- Kernel - mailweb.openeuler.org

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] tracing: Fix cpu buffers unavailable due to 'record_disabled' missed
by Zheng Yejian 28 Aug '23

28 Aug '23

mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.5 commit b71645d6af10196c46cbe3732de2ea7d36b3ff6d category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7SHZP Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Trace ring buffer can no longer record anything after executing following commands at the shell prompt: # cd /sys/kernel/tracing # cat tracing_cpumask fff # echo 0 > tracing_cpumask # echo 1 > snapshot # echo fff > tracing_cpumask # echo 1 > tracing_on # echo "hello world" > trace_marker -bash: echo: write error: Bad file descriptor The root cause is that: 1. After `echo 0 > tracing_cpumask`, 'record_disabled' of cpu buffers in 'tr->array_buffer.buffer' became 1 (see tracing_set_cpumask()); 2. After `echo 1 > snapshot`, 'tr->array_buffer.buffer' is swapped with 'tr->max_buffer.buffer', then the 'record_disabled' became 0 (see update_max_tr()); 3. After `echo fff > tracing_cpumask`, the 'record_disabled' become -1; Then array_buffer and max_buffer are both unavailable due to value of 'record_disabled' is not 0. To fix it, enable or disable both array_buffer and max_buffer at the same time in tracing_set_cpumask(). Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230805033816.3284594-2-zhengyejian1@huawei.com Cc: <mhiramat(a)kernel.org> Cc: <vnagarnaik(a)google.com> Cc: <shuah(a)kernel.org> Fixes: 71babb2705e2 ("tracing: change CPU ring buffer state from tracing_cpumask") Signed-off-by: Zheng Yejian <zhengyejian1(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt(a)goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Zheng Yejian <zhengyejian1(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/trace/trace.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace.c b/kernel/trace/trace.c index 1e1781ace916..fab69081d6d8 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/trace.c +++ b/kernel/trace/trace.c @@ -4249,11 +4249,17 @@ tracing_cpumask_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *ubuf, !cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, tracing_cpumask_new)) { atomic_inc(&per_cpu_ptr(tr->trace_buffer.data, cpu)->disabled); ring_buffer_record_disable_cpu(tr->trace_buffer.buffer, cpu); +#ifdef CONFIG_TRACER_MAX_TRACE + ring_buffer_record_disable_cpu(tr->max_buffer.buffer, cpu); +#endif } if (!cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, tr->tracing_cpumask) && cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, tracing_cpumask_new)) { atomic_dec(&per_cpu_ptr(tr->trace_buffer.data, cpu)->disabled); ring_buffer_record_enable_cpu(tr->trace_buffer.buffer, cpu); +#ifdef CONFIG_TRACER_MAX_TRACE + ring_buffer_record_enable_cpu(tr->max_buffer.buffer, cpu); +#endif } } arch_spin_unlock(&tr->max_lock); -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] tracing: Fix cpu buffers unavailable due to 'record_disabled' missed
by Zheng Yejian 28 Aug '23

28 Aug '23

mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.5 commit b71645d6af10196c46cbe3732de2ea7d36b3ff6d category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7SHZP Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Trace ring buffer can no longer record anything after executing following commands at the shell prompt: # cd /sys/kernel/tracing # cat tracing_cpumask fff # echo 0 > tracing_cpumask # echo 1 > snapshot # echo fff > tracing_cpumask # echo 1 > tracing_on # echo "hello world" > trace_marker -bash: echo: write error: Bad file descriptor The root cause is that: 1. After `echo 0 > tracing_cpumask`, 'record_disabled' of cpu buffers in 'tr->array_buffer.buffer' became 1 (see tracing_set_cpumask()); 2. After `echo 1 > snapshot`, 'tr->array_buffer.buffer' is swapped with 'tr->max_buffer.buffer', then the 'record_disabled' became 0 (see update_max_tr()); 3. After `echo fff > tracing_cpumask`, the 'record_disabled' become -1; Then array_buffer and max_buffer are both unavailable due to value of 'record_disabled' is not 0. To fix it, enable or disable both array_buffer and max_buffer at the same time in tracing_set_cpumask(). Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230805033816.3284594-2-zhengyejian1@huawei.com Cc: <mhiramat(a)kernel.org> Cc: <vnagarnaik(a)google.com> Cc: <shuah(a)kernel.org> Fixes: 71babb2705e2 ("tracing: change CPU ring buffer state from tracing_cpumask") Signed-off-by: Zheng Yejian <zhengyejian1(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt(a)goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Zheng Yejian <zhengyejian1(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/trace/trace.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace.c b/kernel/trace/trace.c index d003e1403ca2..3608cd3b12fd 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/trace.c +++ b/kernel/trace/trace.c @@ -4784,11 +4784,17 @@ int tracing_set_cpumask(struct trace_array *tr, !cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, tracing_cpumask_new)) { atomic_inc(&per_cpu_ptr(tr->array_buffer.data, cpu)->disabled); ring_buffer_record_disable_cpu(tr->array_buffer.buffer, cpu); +#ifdef CONFIG_TRACER_MAX_TRACE + ring_buffer_record_disable_cpu(tr->max_buffer.buffer, cpu); +#endif } if (!cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, tr->tracing_cpumask) && cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, tracing_cpumask_new)) { atomic_dec(&per_cpu_ptr(tr->array_buffer.data, cpu)->disabled); ring_buffer_record_enable_cpu(tr->array_buffer.buffer, cpu); +#ifdef CONFIG_TRACER_MAX_TRACE + ring_buffer_record_enable_cpu(tr->max_buffer.buffer, cpu); +#endif } } arch_spin_unlock(&tr->max_lock); -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-23.09 v2 00/24] ILP32 for ARM64
by Chen Jiahao 28 Aug '23

28 Aug '23

backport ILP32 for ARM64 patches to openEuler-23.09 Andrew Pinski (3): arm64: rename COMPAT to AARCH32_EL0 arm64: uapi: set __BITS_PER_LONG correctly for ILP32 and LP64 arm64:ilp32: add ARM64_ILP32 to Kconfig Dave Martin (1): arm64: signal: Make parse_user_sigframe() independent of rt_sigframe layout James Morse (1): ptrace: Add compat PTRACE_{G,S}ETSIGMASK handlers Philipp Tomsich (1): arm64:ilp32: add vdso-ilp32 and use for signal return Xiongfeng Wang (4): arm64: rename functions that reference compat term arm64: secomp: fix the secure computing mode 1 syscall check for ilp32 ilp32: avoid clearing upper 32 bits of syscall return value for ilp32 ilp32: skip ARM erratum 1418040 for ilp32 application Yury Norov (14): thread: move thread bits accessors to separated file arm64: ilp32: add documentation on the ILP32 ABI for ARM64 arm64: introduce is_a32_compat_{task,thread} for AArch32 compat arm64: ilp32: add is_ilp32_compat_{task,thread} and TIF_32BIT_AARCH64 arm64: introduce AUDIT_ARCH_AARCH64ILP32 for ilp32 arm64: introduce binfmt_elf32.c arm64: change compat_elf_hwcap and compat_elf_hwcap2 prefix to a32 arm64: ilp32: introduce binfmt_ilp32.c arm64: ilp32: share aarch32 syscall handlers arm64: ilp32: introduce syscall table for ILP32 arm64: signal: share lp64 signal structures and routines to ilp32 arm64: signal32: move ilp32 and aarch32 common code to separated file arm64: ilp32: introduce ilp32-specific sigframe and ucontext arm64: ptrace: handle ptrace_request differently for aarch32 and ilp32 Documentation/arm64/ilp32.txt | 52 +++ arch/arm64/Kconfig | 19 +- arch/arm64/Makefile | 3 + arch/arm64/include/asm/arch_timer.h | 4 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/compat.h | 18 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h | 32 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/fpsimd.h | 2 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/ftrace.h | 2 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/hwcap.h | 8 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/is_compat.h | 78 ++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h | 15 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/ptrace.h | 12 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/seccomp.h | 32 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/signal32.h | 31 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/signal32_common.h | 13 + arch/arm64/include/asm/signal_common.h | 391 +++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/signal_ilp32.h | 23 + arch/arm64/include/asm/syscall.h | 17 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h | 4 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h | 5 + arch/arm64/include/asm/vdso.h | 9 + arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/bitsperlong.h | 9 +- arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h | 15 +- arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile | 8 +- arch/arm64/kernel/armv8_deprecated.c | 12 +- arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 13 +- arch/arm64/kernel/binfmt_elf32.c | 27 ++ arch/arm64/kernel/binfmt_ilp32.c | 89 ++++ arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 36 +- arch/arm64/kernel/cpuinfo.c | 18 +- arch/arm64/kernel/debug-monitors.c | 4 +- arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c | 6 +- arch/arm64/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c | 8 +- arch/arm64/kernel/perf_callchain.c | 28 +- arch/arm64/kernel/perf_regs.c | 4 +- arch/arm64/kernel/process.c | 15 +- arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c | 2 +- arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c | 38 +- arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c | 397 +++--------------- arch/arm64/kernel/signal32.c | 97 ++--- arch/arm64/kernel/signal32_common.c | 37 ++ arch/arm64/kernel/signal_ilp32.c | 67 +++ arch/arm64/kernel/sys32.c | 104 +---- arch/arm64/kernel/sys32_common.c | 106 +++++ arch/arm64/kernel/sys_compat.c | 12 +- arch/arm64/kernel/sys_ilp32.c | 82 ++++ arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c | 37 +- arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c | 5 +- arch/arm64/kernel/vdso-ilp32/.gitignore | 2 + arch/arm64/kernel/vdso-ilp32/Makefile | 108 +++++ arch/arm64/kernel/vdso-ilp32/vdso-ilp32.S | 22 + arch/arm64/kernel/vdso-ilp32/vdso-ilp32.lds.S | 88 ++++ arch/arm64/kernel/vdso.c | 46 +- arch/arm64/mm/fault.c | 2 +- include/linux/sched.h | 1 + include/linux/thread_bits.h | 87 ++++ include/linux/thread_info.h | 73 +--- include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 + kernel/ptrace.c | 52 ++- 59 files changed, 1765 insertions(+), 763 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/arm64/ilp32.txt create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/is_compat.h create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/signal32_common.h create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/signal_common.h create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/signal_ilp32.h create mode 100644 arch/arm64/kernel/binfmt_elf32.c create mode 100644 arch/arm64/kernel/binfmt_ilp32.c create mode 100644 arch/arm64/kernel/signal32_common.c create mode 100644 arch/arm64/kernel/signal_ilp32.c create mode 100644 arch/arm64/kernel/sys32_common.c create mode 100644 arch/arm64/kernel/sys_ilp32.c create mode 100644 arch/arm64/kernel/vdso-ilp32/.gitignore create mode 100644 arch/arm64/kernel/vdso-ilp32/Makefile create mode 100644 arch/arm64/kernel/vdso-ilp32/vdso-ilp32.S create mode 100644 arch/arm64/kernel/vdso-ilp32/vdso-ilp32.lds.S create mode 100644 include/linux/thread_bits.h -- 2.34.1

2 25

[openEuler-22.03-LTS 0/2] introduce handle_fasteoi_edge_irq
by Yipeng Zou 28 Aug '23

28 Aug '23

introduce handle_fasteoi_edge_irq Yipeng Zou (2): genirq: introduce handle_fasteoi_edge_irq flow handler genirq: introduce handle_fasteoi_edge_irq for phytium drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-phytium-2500.c | 2 +- drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c | 2 +- include/linux/irq.h | 1 + kernel/irq/chip.c | 67 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 70 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) -- 2.17.1

1 2

[OLK-5.10 0/2] introduce handle_fasteoi_edge_irq
by Yipeng Zou 28 Aug '23

28 Aug '23

introduce handle_fasteoi_edge_irq Yipeng Zou (2): genirq: introduce handle_fasteoi_edge_irq flow handler genirq: introduce handle_fasteoi_edge_irq for phytium drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-phytium-2500.c | 2 +- drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c | 2 +- include/linux/irq.h | 1 + kernel/irq/chip.c | 67 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 70 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) -- 2.17.1

1 2

[PATCH openEuler-23.09 00/24] ILP32 for ARM64
by Chen Jiahao 28 Aug '23

28 Aug '23

backport ILP32 for ARM64 patches to openEuler-23.09 Andrew Pinski (3): arm64: rename COMPAT to AARCH32_EL0 arm64: uapi: set __BITS_PER_LONG correctly for ILP32 and LP64 arm64:ilp32: add ARM64_ILP32 to Kconfig Dave Martin (1): arm64: signal: Make parse_user_sigframe() independent of rt_sigframe layout James Morse (1): ptrace: Add compat PTRACE_{G,S}ETSIGMASK handlers Philipp Tomsich (1): arm64:ilp32: add vdso-ilp32 and use for signal return Xiongfeng Wang (4): arm64: rename functions that reference compat term arm64: secomp: fix the secure computing mode 1 syscall check for ilp32 ilp32: avoid clearing upper 32 bits of syscall return value for ilp32 ilp32: skip ARM erratum 1418040 for ilp32 application Yury Norov (14): thread: move thread bits accessors to separated file arm64: ilp32: add documentation on the ILP32 ABI for ARM64 arm64: introduce is_a32_compat_{task,thread} for AArch32 compat arm64: ilp32: add is_ilp32_compat_{task,thread} and TIF_32BIT_AARCH64 arm64: introduce AUDIT_ARCH_AARCH64ILP32 for ilp32 arm64: introduce binfmt_elf32.c arm64: change compat_elf_hwcap and compat_elf_hwcap2 prefix to a32 arm64: ilp32: introduce binfmt_ilp32.c arm64: ilp32: share aarch32 syscall handlers arm64: ilp32: introduce syscall table for ILP32 arm64: signal: share lp64 signal structures and routines to ilp32 arm64: signal32: move ilp32 and aarch32 common code to separated file arm64: ilp32: introduce ilp32-specific sigframe and ucontext arm64: ptrace: handle ptrace_request differently for aarch32 and ilp32 Documentation/arm64/ilp32.txt | 52 +++ arch/arm64/Kconfig | 19 +- arch/arm64/Makefile | 3 + arch/arm64/include/asm/arch_timer.h | 4 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/compat.h | 18 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h | 32 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/fpsimd.h | 2 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/ftrace.h | 2 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/hwcap.h | 8 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/is_compat.h | 78 ++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h | 15 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/ptrace.h | 12 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/seccomp.h | 32 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/signal32.h | 31 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/signal32_common.h | 13 + arch/arm64/include/asm/signal_common.h | 391 +++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/signal_ilp32.h | 23 + arch/arm64/include/asm/syscall.h | 17 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h | 4 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h | 5 + arch/arm64/include/asm/vdso.h | 9 + arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/bitsperlong.h | 9 +- arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h | 15 +- arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile | 8 +- arch/arm64/kernel/armv8_deprecated.c | 12 +- arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 13 +- arch/arm64/kernel/binfmt_elf32.c | 27 ++ arch/arm64/kernel/binfmt_ilp32.c | 89 ++++ arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 36 +- arch/arm64/kernel/cpuinfo.c | 18 +- arch/arm64/kernel/debug-monitors.c | 4 +- arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c | 6 +- arch/arm64/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c | 8 +- arch/arm64/kernel/perf_callchain.c | 28 +- arch/arm64/kernel/perf_regs.c | 4 +- arch/arm64/kernel/process.c | 15 +- arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c | 2 +- arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c | 38 +- arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c | 397 +++--------------- arch/arm64/kernel/signal32.c | 97 ++--- arch/arm64/kernel/signal32_common.c | 37 ++ arch/arm64/kernel/signal_ilp32.c | 67 +++ arch/arm64/kernel/sys32.c | 104 +---- arch/arm64/kernel/sys32_common.c | 106 +++++ arch/arm64/kernel/sys_compat.c | 12 +- arch/arm64/kernel/sys_ilp32.c | 82 ++++ arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c | 37 +- arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c | 5 +- arch/arm64/kernel/vdso-ilp32/.gitignore | 2 + arch/arm64/kernel/vdso-ilp32/Makefile | 108 +++++ arch/arm64/kernel/vdso-ilp32/vdso-ilp32.S | 22 + arch/arm64/kernel/vdso-ilp32/vdso-ilp32.lds.S | 88 ++++ arch/arm64/kernel/vdso.c | 46 +- arch/arm64/mm/fault.c | 2 +- include/linux/sched.h | 1 + include/linux/thread_bits.h | 87 ++++ include/linux/thread_info.h | 73 +--- include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 + kernel/ptrace.c | 52 ++- 59 files changed, 1765 insertions(+), 763 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/arm64/ilp32.txt create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/is_compat.h create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/signal32_common.h create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/signal_common.h create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/signal_ilp32.h create mode 100644 arch/arm64/kernel/binfmt_elf32.c create mode 100644 arch/arm64/kernel/binfmt_ilp32.c create mode 100644 arch/arm64/kernel/signal32_common.c create mode 100644 arch/arm64/kernel/signal_ilp32.c create mode 100644 arch/arm64/kernel/sys32_common.c create mode 100644 arch/arm64/kernel/sys_ilp32.c create mode 100644 arch/arm64/kernel/vdso-ilp32/.gitignore create mode 100644 arch/arm64/kernel/vdso-ilp32/Makefile create mode 100644 arch/arm64/kernel/vdso-ilp32/vdso-ilp32.S create mode 100644 arch/arm64/kernel/vdso-ilp32/vdso-ilp32.lds.S create mode 100644 include/linux/thread_bits.h -- 2.34.1

1 24

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] ipvlan: Fix a reference count leak warning in ipvlan_ns_exit()
by Lu Wei 28 Aug '23

28 Aug '23

mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.4 commit 043d5f68d0ccdda91029b4b6dce7eeffdcfad281 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7WB3H Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- There are two network devices(veth1 and veth3) in ns1, and ipvlan1 with L3S mode and ipvlan2 with L2 mode are created based on them as figure (1). In this case, ipvlan_register_nf_hook() will be called to register nf hook which is needed by ipvlans in L3S mode in ns1 and value of ipvl_nf_hook_refcnt is set to 1. (1) ns1 ns2 ------------ ------------ veth1--ipvlan1 (L3S) veth3--ipvlan2 (L2) (2) ns1 ns2 ------------ ------------ veth1--ipvlan1 (L3S) ipvlan2 (L2) veth3 | | |------->-------->--------->-------- migrate When veth3 migrates from ns1 to ns2 as figure (2), veth3 will register in ns2 and calls call_netdevice_notifiers with NETDEV_REGISTER event: dev_change_net_namespace call_netdevice_notifiers ipvlan_device_event ipvlan_migrate_l3s_hook ipvlan_register_nf_hook(newnet) (I) ipvlan_unregister_nf_hook(oldnet) (II) In function ipvlan_migrate_l3s_hook(), ipvl_nf_hook_refcnt in ns1 is not 0 since veth1 with ipvlan1 still in ns1, (I) and (II) will be called to register nf_hook in ns2 and unregister nf_hook in ns1. As a result, ipvl_nf_hook_refcnt in ns1 is decreased incorrectly and this in ns2 is increased incorrectly. When the second net namespace is removed, a reference count leak warning in ipvlan_ns_exit() will be triggered. This patch add a check before ipvlan_migrate_l3s_hook() is called. The warning can be triggered as follows: $ ip netns add ns1 $ ip netns add ns2 $ ip netns exec ns1 ip link add veth1 type veth peer name veth2 $ ip netns exec ns1 ip link add veth3 type veth peer name veth4 $ ip netns exec ns1 ip link add ipv1 link veth1 type ipvlan mode l3s $ ip netns exec ns1 ip link add ipv2 link veth3 type ipvlan mode l2 $ ip netns exec ns1 ip link set veth3 netns ns2 $ ip net del ns2 Fixes: 3133822f5ac1 ("ipvlan: use pernet operations and restrict l3s hooks to master netns") Signed-off-by: Lu Wei <luwei32(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal <fw(a)strlen.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230817145449.141827-1-luwei32@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> conflict: drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_main.c Signed-off-by: Lu Wei <luwei32(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_main.c | 12 +++++++----- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_main.c b/drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_main.c index 403852adaff5..9057cdf9b216 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_main.c @@ -875,12 +875,14 @@ static int ipvlan_device_event(struct notifier_block *unused, write_pnet(&port->pnet, newnet); - old_vnet = net_generic(oldnet, ipvlan_netid); - if (!old_vnet->ipvl_nf_hook_refcnt) - break; + if (port->mode == IPVLAN_MODE_L3S) { + old_vnet = net_generic(oldnet, ipvlan_netid); + if (!old_vnet->ipvl_nf_hook_refcnt) + break; - ipvlan_register_nf_hook(newnet); - ipvlan_unregister_nf_hook(oldnet); + ipvlan_register_nf_hook(newnet); + ipvlan_unregister_nf_hook(oldnet); + } break; } case NETDEV_UNREGISTER: -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] SUNRPC: don't pause on incomplete allocation
by ZhaoLong Wang 28 Aug '23

28 Aug '23

From: NeilBrown <neilb(a)suse.de> mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.15-rc1 commit e38b3f20059426a0adbde014ff71071739ab5226 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7RRY4 CVE: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… ------------------------------------------------- alloc_pages_bulk_array() attempts to allocate at least one page based on the provided pages, and then opportunistically allocates more if that can be done without dropping the spinlock. So if it returns fewer than requested, that could just mean that it needed to drop the lock. In that case, try again immediately. Only pause for a time if no progress could be made. Reported-and-tested-by: Mike Javorski <mike.javorski(a)gmail.com> Reported-and-tested-by: Lothar Paltins <lopa(a)mailbox.org> Fixes: f6e70aab9dfe ("SUNRPC: refresh rq_pages using a bulk page allocator") Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb(a)suse.de> Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman(a)suse.com> Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: ZhaoLong Wang <wangzhaolong1(a)huawei.com> Conflicts: net/sunrpc/svc_xprt.c --- net/sunrpc/svc_xprt.c | 13 +++++++------ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/sunrpc/svc_xprt.c b/net/sunrpc/svc_xprt.c index 362487f3a6de..f56b4df6ce28 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/svc_xprt.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/svc_xprt.c @@ -643,7 +643,7 @@ static int svc_alloc_arg(struct svc_rqst *rqstp) { struct svc_serv *serv = rqstp->rq_server; struct xdr_buf *arg = &rqstp->rq_arg; - unsigned long pages, filled; + unsigned long pages, filled, ret; pages = (serv->sv_max_mesg + 2 * PAGE_SIZE) >> PAGE_SHIFT; if (pages > RPCSVC_MAXPAGES) { @@ -653,11 +653,12 @@ static int svc_alloc_arg(struct svc_rqst *rqstp) pages = RPCSVC_MAXPAGES; } - for (;;) { - filled = alloc_pages_bulk_array(GFP_KERNEL, pages, - rqstp->rq_pages); - if (filled == pages) - break; + for (filled = 0; filled < pages; filled = ret) { + ret = alloc_pages_bulk_array(GFP_KERNEL, pages, + rqstp->rq_pages); + if (ret > filled) + /* Made progress, don't sleep yet */ + continue; set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE); if (signalled() || kthread_should_stop()) { -- 2.39.2

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] ip6mr: Fix skb_under_panic in ip6mr_cache_report()
by Yue Haibing 26 Aug '23

26 Aug '23

mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.5-rc3 commit 30e0191b16e8a58e4620fa3e2839ddc7b9d4281c category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7W5X8 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… --------------------------- skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffffffff88771f69 len:56 put:-4 head:ffff88805f86a800 data:ffff887f5f86a850 tail:0x88 end:0x2c0 dev:pim6reg ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:192! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 2 PID: 22968 Comm: kworker/2:11 Not tainted 6.5.0-rc3-00044-g0a8db05b571a #236 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: ipv6_addrconf addrconf_dad_work RIP: 0010:skb_panic+0x152/0x1d0 Call Trace: <TASK> skb_push+0xc4/0xe0 ip6mr_cache_report+0xd69/0x19b0 reg_vif_xmit+0x406/0x690 dev_hard_start_xmit+0x17e/0x6e0 __dev_queue_xmit+0x2d6a/0x3d20 vlan_dev_hard_start_xmit+0x3ab/0x5c0 dev_hard_start_xmit+0x17e/0x6e0 __dev_queue_xmit+0x2d6a/0x3d20 neigh_connected_output+0x3ed/0x570 ip6_finish_output2+0x5b5/0x1950 ip6_finish_output+0x693/0x11c0 ip6_output+0x24b/0x880 NF_HOOK.constprop.0+0xfd/0x530 ndisc_send_skb+0x9db/0x1400 ndisc_send_rs+0x12a/0x6c0 addrconf_dad_completed+0x3c9/0xea0 addrconf_dad_work+0x849/0x1420 process_one_work+0xa22/0x16e0 worker_thread+0x679/0x10c0 ret_from_fork+0x28/0x60 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 When setup a vlan device on dev pim6reg, DAD ns packet may sent on reg_vif_xmit(). reg_vif_xmit() ip6mr_cache_report() skb_push(skb, -skb_network_offset(pkt));//skb_network_offset(pkt) is 4 And skb_push declared as: void *skb_push(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int len); skb->data -= len; //0xffff88805f86a84c - 0xfffffffc = 0xffff887f5f86a850 skb->data is set to 0xffff887f5f86a850, which is invalid mem addr, lead to skb_push() fails. Fixes: 14fb64e1f449 ("[IPV6] MROUTE: Support PIM-SM (SSM).") Signed-off-by: Yue Haibing <yuehaibing(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Yue Haibing <yuehaibing(a)huawei.com> --- net/ipv6/ip6mr.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c b/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c index d392a72cd784..c94a06b11141 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c +++ b/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c @@ -1070,7 +1070,7 @@ static int ip6mr_cache_report(struct mr_table *mrt, struct sk_buff *pkt, And all this only to mangle msg->im6_msgtype and to set msg->im6_mbz to "mbz" :-) */ - skb_push(skb, -skb_network_offset(pkt)); + __skb_pull(skb, skb_network_offset(pkt)); skb_push(skb, sizeof(*msg)); skb_reset_transport_header(skb); -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] SUNRPC: don't pause on incomplete allocation
by ZhaoLong Wang 26 Aug '23

26 Aug '23

From: NeilBrown <neilb(a)suse.de> mainline inclusion from mainline-5.15-rc1 commit e38b3f20059426a0adbde014ff71071739ab5226 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7RRY4 CVE: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… ------------------------------------------------- alloc_pages_bulk_array() attempts to allocate at least one page based on the provided pages, and then opportunistically allocates more if that can be done without dropping the spinlock. So if it returns fewer than requested, that could just mean that it needed to drop the lock. In that case, try again immediately. Only pause for a time if no progress could be made. Reported-and-tested-by: Mike Javorski <mike.javorski(a)gmail.com> Reported-and-tested-by: Lothar Paltins <lopa(a)mailbox.org> Fixes: f6e70aab9dfe ("SUNRPC: refresh rq_pages using a bulk page allocator") Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb(a)suse.de> Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman(a)suse.com> Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: ZhaoLong Wang <wangzhaolong1(a)huawei.com> Conflicts: net/sunrpc/svc_xprt.c --- net/sunrpc/svc_xprt.c | 13 +++++++------ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/sunrpc/svc_xprt.c b/net/sunrpc/svc_xprt.c index 362487f3a6de..f56b4df6ce28 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/svc_xprt.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/svc_xprt.c @@ -643,7 +643,7 @@ static int svc_alloc_arg(struct svc_rqst *rqstp) { struct svc_serv *serv = rqstp->rq_server; struct xdr_buf *arg = &rqstp->rq_arg; - unsigned long pages, filled; + unsigned long pages, filled, ret; pages = (serv->sv_max_mesg + 2 * PAGE_SIZE) >> PAGE_SHIFT; if (pages > RPCSVC_MAXPAGES) { @@ -653,11 +653,12 @@ static int svc_alloc_arg(struct svc_rqst *rqstp) pages = RPCSVC_MAXPAGES; } - for (;;) { - filled = alloc_pages_bulk_array(GFP_KERNEL, pages, - rqstp->rq_pages); - if (filled == pages) - break; + for (filled = 0; filled < pages; filled = ret) { + ret = alloc_pages_bulk_array(GFP_KERNEL, pages, + rqstp->rq_pages); + if (ret > filled) + /* Made progress, don't sleep yet */ + continue; set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE); if (signalled() || kthread_should_stop()) { -- 2.39.2

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] ip6mr: Fix skb_under_panic in ip6mr_cache_report()
by Yue Haibing 26 Aug '23

26 Aug '23

mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.5-rc3 commit 30e0191b16e8a58e4620fa3e2839ddc7b9d4281c category: bugfix bugzilla: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… --------------------------- skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffffffff88771f69 len:56 put:-4 head:ffff88805f86a800 data:ffff887f5f86a850 tail:0x88 end:0x2c0 dev:pim6reg ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:192! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 2 PID: 22968 Comm: kworker/2:11 Not tainted 6.5.0-rc3-00044-g0a8db05b571a #236 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: ipv6_addrconf addrconf_dad_work RIP: 0010:skb_panic+0x152/0x1d0 Call Trace: <TASK> skb_push+0xc4/0xe0 ip6mr_cache_report+0xd69/0x19b0 reg_vif_xmit+0x406/0x690 dev_hard_start_xmit+0x17e/0x6e0 __dev_queue_xmit+0x2d6a/0x3d20 vlan_dev_hard_start_xmit+0x3ab/0x5c0 dev_hard_start_xmit+0x17e/0x6e0 __dev_queue_xmit+0x2d6a/0x3d20 neigh_connected_output+0x3ed/0x570 ip6_finish_output2+0x5b5/0x1950 ip6_finish_output+0x693/0x11c0 ip6_output+0x24b/0x880 NF_HOOK.constprop.0+0xfd/0x530 ndisc_send_skb+0x9db/0x1400 ndisc_send_rs+0x12a/0x6c0 addrconf_dad_completed+0x3c9/0xea0 addrconf_dad_work+0x849/0x1420 process_one_work+0xa22/0x16e0 worker_thread+0x679/0x10c0 ret_from_fork+0x28/0x60 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 When setup a vlan device on dev pim6reg, DAD ns packet may sent on reg_vif_xmit(). reg_vif_xmit() ip6mr_cache_report() skb_push(skb, -skb_network_offset(pkt));//skb_network_offset(pkt) is 4 And skb_push declared as: void *skb_push(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int len); skb->data -= len; //0xffff88805f86a84c - 0xfffffffc = 0xffff887f5f86a850 skb->data is set to 0xffff887f5f86a850, which is invalid mem addr, lead to skb_push() fails. Fixes: 14fb64e1f449 ("[IPV6] MROUTE: Support PIM-SM (SSM).") Signed-off-by: Yue Haibing <yuehaibing(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Yue Haibing <yuehaibing(a)huawei.com> --- net/ipv6/ip6mr.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c b/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c index d392a72cd784..c94a06b11141 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c +++ b/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c @@ -1070,7 +1070,7 @@ static int ip6mr_cache_report(struct mr_table *mrt, struct sk_buff *pkt, And all this only to mangle msg->im6_msgtype and to set msg->im6_mbz to "mbz" :-) */ - skb_push(skb, -skb_network_offset(pkt)); + __skb_pull(skb, skb_network_offset(pkt)); skb_push(skb, sizeof(*msg)); skb_reset_transport_header(skb); -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-23.09 v2 0/8] enable files_cgroup
by Lu Jialin 26 Aug '23

26 Aug '23

v2->v1: enable CONFIG_CGROUP_FILES in openeuler_defconfig for x86 and arm64 Binder Makin (1): cgroups: Resource controller for open files Hou Tao (1): cgroup/files: use task_get_css() to get a valid css during dup_fd() Lu Jialin (3): fs: fix files.usage bug when move tasks fs/filescontrol.c: fix warning:large integer implicitly truncated to unsigned type openeuler_defconfig: enable CONFIG_CGROUP_FILES in openeuler_defconfig for x86 and arm64 Yu Kuai (1): fs/filescontrol: add a switch to enable / disable accounting of open fds Zhang Xiaoxu (1): files_cgroup: fix error pointer when kvm_vm_worker_thread yangerkun (1): fs/dcache.c: avoid panic while lockref of dentry overflow arch/arm64/configs/openeuler_defconfig | 1 + arch/x86/configs/openeuler_defconfig | 1 + fs/Makefile | 1 + fs/dcache.c | 32 ++- fs/file.c | 53 ++++- fs/filescontrol.c | 312 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/cgroup-defs.h | 8 +- include/linux/cgroup_subsys.h | 6 + include/linux/fdtable.h | 1 + include/linux/filescontrol.h | 34 +++ include/linux/fs.h | 3 + init/Kconfig | 10 + 12 files changed, 453 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) create mode 100644 fs/filescontrol.c create mode 100644 include/linux/filescontrol.h -- 2.34.1

2 9

[PATCH v2 OLK-5.10 0/4] Synchronizing mainline HiSilicon uncore PMU patches
by Junhao He 25 Aug '23

25 Aug '23

Synchronizing mainline HiSilicon uncore PMU patches The HISI uncore UC PMU and uncore H60PA/PAv3 PMU drivers have been integrated into the main line. Compared with OLK-5.10, some modifications are made. Add support for HiSilicon UC/H60PA/PAv3 PMU driver. PAv3 PMU: Compared with the PAv2 PMU, the PAv3 PMU has different event. The PAv3 PMU removed some events which are supported by PAv2 PMU. The older PA PMU driver will probe v3 as v2. Add the HISI0275 HID for PAv3 PMU to distinguish different. H60PA PMU: The H60PA PMU and PA are two different devices. The H60PA PMU supports higher bandwidth, and the PA PMU delay is relatively low. Different HIDs are used to distinguish the delay. UC PMU: Each cluster is integrated with a unified cache (UC) PMU, which provides consistency between NUMA and UMA domains. It sits between L2 and the memory system. Junhao He (4): Revert "drivers/perf: hisi: Add support for HiSilicon UC PMU driver" Revert "drivers/perf: hisi: Add support for HiSilicon H60PA and PAv3 PMU driver" drivers/perf: hisi: Add support for HiSilicon H60PA and PAv3 PMU driver drivers/perf: hisi: Add support for HiSilicon UC PMU driver drivers/perf/hisilicon/hisi_uncore_pa_pmu.c | 107 +++++++++----------- drivers/perf/hisilicon/hisi_uncore_pmu.c | 5 +- drivers/perf/hisilicon/hisi_uncore_pmu.h | 32 +----- drivers/perf/hisilicon/hisi_uncore_uc_pmu.c | 35 +++---- 4 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 107 deletions(-) -- 2.33.0

2 5

[PATCH v2 openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP2] mm: add preferred_swap ability
by liubo 25 Aug '23

25 Aug '23

From: Ni Cunshu <nicunshu(a)huawei.com> euleros inclusion category: feature bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7U78A CVE: NA ------------------------------------------------ add a new attribute preferred_swap for each process, which indicates the swapfile or swap device that can be used by the process. Each process can only have one preferred_swap. Signed-off-by: Ni Cunshu <nicunshu(a)huawei.com> --- fs/proc/base.c | 113 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/mm_types.h | 4 ++ include/linux/swap.h | 13 +++++ kernel/fork.c | 4 ++ mm/Kconfig | 7 +++ mm/swap_slots.c | 68 ++++++++++++++++++++++- mm/swapfile.c | 86 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 7 files changed, 292 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c index 24c70ff923b8..34537572db57 100644 --- a/fs/proc/base.c +++ b/fs/proc/base.c @@ -3330,6 +3330,116 @@ static const struct file_operations proc_preferred_cpuset_operations = { }; #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_PREFERRED_SWAP +static ssize_t proc_preferred_swap_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, + size_t count, loff_t *ppos) +{ + struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(file_inode(file)); + struct mm_struct *mm; + int ret; + int err = 0; + size_t len; + char *buffer; + char *path; + + if (!task) + return -ESRCH; + + ret = 0; + mm = get_task_mm(task); + if (!mm) + goto out_no_mm; + + if (mm->preferred_swap) { + buffer = (char *)kmalloc(PATH_MAX + 1, GFP_KERNEL); + if (buffer == NULL) { + err = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + path = d_path(&mm->preferred_swap->swap_file->f_path, + buffer, PATH_MAX); + + if (IS_ERR(path)) { + err = PTR_ERR(path); + kfree(buffer); + goto out; + } + + len = snprintf(buffer, strlen(path) + 2, "%s\n", path); + ret = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, buffer, len); + kfree(buffer); + } +out: + mmput(mm); +out_no_mm: + put_task_struct(task); + if (err < 0) + return err; + return ret; +} + +static ssize_t proc_preferred_swap_write(struct file *file, + const char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) +{ + struct task_struct *task; + struct mm_struct *mm; + char *buffer; + int err = 0; + + if (count >= PATH_MAX) + return -EINVAL; + + buffer = (char *)kmalloc(PATH_MAX, GFP_KERNEL); + if (buffer == NULL) { + err = -ENOMEM; + goto out_no_buffer; + } + if (copy_from_user(buffer, buf, count)) { + err = -EFAULT; + goto out_no_task; + } + buffer[count] = '\0'; + strreplace(buffer, '\n', '\0'); + task = get_proc_task(file_inode(file)); + if (!task) { + err = -ESRCH; + goto out_no_task; + } + mm = get_task_mm(task); + if (!mm) { + err = -ESRCH; + goto out_no_mm; + } + if (strlen(buffer) == 0) { + mm->preferred_swap = NULL; + goto out; + } + err = find_swap_info(buffer, mm); + if (err) { + pr_info("%s failed to be found as swap\n", buffer); + goto out; + } + + preferred_swap_used = 1; +out: + mmput(mm); +out_no_mm: + put_task_struct(task); +out_no_task: + kfree(buffer); +out_no_buffer: + if (err < 0) + return err; + return count; +} +static const struct file_operations proc_preferred_swap_operations = { + .write = proc_preferred_swap_write, + .read = proc_preferred_swap_read, + .llseek = generic_file_llseek, +}; +#endif /* CONFIG_PREFERRED_SWAP */ + static int proc_pid_personality(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *task) { @@ -3526,6 +3636,9 @@ static const struct pid_entry tgid_base_stuff[] = { ONE("ksm_merging_pages", S_IRUSR, proc_pid_ksm_merging_pages), ONE("ksm_stat", S_IRUSR, proc_pid_ksm_stat), #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_PREFERRED_SWAP + REG("preferred_swap", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_preferred_swap_operations), +#endif }; static int proc_tgid_base_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) diff --git a/include/linux/mm_types.h b/include/linux/mm_types.h index e3eaf458787a..2edd816fba7f 100644 --- a/include/linux/mm_types.h +++ b/include/linux/mm_types.h @@ -638,7 +638,11 @@ struct mm_struct { KABI_RESERVE(2) KABI_RESERVE(3) #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_PREFERRED_SWAP + KABI_USE(4, struct swap_info_struct *preferred_swap) +#else KABI_RESERVE(4) +#endif KABI_RESERVE(5) KABI_RESERVE(6) KABI_RESERVE(7) diff --git a/include/linux/swap.h b/include/linux/swap.h index 7f49964f27d2..998f10e97601 100644 --- a/include/linux/swap.h +++ b/include/linux/swap.h @@ -389,6 +389,10 @@ extern int vm_swappiness; extern int remove_mapping(struct address_space *mapping, struct page *page); extern unsigned long reclaim_pages(struct list_head *page_list); +#ifdef CONFIG_PREFERRED_SWAP +extern int find_swap_info(char *filename, struct mm_struct *mm); +extern void clear_tasks_mm_preferred_swap(struct swap_info_struct *p); +#endif #ifdef CONFIG_ETMEM enum etmem_swapcache_watermark_en { ETMEM_SWAPCACHE_WMARK_LOW, @@ -496,6 +500,10 @@ extern long total_swap_pages; extern atomic_t nr_rotate_swap; extern bool has_usable_swap(void); +#ifdef CONFIG_PREFERRED_SWAP +extern int preferred_swap_used; +#endif + /* Swap 50% full? Release swapcache more aggressively.. */ static inline bool vm_swap_full(void) { @@ -511,7 +519,12 @@ extern void si_swapinfo(struct sysinfo *); extern swp_entry_t get_swap_page(struct page *page); extern void put_swap_page(struct page *page, swp_entry_t entry); extern swp_entry_t get_swap_page_of_type(int); +#ifdef CONFIG_PREFERRED_SWAP +extern int get_swap_pages(int n, swp_entry_t swp_entries[], int entry_size, + struct swap_info_struct *preferred_swap); +#else extern int get_swap_pages(int n, swp_entry_t swp_entries[], int entry_size); +#endif extern int add_swap_count_continuation(swp_entry_t, gfp_t); extern void swap_shmem_alloc(swp_entry_t); extern int swap_duplicate(swp_entry_t); diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c index 2547c6a6e5b1..734882ed98c6 100644 --- a/kernel/fork.c +++ b/kernel/fork.c @@ -1072,6 +1072,10 @@ static struct mm_struct *mm_init(struct mm_struct *mm, struct task_struct *p, mm_init_uprobes_state(mm); hugetlb_count_init(mm); +#ifdef CONFIG_PREFERRED_SWAP + mm->preferred_swap = NULL; +#endif + if (current->mm) { mm->flags = current->mm->flags & MMF_INIT_MASK; mm->def_flags = current->mm->def_flags & VM_INIT_DEF_MASK; diff --git a/mm/Kconfig b/mm/Kconfig index f66457168de9..48c37c3bda8c 100644 --- a/mm/Kconfig +++ b/mm/Kconfig @@ -999,6 +999,13 @@ config EXTEND_HUGEPAGE_MAPPING help Introduce vmalloc/vmap/remap interfaces that handle only hugepages. +config PREFERRED_SWAP + bool "make task only swapping memory to assigned swap" + depends on SYSFS + default y + help + Say Y here to enable kernel to limit tasks only swapping memory to assigned swap. + source "mm/damon/Kconfig" endmenu diff --git a/mm/swap_slots.c b/mm/swap_slots.c index 0357fbe70645..79a3164bf393 100644 --- a/mm/swap_slots.c +++ b/mm/swap_slots.c @@ -33,6 +33,9 @@ #include <linux/vmalloc.h> #include <linux/mutex.h> #include <linux/mm.h> +#ifdef CONFIG_PREFERRED_SWAP +#include <linux/rmap.h> +#endif static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct swap_slots_cache, swp_slots); static bool swap_slot_cache_active; @@ -265,8 +268,13 @@ static int refill_swap_slots_cache(struct swap_slots_cache *cache) cache->cur = 0; if (swap_slot_cache_active) +#ifdef CONFIG_PREFERRED_SWAP + cache->nr = get_swap_pages(SWAP_SLOTS_CACHE_SIZE, + cache->slots, 1, NULL); +#else cache->nr = get_swap_pages(SWAP_SLOTS_CACHE_SIZE, cache->slots, 1); +#endif return cache->nr; } @@ -303,16 +311,66 @@ int free_swap_slot(swp_entry_t entry) return 0; } +#ifdef CONFIG_PREFERRED_SWAP +static bool has_preferred_swap(struct page *page, struct vm_area_struct *vma, + unsigned long addr, void *arg) +{ + struct swap_info_struct **si = (struct swap_info_struct **)arg; + + if (*si) { + *si = ERR_PTR(-EPERM); + return false; + } + if (vma->vm_file) { + *si = ERR_PTR(-EPERM); + return false; + } + if (vma->vm_mm->preferred_swap) { + *si = vma->vm_mm->preferred_swap; + } else { + *si = ERR_PTR(-EPERM); + return false; + } + return true; +} + +static struct swap_info_struct *page_preferred_swap(struct page *page) +{ + struct swap_info_struct *preferred_swap = NULL; + struct rmap_walk_control rwc = { + .rmap_one = has_preferred_swap, + .arg = (void *)&preferred_swap, + .anon_lock = page_lock_anon_vma_read, + }; + rmap_walk(page, &rwc); + if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(preferred_swap)) + preferred_swap = NULL; + + return preferred_swap; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_PREFERRED_SWAP */ + swp_entry_t get_swap_page(struct page *page) { swp_entry_t entry; struct swap_slots_cache *cache; +#ifdef CONFIG_PREFERRED_SWAP + struct swap_info_struct *preferred_swap = NULL; + + if (!page_mapping(page)) + preferred_swap = page_preferred_swap(page); +#endif + entry.val = 0; if (PageTransHuge(page)) { if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_THP_SWAP)) +#ifdef CONFIG_PREFERRED_SWAP + get_swap_pages(1, &entry, HPAGE_PMD_NR, preferred_swap); +#else get_swap_pages(1, &entry, HPAGE_PMD_NR); +#endif goto out; } @@ -327,7 +385,11 @@ swp_entry_t get_swap_page(struct page *page) */ cache = raw_cpu_ptr(&swp_slots); - if (likely(check_cache_active() && cache->slots)) { +#ifdef CONFIG_PREFERRED_SWAP + if (likely(check_cache_active() && cache->slots && !preferred_swap)) { +#else + if (likely(check_cache_active() && cache->slots &&)) { +#endif mutex_lock(&cache->alloc_lock); if (cache->slots) { repeat: @@ -344,7 +406,11 @@ swp_entry_t get_swap_page(struct page *page) goto out; } +#ifdef CONFIG_PREFERRED_SWAP + get_swap_pages(1, &entry, 1, preferred_swap); +#else get_swap_pages(1, &entry, 1); +#endif out: if (mem_cgroup_try_charge_swap(page, entry)) { put_swap_page(page, entry); diff --git a/mm/swapfile.c b/mm/swapfile.c index 14e2396fa8a3..835f8a8913b6 100644 --- a/mm/swapfile.c +++ b/mm/swapfile.c @@ -62,7 +62,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nr_swap_pages); /* protected with swap_lock. reading in vm_swap_full() doesn't need lock */ long total_swap_pages; static int least_priority = -1; - +#ifdef CONFIG_PREFERRED_SWAP +DEFINE_SPINLOCK(preferred_swap_lock); +int preferred_swap_used; +#endif static const char Bad_file[] = "Bad swap file entry "; static const char Unused_file[] = "Unused swap file entry "; static const char Bad_offset[] = "Bad swap offset entry "; @@ -1056,7 +1059,13 @@ static unsigned long scan_swap_map(struct swap_info_struct *si, } -int get_swap_pages(int n_goal, swp_entry_t swp_entries[], int entry_size) +#ifdef CONFIG_PREFERRED_SWAP +int get_swap_pages(int n_goal, swp_entry_t swp_entries[], + int entry_size, struct swap_info_struct *preferred_swap) +#else +int get_swap_pages(int n_goal, swp_entry_t swp_entries[], + int entry_size) +#endif { unsigned long size = swap_entry_size(entry_size); struct swap_info_struct *si, *next; @@ -1082,6 +1091,10 @@ int get_swap_pages(int n_goal, swp_entry_t swp_entries[], int entry_size) start_over: node = numa_node_id(); plist_for_each_entry_safe(si, next, &swap_avail_heads[node], avail_lists[node]) { +#ifdef CONFIG_PREFERRED_SWAP + if (preferred_swap && preferred_swap != si) + goto nextsi; +#endif /* requeue si to after same-priority siblings */ plist_requeue(&si->avail_lists[node], &swap_avail_heads[node]); spin_unlock(&swap_avail_lock); @@ -2643,6 +2656,10 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(swapoff, const char __user *, specialfile) p->flags &= ~SWP_WRITEOK; spin_unlock(&p->lock); spin_unlock(&swap_lock); +#ifdef CONFIG_PREFERRED_SWAP + if (preferred_swap_used) + clear_tasks_mm_preferred_swap(p); +#endif disable_swap_slots_cache_lock(); @@ -3878,6 +3895,71 @@ void cgroup_throttle_swaprate(struct page *page, gfp_t gfp_mask) } #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_PREFERRED_SWAP +int find_swap_info(char *filename, struct mm_struct *mm) +{ + struct file *chosen_file; + unsigned int type; + struct path path; + int err = 0; + struct swap_info_struct *found_swap = NULL; + + err = kern_path(filename, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &path); + if (err) + goto out_no_path; + chosen_file = dentry_open(&path, O_RDWR|O_LARGEFILE, current_cred()); + if (IS_ERR(chosen_file)) { + err = PTR_ERR(chosen_file); + goto out_no_file; + } + spin_lock(&preferred_swap_lock); + spin_lock(&swap_lock); + for (type = 0; type < nr_swapfiles; type++) { + if ((swap_info[type]->flags & SWP_USED) && + (swap_info[type]->flags & SWP_WRITEOK)) { + if (swap_info[type]->swap_file->f_mapping == + chosen_file->f_mapping) { + found_swap = swap_info[type]; + break; + } + } + } + + spin_unlock(&swap_lock); + if (type >= nr_swapfiles) { + err = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + + mm->preferred_swap = found_swap; +out: + spin_unlock(&preferred_swap_lock); + filp_close(chosen_file, NULL); +out_no_file: + path_put(&path); +out_no_path: + return err; +} + +void clear_tasks_mm_preferred_swap(struct swap_info_struct *p) +{ + struct task_struct *task; + struct mm_struct *mm; + + spin_lock(&preferred_swap_lock); + read_lock(&tasklist_lock); + for_each_process(task) { + mm = get_task_mm(task); + if (mm) { + if (mm->preferred_swap == p) + mm->preferred_swap = NULL; + mmput(mm); + } + } + read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); + spin_unlock(&preferred_swap_lock); +} +#endif static int __init swapfile_init(void) { int nid; -- 2.27.0

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP2] mm: add preferred_swap ability
by liubo 24 Aug '23

24 Aug '23

From: Ni Cunshu <nicunshu(a)huawei.com> euleros inclusion category: feature bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7U78A CVE: NA ------------------------------------------------ add a new attribute preferred_swap for each process, which indicates the swapfile or swap device that can be used by the process. Each process can only have one preferred_swap. Signed-off-by: Ni Cunshu <nicunshu(a)huawei.com> --- fs/proc/base.c | 113 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/mm_types.h | 4 ++ include/linux/swap.h | 13 +++++ kernel/fork.c | 4 ++ mm/Kconfig | 7 +++ mm/swap_slots.c | 68 ++++++++++++++++++++++- mm/swapfile.c | 86 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 7 files changed, 292 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c index 24c70ff923b8..34537572db57 100644 --- a/fs/proc/base.c +++ b/fs/proc/base.c @@ -3330,6 +3330,116 @@ static const struct file_operations proc_preferred_cpuset_operations = { }; #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_PREFERRED_SWAP +static ssize_t proc_preferred_swap_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, + size_t count, loff_t *ppos) +{ + struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(file_inode(file)); + struct mm_struct *mm; + int ret; + int err = 0; + size_t len; + char *buffer; + char *path; + + if (!task) + return -ESRCH; + + ret = 0; + mm = get_task_mm(task); + if (!mm) + goto out_no_mm; + + if (mm->preferred_swap) { + buffer = (char *)kmalloc(PATH_MAX + 1, GFP_KERNEL); + if (buffer == NULL) { + err = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + path = d_path(&mm->preferred_swap->swap_file->f_path, + buffer, PATH_MAX); + + if (IS_ERR(path)) { + err = PTR_ERR(path); + kfree(buffer); + goto out; + } + + len = snprintf(buffer, strlen(path) + 2, "%s\n", path); + ret = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, buffer, len); + kfree(buffer); + } +out: + mmput(mm); +out_no_mm: + put_task_struct(task); + if (err < 0) + return err; + return ret; +} + +static ssize_t proc_preferred_swap_write(struct file *file, + const char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) +{ + struct task_struct *task; + struct mm_struct *mm; + char *buffer; + int err = 0; + + if (count >= PATH_MAX) + return -EINVAL; + + buffer = (char *)kmalloc(PATH_MAX, GFP_KERNEL); + if (buffer == NULL) { + err = -ENOMEM; + goto out_no_buffer; + } + if (copy_from_user(buffer, buf, count)) { + err = -EFAULT; + goto out_no_task; + } + buffer[count] = '\0'; + strreplace(buffer, '\n', '\0'); + task = get_proc_task(file_inode(file)); + if (!task) { + err = -ESRCH; + goto out_no_task; + } + mm = get_task_mm(task); + if (!mm) { + err = -ESRCH; + goto out_no_mm; + } + if (strlen(buffer) == 0) { + mm->preferred_swap = NULL; + goto out; + } + err = find_swap_info(buffer, mm); + if (err) { + pr_info("%s failed to be found as swap\n", buffer); + goto out; + } + + preferred_swap_used = 1; +out: + mmput(mm); +out_no_mm: + put_task_struct(task); +out_no_task: + kfree(buffer); +out_no_buffer: + if (err < 0) + return err; + return count; +} +static const struct file_operations proc_preferred_swap_operations = { + .write = proc_preferred_swap_write, + .read = proc_preferred_swap_read, + .llseek = generic_file_llseek, +}; +#endif /* CONFIG_PREFERRED_SWAP */ + static int proc_pid_personality(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *task) { @@ -3526,6 +3636,9 @@ static const struct pid_entry tgid_base_stuff[] = { ONE("ksm_merging_pages", S_IRUSR, proc_pid_ksm_merging_pages), ONE("ksm_stat", S_IRUSR, proc_pid_ksm_stat), #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_PREFERRED_SWAP + REG("preferred_swap", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_preferred_swap_operations), +#endif }; static int proc_tgid_base_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) diff --git a/include/linux/mm_types.h b/include/linux/mm_types.h index e3eaf458787a..2edd816fba7f 100644 --- a/include/linux/mm_types.h +++ b/include/linux/mm_types.h @@ -638,7 +638,11 @@ struct mm_struct { KABI_RESERVE(2) KABI_RESERVE(3) #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_PREFERRED_SWAP + KABI_USE(4, struct swap_info_struct *preferred_swap) +#else KABI_RESERVE(4) +#endif KABI_RESERVE(5) KABI_RESERVE(6) KABI_RESERVE(7) diff --git a/include/linux/swap.h b/include/linux/swap.h index 7f49964f27d2..998f10e97601 100644 --- a/include/linux/swap.h +++ b/include/linux/swap.h @@ -389,6 +389,10 @@ extern int vm_swappiness; extern int remove_mapping(struct address_space *mapping, struct page *page); extern unsigned long reclaim_pages(struct list_head *page_list); +#ifdef CONFIG_PREFERRED_SWAP +extern int find_swap_info(char *filename, struct mm_struct *mm); +extern void clear_tasks_mm_preferred_swap(struct swap_info_struct *p); +#endif #ifdef CONFIG_ETMEM enum etmem_swapcache_watermark_en { ETMEM_SWAPCACHE_WMARK_LOW, @@ -496,6 +500,10 @@ extern long total_swap_pages; extern atomic_t nr_rotate_swap; extern bool has_usable_swap(void); +#ifdef CONFIG_PREFERRED_SWAP +extern int preferred_swap_used; +#endif + /* Swap 50% full? Release swapcache more aggressively.. */ static inline bool vm_swap_full(void) { @@ -511,7 +519,12 @@ extern void si_swapinfo(struct sysinfo *); extern swp_entry_t get_swap_page(struct page *page); extern void put_swap_page(struct page *page, swp_entry_t entry); extern swp_entry_t get_swap_page_of_type(int); +#ifdef CONFIG_PREFERRED_SWAP +extern int get_swap_pages(int n, swp_entry_t swp_entries[], int entry_size, + struct swap_info_struct *preferred_swap); +#else extern int get_swap_pages(int n, swp_entry_t swp_entries[], int entry_size); +#endif extern int add_swap_count_continuation(swp_entry_t, gfp_t); extern void swap_shmem_alloc(swp_entry_t); extern int swap_duplicate(swp_entry_t); diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c index 2547c6a6e5b1..734882ed98c6 100644 --- a/kernel/fork.c +++ b/kernel/fork.c @@ -1072,6 +1072,10 @@ static struct mm_struct *mm_init(struct mm_struct *mm, struct task_struct *p, mm_init_uprobes_state(mm); hugetlb_count_init(mm); +#ifdef CONFIG_PREFERRED_SWAP + mm->preferred_swap = NULL; +#endif + if (current->mm) { mm->flags = current->mm->flags & MMF_INIT_MASK; mm->def_flags = current->mm->def_flags & VM_INIT_DEF_MASK; diff --git a/mm/Kconfig b/mm/Kconfig index f66457168de9..48c37c3bda8c 100644 --- a/mm/Kconfig +++ b/mm/Kconfig @@ -999,6 +999,13 @@ config EXTEND_HUGEPAGE_MAPPING help Introduce vmalloc/vmap/remap interfaces that handle only hugepages. +config PREFERRED_SWAP + bool "make task only swapping memory to assigned swap" + depends on SYSFS + default y + help + Say Y here to enable kernel to limit tasks only swapping memory to assigned swap. + source "mm/damon/Kconfig" endmenu diff --git a/mm/swap_slots.c b/mm/swap_slots.c index 0357fbe70645..79a3164bf393 100644 --- a/mm/swap_slots.c +++ b/mm/swap_slots.c @@ -33,6 +33,9 @@ #include <linux/vmalloc.h> #include <linux/mutex.h> #include <linux/mm.h> +#ifdef CONFIG_PREFERRED_SWAP +#include <linux/rmap.h> +#endif static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct swap_slots_cache, swp_slots); static bool swap_slot_cache_active; @@ -265,8 +268,13 @@ static int refill_swap_slots_cache(struct swap_slots_cache *cache) cache->cur = 0; if (swap_slot_cache_active) +#ifdef CONFIG_PREFERRED_SWAP + cache->nr = get_swap_pages(SWAP_SLOTS_CACHE_SIZE, + cache->slots, 1, NULL); +#else cache->nr = get_swap_pages(SWAP_SLOTS_CACHE_SIZE, cache->slots, 1); +#endif return cache->nr; } @@ -303,16 +311,66 @@ int free_swap_slot(swp_entry_t entry) return 0; } +#ifdef CONFIG_PREFERRED_SWAP +static bool has_preferred_swap(struct page *page, struct vm_area_struct *vma, + unsigned long addr, void *arg) +{ + struct swap_info_struct **si = (struct swap_info_struct **)arg; + + if (*si) { + *si = ERR_PTR(-EPERM); + return false; + } + if (vma->vm_file) { + *si = ERR_PTR(-EPERM); + return false; + } + if (vma->vm_mm->preferred_swap) { + *si = vma->vm_mm->preferred_swap; + } else { + *si = ERR_PTR(-EPERM); + return false; + } + return true; +} + +static struct swap_info_struct *page_preferred_swap(struct page *page) +{ + struct swap_info_struct *preferred_swap = NULL; + struct rmap_walk_control rwc = { + .rmap_one = has_preferred_swap, + .arg = (void *)&preferred_swap, + .anon_lock = page_lock_anon_vma_read, + }; + rmap_walk(page, &rwc); + if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(preferred_swap)) + preferred_swap = NULL; + + return preferred_swap; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_PREFERRED_SWAP */ + swp_entry_t get_swap_page(struct page *page) { swp_entry_t entry; struct swap_slots_cache *cache; +#ifdef CONFIG_PREFERRED_SWAP + struct swap_info_struct *preferred_swap = NULL; + + if (!page_mapping(page)) + preferred_swap = page_preferred_swap(page); +#endif + entry.val = 0; if (PageTransHuge(page)) { if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_THP_SWAP)) +#ifdef CONFIG_PREFERRED_SWAP + get_swap_pages(1, &entry, HPAGE_PMD_NR, preferred_swap); +#else get_swap_pages(1, &entry, HPAGE_PMD_NR); +#endif goto out; } @@ -327,7 +385,11 @@ swp_entry_t get_swap_page(struct page *page) */ cache = raw_cpu_ptr(&swp_slots); - if (likely(check_cache_active() && cache->slots)) { +#ifdef CONFIG_PREFERRED_SWAP + if (likely(check_cache_active() && cache->slots && !preferred_swap)) { +#else + if (likely(check_cache_active() && cache->slots &&)) { +#endif mutex_lock(&cache->alloc_lock); if (cache->slots) { repeat: @@ -344,7 +406,11 @@ swp_entry_t get_swap_page(struct page *page) goto out; } +#ifdef CONFIG_PREFERRED_SWAP + get_swap_pages(1, &entry, 1, preferred_swap); +#else get_swap_pages(1, &entry, 1); +#endif out: if (mem_cgroup_try_charge_swap(page, entry)) { put_swap_page(page, entry); diff --git a/mm/swapfile.c b/mm/swapfile.c index 14e2396fa8a3..c40037f29647 100644 --- a/mm/swapfile.c +++ b/mm/swapfile.c @@ -62,7 +62,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nr_swap_pages); /* protected with swap_lock. reading in vm_swap_full() doesn't need lock */ long total_swap_pages; static int least_priority = -1; - +#ifdef CONFIG_EULEROS_PREFERRED_SWAP +DEFINE_SPINLOCK(preferred_swap_lock); +int preferred_swap_used; +#endif static const char Bad_file[] = "Bad swap file entry "; static const char Unused_file[] = "Unused swap file entry "; static const char Bad_offset[] = "Bad swap offset entry "; @@ -1056,7 +1059,13 @@ static unsigned long scan_swap_map(struct swap_info_struct *si, } -int get_swap_pages(int n_goal, swp_entry_t swp_entries[], int entry_size) +#ifdef CONFIG_EULEROS_PREFERRED_SWAP +int get_swap_pages(int n_goal, swp_entry_t swp_entries[], + int entry_size, struct swap_info_struct *preferred_swap) +#else +int get_swap_pages(int n_goal, swp_entry_t swp_entries[], + int entry_size) +#endif { unsigned long size = swap_entry_size(entry_size); struct swap_info_struct *si, *next; @@ -1082,6 +1091,10 @@ int get_swap_pages(int n_goal, swp_entry_t swp_entries[], int entry_size) start_over: node = numa_node_id(); plist_for_each_entry_safe(si, next, &swap_avail_heads[node], avail_lists[node]) { +#ifdef CONFIG_EULEROS_PREFERRED_SWAP + if (preferred_swap && preferred_swap != si) + goto nextsi; +#endif /* requeue si to after same-priority siblings */ plist_requeue(&si->avail_lists[node], &swap_avail_heads[node]); spin_unlock(&swap_avail_lock); @@ -2643,6 +2656,10 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(swapoff, const char __user *, specialfile) p->flags &= ~SWP_WRITEOK; spin_unlock(&p->lock); spin_unlock(&swap_lock); +#ifdef CONFIG_EULEROS_PREFERRED_SWAP + if (preferred_swap_used) + clear_tasks_mm_preferred_swap(p); +#endif disable_swap_slots_cache_lock(); @@ -3878,6 +3895,71 @@ void cgroup_throttle_swaprate(struct page *page, gfp_t gfp_mask) } #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_EULEROS_PREFERRED_SWAP +int find_swap_info(char *filename, struct mm_struct *mm) +{ + struct file *chosen_file; + unsigned int type; + struct path path; + int err = 0; + struct swap_info_struct *found_swap = NULL; + + err = kern_path(filename, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &path); + if (err) + goto out_no_path; + chosen_file = dentry_open(&path, O_RDWR|O_LARGEFILE, current_cred()); + if (IS_ERR(chosen_file)) { + err = PTR_ERR(chosen_file); + goto out_no_file; + } + spin_lock(&preferred_swap_lock); + spin_lock(&swap_lock); + for (type = 0; type < nr_swapfiles; type++) { + if ((swap_info[type]->flags & SWP_USED) && + (swap_info[type]->flags & SWP_WRITEOK)) { + if (swap_info[type]->swap_file->f_mapping == + chosen_file->f_mapping) { + found_swap = swap_info[type]; + break; + } + } + } + + spin_unlock(&swap_lock); + if (type >= nr_swapfiles) { + err = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + + mm->preferred_swap = found_swap; +out: + spin_unlock(&preferred_swap_lock); + filp_close(chosen_file, NULL); +out_no_file: + path_put(&path); +out_no_path: + return err; +} + +void clear_tasks_mm_preferred_swap(struct swap_info_struct *p) +{ + struct task_struct *task; + struct mm_struct *mm; + + spin_lock(&preferred_swap_lock); + read_lock(&tasklist_lock); + for_each_process(task) { + mm = get_task_mm(task); + if (mm) { + if (mm->preferred_swap == p) + mm->preferred_swap = NULL; + mmput(mm); + } + } + read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); + spin_unlock(&preferred_swap_lock); +} +#endif static int __init swapfile_init(void) { int nid; -- 2.27.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] mm: add preferred_swap ability
by liubo 24 Aug '23

24 Aug '23

From: Ni Cunshu <nicunshu(a)huawei.com> euleros inclusion category: feature bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7VR4N CVE: NA ------------------------------------------------ add a new attribute preferred_swap for each process, which indicates the swapfile or swap device that can be used by the process. Each process can only have one preferred_swap. Signed-off-by: Ni Cunshu <nicunshu(a)huawei.com> --- fs/proc/base.c | 113 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/mm_types.h | 4 ++ include/linux/swap.h | 13 +++++ kernel/fork.c | 4 ++ mm/Kconfig | 7 +++ mm/swap_slots.c | 68 ++++++++++++++++++++++- mm/swapfile.c | 85 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 7 files changed, 291 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c index 24c70ff923b8..34537572db57 100644 --- a/fs/proc/base.c +++ b/fs/proc/base.c @@ -3330,6 +3330,116 @@ static const struct file_operations proc_preferred_cpuset_operations = { }; #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_PREFERRED_SWAP +static ssize_t proc_preferred_swap_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, + size_t count, loff_t *ppos) +{ + struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(file_inode(file)); + struct mm_struct *mm; + int ret; + int err = 0; + size_t len; + char *buffer; + char *path; + + if (!task) + return -ESRCH; + + ret = 0; + mm = get_task_mm(task); + if (!mm) + goto out_no_mm; + + if (mm->preferred_swap) { + buffer = (char *)kmalloc(PATH_MAX + 1, GFP_KERNEL); + if (buffer == NULL) { + err = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + path = d_path(&mm->preferred_swap->swap_file->f_path, + buffer, PATH_MAX); + + if (IS_ERR(path)) { + err = PTR_ERR(path); + kfree(buffer); + goto out; + } + + len = snprintf(buffer, strlen(path) + 2, "%s\n", path); + ret = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, buffer, len); + kfree(buffer); + } +out: + mmput(mm); +out_no_mm: + put_task_struct(task); + if (err < 0) + return err; + return ret; +} + +static ssize_t proc_preferred_swap_write(struct file *file, + const char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) +{ + struct task_struct *task; + struct mm_struct *mm; + char *buffer; + int err = 0; + + if (count >= PATH_MAX) + return -EINVAL; + + buffer = (char *)kmalloc(PATH_MAX, GFP_KERNEL); + if (buffer == NULL) { + err = -ENOMEM; + goto out_no_buffer; + } + if (copy_from_user(buffer, buf, count)) { + err = -EFAULT; + goto out_no_task; + } + buffer[count] = '\0'; + strreplace(buffer, '\n', '\0'); + task = get_proc_task(file_inode(file)); + if (!task) { + err = -ESRCH; + goto out_no_task; + } + mm = get_task_mm(task); + if (!mm) { + err = -ESRCH; + goto out_no_mm; + } + if (strlen(buffer) == 0) { + mm->preferred_swap = NULL; + goto out; + } + err = find_swap_info(buffer, mm); + if (err) { + pr_info("%s failed to be found as swap\n", buffer); + goto out; + } + + preferred_swap_used = 1; +out: + mmput(mm); +out_no_mm: + put_task_struct(task); +out_no_task: + kfree(buffer); +out_no_buffer: + if (err < 0) + return err; + return count; +} +static const struct file_operations proc_preferred_swap_operations = { + .write = proc_preferred_swap_write, + .read = proc_preferred_swap_read, + .llseek = generic_file_llseek, +}; +#endif /* CONFIG_PREFERRED_SWAP */ + static int proc_pid_personality(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *task) { @@ -3526,6 +3636,9 @@ static const struct pid_entry tgid_base_stuff[] = { ONE("ksm_merging_pages", S_IRUSR, proc_pid_ksm_merging_pages), ONE("ksm_stat", S_IRUSR, proc_pid_ksm_stat), #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_PREFERRED_SWAP + REG("preferred_swap", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_preferred_swap_operations), +#endif }; static int proc_tgid_base_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) diff --git a/include/linux/mm_types.h b/include/linux/mm_types.h index d1be389c0468..07ccbcd4e65a 100644 --- a/include/linux/mm_types.h +++ b/include/linux/mm_types.h @@ -640,7 +640,11 @@ struct mm_struct { KABI_RESERVE(2) KABI_RESERVE(3) #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_PREFERRED_SWAP + KABI_USE(4, struct swap_info_struct *preferred_swap) +#else KABI_RESERVE(4) +#endif KABI_RESERVE(5) KABI_RESERVE(6) KABI_RESERVE(7) diff --git a/include/linux/swap.h b/include/linux/swap.h index 524e3ca9d0f5..403e37c5641c 100644 --- a/include/linux/swap.h +++ b/include/linux/swap.h @@ -393,6 +393,10 @@ extern int vm_swappiness; extern int remove_mapping(struct address_space *mapping, struct page *page); extern unsigned long reclaim_pages(struct list_head *page_list); +#ifdef CONFIG_PREFERRED_SWAP +extern int find_swap_info(char *filename, struct mm_struct *mm); +extern void clear_tasks_mm_preferred_swap(struct swap_info_struct *p); +#endif #ifdef CONFIG_ETMEM enum etmem_swapcache_watermark_en { ETMEM_SWAPCACHE_WMARK_LOW, @@ -500,6 +504,10 @@ extern long total_swap_pages; extern atomic_t nr_rotate_swap; extern bool has_usable_swap(void); +#ifdef CONFIG_PREFERRED_SWAP +extern int preferred_swap_used; +#endif + /* Swap 50% full? Release swapcache more aggressively.. */ static inline bool vm_swap_full(void) { @@ -517,8 +525,13 @@ extern void si_swapinfo(struct sysinfo *); extern swp_entry_t get_swap_page(struct page *page); extern void put_swap_page(struct page *page, swp_entry_t entry); extern swp_entry_t get_swap_page_of_type(int); +#ifdef CONFIG_PREFERRED_SWAP +extern int get_swap_pages(int n, swp_entry_t swp_entries[], int entry_size, + struct swap_info_struct *preferred_swap, int type); +#else extern int get_swap_pages(int n, swp_entry_t swp_entries[], int entry_size, int type); +#endif extern int add_swap_count_continuation(swp_entry_t, gfp_t); extern void swap_shmem_alloc(swp_entry_t); extern int swap_duplicate(swp_entry_t); diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c index 2547c6a6e5b1..734882ed98c6 100644 --- a/kernel/fork.c +++ b/kernel/fork.c @@ -1072,6 +1072,10 @@ static struct mm_struct *mm_init(struct mm_struct *mm, struct task_struct *p, mm_init_uprobes_state(mm); hugetlb_count_init(mm); +#ifdef CONFIG_PREFERRED_SWAP + mm->preferred_swap = NULL; +#endif + if (current->mm) { mm->flags = current->mm->flags & MMF_INIT_MASK; mm->def_flags = current->mm->def_flags & VM_INIT_DEF_MASK; diff --git a/mm/Kconfig b/mm/Kconfig index 0fe459e79336..61fb6cbaab6b 100644 --- a/mm/Kconfig +++ b/mm/Kconfig @@ -1008,6 +1008,13 @@ config EXTEND_HUGEPAGE_MAPPING help Introduce vmalloc/vmap/remap interfaces that handle only hugepages. +config PREFERRED_SWAP + bool "make task only swapping memory to assigned swap" + depends on SYSFS + default y + help + Say Y here to enable kernel to limit tasks only swapping memory to assigned swap. + source "mm/damon/Kconfig" endmenu diff --git a/mm/swap_slots.c b/mm/swap_slots.c index b7958ca276c2..b77af28cdceb 100644 --- a/mm/swap_slots.c +++ b/mm/swap_slots.c @@ -33,6 +33,9 @@ #include <linux/vmalloc.h> #include <linux/mutex.h> #include <linux/mm.h> +#ifdef CONFIG_PREFERRED_SWAP +#include <linux/rmap.h> +#endif static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct swap_slots_cache, swp_slots); #ifdef CONFIG_MEMCG_SWAP_QOS @@ -385,8 +388,13 @@ static int refill_swap_slots_cache(struct swap_slots_cache *cache, int type) cache->cur = 0; if (swap_slot_cache_active) +#ifdef CONFIG_PREFERRED_SWAP + cache->nr = get_swap_pages(SWAP_SLOTS_CACHE_SIZE, + cache->slots, 1, NULL, type); +#else cache->nr = get_swap_pages(SWAP_SLOTS_CACHE_SIZE, cache->slots, 1, type); +#endif return cache->nr; } @@ -423,12 +431,58 @@ int free_swap_slot(swp_entry_t entry) return 0; } +#ifdef CONFIG_PREFERRED_SWAP +static bool has_preferred_swap(struct page *page, struct vm_area_struct *vma, + unsigned long addr, void *arg) +{ + struct swap_info_struct **si = (struct swap_info_struct **)arg; + + if (*si) { + *si = ERR_PTR(-EPERM); + return false; + } + if (vma->vm_file) { + *si = ERR_PTR(-EPERM); + return false; + } + if (vma->vm_mm->preferred_swap) { + *si = vma->vm_mm->preferred_swap; + } else { + *si = ERR_PTR(-EPERM); + return false; + } + return true; +} + +static struct swap_info_struct *page_preferred_swap(struct page *page) +{ + struct swap_info_struct *preferred_swap = NULL; + struct rmap_walk_control rwc = { + .rmap_one = has_preferred_swap, + .arg = (void *)&preferred_swap, + .anon_lock = page_lock_anon_vma_read, + }; + rmap_walk(page, &rwc); + if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(preferred_swap)) + preferred_swap = NULL; + + return preferred_swap; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_PREFERRED_SWAP */ + swp_entry_t get_swap_page(struct page *page) { swp_entry_t entry; struct swap_slots_cache *cache; int type; +#ifdef CONFIG_PREFERRED_SWAP + struct swap_info_struct *preferred_swap = NULL; + + if (!page_mapping(page)) + preferred_swap = page_preferred_swap(page); +#endif + entry.val = 0; type = memcg_get_swap_type(page); @@ -437,7 +491,11 @@ swp_entry_t get_swap_page(struct page *page) if (PageTransHuge(page)) { if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_THP_SWAP) && arch_thp_swp_supported()) +#ifdef CONFIG_PREFERRED_SWAP + get_swap_pages(1, &entry, HPAGE_PMD_NR, preferred_swap, type); +#else get_swap_pages(1, &entry, HPAGE_PMD_NR, type); +#endif goto out; } @@ -452,7 +510,11 @@ swp_entry_t get_swap_page(struct page *page) */ cache = get_slots_cache(type); - if (likely(check_cache_active() && cache->slots)) { +#ifdef CONFIG_PREFERRED_SWAP + if (likely(check_cache_active() && cache->slots && !preferred_swap)) { +#else + if (likely(check_cache_active() && cache->slots &&)) { +#endif mutex_lock(&cache->alloc_lock); if (cache->slots) { repeat: @@ -469,7 +531,11 @@ swp_entry_t get_swap_page(struct page *page) goto out; } +#ifdef CONFIG_PREFERRED_SWAP + get_swap_pages(1, &entry, 1, preferred_swap, type); +#else get_swap_pages(1, &entry, 1, type); +#endif out: if (mem_cgroup_try_charge_swap(page, entry)) { put_swap_page(page, entry); diff --git a/mm/swapfile.c b/mm/swapfile.c index f5a15511f45a..223af9c9fadb 100644 --- a/mm/swapfile.c +++ b/mm/swapfile.c @@ -62,7 +62,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nr_swap_pages); /* protected with swap_lock. reading in vm_swap_full() doesn't need lock */ long total_swap_pages; static int least_priority = -1; - +#ifdef CONFIG_PREFERRED_SWAP +DEFINE_SPINLOCK(preferred_swap_lock); +int preferred_swap_used; +#endif static const char Bad_file[] = "Bad swap file entry "; static const char Unused_file[] = "Unused swap file entry "; static const char Bad_offset[] = "Bad swap offset entry "; @@ -1145,8 +1148,13 @@ static inline bool should_skip_swap_type(int swap_type, int type) } #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_PREFERRED_SWAP +int get_swap_pages(int n_goal, swp_entry_t swp_entries[], int entry_size, + struct swap_info_struct *preferred_swap, int type) +#else int get_swap_pages(int n_goal, swp_entry_t swp_entries[], int entry_size, int type) +#endif { unsigned long size = swap_entry_size(entry_size); struct swap_info_struct *si, *next; @@ -1172,11 +1180,15 @@ int get_swap_pages(int n_goal, swp_entry_t swp_entries[], int entry_size, start_over: node = numa_node_id(); plist_for_each_entry_safe(si, next, &swap_avail_heads[node], avail_lists[node]) { +#ifdef CONFIG_PREFERRED_SWAP + if (preferred_swap && preferred_swap != si) + goto nextsi; +#endif /* requeue si to after same-priority siblings */ plist_requeue(&si->avail_lists[node], &swap_avail_heads[node]); spin_unlock(&swap_avail_lock); spin_lock(&si->lock); - if (should_skip_swap_type(si->type, type)) { + if (!preferred_swap && should_skip_swap_type(si->type, type)) { spin_unlock(&si->lock); spin_lock(&swap_avail_lock); goto nextsi; @@ -2738,6 +2750,10 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(swapoff, const char __user *, specialfile) p->flags &= ~SWP_WRITEOK; spin_unlock(&p->lock); spin_unlock(&swap_lock); +#ifdef CONFIG_PREFERRED_SWAP + if (preferred_swap_used) + clear_tasks_mm_preferred_swap(p); +#endif disable_swap_slots_cache_lock(); @@ -3974,6 +3990,71 @@ void cgroup_throttle_swaprate(struct page *page, gfp_t gfp_mask) } #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_PREFERRED_SWAP +int find_swap_info(char *filename, struct mm_struct *mm) +{ + struct file *chosen_file; + unsigned int type; + struct path path; + int err = 0; + struct swap_info_struct *found_swap = NULL; + + err = kern_path(filename, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &path); + if (err) + goto out_no_path; + chosen_file = dentry_open(&path, O_RDWR|O_LARGEFILE, current_cred()); + if (IS_ERR(chosen_file)) { + err = PTR_ERR(chosen_file); + goto out_no_file; + } + spin_lock(&preferred_swap_lock); + spin_lock(&swap_lock); + for (type = 0; type < nr_swapfiles; type++) { + if ((swap_info[type]->flags & SWP_USED) && + (swap_info[type]->flags & SWP_WRITEOK)) { + if (swap_info[type]->swap_file->f_mapping == + chosen_file->f_mapping) { + found_swap = swap_info[type]; + break; + } + } + } + + spin_unlock(&swap_lock); + if (type >= nr_swapfiles) { + err = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + + mm->preferred_swap = found_swap; +out: + spin_unlock(&preferred_swap_lock); + filp_close(chosen_file, NULL); +out_no_file: + path_put(&path); +out_no_path: + return err; +} + +void clear_tasks_mm_preferred_swap(struct swap_info_struct *p) +{ + struct task_struct *task; + struct mm_struct *mm; + + spin_lock(&preferred_swap_lock); + read_lock(&tasklist_lock); + for_each_process(task) { + mm = get_task_mm(task); + if (mm) { + if (mm->preferred_swap == p) + mm->preferred_swap = NULL; + mmput(mm); + } + } + read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); + spin_unlock(&preferred_swap_lock); +} +#endif static int __init swapfile_init(void) { int nid; -- 2.27.0

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-23.09 0/7] enable filescgroup and bugfix
by Lu Jialin 24 Aug '23

24 Aug '23

Binder Makin (1): cgroups: Resource controller for open files Hou Tao (1): cgroup/files: use task_get_css() to get a valid css during dup_fd() Lu Jialin (2): fs: fix files.usage bug when move tasks fs/filescontrol.c: fix warning:large integer implicitly truncated to unsigned type Yu Kuai (1): fs/filescontrol: add a switch to enable / disable accounting of open fds Zhang Xiaoxu (1): files_cgroup: fix error pointer when kvm_vm_worker_thread yangerkun (1): fs/dcache.c: avoid panic while lockref of dentry overflow fs/Makefile | 1 + fs/dcache.c | 32 +++- fs/file.c | 53 +++++- fs/filescontrol.c | 312 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/cgroup-defs.h | 8 +- include/linux/cgroup_subsys.h | 6 + include/linux/fdtable.h | 1 + include/linux/filescontrol.h | 34 ++++ include/linux/fs.h | 3 + init/Kconfig | 10 ++ 10 files changed, 451 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) create mode 100644 fs/filescontrol.c create mode 100644 include/linux/filescontrol.h -- 2.34.1

2 8

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] nbd: pass nbd_sock to nbd_read_reply() instead of index
by Li Nan 24 Aug '23

24 Aug '23

hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: 189113, https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7T755 CVE: NA -------------------------------- If a socket is processing ioctl 'NBD_SET_SOCK', config->socks might be krealloc in nbd_add_socket(), and a garbage request is received now, a UAF may occurs. T1 nbd_ioctl __nbd_ioctl nbd_add_socket blk_mq_freeze_queue T2 recv_work nbd_read_reply sock_xmit krealloc config->socks def config->socks Pass nbd_sock to nbd_read_reply(). And introduce a new function sock_xmit_recv(), which differs from sock_xmit only in the way it get socket. ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in sock_xmit+0x525/0x550 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880188ec428 by task kworker/u12:1/18779 Workqueue: knbd4-recv recv_work Call Trace: __dump_stack dump_stack+0xbe/0xfd print_address_description.constprop.0+0x19/0x170 __kasan_report.cold+0x6c/0x84 kasan_report+0x3a/0x50 sock_xmit+0x525/0x550 nbd_read_reply+0xfe/0x2c0 recv_work+0x1c2/0x750 process_one_work+0x6b6/0xf10 worker_thread+0xdd/0xd80 kthread+0x30a/0x410 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 Allocated by task 18784: kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40 kasan_set_track set_alloc_info __kasan_kmalloc __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xf0/0x130 slab_post_alloc_hook slab_alloc_node slab_alloc __kmalloc_track_caller+0x157/0x550 __do_krealloc krealloc+0x37/0xb0 nbd_add_socket +0x2d3/0x880 __nbd_ioctl nbd_ioctl+0x584/0x8e0 __blkdev_driver_ioctl blkdev_ioctl+0x2a0/0x6e0 block_ioctl+0xee/0x130 vfs_ioctl __do_sys_ioctl __se_sys_ioctl+0x138/0x190 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xc6 Freed by task 18784: kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40 kasan_set_track+0x1c/0x30 kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x40 __kasan_slab_free.part.0+0x13f/0x1b0 slab_free_hook slab_free_freelist_hook slab_free kfree+0xcb/0x6c0 krealloc+0x56/0xb0 nbd_add_socket+0x2d3/0x880 __nbd_ioctl nbd_ioctl+0x584/0x8e0 __blkdev_driver_ioctl blkdev_ioctl+0x2a0/0x6e0 block_ioctl+0xee/0x130 vfs_ioctl __do_sys_ioctl __se_sys_ioctl+0x138/0x190 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xc6 Signed-off-by: Li Nan <linan122(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/block/nbd.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/block/nbd.c b/drivers/block/nbd.c index fb4e9cb3d5d6..3b974988b0a9 100644 --- a/drivers/block/nbd.c +++ b/drivers/block/nbd.c @@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ struct nbd_sock { struct recv_thread_args { struct work_struct work; struct nbd_device *nbd; + struct nbd_sock *nsock; int index; }; @@ -453,15 +454,9 @@ static enum blk_eh_timer_return nbd_xmit_timeout(struct request *req, return BLK_EH_DONE; } -/* - * Send or receive packet. Return a positive value on success and - * negtive value on failue, and never return 0. - */ -static int sock_xmit(struct nbd_device *nbd, int index, int send, - struct iov_iter *iter, int msg_flags, int *sent) +static int __sock_xmit(struct nbd_device *nbd, struct socket *sock, int send, + struct iov_iter *iter, int msg_flags, int *sent) { - struct nbd_config *config = nbd->config; - struct socket *sock = config->socks[index]->sock; int result; struct msghdr msg; unsigned int noreclaim_flag; @@ -503,6 +498,19 @@ static int sock_xmit(struct nbd_device *nbd, int index, int send, return result; } +/* + * Send or receive packet. Return a positive value on success and + * negtive value on failure, and never return 0. + */ +static int sock_xmit(struct nbd_device *nbd, int index, int send, + struct iov_iter *iter, int msg_flags, int *sent) +{ + struct nbd_config *config = nbd->config; + struct socket *sock = config->socks[index]->sock; + + return __sock_xmit(nbd, sock, send, iter, msg_flags, sent); +} + /* * Different settings for sk->sk_sndtimeo can result in different return values * if there is a signal pending when we enter sendmsg, because reasons? @@ -664,7 +672,7 @@ static int nbd_send_cmd(struct nbd_device *nbd, struct nbd_cmd *cmd, int index) return 0; } -static int nbd_read_reply(struct nbd_device *nbd, int index, +static int nbd_read_reply(struct nbd_device *nbd, struct socket *sock, struct nbd_reply *reply) { struct kvec iov = {.iov_base = reply, .iov_len = sizeof(*reply)}; @@ -673,7 +681,7 @@ static int nbd_read_reply(struct nbd_device *nbd, int index, reply->magic = 0; iov_iter_kvec(&to, READ | ITER_KVEC, &iov, 1, sizeof(*reply)); - result = sock_xmit(nbd, index, 0, &to, MSG_WAITALL, NULL); + result = __sock_xmit(nbd, sock, 0, &to, MSG_WAITALL, NULL); if (result < 0) { if (!nbd_disconnected(nbd->config)) dev_err(disk_to_dev(nbd->disk), @@ -798,13 +806,13 @@ static void recv_work(struct work_struct *work) struct nbd_device *nbd = args->nbd; struct nbd_config *config = nbd->config; struct request_queue *q = nbd->disk->queue; - struct nbd_sock *nsock; + struct nbd_sock *nsock = args->nsock; struct nbd_cmd *cmd; while (1) { struct nbd_reply reply; - if (nbd_read_reply(nbd, args->index, &reply)) + if (nbd_read_reply(nbd, nsock->sock, &reply)) break; /* @@ -829,7 +837,6 @@ static void recv_work(struct work_struct *work) percpu_ref_put(&q->q_usage_counter); } - nsock = config->socks[args->index]; mutex_lock(&nsock->tx_lock); nbd_mark_nsock_dead(nbd, nsock, 1); mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock); @@ -1164,6 +1171,7 @@ static int nbd_reconnect_socket(struct nbd_device *nbd, unsigned long arg) INIT_WORK(&args->work, recv_work); args->index = i; args->nbd = nbd; + args->nsock = nsock; nsock->cookie++; mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock); sockfd_put(old); @@ -1354,6 +1362,7 @@ static int nbd_start_device(struct nbd_device *nbd) refcount_inc(&nbd->config_refs); INIT_WORK(&args->work, recv_work); args->nbd = nbd; + args->nsock = config->socks[i]; args->index = i; queue_work(nbd->recv_workq, &args->work); } -- 2.39.2

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/4] Synchronizing mainline HiSilicon uncore PMU patches
by Junhao He 24 Aug '23

24 Aug '23

Synchronizing mainline HiSilicon uncore PMU patches The HISI uncore UC PMU and uncore H60PA/PAv3 PMU drivers have been integrated into the main line. Compared with OLK-5.10, some modifications are made. Add support for HiSilicon UC/H60PA/PAv3 PMU driver. PAv3 PMU: Compared with the PAv2 PMU, the PAv3 PMU has different event. The PAv3 PMU removed some events which are supported by PAv2 PMU. The older PA PMU driver will probe v3 as v2. Add the HISI0275 HID for PAv3 PMU to distinguish different. H60PA PMU: The H60PA PMU and PA are two different devices. The H60PA PMU supports higher bandwidth, and the PA PMU delay is relatively low. Different HIDs are used to distinguish the delay. UC PMU: Each cluster is integrated with a unified cache (UC) PMU, which provides consistency between NUMA and UMA domains. It sits between L2 and the memory system. Junhao He (4): Revert "drivers/perf: hisi: Add support for HiSilicon UC PMU driver" Revert "drivers/perf: hisi: Add support for HiSilicon H60PA and PAv3 PMU driver" drivers/perf: hisi: Add support for HiSilicon H60PA and PAv3 PMU driver drivers/perf: hisi: Add support for HiSilicon UC PMU driver drivers/perf/hisilicon/hisi_uncore_pa_pmu.c | 107 +++++++++----------- drivers/perf/hisilicon/hisi_uncore_pmu.c | 5 +- drivers/perf/hisilicon/hisi_uncore_pmu.h | 32 +----- drivers/perf/hisilicon/hisi_uncore_uc_pmu.c | 35 +++---- 4 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 107 deletions(-) -- 2.33.0

2 5

openEuler Kernel SIG 双周例会
by openEuler conference 24 Aug '23

24 Aug '23

您好！ Kernel SIG 邀请您参加 2023-08-25 14:00 召开的Zoom会议(自动录制) 会议主题：openEuler Kernel SIG 双周例会会议内容： 1. 进展update 2. 议题征集中（新增议题可直接回复邮件，或录入会议看板）会议链接：https://us06web.zoom.us/j/88618764013?pwd=aGc4UU9WL2FpNUxnUFphM24xZDBOZz09 会议纪要：https://etherpad.openeuler.org/p/Kernel-meetings 温馨提醒：建议接入会议后修改参会人的姓名，也可以使用您在gitee.com的ID 更多资讯尽在：https://openeuler.org/zh/ Hello! openEuler Kernel SIG invites you to attend the Zoom conference(auto recording) will be held at 2023-08-25 14:00, The subject of the conference is openEuler Kernel SIG 双周例会, Summary: 1. 进展update 2. 议题征集中（新增议题可直接回复邮件，或录入会议看板） You can join the meeting at https://us06web.zoom.us/j/88618764013?pwd=aGc4UU9WL2FpNUxnUFphM24xZDBOZz09. Add topics at https://etherpad.openeuler.org/p/Kernel-meetings. Note: You are advised to change the participant name after joining the conference or use your ID at gitee.com. More information: https://openeuler.org/en/

1 0

[PATCH openEuler-23.09] ring-buffer: Fix deadloop issue on reading trace_pipe
by Zheng Yejian 23 Aug '23

23 Aug '23

mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.5-rc2 commit 7e42907f3a7b4ce3a2d1757f6d78336984daf8f5 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7TKEB CVE: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Soft lockup occurs when reading file 'trace_pipe': watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#6 stuck for 22s! [cat:4488] [...] RIP: 0010:ring_buffer_empty_cpu+0xed/0x170 RSP: 0018:ffff88810dd6fc48 EFLAGS: 00000246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000246 RCX: ffffffff93d1aaeb RDX: ffff88810a280040 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffff88811164b218 RBP: ffff88811164b218 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88815156600f R10: ffffed102a2acc01 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000051651901 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff888115e49500 R15: 0000000000000000 [...] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f8d853c2000 CR3: 000000010dcd8000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: __find_next_entry+0x1a8/0x4b0 ? peek_next_entry+0x250/0x250 ? down_write+0xa5/0x120 ? down_write_killable+0x130/0x130 trace_find_next_entry_inc+0x3b/0x1d0 tracing_read_pipe+0x423/0xae0 ? tracing_splice_read_pipe+0xcb0/0xcb0 vfs_read+0x16b/0x490 ksys_read+0x105/0x210 ? __ia32_sys_pwrite64+0x200/0x200 ? switch_fpu_return+0x108/0x220 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xc6 Through the vmcore, I found it's because in tracing_read_pipe(), ring_buffer_empty_cpu() found some buffer is not empty but then it cannot read anything due to "rb_num_of_entries() == 0" always true, Then it infinitely loop the procedure due to user buffer not been filled, see following code path: tracing_read_pipe() { ... ... waitagain: tracing_wait_pipe() // 1. find non-empty buffer here trace_find_next_entry_inc() // 2. loop here try to find an entry __find_next_entry() ring_buffer_empty_cpu(); // 3. find non-empty buffer peek_next_entry() // 4. but peek always return NULL ring_buffer_peek() rb_buffer_peek() rb_get_reader_page() // 5. because rb_num_of_entries() == 0 always true here // then return NULL // 6. user buffer not been filled so goto 'waitgain' // and eventually leads to an deadloop in kernel!!! } By some analyzing, I found that when resetting ringbuffer, the 'entries' of its pages are not all cleared (see rb_reset_cpu()). Then when reducing the ringbuffer, and if some reduced pages exist dirty 'entries' data, they will be added into 'cpu_buffer->overrun' (see rb_remove_pages()), which cause wrong 'overrun' count and eventually cause the deadloop issue. To fix it, we need to clear every pages in rb_reset_cpu(). Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20230708225144.3785600-1-zhengye… Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: a5fb833172eca ("ring-buffer: Fix uninitialized read_stamp") Signed-off-by: Zheng Yejian <zhengyejian1(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt(a)goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Zheng Yejian <zhengyejian1(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c | 24 +++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c b/kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c index 834b361a4a66..14d8001140c8 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c +++ b/kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c @@ -5242,28 +5242,34 @@ unsigned long ring_buffer_size(struct trace_buffer *buffer, int cpu) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ring_buffer_size); +static void rb_clear_buffer_page(struct buffer_page *page) +{ + local_set(&page->write, 0); + local_set(&page->entries, 0); + rb_init_page(page->page); + page->read = 0; +} + static void rb_reset_cpu(struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer) { + struct buffer_page *page; + rb_head_page_deactivate(cpu_buffer); cpu_buffer->head_page = list_entry(cpu_buffer->pages, struct buffer_page, list); - local_set(&cpu_buffer->head_page->write, 0); - local_set(&cpu_buffer->head_page->entries, 0); - local_set(&cpu_buffer->head_page->page->commit, 0); - - cpu_buffer->head_page->read = 0; + rb_clear_buffer_page(cpu_buffer->head_page); + list_for_each_entry(page, cpu_buffer->pages, list) { + rb_clear_buffer_page(page); + } cpu_buffer->tail_page = cpu_buffer->head_page; cpu_buffer->commit_page = cpu_buffer->head_page; INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cpu_buffer->reader_page->list); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cpu_buffer->new_pages); - local_set(&cpu_buffer->reader_page->write, 0); - local_set(&cpu_buffer->reader_page->entries, 0); - local_set(&cpu_buffer->reader_page->page->commit, 0); - cpu_buffer->reader_page->read = 0; + rb_clear_buffer_page(cpu_buffer->reader_page); local_set(&cpu_buffer->entries_bytes, 0); local_set(&cpu_buffer->overrun, 0); -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH v6 OLK-5.10 0/5] arm64: support batched/deferred tlb shootdown during page reclamation/migration
by Jinjiang Tu 23 Aug '23

23 Aug '23

Support batched/deferred tlb shootdown during page reclamation/migration for arm64. Changelog: v6: - move kabi fix code into a separate patch. v5: - adjust tab num for macro DEFINE_TLB_UBC v4 - define macro DEFINE_TLB_UBC v3: - fix kabi breakage for task_struct->tlb_ubc v2: - fix kabi breakage for mm_struct->tlb_flush_batched Anshuman Khandual (1): mm/tlbbatch: introduce arch_tlbbatch_should_defer() Barry Song (2): mm/tlbbatch: rename and extend some functions arm64: support batched/deferred tlb shootdown during page reclamation/migration Jinjiang Tu (1): mm/tlbbatch: fix kabi change Yicong Yang (1): mm/tlbbatch: introduce arch_flush_tlb_batched_pending() .../features/vm/TLB/arch-support.txt | 2 +- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 1 + arch/arm64/include/asm/tlbbatch.h | 12 +++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/tlbflush.h | 44 +++++++++++++++++-- arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h | 22 +++++++++- include/linux/mm_types.h | 4 +- include/linux/mm_types_task.h | 29 ++++++++++-- include/linux/sched.h | 3 ++ mm/rmap.c | 35 ++++++++------- 9 files changed, 126 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/tlbbatch.h -- 2.25.1

2 6

[PATCH OLK-5.10] net: bridge: multicast: notify switchdev driver whenever MC processing gets disabled
by Zhengchao Shao 23 Aug '23

23 Aug '23

From: Oleksandr Mazur <oleksandr.mazur(a)plvision.eu> mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.17-rc5 commit c832962ac972082b3a1f89775c9d4274c8cb5670 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7V9UB Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Whenever bridge driver hits the max capacity of MDBs, it disables the MC processing (by setting corresponding bridge option), but never notifies switchdev about such change (the notifiers are called only upon explicit setting of this option, through the registered netlink interface). This could lead to situation when Software MDB processing gets disabled, but this event never gets offloaded to the underlying Hardware. Fix this by adding a notify message in such case. Fixes: 147c1e9b902c ("switchdev: bridge: Offload multicast disabled") Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Mazur <oleksandr.mazur(a)plvision.eu> Acked-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay(a)nvidia.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220215165303.31908-1-oleksandr.mazur@plvision.eu Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: net/bridge/br_multicast.c Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao(a)huawei.com> --- net/bridge/br_multicast.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/bridge/br_multicast.c b/net/bridge/br_multicast.c index de79fbfe1611..e2b1bb3de4a1 100644 --- a/net/bridge/br_multicast.c +++ b/net/bridge/br_multicast.c @@ -48,6 +48,8 @@ static const struct rhashtable_params br_sg_port_rht_params = { .automatic_shrinking = true, }; +static void br_mc_disabled_update(struct net_device *dev, bool value); + static void br_multicast_start_querier(struct net_bridge *br, struct bridge_mcast_own_query *query); static void br_multicast_add_router(struct net_bridge *br, @@ -1040,6 +1042,7 @@ struct net_bridge_mdb_entry *br_multicast_new_group(struct net_bridge *br, return mp; if (atomic_read(&br->mdb_hash_tbl.nelems) >= br->hash_max) { + br_mc_disabled_update(br->dev, false); br_opt_toggle(br, BROPT_MULTICAST_ENABLED, false); return ERR_PTR(-E2BIG); } -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS v2] fs: jfs: fix possible NULL pointer dereference in dbFree()
by Li Nan 23 Aug '23

23 Aug '23

From: Zixuan Fu <r33s3n6(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.19-rc1 commit 0d4837fdb796f99369cf7691d33de1b856bcaf1f category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I7TT9F CVE: CVE-2023-4385 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- In our fault-injection testing, the variable "nblocks" in dbFree() can be zero when kmalloc_array() fails in dtSearch(). In this case, the variable "mp" in dbFree() would be NULL and then it is dereferenced in "write_metapage(mp)". The failure log is listed as follows: [ 13.824137] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000020 ... [ 13.827416] RIP: 0010:dbFree+0x5f7/0x910 [jfs] [ 13.834341] Call Trace: [ 13.834540] <TASK> [ 13.834713] txFreeMap+0x7b4/0xb10 [jfs] [ 13.835038] txUpdateMap+0x311/0x650 [jfs] [ 13.835375] jfs_lazycommit+0x5f2/0xc70 [jfs] [ 13.835726] ? sched_dynamic_update+0x1b0/0x1b0 [ 13.836092] kthread+0x3c2/0x4a0 [ 13.836355] ? txLockFree+0x160/0x160 [jfs] [ 13.836763] ? kthread_unuse_mm+0x160/0x160 [ 13.837106] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [ 13.837402] </TASK> ... This patch adds a NULL check of "mp" before "write_metapage(mp)" is called. Reported-by: TOTE Robot <oslab(a)tsinghua.edu.cn> Signed-off-by: Zixuan Fu <r33s3n6(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Li Nan <linan122(a)huawei.com> --- v1 modify the code of funtion dbAllocBottomUp(). It is wrong. Modified dbFree() now. fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c b/fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c index 49263e220dbc..a5b51c2c5e32 100644 --- a/fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c +++ b/fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c @@ -391,7 +391,8 @@ int dbFree(struct inode *ip, s64 blkno, s64 nblocks) } /* write the last buffer. */ - write_metapage(mp); + if (mp) + write_metapage(mp); IREAD_UNLOCK(ipbmap); -- 2.39.2

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] x86/crash: Disable virt in core NMI crash handler to avoid double shootdown
by Yu Liao 23 Aug '23

23 Aug '23

From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.173 commit 8ff2cc2f87750507048d372e8d0f4d27ef446d3b category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7V9HD Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 26044aff37a5455b19a91785086914fd33053ef4 upstream. Disable virtualization in crash_nmi_callback() and rework the emergency_vmx_disable_all() path to do an NMI shootdown if and only if a shootdown has not already occurred. NMI crash shootdown fundamentally can't support multiple invocations as responding CPUs are deliberately put into halt state without unblocking NMIs. But, the emergency reboot path doesn't have any work of its own, it simply cares about disabling virtualization, i.e. so long as a shootdown occurred, emergency reboot doesn't care who initiated the shootdown, or when. If "crash_kexec_post_notifiers" is specified on the kernel command line, panic() will invoke crash_smp_send_stop() and result in a second call to nmi_shootdown_cpus() during native_machine_emergency_restart(). Invoke the callback _before_ disabling virtualization, as the current VMCS needs to be cleared before doing VMXOFF. Note, this results in a subtle change in ordering between disabling virtualization and stopping Intel PT on the responding CPUs. While VMX and Intel PT do interact, VMXOFF and writes to MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL do not induce faults between one another, which is all that matters when panicking. Harden nmi_shootdown_cpus() against multiple invocations to try and capture any such kernel bugs via a WARN instead of hanging the system during a crash/dump, e.g. prior to the recent hardening of register_nmi_handler(), re-registering the NMI handler would trigger a double list_add() and hang the system if CONFIG_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION=y. list_add double add: new=ffffffff82220800, prev=ffffffff8221cfe8, next=ffffffff82220800. WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 1319 at lib/list_debug.c:29 __list_add_valid+0x67/0x70 Call Trace: __register_nmi_handler+0xcf/0x130 nmi_shootdown_cpus+0x39/0x90 native_machine_emergency_restart+0x1c9/0x1d0 panic+0x237/0x29b Extract the disabling logic to a common helper to deduplicate code, and to prepare for doing the shootdown in the emergency reboot path if SVM is supported. Note, prior to commit ed72736183c4 ("x86/reboot: Force all cpus to exit VMX root if VMX is supported"), nmi_shootdown_cpus() was subtly protected against a second invocation by a cpu_vmx_enabled() check as the kdump handler would disable VMX if it ran first. Fixes: ed72736183c4 ("x86/reboot: Force all cpus to exit VMX root if VMX is supported") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Guilherme G. Piccoli <gpiccoli(a)igalia.com> Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets(a)redhat.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini(a)redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220427224924.592546-2-gpiccoli@igalia.com Tested-by: Guilherme G. Piccoli <gpiccoli(a)igalia.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221130233650.1404148-2-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Yu Liao <liaoyu15(a)huawei.com> --- arch/x86/include/asm/reboot.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/kernel/crash.c | 17 +-------- arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c | 65 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- 3 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/reboot.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/reboot.h index 04c17be9b5fd..bc5b4d788c08 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/reboot.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/reboot.h @@ -25,6 +25,8 @@ void __noreturn machine_real_restart(unsigned int type); #define MRR_BIOS 0 #define MRR_APM 1 +void cpu_emergency_disable_virtualization(void); + typedef void (*nmi_shootdown_cb)(int, struct pt_regs*); void nmi_panic_self_stop(struct pt_regs *regs); void nmi_shootdown_cpus(nmi_shootdown_cb callback); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c b/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c index 54ce999ed321..bd4b566ec917 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c @@ -37,7 +37,6 @@ #include <linux/kdebug.h> #include <asm/cpu.h> #include <asm/reboot.h> -#include <asm/virtext.h> #include <asm/intel_pt.h> #include <asm/crash.h> #include <asm/cmdline.h> @@ -94,15 +93,6 @@ static void kdump_nmi_callback(int cpu, struct pt_regs *regs) */ cpu_crash_vmclear_loaded_vmcss(); - /* Disable VMX or SVM if needed. - * - * We need to disable virtualization on all CPUs. - * Having VMX or SVM enabled on any CPU may break rebooting - * after the kdump kernel has finished its task. - */ - cpu_emergency_vmxoff(); - cpu_emergency_svm_disable(); - /* * Disable Intel PT to stop its logging */ @@ -161,12 +151,7 @@ void native_machine_crash_shutdown(struct pt_regs *regs) */ cpu_crash_vmclear_loaded_vmcss(); - /* Booting kdump kernel with VMX or SVM enabled won't work, - * because (among other limitations) we can't disable paging - * with the virt flags. - */ - cpu_emergency_vmxoff(); - cpu_emergency_svm_disable(); + cpu_emergency_disable_virtualization(); /* * Disable Intel PT to stop its logging diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c index df951a8f39d2..d68c8b9a3775 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c @@ -528,10 +528,7 @@ static inline void kb_wait(void) } } -static void vmxoff_nmi(int cpu, struct pt_regs *regs) -{ - cpu_emergency_vmxoff(); -} +static inline void nmi_shootdown_cpus_on_restart(void); /* Use NMIs as IPIs to tell all CPUs to disable virtualization */ static void emergency_vmx_disable_all(void) @@ -554,7 +551,7 @@ static void emergency_vmx_disable_all(void) __cpu_emergency_vmxoff(); /* Halt and exit VMX root operation on the other CPUs. */ - nmi_shootdown_cpus(vmxoff_nmi); + nmi_shootdown_cpus_on_restart(); } } @@ -795,6 +792,17 @@ void machine_crash_shutdown(struct pt_regs *regs) /* This is the CPU performing the emergency shutdown work. */ int crashing_cpu = -1; +/* + * Disable virtualization, i.e. VMX or SVM, to ensure INIT is recognized during + * reboot. VMX blocks INIT if the CPU is post-VMXON, and SVM blocks INIT if + * GIF=0, i.e. if the crash occurred between CLGI and STGI. + */ +void cpu_emergency_disable_virtualization(void) +{ + cpu_emergency_vmxoff(); + cpu_emergency_svm_disable(); +} + #if defined(CONFIG_SMP) static nmi_shootdown_cb shootdown_callback; @@ -817,7 +825,14 @@ static int crash_nmi_callback(unsigned int val, struct pt_regs *regs) return NMI_HANDLED; local_irq_disable(); - shootdown_callback(cpu, regs); + if (shootdown_callback) + shootdown_callback(cpu, regs); + + /* + * Prepare the CPU for reboot _after_ invoking the callback so that the + * callback can safely use virtualization instructions, e.g. VMCLEAR. + */ + cpu_emergency_disable_virtualization(); atomic_dec(&waiting_for_crash_ipi); /* Assume hlt works */ @@ -828,18 +843,32 @@ static int crash_nmi_callback(unsigned int val, struct pt_regs *regs) return NMI_HANDLED; } -/* - * Halt all other CPUs, calling the specified function on each of them +/** + * nmi_shootdown_cpus - Stop other CPUs via NMI + * @callback: Optional callback to be invoked from the NMI handler + * + * The NMI handler on the remote CPUs invokes @callback, if not + * NULL, first and then disables virtualization to ensure that + * INIT is recognized during reboot. * - * This function can be used to halt all other CPUs on crash - * or emergency reboot time. The function passed as parameter - * will be called inside a NMI handler on all CPUs. + * nmi_shootdown_cpus() can only be invoked once. After the first + * invocation all other CPUs are stuck in crash_nmi_callback() and + * cannot respond to a second NMI. */ void nmi_shootdown_cpus(nmi_shootdown_cb callback) { unsigned long msecs; + local_irq_disable(); + /* + * Avoid certain doom if a shootdown already occurred; re-registering + * the NMI handler will cause list corruption, modifying the callback + * will do who knows what, etc... + */ + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(crash_ipi_issued)) + return; + /* Make a note of crashing cpu. Will be used in NMI callback. */ crashing_cpu = safe_smp_processor_id(); @@ -875,7 +904,17 @@ void nmi_shootdown_cpus(nmi_shootdown_cb callback) msecs--; } - /* Leave the nmi callback set */ + /* + * Leave the nmi callback set, shootdown is a one-time thing. Clearing + * the callback could result in a NULL pointer dereference if a CPU + * (finally) responds after the timeout expires. + */ +} + +static inline void nmi_shootdown_cpus_on_restart(void) +{ + if (!crash_ipi_issued) + nmi_shootdown_cpus(NULL); } /* @@ -905,6 +944,8 @@ void nmi_shootdown_cpus(nmi_shootdown_cb callback) /* No other CPUs to shoot down */ } +static inline void nmi_shootdown_cpus_on_restart(void) { } + void run_crash_ipi_callback(struct pt_regs *regs) { } -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] net: vmxnet3: fix possible NULL pointer dereference in vmxnet3_rq_cleanup()
by Zhengchao Shao 22 Aug '23

22 Aug '23

From: Zixuan Fu <r33s3n6(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.18-rc1 commit edf410cb74dc612fd47ef5be319c5a0bcd6e6ccd category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I7UWI8 CVE: CVE-2023-4459 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- In vmxnet3_rq_create(), when dma_alloc_coherent() fails, vmxnet3_rq_destroy() is called. It sets rq->rx_ring[i].base to NULL. Then vmxnet3_rq_create() returns an error to its callers mxnet3_rq_create_all() -> vmxnet3_change_mtu(). Then vmxnet3_change_mtu() calls vmxnet3_force_close() -> dev_close() in error handling code. And the driver calls vmxnet3_close() -> vmxnet3_quiesce_dev() -> vmxnet3_rq_cleanup_all() -> vmxnet3_rq_cleanup(). In vmxnet3_rq_cleanup(), rq->rx_ring[ring_idx].base is accessed, but this variable is NULL, causing a NULL pointer dereference. To fix this possible bug, an if statement is added to check whether rq->rx_ring[0].base is NULL in vmxnet3_rq_cleanup() and exit early if so. The error log in our fault-injection testing is shown as follows: [ 65.220135] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008 ... [ 65.222633] RIP: 0010:vmxnet3_rq_cleanup_all+0x396/0x4e0 [vmxnet3] ... [ 65.227977] Call Trace: ... [ 65.228262] vmxnet3_quiesce_dev+0x80f/0x8a0 [vmxnet3] [ 65.228580] vmxnet3_close+0x2c4/0x3f0 [vmxnet3] [ 65.228866] __dev_close_many+0x288/0x350 [ 65.229607] dev_close_many+0xa4/0x480 [ 65.231124] dev_close+0x138/0x230 [ 65.231933] vmxnet3_force_close+0x1f0/0x240 [vmxnet3] [ 65.232248] vmxnet3_change_mtu+0x75d/0x920 [vmxnet3] ... Fixes: d1a890fa37f27 ("net: VMware virtual Ethernet NIC driver: vmxnet3") Reported-by: TOTE Robot <oslab(a)tsinghua.edu.cn> Signed-off-by: Zixuan Fu <r33s3n6(a)gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220514050711.2636709-1-r33s3n6@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/net/vmxnet3/vmxnet3_drv.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/vmxnet3/vmxnet3_drv.c b/drivers/net/vmxnet3/vmxnet3_drv.c index e454dfc9ad8f..f5cf7643289b 100644 --- a/drivers/net/vmxnet3/vmxnet3_drv.c +++ b/drivers/net/vmxnet3/vmxnet3_drv.c @@ -1584,6 +1584,10 @@ vmxnet3_rq_cleanup(struct vmxnet3_rx_queue *rq, u32 i, ring_idx; struct Vmxnet3_RxDesc *rxd; + /* ring has already been cleaned up */ + if (!rq->rx_ring[0].base) + return; + for (ring_idx = 0; ring_idx < 2; ring_idx++) { for (i = 0; i < rq->rx_ring[ring_idx].size; i++) { #ifdef __BIG_ENDIAN_BITFIELD -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] net: bridge: multicast: notify switchdev driver whenever MC processing gets disabled
by Zhengchao Shao 22 Aug '23

22 Aug '23

From: Oleksandr Mazur <oleksandr.mazur(a)plvision.eu> mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.17-rc5 commit c832962ac972082b3a1f89775c9d4274c8cb5670 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7V613 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Whenever bridge driver hits the max capacity of MDBs, it disables the MC processing (by setting corresponding bridge option), but never notifies switchdev about such change (the notifiers are called only upon explicit setting of this option, through the registered netlink interface). This could lead to situation when Software MDB processing gets disabled, but this event never gets offloaded to the underlying Hardware. Fix this by adding a notify message in such case. Fixes: 147c1e9b902c ("switchdev: bridge: Offload multicast disabled") Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Mazur <oleksandr.mazur(a)plvision.eu> Acked-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay(a)nvidia.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220215165303.31908-1-oleksandr.mazur@plvision.eu Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: net/bridge/br_multicast.c Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao(a)huawei.com> --- net/bridge/br_multicast.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/bridge/br_multicast.c b/net/bridge/br_multicast.c index de79fbfe1611..e2b1bb3de4a1 100644 --- a/net/bridge/br_multicast.c +++ b/net/bridge/br_multicast.c @@ -48,6 +48,8 @@ static const struct rhashtable_params br_sg_port_rht_params = { .automatic_shrinking = true, }; +static void br_mc_disabled_update(struct net_device *dev, bool value); + static void br_multicast_start_querier(struct net_bridge *br, struct bridge_mcast_own_query *query); static void br_multicast_add_router(struct net_bridge *br, @@ -1040,6 +1042,7 @@ struct net_bridge_mdb_entry *br_multicast_new_group(struct net_bridge *br, return mp; if (atomic_read(&br->mdb_hash_tbl.nelems) >= br->hash_max) { + br_mc_disabled_update(br->dev, false); br_opt_toggle(br, BROPT_MULTICAST_ENABLED, false); return ERR_PTR(-E2BIG); } -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-23.09 00/12] Add SDEI Watchdog Support
by Xiongfeng Wang 22 Aug '23

22 Aug '23

Xiongfeng Wang (12): watchdog: make hardlockup detect code public firmware: arm_sdei: add interrupt binding api firmware: arm_sdei: make 'sdei_api_event_disable/enable' public lockup_detector: init lockup detector after all the init_calls watchdog: add nmi_watchdog support for arm64 based on SDEI sdei_watchdog: refresh 'last_timestamp' when enabling nmi_watchdog sdei_watchdog: clear EOI of the secure timer before kdump sdei_watchdog: set secure timer period base on 'watchdog_thresh' kprobes/arm64: Blacklist sdei watchdog callback functions sdei_watchdog: avoid possible false hardlockup init: only move down lockup_detector_init() when sdei_watchdog is enabled openeuler_defconfig: Enable SDEI Watchdog arch/arm64/configs/openeuler_defconfig | 2 + arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile | 1 + arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec.c | 10 ++ arch/arm64/kernel/watchdog_sdei.c | 156 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/firmware/arm_sdei.c | 26 ++++- include/linux/arm_sdei.h | 5 + include/linux/nmi.h | 24 +++- include/uapi/linux/arm_sdei.h | 2 + init/main.c | 7 +- kernel/Makefile | 2 +- kernel/watchdog.c | 2 + kernel/watchdog_hld.c | 61 ++++++---- lib/Kconfig.debug | 8 +- 13 files changed, 278 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/arm64/kernel/watchdog_sdei.c -- 2.20.1

2 13

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1 0/5] fix CVE-2023-20593 for openEuler
by Yu Liao 22 Aug '23

22 Aug '23

AMD Zen2 architecture Zenbleed remote execution vulnerability. The optimal fix is through microcode but in the case the proper microcode revision has not been applied, enable a fallback fix for openEuler. Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo (1): tools arch x86: Sync the msr-index.h copy with the kernel sources Borislav Petkov (1): x86/cpu: Restore AMD's DE_CFG MSR after resume Borislav Petkov (AMD) (2): x86/cpu/amd: Move the errata checking functionality up x86/cpu/amd: Add a Zenbleed fix Cristian Ciocaltea (1): x86/cpu/amd: Enable Zenbleed fix for AMD Custom APU 0405 arch/x86/include/asm/microcode.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/microcode_amd.h | 2 + arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 9 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 206 ++++++++++++++++--------- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c | 4 +- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 10 +- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 2 +- arch/x86/power/cpu.c | 1 + tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 9 +- 10 files changed, 155 insertions(+), 90 deletions(-) -- 2.25.1

2 6

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS 0/5] fix CVE-2023-20593 for openEuler
by Yu Liao 22 Aug '23

22 Aug '23

AMD Zen2 architecture Zenbleed remote execution vulnerability. The optimal fix is through microcode but in the case the proper microcode revision has not been applied, enable a fallback fix for openEuler. Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo (1): tools arch x86: Sync the msr-index.h copy with the kernel sources Borislav Petkov (1): x86/cpu: Restore AMD's DE_CFG MSR after resume Borislav Petkov (AMD) (2): x86/cpu/amd: Move the errata checking functionality up x86/cpu/amd: Add a Zenbleed fix Cristian Ciocaltea (1): x86/cpu/amd: Enable Zenbleed fix for AMD Custom APU 0405 arch/x86/include/asm/microcode.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/microcode_amd.h | 2 + arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 9 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 206 ++++++++++++++++--------- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c | 4 +- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 10 +- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 2 +- arch/x86/power/cpu.c | 1 + tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 9 +- 10 files changed, 155 insertions(+), 90 deletions(-) -- 2.25.1

2 6

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] tcp: Reduce chance of collisions in inet6_hashfn().
by Wang Yufen 22 Aug '23

22 Aug '23

From: Stewart Smith <trawets(a)amazon.com> stable inclusion from stable-v4.19.291 commit d11b0df7ddf1831f3e170972f43186dad520bfcc category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I7FUFX CVE: CVE-2023-1206 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit d11b0df7ddf1831f3e170972f43186dad520bfcc ] For both IPv4 and IPv6 incoming TCP connections are tracked in a hash table with a hash over the source & destination addresses and ports. However, the IPv6 hash is insufficient and can lead to a high rate of collisions. The IPv6 hash used an XOR to fit everything into the 96 bits for the fast jenkins hash, meaning it is possible for an external entity to ensure the hash collides, thus falling back to a linear search in the bucket, which is slow. We take the approach of hash the full length of IPv6 address in __ipv6_addr_jhash() so that all users can benefit from a more secure version. While this may look like it adds overhead, the reality of modern CPUs means that this is unmeasurable in real world scenarios. In simulating with llvm-mca, the increase in cycles for the hashing code was ~16 cycles on Skylake (from a base of ~155), and an extra ~9 on Nehalem (base of ~173). In commit dd6d2910c5e0 ("netfilter: conntrack: switch to siphash") netfilter switched from a jenkins hash to a siphash, but even the faster hsiphash is a more significant overhead (~20-30%) in some preliminary testing. So, in this patch, we keep to the more conservative approach to ensure we don't add much overhead per SYN. In testing, this results in a consistently even spread across the connection buckets. In both testing and real-world scenarios, we have not found any measurable performance impact. Fixes: 08dcdbf6a7b9 ("ipv6: use a stronger hash for tcp") Signed-off-by: Stewart Smith <trawets(a)amazon.com> Signed-off-by: Samuel Mendoza-Jonas <samjonas(a)amazon.com> Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu(a)amazon.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230721222410.17914-1-kuniyu@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Wang Yufen <wangyufen(a)huawei.com> --- include/net/ipv6.h | 8 ++------ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/ipv6.h b/include/net/ipv6.h index 0c88324..3a55a093 100644 --- a/include/net/ipv6.h +++ b/include/net/ipv6.h @@ -602,12 +602,8 @@ static inline u32 ipv6_addr_hash(const struct in6_addr *a) /* more secured version of ipv6_addr_hash() */ static inline u32 __ipv6_addr_jhash(const struct in6_addr *a, const u32 initval) { - u32 v = (__force u32)a->s6_addr32[0] ^ (__force u32)a->s6_addr32[1]; - - return jhash_3words(v, - (__force u32)a->s6_addr32[2], - (__force u32)a->s6_addr32[3], - initval); + return jhash2((__force const u32 *)a->s6_addr32, + ARRAY_SIZE(a->s6_addr32), initval); } static inline bool ipv6_addr_loopback(const struct in6_addr *a) -- 1.8.3.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] tcp: Reduce chance of collisions in inet6_hashfn().
by Wang Yufen 22 Aug '23

22 Aug '23

From: Stewart Smith <trawets(a)amazon.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.190 commit d11b0df7ddf1831f3e170972f43186dad520bfcc category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I7FUFX CVE: CVE-2023-1206 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit d11b0df7ddf1831f3e170972f43186dad520bfcc ] For both IPv4 and IPv6 incoming TCP connections are tracked in a hash table with a hash over the source & destination addresses and ports. However, the IPv6 hash is insufficient and can lead to a high rate of collisions. The IPv6 hash used an XOR to fit everything into the 96 bits for the fast jenkins hash, meaning it is possible for an external entity to ensure the hash collides, thus falling back to a linear search in the bucket, which is slow. We take the approach of hash the full length of IPv6 address in __ipv6_addr_jhash() so that all users can benefit from a more secure version. While this may look like it adds overhead, the reality of modern CPUs means that this is unmeasurable in real world scenarios. In simulating with llvm-mca, the increase in cycles for the hashing code was ~16 cycles on Skylake (from a base of ~155), and an extra ~9 on Nehalem (base of ~173). In commit dd6d2910c5e0 ("netfilter: conntrack: switch to siphash") netfilter switched from a jenkins hash to a siphash, but even the faster hsiphash is a more significant overhead (~20-30%) in some preliminary testing. So, in this patch, we keep to the more conservative approach to ensure we don't add much overhead per SYN. In testing, this results in a consistently even spread across the connection buckets. In both testing and real-world scenarios, we have not found any measurable performance impact. Fixes: 08dcdbf6a7b9 ("ipv6: use a stronger hash for tcp") Signed-off-by: Stewart Smith <trawets(a)amazon.com> Signed-off-by: Samuel Mendoza-Jonas <samjonas(a)amazon.com> Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu(a)amazon.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230721222410.17914-1-kuniyu@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Wang Yufen <wangyufen(a)huawei.com> --- include/net/ipv6.h | 8 ++------ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/ipv6.h b/include/net/ipv6.h index 9a5b617..f2585cc 100644 --- a/include/net/ipv6.h +++ b/include/net/ipv6.h @@ -663,12 +663,8 @@ static inline u32 ipv6_addr_hash(const struct in6_addr *a) /* more secured version of ipv6_addr_hash() */ static inline u32 __ipv6_addr_jhash(const struct in6_addr *a, const u32 initval) { - u32 v = (__force u32)a->s6_addr32[0] ^ (__force u32)a->s6_addr32[1]; - - return jhash_3words(v, - (__force u32)a->s6_addr32[2], - (__force u32)a->s6_addr32[3], - initval); + return jhash2((__force const u32 *)a->s6_addr32, + ARRAY_SIZE(a->s6_addr32), initval); } static inline bool ipv6_addr_loopback(const struct in6_addr *a) -- 1.8.3.1

2 1

[OLK-5.10] tcp: Reduce chance of collisions in inet6_hashfn().
by Wang Yufen 22 Aug '23

22 Aug '23

From: Stewart Smith <trawets(a)amazon.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.190 commit d11b0df7ddf1831f3e170972f43186dad520bfcc category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I7FUFX CVE: CVE-2023-1206 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit d11b0df7ddf1831f3e170972f43186dad520bfcc ] For both IPv4 and IPv6 incoming TCP connections are tracked in a hash table with a hash over the source & destination addresses and ports. However, the IPv6 hash is insufficient and can lead to a high rate of collisions. The IPv6 hash used an XOR to fit everything into the 96 bits for the fast jenkins hash, meaning it is possible for an external entity to ensure the hash collides, thus falling back to a linear search in the bucket, which is slow. We take the approach of hash the full length of IPv6 address in __ipv6_addr_jhash() so that all users can benefit from a more secure version. While this may look like it adds overhead, the reality of modern CPUs means that this is unmeasurable in real world scenarios. In simulating with llvm-mca, the increase in cycles for the hashing code was ~16 cycles on Skylake (from a base of ~155), and an extra ~9 on Nehalem (base of ~173). In commit dd6d2910c5e0 ("netfilter: conntrack: switch to siphash") netfilter switched from a jenkins hash to a siphash, but even the faster hsiphash is a more significant overhead (~20-30%) in some preliminary testing. So, in this patch, we keep to the more conservative approach to ensure we don't add much overhead per SYN. In testing, this results in a consistently even spread across the connection buckets. In both testing and real-world scenarios, we have not found any measurable performance impact. Fixes: 08dcdbf6a7b9 ("ipv6: use a stronger hash for tcp") Signed-off-by: Stewart Smith <trawets(a)amazon.com> Signed-off-by: Samuel Mendoza-Jonas <samjonas(a)amazon.com> Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu(a)amazon.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230721222410.17914-1-kuniyu@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Wang Yufen <wangyufen(a)huawei.com> --- include/net/ipv6.h | 8 ++------ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/ipv6.h b/include/net/ipv6.h index 9a5b617..f2585cc 100644 --- a/include/net/ipv6.h +++ b/include/net/ipv6.h @@ -663,12 +663,8 @@ static inline u32 ipv6_addr_hash(const struct in6_addr *a) /* more secured version of ipv6_addr_hash() */ static inline u32 __ipv6_addr_jhash(const struct in6_addr *a, const u32 initval) { - u32 v = (__force u32)a->s6_addr32[0] ^ (__force u32)a->s6_addr32[1]; - - return jhash_3words(v, - (__force u32)a->s6_addr32[2], - (__force u32)a->s6_addr32[3], - initval); + return jhash2((__force const u32 *)a->s6_addr32, + ARRAY_SIZE(a->s6_addr32), initval); } static inline bool ipv6_addr_loopback(const struct in6_addr *a) -- 1.8.3.1

1 0

[PATCH OLK-5.10] xsk: Initialise xskb free_list_node
by Zhengchao Shao 22 Aug '23

22 Aug '23

From: Ciara Loftus <ciara.loftus(a)intel.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.16-rc8 commit 5bec7ca2be6955ca1aa0d7bae2b981de9b1c9844 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7UZT5 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- This commit initialises the xskb's free_list_node when the xskb is allocated. This prevents a potential false negative returned from a call to list_empty for that node, such as the one introduced in commit 199d983bc015 ("xsk: Fix crash on double free in buffer pool") In my environment this issue caused packets to not be received by the xdpsock application if the traffic was running prior to application launch. This happened when the first batch of packets failed the xskmap lookup and XDP_PASS was returned from the bpf program. This action is handled in the i40e zc driver (and others) by allocating an skbuff, freeing the xdp_buff and adding the associated xskb to the xsk_buff_pool's free_list if it hadn't been added already. Without this fix, the xskb is not added to the free_list because the check to determine if it was added already returns an invalid positive result. Later, this caused allocation errors in the driver and the failure to receive packets. Fixes: 199d983bc015 ("xsk: Fix crash on double free in buffer pool") Fixes: 2b43470add8c ("xsk: Introduce AF_XDP buffer allocation API") Signed-off-by: Ciara Loftus <ciara.loftus(a)intel.com> Acked-by: Magnus Karlsson <magnus.karlsson(a)intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211220155250.2746-1-ciara.loftus@intel.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: net/xdp/xsk_buff_pool.c Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao(a)huawei.com> --- net/xdp/xsk_buff_pool.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/net/xdp/xsk_buff_pool.c b/net/xdp/xsk_buff_pool.c index c347e52f58df..383c083faa01 100644 --- a/net/xdp/xsk_buff_pool.c +++ b/net/xdp/xsk_buff_pool.c @@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ struct xsk_buff_pool *xp_create_and_assign_umem(struct xdp_sock *xs, xskb = &pool->heads[i]; xskb->pool = pool; xskb->xdp.frame_sz = umem->chunk_size - umem->headroom; + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&xskb->free_list_node); pool->free_heads[i] = xskb; } -- 2.34.1

2 1

[openEuler-1.0-LTS] tcp: Reduce chance of collisions in inet6_hashfn().
by Wang Yufen 22 Aug '23

22 Aug '23

From: Stewart Smith <trawets(a)amazon.com> stable inclusion from stable-v4.19.291 commit d11b0df7ddf1831f3e170972f43186dad520bfcc category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I7FUFX CVE: CVE-2023-1206 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit d11b0df7ddf1831f3e170972f43186dad520bfcc ] For both IPv4 and IPv6 incoming TCP connections are tracked in a hash table with a hash over the source & destination addresses and ports. However, the IPv6 hash is insufficient and can lead to a high rate of collisions. The IPv6 hash used an XOR to fit everything into the 96 bits for the fast jenkins hash, meaning it is possible for an external entity to ensure the hash collides, thus falling back to a linear search in the bucket, which is slow. We take the approach of hash the full length of IPv6 address in __ipv6_addr_jhash() so that all users can benefit from a more secure version. While this may look like it adds overhead, the reality of modern CPUs means that this is unmeasurable in real world scenarios. In simulating with llvm-mca, the increase in cycles for the hashing code was ~16 cycles on Skylake (from a base of ~155), and an extra ~9 on Nehalem (base of ~173). In commit dd6d2910c5e0 ("netfilter: conntrack: switch to siphash") netfilter switched from a jenkins hash to a siphash, but even the faster hsiphash is a more significant overhead (~20-30%) in some preliminary testing. So, in this patch, we keep to the more conservative approach to ensure we don't add much overhead per SYN. In testing, this results in a consistently even spread across the connection buckets. In both testing and real-world scenarios, we have not found any measurable performance impact. Fixes: 08dcdbf6a7b9 ("ipv6: use a stronger hash for tcp") Signed-off-by: Stewart Smith <trawets(a)amazon.com> Signed-off-by: Samuel Mendoza-Jonas <samjonas(a)amazon.com> Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu(a)amazon.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230721222410.17914-1-kuniyu@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Wang Yufen <wangyufen(a)huawei.com> --- include/net/ipv6.h | 8 ++------ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/ipv6.h b/include/net/ipv6.h index 0c88324..3a55a093 100644 --- a/include/net/ipv6.h +++ b/include/net/ipv6.h @@ -602,12 +602,8 @@ static inline u32 ipv6_addr_hash(const struct in6_addr *a) /* more secured version of ipv6_addr_hash() */ static inline u32 __ipv6_addr_jhash(const struct in6_addr *a, const u32 initval) { - u32 v = (__force u32)a->s6_addr32[0] ^ (__force u32)a->s6_addr32[1]; - - return jhash_3words(v, - (__force u32)a->s6_addr32[2], - (__force u32)a->s6_addr32[3], - initval); + return jhash2((__force const u32 *)a->s6_addr32, + ARRAY_SIZE(a->s6_addr32), initval); } static inline bool ipv6_addr_loopback(const struct in6_addr *a) -- 1.8.3.1

1 0

[PATCH OLK-5.10] fs: jfs: fix possible NULL pointer dereference in dbFree()
by Li Nan 22 Aug '23

22 Aug '23

From: Zixuan Fu <r33s3n6(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.19-rc1 commit 0d4837fdb796f99369cf7691d33de1b856bcaf1f category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I7TT9F CVE: CVE-2023-4385 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- In our fault-injection testing, the variable "nblocks" in dbFree() can be zero when kmalloc_array() fails in dtSearch(). In this case, the variable "mp" in dbFree() would be NULL and then it is dereferenced in "write_metapage(mp)". The failure log is listed as follows: [ 13.824137] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000020 ... [ 13.827416] RIP: 0010:dbFree+0x5f7/0x910 [jfs] [ 13.834341] Call Trace: [ 13.834540] <TASK> [ 13.834713] txFreeMap+0x7b4/0xb10 [jfs] [ 13.835038] txUpdateMap+0x311/0x650 [jfs] [ 13.835375] jfs_lazycommit+0x5f2/0xc70 [jfs] [ 13.835726] ? sched_dynamic_update+0x1b0/0x1b0 [ 13.836092] kthread+0x3c2/0x4a0 [ 13.836355] ? txLockFree+0x160/0x160 [jfs] [ 13.836763] ? kthread_unuse_mm+0x160/0x160 [ 13.837106] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [ 13.837402] </TASK> ... This patch adds a NULL check of "mp" before "write_metapage(mp)" is called. Reported-by: TOTE Robot <oslab(a)tsinghua.edu.cn> Signed-off-by: Zixuan Fu <r33s3n6(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Li Nan <linan122(a)huawei.com> --- fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c b/fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c index 2c9493011aec..7b2c9e60dabc 100644 --- a/fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c +++ b/fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c @@ -3262,7 +3262,8 @@ int dbAllocBottomUp(struct inode *ip, s64 blkno, s64 nblocks) } /* write the last buffer. */ - write_metapage(mp); + if (mp) + write_metapage(mp); IREAD_UNLOCK(ipbmap); -- 2.39.2

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS v3 0/3] fix NULL pointer dereference in __nf_nat_mangle_tcp_packet
by Zhengchao Shao 22 Aug '23

22 Aug '23

When nf_nat_ipv4.ko is not loaded, l3proto is NULL pointer. If the csum_recalc function of l3proto is called, it will cause NULL pointer access issue. --- v3: add space after return type for Patch 3/3 v2: modify commit message for Patch 3/3 --- Florian Westphal (2): netfilter: nat: remove csum_recalc hook netfilter: nat: fix udp checksum corruption Zhengchao Shao (1): netfilter: nat: fix kabi change include/net/netfilter/nf_nat_l3proto.h | 4 ++ net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_l3proto_ipv4.c | 19 ------ net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_nat_l3proto_ipv6.c | 19 ------ net/netfilter/Makefile | 2 +- net/netfilter/nf_nat_helper.c | 12 ++-- net/netfilter/nf_nat_proto.c | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ 6 files changed, 83 insertions(+), 47 deletions(-) create mode 100644 net/netfilter/nf_nat_proto.c -- 2.34.1

2 4

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS v2 0/3] fix NULL pointer dereference in __nf_nat_mangle_tcp_packet
by Zhengchao Shao 22 Aug '23

22 Aug '23

When nf_nat_ipv4.ko is not loaded, l3proto is NULL pointer. If the csum_recalc function of l3proto is called, it will cause NULL pointer access issue. --- v2: modify commit message for Patch 3/3 --- Florian Westphal (2): netfilter: nat: remove csum_recalc hook netfilter: nat: fix udp checksum corruption Zhengchao Shao (1): netfilter: nat: fix kabi change include/net/netfilter/nf_nat_l3proto.h | 10 +++- net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_l3proto_ipv4.c | 19 ------ net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_nat_l3proto_ipv6.c | 19 ------ net/netfilter/Makefile | 2 +- net/netfilter/nf_nat_helper.c | 12 ++-- net/netfilter/nf_nat_proto.c | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ 6 files changed, 86 insertions(+), 50 deletions(-) create mode 100644 net/netfilter/nf_nat_proto.c -- 2.34.1

2 4

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/2] x86/speculation: Add Gather Data Sampling mitigation
by Zeng Heng 21 Aug '23

21 Aug '23

Arnd Bergmann (1): [Backport] x86/speculation: Add cpu_show_gds() prototype Daniel Sneddon (1): [Backport] x86/speculation: Add Gather Data Sampling mitigation .../ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu | 13 +- .../hw-vuln/gather_data_sampling.rst | 99 ++++++++++++++ Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst | 1 + .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 39 ++++-- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 11 ++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 129 ++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 34 +++-- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h | 1 + drivers/base/cpu.c | 8 ++ include/linux/cpu.h | 8 +- 11 files changed, 315 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/gather_data_sampling.rst -- 2.25.1

2 3

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS,v2 0/3] fix NULL pointer dereference in __nf_nat_mangle_tcp_packet
by Zhengchao Shao 21 Aug '23

21 Aug '23

When nf_nat_ipv4.ko is not loaded, l3proto is NULL pointer. If the csum_recalc function of l3proto is called, it will cause NULL pointer access issue. --- v2: modify commit message for Patch 3/3 --- Florian Westphal (2): netfilter: nat: remove csum_recalc hook netfilter: nat: fix udp checksum corruption Zhengchao Shao (1): netfilter: nat: fix kabi change include/net/netfilter/nf_nat_l3proto.h | 10 +++- net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_l3proto_ipv4.c | 19 ------ net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_nat_l3proto_ipv6.c | 19 ------ net/netfilter/Makefile | 2 +- net/netfilter/nf_nat_helper.c | 12 ++-- net/netfilter/nf_nat_proto.c | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ 6 files changed, 86 insertions(+), 50 deletions(-) create mode 100644 net/netfilter/nf_nat_proto.c -- 2.34.1

1 3

[PATCH v5 OLK-5.10 0/4] arm64: support batched/deferred tlb shootdown during page reclamation/migration
by Jinjiang Tu 21 Aug '23

21 Aug '23

Support batched/deferred tlb shootdown during page reclamation/migration for arm64. Changelog: v5: - adjust tab num for macro DEFINE_TLB_UBC v4 - define macro DEFINE_TLB_UBC v3: - fix kabi breakage for task_struct->tlb_ubc v2: - fix kabi breakage for mm_struct->tlb_flush_batched Anshuman Khandual (1): mm/tlbbatch: introduce arch_tlbbatch_should_defer() Barry Song (2): mm/tlbbatch: rename and extend some functions arm64: support batched/deferred tlb shootdown during page reclamation/migration Yicong Yang (1): mm/tlbbatch: introduce arch_flush_tlb_batched_pending() .../features/vm/TLB/arch-support.txt | 2 +- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 1 + arch/arm64/include/asm/tlbbatch.h | 12 +++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/tlbflush.h | 44 +++++++++++++++++-- arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h | 22 +++++++++- include/linux/mm_types.h | 4 +- include/linux/mm_types_task.h | 29 ++++++++++-- include/linux/sched.h | 3 ++ mm/rmap.c | 35 ++++++++------- 9 files changed, 126 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/tlbbatch.h -- 2.25.1

2 5

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS 0/3] fix NULL pointer dereference in __nf_nat_mangle_tcp_packet
by Zhengchao Shao 21 Aug '23

21 Aug '23

When nf_nat_ipv4.ko is not loaded, l3proto is NULL pointer. If the csum_recalc function of l3proto is called, it will cause NULL pointer access issue. Florian Westphal (2): netfilter: nat: remove csum_recalc hook netfilter: nat: fix udp checksum corruption Zhengchao Shao (1): netfilter: nat: fix kabi change include/net/netfilter/nf_nat_l3proto.h | 10 +++- net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_l3proto_ipv4.c | 19 ------ net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_nat_l3proto_ipv6.c | 19 ------ net/netfilter/Makefile | 2 +- net/netfilter/nf_nat_helper.c | 12 ++-- net/netfilter/nf_nat_proto.c | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ 6 files changed, 86 insertions(+), 50 deletions(-) create mode 100644 net/netfilter/nf_nat_proto.c -- 2.34.1

2 4

[PATCH OLK-5.10] nbd: pass nbd_sock to nbd_read_reply() instead of index
by Li Nan 21 Aug '23

21 Aug '23

hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: 189113, https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7T755 CVE: NA -------------------------------- If a socket is processing ioctl 'NBD_SET_SOCK', config->socks might be krealloc in nbd_add_socket(), and a garbage request is received now, a UAF may occurs. T1 nbd_ioctl __nbd_ioctl nbd_add_socket blk_mq_freeze_queue T2 recv_work nbd_read_reply sock_xmit krealloc config->socks def config->socks Pass nbd_sock to nbd_read_reply(). And introduce a new function sock_xmit_recv(), which differs from sock_xmit only in the way it get socket. ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in sock_xmit+0x525/0x550 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880188ec428 by task kworker/u12:1/18779 Workqueue: knbd4-recv recv_work Call Trace: __dump_stack dump_stack+0xbe/0xfd print_address_description.constprop.0+0x19/0x170 __kasan_report.cold+0x6c/0x84 kasan_report+0x3a/0x50 sock_xmit+0x525/0x550 nbd_read_reply+0xfe/0x2c0 recv_work+0x1c2/0x750 process_one_work+0x6b6/0xf10 worker_thread+0xdd/0xd80 kthread+0x30a/0x410 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 Allocated by task 18784: kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40 kasan_set_track set_alloc_info __kasan_kmalloc __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xf0/0x130 slab_post_alloc_hook slab_alloc_node slab_alloc __kmalloc_track_caller+0x157/0x550 __do_krealloc krealloc+0x37/0xb0 nbd_add_socket +0x2d3/0x880 __nbd_ioctl nbd_ioctl+0x584/0x8e0 __blkdev_driver_ioctl blkdev_ioctl+0x2a0/0x6e0 block_ioctl+0xee/0x130 vfs_ioctl __do_sys_ioctl __se_sys_ioctl+0x138/0x190 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xc6 Freed by task 18784: kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40 kasan_set_track+0x1c/0x30 kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x40 __kasan_slab_free.part.0+0x13f/0x1b0 slab_free_hook slab_free_freelist_hook slab_free kfree+0xcb/0x6c0 krealloc+0x56/0xb0 nbd_add_socket+0x2d3/0x880 __nbd_ioctl nbd_ioctl+0x584/0x8e0 __blkdev_driver_ioctl blkdev_ioctl+0x2a0/0x6e0 block_ioctl+0xee/0x130 vfs_ioctl __do_sys_ioctl __se_sys_ioctl+0x138/0x190 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xc6 Signed-off-by: Li Nan <linan122(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/block/nbd.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/block/nbd.c b/drivers/block/nbd.c index e0a21169b4b8..db885f3a2f0f 100644 --- a/drivers/block/nbd.c +++ b/drivers/block/nbd.c @@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ struct nbd_sock { struct recv_thread_args { struct work_struct work; struct nbd_device *nbd; + struct nbd_sock *nsock; int index; }; @@ -500,15 +501,9 @@ static enum blk_eh_timer_return nbd_xmit_timeout(struct request *req, return BLK_EH_DONE; } -/* - * Send or receive packet. Return a positive value on success and - * negtive value on failue, and never return 0. - */ -static int sock_xmit(struct nbd_device *nbd, int index, int send, - struct iov_iter *iter, int msg_flags, int *sent) +static int __sock_xmit(struct nbd_device *nbd, struct socket *sock, int send, + struct iov_iter *iter, int msg_flags, int *sent) { - struct nbd_config *config = nbd->config; - struct socket *sock = config->socks[index]->sock; int result; struct msghdr msg; unsigned int noreclaim_flag; @@ -550,6 +545,19 @@ static int sock_xmit(struct nbd_device *nbd, int index, int send, return result; } +/* + * Send or receive packet. Return a positive value on success and + * negtive value on failure, and never return 0. + */ +static int sock_xmit(struct nbd_device *nbd, int index, int send, + struct iov_iter *iter, int msg_flags, int *sent) +{ + struct nbd_config *config = nbd->config; + struct socket *sock = config->socks[index]->sock; + + return __sock_xmit(nbd, sock, send, iter, msg_flags, sent); +} + /* * Different settings for sk->sk_sndtimeo can result in different return values * if there is a signal pending when we enter sendmsg, because reasons? @@ -706,7 +714,7 @@ static int nbd_send_cmd(struct nbd_device *nbd, struct nbd_cmd *cmd, int index) return 0; } -static int nbd_read_reply(struct nbd_device *nbd, int index, +static int nbd_read_reply(struct nbd_device *nbd, struct socket *sock, struct nbd_reply *reply) { struct kvec iov = {.iov_base = reply, .iov_len = sizeof(*reply)}; @@ -715,7 +723,7 @@ static int nbd_read_reply(struct nbd_device *nbd, int index, reply->magic = 0; iov_iter_kvec(&to, READ, &iov, 1, sizeof(*reply)); - result = sock_xmit(nbd, index, 0, &to, MSG_WAITALL, NULL); + result = __sock_xmit(nbd, sock, 0, &to, MSG_WAITALL, NULL); if (result < 0) { if (!nbd_disconnected(nbd->config)) dev_err(disk_to_dev(nbd->disk), @@ -837,14 +845,14 @@ static void recv_work(struct work_struct *work) struct nbd_device *nbd = args->nbd; struct nbd_config *config = nbd->config; struct request_queue *q = nbd->disk->queue; - struct nbd_sock *nsock; + struct nbd_sock *nsock = args->nsock; struct nbd_cmd *cmd; struct request *rq; while (1) { struct nbd_reply reply; - if (nbd_read_reply(nbd, args->index, &reply)) + if (nbd_read_reply(nbd, nsock->sock, &reply)) break; /* @@ -879,7 +887,6 @@ static void recv_work(struct work_struct *work) percpu_ref_put(&q->q_usage_counter); } - nsock = config->socks[args->index]; mutex_lock(&nsock->tx_lock); nbd_mark_nsock_dead(nbd, nsock, 1); mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock); @@ -1223,6 +1230,7 @@ static int nbd_reconnect_socket(struct nbd_device *nbd, unsigned long arg) INIT_WORK(&args->work, recv_work); args->index = i; args->nbd = nbd; + args->nsock = nsock; nsock->cookie++; mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock); sockfd_put(old); @@ -1413,6 +1421,7 @@ static int nbd_start_device(struct nbd_device *nbd) refcount_inc(&nbd->config_refs); INIT_WORK(&args->work, recv_work); args->nbd = nbd; + args->nsock = config->socks[i]; args->index = i; queue_work(nbd->recv_workq, &args->work); } -- 2.39.2

2 1

[PATCH v3 OLK-5.10] ima: Add macros to isolate the IMA digest list
by Zhou Shuiqing 21 Aug '23

21 Aug '23

euleros inclusion category: feature bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I277UJ -------------------------------- Isolate the IMA digest list code by using macros. changelog v2: Exclude some macros for code that has already been merged into upstream kernel. v3: add patch header and fix some simple code warnings Signed-off-by: Zhou Shuiqing <zhoushuiqing2(a)huawei.com> --- fs/xattr.c | 4 + include/linux/evm.h | 4 +- include/linux/ima.h | 8 + security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c | 4 + security/integrity/evm/evm.h | 2 + security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 38 +++- security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 79 +++++++- security/integrity/iint.c | 2 + security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 80 +++++++- security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 39 ++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 154 ++++++++++++++- security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 248 ++++++++++++++++++++++++- security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c | 6 + security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 36 ++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 80 ++++++++ security/integrity/integrity.h | 15 +- security/security.c | 2 + 17 files changed, 780 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/xattr.c b/fs/xattr.c index 149b8cf5f99f..c31266a83391 100644 --- a/fs/xattr.c +++ b/fs/xattr.c @@ -16,7 +16,9 @@ #include <linux/namei.h> #include <linux/security.h> #include <linux/evm.h> +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST #include <linux/ima.h> +#endif #include <linux/syscalls.h> #include <linux/export.h> #include <linux/fsnotify.h> @@ -475,7 +477,9 @@ __vfs_removexattr_locked(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, if (!error) { fsnotify_xattr(dentry); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST ima_inode_post_removexattr(dentry, name); +#endif evm_inode_post_removexattr(dentry, name); } diff --git a/include/linux/evm.h b/include/linux/evm.h index e5b7bcb152b9..39bb17a8236b 100644 --- a/include/linux/evm.h +++ b/include/linux/evm.h @@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ extern void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, extern int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *xattr_array, struct xattr *evm); -extern bool evm_status_revalidate(const char *xattr_name); +extern bool evm_revalidate_status(const char *xattr_name); #ifdef CONFIG_FS_POSIX_ACL extern int posix_xattr_acl(const char *xattrname); #else @@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ static inline int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, return 0; } -static inline bool evm_status_revalidate(const char *xattr_name) +static inline bool evm_revalidate_status(const char *xattr_name) { return false; } diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h index f7a088b2579e..713c6f9696cb 100644 --- a/include/linux/ima.h +++ b/include/linux/ima.h @@ -144,13 +144,17 @@ extern bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void); extern void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry); extern int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST extern void ima_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len); +#endif extern int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST extern void ima_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name); +#endif #else static inline bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void) { @@ -170,12 +174,14 @@ static inline int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, return 0; } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST static inline void ima_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) { } +#endif static inline int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) @@ -183,10 +189,12 @@ static inline int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, return 0; } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST static inline void ima_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) { } +#endif #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE */ #if defined(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) && defined(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING) diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c index 92dc64755e53..72941f9b1b99 100644 --- a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c +++ b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c @@ -9,7 +9,9 @@ #include <linux/err.h> #include <linux/ratelimit.h> #include <linux/key-type.h> +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST #include <linux/verification.h> +#endif #include <crypto/public_key.h> #include <crypto/hash_info.h> #include <keys/asymmetric-type.h> @@ -55,6 +57,7 @@ static struct key *request_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring, uint32_t keyid) key = request_key(&key_type_asymmetric, name, NULL); } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (IS_ERR(key)) { #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY keyring = VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING; @@ -63,6 +66,7 @@ static struct key *request_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring, uint32_t keyid) #endif key = search_trusted_key(keyring, &key_type_asymmetric, name); } +#endif if (IS_ERR(key)) { if (keyring) diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h index ca7ed2e532dc..f8b1627708a1 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h @@ -32,7 +32,9 @@ struct xattr_list { }; extern int evm_initialized; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST extern enum hash_algo evm_hash_algo; +#endif #define EVM_ATTR_FSUUID 0x0001 diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c index 7c36dbb96d24..fa8147c2294e 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c @@ -33,7 +33,11 @@ static DEFINE_MUTEX(mutex); static unsigned long evm_set_key_flags; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST enum hash_algo evm_hash_algo __ro_after_init = HASH_ALGO_SHA1; +#else +static const char evm_hmac[] = "hmac(sha1)"; +#endif /** * evm_set_key() - set EVM HMAC key from the kernel @@ -74,11 +78,13 @@ static struct shash_desc *init_desc(char type, uint8_t hash_algo) long rc; const char *algo; struct crypto_shash **tfm, *tmp_tfm; - char evm_hmac[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME]; struct shash_desc *desc; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST + char evm_hmac[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME]; snprintf(evm_hmac, sizeof(evm_hmac), "hmac(%s)", CONFIG_EVM_DEFAULT_HASH); +#endif if (type == EVM_XATTR_HMAC) { if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC)) { @@ -156,8 +162,12 @@ static void hmac_add_misc(struct shash_desc *desc, struct inode *inode, /* Don't include the inode or generation number in portable * signatures */ +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG && type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_LIST) { +#else + if (type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG) { +#endif hmac_misc.ino = inode->i_ino; hmac_misc.generation = inode->i_generation; } @@ -174,8 +184,12 @@ static void hmac_add_misc(struct shash_desc *desc, struct inode *inode, hmac_misc.mode = inode->i_mode; crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)&hmac_misc, sizeof(hmac_misc)); if ((evm_hmac_attrs & EVM_ATTR_FSUUID) && +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG && type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_LIST) +#else + type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG) +#endif crypto_shash_update(desc, (u8 *)&inode->i_sb->s_uuid, UUID_SIZE); crypto_shash_final(desc, digest); } @@ -288,8 +302,12 @@ static int evm_is_immutable(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode) return 0; return rc; } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (xattr_data->type == EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG || xattr_data->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_LIST) +#else + if (xattr_data->type == EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG) +#endif rc = 1; else rc = 0; @@ -321,15 +339,23 @@ int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, if (rc) return -EPERM; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST data.hdr.algo = evm_hash_algo; +#else + data.hdr.algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1; +#endif rc = evm_calc_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len, &data); if (rc == 0) { data.hdr.xattr.sha1.type = EVM_XATTR_HMAC; rc = __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM, &data.hdr.xattr.data[1], +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST hash_digest_size[evm_hash_algo] + 1, 0); +#else + SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE + 1, 0); +#endif } else if (rc == -ENODATA && (inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) { rc = __vfs_removexattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM); } @@ -341,7 +367,11 @@ int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *lsm_xattr, { struct shash_desc *desc; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST desc = init_desc(EVM_XATTR_HMAC, evm_hash_algo); +#else + desc = init_desc(EVM_XATTR_HMAC, HASH_ALGO_SHA1); +#endif if (IS_ERR(desc)) { pr_info("init_desc failed\n"); return PTR_ERR(desc); @@ -353,9 +383,15 @@ int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *lsm_xattr, return 0; } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST /* * Get the key from the TPM for the HMAC */ +#else +/* + * Get the key from the TPM for the SHA1-HMAC + */ +#endif int evm_init_key(void) { struct key *evm_key; diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c index cddfc0e43a80..a3f6729e00ca 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ static struct xattr_list evm_config_default_xattrnames[] = { LIST_HEAD(evm_config_xattrnames); static int evm_fixmode __ro_after_init; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST static int __init evm_set_param(char *str) { if (strncmp(str, "fix", 3) == 0) @@ -73,6 +74,18 @@ static int __init evm_set_param(char *str) return 1; } __setup("evm=", evm_set_param); +#else +static int __init evm_set_fixmode(char *str) +{ + if (strncmp(str, "fix", 3) == 0) + evm_fixmode = 1; + else + pr_err("invalid \"%s\" mode", str); + + return 0; +} +__setup("evm=", evm_set_fixmode); +#endif static void __init evm_init_config(void) { @@ -98,6 +111,7 @@ static bool evm_key_loaded(void) return (bool)(evm_initialized & EVM_KEY_MASK); } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST /* * Ignoring INTEGRITY_NOLABEL/INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS is safe if no HMAC key * is loaded and the EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE initialization flag is set. @@ -115,8 +129,13 @@ static bool evm_ignore_error_safe(enum integrity_status evm_status) return true; } +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST static int evm_find_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry, int *ima_present) +#else +static int evm_find_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry) +#endif { struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); struct xattr_list *xattr; @@ -133,8 +152,10 @@ static int evm_find_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry, int *ima_present) continue; return error; } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (!strcmp(xattr->name, XATTR_NAME_IMA)) *ima_present = 1; +#endif count++; } @@ -163,6 +184,7 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = NULL; struct signature_v2_hdr *hdr; enum integrity_status evm_status = INTEGRITY_PASS; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST enum integrity_status saved_evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; struct evm_digest digest; struct ima_digest *found_digest; @@ -172,6 +194,12 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, .version = 2, .hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA256 }; int rc, xattr_len, evm_immutable = 0, ima_present = 0; +#else + struct evm_digest digest; + struct inode *inode; + int rc, xattr_len, evm_immutable = 0; +#endif + if (iint && (iint->evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS || iint->evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE)) return iint->evm_status; @@ -184,7 +212,11 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, if (rc <= 0) { evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; if (rc == -ENODATA) { +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST rc = evm_find_protected_xattrs(dentry, &ima_present); +#else + rc = evm_find_protected_xattrs(dentry); +#endif if (rc > 0) evm_status = INTEGRITY_NOLABEL; else if (rc == 0) @@ -192,6 +224,7 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, } else if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) { evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST /* IMA added a fake xattr, set also EVM fake xattr */ if (!ima_present && xattr_name && !strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_IMA) && @@ -206,6 +239,9 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, goto out; saved_evm_status = evm_status; +#else + goto out; +#endif } xattr_len = rc; @@ -262,6 +298,7 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, } } break; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_LIST: /* At this point, we cannot determine whether metadata are * immutable or not. However, it is safe to return the @@ -302,11 +339,13 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, evm_status = INTEGRITY_PASS; } break; +#endif default: rc = -EINVAL; break; } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (rc && xattr_data == (struct evm_ima_xattr_data *)&evm_fake_xattr) { evm_status = saved_evm_status; } else if (rc) { @@ -315,10 +354,22 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, evm_status = evm_immutable ? INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE : INTEGRITY_FAIL; } +#else + if (rc) { + if (rc == -ENODATA) + evm_status = INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS; + else if (evm_immutable) + evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE; + else + evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; + } +#endif out: if (iint) iint->evm_status = evm_status; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (xattr_data != (struct evm_ima_xattr_data *)&evm_fake_xattr) +#endif kfree(xattr_data); return evm_status; } @@ -569,8 +620,12 @@ int evm_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, if (!xattr_value_len) return -EINVAL; if (xattr_data->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG && +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST xattr_data->type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG && xattr_data->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_LIST) +#else + xattr_data->type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG) +#endif return -EPERM; } return evm_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, @@ -606,7 +661,7 @@ static void evm_reset_status(struct inode *inode) } /** - * evm_status_revalidate - report whether EVM status re-validation is necessary + * evm_revalidate_status - report whether EVM status re-validation is necessary * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name * * Report whether callers of evm_verifyxattr() should re-validate the @@ -614,7 +669,7 @@ static void evm_reset_status(struct inode *inode) * * Return true if re-validation is necessary, false otherwise. */ -bool evm_status_revalidate(const char *xattr_name) +bool evm_revalidate_status(const char *xattr_name) { if (!evm_key_loaded()) return false; @@ -646,7 +701,7 @@ bool evm_status_revalidate(const char *xattr_name) void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) { - if (!evm_status_revalidate(xattr_name)) + if (!evm_revalidate_status(xattr_name)) return; evm_reset_status(dentry->d_inode); @@ -669,7 +724,7 @@ void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, */ void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) { - if (!evm_status_revalidate(xattr_name)) + if (!evm_revalidate_status(xattr_name)) return; evm_reset_status(dentry->d_inode); @@ -714,6 +769,7 @@ int evm_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) if (!(ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID))) return 0; evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST /* * Writing attrs is safe for portable signatures, as portable signatures * are immutable and can never be updated. @@ -723,6 +779,12 @@ int evm_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) (evm_status == INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE) || (evm_ignore_error_safe(evm_status))) return 0; +#else + if ((evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS) || + (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS) || + (evm_status == INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE)) + return 0; +#endif if (evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE && !evm_attr_change(dentry, attr)) @@ -747,7 +809,7 @@ int evm_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) */ void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid) { - if (!evm_status_revalidate(NULL)) + if (!evm_revalidate_status(NULL)) return; evm_reset_status(dentry->d_inode); @@ -780,7 +842,9 @@ int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, goto out; evm_xattr->value = xattr_data; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST evm_xattr->value_len = hash_digest_size[evm_hash_algo] + 1; +#endif evm_xattr->name = XATTR_EVM_SUFFIX; return 0; out: @@ -802,6 +866,7 @@ void __init evm_load_x509(void) static int __init init_evm(void) { +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST int error, i; struct list_head *pos, *q; @@ -809,6 +874,10 @@ static int __init init_evm(void) CONFIG_EVM_DEFAULT_HASH); if (i >= 0) evm_hash_algo = i; +#else + int error; + struct list_head *pos, *q; +#endif evm_init_config(); diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c index 8953ac6412c3..22dc1eb63f78 100644 --- a/security/integrity/iint.c +++ b/security/integrity/iint.c @@ -212,7 +212,9 @@ void __init integrity_load_keys(void) if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_LOAD_X509)) evm_load_x509(); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST ima_load_digest_lists(); +#endif } static int __init integrity_fs_init(void) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index 46afb6bef45b..72e1843b05e1 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -53,11 +53,11 @@ extern int ima_hash_algo_idx __ro_after_init; extern int ima_extra_slots __ro_after_init; extern int ima_appraise; extern struct tpm_chip *ima_tpm_chip; +extern const char boot_aggregate_name[]; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST extern int ima_digest_list_pcr; extern bool ima_plus_standard_pcr; -extern const char boot_aggregate_name[]; extern int ima_digest_list_actions; -#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST extern int ima_digest_db_max_size __ro_after_init; extern int ima_digest_db_size; #endif @@ -189,6 +189,7 @@ static inline unsigned int ima_hash_key(u8 *digest) return (digest[0] | digest[1] << 8) % IMA_MEASURE_HTABLE_SIZE; } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST #define __ima_hooks(hook) \ hook(NONE, none) \ hook(FILE_CHECK, file) \ @@ -205,6 +206,23 @@ static inline unsigned int ima_hash_key(u8 *digest) hook(KEY_CHECK, key) \ hook(DIGEST_LIST_CHECK, digest_list) \ hook(MAX_CHECK, none) +#else +#define __ima_hooks(hook) \ + (hook(NONE, none) \ + hook(FILE_CHECK, file) \ + hook(MMAP_CHECK, mmap) \ + hook(BPRM_CHECK, bprm) \ + hook(CREDS_CHECK, creds) \ + hook(POST_SETATTR, post_setattr) \ + hook(MODULE_CHECK, module) \ + hook(FIRMWARE_CHECK, firmware) \ + hook(KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK, kexec_kernel) \ + hook(KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK, kexec_initramfs) \ + hook(POLICY_CHECK, policy) \ + hook(KEXEC_CMDLINE, kexec_cmdline) \ + hook(KEY_CHECK, key) \ + hook(MAX_CHECK, none)) +#endif #define __ima_hook_enumify(ENUM, str) ENUM, #define __ima_stringify(arg) (#arg) @@ -264,12 +282,20 @@ int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func); int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, enum hash_algo algo, struct modsig *modsig); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr, struct ima_template_desc *template_desc, struct ima_digest *digest); +#else +void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, + const unsigned char *filename, + struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, + int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr, + struct ima_template_desc *template_desc); +#endif void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size, const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func, int pcr, const char *keyring); @@ -278,9 +304,15 @@ void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, int ima_alloc_init_template(struct ima_event_data *event_data, struct ima_template_entry **entry, struct ima_template_desc *template_desc); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation, struct inode *inode, const unsigned char *filename, int pcr, struct ima_digest *digest); +#else +int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation, + struct inode *inode, + const unsigned char *filename, int pcr); +#endif void ima_free_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry); const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char **pathbuf, char *filename); @@ -308,21 +340,41 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v); #define IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE 0x10 #define IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY 0x20 #define IMA_APPRAISE_KEXEC 0x40 +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST #define IMA_APPRAISE_DIGEST_LIST 0x80 +#endif #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr); + +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig, struct ima_digest *found_digest); +#else +int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, + struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, + struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, + struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, + int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig); +#endif + int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func); void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file); enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, enum ima_hooks func); + +#ifndef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST +enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, + int xattr_len); +int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, + struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value); +#endif + #else static inline int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr) @@ -330,6 +382,7 @@ static inline int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, return 0; } +#ifndef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST static inline int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, @@ -338,6 +391,15 @@ static inline int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig, struct ima_digest *found_digest) +#else +static inline int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, + struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, + struct file *file, + const unsigned char *filename, + struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, + int xattr_len, + const struct modsig *modsig) +#endif { return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; } @@ -360,6 +422,20 @@ static inline enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_c return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; } +#ifndef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST +static inline enum hash_algo +ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len) +{ + return ima_hash_algo; +} + +static inline int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, + struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value) +{ + return 0; +} +#endif + #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE */ #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c index 6ecaf6834844..1b8d3696d873 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c @@ -99,15 +99,23 @@ int ima_alloc_init_template(struct ima_event_data *event_data, * * Returns 0 on success, error code otherwise */ +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation, struct inode *inode, const unsigned char *filename, int pcr, struct ima_digest *digest) +#else +int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, + int violation, struct inode *inode, + const unsigned char *filename, int pcr) +#endif { static const char op[] = "add_template_measure"; static const char audit_cause[] = "hashing_error"; char *template_name = entry->template_desc->name; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST struct ima_template_entry *duplicated_entry = NULL; +#endif int result; if (!violation) { @@ -121,6 +129,7 @@ int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, } } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (ima_plus_standard_pcr && !digest) { duplicated_entry = kmemdup(entry, sizeof(*entry) + entry->template_desc->num_fields * @@ -130,9 +139,11 @@ int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, } else if (!ima_plus_standard_pcr && ima_digest_list_pcr >= 0) { pcr = ima_digest_list_pcr; } +#endif entry->pcr = pcr; result = ima_add_template_entry(entry, violation, op, inode, filename); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (result) { kfree(duplicated_entry); } else if (duplicated_entry) { @@ -141,6 +152,7 @@ int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, if (result < 0) kfree(duplicated_entry); } +#endif return result; } @@ -173,8 +185,13 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, result = -ENOMEM; goto err_out; } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode, filename, CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX, NULL); +#else + result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode, + filename, CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX); +#endif if (result < 0) ima_free_template_entry(entry); err_out: @@ -315,18 +332,30 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, * * Must be called with iint->mutex held. */ +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr, struct ima_template_desc *template_desc, struct ima_digest *digest) +#else +void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, + struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, + struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, + int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr, + struct ima_template_desc *template_desc) +#endif { static const char op[] = "add_template_measure"; static const char audit_cause[] = "ENOMEM"; int result = -ENOMEM; struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST struct ima_template_entry *entry = NULL; +#else + struct ima_template_entry *entry; +#endif struct ima_event_data event_data = { .iint = iint, .file = file, .filename = filename, @@ -344,10 +373,12 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, if (iint->measured_pcrs & (0x1 << pcr) && !modsig) return; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (digest && !ima_plus_standard_pcr && ima_digest_list_pcr >= 0) { result = -EEXIST; goto out; } +#endif result = ima_alloc_init_template(&event_data, &entry, template_desc); if (result < 0) { @@ -356,14 +387,22 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, return; } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode, filename, pcr, digest); out: +#else + result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode, filename, pcr); +#endif if ((!result || result == -EEXIST) && !(file->f_flags & O_DIRECT)) { iint->flags |= IMA_MEASURED; iint->measured_pcrs |= (0x1 << pcr); } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (result < 0 && entry) +#else + if (result < 0) +#endif ima_free_template_entry(entry); } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index 956fb0f4c006..9dd8634b9e5a 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -15,9 +15,11 @@ #include <keys/system_keyring.h> #include "ima.h" +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST #include "ima_digest_list.h" static bool ima_appraise_req_evm __ro_after_init; +#endif static int __init default_appraise_setup(char *str) { #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM @@ -45,16 +47,18 @@ static int __init default_appraise_setup(char *str) ima_appraise = appraisal_state; } #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (strcmp(str, "enforce-evm") == 0 || strcmp(str, "log-evm") == 0) ima_appraise_req_evm = true; +#endif return 1; } __setup("ima_appraise=", default_appraise_setup); -static bool ima_appraise_no_metadata __ro_after_init; #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST +static bool ima_appraise_no_metadata __ro_after_init; static int __init appraise_digest_list_setup(char *str) { if (!strncmp(str, "digest", 6)) { @@ -108,9 +112,11 @@ static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, } else { offset = 0; iint->ima_hash->xattr.ng.type = IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (test_bit(IMA_DIGEST_LIST, &iint->atomic_flags)) iint->ima_hash->xattr.ng.type = EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_LIST; +#endif iint->ima_hash->xattr.ng.algo = algo; } rc = __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, @@ -189,6 +195,60 @@ static void ima_cache_flags(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, } } +#ifndef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST +enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, + int xattr_len) +{ + struct signature_v2_hdr *sig; + enum hash_algo ret; + + if (!xattr_value || xattr_len < 2) + /* return default hash algo */ + return ima_hash_algo; + + switch (xattr_value->type) { + case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG: + sig = (typeof(sig))xattr_value; + if (sig->version != 2 || xattr_len <= sizeof(*sig)) + return ima_hash_algo; + return sig->hash_algo; + case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG: + /* first byte contains algorithm id */ + ret = xattr_value->data[0]; + if (ret < HASH_ALGO__LAST) + return ret; + break; + case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST: + /* this is for backward compatibility */ + if (xattr_len == 21) { + unsigned int zero = 0; + + if (!memcmp(&xattr_value->data[16], &zero, 4)) + return HASH_ALGO_MD5; + else + return HASH_ALGO_SHA1; + } else if (xattr_len == 17) + return HASH_ALGO_MD5; + break; + } + + /* return default hash algo */ + return ima_hash_algo; +} + +int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, + struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value) +{ + ssize_t ret; + + ret = vfs_getxattr_alloc(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, (char **)xattr_value, + 0, GFP_NOFS); + if (ret == -EOPNOTSUPP) + ret = 0; + return ret; +} +#endif + /* * xattr_verify - verify xattr digest or signature * @@ -196,18 +256,27 @@ static void ima_cache_flags(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, * * Return 0 on success, error code otherwise. */ +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST static int xattr_verify(enum ima_hooks func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len, enum integrity_status *status, const char **cause, struct ima_digest *found_digest) +#else +static int xattr_verify(enum ima_hooks func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, + struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len, + enum integrity_status *status, const char **cause) +#endif { int rc = -EINVAL, hash_start = 0; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (found_digest && *status != INTEGRITY_PASS && *status != INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE) set_bit(IMA_DIGEST_LIST, &iint->atomic_flags); +#endif switch (xattr_value->type) { +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_LIST: set_bit(IMA_DIGEST_LIST, &iint->atomic_flags); @@ -217,13 +286,18 @@ static int xattr_verify(enum ima_hooks func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, break; } fallthrough; +#endif case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG: /* first byte contains algorithm id */ hash_start = 1; fallthrough; case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST: +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (*status != INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE && (!found_digest || !ima_digest_is_immutable(found_digest))) { +#else + if (*status != INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE) { +#endif if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) { *cause = "IMA-signature-required"; *status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; @@ -352,26 +426,39 @@ int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, * * Return 0 on success, error code otherwise */ +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig, struct ima_digest *found_digest) +#else +int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, + struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, + struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, + struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, + int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig) +#endif { static const char op[] = "appraise_data"; const char *cause = "unknown"; struct dentry *dentry = file_dentry(file); struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); enum integrity_status status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST int rc = xattr_len, rc_evm; char _buf[sizeof(struct evm_ima_xattr_data) + 1 + SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE]; +#else + int rc = xattr_len; +#endif bool try_modsig = iint->flags & IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED && modsig; /* If not appraising a modsig, we need an xattr. */ if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR) && !try_modsig) return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (xattr_value && xattr_value->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG && xattr_len == sizeof(struct signature_v2_hdr)) rc = -ENODATA; @@ -394,6 +481,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, rc = xattr_len; } } +#endif /* If reading the xattr failed and there's no modsig, error out. */ if (rc <= 0 && !try_modsig) { @@ -417,11 +505,15 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, switch (status) { case INTEGRITY_PASS: case INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE: +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST break; case INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN: if (ima_appraise_req_evm && xattr_value->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG && !found_digest) goto out; +#else + case INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN: +#endif break; case INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS: /* No EVM protected xattrs. */ /* It's fine not to have xattrs when using a modsig. */ @@ -429,6 +521,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, break; fallthrough; case INTEGRITY_NOLABEL: /* No security.evm xattr. */ +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST /* * If the digest-nometadata mode is selected, allow access * without metadata check. EVM will eventually create an HMAC @@ -446,6 +539,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, ima_digest_is_immutable(found_digest)) break; } +#endif cause = "missing-HMAC"; goto out; case INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE: @@ -458,6 +552,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, WARN_ONCE(true, "Unexpected integrity status %d\n", status); } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if ((iint->flags & IMA_META_IMMUTABLE_REQUIRED) && status != INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE) { status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; @@ -466,10 +561,16 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, filename, op, cause, rc, 0); goto out; } +#endif if (xattr_value) +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST rc = xattr_verify(func, iint, xattr_value, xattr_len, &status, &cause, found_digest); +#else + rc = xattr_verify(func, iint, xattr_value, xattr_len, &status, + &cause); +#endif /* * If we have a modsig and either no imasig or the imasig's key isn't @@ -609,6 +710,7 @@ static void ima_reset_appraise_flags(struct inode *inode, int digsig) clear_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags); } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) { @@ -624,7 +726,35 @@ int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, } return result; } +#else +int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, + const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) +{ + const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xvalue = xattr_value; + int digsig = 0; + int result; + result = ima_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, + xattr_value_len); + if (result == 1) { + if (!xattr_value_len || (xvalue->type >= IMA_XATTR_LAST)) + return -EINVAL; + digsig = (xvalue->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG); +#ifndef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST + } else if (!strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM) && xattr_value_len > 0) { + digsig = (xvalue->type == EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG); +#endif + } + if (result == 1 || evm_revalidate_status(xattr_name)) { + ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), digsig); + if (result == 1) + result = 0; + } + return result; +} +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST void ima_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) { @@ -638,10 +768,12 @@ void ima_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, digsig = (xvalue->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG); if (!strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM) && xattr_value_len > 0) digsig = (xvalue->type == EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG); - if (result == 1 || evm_status_revalidate(xattr_name)) + if (result == 1 || evm_revalidate_status(xattr_name)) ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), digsig); } +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) { int result; @@ -652,12 +784,28 @@ int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) } return result; } +#else +int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) +{ + int result; + result = ima_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0); + if (result == 1 || evm_revalidate_status(xattr_name)) { + ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), 0); + if (result == 1) + result = 0; + } + return result; +} +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST void ima_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) { int result; result = ima_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0); - if (result == 1 || evm_status_revalidate(xattr_name)) + if (result == 1 || evm_revalidate_status(xattr_name)) ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), 0); } +#endif diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c index f1bc3e201bd8..345ca9bc5c43 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c @@ -21,11 +21,15 @@ #include <linux/rcupdate.h> #include <linux/parser.h> #include <linux/vmalloc.h> +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST #include <linux/file.h> +#endif #include <linux/ctype.h> #include "ima.h" +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST #include "ima_digest_list.h" +#endif static DEFINE_MUTEX(ima_write_mutex); @@ -36,9 +40,11 @@ static struct dentry *ascii_runtime_measurements; static struct dentry *runtime_measurements_count; static struct dentry *violations; static struct dentry *ima_policy; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST static struct dentry *digests_count; static struct dentry *digest_list_data; static struct dentry *digest_list_data_del; +#endif bool ima_canonical_fmt; static int __init default_canonical_fmt_setup(char *str) @@ -52,6 +58,7 @@ __setup("ima_canonical_fmt", default_canonical_fmt_setup); static int valid_policy = 1; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST static ssize_t ima_show_htable_value(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { @@ -63,19 +70,55 @@ static ssize_t ima_show_htable_value(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, val = &ima_htable.violations; else if (filp->f_path.dentry == runtime_measurements_count) val = &ima_htable.len; -#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST else if (filp->f_path.dentry == digests_count) val = &ima_digests_htable.len; -#endif len = scnprintf(tmpbuf, sizeof(tmpbuf), "%li\n", atomic_long_read(val)); return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, len); } +#else +static ssize_t ima_show_htable_value(char __user *buf, size_t count, + loff_t *ppos, atomic_long_t *val) +{ + char tmpbuf[32]; /* greater than largest 'long' string value */ + ssize_t len; + + len = scnprintf(tmpbuf, sizeof(tmpbuf), "%li\n", atomic_long_read(val)); + return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, len); +} +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST static const struct file_operations ima_htable_value_ops = { .read = ima_show_htable_value, .llseek = generic_file_llseek, }; +#else +static ssize_t ima_show_htable_violations(struct file *filp, + char __user *buf, + size_t count, loff_t *ppos) +{ + return ima_show_htable_value(buf, count, ppos, &ima_htable.violations); +} + +static const struct file_operations ima_htable_violations_ops = { + .read = ima_show_htable_violations, + .llseek = generic_file_llseek, +}; + +static ssize_t ima_show_measurements_count(struct file *filp, + char __user *buf, + size_t count, loff_t *ppos) +{ + return ima_show_htable_value(buf, count, ppos, &ima_htable.len); + +} + +static const struct file_operations ima_measurements_count_ops = { + .read = ima_show_measurements_count, + .llseek = generic_file_llseek, +}; +#endif /* returns pointer to hlist_node */ static void *ima_measurements_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos) @@ -275,6 +318,7 @@ static const struct file_operations ima_ascii_measurements_ops = { .release = seq_release, }; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST static ssize_t ima_read_file(char *path, struct dentry *dentry) { void *data = NULL; @@ -320,7 +364,6 @@ static ssize_t ima_read_file(char *path, struct dentry *dentry) rc = ima_parse_add_rule(p); } else if (dentry == digest_list_data || dentry == digest_list_data_del) { -#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST /* Only check size when adding digest lists */ if (dentry == digest_list_data && size > ima_digest_db_max_size - ima_digest_db_size) { @@ -328,7 +371,6 @@ static ssize_t ima_read_file(char *path, struct dentry *dentry) rc = -ENOMEM; break; } -#endif /* * Disable usage of digest lists if not measured * or appraised. @@ -343,12 +385,10 @@ static ssize_t ima_read_file(char *path, struct dentry *dentry) if (rc < 0) break; -#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST else if (dentry == digest_list_data) pr_debug("digest imported, current DB size: %d\n", ima_digest_db_size); else if (dentry == digest_list_data_del) pr_debug("digest deleted, current DB size: %d\n", ima_digest_db_size); -#endif size -= rc; } @@ -461,6 +501,104 @@ static enum ima_fs_flags ima_get_dentry_flag(struct dentry *dentry) return flag; } +#else +static ssize_t ima_read_policy(char *path) +{ + void *data = NULL; + char *datap; + size_t size; + int rc, pathlen = strlen(path); + + char *p; + + /* remove \n */ + datap = path; + strsep(&datap, "\n"); + + rc = kernel_read_file_from_path(path, 0, &data, INT_MAX, NULL, + READING_POLICY); + if (rc < 0) { + pr_err("Unable to open file: %s (%d)", path, rc); + return rc; + } + size = rc; + rc = 0; + + datap = data; + while (size > 0 && (p = strsep(&datap, "\n"))) { + pr_debug("rule: %s\n", p); + rc = ima_parse_add_rule(p); + if (rc < 0) + break; + size -= rc; + } + + vfree(data); + if (rc < 0) + return rc; + else if (size) + return -EINVAL; + else + return pathlen; +} + +static ssize_t ima_write_policy(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, + size_t datalen, loff_t *ppos) +{ + char *data; + ssize_t result; + + if (datalen >= PAGE_SIZE) + datalen = PAGE_SIZE - 1; + + /* No partial writes. */ + result = -EINVAL; + if (*ppos != 0) + goto out; + + data = memdup_user_nul(buf, datalen); + if (IS_ERR(data)) { + result = PTR_ERR(data); + goto out; + } + + result = mutex_lock_interruptible(&ima_write_mutex); + if (result < 0) + goto out_free; + + if (data[0] == '/') { + result = ima_read_policy(data); + } else if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY) { + pr_err("signed policy file (specified as an absolute pathname) required\n"); + integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL, NULL, + "policy_update", "signed policy required", + 1, 0); + result = -EACCES; + } else { + result = ima_parse_add_rule(data); + } + mutex_unlock(&ima_write_mutex); +out_free: + kfree(data); +out: + if (result < 0) + valid_policy = 0; + + return result; +} + +static struct dentry *ima_dir; +static struct dentry *ima_symlink; +static struct dentry *binary_runtime_measurements; +static struct dentry *ascii_runtime_measurements; +static struct dentry *runtime_measurements_count; +static struct dentry *violations; +static struct dentry *ima_policy; + +enum ima_fs_flags { + IMA_FS_BUSY, +}; +#endif static unsigned long ima_fs_flags; @@ -473,6 +611,7 @@ static const struct seq_operations ima_policy_seqops = { }; #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST /* * ima_open_data_upload: sequentialize access to the data upload interface */ @@ -568,6 +707,79 @@ static const struct file_operations ima_data_upload_ops = { .release = ima_release_data_upload, .llseek = generic_file_llseek, }; +#else +/* + * ima_open_policy: sequentialize access to the policy file + */ +static int ima_open_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) +{ + if (!(filp->f_flags & O_WRONLY)) { +#ifndef CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY + return -EACCES; +#else + if ((filp->f_flags & O_ACCMODE) != O_RDONLY) + return -EACCES; + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; + return seq_open(filp, &ima_policy_seqops); +#endif + } + if (test_and_set_bit(IMA_FS_BUSY, &ima_fs_flags)) + return -EBUSY; + return 0; +} + +/* + * ima_release_policy - start using the new measure policy rules. + * + * Initially, ima_measure points to the default policy rules, now + * point to the new policy rules, and remove the securityfs policy file, + * assuming a valid policy. + */ +static int ima_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) +{ + const char *cause = valid_policy ? "completed" : "failed"; + + if ((file->f_flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_RDONLY) + return seq_release(inode, file); + + if (valid_policy && ima_check_policy() < 0) { + cause = "failed"; + valid_policy = 0; + } + + pr_info("policy update %s\n", cause); + integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL, NULL, + "policy_update", cause, !valid_policy, 0); + + if (!valid_policy) { + ima_delete_rules(); + valid_policy = 1; + clear_bit(IMA_FS_BUSY, &ima_fs_flags); + return 0; + } + + ima_update_policy(); +#if !defined(CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY) && !defined(CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY) + securityfs_remove(ima_policy); + ima_policy = NULL; +#elif defined(CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY) + clear_bit(IMA_FS_BUSY, &ima_fs_flags); +#elif defined(CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY) + inode->i_mode &= ~S_IWUSR; +#endif + return 0; +} + +static const struct file_operations ima_measure_policy_ops = { + .open = ima_open_policy, + .write = ima_write_policy, + .read = seq_read, + .release = ima_release_policy, + .llseek = generic_file_llseek, +}; + +#endif int __init ima_fs_init(void) { @@ -594,6 +806,7 @@ int __init ima_fs_init(void) if (IS_ERR(ascii_runtime_measurements)) goto out; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST runtime_measurements_count = securityfs_create_file("runtime_measurements_count", S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, ima_dir, NULL, @@ -613,7 +826,6 @@ int __init ima_fs_init(void) if (IS_ERR(ima_policy)) goto out; -#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST digests_count = securityfs_create_file("digests_count", S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, ima_dir, NULL, &ima_htable_value_ops); @@ -631,12 +843,34 @@ int __init ima_fs_init(void) &ima_data_upload_ops); if (IS_ERR(digest_list_data_del)) goto out; +#else + runtime_measurements_count = + securityfs_create_file("runtime_measurements_count", + S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, ima_dir, NULL, + &ima_measurements_count_ops); + if (IS_ERR(runtime_measurements_count)) + goto out; + + violations = + securityfs_create_file("violations", S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, + ima_dir, NULL, &ima_htable_violations_ops); + if (IS_ERR(violations)) + goto out; + + ima_policy = securityfs_create_file("policy", POLICY_FILE_FLAGS, + ima_dir, NULL, + &ima_measure_policy_ops); + if (IS_ERR(ima_policy)) + goto out; + #endif return 0; out: +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST securityfs_remove(digest_list_data_del); securityfs_remove(digest_list_data); securityfs_remove(digests_count); +#endif securityfs_remove(ima_policy); securityfs_remove(violations); securityfs_remove(runtime_measurements_count); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c index 913d6b879b0b..da47d366a98c 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c @@ -84,9 +84,15 @@ static int __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(void) goto err_out; } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, NULL, boot_aggregate_name, CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX, NULL); +#else + result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, NULL, + boot_aggregate_name, + CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX); +#endif if (result < 0) { ima_free_template_entry(entry); audit_cause = "store_entry"; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 999d5904cce0..fc1af21b3ad8 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -28,7 +28,9 @@ #include <linux/fs.h> #include "ima.h" +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST #include "ima_digest_list.h" +#endif #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE int ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE; @@ -38,12 +40,14 @@ int ima_appraise; int ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST /* Actions (measure/appraisal) for which digest lists can be used */ int ima_digest_list_actions; /* PCR used for digest list measurements */ int ima_digest_list_pcr = -1; /* Flag to include standard measurement if digest list PCR is specified */ bool ima_plus_standard_pcr; +#endif static int hash_setup_done; @@ -156,6 +160,7 @@ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file, "invalid_pcr", "open_writers"); } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST static enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len) { @@ -209,6 +214,7 @@ static int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, ret = 0; return ret; } +#endif static void ima_check_last_writer(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct inode *inode, struct file *file) @@ -268,7 +274,9 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, const char *pathname = NULL; int rc = 0, action, must_appraise = 0; int pcr = CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST struct ima_digest *found_digest; +#endif struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value = NULL; struct modsig *modsig = NULL; int xattr_len = 0; @@ -398,28 +406,42 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, if (!pathbuf) /* ima_rdwr_violation possibly pre-fetched */ pathname = ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf, filename); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (!pathname || strlen(pathname) > IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX) pathname = file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name; found_digest = ima_lookup_digest(iint->ima_hash->digest, hash_algo, COMPACT_FILE); +#endif if (action & IMA_MEASURE) +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST ima_store_measurement(iint, file, pathname, xattr_value, xattr_len, modsig, pcr, template_desc, ima_digest_allow(found_digest, IMA_MEASURE)); +#else + ima_store_measurement(iint, file, pathname, + xattr_value, xattr_len, modsig, pcr, + template_desc); +#endif if (rc == 0 && (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)) { rc = ima_check_blacklist(iint, modsig, pcr); if (rc != -EPERM) { inode_lock(inode); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST rc = ima_appraise_measurement(func, iint, file, pathname, xattr_value, xattr_len, modsig, ima_digest_allow(found_digest, IMA_APPRAISE)); +#else + rc = ima_appraise_measurement(func, iint, file, + pathname, xattr_value, + xattr_len, modsig); +#endif inode_unlock(inode); } if (!rc) @@ -568,15 +590,23 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask) { u32 secid; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST int rc; +#endif security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST rc = process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0, mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC | MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK); if (ima_current_is_parser() && !rc) ima_check_measured_appraised(file); return rc; +#else + return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0, + mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC | + MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK); +#endif } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check); @@ -739,7 +769,9 @@ const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = { [READING_KEXEC_IMAGE] = KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK, [READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS] = KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK, [READING_POLICY] = POLICY_CHECK, +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST [READING_DIGEST_LIST] = DIGEST_LIST_CHECK +#endif }; /** @@ -941,7 +973,11 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size, goto out; } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST ret = ima_store_template(entry, violation, NULL, buf, pcr, NULL); +#else + ret = ima_store_template(entry, violation, NULL, buf, pcr); +#endif if (ret < 0) { audit_cause = "store_entry"; ima_free_template_entry(entry); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 274f4c7c99f4..3e14b55ecf0f 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -21,7 +21,9 @@ #include <linux/ima.h> #include "ima.h" +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST #include "ima_digest_list.h" +#endif /* flags definitions */ #define IMA_FUNC 0x0001 @@ -35,7 +37,9 @@ #define IMA_PCR 0x0100 #define IMA_FSNAME 0x0200 #define IMA_KEYRINGS 0x0400 +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST #define IMA_PARSER 0x0800 +#endif #define UNKNOWN 0 #define MEASURE 0x0001 /* same as IMA_MEASURE */ @@ -58,7 +62,11 @@ enum lsm_rule_types { LSM_OBJ_USER, LSM_OBJ_ROLE, LSM_OBJ_TYPE, LSM_SUBJ_USER, LSM_SUBJ_ROLE, LSM_SUBJ_TYPE }; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST enum policy_types { ORIGINAL_TCB = 1, DEFAULT_TCB, EXEC_TCB }; +#else +enum policy_types { ORIGINAL_TCB = 1, DEFAULT_TCB }; +#endif enum policy_rule_list { IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY = 1, IMA_CUSTOM_POLICY }; @@ -145,11 +153,13 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry default_measurement_rules[] __ro_after_init = { {.action = MEASURE, .func = MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC}, {.action = MEASURE, .func = FIRMWARE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC}, {.action = MEASURE, .func = POLICY_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC}, +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST {.action = MEASURE, .func = DIGEST_LIST_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC}, }; static struct ima_rule_entry ima_parser_measure_rule __ro_after_init = { .action = MEASURE, .flags = IMA_PARSER +#endif }; static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules[] __ro_after_init = { @@ -181,12 +191,14 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules[] __ro_after_init = { #endif }; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST static struct ima_rule_entry appraise_exec_rules[] __ro_after_init = { {.action = APPRAISE, .func = BPRM_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED}, {.action = APPRAISE, .func = MMAP_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED}, }; +#endif static struct ima_rule_entry build_appraise_rules[] __ro_after_init = { #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_MODULE_SIGS @@ -216,6 +228,7 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry secure_boot_rules[] __ro_after_init = { .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED}, {.action = APPRAISE, .func = POLICY_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED}, +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST {.action = APPRAISE, .func = DIGEST_LIST_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED}, }; @@ -223,6 +236,7 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry secure_boot_rules[] __ro_after_init = { static struct ima_rule_entry ima_parser_appraise_rule __ro_after_init = { .action = APPRAISE, .flags = IMA_PARSER | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED +#endif }; /* An array of architecture specific rules */ @@ -246,8 +260,10 @@ static int __init default_measure_policy_setup(char *str) __setup("ima_tcb", default_measure_policy_setup); static bool ima_use_appraise_tcb __initdata; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST static bool ima_use_appraise_exec_tcb __initdata; static bool ima_use_appraise_exec_immutable __initdata; +#endif static bool ima_use_secure_boot __initdata; static bool ima_fail_unverifiable_sigs __ro_after_init; static int __init policy_setup(char *str) @@ -259,14 +275,18 @@ static int __init policy_setup(char *str) continue; if ((strcmp(p, "tcb") == 0) && !ima_policy) ima_policy = DEFAULT_TCB; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST else if ((strcmp(p, "exec_tcb") == 0) && !ima_policy) ima_policy = EXEC_TCB; +#endif else if (strcmp(p, "appraise_tcb") == 0) ima_use_appraise_tcb = true; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST else if (strcmp(p, "appraise_exec_tcb") == 0) ima_use_appraise_exec_tcb = true; else if (strcmp(p, "appraise_exec_immutable") == 0) ima_use_appraise_exec_immutable = true; +#endif else if (strcmp(p, "secure_boot") == 0) ima_use_secure_boot = true; else if (strcmp(p, "fail_securely") == 0) @@ -569,9 +589,11 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode, if ((rule->flags & IMA_FOWNER) && !rule->fowner_op(inode->i_uid, rule->fowner)) return false; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if ((rule->flags & IMA_PARSER) && !ima_current_is_parser()) return false; +#endif for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) { int rc = 0; u32 osid; @@ -752,19 +774,27 @@ static int ima_appraise_flag(enum ima_hooks func) return IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY; else if (func == KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK) return IMA_APPRAISE_KEXEC; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST else if (func == DIGEST_LIST_CHECK) return IMA_APPRAISE_DIGEST_LIST; +#endif return 0; } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST static void __init add_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *entries, int count, enum policy_rule_list policy_rule) +#else +static void add_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *entries, int count, + enum policy_rule_list policy_rule) +#endif { int i = 0; for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { struct ima_rule_entry *entry; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (ima_policy == EXEC_TCB) { if (entries == dont_measure_rules) if ((entries[i].flags & IMA_FSMAGIC) && @@ -792,6 +822,7 @@ static void __init add_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *entries, int count, (entries[i].flags & IMA_FUNC) && entries[i].func == BPRM_CHECK) entries[i].flags |= IMA_META_IMMUTABLE_REQUIRED; +#endif if (policy_rule & IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY) list_add_tail(&entries[i].list, &ima_default_rules); @@ -879,8 +910,10 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void) ARRAY_SIZE(original_measurement_rules), IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY); break; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST case EXEC_TCB: fallthrough; +#endif case DEFAULT_TCB: add_rules(default_measurement_rules, ARRAY_SIZE(default_measurement_rules), @@ -889,8 +922,10 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void) break; } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (ima_policy) add_rules(&ima_parser_measure_rule, 1, IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY); +#endif /* * Based on runtime secure boot flags, insert arch specific measurement @@ -909,7 +944,11 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void) * Insert the builtin "secure_boot" policy rules requiring file * signatures, prior to other appraise rules. */ +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (ima_use_secure_boot || ima_use_appraise_exec_tcb) +#else + if (ima_use_secure_boot) +#endif add_rules(secure_boot_rules, ARRAY_SIZE(secure_boot_rules), IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY); @@ -929,11 +968,16 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void) IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY | IMA_CUSTOM_POLICY); } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (ima_use_appraise_tcb || ima_use_appraise_exec_tcb) +#else + if (ima_use_appraise_tcb) +#endif add_rules(default_appraise_rules, ARRAY_SIZE(default_appraise_rules), IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (ima_use_appraise_exec_tcb) add_rules(appraise_exec_rules, ARRAY_SIZE(appraise_exec_rules), @@ -942,6 +986,7 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void) if (ima_use_secure_boot || ima_use_appraise_tcb || ima_use_appraise_exec_tcb) add_rules(&ima_parser_appraise_rule, 1, IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY); +#endif ima_update_policy_flag(); } @@ -1002,7 +1047,11 @@ enum { Opt_uid_lt, Opt_euid_lt, Opt_fowner_lt, Opt_appraise_type, Opt_appraise_flag, Opt_permit_directio, Opt_pcr, Opt_template, Opt_keyrings, +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST Opt_parser, Opt_err +#else + Opt_err +#endif }; static const match_table_t policy_tokens = { @@ -1039,7 +1088,9 @@ static const match_table_t policy_tokens = { {Opt_pcr, "pcr=%s"}, {Opt_template, "template=%s"}, {Opt_keyrings, "keyrings=%s"}, +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST {Opt_parser, "parser"}, +#endif {Opt_err, NULL} }; @@ -1134,9 +1185,14 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) if (entry->action != MEASURE && entry->flags & IMA_PCR) return false; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (entry->action != APPRAISE && entry->flags & (IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED | IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED | IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST | IMA_META_IMMUTABLE_REQUIRED)) +#else + if (entry->action != APPRAISE && + entry->flags & (IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED | IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED | IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST)) +#endif return false; /* @@ -1162,13 +1218,19 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) case POST_SETATTR: case FIRMWARE_CHECK: case POLICY_CHECK: +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST case DIGEST_LIST_CHECK: +#endif if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_FSMAGIC | IMA_UID | IMA_FOWNER | IMA_FSUUID | IMA_INMASK | IMA_EUID | IMA_PCR | IMA_FSNAME | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED | +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO | IMA_META_IMMUTABLE_REQUIRED | IMA_PARSER)) +#else + IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO)) +#endif return false; break; @@ -1180,8 +1242,12 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) IMA_INMASK | IMA_EUID | IMA_PCR | IMA_FSNAME | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED | IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO | IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED | +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST | IMA_META_IMMUTABLE_REQUIRED)) +#else + IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST)) +#endif return false; break; @@ -1338,8 +1404,10 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS) && strcmp(args[0].from, "KEY_CHECK") == 0) entry->func = KEY_CHECK; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "DIGEST_LIST_CHECK") == 0) entry->func = DIGEST_LIST_CHECK; +#endif else result = -EINVAL; if (!result) @@ -1526,8 +1594,10 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) strcmp(args[0].from, "imasig|modsig") == 0) entry->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED | IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "meta_immutable") == 0) entry->flags |= IMA_META_IMMUTABLE_REQUIRED; +#endif else result = -EINVAL; break; @@ -1546,8 +1616,12 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) ima_log_string(ab, "pcr", args[0].from); result = kstrtoint(args[0].from, 10, &entry->pcr); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (result || INVALID_PCR(entry->pcr) || entry->pcr == ima_digest_list_pcr) +#else + if (result || INVALID_PCR(entry->pcr)) +#endif result = -EINVAL; else entry->flags |= IMA_PCR; @@ -1574,10 +1648,12 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) &(template_desc->fields), &(template_desc->num_fields)); entry->template = template_desc; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST break; case Opt_parser: audit_log_format(ab, "parser "); entry->flags |= IMA_PARSER; +#endif break; case Opt_err: ima_log_string(ab, "UNKNOWN", p); @@ -1849,8 +1925,10 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) seq_puts(m, " "); } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (entry->flags & IMA_PARSER) seq_puts(m, "parser "); +#endif for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) { if (entry->lsm[i].rule) { @@ -1893,8 +1971,10 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) } if (entry->flags & IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST) seq_puts(m, "appraise_flag=check_blacklist "); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (entry->flags & IMA_META_IMMUTABLE_REQUIRED) seq_puts(m, "appraise_type=meta_immutable "); +#endif if (entry->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO) seq_puts(m, "permit_directio "); rcu_read_unlock(); diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h index 77e6819e8db8..d9cf29e286a9 100644 --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h @@ -14,10 +14,13 @@ #include <linux/types.h> #include <linux/integrity.h> +#include <crypto/sha1.h> #include <crypto/sha2.h> #include <linux/key.h> #include <linux/audit.h> +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST #include <linux/hash_info.h> +#endif /* iint action cache flags */ #define IMA_MEASURE 0x00000001 @@ -40,7 +43,9 @@ #define IMA_FAIL_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGS 0x10000000 #define IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED 0x20000000 #define IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST 0x40000000 +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST #define IMA_META_IMMUTABLE_REQUIRED 0x80000000 +#endif #define IMA_DO_MASK (IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_AUDIT | \ IMA_HASH | IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK) @@ -72,7 +77,9 @@ #define IMA_CHANGE_ATTR 2 #define IMA_DIGSIG 3 #define IMA_MUST_MEASURE 4 +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST #define IMA_DIGEST_LIST 5 +#endif enum evm_ima_xattr_type { IMA_XATTR_DIGEST = 0x01, @@ -80,7 +87,9 @@ enum evm_ima_xattr_type { EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG, IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG, EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG, +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_LIST, +#endif IMA_XATTR_LAST }; @@ -92,7 +101,11 @@ struct evm_ima_xattr_data { /* Only used in the EVM HMAC code. */ struct evm_xattr { struct evm_ima_xattr_data data; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST u8 digest[SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE]; +#else + u8 digest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; +#endif } __packed; #define IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE 64 @@ -144,6 +157,7 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache { struct ima_digest_data *ima_hash; }; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST enum compact_types { COMPACT_KEY, COMPACT_PARSER, COMPACT_FILE, COMPACT_METADATA, COMPACT__LAST }; enum compact_modifiers { COMPACT_MOD_IMMUTABLE, COMPACT_MOD__LAST }; @@ -162,7 +176,6 @@ static inline bool ima_digest_is_immutable(struct ima_digest *digest) return (digest->modifiers & (1 << COMPACT_MOD_IMMUTABLE)); } -#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST struct ima_digest *ima_lookup_digest(u8 *digest, enum hash_algo algo, enum compact_types type); struct ima_digest *ima_digest_allow(struct ima_digest *digest, int action); diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 5678d4e334fb..11c859a9b8ed 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -1362,7 +1362,9 @@ void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) return; call_void_hook(inode_post_setxattr, dentry, name, value, size, flags); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST ima_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size); +#endif evm_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size); } -- 2.33.0

2 1

[PATCH v4 OLK-5.10 0/4] arm64: support batched/deferred tlb shootdown during page reclamation/migration
by Jinjiang Tu 21 Aug '23

21 Aug '23

Support batched/deferred tlb shootdown during page reclamation/migration for arm64. Changelog: v4 - define macro DEFINE_TLB_UBC v3: - fix kabi breakage for task_struct->tlb_ubc v2: - fix kabi breakage for mm_struct->tlb_flush_batched Anshuman Khandual (1): mm/tlbbatch: introduce arch_tlbbatch_should_defer() Barry Song (2): mm/tlbbatch: rename and extend some functions arm64: support batched/deferred tlb shootdown during page reclamation/migration Yicong Yang (1): mm/tlbbatch: introduce arch_flush_tlb_batched_pending() .../features/vm/TLB/arch-support.txt | 2 +- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 1 + arch/arm64/include/asm/tlbbatch.h | 12 +++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/tlbflush.h | 44 +++++++++++++++++-- arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h | 22 +++++++++- include/linux/mm_types.h | 4 +- include/linux/mm_types_task.h | 29 ++++++++++-- include/linux/sched.h | 3 ++ mm/rmap.c | 35 ++++++++------- 9 files changed, 126 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/tlbbatch.h -- 2.25.1

2 5

[PATCH OLK-5.10] Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix use-after-free in l2cap_sock_ready_cb
by Dong Chenchen 21 Aug '23

21 Aug '23

From: Sungwoo Kim <iam(a)sung-woo.kim> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.189 commit 06f87c96216bc5cd1094c23492274f77f1d5dd3b category: bugfix bugzilla: 189135, https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I7SXVG CVE: CVE-2023-40283 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 1728137b33c00d5a2b5110ed7aafb42e7c32e4a1 upstream. l2cap_sock_release(sk) frees sk. However, sk's children are still alive and point to the already free'd sk's address. To fix this, l2cap_sock_release(sk) also cleans sk's children. ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in l2cap_sock_ready_cb+0xb7/0x100 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c:1650 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888104617aa8 by task kworker/u3:0/276 CPU: 0 PID: 276 Comm: kworker/u3:0 Not tainted 6.2.0-00001-gef397bd4d5fb-dirty #59 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: hci2 hci_rx_work Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x72/0x95 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:306 [inline] print_report+0x175/0x478 mm/kasan/report.c:417 kasan_report+0xb1/0x130 mm/kasan/report.c:517 l2cap_sock_ready_cb+0xb7/0x100 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c:1650 l2cap_chan_ready+0x10e/0x1e0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:1386 l2cap_config_req+0x753/0x9f0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:4480 l2cap_bredr_sig_cmd net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:5739 [inline] l2cap_sig_channel net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:6509 [inline] l2cap_recv_frame+0xe2e/0x43c0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7788 l2cap_recv_acldata+0x6ed/0x7e0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:8506 hci_acldata_packet net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:3813 [inline] hci_rx_work+0x66e/0xbc0 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4048 process_one_work+0x4ea/0x8e0 kernel/workqueue.c:2289 worker_thread+0x364/0x8e0 kernel/workqueue.c:2436 kthread+0x1b9/0x200 kernel/kthread.c:376 ret_from_fork+0x2c/0x50 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:308 </TASK> Allocated by task 288: kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:45 kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:52 ____kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:374 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc+0x82/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:383 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:211 [inline] __do_kmalloc_node mm/slab_common.c:968 [inline] __kmalloc+0x5a/0x140 mm/slab_common.c:981 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:584 [inline] sk_prot_alloc+0x113/0x1f0 net/core/sock.c:2040 sk_alloc+0x36/0x3c0 net/core/sock.c:2093 l2cap_sock_alloc.constprop.0+0x39/0x1c0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c:1852 l2cap_sock_create+0x10d/0x220 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c:1898 bt_sock_create+0x183/0x290 net/bluetooth/af_bluetooth.c:132 __sock_create+0x226/0x380 net/socket.c:1518 sock_create net/socket.c:1569 [inline] __sys_socket_create net/socket.c:1606 [inline] __sys_socket_create net/socket.c:1591 [inline] __sys_socket+0x112/0x200 net/socket.c:1639 __do_sys_socket net/socket.c:1652 [inline] __se_sys_socket net/socket.c:1650 [inline] __x64_sys_socket+0x40/0x50 net/socket.c:1650 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc Freed by task 288: kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:45 kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:52 kasan_save_free_info+0x2e/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:523 ____kasan_slab_free mm/kasan/common.c:236 [inline] ____kasan_slab_free mm/kasan/common.c:200 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x10a/0x190 mm/kasan/common.c:244 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:177 [inline] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1781 [inline] slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1807 [inline] slab_free mm/slub.c:3787 [inline] __kmem_cache_free+0x88/0x1f0 mm/slub.c:3800 sk_prot_free net/core/sock.c:2076 [inline] __sk_destruct+0x347/0x430 net/core/sock.c:2168 sk_destruct+0x9c/0xb0 net/core/sock.c:2183 __sk_free+0x82/0x220 net/core/sock.c:2194 sk_free+0x7c/0xa0 net/core/sock.c:2205 sock_put include/net/sock.h:1991 [inline] l2cap_sock_kill+0x256/0x2b0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c:1257 l2cap_sock_release+0x1a7/0x220 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c:1428 __sock_release+0x80/0x150 net/socket.c:650 sock_close+0x19/0x30 net/socket.c:1368 __fput+0x17a/0x5c0 fs/file_table.c:320 task_work_run+0x132/0x1c0 kernel/task_work.c:179 resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:49 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:171 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x113/0x120 kernel/entry/common.c:203 __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:285 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x21/0x50 kernel/entry/common.c:296 do_syscall_64+0x4c/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888104617800 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024 The buggy address is located 680 bytes inside of 1024-byte region [ffff888104617800, ffff888104617c00) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:00000000dbca6a80 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff888104614000 pfn:0x104614 head:00000000dbca6a80 order:2 compound_mapcount:0 subpages_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0 flags: 0x200000000010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=2) raw: 0200000000010200 ffff888100041dc0 ffffea0004212c10 ffffea0004234b10 raw: ffff888104614000 0000000000080002 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888104617980: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff888104617a00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb >ffff888104617a80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff888104617b00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff888104617b80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ================================================================== Ack: This bug is found by FuzzBT with a modified Syzkaller. Other contributors are Ruoyu Wu and Hui Peng. Signed-off-by: Sungwoo Kim <iam(a)sung-woo.kim> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c index d2c678520599..63bfbb5918fe 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c @@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ static const struct proto_ops l2cap_sock_ops; static void l2cap_sock_init(struct sock *sk, struct sock *parent); static struct sock *l2cap_sock_alloc(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int proto, gfp_t prio, int kern); +static void l2cap_sock_cleanup_listen(struct sock *parent); bool l2cap_is_socket(struct socket *sock) { @@ -1414,6 +1415,7 @@ static int l2cap_sock_release(struct socket *sock) if (!sk) return 0; + l2cap_sock_cleanup_listen(sk); bt_sock_unlink(&l2cap_sk_list, sk); err = l2cap_sock_shutdown(sock, SHUT_RDWR); -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/4] fix CVE-2023-20593 for openEuler
by Yu Liao 21 Aug '23

21 Aug '23

AMD Zen2 architecture Zenbleed remote execution vulnerability. The optimal fix is through microcode but in the case the proper microcode revision has not been applied, enable a fallback fix for openEuler. Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo (1): [Backport] tools arch x86: Sync the msr-index.h copy with the kernel sources Borislav Petkov (AMD) (2): [Backport] x86/cpu/amd: Move the errata checking functionality up [Backport] x86/cpu/amd: Add a Zenbleed fix Cristian Ciocaltea (1): [Backport] x86/cpu/amd: Enable Zenbleed fix for AMD Custom APU 0405 arch/x86/include/asm/microcode.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/microcode_amd.h | 2 + arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 200 ++++++++++++++++--------- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 1 + tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 1 + 6 files changed, 134 insertions(+), 72 deletions(-) -- 2.25.1

2 5

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/2] ksmbd: fix cve-2023-38432
by Long Li 21 Aug '23

21 Aug '23

Long Li (1): ksmbd: validate command request size Namjae Jeon (1): ksmbd: validate command payload size fs/ksmbd/smb2misc.c | 27 ++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) -- 2.31.1

2 3

[PATCH v3 OLK-5.10 0/4] arm64: support batched/deferred tlb shootdown during page reclamation/migration
by Jinjiang Tu 21 Aug '23

21 Aug '23

Support batched/deferred tlb shootdown during page reclamation/migration for arm64. Changelog: v2: - fix kabi breakage for task_struct->tlb_ubc v1: - fix kabi breakage for mm_struct->tlb_flush_batched Anshuman Khandual (1): mm/tlbbatch: introduce arch_tlbbatch_should_defer() Barry Song (2): mm/tlbbatch: rename and extend some functions arm64: support batched/deferred tlb shootdown during page reclamation/migration Yicong Yang (1): mm/tlbbatch: introduce arch_flush_tlb_batched_pending() .../features/vm/TLB/arch-support.txt | 2 +- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 1 + arch/arm64/include/asm/tlbbatch.h | 12 +++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/tlbflush.h | 44 +++++++++++++++++-- arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h | 22 +++++++++- include/linux/mm_types.h | 4 +- include/linux/mm_types_task.h | 29 ++++++++++-- include/linux/sched.h | 3 ++ mm/rmap.c | 33 ++++++++------ 9 files changed, 127 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/tlbbatch.h -- 2.25.1

2 5

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix use-after-free in l2cap_sock_ready_cb
by Dong Chenchen 20 Aug '23

20 Aug '23

From: Sungwoo Kim <iam(a)sung-woo.kim> stable inclusion from stable-v4.19.290 commit 82cdb2ccbe43337798393369f0ceb98699fe6037 category: bugfix bugzilla: 189135, https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I7SXVG CVE: CVE-2023-40283 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 1728137b33c00d5a2b5110ed7aafb42e7c32e4a1 upstream. l2cap_sock_release(sk) frees sk. However, sk's children are still alive and point to the already free'd sk's address. To fix this, l2cap_sock_release(sk) also cleans sk's children. ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in l2cap_sock_ready_cb+0xb7/0x100 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c:1650 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888104617aa8 by task kworker/u3:0/276 CPU: 0 PID: 276 Comm: kworker/u3:0 Not tainted 6.2.0-00001-gef397bd4d5fb-dirty #59 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: hci2 hci_rx_work Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x72/0x95 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:306 [inline] print_report+0x175/0x478 mm/kasan/report.c:417 kasan_report+0xb1/0x130 mm/kasan/report.c:517 l2cap_sock_ready_cb+0xb7/0x100 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c:1650 l2cap_chan_ready+0x10e/0x1e0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:1386 l2cap_config_req+0x753/0x9f0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:4480 l2cap_bredr_sig_cmd net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:5739 [inline] l2cap_sig_channel net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:6509 [inline] l2cap_recv_frame+0xe2e/0x43c0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7788 l2cap_recv_acldata+0x6ed/0x7e0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:8506 hci_acldata_packet net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:3813 [inline] hci_rx_work+0x66e/0xbc0 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4048 process_one_work+0x4ea/0x8e0 kernel/workqueue.c:2289 worker_thread+0x364/0x8e0 kernel/workqueue.c:2436 kthread+0x1b9/0x200 kernel/kthread.c:376 ret_from_fork+0x2c/0x50 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:308 </TASK> Allocated by task 288: kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:45 kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:52 ____kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:374 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc+0x82/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:383 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:211 [inline] __do_kmalloc_node mm/slab_common.c:968 [inline] __kmalloc+0x5a/0x140 mm/slab_common.c:981 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:584 [inline] sk_prot_alloc+0x113/0x1f0 net/core/sock.c:2040 sk_alloc+0x36/0x3c0 net/core/sock.c:2093 l2cap_sock_alloc.constprop.0+0x39/0x1c0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c:1852 l2cap_sock_create+0x10d/0x220 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c:1898 bt_sock_create+0x183/0x290 net/bluetooth/af_bluetooth.c:132 __sock_create+0x226/0x380 net/socket.c:1518 sock_create net/socket.c:1569 [inline] __sys_socket_create net/socket.c:1606 [inline] __sys_socket_create net/socket.c:1591 [inline] __sys_socket+0x112/0x200 net/socket.c:1639 __do_sys_socket net/socket.c:1652 [inline] __se_sys_socket net/socket.c:1650 [inline] __x64_sys_socket+0x40/0x50 net/socket.c:1650 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc Freed by task 288: kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:45 kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:52 kasan_save_free_info+0x2e/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:523 ____kasan_slab_free mm/kasan/common.c:236 [inline] ____kasan_slab_free mm/kasan/common.c:200 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x10a/0x190 mm/kasan/common.c:244 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:177 [inline] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1781 [inline] slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1807 [inline] slab_free mm/slub.c:3787 [inline] __kmem_cache_free+0x88/0x1f0 mm/slub.c:3800 sk_prot_free net/core/sock.c:2076 [inline] __sk_destruct+0x347/0x430 net/core/sock.c:2168 sk_destruct+0x9c/0xb0 net/core/sock.c:2183 __sk_free+0x82/0x220 net/core/sock.c:2194 sk_free+0x7c/0xa0 net/core/sock.c:2205 sock_put include/net/sock.h:1991 [inline] l2cap_sock_kill+0x256/0x2b0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c:1257 l2cap_sock_release+0x1a7/0x220 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c:1428 __sock_release+0x80/0x150 net/socket.c:650 sock_close+0x19/0x30 net/socket.c:1368 __fput+0x17a/0x5c0 fs/file_table.c:320 task_work_run+0x132/0x1c0 kernel/task_work.c:179 resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:49 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:171 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x113/0x120 kernel/entry/common.c:203 __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:285 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x21/0x50 kernel/entry/common.c:296 do_syscall_64+0x4c/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888104617800 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024 The buggy address is located 680 bytes inside of 1024-byte region [ffff888104617800, ffff888104617c00) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:00000000dbca6a80 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff888104614000 pfn:0x104614 head:00000000dbca6a80 order:2 compound_mapcount:0 subpages_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0 flags: 0x200000000010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=2) raw: 0200000000010200 ffff888100041dc0 ffffea0004212c10 ffffea0004234b10 raw: ffff888104614000 0000000000080002 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888104617980: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff888104617a00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb >ffff888104617a80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff888104617b00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff888104617b80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ================================================================== Ack: This bug is found by FuzzBT with a modified Syzkaller. Other contributors are Ruoyu Wu and Hui Peng. Signed-off-by: Sungwoo Kim <iam(a)sung-woo.kim> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c index b4f6b74c4003..bcada51cb01e 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c @@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ static const struct proto_ops l2cap_sock_ops; static void l2cap_sock_init(struct sock *sk, struct sock *parent); static struct sock *l2cap_sock_alloc(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int proto, gfp_t prio, int kern); +static void l2cap_sock_cleanup_listen(struct sock *parent); bool l2cap_is_socket(struct socket *sock) { @@ -1196,6 +1197,7 @@ static int l2cap_sock_release(struct socket *sock) if (!sk) return 0; + l2cap_sock_cleanup_listen(sk); bt_sock_unlink(&l2cap_sk_list, sk); err = l2cap_sock_shutdown(sock, 2); -- 2.25.1

2 1

2024

2023

2022

2021

2020

2019

Kernel