmd_msg *in, ent->polling = force_polling; init_completion(&ent->handling); + init_completion(&ent->slotted); if (!callback) init_completion(&ent->done); @@ -1130,7 +1152,7 @@ static int mlx5_cmd_invoke(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev, struct mlx5_cmd_msg *in, goto out; /* mlx5_cmd_comp_handler() will put(ent) */ err = wait_func(dev, ent); - if (err == -ETIMEDOUT || err == -ECANCELED) + if (err == -ETIMEDOUT || err == -ECANCELED || err == -EBUSY) goto out_free; ds = ent->ts2 - ent->ts1; diff --git a/include/linux/mlx5/driver.h b/include/linux/mlx5/driver.h index 41fbb4793394..f3695ef9db60 100644 --- a/include/linux/mlx5/driver.h +++ b/include/linux/mlx5/driver.h @@ -756,6 +756,7 @@ struct mlx5_cmd_work_ent { void *context; int idx; struct completion handling; + struct completion slotted; struct completion done; struct mlx5_cmd *cmd; struct work_struct work; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] io_uring: check for non-NULL file pointer in io_file_can_poll()
by Yifan Qiao 26 Jun '24

26 Jun '24

From: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.35 commit 43cfac7b88adedfb26c27834386992650f1642f3 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IA8AEH CVE: CVE-2024-39371 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 5fc16fa5f13b3c06fdb959ef262050bd810416a2 upstream. In earlier kernels, it was possible to trigger a NULL pointer dereference off the forced async preparation path, if no file had been assigned. The trace leading to that looks as follows: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000b0 PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP CPU: 67 PID: 1633 Comm: buf-ring-invali Not tainted 6.8.0-rc3+ #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS unknown 2/2/2022 RIP: 0010:io_buffer_select+0xc3/0x210 Code: 00 00 48 39 d1 0f 82 ae 00 00 00 48 81 4b 48 00 00 01 00 48 89 73 70 0f b7 50 0c 66 89 53 42 85 ed 0f 85 d2 00 00 00 48 8b 13 <48> 8b 92 b0 00 00 00 48 83 7a 40 00 0f 84 21 01 00 00 4c 8b 20 5b RSP: 0018:ffffb7bec38c7d88 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: ffff97af2be61000 RBX: ffff97af234f1700 RCX: 0000000000000040 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff97aecfb04820 RDI: ffff97af234f1700 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000200030 R09: 0000000000000020 R10: ffffb7bec38c7dc8 R11: 000000000000c000 R12: ffffb7bec38c7db8 R13: ffff97aecfb05800 R14: ffff97aecfb05800 R15: ffff97af2be5e000 FS: 00007f852f74b740(0000) GS:ffff97b1eeec0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000000000b0 CR3: 000000016deab005 CR4: 0000000000370ef0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die+0x1f/0x60 ? page_fault_oops+0x14d/0x420 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x61/0x6a0 ? exc_page_fault+0x6c/0x150 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 ? io_buffer_select+0xc3/0x210 __io_import_iovec+0xb5/0x120 io_readv_prep_async+0x36/0x70 io_queue_sqe_fallback+0x20/0x260 io_submit_sqes+0x314/0x630 __do_sys_io_uring_enter+0x339/0xbc0 ? __do_sys_io_uring_register+0x11b/0xc50 ? vm_mmap_pgoff+0xce/0x160 do_syscall_64+0x5f/0x180 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e RIP: 0033:0x55e0a110a67e Code: ba cc 00 00 00 45 31 c0 44 0f b6 92 d0 00 00 00 31 d2 41 b9 08 00 00 00 41 83 e2 01 41 c1 e2 04 41 09 c2 b8 aa 01 00 00 0f 05 <c3> 90 89 30 eb a9 0f 1f 40 00 48 8b 42 20 8b 00 a8 06 75 af 85 f6 because the request is marked forced ASYNC and has a bad file fd, and hence takes the forced async prep path. Current kernels with the request async prep cleaned up can no longer hit this issue, but for ease of backporting, let's add this safety check in here too as it really doesn't hurt. For both cases, this will inevitably end with a CQE posted with -EBADF. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: a76c0b31eef5 ("io_uring: commit non-pollable provided mapped buffers upfront") Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Yifan Qiao <qiaoyifan4(a)huawei.com> --- io_uring/kbuf.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/io_uring/kbuf.c b/io_uring/kbuf.c index 26a00920042c..702c08c26cd4 100644 --- a/io_uring/kbuf.c +++ b/io_uring/kbuf.c @@ -168,7 +168,8 @@ static void __user *io_ring_buffer_select(struct io_kiocb *req, size_t *len, req->buf_list = bl; req->buf_index = buf->bid; - if (issue_flags & IO_URING_F_UNLOCKED || !file_can_poll(req->file)) { + if (issue_flags & IO_URING_F_UNLOCKED || + (req->file && !file_can_poll(req->file))) { /* * If we came in unlocked, we have no choice but to consume the * buffer here, otherwise nothing ensures that the buffer won't -- 2.39.2

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] CVE-2024-38662
by Pu Lehui 26 Jun '24

26 Jun '24

Jakub Sitnicki (2): bpf: Allow delete from sockmap/sockhash only if update is allowed Revert "bpf, sockmap: Prevent lock inversion deadlock in map delete elem" kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 10 +++++++--- net/core/sock_map.c | 6 ------ 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 3

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS 0/2] quota: Fix rcu annotations of inode dquot pointers
by Baokun Li 26 Jun '24

26 Jun '24

Jan Kara (1): quota: Fix rcu annotations of inode dquot pointers Jiang Biao (1): fs/quota: erase unused but set variable warning fs/quota/dquot.c | 71 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------- 1 file changed, 43 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-) -- 2.31.1

2 3

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/1] fix CVE-2024-38621
by Liao Chen 26 Jun '24

26 Jun '24

media: stk1160: fix bounds checking in stk1160_copy_video() Dan Carpenter (1): media: stk1160: fix bounds checking in stk1160_copy_video() drivers/media/usb/stk1160/stk1160-video.c | 20 +++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 2

[PATCH OLK-5.10 v2 0/2] CVE-2024-27032
by Xiongfeng Wang 26 Jun '24

26 Jun '24

Chao Yu (2): f2fs: fix to check return value of f2fs_reserve_new_block() f2fs: fix to avoid potential panic during recovery fs/f2fs/f2fs.h | 5 +++++ fs/f2fs/recovery.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++-------- 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) -- 2.20.1

2 3

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1 v2 0/2] CVE-2024-27032
by Xiongfeng Wang 26 Jun '24

26 Jun '24

Chao Yu (2): f2fs: fix to check return value of f2fs_reserve_new_block() f2fs: fix to avoid potential panic during recovery fs/f2fs/f2fs.h | 5 +++++ fs/f2fs/recovery.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++-------- 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) -- 2.20.1

2 3

[PATCH OLK-6.6] bpf: Fix verifier assumptions about socket->sk
by Tengda Wu 26 Jun '24

26 Jun '24

From: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.10-rc1 commit 0db63c0b86e981a1e97d2596d64ceceba1a5470e category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IA77YV CVE: CVE-2024-38566 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- The verifier assumes that 'sk' field in 'struct socket' is valid and non-NULL when 'socket' pointer itself is trusted and non-NULL. That may not be the case when socket was just created and passed to LSM socket_accept hook. Fix this verifier assumption and adjust tests. Reported-by: Liam Wisehart <liamwisehart(a)meta.com> Acked-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor(a)gmail.com> Fixes: 6fcd486b3a0a ("bpf: Refactor RCU enforcement in the verifier.") Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240427002544.68803-1-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.c… Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: kernel/bpf/verifier.c [this is because we did not backport commit 36d8bdf75a93 ("bpf: Add alloc/xchg/direct_access support for local percpu kptr")] since it is a feature commit] Signed-off-by: Tengda Wu <wutengda2(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 23 +++++++++++++++---- .../bpf/progs/bench_local_storage_create.c | 5 ++-- .../selftests/bpf/progs/local_storage.c | 20 ++++++++-------- .../testing/selftests/bpf/progs/lsm_cgroup.c | 8 +++++-- 4 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 1fcba0c46f6e..555c7801d90f 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -2543,6 +2543,8 @@ static void mark_btf_ld_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, regs[regno].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | flag; regs[regno].btf = btf; regs[regno].btf_id = btf_id; + if (type_may_be_null(flag)) + regs[regno].id = ++env->id_gen; } #define DEF_NOT_SUBREG (0) @@ -5375,8 +5377,6 @@ static int check_map_kptr_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, rcu_safe_kptr(kptr_field) && in_rcu_cs(env) ? PTR_MAYBE_NULL | MEM_RCU : PTR_MAYBE_NULL | PTR_UNTRUSTED); - /* For mark_ptr_or_null_reg */ - val_reg->id = ++env->id_gen; } else if (class == BPF_STX) { val_reg = reg_state(env, value_regno); if (!register_is_null(val_reg) && @@ -5686,7 +5686,8 @@ static bool is_trusted_reg(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) return true; /* Types listed in the reg2btf_ids are always trusted */ - if (reg2btf_ids[base_type(reg->type)]) + if (reg2btf_ids[base_type(reg->type)] && + !bpf_type_has_unsafe_modifiers(reg->type)) return true; /* If a register is not referenced, it is trusted if it has the @@ -6265,6 +6266,7 @@ static int bpf_map_direct_read(struct bpf_map *map, int off, int size, u64 *val, #define BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU(__type) __PASTE(__type, __safe_rcu) #define BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU_OR_NULL(__type) __PASTE(__type, __safe_rcu_or_null) #define BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(__type) __PASTE(__type, __safe_trusted) +#define BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED_OR_NULL(__type) __PASTE(__type, __safe_trusted_or_null) /* * Allow list few fields as RCU trusted or full trusted. @@ -6328,7 +6330,7 @@ BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct dentry) { struct inode *d_inode; }; -BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct socket) { +BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED_OR_NULL(struct socket) { struct sock *sk; }; @@ -6363,11 +6365,20 @@ static bool type_is_trusted(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct linux_binprm)); BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct file)); BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct dentry)); - BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct socket)); return btf_nested_type_is_trusted(&env->log, reg, field_name, btf_id, "__safe_trusted"); } +static bool type_is_trusted_or_null(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, + struct bpf_reg_state *reg, + const char *field_name, u32 btf_id) +{ + BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED_OR_NULL(struct socket)); + + return btf_nested_type_is_trusted(&env->log, reg, field_name, btf_id, + "__safe_trusted_or_null"); +} + static int check_ptr_to_btf_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *regs, int regno, int off, int size, @@ -6476,6 +6487,8 @@ static int check_ptr_to_btf_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, */ if (type_is_trusted(env, reg, field_name, btf_id)) { flag |= PTR_TRUSTED; + } else if (type_is_trusted_or_null(env, reg, field_name, btf_id)) { + flag |= PTR_TRUSTED | PTR_MAYBE_NULL; } else if (in_rcu_cs(env) && !type_may_be_null(reg->type)) { if (type_is_rcu(env, reg, field_name, btf_id)) { /* ignore __rcu tag and mark it MEM_RCU */ diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bench_local_storage_create.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bench_local_storage_create.c index e4bfbba6c193..c8ec0d0368e4 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bench_local_storage_create.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bench_local_storage_create.c @@ -61,14 +61,15 @@ SEC("lsm.s/socket_post_create") int BPF_PROG(socket_post_create, struct socket *sock, int family, int type, int protocol, int kern) { + struct sock *sk = sock->sk; struct storage *stg; __u32 pid; pid = bpf_get_current_pid_tgid() >> 32; - if (pid != bench_pid) + if (pid != bench_pid || !sk) return 0; - stg = bpf_sk_storage_get(&sk_storage_map, sock->sk, NULL, + stg = bpf_sk_storage_get(&sk_storage_map, sk, NULL, BPF_LOCAL_STORAGE_GET_F_CREATE); if (stg) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/local_storage.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/local_storage.c index bc8ea56671a1..3bf75f4ea690 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/local_storage.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/local_storage.c @@ -140,11 +140,12 @@ int BPF_PROG(socket_bind, struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, { __u32 pid = bpf_get_current_pid_tgid() >> 32; struct local_storage *storage; + struct sock *sk = sock->sk; - if (pid != monitored_pid) + if (pid != monitored_pid || !sk) return 0; - storage = bpf_sk_storage_get(&sk_storage_map, sock->sk, 0, 0); + storage = bpf_sk_storage_get(&sk_storage_map, sk, 0, 0); if (!storage) return 0; @@ -155,24 +156,24 @@ int BPF_PROG(socket_bind, struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, /* This tests that we can associate multiple elements * with the local storage. */ - storage = bpf_sk_storage_get(&sk_storage_map2, sock->sk, 0, + storage = bpf_sk_storage_get(&sk_storage_map2, sk, 0, BPF_LOCAL_STORAGE_GET_F_CREATE); if (!storage) return 0; - if (bpf_sk_storage_delete(&sk_storage_map2, sock->sk)) + if (bpf_sk_storage_delete(&sk_storage_map2, sk)) return 0; - storage = bpf_sk_storage_get(&sk_storage_map2, sock->sk, 0, + storage = bpf_sk_storage_get(&sk_storage_map2, sk, 0, BPF_LOCAL_STORAGE_GET_F_CREATE); if (!storage) return 0; - if (bpf_sk_storage_delete(&sk_storage_map, sock->sk)) + if (bpf_sk_storage_delete(&sk_storage_map, sk)) return 0; /* Ensure that the sk_storage_map is disconnected from the storage. */ - if (!sock->sk->sk_bpf_storage || sock->sk->sk_bpf_storage->smap) + if (!sk->sk_bpf_storage || sk->sk_bpf_storage->smap) return 0; sk_storage_result = 0; @@ -185,11 +186,12 @@ int BPF_PROG(socket_post_create, struct socket *sock, int family, int type, { __u32 pid = bpf_get_current_pid_tgid() >> 32; struct local_storage *storage; + struct sock *sk = sock->sk; - if (pid != monitored_pid) + if (pid != monitored_pid || !sk) return 0; - storage = bpf_sk_storage_get(&sk_storage_map, sock->sk, 0, + storage = bpf_sk_storage_get(&sk_storage_map, sk, 0, BPF_LOCAL_STORAGE_GET_F_CREATE); if (!storage) return 0; diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/lsm_cgroup.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/lsm_cgroup.c index 02c11d16b692..d7598538aa2d 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/lsm_cgroup.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/lsm_cgroup.c @@ -103,11 +103,15 @@ static __always_inline int real_bind(struct socket *sock, int addrlen) { struct sockaddr_ll sa = {}; + struct sock *sk = sock->sk; - if (sock->sk->__sk_common.skc_family != AF_PACKET) + if (!sk) + return 1; + + if (sk->__sk_common.skc_family != AF_PACKET) return 1; - if (sock->sk->sk_kern_sock) + if (sk->sk_kern_sock) return 1; bpf_probe_read_kernel(&sa, sizeof(sa), address); -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] bpf: Add BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB attach type enforcement in BPF_LINK_CREATE
by Tengda Wu 26 Jun '24

26 Jun '24

mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.10-rc1 commit 543576ec15b17c0c93301ac8297333c7b6e84ac7 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IA6S6Q CVE: CVE-2024-38564 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- bpf_prog_attach uses attach_type_to_prog_type to enforce proper attach type for BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB. link_create uses bpf_prog_get and relies on bpf_prog_attach_check_attach_type to properly verify prog_type <> attach_type association. Add missing attach_type enforcement for the link_create case. Otherwise, it's currently possible to attach cgroup_skb prog types to other cgroup hooks. Fixes: af6eea57437a ("bpf: Implement bpf_link-based cgroup BPF program attachment") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/0000000000004792a90615a1dde0@google.com/ Reported-by: syzbot+838346b979830606c854(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf(a)google.com> Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87(a)gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240426231621.2716876-2-sdf@google.com Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: kernel/bpf/syscall.c [Although this mainline patch itself has no conflicts, due to the lack of ptype and attach_type_to_prog_type declarations which comes from unnecessary commit db8eae6bc5c7 and 3505cb9fa26c, we fix it manually] Signed-off-by: Tengda Wu <wutengda2(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------- 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c index 6c8122ae938f..da8154c4706c 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c @@ -2945,29 +2945,6 @@ static int bpf_raw_tracepoint_open(const union bpf_attr *attr) return err; } -static int bpf_prog_attach_check_attach_type(const struct bpf_prog *prog, - enum bpf_attach_type attach_type) -{ - switch (prog->type) { - case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK: - case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK_ADDR: - case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCKOPT: - case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_LOOKUP: - return attach_type == prog->expected_attach_type ? 0 : -EINVAL; - case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB: - if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) - /* cg-skb progs can be loaded by unpriv user. - * check permissions at attach time. - */ - return -EPERM; - return prog->enforce_expected_attach_type && - prog->expected_attach_type != attach_type ? - -EINVAL : 0; - default: - return 0; - } -} - static enum bpf_prog_type attach_type_to_prog_type(enum bpf_attach_type attach_type) { @@ -3022,6 +2999,36 @@ attach_type_to_prog_type(enum bpf_attach_type attach_type) } } +static int bpf_prog_attach_check_attach_type(const struct bpf_prog *prog, + enum bpf_attach_type attach_type) +{ + enum bpf_prog_type ptype; + + switch (prog->type) { + case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK: + case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK_ADDR: + case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCKOPT: + case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_LOOKUP: + return attach_type == prog->expected_attach_type ? 0 : -EINVAL; + case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB: + if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) + /* cg-skb progs can be loaded by unpriv user. + * check permissions at attach time. + */ + return -EPERM; + + ptype = attach_type_to_prog_type(attach_type); + if (prog->type != ptype) + return -EINVAL; + + return prog->enforce_expected_attach_type && + prog->expected_attach_type != attach_type ? + -EINVAL : 0; + default: + return 0; + } +} + #define BPF_PROG_ATTACH_LAST_FIELD replace_bpf_fd #define BPF_F_ATTACH_MASK \ -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH OLK-6.6] bpf: Add BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB attach type enforcement in BPF_LINK_CREATE
by Tengda Wu 26 Jun '24

26 Jun '24

From: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf(a)google.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.10-rc1 commit 543576ec15b17c0c93301ac8297333c7b6e84ac7 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IA6S6Q CVE: CVE-2024-38564 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- bpf_prog_attach uses attach_type_to_prog_type to enforce proper attach type for BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB. link_create uses bpf_prog_get and relies on bpf_prog_attach_check_attach_type to properly verify prog_type <> attach_type association. Add missing attach_type enforcement for the link_create case. Otherwise, it's currently possible to attach cgroup_skb prog types to other cgroup hooks. Fixes: af6eea57437a ("bpf: Implement bpf_link-based cgroup BPF program attachment") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/0000000000004792a90615a1dde0@google.com/ Reported-by: syzbot+838346b979830606c854(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf(a)google.com> Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87(a)gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240426231621.2716876-2-sdf@google.com Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Tengda Wu <wutengda2(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c index a1c254037437..ade28c519165 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c @@ -3812,6 +3812,11 @@ static int bpf_prog_attach_check_attach_type(const struct bpf_prog *prog, * check permissions at attach time. */ return -EPERM; + + ptype = attach_type_to_prog_type(attach_type); + if (prog->type != ptype) + return -EINVAL; + return prog->enforce_expected_attach_type && prog->expected_attach_type != attach_type ? -EINVAL : 0; -- 2.34.1

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