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[PATCH OLK-6.6 v2 0/2] CVE-2026-23319
by Pu Lehui 30 Mar '26

30 Mar '26

Kui-Feng Lee (1): bpf: export bpf_link_inc_not_zero. Lang Xu (1): bpf: Fix a UAF issue in bpf_trampoline_link_cgroup_shim include/linux/bpf.h | 6 ++++++ kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 3 ++- kernel/bpf/trampoline.c | 4 +--- 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH OLK-6.6] bpf: Fix stack-out-of-bounds write in devmap
by Pu Lehui 30 Mar '26

30 Mar '26

From: Kohei Enju <kohei(a)enjuk.jp> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.130 commit 8a95fb9df1105b1618872c2846a6c01e3ba20b45 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13922 CVE: CVE-2026-23359 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit b7bf516c3ecd9a2aae2dc2635178ab87b734fef1 ] get_upper_ifindexes() iterates over all upper devices and writes their indices into an array without checking bounds. Also the callers assume that the max number of upper devices is MAX_NEST_DEV and allocate excluded_devices[1+MAX_NEST_DEV] on the stack, but that assumption is not correct and the number of upper devices could be larger than MAX_NEST_DEV (e.g., many macvlans), causing a stack-out-of-bounds write. Add a max parameter to get_upper_ifindexes() to avoid the issue. When there are too many upper devices, return -EOVERFLOW and abort the redirect. To reproduce, create more than MAX_NEST_DEV(8) macvlans on a device with an XDP program attached using BPF_F_BROADCAST | BPF_F_EXCLUDE_INGRESS. Then send a packet to the device to trigger the XDP redirect path. Reported-by: syzbot+10cc7f13760b31bd2e61(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/698c4ce3.050a0220.340abe.000b.GAE@google.com/T/ Fixes: aeea1b86f936 ("bpf, devmap: Exclude XDP broadcast to master device") Reviewed-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kohei Enju <kohei(a)enjuk.jp> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260225053506.4738-1-kohei@enjuk.jp Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui <pulehui(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/bpf/devmap.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/devmap.c b/kernel/bpf/devmap.c index 5f2356b47b2d..3bdec239be61 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/devmap.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/devmap.c @@ -577,18 +577,22 @@ static inline bool is_ifindex_excluded(int *excluded, int num_excluded, int ifin } /* Get ifindex of each upper device. 'indexes' must be able to hold at - * least MAX_NEST_DEV elements. - * Returns the number of ifindexes added. + * least 'max' elements. + * Returns the number of ifindexes added, or -EOVERFLOW if there are too + * many upper devices. */ -static int get_upper_ifindexes(struct net_device *dev, int *indexes) +static int get_upper_ifindexes(struct net_device *dev, int *indexes, int max) { struct net_device *upper; struct list_head *iter; int n = 0; netdev_for_each_upper_dev_rcu(dev, upper, iter) { + if (n >= max) + return -EOVERFLOW; indexes[n++] = upper->ifindex; } + return n; } @@ -604,7 +608,11 @@ int dev_map_enqueue_multi(struct xdp_frame *xdpf, struct net_device *dev_rx, int err; if (exclude_ingress) { - num_excluded = get_upper_ifindexes(dev_rx, excluded_devices); + num_excluded = get_upper_ifindexes(dev_rx, excluded_devices, + ARRAY_SIZE(excluded_devices) - 1); + if (num_excluded < 0) + return num_excluded; + excluded_devices[num_excluded++] = dev_rx->ifindex; } @@ -722,7 +730,11 @@ int dev_map_redirect_multi(struct net_device *dev, struct sk_buff *skb, int err; if (exclude_ingress) { - num_excluded = get_upper_ifindexes(dev, excluded_devices); + num_excluded = get_upper_ifindexes(dev, excluded_devices, + ARRAY_SIZE(excluded_devices) - 1); + if (num_excluded < 0) + return num_excluded; + excluded_devices[num_excluded++] = dev->ifindex; } -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH OLK-6.6] bpf: Fix a UAF issue in bpf_trampoline_link_cgroup_shim
by Pu Lehui 30 Mar '26

30 Mar '26

From: Lang Xu <xulang(a)uniontech.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.130 commit 9b02c5c4147f8af8ed783c8deb5df927a55c3951 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13962 CVE: CVE-2026-23319 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 56145d237385ca0e7ca9ff7b226aaf2eb8ef368b ] The root cause of this bug is that when 'bpf_link_put' reduces the refcount of 'shim_link->link.link' to zero, the resource is considered released but may still be referenced via 'tr->progs_hlist' in 'cgroup_shim_find'. The actual cleanup of 'tr->progs_hlist' in 'bpf_shim_tramp_link_release' is deferred. During this window, another process can cause a use-after-free via 'bpf_trampoline_link_cgroup_shim'. Based on Martin KaFai Lau's suggestions, I have created a simple patch. To fix this: Add an atomic non-zero check in 'bpf_trampoline_link_cgroup_shim'. Only increment the refcount if it is not already zero. Testing: I verified the fix by adding a delay in 'bpf_shim_tramp_link_release' to make the bug easier to trigger: static void bpf_shim_tramp_link_release(struct bpf_link *link) { /* ... */ if (!shim_link->trampoline) return; + msleep(100); WARN_ON_ONCE(bpf_trampoline_unlink_prog(&shim_link->link, shim_link->trampoline, NULL)); bpf_trampoline_put(shim_link->trampoline); } Before the patch, running a PoC easily reproduced the crash(almost 100%) with a call trace similar to KaiyanM's report. After the patch, the bug no longer occurs even after millions of iterations. Fixes: 69fd337a975c ("bpf: per-cgroup lsm flavor") Reported-by: Kaiyan Mei <M202472210(a)hust.edu.cn> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/3c4ebb0b.46ff8.19abab8abe2.Coremail.kaiyanm@hus… Signed-off-by: Lang Xu <xulang(a)uniontech.com> Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau(a)kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/279EEE1BA1DDB49D+20260303095217.34436-1-xulang@uni… Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui <pulehui(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/bpf/trampoline.c | 4 +--- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/trampoline.c b/kernel/bpf/trampoline.c index 08325a65835b..bb842decab0d 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/trampoline.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/trampoline.c @@ -733,10 +733,8 @@ int bpf_trampoline_link_cgroup_shim(struct bpf_prog *prog, mutex_lock(&tr->mutex); shim_link = cgroup_shim_find(tr, bpf_func); - if (shim_link) { + if (shim_link && !IS_ERR(bpf_link_inc_not_zero(&shim_link->link.link))) { /* Reusing existing shim attached by the other program. */ - bpf_link_inc(&shim_link->link.link); - mutex_unlock(&tr->mutex); bpf_trampoline_put(tr); /* bpf_trampoline_get above */ return 0; -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH OLK-6.6] bpf: Release module BTF IDR before module unload
by Pu Lehui 30 Mar '26

30 Mar '26

From: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.0-rc5 commit 146bd2a87a65aa407bb17fac70d8d583d19aba06 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/8835 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Gregory reported in [0] that the global_map_resize test when run in repeatedly ends up failing during program load. This stems from the fact that BTF reference has not dropped to zero after the previous run's module is unloaded, and the older module's BTF is still discoverable and visible. Later, in libbpf, load_module_btfs() will find the ID for this stale BTF, open its fd, and then it will be used during program load where later steps taking module reference using btf_try_get_module() fail since the underlying module for the BTF is gone. Logically, once a module is unloaded, it's associated BTF artifacts should become hidden. The BTF object inside the kernel may still remain alive as long its reference counts are alive, but it should no longer be discoverable. To fix this, let us call btf_free_id() from the MODULE_STATE_GOING case for the module unload to free the BTF associated IDR entry, and disable its discovery once module unload returns to user space. If a race happens during unload, the outcome is non-deterministic anyway. However, user space should be able to rely on the guarantee that once it has synchronously established a successful module unload, no more stale artifacts associated with this module can be obtained subsequently. Note that we must be careful to not invoke btf_free_id() in btf_put() when btf_is_module() is true now. There could be a window where the module unload drops a non-terminal reference, frees the IDR, but the same ID gets reused and the second unconditional btf_free_id() ends up releasing an unrelated entry. To avoid a special case for btf_is_module() case, set btf->id to zero to make btf_free_id() idempotent, such that we can unconditionally invoke it from btf_put(), and also from the MODULE_STATE_GOING case. Since zero is an invalid IDR, the idr_remove() should be a noop. Note that we can be sure that by the time we reach final btf_put() for btf_is_module() case, the btf_free_id() is already done, since the module itself holds the BTF reference, and it will call this function for the BTF before dropping its own reference. [0]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/cover.1773170190.git.grbell@redhat.com Fixes: 36e68442d1af ("bpf: Load and verify kernel module BTFs") Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau(a)kernel.org> Suggested-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau(a)kernel.org> Reported-by: Gregory Bell <grbell(a)redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis <emil(a)etsalapatis.com> Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor(a)gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260312205307.1346991-1-memxor@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui <pulehui(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/bpf/btf.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/btf.c b/kernel/bpf/btf.c index 7c888ee0ccc7..5d1413e95185 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/btf.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/btf.c @@ -1640,7 +1640,16 @@ static void btf_free_id(struct btf *btf) * of the _bh() version. */ spin_lock_irqsave(&btf_idr_lock, flags); - idr_remove(&btf_idr, btf->id); + if (btf->id) { + idr_remove(&btf_idr, btf->id); + /* + * Clear the id here to make this function idempotent, since it will get + * called a couple of times for module BTFs: on module unload, and then + * the final btf_put(). btf_alloc_id() starts IDs with 1, so we can use + * 0 as sentinel value. + */ + WRITE_ONCE(btf->id, 0); + } spin_unlock_irqrestore(&btf_idr_lock, flags); } @@ -7408,7 +7417,7 @@ static void bpf_btf_show_fdinfo(struct seq_file *m, struct file *filp) { const struct btf *btf = filp->private_data; - seq_printf(m, "btf_id:\t%u\n", btf->id); + seq_printf(m, "btf_id:\t%u\n", READ_ONCE(btf->id)); } #endif @@ -7500,7 +7509,7 @@ int btf_get_info_by_fd(const struct btf *btf, if (copy_from_user(&info, uinfo, info_copy)) return -EFAULT; - info.id = btf->id; + info.id = READ_ONCE(btf->id); ubtf = u64_to_user_ptr(info.btf); btf_copy = min_t(u32, btf->data_size, info.btf_size); if (copy_to_user(ubtf, btf->data, btf_copy)) @@ -7563,7 +7572,7 @@ int btf_get_fd_by_id(u32 id) u32 btf_obj_id(const struct btf *btf) { - return btf->id; + return READ_ONCE(btf->id); } bool btf_is_kernel(const struct btf *btf) @@ -7695,6 +7704,13 @@ static int btf_module_notify(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long op, if (btf_mod->module != module) continue; + /* + * For modules, we do the freeing of BTF IDR as soon as + * module goes away to disable BTF discovery, since the + * btf_try_get_module() on such BTFs will fail. This may + * be called again on btf_put(), but it's ok to do so. + */ + btf_free_id(btf_mod->btf); list_del(&btf_mod->list); if (btf_mod->sysfs_attr) sysfs_remove_bin_file(btf_kobj, btf_mod->sysfs_attr); -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] wifi: prevent A-MSDU attacks in mesh networks
by Zhang Yuwei 28 Mar '26

28 Mar '26

From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef(a)kuleuven.be> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.99 commit ec6392061de6681148b63ee6c8744da833498cdd category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/7758 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 737bb912ebbe4571195c56eba557c4d7315b26fb upstream. This patch is a mitigation to prevent the A-MSDU spoofing vulnerability for mesh networks. The initial update to the IEEE 802.11 standard, in response to the FragAttacks, missed this case (CVE-2025-27558). It can be considered a variant of CVE-2020-24588 but for mesh networks. This patch tries to detect if a standard MSDU was turned into an A-MSDU by an adversary. This is done by parsing a received A-MSDU as a standard MSDU, calculating the length of the Mesh Control header, and seeing if the 6 bytes after this header equal the start of an rfc1042 header. If equal, this is a strong indication of an ongoing attack attempt. This defense was tested with mac80211_hwsim against a mesh network that uses an empty Mesh Address Extension field, i.e., when four addresses are used, and when using a 12-byte Mesh Address Extension field, i.e., when six addresses are used. Functionality of normal MSDUs and A-MSDUs was also tested, and confirmed working, when using both an empty and 12-byte Mesh Address Extension field. It was also tested with mac80211_hwsim that A-MSDU attacks in non-mesh networks keep being detected and prevented. Note that the vulnerability being patched, and the defense being implemented, was also discussed in the following paper and in the following IEEE 802.11 presentation: https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/wisec2025.pdf https://mentor.ieee.org/802.11/dcn/25/11-25-0949-00-000m-a-msdu-mesh-spoof-… Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef(a)kuleuven.be> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250616004635.224344-1-Mathy.Vanhoef@kuleuven.be Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Wang Hai <wanghai38(a)huawei.com> --- net/wireless/util.c | 51 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 49 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/wireless/util.c b/net/wireless/util.c index 4e81210e5b24..4af280c1a6d4 100644 --- a/net/wireless/util.c +++ b/net/wireless/util.c @@ -623,6 +623,51 @@ __ieee80211_amsdu_copy(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int hlen, return frame; } +/* + * Detects if an MSDU frame was maliciously converted into an A-MSDU + * frame by an adversary. This is done by parsing the received frame + * as if it were a regular MSDU, even though the A-MSDU flag is set. + * + * For non-mesh interfaces, detection involves checking whether the + * payload, when interpreted as an MSDU, begins with a valid RFC1042 + * header. This is done by comparing the A-MSDU subheader's destination + * address to the start of the RFC1042 header. + * + * For mesh interfaces, the MSDU includes a 6-byte Mesh Control field + * and an optional variable-length Mesh Address Extension field before + * the RFC1042 header. The position of the RFC1042 header must therefore + * be calculated based on the mesh header length. + * + * Since this function intentionally parses an A-MSDU frame as an MSDU, + * it only assumes that the A-MSDU subframe header is present, and + * beyond this it performs its own bounds checks under the assumption + * that the frame is instead parsed as a non-aggregated MSDU. + */ +static bool +is_amsdu_aggregation_attack(struct ethhdr *eth, struct sk_buff *skb, + enum nl80211_iftype iftype) +{ + int offset; + + /* Non-mesh case can be directly compared */ + if (iftype != NL80211_IFTYPE_MESH_POINT) + return ether_addr_equal(eth->h_dest, rfc1042_header); + + offset = __ieee80211_get_mesh_hdrlen(eth->h_dest[0]); + if (offset == 6) { + /* Mesh case with empty address extension field */ + return ether_addr_equal(eth->h_source, rfc1042_header); + } else if (offset + ETH_ALEN <= skb->len) { + /* Mesh case with non-empty address extension field */ + u8 temp[ETH_ALEN]; + + skb_copy_bits(skb, offset, temp, ETH_ALEN); + return ether_addr_equal(temp, rfc1042_header); + } + + return false; +} + void ieee80211_amsdu_to_8023s(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sk_buff_head *list, const u8 *addr, enum nl80211_iftype iftype, const unsigned int extra_headroom, @@ -655,8 +700,10 @@ void ieee80211_amsdu_to_8023s(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sk_buff_head *list, /* the last MSDU has no padding */ if (subframe_len > remaining) goto purge; - /* mitigate A-MSDU aggregation injection attacks */ - if (ether_addr_equal(eth.h_dest, rfc1042_header)) + /* mitigate A-MSDU aggregation injection attacks, to be + * checked when processing first subframe (offset == 0). + */ + if (offset == 0 && is_amsdu_aggregation_attack(&eth, skb, iftype)) goto purge; offset += sizeof(struct ethhdr); -- 2.22.0

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[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] wifi: prevent A-MSDU attacks in mesh networks
by Zhang Yuwei 28 Mar '26

28 Mar '26

From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef(a)kuleuven.be> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.99 commit ec6392061de6681148b63ee6c8744da833498cdd category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/7758 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 737bb912ebbe4571195c56eba557c4d7315b26fb upstream. This patch is a mitigation to prevent the A-MSDU spoofing vulnerability for mesh networks. The initial update to the IEEE 802.11 standard, in response to the FragAttacks, missed this case (CVE-2025-27558). It can be considered a variant of CVE-2020-24588 but for mesh networks. This patch tries to detect if a standard MSDU was turned into an A-MSDU by an adversary. This is done by parsing a received A-MSDU as a standard MSDU, calculating the length of the Mesh Control header, and seeing if the 6 bytes after this header equal the start of an rfc1042 header. If equal, this is a strong indication of an ongoing attack attempt. This defense was tested with mac80211_hwsim against a mesh network that uses an empty Mesh Address Extension field, i.e., when four addresses are used, and when using a 12-byte Mesh Address Extension field, i.e., when six addresses are used. Functionality of normal MSDUs and A-MSDUs was also tested, and confirmed working, when using both an empty and 12-byte Mesh Address Extension field. It was also tested with mac80211_hwsim that A-MSDU attacks in non-mesh networks keep being detected and prevented. Note that the vulnerability being patched, and the defense being implemented, was also discussed in the following paper and in the following IEEE 802.11 presentation: https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/wisec2025.pdf https://mentor.ieee.org/802.11/dcn/25/11-25-0949-00-000m-a-msdu-mesh-spoof-… Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef(a)kuleuven.be> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250616004635.224344-1-Mathy.Vanhoef@kuleuven.be Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Wang Hai <wanghai38(a)huawei.com> --- net/wireless/util.c | 51 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 49 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/wireless/util.c b/net/wireless/util.c index 4e81210e5b24..dcca1b882455 100644 --- a/net/wireless/util.c +++ b/net/wireless/util.c @@ -623,6 +623,51 @@ __ieee80211_amsdu_copy(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int hlen, return frame; } +/* + * Detects if an MSDU frame was maliciously converted into an A-MSDU + * frame by an adversary. This is done by parsing the received frame + * as if it were a regular MSDU, even though the A-MSDU flag is set. + * + * For non-mesh interfaces, detection involves checking whether the + * payload, when interpreted as an MSDU, begins with a valid RFC1042 + * header. This is done by comparing the A-MSDU subheader's destination + * address to the start of the RFC1042 header. + * + * For mesh interfaces, the MSDU includes a 6-byte Mesh Control field + * and an optional variable-length Mesh Address Extension field before + * the RFC1042 header. The position of the RFC1042 header must therefore + * be calculated based on the mesh header length. + * + * Since this function intentionally parses an A-MSDU frame as an MSDU, + * it only assumes that the A-MSDU subframe header is present, and + * beyond this it performs its own bounds checks under the assumption + * that the frame is instead parsed as a non-aggregated MSDU. + */ +static bool +is_amsdu_aggregation_attack(struct ethhdr *eth, struct sk_buff *skb, + enum nl80211_iftype iftype) +{ + int offset; + + /* Non-mesh case can be directly compared */ + if (iftype != NL80211_IFTYPE_MESH_POINT) + return ether_addr_equal(eth->h_dest, rfc1042_header); + + offset = __ieee80211_get_mesh_hdrlen(eth->h_dest[0]); + if (offset == 6) { + /* Mesh case with empty address extension field */ + return ether_addr_equal(eth->h_source, rfc1042_header); + } else if (offset + ETH_ALEN <= skb->len) { + /* Mesh case with non-empty address extension field */ + u8 temp[ETH_ALEN]; + + skb_copy_bits(skb, offset, temp, ETH_ALEN); + return ether_addr_equal(temp, rfc1042_header); + } + + return false; +} + void ieee80211_amsdu_to_8023s(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sk_buff_head *list, const u8 *addr, enum nl80211_iftype iftype, const unsigned int extra_headroom, @@ -655,8 +700,10 @@ void ieee80211_amsdu_to_8023s(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sk_buff_head *list, /* the last MSDU has no padding */ if (subframe_len > remaining) goto purge; - /* mitigate A-MSDU aggregation injection attacks */ - if (ether_addr_equal(eth.h_dest, rfc1042_header)) + /* mitigate A-MSDU aggregation injection attacks, to be + * checked when processing first subframe (offset == 0). + */ + if (offset == 0 && is_amsdu_aggregation_attack(&hdr.eth, skb, iftype)) goto purge; offset += sizeof(struct ethhdr); -- 2.22.0

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[PATCH OLK-5.10] RDMA/umad: Reject negative data_len in ib_umad_write
by Liu Kai 28 Mar '26

28 Mar '26

From: YunJe Shin <yjshin0438(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.252 commit 1371ef6b1ecf3676b8942f5dfb3634fb0648128e category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13865 CVE: CVE-2026-23243 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 5551b02fdbfd85a325bb857f3a8f9c9f33397ed2 upstream. ib_umad_write computes data_len from user-controlled count and the MAD header sizes. With a mismatched user MAD header size and RMPP header length, data_len can become negative and reach ib_create_send_mad(). This can make the padding calculation exceed the segment size and trigger an out-of-bounds memset in alloc_send_rmpp_list(). Add an explicit check to reject negative data_len before creating the send buffer. KASAN splat: [ 211.363464] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ib_create_send_mad+0xa01/0x11b0 [ 211.364077] Write of size 220 at addr ffff88800c3fa1f8 by task spray_thread/102 [ 211.365867] ib_create_send_mad+0xa01/0x11b0 [ 211.365887] ib_umad_write+0x853/0x1c80 Fixes: 2be8e3ee8efd ("IB/umad: Add P_Key index support") Signed-off-by: YunJe Shin <ioerts(a)kookmin.ac.kr> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260203100628.1215408-1-ioerts@kookmin.ac.kr Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Liu Kai <liukai284(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c b/drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c index 063707dd4fe3..c8ad6ef39fa5 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c @@ -514,7 +514,8 @@ static ssize_t ib_umad_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *buf, struct rdma_ah_attr ah_attr; struct ib_ah *ah; __be64 *tid; - int ret, data_len, hdr_len, copy_offset, rmpp_active; + int ret, hdr_len, copy_offset, rmpp_active; + size_t data_len; u8 base_version; if (count < hdr_size(file) + IB_MGMT_RMPP_HDR) @@ -588,7 +589,10 @@ static ssize_t ib_umad_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *buf, } base_version = ((struct ib_mad_hdr *)&packet->mad.data)->base_version; - data_len = count - hdr_size(file) - hdr_len; + if (check_sub_overflow(count, hdr_size(file) + hdr_len, &data_len)) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto err_ah; + } packet->msg = ib_create_send_mad(agent, be32_to_cpu(packet->mad.hdr.qpn), packet->mad.hdr.pkey_index, rmpp_active, -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] RDMA/umad: Reject negative data_len in ib_umad_write
by Liu Kai 28 Mar '26

28 Mar '26

From: YunJe Shin <yjshin0438(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.128 commit a6a3e4af10993cb9e4b8f0548680aba0ab5f3b0d category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13865 CVE: CVE-2026-23243 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 5551b02fdbfd85a325bb857f3a8f9c9f33397ed2 upstream. ib_umad_write computes data_len from user-controlled count and the MAD header sizes. With a mismatched user MAD header size and RMPP header length, data_len can become negative and reach ib_create_send_mad(). This can make the padding calculation exceed the segment size and trigger an out-of-bounds memset in alloc_send_rmpp_list(). Add an explicit check to reject negative data_len before creating the send buffer. KASAN splat: [ 211.363464] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ib_create_send_mad+0xa01/0x11b0 [ 211.364077] Write of size 220 at addr ffff88800c3fa1f8 by task spray_thread/102 [ 211.365867] ib_create_send_mad+0xa01/0x11b0 [ 211.365887] ib_umad_write+0x853/0x1c80 Fixes: 2be8e3ee8efd ("IB/umad: Add P_Key index support") Signed-off-by: YunJe Shin <ioerts(a)kookmin.ac.kr> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260203100628.1215408-1-ioerts@kookmin.ac.kr Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Liu Kai <liukai284(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c b/drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c index 2ed749f50a29..285f251fc014 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c @@ -514,7 +514,8 @@ static ssize_t ib_umad_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *buf, struct rdma_ah_attr ah_attr; struct ib_ah *ah; __be64 *tid; - int ret, data_len, hdr_len, copy_offset, rmpp_active; + int ret, hdr_len, copy_offset, rmpp_active; + size_t data_len; u8 base_version; if (count < hdr_size(file) + IB_MGMT_RMPP_HDR) @@ -588,7 +589,10 @@ static ssize_t ib_umad_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *buf, } base_version = ((struct ib_mad_hdr *)&packet->mad.data)->base_version; - data_len = count - hdr_size(file) - hdr_len; + if (check_sub_overflow(count, hdr_size(file) + hdr_len, &data_len)) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto err_ah; + } packet->msg = ib_create_send_mad(agent, be32_to_cpu(packet->mad.hdr.qpn), packet->mad.hdr.pkey_index, rmpp_active, -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] nvme: fix admin queue leak on controller reset
by Zizhi Wo 28 Mar '26

28 Mar '26

From: Ming Lei <ming.lei(a)redhat.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.12.77 commit 64f87b96de0e645a4c066c7cffd753f334446db6 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13921 CVE: CVE-2026-23360 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit b84bb7bd913d8ca2f976ee6faf4a174f91c02b8d ] When nvme_alloc_admin_tag_set() is called during a controller reset, a previous admin queue may still exist. Release it properly before allocating a new one to avoid orphaning the old queue. This fixes a regression introduced by commit 03b3bcd319b3 ("nvme: fix admin request_queue lifetime"). Cc: Keith Busch <kbusch(a)kernel.org> Fixes: 03b3bcd319b3 ("nvme: fix admin request_queue lifetime"). Reported-and-tested-by: Yi Zhang <yi.zhang(a)redhat.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-block/CAHj4cs9wv3SdPo+N01Fw2SHBYDs9tj2M_e1-Gd… Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: drivers/nvme/host/core.c [Commit 9ac4dd8c47d5 ("block: pass a queue_limits argument to blk_mq_init_queue") replace blk_mq_init_queue by blk_mq_alloc_queue to get admin_q.] Signed-off-by: Zizhi Wo <wozizhi(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/nvme/host/core.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/core.c b/drivers/nvme/host/core.c index 2997d0561c39..50de9e76d07d 100644 --- a/drivers/nvme/host/core.c +++ b/drivers/nvme/host/core.c @@ -4301,10 +4301,17 @@ int nvme_alloc_admin_tag_set(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, struct blk_mq_tag_set *set, set->timeout = NVME_ADMIN_TIMEOUT; ret = blk_mq_alloc_tag_set(set); if (ret) return ret; + /* + * If a previous admin queue exists (e.g., from before a reset), + * put it now before allocating a new one to avoid orphaning it. + */ + if (ctrl->admin_q) + blk_put_queue(ctrl->admin_q); + ctrl->admin_q = blk_mq_init_queue(set); if (IS_ERR(ctrl->admin_q)) { ret = PTR_ERR(ctrl->admin_q); goto out_free_tagset; } -- 2.39.2

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] scsi: target: Fix recursive locking in __configfs_open_file()
by Zizhi Wo 28 Mar '26

28 Mar '26

From: Prithvi Tambewagh <activprithvi(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.130 commit e8ef82cb6443d5f3260b1b830e17f03dda4229ea category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13995 CVE: CVE-2026-23292 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 14d4ac19d1895397532eec407433c5d74d9da53b upstream. In flush_write_buffer, &p->frag_sem is acquired and then the loaded store function is called, which, here, is target_core_item_dbroot_store(). This function called filp_open(), following which these functions were called (in reverse order), according to the call trace: down_read __configfs_open_file do_dentry_open vfs_open do_open path_openat do_filp_open file_open_name filp_open target_core_item_dbroot_store flush_write_buffer configfs_write_iter target_core_item_dbroot_store() tries to validate the new file path by trying to open the file path provided to it; however, in this case, the bug report shows: db_root: not a directory: /sys/kernel/config/target/dbroot indicating that the same configfs file was tried to be opened, on which it is currently working on. Thus, it is trying to acquire frag_sem semaphore of the same file of which it already holds the semaphore obtained in flush_write_buffer(), leading to acquiring the semaphore in a nested manner and a possibility of recursive locking. Fix this by modifying target_core_item_dbroot_store() to use kern_path() instead of filp_open() to avoid opening the file using filesystem-specific function __configfs_open_file(), and further modifying it to make this fix compatible. Reported-by: syzbot+f6e8174215573a84b797(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=f6e8174215573a84b797 Tested-by: syzbot+f6e8174215573a84b797(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Prithvi Tambewagh <activprithvi(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Bogdanov <d.bogdanov(a)yadro.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260216062002.61937-1-activprithvi@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Zizhi Wo <wozizhi(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/target/target_core_configfs.c | 15 ++++++--------- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/target/target_core_configfs.c b/drivers/target/target_core_configfs.c index eddcfd09c05b..f1a0022e5295 100644 --- a/drivers/target/target_core_configfs.c +++ b/drivers/target/target_core_configfs.c @@ -106,12 +106,12 @@ static ssize_t target_core_item_dbroot_show(struct config_item *item, static ssize_t target_core_item_dbroot_store(struct config_item *item, const char *page, size_t count) { ssize_t read_bytes; - struct file *fp; ssize_t r = -EINVAL; + struct path path = {}; mutex_lock(&target_devices_lock); if (target_devices) { pr_err("db_root: cannot be changed because it's in use\n"); goto unlock; @@ -129,21 +129,18 @@ static ssize_t target_core_item_dbroot_store(struct config_item *item, if (db_root_stage[read_bytes - 1] == '\n') db_root_stage[read_bytes - 1] = '\0'; /* validate new db root before accepting it */ - fp = filp_open(db_root_stage, O_RDONLY, 0); - if (IS_ERR(fp)) { + r = kern_path(db_root_stage, LOOKUP_FOLLOW | LOOKUP_DIRECTORY, &path); + if (r) { pr_err("db_root: cannot open: %s\n", db_root_stage); + if (r == -ENOTDIR) + pr_err("db_root: not a directory: %s\n", db_root_stage); goto unlock; } - if (!S_ISDIR(file_inode(fp)->i_mode)) { - filp_close(fp, NULL); - pr_err("db_root: not a directory: %s\n", db_root_stage); - goto unlock; - } - filp_close(fp, NULL); + path_put(&path); strncpy(db_root, db_root_stage, read_bytes); pr_debug("Target_Core_ConfigFS: db_root set to %s\n", db_root); r = read_bytes; -- 2.39.2

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6 v3 0/2] CVE-2026-23352
by Jinjie Ruan 28 Mar '26

28 Mar '26

CVE-2026-23352 Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) (2): x86/efi: defer freeing of boot services memory x86/efi: efi_unmap_boot_services: fix calculation of ranges_to_free size arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h | 2 +- arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c | 2 +- arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- drivers/firmware/efi/mokvar-table.c | 2 +- 4 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 3

[PATCH OLK-5.10 v3 0/2] CVE-2026-23352
by Jinjie Ruan 28 Mar '26

28 Mar '26

CVE-2026-23352 Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) (2): x86/efi: defer freeing of boot services memory x86/efi: efi_unmap_boot_services: fix calculation of ranges_to_free size arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h | 2 +- arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c | 2 +- arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- drivers/firmware/efi/mokvar-table.c | 2 +- 4 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 3

[PATCH OLK-5.10 v2 0/2] *** SUBJECT HERE ***
by Jinjie Ruan 28 Mar '26

28 Mar '26

*** BLURB HERE *** Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) (2): x86/efi: defer freeing of boot services memory x86/efi: efi_unmap_boot_services: fix calculation of ranges_to_free size arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h | 2 +- arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c | 2 +- arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- drivers/firmware/efi/mokvar-table.c | 2 +- 4 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

3 5

[PATCH OLK-6.6 v2 0/2] *** SUBJECT HERE ***
by Jinjie Ruan 28 Mar '26

28 Mar '26

*** BLURB HERE *** Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) (2): x86/efi: defer freeing of boot services memory x86/efi: efi_unmap_boot_services: fix calculation of ranges_to_free size arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h | 2 +- arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c | 2 +- arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- drivers/firmware/efi/mokvar-table.c | 2 +- 4 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 3

[PATCH OLK-5.10] x86/efi: defer freeing of boot services memory
by Jinjie Ruan 28 Mar '26

28 Mar '26

From: "Mike Rapoport (Microsoft)" <rppt(a)kernel.org> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.130 commit 6a25e25279282c5c8ade554c04c6ab9dc7902c64 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13929 CVE: CVE-2026-23352 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit a4b0bf6a40f3c107c67a24fbc614510ef5719980 upstream. efi_free_boot_services() frees memory occupied by EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_CODE and EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA using memblock_free_late(). There are two issue with that: memblock_free_late() should be used for memory allocated with memblock_alloc() while the memory reserved with memblock_reserve() should be freed with free_reserved_area(). More acutely, with CONFIG_DEFERRED_STRUCT_PAGE_INIT=y efi_free_boot_services() is called before deferred initialization of the memory map is complete. Benjamin Herrenschmidt reports that this causes a leak of ~140MB of RAM on EC2 t3a.nano instances which only have 512MB or RAM. If the freed memory resides in the areas that memory map for them is still uninitialized, they won't be actually freed because memblock_free_late() calls memblock_free_pages() and the latter skips uninitialized pages. Using free_reserved_area() at this point is also problematic because __free_page() accesses the buddy of the freed page and that again might end up in uninitialized part of the memory map. Delaying the entire efi_free_boot_services() could be problematic because in addition to freeing boot services memory it updates efi.memmap without any synchronization and that's undesirable late in boot when there is concurrency. More robust approach is to only defer freeing of the EFI boot services memory. Split efi_free_boot_services() in two. First efi_unmap_boot_services() collects ranges that should be freed into an array then efi_free_boot_services() later frees them after deferred init is complete. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ec2aaef14783869b3be6e3c253b2dcbf67dbc12a.camel@… Fixes: 916f676f8dc0 ("x86, efi: Retain boot service code until after switching to virtual mode") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) <rppt(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh(a)kernel.crashing.org> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Conflicts: arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c [ context conflict. ] Signed-off-by: Jinjie Ruan <ruanjinjie(a)huawei.com> --- arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h | 2 +- arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c | 2 +- arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- drivers/firmware/efi/mokvar-table.c | 2 +- 4 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h index 2de20f6a765b..fb1c8fded78b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h @@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ extern int __init efi_reuse_config(u64 tables, int nr_tables); extern void efi_delete_dummy_variable(void); extern void efi_switch_mm(struct mm_struct *mm); extern void efi_recover_from_page_fault(unsigned long phys_addr); -extern void efi_free_boot_services(void); +extern void efi_unmap_boot_services(void); /* kexec external ABI */ struct efi_setup_data { diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c index 91f8edd50dd7..9f18c5d2a812 100644 --- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c +++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c @@ -793,7 +793,7 @@ static void __init __efi_enter_virtual_mode(void) } efi_check_for_embedded_firmwares(); - efi_free_boot_services(); + efi_unmap_boot_services(); if (!efi_is_mixed()) efi_native_runtime_setup(); diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c index c1eec019dcee..a152d5762400 100644 --- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c +++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c @@ -333,7 +333,7 @@ void __init efi_reserve_boot_services(void) /* * Because the following memblock_reserve() is paired - * with memblock_free_late() for this region in + * with free_reserved_area() for this region in * efi_free_boot_services(), we must be extremely * careful not to reserve, and subsequently free, * critical regions of memory (like the kernel image) or @@ -396,17 +396,33 @@ static void __init efi_unmap_pages(efi_memory_desc_t *md) pr_err("Failed to unmap VA mapping for 0x%llx\n", va); } -void __init efi_free_boot_services(void) +struct efi_freeable_range { + u64 start; + u64 end; +}; + +static struct efi_freeable_range *ranges_to_free; + +void __init efi_unmap_boot_services(void) { struct efi_memory_map_data data = { 0 }; efi_memory_desc_t *md; int num_entries = 0; + int idx = 0; + size_t sz; void *new, *new_md; /* Keep all regions for /sys/kernel/debug/efi */ if (efi_enabled(EFI_DBG)) return; + sz = sizeof(*ranges_to_free) * efi.memmap.nr_map + 1; + ranges_to_free = kzalloc(sz, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ranges_to_free) { + pr_err("Failed to allocate storage for freeable EFI regions\n"); + return; + } + for_each_efi_memory_desc(md) { unsigned long long start = md->phys_addr; unsigned long long size = md->num_pages << EFI_PAGE_SHIFT; @@ -451,7 +467,15 @@ void __init efi_free_boot_services(void) size -= rm_size; } - memblock_free_late(start, size); + /* + * With CONFIG_DEFERRED_STRUCT_PAGE_INIT parts of the memory + * map are still not initialized and we can't reliably free + * memory here. + * Queue the ranges to free at a later point. + */ + ranges_to_free[idx].start = start; + ranges_to_free[idx].end = start + size; + idx++; } if (!num_entries) @@ -492,6 +516,31 @@ void __init efi_free_boot_services(void) } } +static int __init efi_free_boot_services(void) +{ + struct efi_freeable_range *range = ranges_to_free; + unsigned long freed = 0; + + if (!ranges_to_free) + return 0; + + while (range->start) { + void *start = phys_to_virt(range->start); + void *end = phys_to_virt(range->end); + + free_reserved_area(start, end, -1, NULL); + freed += (end - start); + range++; + } + kfree(ranges_to_free); + + if (freed) + pr_info("Freeing EFI boot services memory: %ldK\n", freed / SZ_1K); + + return 0; +} +arch_initcall(efi_free_boot_services); + /* * A number of config table entries get remapped to virtual addresses * after entering EFI virtual mode. However, the kexec kernel requires diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/mokvar-table.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/mokvar-table.c index 38722d2009e2..4a5c2f823788 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/mokvar-table.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/mokvar-table.c @@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ static struct kobject *mokvar_kobj; * as an alternative to ordinary EFI variables, due to platform-dependent * limitations. The memory occupied by this table is marked as reserved. * - * This routine must be called before efi_free_boot_services() in order + * This routine must be called before efi_unmap_boot_services() in order * to guarantee that it can mark the table as reserved. * * Implicit inputs: -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] x86/efi: defer freeing of boot services memory
by Jinjie Ruan 28 Mar '26

28 Mar '26

From: "Mike Rapoport (Microsoft)" <rppt(a)kernel.org> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.130 commit 6a25e25279282c5c8ade554c04c6ab9dc7902c64 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13929 CVE: CVE-2026-23352 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit a4b0bf6a40f3c107c67a24fbc614510ef5719980 upstream. efi_free_boot_services() frees memory occupied by EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_CODE and EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA using memblock_free_late(). There are two issue with that: memblock_free_late() should be used for memory allocated with memblock_alloc() while the memory reserved with memblock_reserve() should be freed with free_reserved_area(). More acutely, with CONFIG_DEFERRED_STRUCT_PAGE_INIT=y efi_free_boot_services() is called before deferred initialization of the memory map is complete. Benjamin Herrenschmidt reports that this causes a leak of ~140MB of RAM on EC2 t3a.nano instances which only have 512MB or RAM. If the freed memory resides in the areas that memory map for them is still uninitialized, they won't be actually freed because memblock_free_late() calls memblock_free_pages() and the latter skips uninitialized pages. Using free_reserved_area() at this point is also problematic because __free_page() accesses the buddy of the freed page and that again might end up in uninitialized part of the memory map. Delaying the entire efi_free_boot_services() could be problematic because in addition to freeing boot services memory it updates efi.memmap without any synchronization and that's undesirable late in boot when there is concurrency. More robust approach is to only defer freeing of the EFI boot services memory. Split efi_free_boot_services() in two. First efi_unmap_boot_services() collects ranges that should be freed into an array then efi_free_boot_services() later frees them after deferred init is complete. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ec2aaef14783869b3be6e3c253b2dcbf67dbc12a.camel@… Fixes: 916f676f8dc0 ("x86, efi: Retain boot service code until after switching to virtual mode") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) <rppt(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh(a)kernel.crashing.org> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Jinjie Ruan <ruanjinjie(a)huawei.com> --- arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h | 2 +- arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c | 2 +- arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- drivers/firmware/efi/mokvar-table.c | 2 +- 4 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h index a050d329e34b..aaf1e71b067a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h @@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ extern void __init efi_apply_memmap_quirks(void); extern int __init efi_reuse_config(u64 tables, int nr_tables); extern void efi_delete_dummy_variable(void); extern void efi_crash_gracefully_on_page_fault(unsigned long phys_addr); -extern void efi_free_boot_services(void); +extern void efi_unmap_boot_services(void); void arch_efi_call_virt_setup(void); void arch_efi_call_virt_teardown(void); diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c index e9f99c56f3ce..55a61aaa3303 100644 --- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c +++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c @@ -860,7 +860,7 @@ static void __init __efi_enter_virtual_mode(void) } efi_check_for_embedded_firmwares(); - efi_free_boot_services(); + efi_unmap_boot_services(); if (!efi_is_mixed()) efi_native_runtime_setup(); diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c index f0cc00032751..df3b45ef1420 100644 --- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c +++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c @@ -341,7 +341,7 @@ void __init efi_reserve_boot_services(void) /* * Because the following memblock_reserve() is paired - * with memblock_free_late() for this region in + * with free_reserved_area() for this region in * efi_free_boot_services(), we must be extremely * careful not to reserve, and subsequently free, * critical regions of memory (like the kernel image) or @@ -404,17 +404,33 @@ static void __init efi_unmap_pages(efi_memory_desc_t *md) pr_err("Failed to unmap VA mapping for 0x%llx\n", va); } -void __init efi_free_boot_services(void) +struct efi_freeable_range { + u64 start; + u64 end; +}; + +static struct efi_freeable_range *ranges_to_free; + +void __init efi_unmap_boot_services(void) { struct efi_memory_map_data data = { 0 }; efi_memory_desc_t *md; int num_entries = 0; + int idx = 0; + size_t sz; void *new, *new_md; /* Keep all regions for /sys/kernel/debug/efi */ if (efi_enabled(EFI_DBG)) return; + sz = sizeof(*ranges_to_free) * efi.memmap.nr_map + 1; + ranges_to_free = kzalloc(sz, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ranges_to_free) { + pr_err("Failed to allocate storage for freeable EFI regions\n"); + return; + } + for_each_efi_memory_desc(md) { unsigned long long start = md->phys_addr; unsigned long long size = md->num_pages << EFI_PAGE_SHIFT; @@ -471,7 +487,15 @@ void __init efi_free_boot_services(void) start = SZ_1M; } - memblock_free_late(start, size); + /* + * With CONFIG_DEFERRED_STRUCT_PAGE_INIT parts of the memory + * map are still not initialized and we can't reliably free + * memory here. + * Queue the ranges to free at a later point. + */ + ranges_to_free[idx].start = start; + ranges_to_free[idx].end = start + size; + idx++; } if (!num_entries) @@ -512,6 +536,31 @@ void __init efi_free_boot_services(void) } } +static int __init efi_free_boot_services(void) +{ + struct efi_freeable_range *range = ranges_to_free; + unsigned long freed = 0; + + if (!ranges_to_free) + return 0; + + while (range->start) { + void *start = phys_to_virt(range->start); + void *end = phys_to_virt(range->end); + + free_reserved_area(start, end, -1, NULL); + freed += (end - start); + range++; + } + kfree(ranges_to_free); + + if (freed) + pr_info("Freeing EFI boot services memory: %ldK\n", freed / SZ_1K); + + return 0; +} +arch_initcall(efi_free_boot_services); + /* * A number of config table entries get remapped to virtual addresses * after entering EFI virtual mode. However, the kexec kernel requires diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/mokvar-table.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/mokvar-table.c index 4eb0dff4dfaf..bd84a22805b5 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/mokvar-table.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/mokvar-table.c @@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ static struct kobject *mokvar_kobj; * as an alternative to ordinary EFI variables, due to platform-dependent * limitations. The memory occupied by this table is marked as reserved. * - * This routine must be called before efi_free_boot_services() in order + * This routine must be called before efi_unmap_boot_services() in order * to guarantee that it can mark the table as reserved. * * Implicit inputs: -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] regmap: maple: free entry on mas_store_gfp() failure
by Lin Ruifeng 28 Mar '26

28 Mar '26

From: Kaushlendra Kumar <kaushlendra.kumar(a)intel.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.124 commit d61171cf097156030142643942c217759a9cc806 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13884 CVE: CVE-2026-23260 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit f3f380ce6b3d5c9805c7e0b3d5bc28d9ec41e2e8 ] regcache_maple_write() allocates a new block ('entry') to merge adjacent ranges and then stores it with mas_store_gfp(). When mas_store_gfp() fails, the new 'entry' remains allocated and is never freed, leaking memory. Free 'entry' on the failure path; on success continue freeing the replaced neighbor blocks ('lower', 'upper'). Signed-off-by: Kaushlendra Kumar <kaushlendra.kumar(a)intel.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260105031820.260119-1-kaushlendra.kumar@intel.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Ruifeng <linruifeng4(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/base/regmap/regcache-maple.c | 11 ++++++----- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/base/regmap/regcache-maple.c b/drivers/base/regmap/regcache-maple.c index fb5761a5ef6e..86de71ce2c19 100644 --- a/drivers/base/regmap/regcache-maple.c +++ b/drivers/base/regmap/regcache-maple.c @@ -96,12 +96,13 @@ static int regcache_maple_write(struct regmap *map, unsigned int reg, mas_unlock(&mas); - if (ret == 0) { - kfree(lower); - kfree(upper); + if (ret) { + kfree(entry); + return ret; } - - return ret; + kfree(lower); + kfree(upper); + return 0; } static int regcache_maple_drop(struct regmap *map, unsigned int min, -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] bpf: Fix NULL event->prog pointer access in bpf_overflow_handler
by Pu Lehui 27 Mar '26

27 Mar '26

From: Yonghong Song <yhs(a)fb.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.15-rc1 commit 594286b7574c6e8217b1c233cc0d0650f2268a77 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/8819 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Andrii reported that libbpf CI hit the following oops when running selftest send_signal: [ 1243.160719] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000030 [ 1243.161066] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 1243.161066] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 1243.161066] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 1243.161066] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [ 1243.161066] CPU: 1 PID: 882 Comm: new_name Tainted: G O 5.14.0-rc5 #1 [ 1243.161066] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014 [ 1243.161066] RIP: 0010:bpf_overflow_handler+0x9a/0x1e0 [ 1243.161066] Code: 5a 84 c0 0f 84 06 01 00 00 be 66 02 00 00 48 c7 c7 6d 96 07 82 48 8b ab 18 05 00 00 e8 df 55 eb ff 66 90 48 8d 75 48 48 89 e7 <ff> 55 30 41 89 c4 e8 fb c1 f0 ff 84 c0 0f 84 94 00 00 00 e8 6e 0f [ 1243.161066] RSP: 0018:ffffc900000c0d80 EFLAGS: 00000046 [ 1243.161066] RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff8881002e0dd0 RCX: 00000000b4b47cf8 [ 1243.161066] RDX: ffffffff811dcb06 RSI: 0000000000000048 RDI: ffffc900000c0d80 [ 1243.161066] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 1a9d56bb00000000 [ 1243.161066] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000080000 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 1243.161066] R13: ffffc900000c0e00 R14: ffffc900001c3c68 R15: 0000000000000082 [ 1243.161066] FS: 00007fc0be2d3380(0000) GS:ffff88813bd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 1243.161066] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 1243.161066] CR2: 0000000000000030 CR3: 0000000104f8e000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 [ 1243.161066] Call Trace: [ 1243.161066] <IRQ> [ 1243.161066] __perf_event_overflow+0x4f/0xf0 [ 1243.161066] perf_swevent_hrtimer+0x116/0x130 [ 1243.161066] ? __lock_acquire+0x378/0x2730 [ 1243.161066] ? __lock_acquire+0x372/0x2730 [ 1243.161066] ? lock_is_held_type+0xd5/0x130 [ 1243.161066] ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80 [ 1243.161066] ? lock_is_held_type+0xd5/0x130 [ 1243.161066] ? perf_event_groups_first+0x80/0x80 [ 1243.161066] ? perf_event_groups_first+0x80/0x80 [ 1243.161066] __hrtimer_run_queues+0x1a3/0x460 [ 1243.161066] hrtimer_interrupt+0x110/0x220 [ 1243.161066] __sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x8a/0x260 [ 1243.161066] sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x89/0xc0 [ 1243.161066] </IRQ> [ 1243.161066] asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x12/0x20 [ 1243.161066] RIP: 0010:finish_task_switch+0xaf/0x250 [ 1243.161066] Code: 31 f6 68 90 2a 09 81 49 8d 7c 24 18 e8 aa d6 03 00 4c 89 e7 e8 12 ff ff ff 4c 89 e7 e8 ca 9c 80 00 e8 35 af 0d 00 fb 4d 85 f6 <58> 74 1d 65 48 8b 04 25 c0 6d 01 00 4c 3b b0 a0 04 00 00 74 37 f0 [ 1243.161066] RSP: 0018:ffffc900001c3d18 EFLAGS: 00000282 [ 1243.161066] RAX: 000000000000031f RBX: ffff888104cf4980 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 1243.161066] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff82095460 RDI: ffffffff820adc4e [ 1243.161066] RBP: ffffc900001c3d58 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001 [ 1243.161066] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000080000 R12: ffff88813bd2bc80 [ 1243.161066] R13: ffff8881002e8000 R14: ffff88810022ad80 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 1243.161066] ? finish_task_switch+0xab/0x250 [ 1243.161066] ? finish_task_switch+0x70/0x250 [ 1243.161066] __schedule+0x36b/0xbb0 [ 1243.161066] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x2d/0x50 [ 1243.161066] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x79/0x100 [ 1243.161066] schedule+0x43/0xe0 [ 1243.161066] pipe_read+0x30b/0x450 [ 1243.161066] ? wait_woken+0x80/0x80 [ 1243.161066] new_sync_read+0x164/0x170 [ 1243.161066] vfs_read+0x122/0x1b0 [ 1243.161066] ksys_read+0x93/0xd0 [ 1243.161066] do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80 [ 1243.161066] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae The oops can also be reproduced with the following steps: ./vmtest.sh -s # at qemu shell cd /root/bpf && while true; do ./test_progs -t send_signal Further analysis showed that the failure is introduced with commit b89fbfbb854c ("bpf: Implement minimal BPF perf link"). With the above commit, the following scenario becomes possible: cpu1 cpu2 hrtimer_interrupt -> bpf_overflow_handler (due to closing link_fd) bpf_perf_link_release -> perf_event_free_bpf_prog -> perf_event_free_bpf_handler -> WRITE_ONCE(event->overflow_handler, event->orig_overflow_handler) event->prog = NULL bpf_prog_run(event->prog, &ctx) In the above case, the event->prog is NULL for bpf_prog_run, hence causing oops. To fix the issue, check whether event->prog is NULL or not. If it is, do not call bpf_prog_run. This seems working as the above reproducible step runs more than one hour and I didn't see any failures. Fixes: b89fbfbb854c ("bpf: Implement minimal BPF perf link") Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs(a)fb.com> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii(a)kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210819155209.1927994-1-yhs@fb.com Conflicts: kernel/events/core.c [ctx conflicts] Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui <pulehui(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/events/core.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c index ff875ddf4aeb..372450750559 100644 --- a/kernel/events/core.c +++ b/kernel/events/core.c @@ -8747,6 +8747,7 @@ static void bpf_overflow_handler(struct perf_event *event, .data = data, .event = event, }; + struct bpf_prog *prog; int ret = 0; ctx.regs = perf_arch_bpf_user_pt_regs(regs); @@ -8754,7 +8755,9 @@ static void bpf_overflow_handler(struct perf_event *event, if (unlikely(__this_cpu_inc_return(bpf_prog_active) != 1)) goto out; rcu_read_lock(); - ret = BPF_PROG_RUN(event->prog, &ctx); + prog = READ_ONCE(event->prog); + if (prog) + ret = BPF_PROG_RUN(prog, &ctx); rcu_read_unlock(); out: __this_cpu_dec(bpf_prog_active); -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] bpf: Fix NULL event->prog pointer access in bpf_overflow_handler
by Pu Lehui 27 Mar '26

27 Mar '26

From: Yonghong Song <yhs(a)fb.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.15-rc1 commit 594286b7574c6e8217b1c233cc0d0650f2268a77 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/8819 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Andrii reported that libbpf CI hit the following oops when running selftest send_signal: [ 1243.160719] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000030 [ 1243.161066] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 1243.161066] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 1243.161066] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 1243.161066] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [ 1243.161066] CPU: 1 PID: 882 Comm: new_name Tainted: G O 5.14.0-rc5 #1 [ 1243.161066] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014 [ 1243.161066] RIP: 0010:bpf_overflow_handler+0x9a/0x1e0 [ 1243.161066] Code: 5a 84 c0 0f 84 06 01 00 00 be 66 02 00 00 48 c7 c7 6d 96 07 82 48 8b ab 18 05 00 00 e8 df 55 eb ff 66 90 48 8d 75 48 48 89 e7 <ff> 55 30 41 89 c4 e8 fb c1 f0 ff 84 c0 0f 84 94 00 00 00 e8 6e 0f [ 1243.161066] RSP: 0018:ffffc900000c0d80 EFLAGS: 00000046 [ 1243.161066] RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff8881002e0dd0 RCX: 00000000b4b47cf8 [ 1243.161066] RDX: ffffffff811dcb06 RSI: 0000000000000048 RDI: ffffc900000c0d80 [ 1243.161066] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 1a9d56bb00000000 [ 1243.161066] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000080000 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 1243.161066] R13: ffffc900000c0e00 R14: ffffc900001c3c68 R15: 0000000000000082 [ 1243.161066] FS: 00007fc0be2d3380(0000) GS:ffff88813bd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 1243.161066] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 1243.161066] CR2: 0000000000000030 CR3: 0000000104f8e000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 [ 1243.161066] Call Trace: [ 1243.161066] <IRQ> [ 1243.161066] __perf_event_overflow+0x4f/0xf0 [ 1243.161066] perf_swevent_hrtimer+0x116/0x130 [ 1243.161066] ? __lock_acquire+0x378/0x2730 [ 1243.161066] ? __lock_acquire+0x372/0x2730 [ 1243.161066] ? lock_is_held_type+0xd5/0x130 [ 1243.161066] ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80 [ 1243.161066] ? lock_is_held_type+0xd5/0x130 [ 1243.161066] ? perf_event_groups_first+0x80/0x80 [ 1243.161066] ? perf_event_groups_first+0x80/0x80 [ 1243.161066] __hrtimer_run_queues+0x1a3/0x460 [ 1243.161066] hrtimer_interrupt+0x110/0x220 [ 1243.161066] __sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x8a/0x260 [ 1243.161066] sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x89/0xc0 [ 1243.161066] </IRQ> [ 1243.161066] asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x12/0x20 [ 1243.161066] RIP: 0010:finish_task_switch+0xaf/0x250 [ 1243.161066] Code: 31 f6 68 90 2a 09 81 49 8d 7c 24 18 e8 aa d6 03 00 4c 89 e7 e8 12 ff ff ff 4c 89 e7 e8 ca 9c 80 00 e8 35 af 0d 00 fb 4d 85 f6 <58> 74 1d 65 48 8b 04 25 c0 6d 01 00 4c 3b b0 a0 04 00 00 74 37 f0 [ 1243.161066] RSP: 0018:ffffc900001c3d18 EFLAGS: 00000282 [ 1243.161066] RAX: 000000000000031f RBX: ffff888104cf4980 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 1243.161066] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff82095460 RDI: ffffffff820adc4e [ 1243.161066] RBP: ffffc900001c3d58 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001 [ 1243.161066] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000080000 R12: ffff88813bd2bc80 [ 1243.161066] R13: ffff8881002e8000 R14: ffff88810022ad80 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 1243.161066] ? finish_task_switch+0xab/0x250 [ 1243.161066] ? finish_task_switch+0x70/0x250 [ 1243.161066] __schedule+0x36b/0xbb0 [ 1243.161066] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x2d/0x50 [ 1243.161066] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x79/0x100 [ 1243.161066] schedule+0x43/0xe0 [ 1243.161066] pipe_read+0x30b/0x450 [ 1243.161066] ? wait_woken+0x80/0x80 [ 1243.161066] new_sync_read+0x164/0x170 [ 1243.161066] vfs_read+0x122/0x1b0 [ 1243.161066] ksys_read+0x93/0xd0 [ 1243.161066] do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80 [ 1243.161066] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae The oops can also be reproduced with the following steps: ./vmtest.sh -s # at qemu shell cd /root/bpf && while true; do ./test_progs -t send_signal Further analysis showed that the failure is introduced with commit b89fbfbb854c ("bpf: Implement minimal BPF perf link"). With the above commit, the following scenario becomes possible: cpu1 cpu2 hrtimer_interrupt -> bpf_overflow_handler (due to closing link_fd) bpf_perf_link_release -> perf_event_free_bpf_prog -> perf_event_free_bpf_handler -> WRITE_ONCE(event->overflow_handler, event->orig_overflow_handler) event->prog = NULL bpf_prog_run(event->prog, &ctx) In the above case, the event->prog is NULL for bpf_prog_run, hence causing oops. To fix the issue, check whether event->prog is NULL or not. If it is, do not call bpf_prog_run. This seems working as the above reproducible step runs more than one hour and I didn't see any failures. Fixes: b89fbfbb854c ("bpf: Implement minimal BPF perf link") Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs(a)fb.com> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii(a)kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210819155209.1927994-1-yhs@fb.com Conflicts: kernel/events/core.c [ctx conflicts] Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui <pulehui(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/events/core.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c index d1ffd5fb9c6f..a46f2cefc031 100644 --- a/kernel/events/core.c +++ b/kernel/events/core.c @@ -9728,13 +9728,16 @@ static void bpf_overflow_handler(struct perf_event *event, .data = data, .event = event, }; + struct bpf_prog *prog; int ret = 0; ctx.regs = perf_arch_bpf_user_pt_regs(regs); if (unlikely(__this_cpu_inc_return(bpf_prog_active) != 1)) goto out; rcu_read_lock(); - ret = BPF_PROG_RUN(event->prog, &ctx); + prog = READ_ONCE(event->prog); + if (prog) + ret = BPF_PROG_RUN(prog, &ctx); rcu_read_unlock(); out: __this_cpu_dec(bpf_prog_active); -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/4] CVE-2026-23320
by Jinjie Ruan 27 Mar '26

27 Mar '26

CVE-2026-23320 Christian Brauner (1): file: add take_fd() cleanup helper Kuen-Han Tsai (1): usb: gadget: f_ncm: Fix net_device lifecycle with device_move Peter Zijlstra (1): cleanup: Make no_free_ptr() __must_check Thomas Gleixner (1): cleanup: Provide retain_and_null_ptr() drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_ncm.c | 35 ++++++++++----- drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ether.c | 22 ++++++++++ drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ether.h | 26 ++++++++++++ drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ncm.h | 2 +- include/linux/cleanup.h | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-- include/linux/file.h | 20 +++++++++ 6 files changed, 151 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 5

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/2] fix queue start/stop imbalance under race
by Zheng Qixing 27 Mar '26

27 Mar '26

Zheng Qixing (2): dm: fix queue start/stop imbalance under suspend/load/resume races dm: fix queue start/stop imbalance under remove/resume races drivers/md/dm-core.h | 1 + drivers/md/dm.c | 11 ++++++++--- 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) -- 2.39.2

2 3

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] fix queue start/stop imbalance under race
by Zheng Qixing 27 Mar '26

27 Mar '26

Zheng Qixing (2): dm: fix queue start/stop imbalance under suspend/load/resume races dm: fix queue start/stop imbalance under remove/resume races drivers/md/dm-core.h | 1 + drivers/md/dm.c | 11 ++++++++--- 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) -- 2.39.2

2 3

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] CVE-2026-23296
by Li Lingfeng 27 Mar '26

27 Mar '26

Junxiao Bi (2): scsi: core: Fix refcount leak for tagset_refcnt scsi: core: Fix error handling for scsi_alloc_sdev() drivers/scsi/scsi_scan.c | 7 ++----- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) -- 2.52.0

2 3

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] fix queue start/stop imbalance under race
by Zheng Qixing 27 Mar '26

27 Mar '26

Zheng Qixing (2): dm: fix queue start/stop imbalance under suspend/load/resume races dm: fix queue start/stop imbalance under remove/resume races drivers/md/dm-core.h | 1 + drivers/md/dm.c | 11 ++++++++--- 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) -- 2.39.2

2 3

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/2] fix queue start/stop imbalance under race
by Zheng Qixing 27 Mar '26

27 Mar '26

Zheng Qixing (2): dm: fix queue start/stop imbalance under suspend/load/resume races dm: fix queue start/stop imbalance under remove/resume races drivers/md/dm-core.h | 1 + drivers/md/dm.c | 11 ++++++++--- 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) -- 2.39.2

2 3

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] wifi: prevent A-MSDU attacks in mesh networks
by Zhang Yuwei 27 Mar '26

27 Mar '26

From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef(a)kuleuven.be> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.99 commit ec6392061de6681148b63ee6c8744da833498cdd category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/ICTWCN Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 737bb912ebbe4571195c56eba557c4d7315b26fb upstream. This patch is a mitigation to prevent the A-MSDU spoofing vulnerability for mesh networks. The initial update to the IEEE 802.11 standard, in response to the FragAttacks, missed this case (CVE-2025-27558). It can be considered a variant of CVE-2020-24588 but for mesh networks. This patch tries to detect if a standard MSDU was turned into an A-MSDU by an adversary. This is done by parsing a received A-MSDU as a standard MSDU, calculating the length of the Mesh Control header, and seeing if the 6 bytes after this header equal the start of an rfc1042 header. If equal, this is a strong indication of an ongoing attack attempt. This defense was tested with mac80211_hwsim against a mesh network that uses an empty Mesh Address Extension field, i.e., when four addresses are used, and when using a 12-byte Mesh Address Extension field, i.e., when six addresses are used. Functionality of normal MSDUs and A-MSDUs was also tested, and confirmed working, when using both an empty and 12-byte Mesh Address Extension field. It was also tested with mac80211_hwsim that A-MSDU attacks in non-mesh networks keep being detected and prevented. Note that the vulnerability being patched, and the defense being implemented, was also discussed in the following paper and in the following IEEE 802.11 presentation: https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/wisec2025.pdf https://mentor.ieee.org/802.11/dcn/25/11-25-0949-00-000m-a-msdu-mesh-spoof-… Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef(a)kuleuven.be> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250616004635.224344-1-Mathy.Vanhoef@kuleuven.be Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Wang Hai <wanghai38(a)huawei.com> --- net/wireless/util.c | 51 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 49 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/wireless/util.c b/net/wireless/util.c index 4e81210e5b24..dcca1b882455 100644 --- a/net/wireless/util.c +++ b/net/wireless/util.c @@ -623,6 +623,51 @@ __ieee80211_amsdu_copy(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int hlen, return frame; } +/* + * Detects if an MSDU frame was maliciously converted into an A-MSDU + * frame by an adversary. This is done by parsing the received frame + * as if it were a regular MSDU, even though the A-MSDU flag is set. + * + * For non-mesh interfaces, detection involves checking whether the + * payload, when interpreted as an MSDU, begins with a valid RFC1042 + * header. This is done by comparing the A-MSDU subheader's destination + * address to the start of the RFC1042 header. + * + * For mesh interfaces, the MSDU includes a 6-byte Mesh Control field + * and an optional variable-length Mesh Address Extension field before + * the RFC1042 header. The position of the RFC1042 header must therefore + * be calculated based on the mesh header length. + * + * Since this function intentionally parses an A-MSDU frame as an MSDU, + * it only assumes that the A-MSDU subframe header is present, and + * beyond this it performs its own bounds checks under the assumption + * that the frame is instead parsed as a non-aggregated MSDU. + */ +static bool +is_amsdu_aggregation_attack(struct ethhdr *eth, struct sk_buff *skb, + enum nl80211_iftype iftype) +{ + int offset; + + /* Non-mesh case can be directly compared */ + if (iftype != NL80211_IFTYPE_MESH_POINT) + return ether_addr_equal(eth->h_dest, rfc1042_header); + + offset = __ieee80211_get_mesh_hdrlen(eth->h_dest[0]); + if (offset == 6) { + /* Mesh case with empty address extension field */ + return ether_addr_equal(eth->h_source, rfc1042_header); + } else if (offset + ETH_ALEN <= skb->len) { + /* Mesh case with non-empty address extension field */ + u8 temp[ETH_ALEN]; + + skb_copy_bits(skb, offset, temp, ETH_ALEN); + return ether_addr_equal(temp, rfc1042_header); + } + + return false; +} + void ieee80211_amsdu_to_8023s(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sk_buff_head *list, const u8 *addr, enum nl80211_iftype iftype, const unsigned int extra_headroom, @@ -655,8 +700,10 @@ void ieee80211_amsdu_to_8023s(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sk_buff_head *list, /* the last MSDU has no padding */ if (subframe_len > remaining) goto purge; - /* mitigate A-MSDU aggregation injection attacks */ - if (ether_addr_equal(eth.h_dest, rfc1042_header)) + /* mitigate A-MSDU aggregation injection attacks, to be + * checked when processing first subframe (offset == 0). + */ + if (offset == 0 && is_amsdu_aggregation_attack(&hdr.eth, skb, iftype)) goto purge; offset += sizeof(struct ethhdr); -- 2.22.0

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] RDMA/umad: Reject negative data_len in ib_umad_write
by Liu Kai 27 Mar '26

27 Mar '26

From: YunJe Shin <yjshin0438(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.0-rc1 commit 5551b02fdbfd85a325bb857f3a8f9c9f33397ed2 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13865 CVE: CVE-2026-23243 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- ib_umad_write computes data_len from user-controlled count and the MAD header sizes. With a mismatched user MAD header size and RMPP header length, data_len can become negative and reach ib_create_send_mad(). This can make the padding calculation exceed the segment size and trigger an out-of-bounds memset in alloc_send_rmpp_list(). Add an explicit check to reject negative data_len before creating the send buffer. KASAN splat: [ 211.363464] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ib_create_send_mad+0xa01/0x11b0 [ 211.364077] Write of size 220 at addr ffff88800c3fa1f8 by task spray_thread/102 [ 211.365867] ib_create_send_mad+0xa01/0x11b0 [ 211.365887] ib_umad_write+0x853/0x1c80 Fixes: 2be8e3ee8efd ("IB/umad: Add P_Key index support") Signed-off-by: YunJe Shin <ioerts(a)kookmin.ac.kr> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260203100628.1215408-1-ioerts@kookmin.ac.kr Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c [add type casting in check_sub_overflow()] Signed-off-by: Liu Kai <liukai284(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c | 9 +++++++-- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c b/drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c index b37aada92a62a..5d51794b69d46 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c @@ -486,7 +486,8 @@ static ssize_t ib_umad_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *buf, struct ib_ah *ah; struct ib_rmpp_mad *rmpp_mad; __be64 *tid; - int ret, data_len, hdr_len, copy_offset, rmpp_active; + int ret, hdr_len, copy_offset, rmpp_active; + size_t data_len; u8 base_version; if (count < hdr_size(file) + IB_MGMT_RMPP_HDR) @@ -557,7 +558,11 @@ static ssize_t ib_umad_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *buf, } base_version = ((struct ib_mad_hdr *)&packet->mad.data)->base_version; - data_len = count - hdr_size(file) - hdr_len; + if (check_sub_overflow(count, (size_t) (hdr_size(file) + hdr_len), + &data_len)) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto err_ah; + } packet->msg = ib_create_send_mad(agent, be32_to_cpu(packet->mad.hdr.qpn), packet->mad.hdr.pkey_index, rmpp_active, -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] RDMA/umad: Reject negative data_len in ib_umad_write
by Liu Kai 26 Mar '26

26 Mar '26

From: YunJe Shin <yjshin0438(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from mainline-v7.0-rc1 commit 5551b02fdbfd85a325bb857f3a8f9c9f33397ed2 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13865 CVE: CVE-2026-23243 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- ib_umad_write computes data_len from user-controlled count and the MAD header sizes. With a mismatched user MAD header size and RMPP header length, data_len can become negative and reach ib_create_send_mad(). This can make the padding calculation exceed the segment size and trigger an out-of-bounds memset in alloc_send_rmpp_list(). Add an explicit check to reject negative data_len before creating the send buffer. KASAN splat: [ 211.363464] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ib_create_send_mad+0xa01/0x11b0 [ 211.364077] Write of size 220 at addr ffff88800c3fa1f8 by task spray_thread/102 [ 211.365867] ib_create_send_mad+0xa01/0x11b0 [ 211.365887] ib_umad_write+0x853/0x1c80 Fixes: 2be8e3ee8efd ("IB/umad: Add P_Key index support") Signed-off-by: YunJe Shin <ioerts(a)kookmin.ac.kr> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260203100628.1215408-1-ioerts@kookmin.ac.kr Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c [add type casting in check_sub_overflow()] Signed-off-by: Liu Kai <liukai284(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c | 9 +++++++-- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c b/drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c index b37aada92a62a..5d51794b69d46 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c @@ -486,7 +486,8 @@ static ssize_t ib_umad_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *buf, struct ib_ah *ah; struct ib_rmpp_mad *rmpp_mad; __be64 *tid; - int ret, data_len, hdr_len, copy_offset, rmpp_active; + int ret, hdr_len, copy_offset, rmpp_active; + size_t data_len; u8 base_version; if (count < hdr_size(file) + IB_MGMT_RMPP_HDR) @@ -557,7 +558,11 @@ static ssize_t ib_umad_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *buf, } base_version = ((struct ib_mad_hdr *)&packet->mad.data)->base_version; - data_len = count - hdr_size(file) - hdr_len; + if (check_sub_overflow(count, (size_t) (hdr_size(file) + hdr_len), + &data_len)) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto err_ah; + } packet->msg = ib_create_send_mad(agent, be32_to_cpu(packet->mad.hdr.qpn), packet->mad.hdr.pkey_index, rmpp_active, -- 2.34.1

2 2

[PATCH OLK-5.10] ext4: fix memory leak in ext4_ext_shift_extents()
by Yongjian Sun 26 Mar '26

26 Mar '26

From: Zilin Guan <zilin(a)seu.edu.cn> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.0-rc1 commit ca81109d4a8f192dc1cbad4a1ee25246363c2833 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13898 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- In ext4_ext_shift_extents(), if the extent is NULL in the while loop, the function returns immediately without releasing the path obtained via ext4_find_extent(), leading to a memory leak. Fix this by jumping to the out label to ensure the path is properly released. Fixes: a18ed359bdddc ("ext4: always check ext4_ext_find_extent result") Signed-off-by: Zilin Guan <zilin(a)seu.edu.cn> Reviewed-by: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1(a)huawei.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251225084800.905701-1-zilin@seu.edu.cn Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso(a)mit.edu> Cc: stable(a)kernel.org Signed-off-by: Yongjian Sun <sunyongjian1(a)huawei.com> --- fs/ext4/extents.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/extents.c b/fs/ext4/extents.c index ceca82a0fd5c..786701524736 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/extents.c +++ b/fs/ext4/extents.c @@ -5278,7 +5278,8 @@ ext4_ext_shift_extents(struct inode *inode, handle_t *handle, if (!extent) { EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "unexpected hole at %lu", (unsigned long) *iterator); - return -EFSCORRUPTED; + ret = -EFSCORRUPTED; + goto out; } if (SHIFT == SHIFT_LEFT && *iterator > le32_to_cpu(extent->ee_block)) { -- 2.39.2

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] quota: fix livelock between quotactl and freeze_super
by Yongjian Sun 26 Mar '26

26 Mar '26

From: Abhishek Bapat <abhishekbapat(a)google.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.0-rc1 commit 77449e453dfc006ad738dec55374c4cbc056fd39 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13898 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- When a filesystem is frozen, quotactl_block() enters a retry loop waiting for the filesystem to thaw. It acquires s_umount, checks the freeze state, drops s_umount and uses sb_start_write() - sb_end_write() pair to wait for the unfreeze. However, this retry loop can trigger a livelock issue, specifically on kernels with preemption disabled. The mechanism is as follows: 1. freeze_super() sets SB_FREEZE_WRITE and calls sb_wait_write(). 2. sb_wait_write() calls percpu_down_write(), which initiates synchronize_rcu(). 3. Simultaneously, quotactl_block() spins in its retry loop, immediately executing the sb_start_write() - sb_end_write() pair. 4. Because the kernel is non-preemptible and the loop contains no scheduling points, quotactl_block() never yields the CPU. This prevents that CPU from reaching an RCU quiescent state. 5. synchronize_rcu() in the freezer thread waits indefinitely for the quotactl_block() CPU to report a quiescent state. 6. quotactl_block() spins indefinitely waiting for the freezer to advance, which it cannot do as it is blocked on the RCU sync. This results in a hang of the freezer process and 100% CPU usage by the quota process. While this can occur intermittently on multi-core systems, it is reliably reproducing on a node with the following script, running both the freezer and the quota toggle on the same CPU: # mkfs.ext4 -O quota /dev/sda 2g && mkdir a_mount # mount /dev/sda -o quota,usrquota,grpquota a_mount # taskset -c 3 bash -c "while true; do xfs_freeze -f a_mount; \ xfs_freeze -u a_mount; done" & # taskset -c 3 bash -c "while true; do quotaon a_mount; \ quotaoff a_mount; done" & Adding cond_resched() to the retry loop fixes the issue. It acts as an RCU quiescent state, allowing synchronize_rcu() in percpu_down_write() to complete. Fixes: 576215cffdef ("fs: Drop wait_unfrozen wait queue") Signed-off-by: Abhishek Bapat <abhishekbapat(a)google.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260115213103.1089129-1-abhishekbapat@google.com Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack(a)suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Yongjian Sun <sunyongjian1(a)huawei.com> --- fs/quota/quota.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/fs/quota/quota.c b/fs/quota/quota.c index 0e41fb84060f..5be53cae2c95 100644 --- a/fs/quota/quota.c +++ b/fs/quota/quota.c @@ -899,6 +899,7 @@ static struct super_block *quotactl_block(const char __user *special, int cmd) sb_start_write(sb); sb_end_write(sb); put_super(sb); + cond_resched(); goto retry; } return sb; -- 2.39.2

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] ext4: fix dirtyclusters double decrement on fs shutdown
by Yongjian Sun 26 Mar '26

26 Mar '26

From: Brian Foster <bfoster(a)redhat.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.0-rc1 commit 94a8cea54cd935c54fa2fba70354757c0fc245e3 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13898 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- fstests test generic/388 occasionally reproduces a warning in ext4_put_super() associated with the dirty clusters count: WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 76064 at fs/ext4/super.c:1324 ext4_put_super+0x48c/0x590 [ext4] Tracing the failure shows that the warning fires due to an s_dirtyclusters_counter value of -1. IOW, this appears to be a spurious decrement as opposed to some sort of leak. Further tracing of the dirty cluster count deltas and an LLM scan of the resulting output identified the cause as a double decrement in the error path between ext4_mb_mark_diskspace_used() and the caller ext4_mb_new_blocks(). First, note that generic/388 is a shutdown vs. fsstress test and so produces a random set of operations and shutdown injections. In the problematic case, the shutdown triggers an error return from the ext4_handle_dirty_metadata() call(s) made from ext4_mb_mark_context(). The changed value is non-zero at this point, so ext4_mb_mark_diskspace_used() does not exit after the error bubbles up from ext4_mb_mark_context(). Instead, the former decrements both cluster counters and returns the error up to ext4_mb_new_blocks(). The latter falls into the !ar->len out path which decrements the dirty clusters counter a second time, creating the inconsistency. To avoid this problem and simplify ownership of the cluster reservation in this codepath, lift the counter reduction to a single place in the caller. This makes it more clear that ext4_mb_new_blocks() is responsible for acquiring cluster reservation (via ext4_claim_free_clusters()) in the !delalloc case as well as releasing it, regardless of whether it ends up consumed or returned due to failure. Fixes: 0087d9fb3f29 ("ext4: Fix s_dirty_blocks_counter if block allocation failed with nodelalloc") Signed-off-by: Brian Foster <bfoster(a)redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1(a)huawei.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260113171905.118284-1-bfoster@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso(a)mit.edu> Cc: stable(a)kernel.org Conflicts: fs/ext4/mballoc-test.c fs/ext4/mballoc.c [mainline 2f94711b098b & 7c9fa399a369 not applied] Signed-off-by: Yongjian Sun <sunyongjian1(a)huawei.com> --- fs/ext4/mballoc.c | 21 +++++---------------- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/mballoc.c b/fs/ext4/mballoc.c index ba5a8f2c7bff..81c3ba818aca 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/mballoc.c +++ b/fs/ext4/mballoc.c @@ -4071,8 +4071,7 @@ void ext4_exit_mballoc(void) * Returns 0 if success or error code */ static noinline_for_stack int -ext4_mb_mark_diskspace_used(struct ext4_allocation_context *ac, - handle_t *handle, unsigned int reserv_clstrs) +ext4_mb_mark_diskspace_used(struct ext4_allocation_context *ac, handle_t *handle) { struct buffer_head *bitmap_bh = NULL; struct ext4_group_desc *gdp; @@ -4158,13 +4157,6 @@ ext4_mb_mark_diskspace_used(struct ext4_allocation_context *ac, ext4_unlock_group(sb, ac->ac_b_ex.fe_group); percpu_counter_sub(&sbi->s_freeclusters_counter, ac->ac_b_ex.fe_len); - /* - * Now reduce the dirty block count also. Should not go negative - */ - if (!(ac->ac_flags & EXT4_MB_DELALLOC_RESERVED)) - /* release all the reserved blocks if non delalloc */ - percpu_counter_sub(&sbi->s_dirtyclusters_counter, - reserv_clstrs); if (sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex) { ext4_group_t flex_group = ext4_flex_group(sbi, @@ -6402,7 +6394,7 @@ ext4_fsblk_t ext4_mb_new_blocks(handle_t *handle, ext4_mb_pa_put_free(ac); } if (likely(ac->ac_status == AC_STATUS_FOUND)) { - *errp = ext4_mb_mark_diskspace_used(ac, handle, reserv_clstrs); + *errp = ext4_mb_mark_diskspace_used(ac, handle); if (*errp) { ext4_discard_allocated_blocks(ac); goto errout; @@ -6433,12 +6425,9 @@ ext4_fsblk_t ext4_mb_new_blocks(handle_t *handle, out: if (inquota && ar->len < inquota) dquot_free_block(ar->inode, EXT4_C2B(sbi, inquota - ar->len)); - if (!ar->len) { - if ((ar->flags & EXT4_MB_DELALLOC_RESERVED) == 0) - /* release all the reserved blocks if non delalloc */ - percpu_counter_sub(&sbi->s_dirtyclusters_counter, - reserv_clstrs); - } + /* release any reserved blocks */ + if (reserv_clstrs) + percpu_counter_sub(&sbi->s_dirtyclusters_counter, reserv_clstrs); trace_ext4_allocate_blocks(ar, (unsigned long long)block); -- 2.39.2

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] fat: avoid parent link count underflow in rmdir
by Yongjian Sun 26 Mar '26

26 Mar '26

From: Zhiyu Zhang <zhiyuzhang999(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.0-rc1 commit 8cafcb881364af5ef3a8b9fed4db254054033d8a category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13898 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Corrupted FAT images can leave a directory inode with an incorrect i_nlink (e.g. 2 even though subdirectories exist). rmdir then unconditionally calls drop_nlink(dir) and can drive i_nlink to 0, triggering the WARN_ON in drop_nlink(). Add a sanity check in vfat_rmdir() and msdos_rmdir(): only drop the parent link count when it is at least 3, otherwise report a filesystem error. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20260101111148.1437-1-zhiyuzhang999@gmail.com Fixes: 9a53c3a783c2 ("[PATCH] r/o bind mounts: unlink: monitor i_nlink") Signed-off-by: Zhiyu Zhang <zhiyuzhang999(a)gmail.com> Reported-by: Zhiyu Zhang <zhiyuzhang999(a)gmail.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/aVN06OKsKxZe6-Kv@casper.infradead.org… Tested-by: Zhiyu Zhang <zhiyuzhang999(a)gmail.com> Acked-by: OGAWA Hirofumi <hirofumi(a)mail.parknet.co.jp> Cc: Al Viro <viro(a)zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner(a)kernel.org> Cc: Jan Kara <jack(a)suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Yongjian Sun <sunyongjian1(a)huawei.com> --- fs/fat/namei_msdos.c | 7 ++++++- fs/fat/namei_vfat.c | 7 ++++++- 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/fat/namei_msdos.c b/fs/fat/namei_msdos.c index 2116c486843b..e189fbf95fca 100644 --- a/fs/fat/namei_msdos.c +++ b/fs/fat/namei_msdos.c @@ -325,7 +325,12 @@ static int msdos_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) err = fat_remove_entries(dir, &sinfo); /* and releases bh */ if (err) goto out; - drop_nlink(dir); + if (dir->i_nlink >= 3) + drop_nlink(dir); + else { + fat_fs_error(sb, "parent dir link count too low (%u)", + dir->i_nlink); + } clear_nlink(inode); fat_truncate_time(inode, NULL, S_CTIME); diff --git a/fs/fat/namei_vfat.c b/fs/fat/namei_vfat.c index 3cf22a6727f1..7d7ac30c6eff 100644 --- a/fs/fat/namei_vfat.c +++ b/fs/fat/namei_vfat.c @@ -806,7 +806,12 @@ static int vfat_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) err = fat_remove_entries(dir, &sinfo); /* and releases bh */ if (err) goto out; - drop_nlink(dir); + if (dir->i_nlink >= 3) + drop_nlink(dir); + else { + fat_fs_error(sb, "parent dir link count too low (%u)", + dir->i_nlink); + } clear_nlink(inode); fat_truncate_time(inode, NULL, S_ATIME|S_MTIME); -- 2.39.2

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] ext4: don't set EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CONVERT when splitting before submitting I/O
by Yongjian Sun 26 Mar '26

26 Mar '26

From: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang(a)huawei.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.0-rc1 commit feaf2a80e78f89ee8a3464126077ba8683b62791 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13898 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- When allocating blocks during within-EOF DIO and writeback with dioread_nolock enabled, EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_PRE_IO was set to split an existing large unwritten extent. However, EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CONVERT was set when calling ext4_split_convert_extents(), which may potentially result in stale data issues. Assume we have an unwritten extent, and then DIO writes the second half. [UUUUUUUUUUUUUUUU] on-disk extent U: unwritten extent [UUUUUUUUUUUUUUUU] extent status tree |<- ->| ----> dio write this range First, ext4_iomap_alloc() call ext4_map_blocks() with EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_PRE_IO, EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_UNWRIT_EXT and EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CREATE flags set. ext4_map_blocks() find this extent and call ext4_split_convert_extents() with EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CONVERT and the above flags set. Then, ext4_split_convert_extents() calls ext4_split_extent() with EXT4_EXT_MAY_ZEROOUT, EXT4_EXT_MARK_UNWRIT2 and EXT4_EXT_DATA_VALID2 flags set, and it calls ext4_split_extent_at() to split the second half with EXT4_EXT_DATA_VALID2, EXT4_EXT_MARK_UNWRIT1, EXT4_EXT_MAY_ZEROOUT and EXT4_EXT_MARK_UNWRIT2 flags set. However, ext4_split_extent_at() failed to insert extent since a temporary lack -ENOSPC. It zeroes out the first half but convert the entire on-disk extent to written since the EXT4_EXT_DATA_VALID2 flag set, but left the second half as unwritten in the extent status tree. [0000000000SSSSSS] data S: stale data, 0: zeroed [WWWWWWWWWWWWWWWW] on-disk extent W: written extent [WWWWWWWWWWUUUUUU] extent status tree Finally, if the DIO failed to write data to the disk, the stale data in the second half will be exposed once the cached extent entry is gone. Fix this issue by not passing EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CONVERT when splitting an unwritten extent before submitting I/O, and make ext4_split_convert_extents() to zero out the entire extent range to zero for this case, and also mark the extent in the extent status tree for consistency. Fixes: b8a8684502a0 ("ext4: Introduce FALLOC_FL_ZERO_RANGE flag for fallocate") Signed-off-by: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Ojaswin Mujoo <ojaswin(a)linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1(a)huawei.com> Cc: stable(a)kernel.org Message-ID: <20251129103247.686136-4-yi.zhang(a)huaweicloud.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso(a)mit.edu> Conflicts: fs/ext4/extents.c [mainline commit dac092195b6a not applied] Signed-off-by: Yongjian Sun <sunyongjian1(a)huawei.com> --- fs/ext4/extents.c | 12 ++++++++---- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/extents.c b/fs/ext4/extents.c index 19eae32fc128..83b2e5d1e00a 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/extents.c +++ b/fs/ext4/extents.c @@ -3713,11 +3713,15 @@ static int ext4_split_convert_extents(handle_t *handle, /* Convert to unwritten */ if (flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CONVERT_UNWRITTEN) { split_flag |= EXT4_EXT_DATA_VALID1; - /* Convert to initialized */ - } else if (flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CONVERT) { + /* Split the existing unwritten extent */ + } else if (flags & (EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_UNWRIT_EXT | + EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CONVERT)) { split_flag |= ee_block + ee_len <= eof_block ? EXT4_EXT_MAY_ZEROOUT : 0; - split_flag |= (EXT4_EXT_MARK_UNWRIT2 | EXT4_EXT_DATA_VALID2); + split_flag |= EXT4_EXT_MARK_UNWRIT2; + /* Convert to initialized */ + if (flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CONVERT) + split_flag |= EXT4_EXT_DATA_VALID2; } flags |= EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_PRE_IO; return ext4_split_extent(handle, inode, ppath, map, split_flag, flags); @@ -3888,7 +3892,7 @@ ext4_ext_handle_unwritten_extents(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode, /* get_block() before submitting IO, split the extent */ if (flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_PRE_IO) { ret = ext4_split_convert_extents(handle, inode, map, ppath, - flags | EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CONVERT); + flags); if (ret < 0) { err = ret; goto out2; -- 2.39.2

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] ext4: fix memory leak in ext4_ext_shift_extents()
by Yongjian Sun 26 Mar '26

26 Mar '26

From: Zilin Guan <zilin(a)seu.edu.cn> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.0-rc1 commit ca81109d4a8f192dc1cbad4a1ee25246363c2833 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13898 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- In ext4_ext_shift_extents(), if the extent is NULL in the while loop, the function returns immediately without releasing the path obtained via ext4_find_extent(), leading to a memory leak. Fix this by jumping to the out label to ensure the path is properly released. Fixes: a18ed359bdddc ("ext4: always check ext4_ext_find_extent result") Signed-off-by: Zilin Guan <zilin(a)seu.edu.cn> Reviewed-by: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1(a)huawei.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251225084800.905701-1-zilin@seu.edu.cn Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso(a)mit.edu> Cc: stable(a)kernel.org Signed-off-by: Yongjian Sun <sunyongjian1(a)huawei.com> --- fs/ext4/extents.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/extents.c b/fs/ext4/extents.c index 6126f98bac63..19eae32fc128 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/extents.c +++ b/fs/ext4/extents.c @@ -5281,7 +5281,8 @@ ext4_ext_shift_extents(struct inode *inode, handle_t *handle, if (!extent) { EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "unexpected hole at %lu", (unsigned long) *iterator); - return -EFSCORRUPTED; + ret = -EFSCORRUPTED; + goto out; } if (SHIFT == SHIFT_LEFT && *iterator > le32_to_cpu(extent->ee_block)) { -- 2.39.2

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] blktrace: fix __this_cpu_read/write in preemptible context
by Yongjian Sun 26 Mar '26

26 Mar '26

From: Chaitanya Kulkarni <kch(a)nvidia.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.0-rc3 commit da46b5dfef48658d03347cda21532bcdbb521e67 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14005 CVE: CVE-2026-23374 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- tracing_record_cmdline() internally uses __this_cpu_read() and __this_cpu_write() on the per-CPU variable trace_cmdline_save, and trace_save_cmdline() explicitly asserts preemption is disabled via lockdep_assert_preemption_disabled(). These operations are only safe when preemption is off, as they were designed to be called from the scheduler context (probe_wakeup_sched_switch() / probe_wakeup()). __blk_add_trace() was calling tracing_record_cmdline(current) early in the blk_tracer path, before ring buffer reservation, from process context where preemption is fully enabled. This triggers the following using blktests/blktrace/002: blktrace/002 (blktrace ftrace corruption with sysfs trace) [failed] runtime 0.367s ... 0.437s something found in dmesg: [ 81.211018] run blktests blktrace/002 at 2026-02-25 22:24:33 [ 81.239580] null_blk: disk nullb1 created [ 81.357294] BUG: using __this_cpu_read() in preemptible [00000000] code: dd/2516 [ 81.362842] caller is tracing_record_cmdline+0x10/0x40 [ 81.362872] CPU: 16 UID: 0 PID: 2516 Comm: dd Tainted: G N 7.0.0-rc1lblk+ #84 PREEMPT(full) [ 81.362877] Tainted: [N]=TEST [ 81.362878] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.17.0-0-gb52ca86e094d-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 81.362881] Call Trace: [ 81.362884] <TASK> [ 81.362886] dump_stack_lvl+0x8d/0xb0 ... (See '/mnt/sda/blktests/results/nodev/blktrace/002.dmesg' for the entire message) [ 81.211018] run blktests blktrace/002 at 2026-02-25 22:24:33 [ 81.239580] null_blk: disk nullb1 created [ 81.357294] BUG: using __this_cpu_read() in preemptible [00000000] code: dd/2516 [ 81.362842] caller is tracing_record_cmdline+0x10/0x40 [ 81.362872] CPU: 16 UID: 0 PID: 2516 Comm: dd Tainted: G N 7.0.0-rc1lblk+ #84 PREEMPT(full) [ 81.362877] Tainted: [N]=TEST [ 81.362878] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.17.0-0-gb52ca86e094d-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 81.362881] Call Trace: [ 81.362884] <TASK> [ 81.362886] dump_stack_lvl+0x8d/0xb0 [ 81.362895] check_preemption_disabled+0xce/0xe0 [ 81.362902] tracing_record_cmdline+0x10/0x40 [ 81.362923] __blk_add_trace+0x307/0x5d0 [ 81.362934] ? lock_acquire+0xe0/0x300 [ 81.362940] ? iov_iter_extract_pages+0x101/0xa30 [ 81.362959] blk_add_trace_bio+0x106/0x1e0 [ 81.362968] submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x24b/0x3a0 [ 81.362979] ? lockdep_init_map_type+0x58/0x260 [ 81.362988] submit_bio_wait+0x56/0x90 [ 81.363009] __blkdev_direct_IO_simple+0x16c/0x250 [ 81.363026] ? __pfx_submit_bio_wait_endio+0x10/0x10 [ 81.363038] ? rcu_read_lock_any_held+0x73/0xa0 [ 81.363051] blkdev_read_iter+0xc1/0x140 [ 81.363059] vfs_read+0x20b/0x330 [ 81.363083] ksys_read+0x67/0xe0 [ 81.363090] do_syscall_64+0xbf/0xf00 [ 81.363102] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 81.363106] RIP: 0033:0x7f281906029d [ 81.363111] Code: 31 c0 e9 c6 fe ff ff 50 48 8d 3d 66 63 0a 00 e8 59 ff 01 00 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 80 3d 41 33 0e 00 00 74 17 31 c0 0f 0c [ 81.363113] RSP: 002b:00007ffca127dd48 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000 [ 81.363120] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f281906029d [ 81.363122] RDX: 0000000000001000 RSI: 0000559f8bfae000 RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 81.363123] RBP: 0000000000001000 R08: 0000002863a10a81 R09: 00007f281915f000 [ 81.363124] R10: 00007f2818f77b60 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000559f8bfae000 [ 81.363126] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 000000000000000a [ 81.363142] </TASK> The same BUG fires from blk_add_trace_plug(), blk_add_trace_unplug(), and blk_add_trace_rq() paths as well. The purpose of tracing_record_cmdline() is to cache the task->comm for a given PID so that the trace can later resolve it. It is only meaningful when a trace event is actually being recorded. Ring buffer reservation via ring_buffer_lock_reserve() disables preemption, and preemption remains disabled until the event is committed :- __blk_add_trace() __trace_buffer_lock_reserve() __trace_buffer_lock_reserve() ring_buffer_lock_reserve() preempt_disable_notrace(); <--- With this fix blktests for blktrace pass: blktests (master) # ./check blktrace blktrace/001 (blktrace zone management command tracing) [passed] runtime 3.650s ... 3.647s blktrace/002 (blktrace ftrace corruption with sysfs trace) [passed] runtime 0.411s ... 0.384s Fixes: 7ffbd48d5cab ("tracing: Cache comms only after an event occurred") Reported-by: Shinichiro Kawasaki <shinichiro.kawasaki(a)wdc.com> Suggested-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt(a)goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Chaitanya Kulkarni <kch(a)nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt(a)goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk> Conflicts: kernel/trace/blktrace.c [mainline e472eca538358 & 48886b9d668 not applied] Signed-off-by: Yongjian Sun <sunyongjian1(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/trace/blktrace.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/trace/blktrace.c b/kernel/trace/blktrace.c index d5d94510afd3..ce797d8dd451 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/blktrace.c +++ b/kernel/trace/blktrace.c @@ -251,8 +251,6 @@ static void __blk_add_trace(struct blk_trace *bt, sector_t sector, int bytes, cpu = raw_smp_processor_id(); if (blk_tracer) { - tracing_record_cmdline(current); - buffer = blk_tr->array_buffer.buffer; trace_ctx = tracing_gen_ctx_flags(0); event = trace_buffer_lock_reserve(buffer, TRACE_BLK, @@ -260,6 +258,8 @@ static void __blk_add_trace(struct blk_trace *bt, sector_t sector, int bytes, trace_ctx); if (!event) return; + + tracing_record_cmdline(current); t = ring_buffer_event_data(event); goto record_it; } -- 2.39.2

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] ext4: fix dirtyclusters double decrement on fs shutdown
by Yongjian Sun 26 Mar '26

26 Mar '26

From: Brian Foster <bfoster(a)redhat.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.0-rc1 commit 94a8cea54cd935c54fa2fba70354757c0fc245e3 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13898 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- fstests test generic/388 occasionally reproduces a warning in ext4_put_super() associated with the dirty clusters count: WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 76064 at fs/ext4/super.c:1324 ext4_put_super+0x48c/0x590 [ext4] Tracing the failure shows that the warning fires due to an s_dirtyclusters_counter value of -1. IOW, this appears to be a spurious decrement as opposed to some sort of leak. Further tracing of the dirty cluster count deltas and an LLM scan of the resulting output identified the cause as a double decrement in the error path between ext4_mb_mark_diskspace_used() and the caller ext4_mb_new_blocks(). First, note that generic/388 is a shutdown vs. fsstress test and so produces a random set of operations and shutdown injections. In the problematic case, the shutdown triggers an error return from the ext4_handle_dirty_metadata() call(s) made from ext4_mb_mark_context(). The changed value is non-zero at this point, so ext4_mb_mark_diskspace_used() does not exit after the error bubbles up from ext4_mb_mark_context(). Instead, the former decrements both cluster counters and returns the error up to ext4_mb_new_blocks(). The latter falls into the !ar->len out path which decrements the dirty clusters counter a second time, creating the inconsistency. To avoid this problem and simplify ownership of the cluster reservation in this codepath, lift the counter reduction to a single place in the caller. This makes it more clear that ext4_mb_new_blocks() is responsible for acquiring cluster reservation (via ext4_claim_free_clusters()) in the !delalloc case as well as releasing it, regardless of whether it ends up consumed or returned due to failure. Fixes: 0087d9fb3f29 ("ext4: Fix s_dirty_blocks_counter if block allocation failed with nodelalloc") Signed-off-by: Brian Foster <bfoster(a)redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1(a)huawei.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260113171905.118284-1-bfoster@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso(a)mit.edu> Cc: stable(a)kernel.org Conflicts: fs/ext4/mballoc-test.c fs/ext4/mballoc.c [mainline 2f94711b098b & 7c9fa399a369 not applied] Signed-off-by: Yongjian Sun <sunyongjian1(a)huawei.com> --- fs/ext4/mballoc.c | 21 +++++---------------- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/mballoc.c b/fs/ext4/mballoc.c index 9d4e8e3c74e2..683f1e220645 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/mballoc.c +++ b/fs/ext4/mballoc.c @@ -3300,8 +3300,7 @@ void ext4_exit_mballoc(void) * Returns 0 if success or error code */ static noinline_for_stack int -ext4_mb_mark_diskspace_used(struct ext4_allocation_context *ac, - handle_t *handle, unsigned int reserv_clstrs) +ext4_mb_mark_diskspace_used(struct ext4_allocation_context *ac, handle_t *handle) { struct buffer_head *bitmap_bh = NULL; struct ext4_group_desc *gdp; @@ -3388,13 +3387,6 @@ ext4_mb_mark_diskspace_used(struct ext4_allocation_context *ac, ext4_unlock_group(sb, ac->ac_b_ex.fe_group); percpu_counter_sub(&sbi->s_freeclusters_counter, ac->ac_b_ex.fe_len); - /* - * Now reduce the dirty block count also. Should not go negative - */ - if (!(ac->ac_flags & EXT4_MB_DELALLOC_RESERVED)) - /* release all the reserved blocks if non delalloc */ - percpu_counter_sub(&sbi->s_dirtyclusters_counter, - reserv_clstrs); if (sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex) { ext4_group_t flex_group = ext4_flex_group(sbi, @@ -5272,7 +5264,7 @@ ext4_fsblk_t ext4_mb_new_blocks(handle_t *handle, ext4_mb_pa_free(ac); } if (likely(ac->ac_status == AC_STATUS_FOUND)) { - *errp = ext4_mb_mark_diskspace_used(ac, handle, reserv_clstrs); + *errp = ext4_mb_mark_diskspace_used(ac, handle); if (*errp) { ext4_discard_allocated_blocks(ac); goto errout; @@ -5304,12 +5296,9 @@ ext4_fsblk_t ext4_mb_new_blocks(handle_t *handle, kmem_cache_free(ext4_ac_cachep, ac); if (inquota && ar->len < inquota) dquot_free_block(ar->inode, EXT4_C2B(sbi, inquota - ar->len)); - if (!ar->len) { - if ((ar->flags & EXT4_MB_DELALLOC_RESERVED) == 0) - /* release all the reserved blocks if non delalloc */ - percpu_counter_sub(&sbi->s_dirtyclusters_counter, - reserv_clstrs); - } + /* release any reserved blocks */ + if (reserv_clstrs) + percpu_counter_sub(&sbi->s_dirtyclusters_counter, reserv_clstrs); trace_ext4_allocate_blocks(ar, (unsigned long long)block); -- 2.39.2

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] ext4: don't set EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CONVERT when splitting before submitting I/O
by Yongjian Sun 26 Mar '26

26 Mar '26

From: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang(a)huawei.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.0-rc1 commit feaf2a80e78f89ee8a3464126077ba8683b62791 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13898 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- When allocating blocks during within-EOF DIO and writeback with dioread_nolock enabled, EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_PRE_IO was set to split an existing large unwritten extent. However, EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CONVERT was set when calling ext4_split_convert_extents(), which may potentially result in stale data issues. Assume we have an unwritten extent, and then DIO writes the second half. [UUUUUUUUUUUUUUUU] on-disk extent U: unwritten extent [UUUUUUUUUUUUUUUU] extent status tree |<- ->| ----> dio write this range First, ext4_iomap_alloc() call ext4_map_blocks() with EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_PRE_IO, EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_UNWRIT_EXT and EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CREATE flags set. ext4_map_blocks() find this extent and call ext4_split_convert_extents() with EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CONVERT and the above flags set. Then, ext4_split_convert_extents() calls ext4_split_extent() with EXT4_EXT_MAY_ZEROOUT, EXT4_EXT_MARK_UNWRIT2 and EXT4_EXT_DATA_VALID2 flags set, and it calls ext4_split_extent_at() to split the second half with EXT4_EXT_DATA_VALID2, EXT4_EXT_MARK_UNWRIT1, EXT4_EXT_MAY_ZEROOUT and EXT4_EXT_MARK_UNWRIT2 flags set. However, ext4_split_extent_at() failed to insert extent since a temporary lack -ENOSPC. It zeroes out the first half but convert the entire on-disk extent to written since the EXT4_EXT_DATA_VALID2 flag set, but left the second half as unwritten in the extent status tree. [0000000000SSSSSS] data S: stale data, 0: zeroed [WWWWWWWWWWWWWWWW] on-disk extent W: written extent [WWWWWWWWWWUUUUUU] extent status tree Finally, if the DIO failed to write data to the disk, the stale data in the second half will be exposed once the cached extent entry is gone. Fix this issue by not passing EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CONVERT when splitting an unwritten extent before submitting I/O, and make ext4_split_convert_extents() to zero out the entire extent range to zero for this case, and also mark the extent in the extent status tree for consistency. Fixes: b8a8684502a0 ("ext4: Introduce FALLOC_FL_ZERO_RANGE flag for fallocate") Signed-off-by: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Ojaswin Mujoo <ojaswin(a)linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1(a)huawei.com> Cc: stable(a)kernel.org Message-ID: <20251129103247.686136-4-yi.zhang(a)huaweicloud.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso(a)mit.edu> Conflicts: fs/ext4/extents.c [mainline commit dac092195b6a not applied] Signed-off-by: Yongjian Sun <sunyongjian1(a)huawei.com> --- fs/ext4/extents.c | 12 ++++++++---- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/extents.c b/fs/ext4/extents.c index 786701524736..4c77284be84d 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/extents.c +++ b/fs/ext4/extents.c @@ -3714,11 +3714,15 @@ static int ext4_split_convert_extents(handle_t *handle, /* Convert to unwritten */ if (flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CONVERT_UNWRITTEN) { split_flag |= EXT4_EXT_DATA_VALID1; - /* Convert to initialized */ - } else if (flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CONVERT) { + /* Split the existing unwritten extent */ + } else if (flags & (EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_UNWRIT_EXT | + EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CONVERT)) { split_flag |= ee_block + ee_len <= eof_block ? EXT4_EXT_MAY_ZEROOUT : 0; - split_flag |= (EXT4_EXT_MARK_UNWRIT2 | EXT4_EXT_DATA_VALID2); + split_flag |= EXT4_EXT_MARK_UNWRIT2; + /* Convert to initialized */ + if (flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CONVERT) + split_flag |= EXT4_EXT_DATA_VALID2; } flags |= EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_PRE_IO; return ext4_split_extent(handle, inode, ppath, map, split_flag, flags); @@ -3883,7 +3887,7 @@ ext4_ext_handle_unwritten_extents(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode, /* get_block() before submitting IO, split the extent */ if (flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_PRE_IO) { ret = ext4_split_convert_extents(handle, inode, map, ppath, - flags | EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CONVERT); + flags); if (ret < 0) { err = ret; goto out2; -- 2.39.2

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] fat: avoid parent link count underflow in rmdir
by Yongjian Sun 26 Mar '26

26 Mar '26

From: Zhiyu Zhang <zhiyuzhang999(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.0-rc1 commit 8cafcb881364af5ef3a8b9fed4db254054033d8a category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13898 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Corrupted FAT images can leave a directory inode with an incorrect i_nlink (e.g. 2 even though subdirectories exist). rmdir then unconditionally calls drop_nlink(dir) and can drive i_nlink to 0, triggering the WARN_ON in drop_nlink(). Add a sanity check in vfat_rmdir() and msdos_rmdir(): only drop the parent link count when it is at least 3, otherwise report a filesystem error. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20260101111148.1437-1-zhiyuzhang999@gmail.com Fixes: 9a53c3a783c2 ("[PATCH] r/o bind mounts: unlink: monitor i_nlink") Signed-off-by: Zhiyu Zhang <zhiyuzhang999(a)gmail.com> Reported-by: Zhiyu Zhang <zhiyuzhang999(a)gmail.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/aVN06OKsKxZe6-Kv@casper.infradead.org… Tested-by: Zhiyu Zhang <zhiyuzhang999(a)gmail.com> Acked-by: OGAWA Hirofumi <hirofumi(a)mail.parknet.co.jp> Cc: Al Viro <viro(a)zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner(a)kernel.org> Cc: Jan Kara <jack(a)suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Yongjian Sun <sunyongjian1(a)huawei.com> --- fs/fat/namei_msdos.c | 7 ++++++- fs/fat/namei_vfat.c | 7 ++++++- 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/fat/namei_msdos.c b/fs/fat/namei_msdos.c index 9d062886fbc1..63a323be9179 100644 --- a/fs/fat/namei_msdos.c +++ b/fs/fat/namei_msdos.c @@ -325,7 +325,12 @@ static int msdos_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) err = fat_remove_entries(dir, &sinfo); /* and releases bh */ if (err) goto out; - drop_nlink(dir); + if (dir->i_nlink >= 3) + drop_nlink(dir); + else { + fat_fs_error(sb, "parent dir link count too low (%u)", + dir->i_nlink); + } clear_nlink(inode); fat_truncate_time(inode, NULL, S_CTIME); diff --git a/fs/fat/namei_vfat.c b/fs/fat/namei_vfat.c index 0cdd0fb9f742..db9a88fb6e2d 100644 --- a/fs/fat/namei_vfat.c +++ b/fs/fat/namei_vfat.c @@ -808,7 +808,12 @@ static int vfat_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) err = fat_remove_entries(dir, &sinfo); /* and releases bh */ if (err) goto out; - drop_nlink(dir); + if (dir->i_nlink >= 3) + drop_nlink(dir); + else { + fat_fs_error(sb, "parent dir link count too low (%u)", + dir->i_nlink); + } clear_nlink(inode); fat_truncate_time(inode, NULL, S_ATIME|S_MTIME); -- 2.39.2

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] scsi: core: Fix refcount leak for tagset_refcnt
by Li Lingfeng 26 Mar '26

26 Mar '26

From: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi(a)oracle.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.130 commit 7c01b680beaf4d3143866b062b8e770e8b237fb8 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13999 CVE: CVE-2026-23296 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 1ac22c8eae81366101597d48360718dff9b9d980 upstream. This leak will cause a hang when tearing down the SCSI host. For example, iscsid hangs with the following call trace: [130120.652718] scsi_alloc_sdev: Allocation failure during SCSI scanning, some SCSI devices might not be configured PID: 2528 TASK: ffff9d0408974e00 CPU: 3 COMMAND: "iscsid" #0 [ffffb5b9c134b9e0] __schedule at ffffffff860657d4 #1 [ffffb5b9c134ba28] schedule at ffffffff86065c6f #2 [ffffb5b9c134ba40] schedule_timeout at ffffffff86069fb0 #3 [ffffb5b9c134bab0] __wait_for_common at ffffffff8606674f #4 [ffffb5b9c134bb10] scsi_remove_host at ffffffff85bfe84b #5 [ffffb5b9c134bb30] iscsi_sw_tcp_session_destroy at ffffffffc03031c4 [iscsi_tcp] #6 [ffffb5b9c134bb48] iscsi_if_recv_msg at ffffffffc0292692 [scsi_transport_iscsi] #7 [ffffb5b9c134bb98] iscsi_if_rx at ffffffffc02929c2 [scsi_transport_iscsi] #8 [ffffb5b9c134bbf0] netlink_unicast at ffffffff85e551d6 #9 [ffffb5b9c134bc38] netlink_sendmsg at ffffffff85e554ef Fixes: 8fe4ce5836e9 ("scsi: core: Fix a use-after-free") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi(a)oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Mike Christie <michael.christie(a)oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche(a)acm.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260223232728.93350-1-junxiao.bi@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Li Lingfeng <lilingfeng3(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/scsi/scsi_scan.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/scsi/scsi_scan.c b/drivers/scsi/scsi_scan.c index 8ee74dddef16..e5b62e36761f 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/scsi_scan.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/scsi_scan.c @@ -354,6 +354,7 @@ static struct scsi_device *scsi_alloc_sdev(struct scsi_target *starget, * since we use this queue depth most of times. */ if (scsi_realloc_sdev_budget_map(sdev, depth)) { + kref_put(&sdev->host->tagset_refcnt, scsi_mq_free_tags); put_device(&starget->dev); kfree(sdev); goto out; -- 2.52.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] bonding: fix use-after-free due to enslave fail after slave array update
by Dong Chenchen 26 Mar '26

26 Mar '26

From: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor(a)blackwall.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.19-rc8 commit e9acda52fd2ee0cdca332f996da7a95c5fd25294 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13721 CVE: CVE-2026-23171 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Fix a use-after-free which happens due to enslave failure after the new slave has been added to the array. Since the new slave can be used for Tx immediately, we can use it after it has been freed by the enslave error cleanup path which frees the allocated slave memory. Slave update array is supposed to be called last when further enslave failures are not expected. Move it after xdp setup to avoid any problems. It is very easy to reproduce the problem with a simple xdp_pass prog: ip l add bond1 type bond mode balance-xor ip l set bond1 up ip l set dev bond1 xdp object xdp_pass.o sec xdp_pass ip l add dumdum type dummy Then run in parallel: while :; do ip l set dumdum master bond1 1>/dev/null 2>&1; done; mausezahn bond1 -a own -b rand -A rand -B 1.1.1.1 -c 0 -t tcp "dp=1-1023, flags=syn" The crash happens almost immediately: [ 605.602850] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xe0e6fc2460000137: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI [ 605.602916] KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range [0x07380123000009b8-0x07380123000009bf] [ 605.602946] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 2445 Comm: mausezahn Kdump: loaded Tainted: G B 6.19.0-rc6+ #21 PREEMPT(voluntary) [ 605.602979] Tainted: [B]=BAD_PAGE [ 605.602998] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 [ 605.603032] RIP: 0010:netdev_core_pick_tx+0xcd/0x210 [ 605.603063] Code: 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 3e 01 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 8b 6b 08 49 8d 7d 30 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 25 01 00 00 49 8b 45 30 4c 89 e2 48 89 ee 48 89 [ 605.603111] RSP: 0018:ffff88817b9af348 EFLAGS: 00010213 [ 605.603145] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff88817d28b420 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 605.603172] RDX: 00e7002460000137 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: 07380123000009be [ 605.603199] RBP: ffff88817b541a00 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: fffffbfff3ed8c0c [ 605.603226] R10: ffffffff9f6c6067 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 605.603253] R13: 073801230000098e R14: ffff88817d28b448 R15: ffff88817b541a84 [ 605.603286] FS: 00007f6570ef67c0(0000) GS:ffff888221dfa000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 605.603319] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 605.603343] CR2: 00007f65712fae40 CR3: 000000011371b000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0 [ 605.603373] Call Trace: [ 605.603392] <TASK> [ 605.603410] __dev_queue_xmit+0x448/0x32a0 [ 605.603434] ? __pfx_vprintk_emit+0x10/0x10 [ 605.603461] ? __pfx_vprintk_emit+0x10/0x10 [ 605.603484] ? __pfx___dev_queue_xmit+0x10/0x10 [ 605.603507] ? bond_start_xmit+0xbfb/0xc20 [bonding] [ 605.603546] ? _printk+0xcb/0x100 [ 605.603566] ? __pfx__printk+0x10/0x10 [ 605.603589] ? bond_start_xmit+0xbfb/0xc20 [bonding] [ 605.603627] ? add_taint+0x5e/0x70 [ 605.603648] ? add_taint+0x2a/0x70 [ 605.603670] ? end_report.cold+0x51/0x75 [ 605.603693] ? bond_start_xmit+0xbfb/0xc20 [bonding] [ 605.603731] bond_start_xmit+0x623/0xc20 [bonding] Fixes: 9e2ee5c7e7c3 ("net, bonding: Add XDP support to the bonding driver") Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor(a)blackwall.org> Reported-by: Chen Zhen <chenzhen126(a)huawei.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/fae17c21-4940-5605-85b2-1d5e17342358@huawei.… CC: Jussi Maki <joamaki(a)gmail.com> CC: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260123120659.571187-1-razor@blackwall.org Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> Conflicts: drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c [commit e0caeb24f538 and cb9e6e584d584 are not backport] Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c b/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c index cd64d7cc65aa..9deea4439b79 100644 --- a/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c @@ -2139,9 +2139,6 @@ int bond_enslave(struct net_device *bond_dev, struct net_device *slave_dev, unblock_netpoll_tx(); } - if (bond_mode_can_use_xmit_hash(bond)) - bond_update_slave_arr(bond, NULL); - if (!slave_dev->netdev_ops->ndo_bpf || !slave_dev->netdev_ops->ndo_xdp_xmit) { @@ -2178,6 +2175,9 @@ int bond_enslave(struct net_device *bond_dev, struct net_device *slave_dev, bpf_prog_inc(bond->xdp_prog); } + if (bond_mode_can_use_xmit_hash(bond)) + bond_update_slave_arr(bond, NULL); + slave_info(bond_dev, slave_dev, "Enslaving as %s interface with %s link\n", bond_is_active_slave(new_slave) ? "an active" : "a backup", new_slave->link != BOND_LINK_DOWN ? "an up" : "a down"); -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] perf: HiSilicon: Support uncore ITS PMU
by Yushan Wang 26 Mar '26

26 Mar '26

driver inclusion category: feature bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/8741 ----------------------------------------------- Support uncore ITS PMU, which provides the capability of counting interrupts routed to ITS by interrupt catagories, and its latency. It also supports ITS internal structure latency and DDR access events. The driver adapts to HiSilicon uncore PMU framework. ITS PMU driver does not support overflow interruption, which is the same as NoC PMU, so a few dummy functions or handling interrupts are left empty. Signed-off-by: Yushan Wang <wangyushan12(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Ying Jiang <jiangying44(a)h-partners.com> --- drivers/perf/hisilicon/hisi_uncore_its_pmu.c | 364 +++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 364 insertions(+) create mode 100644 drivers/perf/hisilicon/hisi_uncore_its_pmu.c diff --git a/drivers/perf/hisilicon/hisi_uncore_its_pmu.c b/drivers/perf/hisilicon/hisi_uncore_its_pmu.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..9d9035207e78 --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/perf/hisilicon/hisi_uncore_its_pmu.c @@ -0,0 +1,364 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Driver for HiSilicon Uncore ITS PMU device + * + * Copyright (c) 2025 HiSilicon Technologies Co., Ltd. + * Author: Yushan Wang <wangyushan12(a)huawei.com> + */ +#include <linux/bitops.h> +#include <linux/cpuhotplug.h> +#include <linux/device.h> +#include <linux/io.h> +#include <linux/mod_devicetable.h> +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/platform_device.h> +#include <linux/property.h> +#include <linux/sysfs.h> + +#include "hisi_uncore_pmu.h" + +#define ITS_PMU_VERSION 0x21000 +#define ITS_PMU_GLOBAL_CTRL 0x21004 +#define ITS_PMU_GLOBAL_CTRL_PMU_EN BIT(0) +#define ITS_PMU_COUNTER_CTRL 0x21008 +#define ITS_PMU_EVENT_CTRL 0x2100c +#define ITS_PMU_COUNTER0 0x21010 + +#define ITS_PMU_INT_ID_MASK 0x20008 +#define ITS_PMU_INT_ID_CTRL 0x20084 + +#define ITS_PMU_NR_COUNTERS 4 + +#define ITS_PMU_EVENT_CNTRn(cntr0, n) ((cntr0) + 8 * (n)) +#define ITS_PMU_CNTR_CTRL_MASK(n) GENMASK(8 * ((n) + 1) - 1, 8 * (n)) +#define ITS_PMU_CNTR_EVENT_CFG(n, e) ((e) << ((n) * 8)) +#define ITS_PMU_EVENT_CTRL_TYPE GENMASK(12, 0) + +HISI_PMU_EVENT_ATTR_EXTRACTOR(int_id, config1, 31, 0); + +/* Dynamic CPU hotplug state used by this PMU driver */ +static enum cpuhp_state hisi_its_pmu_cpuhp_state; + +struct hisi_its_pmu_regs { + u32 version; + u32 pmu_ctrl; + u32 event_ctrl0; + u32 event_cntr0; + u32 cntr_ctrl; +}; + +static void hisi_its_pmu_write_evtype(struct hisi_pmu *its_pmu, int idx, u32 type) +{ + struct hisi_its_pmu_regs *reg_info = its_pmu->dev_info->private; + u32 reg; + + reg = readl(its_pmu->base + reg_info->event_ctrl0); + reg &= ~ITS_PMU_CNTR_CTRL_MASK(idx); + reg |= ITS_PMU_CNTR_EVENT_CFG(idx, type); + writel(reg, its_pmu->base + reg_info->event_ctrl0); +} + +static u64 hisi_its_pmu_read_counter(struct hisi_pmu *its_pmu, + struct hw_perf_event *hwc) +{ + struct hisi_its_pmu_regs *reg_info = its_pmu->dev_info->private; + + return readq(its_pmu->base + ITS_PMU_EVENT_CNTRn(reg_info->event_cntr0, hwc->idx)); +} + +static void hisi_its_pmu_write_counter(struct hisi_pmu *its_pmu, + struct hw_perf_event *hwc, u64 val) +{ + struct hisi_its_pmu_regs *reg_info = its_pmu->dev_info->private; + + writeq(val, its_pmu->base + ITS_PMU_EVENT_CNTRn(reg_info->event_cntr0, hwc->idx)); +} + +static void hisi_its_pmu_enable_counter(struct hisi_pmu *its_pmu, + struct hw_perf_event *hwc) +{ + struct hisi_its_pmu_regs *reg_info = its_pmu->dev_info->private; + u32 reg; + + reg = readl(its_pmu->base + reg_info->cntr_ctrl); + reg |= BIT(hwc->idx); + writel(reg, its_pmu->base + reg_info->cntr_ctrl); +} + +static void hisi_its_pmu_disable_counter(struct hisi_pmu *its_pmu, + struct hw_perf_event *hwc) +{ + struct hisi_its_pmu_regs *reg_info = its_pmu->dev_info->private; + u32 reg; + + reg = readl(its_pmu->base + reg_info->cntr_ctrl); + reg &= ~BIT(hwc->idx); + writel(reg, its_pmu->base + reg_info->cntr_ctrl); +} + +static void hisi_its_pmu_enable_counter_int(struct hisi_pmu *its_pmu, + struct hw_perf_event *hwc) +{ + /* We don't support interrupt, so a stub here. */ +} + +static void hisi_its_pmu_disable_counter_int(struct hisi_pmu *its_pmu, + struct hw_perf_event *hwc) +{ +} + +static void hisi_its_pmu_start_counters(struct hisi_pmu *its_pmu) +{ + struct hisi_its_pmu_regs *reg_info = its_pmu->dev_info->private; + u32 reg; + + reg = readl(its_pmu->base + reg_info->pmu_ctrl); + reg |= ITS_PMU_GLOBAL_CTRL_PMU_EN; + writel(reg, its_pmu->base + reg_info->pmu_ctrl); +} + +static void hisi_its_pmu_stop_counters(struct hisi_pmu *its_pmu) +{ + struct hisi_its_pmu_regs *reg_info = its_pmu->dev_info->private; + u32 reg; + + reg = readl(its_pmu->base + reg_info->pmu_ctrl); + reg &= ~ITS_PMU_GLOBAL_CTRL_PMU_EN; + writel(reg, its_pmu->base + reg_info->pmu_ctrl); +} + +static void hisi_its_pmu_enable_filter(struct perf_event *event) +{ + struct hisi_pmu *its_pmu = to_hisi_pmu(event->pmu); + u32 int_id = hisi_get_int_id(event); + u32 reg = int_id ? 0 : -1U; + + if (int_id) + writel(int_id, its_pmu->base + ITS_PMU_INT_ID_CTRL); + + writel(reg, its_pmu->base + ITS_PMU_INT_ID_MASK); +} + +static void hisi_its_pmu_disable_filter(struct perf_event *event) +{ + struct hisi_pmu *its_pmu = to_hisi_pmu(event->pmu); + u32 int_id = hisi_get_int_id(event); + + if (bitmap_weight(its_pmu->pmu_events.used_mask, its_pmu->num_counters) > 1) + return; + + if (int_id) { + writel(0, its_pmu->base + ITS_PMU_INT_ID_CTRL); + writel(-1U, its_pmu->base + ITS_PMU_INT_ID_MASK); + } +} + +static const struct hisi_uncore_ops hisi_uncore_its_ops = { + .write_evtype = hisi_its_pmu_write_evtype, + .get_event_idx = hisi_uncore_pmu_get_event_idx, + .read_counter = hisi_its_pmu_read_counter, + .write_counter = hisi_its_pmu_write_counter, + .enable_counter = hisi_its_pmu_enable_counter, + .disable_counter = hisi_its_pmu_disable_counter, + .enable_counter_int = hisi_its_pmu_enable_counter_int, + .disable_counter_int = hisi_its_pmu_disable_counter_int, + .start_counters = hisi_its_pmu_start_counters, + .stop_counters = hisi_its_pmu_stop_counters, + .enable_filter = hisi_its_pmu_enable_filter, + .disable_filter = hisi_its_pmu_disable_filter, +}; + +static struct attribute *hisi_its_pmu_format_attrs[] = { + HISI_PMU_FORMAT_ATTR(event, "config:0-16"), + HISI_PMU_FORMAT_ATTR(int_id, "config1:0-31"), + NULL +}; + +static const struct attribute_group hisi_its_pmu_format_group = { + .name = "format", + .attrs = hisi_its_pmu_format_attrs, +}; + +static struct attribute *hisi_its_pmu_events_attrs[] = { + HISI_PMU_EVENT_ATTR(lpi_num, 0xc0), + HISI_PMU_EVENT_ATTR(lpi_time, 0x80), + HISI_PMU_EVENT_ATTR(sgi_num, 0xc1), + HISI_PMU_EVENT_ATTR(sgi_time, 0x81), + HISI_PMU_EVENT_ATTR(ppi_num, 0xc2), + HISI_PMU_EVENT_ATTR(ppi_time, 0x82), + HISI_PMU_EVENT_ATTR(sl3_lpi_num, 0xc3), + HISI_PMU_EVENT_ATTR(sl3_sgi_num, 0xc4), + HISI_PMU_EVENT_ATTR(sl3_ppi_num, 0xc5), + HISI_PMU_EVENT_ATTR(sl0_ddr_read, 0xc9), + HISI_PMU_EVENT_ATTR(sl0_ddr_time, 0x89), + HISI_PMU_EVENT_ATTR(sl1_ddr_read, 0xca), + HISI_PMU_EVENT_ATTR(sl1_ddr_time, 0x8a), + HISI_PMU_EVENT_ATTR(sl2_ddr_read, 0xcb), + HISI_PMU_EVENT_ATTR(sl2_ddr_time, 0x8b), + HISI_PMU_EVENT_ATTR(cycles, 0xcc), + NULL +}; + +static const struct attribute_group hisi_its_pmu_events_group = { + .name = "events", + .attrs = hisi_its_pmu_events_attrs, +}; + +static const struct attribute_group *hisi_its_pmu_attr_groups[] = { + &hisi_its_pmu_format_group, + &hisi_its_pmu_events_group, + &hisi_pmu_cpumask_attr_group, + &hisi_pmu_identifier_group, + NULL +}; + +static int hisi_its_pmu_dev_init(struct platform_device *pdev, struct hisi_pmu *its_pmu) +{ + struct hisi_its_pmu_regs *reg_info; + + hisi_uncore_pmu_init_topology(its_pmu, &pdev->dev); + + if (its_pmu->topo.scl_id < 0) + return dev_err_probe(&pdev->dev, -EINVAL, "failed to get scl-id\n"); + + if (its_pmu->topo.index_id < 0) + return dev_err_probe(&pdev->dev, -EINVAL, "failed to get idx-id\n"); + + its_pmu->base = devm_platform_ioremap_resource(pdev, 0); + if (IS_ERR(its_pmu->base)) + return dev_err_probe(&pdev->dev, PTR_ERR(its_pmu->base), + "fail to remap io memory\n"); + + its_pmu->dev_info = device_get_match_data(&pdev->dev); + if (!its_pmu->dev_info) + return -ENODEV; + + its_pmu->pmu_events.attr_groups = its_pmu->dev_info->attr_groups; + its_pmu->counter_bits = its_pmu->dev_info->counter_bits; + its_pmu->check_event = its_pmu->dev_info->check_event; + its_pmu->num_counters = ITS_PMU_NR_COUNTERS; + its_pmu->ops = &hisi_uncore_its_ops; + its_pmu->dev = &pdev->dev; + its_pmu->on_cpu = -1; + + reg_info = its_pmu->dev_info->private; + its_pmu->identifier = readl(its_pmu->base + reg_info->version); + + return 0; +} + +static void hisi_its_pmu_remove_cpuhp_instance(void *hotplug_node) +{ + cpuhp_state_remove_instance_nocalls(hisi_its_pmu_cpuhp_state, hotplug_node); +} + +static void hisi_its_pmu_unregister_pmu(void *pmu) +{ + perf_pmu_unregister(pmu); +} + +static int hisi_its_pmu_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) +{ + struct device *dev = &pdev->dev; + struct hisi_pmu *its_pmu; + char *name; + int ret; + + its_pmu = devm_kzalloc(dev, sizeof(*its_pmu), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!its_pmu) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* + * HiSilicon Uncore PMU framework needs to get common hisi_pmu device + * from device's drvdata. + */ + platform_set_drvdata(pdev, its_pmu); + + ret = hisi_its_pmu_dev_init(pdev, its_pmu); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = cpuhp_state_add_instance(hisi_its_pmu_cpuhp_state, &its_pmu->node); + if (ret) + return dev_err_probe(dev, ret, "Fail to register cpuhp instance\n"); + + ret = devm_add_action_or_reset(dev, hisi_its_pmu_remove_cpuhp_instance, + &its_pmu->node); + if (ret) + return ret; + + hisi_pmu_init(its_pmu, THIS_MODULE); + + name = devm_kasprintf(dev, GFP_KERNEL, "hisi_scl%d_its%d", + its_pmu->topo.scl_id, its_pmu->topo.index_id); + if (!name) + return -ENOMEM; + + ret = perf_pmu_register(&its_pmu->pmu, name, -1); + if (ret) + return dev_err_probe(dev, ret, "Fail to register PMU\n"); + + return devm_add_action_or_reset(dev, hisi_its_pmu_unregister_pmu, + &its_pmu->pmu); +} + +static struct hisi_its_pmu_regs hisi_its_v1_pmu_regs = { + .version = ITS_PMU_VERSION, + .pmu_ctrl = ITS_PMU_GLOBAL_CTRL, + .event_ctrl0 = ITS_PMU_EVENT_CTRL, + .event_cntr0 = ITS_PMU_COUNTER0, + .cntr_ctrl = ITS_PMU_COUNTER_CTRL, +}; + +static const struct hisi_pmu_dev_info hisi_its_v1 = { + .attr_groups = hisi_its_pmu_attr_groups, + .counter_bits = 48, + .check_event = ITS_PMU_EVENT_CTRL_TYPE, + .private = &hisi_its_v1_pmu_regs, +}; + +static const struct acpi_device_id hisi_its_pmu_ids[] = { + { "HISI0591", (kernel_ulong_t) &hisi_its_v1 }, + { } +}; +MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(acpi, hisi_its_pmu_ids); + +static struct platform_driver hisi_its_pmu_driver = { + .driver = { + .name = "hisi_its_pmu", + .acpi_match_table = hisi_its_pmu_ids, + .suppress_bind_attrs = true, + }, + .probe = hisi_its_pmu_probe, +}; + +static int __init hisi_its_pmu_module_init(void) +{ + int ret = cpuhp_setup_state_multi(CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN, + "perf/hisi/its:online", + hisi_uncore_pmu_online_cpu, + hisi_uncore_pmu_offline_cpu); + if (ret < 0) { + pr_err("hisi_its_pmu: Fail to setup cpuhp callbacks, ret = %d\n", ret); + return ret; + } + hisi_its_pmu_cpuhp_state = ret; + + ret = platform_driver_register(&hisi_its_pmu_driver); + if (ret) + cpuhp_remove_multi_state(hisi_its_pmu_cpuhp_state); + + return ret; +} +module_init(hisi_its_pmu_module_init); + +static void __exit hisi_its_pmu_module_exit(void) +{ + platform_driver_unregister(&hisi_its_pmu_driver); + cpuhp_remove_multi_state(hisi_its_pmu_cpuhp_state); +} +module_exit(hisi_its_pmu_module_exit); + +MODULE_IMPORT_NS(HISI_PMU); +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("HiSilicon SoC Uncore ITS PMU driver"); +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); -- 2.33.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] drivers/perf: hisi: Add new function for HiSilicon MN PMU driver
by Yifan Wu 26 Mar '26

26 Mar '26

driver inclusion category: feature bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/8741 ----------------------------------------------- MN (Miscellaneous Node) is a hybrid node in ARM CHI. The MN PMU driver using the HiSilicon uncore PMU framework. On HiSilicon Hip13 platform, cycle event is supported on MN PMU. The cycle event is exposed directly in driver and some variables shall be added suffix to distinguish the version. Signed-off-by: Yifan Wu <wuyifan50(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Ying Jiang <jiangying44(a)h-partners.com> --- drivers/perf/hisilicon/hisi_uncore_mn_pmu.c | 61 +++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 55 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/perf/hisilicon/hisi_uncore_mn_pmu.c b/drivers/perf/hisilicon/hisi_uncore_mn_pmu.c index 38a72c95fb6d..5baebb63af2a 100644 --- a/drivers/perf/hisilicon/hisi_uncore_mn_pmu.c +++ b/drivers/perf/hisilicon/hisi_uncore_mn_pmu.c @@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ static const struct attribute_group hisi_mn_pmu_format_group = { .attrs = hisi_mn_pmu_format_attr, }; -static struct attribute *hisi_mn_pmu_events_attr[] = { +static struct attribute *hisi_mn_pmu_events_attr_v1[] = { HISI_PMU_EVENT_ATTR(req_eobarrier_num, 0x00), HISI_PMU_EVENT_ATTR(req_ecbarrier_num, 0x01), HISI_PMU_EVENT_ATTR(req_dvmop_num, 0x02), @@ -219,14 +219,55 @@ static struct attribute *hisi_mn_pmu_events_attr[] = { NULL }; -static const struct attribute_group hisi_mn_pmu_events_group = { +static const struct attribute_group hisi_mn_pmu_events_group_v1 = { .name = "events", - .attrs = hisi_mn_pmu_events_attr, + .attrs = hisi_mn_pmu_events_attr_v1, }; -static const struct attribute_group *hisi_mn_pmu_attr_groups[] = { +static const struct attribute_group *hisi_mn_pmu_attr_groups_v1[] = { &hisi_mn_pmu_format_group, - &hisi_mn_pmu_events_group, + &hisi_mn_pmu_events_group_v1, + &hisi_pmu_cpumask_attr_group, + &hisi_pmu_identifier_group, + NULL +}; + +static struct attribute *hisi_mn_pmu_events_attr_v2[] = { + HISI_PMU_EVENT_ATTR(req_eobarrier_num, 0x00), + HISI_PMU_EVENT_ATTR(req_ecbarrier_num, 0x01), + HISI_PMU_EVENT_ATTR(req_dvmop_num, 0x02), + HISI_PMU_EVENT_ATTR(req_dvmsync_num, 0x03), + HISI_PMU_EVENT_ATTR(req_retry_num, 0x04), + HISI_PMU_EVENT_ATTR(req_writenosnp_num, 0x05), + HISI_PMU_EVENT_ATTR(req_readnosnp_num, 0x06), + HISI_PMU_EVENT_ATTR(snp_dvm_num, 0x07), + HISI_PMU_EVENT_ATTR(snp_dvmsync_num, 0x08), + HISI_PMU_EVENT_ATTR(l3t_req_dvm_num, 0x09), + HISI_PMU_EVENT_ATTR(l3t_req_dvmsync_num, 0x0A), + HISI_PMU_EVENT_ATTR(mn_req_dvm_num, 0x0B), + HISI_PMU_EVENT_ATTR(mn_req_dvmsync_num, 0x0C), + HISI_PMU_EVENT_ATTR(pa_req_dvm_num, 0x0D), + HISI_PMU_EVENT_ATTR(pa_req_dvmsync_num, 0x0E), + HISI_PMU_EVENT_ATTR(cycles, 0x0F), + HISI_PMU_EVENT_ATTR(snp_dvm_latency, 0x80), + HISI_PMU_EVENT_ATTR(snp_dvmsync_latency, 0x81), + HISI_PMU_EVENT_ATTR(l3t_req_dvm_latency, 0x82), + HISI_PMU_EVENT_ATTR(l3t_req_dvmsync_latency, 0x83), + HISI_PMU_EVENT_ATTR(mn_req_dvm_latency, 0x84), + HISI_PMU_EVENT_ATTR(mn_req_dvmsync_latency, 0x85), + HISI_PMU_EVENT_ATTR(pa_req_dvm_latency, 0x86), + HISI_PMU_EVENT_ATTR(pa_req_dvmsync_latency, 0x87), + NULL +}; + +static const struct attribute_group hisi_mn_pmu_events_group_v2 = { + .name = "events", + .attrs = hisi_mn_pmu_events_attr_v2, +}; + +static const struct attribute_group *hisi_mn_pmu_attr_groups_v2[] = { + &hisi_mn_pmu_format_group, + &hisi_mn_pmu_events_group_v2, &hisi_pmu_cpumask_attr_group, &hisi_pmu_identifier_group, NULL @@ -351,7 +392,14 @@ static struct hisi_mn_pmu_regs hisi_mn_v1_pmu_regs = { }; static const struct hisi_pmu_dev_info hisi_mn_v1 = { - .attr_groups = hisi_mn_pmu_attr_groups, + .attr_groups = hisi_mn_pmu_attr_groups_v1, + .counter_bits = 48, + .check_event = HISI_MN_EVTYPE_MASK, + .private = &hisi_mn_v1_pmu_regs, +}; + +static const struct hisi_pmu_dev_info hisi_mn_v2 = { + .attr_groups = hisi_mn_pmu_attr_groups_v2, .counter_bits = 48, .check_event = HISI_MN_EVTYPE_MASK, .private = &hisi_mn_v1_pmu_regs, @@ -359,6 +407,7 @@ static const struct hisi_pmu_dev_info hisi_mn_v1 = { static const struct acpi_device_id hisi_mn_pmu_acpi_match[] = { { "HISI0222", (kernel_ulong_t) &hisi_mn_v1 }, + { "HISI0224", (kernel_ulong_t) &hisi_mn_v2 }, { } }; MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(acpi, hisi_mn_pmu_acpi_match); -- 2.33.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6 1/1] perf: HiSilicon: Support uncore ITS PMU
by Yushan Wang 26 Mar '26

26 Mar '26

driver inclusion category: feature bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/8741 ----------------------------------------------- Support uncore ITS PMU, which provides the capability of counting interrupts routed to ITS by interrupt catagories, and its latency. It also supports ITS internal structure latency and DDR access events. The driver adapts to HiSilicon uncore PMU framework. ITS PMU driver does not support overflow interruption, which is the same as NoC PMU, so a few dummy functions or handling interrupts are left empty. Signed-off-by: Yushan Wang <wangyushan12(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Ying Jiang <jiangying44(a)h-partners.com> --- drivers/perf/hisilicon/hisi_uncore_its_pmu.c | 364 +++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 364 insertions(+) create mode 100644 drivers/perf/hisilicon/hisi_uncore_its_pmu.c diff --git a/drivers/perf/hisilicon/hisi_uncore_its_pmu.c b/drivers/perf/hisilicon/hisi_uncore_its_pmu.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..9d9035207e78 --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/perf/hisilicon/hisi_uncore_its_pmu.c @@ -0,0 +1,364 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Driver for HiSilicon Uncore ITS PMU device + * + * Copyright (c) 2025 HiSilicon Technologies Co., Ltd. + * Author: Yushan Wang <wangyushan12(a)huawei.com> + */ +#include <linux/bitops.h> +#include <linux/cpuhotplug.h> +#include <linux/device.h> +#include <linux/io.h> +#include <linux/mod_devicetable.h> +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/platform_device.h> +#include <linux/property.h> +#include <linux/sysfs.h> + +#include "hisi_uncore_pmu.h" + +#define ITS_PMU_VERSION 0x21000 +#define ITS_PMU_GLOBAL_CTRL 0x21004 +#define ITS_PMU_GLOBAL_CTRL_PMU_EN BIT(0) +#define ITS_PMU_COUNTER_CTRL 0x21008 +#define ITS_PMU_EVENT_CTRL 0x2100c +#define ITS_PMU_COUNTER0 0x21010 + +#define ITS_PMU_INT_ID_MASK 0x20008 +#define ITS_PMU_INT_ID_CTRL 0x20084 + +#define ITS_PMU_NR_COUNTERS 4 + +#define ITS_PMU_EVENT_CNTRn(cntr0, n) ((cntr0) + 8 * (n)) +#define ITS_PMU_CNTR_CTRL_MASK(n) GENMASK(8 * ((n) + 1) - 1, 8 * (n)) +#define ITS_PMU_CNTR_EVENT_CFG(n, e) ((e) << ((n) * 8)) +#define ITS_PMU_EVENT_CTRL_TYPE GENMASK(12, 0) + +HISI_PMU_EVENT_ATTR_EXTRACTOR(int_id, config1, 31, 0); + +/* Dynamic CPU hotplug state used by this PMU driver */ +static enum cpuhp_state hisi_its_pmu_cpuhp_state; + +struct hisi_its_pmu_regs { + u32 version; + u32 pmu_ctrl; + u32 event_ctrl0; + u32 event_cntr0; + u32 cntr_ctrl; +}; + +static void hisi_its_pmu_write_evtype(struct hisi_pmu *its_pmu, int idx, u32 type) +{ + struct hisi_its_pmu_regs *reg_info = its_pmu->dev_info->private; + u32 reg; + + reg = readl(its_pmu->base + reg_info->event_ctrl0); + reg &= ~ITS_PMU_CNTR_CTRL_MASK(idx); + reg |= ITS_PMU_CNTR_EVENT_CFG(idx, type); + writel(reg, its_pmu->base + reg_info->event_ctrl0); +} + +static u64 hisi_its_pmu_read_counter(struct hisi_pmu *its_pmu, + struct hw_perf_event *hwc) +{ + struct hisi_its_pmu_regs *reg_info = its_pmu->dev_info->private; + + return readq(its_pmu->base + ITS_PMU_EVENT_CNTRn(reg_info->event_cntr0, hwc->idx)); +} + +static void hisi_its_pmu_write_counter(struct hisi_pmu *its_pmu, + struct hw_perf_event *hwc, u64 val) +{ + struct hisi_its_pmu_regs *reg_info = its_pmu->dev_info->private; + + writeq(val, its_pmu->base + ITS_PMU_EVENT_CNTRn(reg_info->event_cntr0, hwc->idx)); +} + +static void hisi_its_pmu_enable_counter(struct hisi_pmu *its_pmu, + struct hw_perf_event *hwc) +{ + struct hisi_its_pmu_regs *reg_info = its_pmu->dev_info->private; + u32 reg; + + reg = readl(its_pmu->base + reg_info->cntr_ctrl); + reg |= BIT(hwc->idx); + writel(reg, its_pmu->base + reg_info->cntr_ctrl); +} + +static void hisi_its_pmu_disable_counter(struct hisi_pmu *its_pmu, + struct hw_perf_event *hwc) +{ + struct hisi_its_pmu_regs *reg_info = its_pmu->dev_info->private; + u32 reg; + + reg = readl(its_pmu->base + reg_info->cntr_ctrl); + reg &= ~BIT(hwc->idx); + writel(reg, its_pmu->base + reg_info->cntr_ctrl); +} + +static void hisi_its_pmu_enable_counter_int(struct hisi_pmu *its_pmu, + struct hw_perf_event *hwc) +{ + /* We don't support interrupt, so a stub here. */ +} + +static void hisi_its_pmu_disable_counter_int(struct hisi_pmu *its_pmu, + struct hw_perf_event *hwc) +{ +} + +static void hisi_its_pmu_start_counters(struct hisi_pmu *its_pmu) +{ + struct hisi_its_pmu_regs *reg_info = its_pmu->dev_info->private; + u32 reg; + + reg = readl(its_pmu->base + reg_info->pmu_ctrl); + reg |= ITS_PMU_GLOBAL_CTRL_PMU_EN; + writel(reg, its_pmu->base + reg_info->pmu_ctrl); +} + +static void hisi_its_pmu_stop_counters(struct hisi_pmu *its_pmu) +{ + struct hisi_its_pmu_regs *reg_info = its_pmu->dev_info->private; + u32 reg; + + reg = readl(its_pmu->base + reg_info->pmu_ctrl); + reg &= ~ITS_PMU_GLOBAL_CTRL_PMU_EN; + writel(reg, its_pmu->base + reg_info->pmu_ctrl); +} + +static void hisi_its_pmu_enable_filter(struct perf_event *event) +{ + struct hisi_pmu *its_pmu = to_hisi_pmu(event->pmu); + u32 int_id = hisi_get_int_id(event); + u32 reg = int_id ? 0 : -1U; + + if (int_id) + writel(int_id, its_pmu->base + ITS_PMU_INT_ID_CTRL); + + writel(reg, its_pmu->base + ITS_PMU_INT_ID_MASK); +} + +static void hisi_its_pmu_disable_filter(struct perf_event *event) +{ + struct hisi_pmu *its_pmu = to_hisi_pmu(event->pmu); + u32 int_id = hisi_get_int_id(event); + + if (bitmap_weight(its_pmu->pmu_events.used_mask, its_pmu->num_counters) > 1) + return; + + if (int_id) { + writel(0, its_pmu->base + ITS_PMU_INT_ID_CTRL); + writel(-1U, its_pmu->base + ITS_PMU_INT_ID_MASK); + } +} + +static const struct hisi_uncore_ops hisi_uncore_its_ops = { + .write_evtype = hisi_its_pmu_write_evtype, + .get_event_idx = hisi_uncore_pmu_get_event_idx, + .read_counter = hisi_its_pmu_read_counter, + .write_counter = hisi_its_pmu_write_counter, + .enable_counter = hisi_its_pmu_enable_counter, + .disable_counter = hisi_its_pmu_disable_counter, + .enable_counter_int = hisi_its_pmu_enable_counter_int, + .disable_counter_int = hisi_its_pmu_disable_counter_int, + .start_counters = hisi_its_pmu_start_counters, + .stop_counters = hisi_its_pmu_stop_counters, + .enable_filter = hisi_its_pmu_enable_filter, + .disable_filter = hisi_its_pmu_disable_filter, +}; + +static struct attribute *hisi_its_pmu_format_attrs[] = { + HISI_PMU_FORMAT_ATTR(event, "config:0-16"), + HISI_PMU_FORMAT_ATTR(int_id, "config1:0-31"), + NULL +}; + +static const struct attribute_group hisi_its_pmu_format_group = { + .name = "format", + .attrs = hisi_its_pmu_format_attrs, +}; + +static struct attribute *hisi_its_pmu_events_attrs[] = { + HISI_PMU_EVENT_ATTR(lpi_num, 0xc0), + HISI_PMU_EVENT_ATTR(lpi_time, 0x80), + HISI_PMU_EVENT_ATTR(sgi_num, 0xc1), + HISI_PMU_EVENT_ATTR(sgi_time, 0x81), + HISI_PMU_EVENT_ATTR(ppi_num, 0xc2), + HISI_PMU_EVENT_ATTR(ppi_time, 0x82), + HISI_PMU_EVENT_ATTR(sl3_lpi_num, 0xc3), + HISI_PMU_EVENT_ATTR(sl3_sgi_num, 0xc4), + HISI_PMU_EVENT_ATTR(sl3_ppi_num, 0xc5), + HISI_PMU_EVENT_ATTR(sl0_ddr_read, 0xc9), + HISI_PMU_EVENT_ATTR(sl0_ddr_time, 0x89), + HISI_PMU_EVENT_ATTR(sl1_ddr_read, 0xca), + HISI_PMU_EVENT_ATTR(sl1_ddr_time, 0x8a), + HISI_PMU_EVENT_ATTR(sl2_ddr_read, 0xcb), + HISI_PMU_EVENT_ATTR(sl2_ddr_time, 0x8b), + HISI_PMU_EVENT_ATTR(cycles, 0xcc), + NULL +}; + +static const struct attribute_group hisi_its_pmu_events_group = { + .name = "events", + .attrs = hisi_its_pmu_events_attrs, +}; + +static const struct attribute_group *hisi_its_pmu_attr_groups[] = { + &hisi_its_pmu_format_group, + &hisi_its_pmu_events_group, + &hisi_pmu_cpumask_attr_group, + &hisi_pmu_identifier_group, + NULL +}; + +static int hisi_its_pmu_dev_init(struct platform_device *pdev, struct hisi_pmu *its_pmu) +{ + struct hisi_its_pmu_regs *reg_info; + + hisi_uncore_pmu_init_topology(its_pmu, &pdev->dev); + + if (its_pmu->topo.scl_id < 0) + return dev_err_probe(&pdev->dev, -EINVAL, "failed to get scl-id\n"); + + if (its_pmu->topo.index_id < 0) + return dev_err_probe(&pdev->dev, -EINVAL, "failed to get idx-id\n"); + + its_pmu->base = devm_platform_ioremap_resource(pdev, 0); + if (IS_ERR(its_pmu->base)) + return dev_err_probe(&pdev->dev, PTR_ERR(its_pmu->base), + "fail to remap io memory\n"); + + its_pmu->dev_info = device_get_match_data(&pdev->dev); + if (!its_pmu->dev_info) + return -ENODEV; + + its_pmu->pmu_events.attr_groups = its_pmu->dev_info->attr_groups; + its_pmu->counter_bits = its_pmu->dev_info->counter_bits; + its_pmu->check_event = its_pmu->dev_info->check_event; + its_pmu->num_counters = ITS_PMU_NR_COUNTERS; + its_pmu->ops = &hisi_uncore_its_ops; + its_pmu->dev = &pdev->dev; + its_pmu->on_cpu = -1; + + reg_info = its_pmu->dev_info->private; + its_pmu->identifier = readl(its_pmu->base + reg_info->version); + + return 0; +} + +static void hisi_its_pmu_remove_cpuhp_instance(void *hotplug_node) +{ + cpuhp_state_remove_instance_nocalls(hisi_its_pmu_cpuhp_state, hotplug_node); +} + +static void hisi_its_pmu_unregister_pmu(void *pmu) +{ + perf_pmu_unregister(pmu); +} + +static int hisi_its_pmu_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) +{ + struct device *dev = &pdev->dev; + struct hisi_pmu *its_pmu; + char *name; + int ret; + + its_pmu = devm_kzalloc(dev, sizeof(*its_pmu), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!its_pmu) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* + * HiSilicon Uncore PMU framework needs to get common hisi_pmu device + * from device's drvdata. + */ + platform_set_drvdata(pdev, its_pmu); + + ret = hisi_its_pmu_dev_init(pdev, its_pmu); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = cpuhp_state_add_instance(hisi_its_pmu_cpuhp_state, &its_pmu->node); + if (ret) + return dev_err_probe(dev, ret, "Fail to register cpuhp instance\n"); + + ret = devm_add_action_or_reset(dev, hisi_its_pmu_remove_cpuhp_instance, + &its_pmu->node); + if (ret) + return ret; + + hisi_pmu_init(its_pmu, THIS_MODULE); + + name = devm_kasprintf(dev, GFP_KERNEL, "hisi_scl%d_its%d", + its_pmu->topo.scl_id, its_pmu->topo.index_id); + if (!name) + return -ENOMEM; + + ret = perf_pmu_register(&its_pmu->pmu, name, -1); + if (ret) + return dev_err_probe(dev, ret, "Fail to register PMU\n"); + + return devm_add_action_or_reset(dev, hisi_its_pmu_unregister_pmu, + &its_pmu->pmu); +} + +static struct hisi_its_pmu_regs hisi_its_v1_pmu_regs = { + .version = ITS_PMU_VERSION, + .pmu_ctrl = ITS_PMU_GLOBAL_CTRL, + .event_ctrl0 = ITS_PMU_EVENT_CTRL, + .event_cntr0 = ITS_PMU_COUNTER0, + .cntr_ctrl = ITS_PMU_COUNTER_CTRL, +}; + +static const struct hisi_pmu_dev_info hisi_its_v1 = { + .attr_groups = hisi_its_pmu_attr_groups, + .counter_bits = 48, + .check_event = ITS_PMU_EVENT_CTRL_TYPE, + .private = &hisi_its_v1_pmu_regs, +}; + +static const struct acpi_device_id hisi_its_pmu_ids[] = { + { "HISI0591", (kernel_ulong_t) &hisi_its_v1 }, + { } +}; +MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(acpi, hisi_its_pmu_ids); + +static struct platform_driver hisi_its_pmu_driver = { + .driver = { + .name = "hisi_its_pmu", + .acpi_match_table = hisi_its_pmu_ids, + .suppress_bind_attrs = true, + }, + .probe = hisi_its_pmu_probe, +}; + +static int __init hisi_its_pmu_module_init(void) +{ + int ret = cpuhp_setup_state_multi(CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN, + "perf/hisi/its:online", + hisi_uncore_pmu_online_cpu, + hisi_uncore_pmu_offline_cpu); + if (ret < 0) { + pr_err("hisi_its_pmu: Fail to setup cpuhp callbacks, ret = %d\n", ret); + return ret; + } + hisi_its_pmu_cpuhp_state = ret; + + ret = platform_driver_register(&hisi_its_pmu_driver); + if (ret) + cpuhp_remove_multi_state(hisi_its_pmu_cpuhp_state); + + return ret; +} +module_init(hisi_its_pmu_module_init); + +static void __exit hisi_its_pmu_module_exit(void) +{ + platform_driver_unregister(&hisi_its_pmu_driver); + cpuhp_remove_multi_state(hisi_its_pmu_cpuhp_state); +} +module_exit(hisi_its_pmu_module_exit); + +MODULE_IMPORT_NS(HISI_PMU); +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("HiSilicon SoC Uncore ITS PMU driver"); +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); -- 2.33.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] xsched: xcu cgrp kabi
by Liu Kai 26 Mar '26

26 Mar '26

hulk inclusion category: feature bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/8424 ---------------------------------------- to do Signed-off-by: Liu Kai <liukai284(a)huawei.com> --- arch/arm64/configs/openeuler_defconfig | 3 +- arch/x86/configs/openeuler_defconfig | 3 +- include/linux/cgroup_subsys.h | 8 +- include/linux/device_cgroup.h | 28 +++++ include/linux/xsched.h | 2 + kernel/xsched/cgroup.c | 138 +++++++++++++++++++++++-- security/device_cgroup.c | 48 +++++++-- 7 files changed, 208 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/configs/openeuler_defconfig b/arch/arm64/configs/openeuler_defconfig index fc581adb563b..622d44e6d9ff 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/configs/openeuler_defconfig +++ b/arch/arm64/configs/openeuler_defconfig @@ -101,7 +101,8 @@ CONFIG_XCU_SCHEDULER=y CONFIG_XCU_VSTREAM=y CONFIG_XSCHED_NR_CUS=128 CONFIG_XCU_SCHED_RT=y -# CONFIG_XCU_SCHED_CFS is not set +CONFIG_XCU_SCHED_CFS=y +CONFIG_CGROUP_XCU=y # # CPU/Task time and stats accounting diff --git a/arch/x86/configs/openeuler_defconfig b/arch/x86/configs/openeuler_defconfig index d493dbf6b8a1..e66724b15bb4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/configs/openeuler_defconfig +++ b/arch/x86/configs/openeuler_defconfig @@ -121,7 +121,8 @@ CONFIG_XCU_SCHEDULER=y CONFIG_XCU_VSTREAM=y CONFIG_XSCHED_NR_CUS=128 CONFIG_XCU_SCHED_RT=y -# CONFIG_XCU_SCHED_CFS is not set +CONFIG_XCU_SCHED_CFS=y +CONFIG_CGROUP_XCU=y # # CPU/Task time and stats accounting diff --git a/include/linux/cgroup_subsys.h b/include/linux/cgroup_subsys.h index e65ae90946c2..4130c924f47c 100644 --- a/include/linux/cgroup_subsys.h +++ b/include/linux/cgroup_subsys.h @@ -29,7 +29,9 @@ SUBSYS(io) SUBSYS(memory) #endif -#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE) +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CGROUP_XCU) +SUBSYS(xcu) +#elif IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE) SUBSYS(devices) #endif @@ -61,10 +63,6 @@ SUBSYS(pids) SUBSYS(rdma) #endif -#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CGROUP_XCU) -SUBSYS(xcu) -#endif - #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CGROUP_MISC) SUBSYS(misc) #endif diff --git a/include/linux/device_cgroup.h b/include/linux/device_cgroup.h index d02f32b7514e..ee84ce61546c 100644 --- a/include/linux/device_cgroup.h +++ b/include/linux/device_cgroup.h @@ -1,6 +1,10 @@ /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ #include <linux/fs.h> +#ifdef CONFIG_CGROUP_XCU +#include <linux/cgroup-defs.h> +#endif + #define DEVCG_ACC_MKNOD 1 #define DEVCG_ACC_READ 2 #define DEVCG_ACC_WRITE 4 @@ -65,3 +69,27 @@ static inline int devcgroup_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) static inline int devcgroup_inode_mknod(int mode, dev_t dev) { return 0; } #endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_CGROUP_XCU +/* + * When CONFIG_CGROUP_XCU is enabled, devices_cgrp_subsys and xcu_cgrp_subsys + * share the same set of cgroup_subsys hook functions. Consequently, the hooks for + * devices_cgrp_subsys must be exposed externally to allow linkage with the XCU + * cgroup_subsys. + * + * The STATIC macro is used to handle this conditional visibility: + * - Enabled: interfaces are defined as non-static (exported). + * - Disabled: interfaces remain static (file-local). + */ +#define STATIC +#define devices_cgrp_id xcu_cgrp_id + +extern struct cftype dev_cgroup_files[]; +int devcgroup_online(struct cgroup_subsys_state *css); +void devcgroup_offline(struct cgroup_subsys_state *css); +struct cgroup_subsys_state * +devcgroup_css_alloc(struct cgroup_subsys_state *parent_css); +void devcgroup_css_free(struct cgroup_subsys_state *css); +#else +#define STATIC static +#endif diff --git a/include/linux/xsched.h b/include/linux/xsched.h index ff314f88169f..e9c580149d55 100644 --- a/include/linux/xsched.h +++ b/include/linux/xsched.h @@ -485,6 +485,8 @@ void xsched_quota_account(struct xsched_group *xg, s64 exec_time); void xsched_quota_check(struct xsched_group *xg, struct xsched_cu *xcu); void xsched_quota_refill(struct work_struct *work); +bool xcu_cgroup_enabled(void); + #define XCU_PERIOD_MIN_MS 1 #define XCU_QUOTA_RUNTIME_INF -1 #define XCU_SHARES_MIN 1 diff --git a/kernel/xsched/cgroup.c b/kernel/xsched/cgroup.c index 73f044475939..53f958f7b844 100644 --- a/kernel/xsched/cgroup.c +++ b/kernel/xsched/cgroup.c @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/xsched.h> #include <linux/delay.h> +#include <linux/device_cgroup.h> static struct xsched_group root_xsched_group; struct xsched_group *root_xcg = &root_xsched_group; @@ -39,6 +40,61 @@ static const char xcu_sched_name[XSCHED_TYPE_NUM][SCHED_CLASS_MAX_LENGTH] = { [XSCHED_TYPE_CFS] = "cfs" }; +/* + * xcu_mode: + * 0 = disable (devices cgroup) + * 1 = enable (xcu cgroup) + */ +static int xcu_mode; + +/** + * Parse the "xcu=" kernel command line parameter. + * + * Usage: + * xcu=enable → enable xcu_cgrp_subsys + * Otherwise → enable devices_cgrp_subsys + * + * Returns: + * 1 (handled), 0 (not handled) + */ +static int __init xcu_setup(char *str) +{ + if (!str) + return 0; + + if (strcmp(str, "enable") == 0) + xcu_mode = 1; + + return 1; +} +__setup("xcu=", xcu_setup); + +bool xcu_cgroup_enabled(void) +{ + return xcu_mode; +} + +/** + * xcu_cgroup_check_compat - Verify XCU mode matches the cgroup hierarchy version. + * + * Checks if the current xcu_mode aligns with the cgroup subsystem's default + * hierarchy status. + * + * IMPORTANT: cgroup_subsys_on_dfl() only returns a valid version indicator + * after the cgroup filesystem has been mounted at the root node. Calling + * this function prior to mount may yield incorrect results. + * + * Return: true if compatible, false otherwise (with a warning logged). + */ +bool xcu_cgroup_check_compat(void) +{ + if (xcu_mode != cgroup_subsys_on_dfl(xcu_cgrp_subsys)) { + XSCHED_WARN("XCU cgrp is incompatible with the cgroup version\n"); + return false; + } + return true; +} + static int xcu_cg_set_file_show(struct xsched_group *xg, int sched_class) { if (!xg) { @@ -742,6 +798,7 @@ static struct cftype xcu_cg_files[] = { }, { .name = "stat", + .flags = CFTYPE_NOT_ON_ROOT, .seq_show = xcu_stat, }, { @@ -753,17 +810,80 @@ static struct cftype xcu_cg_files[] = { {} /* terminate */ }; +static struct cgroup_subsys_state * +xcu_devices_compat_css_alloc(struct cgroup_subsys_state *parent_css) +{ + if (parent_css && xcu_cgroup_check_compat()) + return ERR_PTR(-EPERM); + + if (xcu_cgroup_enabled()) + return xcu_css_alloc(parent_css); + + return devcgroup_css_alloc(parent_css); +} + +static int xcu_devices_compat_css_online(struct cgroup_subsys_state *css) +{ + if (xcu_cgroup_enabled()) + return xcu_css_online(css); + + return devcgroup_online(css); +} + +static void xcu_devices_compat_css_offline(struct cgroup_subsys_state *css) +{ + if (xcu_cgroup_enabled()) + return xcu_css_offline(css); + + return devcgroup_offline(css); +} + +static void xcu_devices_compat_css_released(struct cgroup_subsys_state *css) +{ + if (xcu_cgroup_enabled()) + return xcu_css_released(css); +} + +static void xcu_devices_compat_css_free(struct cgroup_subsys_state *css) +{ + if (xcu_cgroup_enabled()) + return xcu_css_free(css); + + return devcgroup_css_free(css); +} + +static int xcu_devices_compat_can_attach(struct cgroup_taskset *tset) +{ + if (xcu_cgroup_enabled()) + return xcu_can_attach(tset); + + return 0; +} + +static void xcu_devices_compat_cancel_attach(struct cgroup_taskset *tset) +{ + if (xcu_cgroup_enabled()) + return xcu_cancel_attach(tset); +} + +static void xcu_devices_compat_attach(struct cgroup_taskset *tset) +{ + if (xcu_cgroup_enabled()) + return xcu_attach(tset); +} + struct cgroup_subsys xcu_cgrp_subsys = { - .css_alloc = xcu_css_alloc, - .css_online = xcu_css_online, - .css_offline = xcu_css_offline, - .css_released = xcu_css_released, - .css_free = xcu_css_free, - .can_attach = xcu_can_attach, - .cancel_attach = xcu_cancel_attach, - .attach = xcu_attach, + .css_alloc = xcu_devices_compat_css_alloc, + .css_online = xcu_devices_compat_css_online, + .css_offline = xcu_devices_compat_css_offline, + .css_released = xcu_devices_compat_css_released, + .css_free = xcu_devices_compat_css_free, + .can_attach = xcu_devices_compat_can_attach, + .cancel_attach = xcu_devices_compat_cancel_attach, + .attach = xcu_devices_compat_attach, .dfl_cftypes = xcu_cg_files, - .legacy_cftypes = xcu_cg_files, + .legacy_cftypes = dev_cgroup_files, + .legacy_name = "devices", .early_init = false, .threaded = true }; diff --git a/security/device_cgroup.c b/security/device_cgroup.c index dc4df7475081..72b471e0e0fd 100644 --- a/security/device_cgroup.c +++ b/security/device_cgroup.c @@ -16,6 +16,10 @@ #include <linux/rcupdate.h> #include <linux/mutex.h> +#ifdef CONFIG_CGROUP_XCU +#include <linux/xsched.h> +#endif + #ifdef CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE static DEFINE_MUTEX(devcgroup_mutex); @@ -185,7 +189,7 @@ static inline bool is_devcg_online(const struct dev_cgroup *devcg) * @css: css getting online * returns 0 in case of success, error code otherwise */ -static int devcgroup_online(struct cgroup_subsys_state *css) +STATIC int devcgroup_online(struct cgroup_subsys_state *css) { struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup = css_to_devcgroup(css); struct dev_cgroup *parent_dev_cgroup = css_to_devcgroup(css->parent); @@ -206,7 +210,7 @@ static int devcgroup_online(struct cgroup_subsys_state *css) return ret; } -static void devcgroup_offline(struct cgroup_subsys_state *css) +STATIC void devcgroup_offline(struct cgroup_subsys_state *css) { struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup = css_to_devcgroup(css); @@ -218,7 +222,7 @@ static void devcgroup_offline(struct cgroup_subsys_state *css) /* * called from kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c with cgroup_lock() held. */ -static struct cgroup_subsys_state * +STATIC struct cgroup_subsys_state * devcgroup_css_alloc(struct cgroup_subsys_state *parent_css) { struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup; @@ -232,7 +236,7 @@ devcgroup_css_alloc(struct cgroup_subsys_state *parent_css) return &dev_cgroup->css; } -static void devcgroup_css_free(struct cgroup_subsys_state *css) +STATIC void devcgroup_css_free(struct cgroup_subsys_state *css) { struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup = css_to_devcgroup(css); @@ -280,10 +284,20 @@ static void set_majmin(char *str, unsigned m) static int devcgroup_seq_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) { - struct dev_cgroup *devcgroup = css_to_devcgroup(seq_css(m)); + struct dev_cgroup *devcgroup; struct dev_exception_item *ex; char maj[MAJMINLEN], min[MAJMINLEN], acc[ACCLEN]; +#ifdef CONFIG_CGROUP_XCU + /* + * When the XCU subsystem is enabled but cgroup v1 is mounted, + * operations on the devices subsystem interfaces are not permitted. + */ + if (xcu_cgroup_enabled()) + return -EPERM; +#endif /* CONFIG_CGROUP_XCU */ + + devcgroup = css_to_devcgroup(seq_css(m)); rcu_read_lock(); /* * To preserve the compatibility: @@ -786,6 +800,15 @@ static ssize_t devcgroup_access_write(struct kernfs_open_file *of, { int retval; +#ifdef CONFIG_CGROUP_XCU + /* + * When the XCU subsystem is enabled but cgroup v1 is mounted, + * operations on the devices subsystem interfaces are not permitted. + */ + if (xcu_cgroup_enabled()) + return -EPERM; +#endif /* CONFIG_CGROUP_XCU */ + mutex_lock(&devcgroup_mutex); retval = devcgroup_update_access(css_to_devcgroup(of_css(of)), of_cft(of)->private, strstrip(buf)); @@ -793,7 +816,7 @@ static ssize_t devcgroup_access_write(struct kernfs_open_file *of, return retval ?: nbytes; } -static struct cftype dev_cgroup_files[] = { +STATIC struct cftype dev_cgroup_files[] = { { .name = "allow", .write = devcgroup_access_write, @@ -835,6 +858,19 @@ static int devcgroup_legacy_check_permission(short type, u32 major, u32 minor, struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup; bool rc; +#ifdef CONFIG_CGROUP_XCU + /* + * When CONFIG_CGROUP_XCU is enabled and "xcu=enable" is set on the command line, + * xcu_cgrp_subsys is used instead of the standard devices_cgrp_subsys. + * In this case, task_devcgroup() returns an invalid dev_cgroup, which would + * trigger an exception if processed further. + * This scenario is effectively equivalent to having CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE disabled. + * Therefore, we can safely return 0 here without proceeding further. + */ + if (xcu_cgroup_enabled()) + return 0; +#endif /* CONFIG_CGROUP_XCU */ + rcu_read_lock(); dev_cgroup = task_devcgroup(current); if (dev_cgroup->behavior == DEVCG_DEFAULT_ALLOW) -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] nvme: fix memory allocation in nvme_pr_read_keys()
by Long Li 26 Mar '26

26 Mar '26

From: Sungwoo Kim <iam(a)sung-woo.kim> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.17-rc7 commit c3320153769f05fd7fe9d840cb555dd3080ae424 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13870 CVE: CVE-2026-23244 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- nvme_pr_read_keys() takes num_keys from userspace and uses it to calculate the allocation size for rse via struct_size(). The upper limit is PR_KEYS_MAX (64K). A malicious or buggy userspace can pass a large num_keys value that results in a 4MB allocation attempt at most, causing a warning in the page allocator when the order exceeds MAX_PAGE_ORDER. To fix this, use kvzalloc() instead of kzalloc(). This bug has the same reasoning and fix with the patch below: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-block/20251212013510.3576091-1-kartikey406@gm… Warning log: WARNING: mm/page_alloc.c:5216 at __alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x5aa/0x2300 mm/page_alloc.c:5216, CPU#1: syz-executor117/272 Modules linked in: CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 272 Comm: syz-executor117 Not tainted 6.19.0 #1 PREEMPT(voluntary) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:__alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x5aa/0x2300 mm/page_alloc.c:5216 Code: ff 83 bd a8 fe ff ff 0a 0f 86 69 fb ff ff 0f b6 1d f9 f9 c4 04 80 fb 01 0f 87 3b 76 30 ff 83 e3 01 75 09 c6 05 e4 f9 c4 04 01 <0f> 0b 48 c7 85 70 fe ff ff 00 00 00 00 e9 8f fd ff ff 31 c0 e9 0d RSP: 0018:ffffc90000fcf450 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 1ffff920001f9ea0 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000000b RDI: 0000000000040dc0 RBP: ffffc90000fcf648 R08: ffff88800b6c3380 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: ffffc90000fcf840 R11: ffff88807ffad280 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000040dc0 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: ffffc90000fcf620 FS: 0000555565db33c0(0000) GS:ffff8880be26c000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000000002000000c CR3: 0000000003b72000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: <TASK> alloc_pages_mpol+0x236/0x4d0 mm/mempolicy.c:2486 alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x149/0x180 mm/mempolicy.c:2557 ___kmalloc_large_node+0x10c/0x140 mm/slub.c:5598 __kmalloc_large_node_noprof+0x25/0xc0 mm/slub.c:5629 __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:5645 [inline] __kmalloc_noprof+0x483/0x6f0 mm/slub.c:5669 kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:961 [inline] kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1094 [inline] nvme_pr_read_keys+0x8f/0x4c0 drivers/nvme/host/pr.c:245 blkdev_pr_read_keys block/ioctl.c:456 [inline] blkdev_common_ioctl+0x1b71/0x29b0 block/ioctl.c:730 blkdev_ioctl+0x299/0x700 block/ioctl.c:786 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:583 [inline] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x1bf/0x220 fs/ioctl.c:583 x64_sys_call+0x1280/0x21b0 mnt/fuzznvme_1/fuzznvme/linux-build/v6.19/./arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:17 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x71/0x330 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7fb893d3108d Code: 28 c3 e8 46 1e 00 00 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffff61f2f38 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffff61f3138 RCX: 00007fb893d3108d RDX: 0000000020000040 RSI: 00000000c01070ce RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007ffff61f3138 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: 00007ffff61f3128 R14: 00007fb893dae530 R15: 0000000000000001 </TASK> Fixes: 5fd96a4e15de (nvme: Add pr_ops read_keys support) Acked-by: Chao Shi <cshi008(a)fiu.edu> Acked-by: Weidong Zhu <weizhu(a)fiu.edu> Acked-by: Dave Tian <daveti(a)purdue.edu> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch(a)lst.de> Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare(a)suse.de> Signed-off-by: Sungwoo Kim <iam(a)sung-woo.kim> Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: drivers/nvme/host/pr.c [Context conflicts] Signed-off-by: Long Li <leo.lilong(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/nvme/host/pr.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/pr.c b/drivers/nvme/host/pr.c index 803efc97fd1e..08b8965bd945 100644 --- a/drivers/nvme/host/pr.c +++ b/drivers/nvme/host/pr.c @@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ static int nvme_pr_read_keys(struct block_device *bdev, * enough to get enough keys to fill the return keys buffer. */ rse_len = struct_size(rse, regctl_eds, num_keys); - rse = kzalloc(rse_len, GFP_KERNEL); + rse = kvzalloc(rse_len, GFP_KERNEL); if (!rse) return -ENOMEM; @@ -238,7 +238,7 @@ static int nvme_pr_read_keys(struct block_device *bdev, } free_rse: - kfree(rse); + kvfree(rse); return ret; } -- 2.39.2

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/5] Transition from CPU Type to MIDR Register for Virtualization Feature Detection
by liqiqi 25 Mar '26

25 Mar '26

Currently, there are two methods for determining whether a chip supports specific virtualization features: 1. Reading the chip's CPU type from BIOS 2. Reading the value of the MIDR register The issue with the first method is that each time a new chip is introduced, the new CPU type must be defined, which leads to poor code portability and maintainability. Therefore, the second method has been adopted to replace the first. This approach eliminates the dependency on CPU type by using the MIDR register and removes the need for defining CPU types and their related interfaces. liqiqi (5): kvm: arm64: use MIDR_HISI_TSV110 to determine whether NCSNP is supported kvm: arm64: Add HIP10, HIP10C MIDR definitions kvm: arm64: Use MIDR to determine whether DVMBM is supported kvm: arm64: Use MIDR to determine whether IPIv is supported kvm: arm64: Remove cpu_type definition and it's related interfaces arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h | 4 + arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c | 1 - arch/arm64/kvm/hisilicon/hisi_virt.c | 111 +++------------------------ arch/arm64/kvm/hisilicon/hisi_virt.h | 12 --- 4 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 113 deletions(-) -- 2.43.0

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[PATCH OLK-6.6] perf: Fix __perf_event_overflow() vs perf_remove_from_context() race
by Luo Gengkun 25 Mar '26

25 Mar '26

From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.0-rc2 commit c9bc1753b3cc41d0e01fbca7f035258b5f4db0ae category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13907 CVE: CVE-2026-23271 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Make sure that __perf_event_overflow() runs with IRQs disabled for all possible callchains. Specifically the software events can end up running it with only preemption disabled. This opens up a race vs perf_event_exit_event() and friends that will go and free various things the overflow path expects to be present, like the BPF program. Fixes: 592903cdcbf6 ("perf_counter: add an event_list") Reported-by: Simond Hu <cmdhh1767(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz(a)infradead.org> Tested-by: Simond Hu <cmdhh1767(a)gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260224122909.GV1395416@noisy.programming.kicks-a… Signed-off-by: Luo Gengkun <luogengkun2(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/events/core.c | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 41 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c index e5c2105625a2..1d3f8eed6d0d 100644 --- a/kernel/events/core.c +++ b/kernel/events/core.c @@ -9708,6 +9708,13 @@ int perf_event_overflow(struct perf_event *event, struct perf_sample_data *data, struct pt_regs *regs) { + /* + * Entry point from hardware PMI, interrupts should be disabled here. + * This serializes us against perf_event_remove_from_context() in + * things like perf_event_release_kernel(). + */ + lockdep_assert_irqs_disabled(); + return __perf_event_overflow(event, 1, data, regs); } @@ -9788,6 +9795,19 @@ static void perf_swevent_event(struct perf_event *event, u64 nr, { struct hw_perf_event *hwc = &event->hw; + /* + * This is: + * - software preempt + * - tracepoint preempt + * - tp_target_task irq (ctx->lock) + * - uprobes preempt/irq + * - kprobes preempt/irq + * - hw_breakpoint irq + * + * Any of these are sufficient to hold off RCU and thus ensure @event + * exists. + */ + lockdep_assert_preemption_disabled(); local64_add(nr, &event->count); if (!regs) @@ -9796,6 +9816,16 @@ static void perf_swevent_event(struct perf_event *event, u64 nr, if (!is_sampling_event(event)) return; + /* + * Serialize against event_function_call() IPIs like normal overflow + * event handling. Specifically, must not allow + * perf_event_release_kernel() -> perf_remove_from_context() to make + * progress and 'release' the event from under us. + */ + guard(irqsave)(); + if (event->state != PERF_EVENT_STATE_ACTIVE) + return; + if ((event->attr.sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_PERIOD) && !event->attr.freq) { data->period = nr; return perf_swevent_overflow(event, 1, data, regs); @@ -10299,6 +10329,11 @@ void perf_tp_event(u16 event_type, u64 count, void *record, int entry_size, struct perf_sample_data data; struct perf_event *event; + /* + * Per being a tracepoint, this runs with preemption disabled. + */ + lockdep_assert_preemption_disabled(); + struct perf_raw_record raw = { .frag = { .size = entry_size, @@ -10712,6 +10747,11 @@ void perf_bp_event(struct perf_event *bp, void *data) struct perf_sample_data sample; struct pt_regs *regs = data; + /* + * Exception context, will have interrupts disabled. + */ + lockdep_assert_irqs_disabled(); + perf_sample_data_init(&sample, bp->attr.bp_addr, 0); if (!bp->hw.state && !perf_exclude_event(bp, regs)) @@ -11164,7 +11204,7 @@ static enum hrtimer_restart perf_swevent_hrtimer(struct hrtimer *hrtimer) if (regs && !perf_exclude_event(event, regs)) { if (!(event->attr.exclude_idle && is_idle_task(current))) - if (__perf_event_overflow(event, 1, &data, regs)) + if (perf_event_overflow(event, &data, regs)) ret = HRTIMER_NORESTART; } -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH 0/5] Transition from CPU Type to MIDR Register for Virtualization Feature Detection
by liqiqi 25 Mar '26

25 Mar '26

Currently, there are two methods for determining whether a chip supports specific virtualization features: 1. Reading the chip's CPU type from BIOS 2. Reading the value of the MIDR register The issue with the first method is that each time a new chip is introduced, the new CPU type must be defined, which leads to poor code portability and maintainability. Therefore, the second method has been adopted to replace the first. This approach eliminates the dependency on CPU type by using the MIDR register and removes the need for defining CPU types and their related interfaces. liqiqi (5): kvm: arm64: use MIDR_HISI_TSV110 to determine whether NCSNP is supported kvm: arm64: Add HIP10, HIP10C MIDR definitions kvm: arm64: Use MIDR to determine whether DVMBM is supported kvm: arm64: Use MIDR to determine whether IPIv is supported kvm: arm64: Remove cpu_type definition and it's related interfaces arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h | 4 + arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c | 1 - arch/arm64/kvm/hisilicon/hisi_virt.c | 111 +++------------------------ arch/arm64/kvm/hisilicon/hisi_virt.h | 12 --- 4 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 113 deletions(-) -- 2.43.0

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[PATCH OLK-6.6] media: dvb-core: fix wrong reinitialization of ringbuffer on reopen
by Chen Jinghuang 25 Mar '26

25 Mar '26

From: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.0-rc2 commit bfbc0b5b32a8f28ce284add619bf226716a59bc0 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13873 CVE: CVE-2026-23253 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- dvb_dvr_open() calls dvb_ringbuffer_init() when a new reader opens the DVR device. dvb_ringbuffer_init() calls init_waitqueue_head(), which reinitializes the waitqueue list head to empty. Since dmxdev->dvr_buffer.queue is a shared waitqueue (all opens of the same DVR device share it), this orphans any existing waitqueue entries from io_uring poll or epoll, leaving them with stale prev/next pointers while the list head is reset to {self, self}. The waitqueue and spinlock in dvr_buffer are already properly initialized once in dvb_dmxdev_init(). The open path only needs to reset the buffer data pointer, size, and read/write positions. Replace the dvb_ringbuffer_init() call in dvb_dvr_open() with direct assignment of data/size and a call to dvb_ringbuffer_reset(), which properly resets pread, pwrite, and error with correct memory ordering without touching the waitqueue or spinlock. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 34731df288a5 ("V4L/DVB (3501): Dmxdev: use dvb_ringbuffer") Reported-by: syzbot+ab12f0c08dd7ab8d057c(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=ab12f0c08dd7ab8d057c Tested-by: syzbot+ab12f0c08dd7ab8d057c(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/698a26d3.050a0220.3b3015.007d.GAE@google.com/ Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Conflicts: drivers/media/dvb-core/dmxdev.c [context conflict] Signed-off-by: Chen Jinghuang <chenjinghuang2(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/media/dvb-core/dmxdev.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/media/dvb-core/dmxdev.c b/drivers/media/dvb-core/dmxdev.c index 9ce5f010de3f..4ce3ae3954c5 100644 --- a/drivers/media/dvb-core/dmxdev.c +++ b/drivers/media/dvb-core/dmxdev.c @@ -168,7 +168,9 @@ static int dvb_dvr_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) mutex_unlock(&dmxdev->mutex); return -ENOMEM; } - dvb_ringbuffer_init(&dmxdev->dvr_buffer, mem, DVR_BUFFER_SIZE); + dmxdev->dvr_buffer.data = mem; + dmxdev->dvr_buffer.size = DVR_BUFFER_SIZE; + dvb_ringbuffer_reset(&dmxdev->dvr_buffer); if (dmxdev->may_do_mmap) dvb_vb2_init(&dmxdev->dvr_vb2_ctx, "dvr", file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK); -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH 0/5] Transition from CPU Type to MIDR Register for Virtualization Feature Detection
by liqiqi 25 Mar '26

25 Mar '26

Currently, there are two methods for determining whether a chip supports specific virtualization features: 1. Reading the chip's CPU type from BIOS 2. Reading the value of the MIDR register The issue with the first method is that each time a new chip is introduced, the new CPU type must be defined, which leads to poor code portability and maintainability. Therefore, the second method has been adopted to replace the first. This approach eliminates the dependency on CPU type by using the MIDR register and removes the need for defining CPU types and their related interfaces. liqiqi (5): kvm: arm64: use MIDR_HISI_TSV110 to determine whether NCSNP is supported kvm: arm64: Add HIP10, HIP10C MIDR definitions kvm: arm64: Use MIDR to determine whether DVMBM is supported kvm: arm64: Use MIDR to determine whether IPIv is supported kvm: arm64: Remove cpu_type definition and it's related interfaces arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h | 4 + arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c | 1 - arch/arm64/kvm/hisilicon/hisi_virt.c | 111 +++------------------------ arch/arm64/kvm/hisilicon/hisi_virt.h | 12 --- 4 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 113 deletions(-) -- 2.43.0

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