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[PATCH OLK-5.10 00/14] CVE-2026-46054
by Cai Xinchen 10 Jul '26

10 Jul '26

ovl_open_realfile reletion code feature patch ("ovl: pass layer mnt to ovl_open_realfile: ovl_open_realfile reletion.") init_file code refactoring patch ("fs: move kmem_cache_zalloc() into alloc_empty_file*() helpers") backing_file structure and backing_file_open function reletion features: patch ("fs: use backing_file container for internal files with "fake" f_path") patch ("fs: move cleanup from init_file() into its callers") bpf_fd_pass const warning fix patch ("lsm: constify the 'file' parameter in security_binder_transfer_file()") code refactoring: store real path instead of fake path in backing file f_path patch ("fs: get mnt_writers count for an open backing file's real path") patch ("fs: create helper file_user_path() for user displayed mapped file path") patch ("fs: store real path instead of fake path in backing file f_path") patch ("ovl: Fix nested backing file paths") patch ("perf/core: Fix MMAP event path names with backing files") backing_file const warning fix patch ("fs: constify file ptr in backing_file accessor helpers") SELinux overlay backing_file mmap/mprotect check prepare for lsm function: patch ("fs: prepare for adding LSM blob to backing_file") patch ("lsm: add backing_file LSM hooks") CVE-2026-46054 fix: Add SELinux lsm hooks for backing_file mmap/mprotect patch ("selinux: fix overlayfs mmap() and mprotect() access checks") Adrian Hunter (1): perf/core: Fix MMAP event path names with backing files Amir Goldstein (9): [Backport] ovl: pass layer mnt to ovl_open_realfile() fs: move kmem_cache_zalloc() into alloc_empty_file*() helpers fs: use backing_file container for internal files with "fake" f_path fs: move cleanup from init_file() into its callers fs: get mnt_writers count for an open backing file's real path fs: create helper file_user_path() for user displayed mapped file path fs: store real path instead of fake path in backing file f_path fs: constify file ptr in backing_file accessor helpers fs: prepare for adding LSM blob to backing_file André Almeida (1): ovl: Fix nested backing file paths Khadija Kamran (1): lsm: constify the 'file' parameter in security_binder_transfer_file() Paul Moore (2): lsm: add backing_file LSM hooks selinux: fix overlayfs mmap() and mprotect() access checks arch/arc/kernel/troubleshoot.c | 6 +- fs/file_table.c | 139 ++++++++++++++--- fs/internal.h | 18 ++- fs/open.c | 76 ++++++--- fs/overlayfs/file.c | 34 ++-- fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h | 1 + fs/overlayfs/super.c | 16 +- fs/overlayfs/util.c | 14 ++ fs/proc/base.c | 2 +- fs/proc/nommu.c | 2 +- fs/proc/task_mmu.c | 4 +- fs/proc/task_nommu.c | 2 +- include/linux/fs.h | 44 +++++- include/linux/lsm_audit.h | 2 +- include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 7 +- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 1 + include/linux/security.h | 26 +++- kernel/events/core.c | 2 +- kernel/trace/trace_output.c | 2 +- security/security.c | 112 ++++++++++++- security/selinux/hooks.c | 250 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------- security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 11 ++ 22 files changed, 631 insertions(+), 140 deletions(-) -- 2.18.0.huawei.25

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[PATCH OLK-6.6] mm/numa_remote: limit remote NUMA linear mapping to PMD granularity
by Jinjiang Tu 09 Jul '26

09 Jul '26

hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/9543 ---------------------------------------- When hot-adding 1G memory and then hot-removing a 128MB portion, the entire 1G PUD-level page table gets torn down because the linear mapping was created at PUD block granularity. This causes valid remaining memory to lose its mapping. Fix this by forcing PMD-level block mappings for remote NUMA nodes during arch_add_memory(), so that hot-remove only tears down PMD-sized segments rather than the full PUD range. Since hot-add/hot-remove granularity is larger than PMD size, there is no risk of incorrectly removing linear mappings belonging to adjacent memory regions. Fixes: 564bbaf3fbb5 ("mm/numa_remote: support to hotplug/hotremove remote memory") Signed-off-by: Jinjiang Tu <tujinjiang(a)huawei.com> --- arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c b/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c index 6fd01159820b..2820748d7152 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ #include <linux/vmalloc.h> #include <linux/set_memory.h> #include <linux/kfence.h> +#include <linux/numa_remote.h> #include "internal.h" #include <asm/barrier.h> @@ -1408,7 +1409,7 @@ int arch_add_memory(int nid, u64 start, u64 size, if (can_set_direct_map() || is_virtcca_cvm_world()) flags |= NO_BLOCK_MAPPINGS | NO_CONT_MAPPINGS; - else if (should_pmd_linear_mapping()) + else if (should_pmd_linear_mapping() || numa_is_remote_node(nid)) flags |= NO_PUD_BLOCK_MAPPINGS | NO_CONT_MAPPINGS; __create_pgd_mapping(swapper_pg_dir, start, __phys_to_virt(start), -- 2.43.0

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[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/4] Fix CVE-2026-46054
by Cai Xinchen 08 Jul '26

08 Jul '26

Backport the patch series "Fix incorrect overlayfs mmap() and mprotect() LSM access controls" [1] to OLK-6.6. The patch "fs: constify file ptr in backing_file accessor helpers" is backport to fix const warning. Amir Goldstein (2): fs: prepare for adding LSM blob to backing_file fs: constify file ptr in backing_file accessor helpers Paul Moore (2): lsm: add backing_file LSM hooks selinux: fix overlayfs mmap() and mprotect() access checks fs/backing-file.c | 15 +- fs/file_table.c | 54 ++++++- fs/fuse/passthrough.c | 2 +- fs/internal.h | 4 +- fs/overlayfs/file.c | 4 +- include/linux/backing-file.h | 2 +- include/linux/fs.h | 17 ++- include/linux/lsm_audit.h | 2 +- include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 5 + include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 1 + include/linux/security.h | 22 +++ security/security.c | 109 ++++++++++++++ security/selinux/hooks.c | 242 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------- security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 11 ++ 14 files changed, 408 insertions(+), 82 deletions(-) -- 2.18.0.huawei.25

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openEuler Kernel SIG双周例会
by openEuler conference 08 Jul '26

08 Jul '26

您好！ Kernel 邀请您参加 2026-07-10 14:00 召开的WeLink会议(自动录制) 会议主题：openEuler Kernel SIG双周例会会议发起人： LiaoTao_Wave 会议内容： 1. 进展update 2. 议题征集中（新增议题请填报至会议纪要看板）会议链接：https://meeting.huaweicloud.com:36443/#/j/968477591 会议纪要&签到链接：https://etherpad.openeuler.org/p/Kernel-meetings 更多资讯尽在：https://www.openeuler.org/zh/ Hello! Kernel invites you to attend the WeLink conference(auto recording) will be held at 2026-07-10 14:00 The subject of the conference is openEuler Kernel SIG双周例会 The sponsor of the conference is LiaoTao_Wave Summary: 1. 进展update 2. 议题征集中（新增议题请填报至会议纪要看板） You can join the meeting at https://meeting.huaweicloud.com:36443/#/j/968477591 Add topics at https://etherpad.openeuler.org/p/Kernel-meetings More information: https://www.openeuler.org/en/

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[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/4] Fix CVE-2026-46054
by Cai Xinchen 08 Jul '26

08 Jul '26

Backport the patch series "Fix incorrect overlayfs mmap() and mprotect() LSM access controls" [1] to OLK-6.6. The patch "fs: constify file ptr in backing_file accessor helpers" is backport to fix const warning. Amir Goldstein (2): fs: prepare for adding LSM blob to backing_file fs: constify file ptr in backing_file accessor helpers Paul Moore (2): lsm: add backing_file LSM hooks selinux: fix overlayfs mmap() and mprotect() access checks fs/backing-file.c | 15 +- fs/file_table.c | 54 ++++++- fs/fuse/passthrough.c | 2 +- fs/internal.h | 4 +- fs/overlayfs/file.c | 4 +- include/linux/backing-file.h | 2 +- include/linux/fs.h | 17 ++- include/linux/lsm_audit.h | 2 +- include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 5 + include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 1 + include/linux/security.h | 22 +++ security/security.c | 109 ++++++++++++++ security/selinux/hooks.c | 242 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------- security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 11 ++ 14 files changed, 408 insertions(+), 82 deletions(-) -- 2.18.0.huawei.25

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[PATCH OLK-6.6] drm/amd/display: Fix out-of-bounds read in dp_get_eq_aux_rd_interval()
by Hongtao Zhang 08 Jul '26

08 Jul '26

From: Harry Wentland <harry.wentland(a)amd.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.1-rc7 commit e8b4d37eba05141ee01794fc6b7f2da808cee83b category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/16039 CVE: CVE-2026-53330 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [Why & How] The aux_rd_interval array in struct dc_lttpr_caps is declared with MAX_REPEATER_CNT - 1 (7) elements, indexed 0..6. However, the offset parameter passed to dp_get_eq_aux_rd_interval() can be as large as MAX_REPEATER_CNT (8) when a sink reports 8 LTTPR repeaters via DPCD. This leads to an out-of-bounds read of aux_rd_interval[7] when offset is 8. Fix this by growing aux_rd_interval to MAX_REPEATER_CNT elements to accommodate the full range of valid repeater counts defined by the DP spec. Assisted-by: GitHub Copilot:Claude claude-4-opus Signed-off-by: Harry Wentland <harry.wentland(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Ray Wu <ray.wu(a)amd.com> Tested-by: Daniel Wheeler <daniel.wheeler(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher(a)amd.com> (cherry picked from commit a55a458a8df37a65ffda5cf721d554a8f74f6b04) Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Conflicts: drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dc_dp_types.h [conflicts due to not mergered de84d580126eb ("drm/amd/display: Read LTTPR ALPM caps during link cap retrieval")] Signed-off-by: Zhang Hongtao <zhanghongtao35(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dc_dp_types.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dc_dp_types.h b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dc_dp_types.h index 83719f5bea495..f834c0fa3b17c 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dc_dp_types.h +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dc_dp_types.h @@ -1156,7 +1156,7 @@ struct dc_lttpr_caps { uint8_t max_ext_timeout; union dp_main_link_channel_coding_lttpr_cap main_link_channel_coding; union dp_128b_132b_supported_lttpr_link_rates supported_128b_132b_rates; - uint8_t aux_rd_interval[MAX_REPEATER_CNT - 1]; + uint8_t aux_rd_interval[MAX_REPEATER_CNT]; }; struct dc_dongle_dfp_cap_ext { -- 2.43.0

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[PATCH OLK-5.10] drm/amd/display: Fix out-of-bounds read in dp_get_eq_aux_rd_interval()
by Hongtao Zhang 08 Jul '26

08 Jul '26

From: Harry Wentland <harry.wentland(a)amd.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.1-rc7 commit e8b4d37eba05141ee01794fc6b7f2da808cee83b category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/16039 CVE: CVE-2026-53330 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [Why & How] The aux_rd_interval array in struct dc_lttpr_caps is declared with MAX_REPEATER_CNT - 1 (7) elements, indexed 0..6. However, the offset parameter passed to dp_get_eq_aux_rd_interval() can be as large as MAX_REPEATER_CNT (8) when a sink reports 8 LTTPR repeaters via DPCD. This leads to an out-of-bounds read of aux_rd_interval[7] when offset is 8. Fix this by growing aux_rd_interval to MAX_REPEATER_CNT elements to accommodate the full range of valid repeater counts defined by the DP spec. Assisted-by: GitHub Copilot:Claude claude-4-opus Signed-off-by: Harry Wentland <harry.wentland(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Ray Wu <ray.wu(a)amd.com> Tested-by: Daniel Wheeler <daniel.wheeler(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher(a)amd.com> (cherry picked from commit a55a458a8df37a65ffda5cf721d554a8f74f6b04) Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Conflicts: drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dc_types.h drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dc_dp_types.h [conflicts due to not mergered de84d580126eb ("drm/amd/display: Read LTTPR ALPM caps during link cap retrieval")] Signed-off-by: Zhang Hongtao <zhanghongtao35(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dc_types.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dc_types.h b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dc_types.h index c47a19719de2c..6c7530b1ca039 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dc_types.h +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dc_types.h @@ -438,7 +438,7 @@ struct dc_lttpr_caps { uint8_t max_link_rate; uint8_t phy_repeater_cnt; uint8_t max_ext_timeout; - uint8_t aux_rd_interval[MAX_REPEATER_CNT - 1]; + uint8_t aux_rd_interval[MAX_REPEATER_CNT]; }; struct dc_dongle_caps { -- 2.43.0

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[PATCH OLK-6.6] drm/amd/display: Fix NULL deref and buffer over-read in SDP debugfs
by Hongtao Zhang 08 Jul '26

08 Jul '26

From: Harry Wentland <harry.wentland(a)amd.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.143 commit 7fc4fab4acc307ad2903312c195872b2953d32c3 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15829 CVE: CVE-2026-53135 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit adf67034b1f61f7119295208085bfd43f85f56af upstream. [Why & How] dp_sdp_message_debugfs_write() dereferences connector->base.state->crtc without checking for NULL. A connector can be connected but not bound to any CRTC (e.g. after hot-plug before the next atomic commit), causing a kernel crash when writing to the sdp_message debugfs node. The function also ignores the user-provided size argument and always passes 36 bytes to copy_from_user(), reading past the user buffer when size < 36. Fix both issues by: - Returning -ENODEV when connector->base.state or state->crtc is NULL - Clamping write_size to min(size, sizeof(data)) Fixes: c7ba3653e977 ("drm/amd/display: Generic SDP message access in amdgpu") Assisted-by: Copilot:claude-opus-4.6 Reviewed-by: Alex Hung <alex.hung(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Harry Wentland <harry.wentland(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Ray Wu <ray.wu(a)amd.com> Tested-by: Daniel Wheeler <daniel.wheeler(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher(a)amd.com> (cherry picked from commit 6ab4c36a522842ff70474a1c0af2e40e50fc8300) Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Zhang Hongtao <zhanghongtao35(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm_debugfs.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm_debugfs.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm_debugfs.c index c8609595f324b..4b8101bf62e9d 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm_debugfs.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm_debugfs.c @@ -1230,8 +1230,13 @@ static ssize_t dp_sdp_message_debugfs_write(struct file *f, const char __user *b if (size == 0) return 0; + if (!connector->base.state || !connector->base.state->crtc) + return -ENODEV; + acrtc_state = to_dm_crtc_state(connector->base.state->crtc->state); + write_size = min_t(size_t, size, sizeof(data)); + r = copy_from_user(data, buf, write_size); write_size -= r; -- 2.43.0

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[PATCH OLK-5.10] drm/amd/display: Fix NULL deref and buffer over-read in SDP debugfs
by Hongtao Zhang 08 Jul '26

08 Jul '26

From: Harry Wentland <harry.wentland(a)amd.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.259 commit ee9cfcf77a8e8af637396dc00966df5f701e661c category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15829 CVE: CVE-2026-53135 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit adf67034b1f61f7119295208085bfd43f85f56af upstream. [Why & How] dp_sdp_message_debugfs_write() dereferences connector->base.state->crtc without checking for NULL. A connector can be connected but not bound to any CRTC (e.g. after hot-plug before the next atomic commit), causing a kernel crash when writing to the sdp_message debugfs node. The function also ignores the user-provided size argument and always passes 36 bytes to copy_from_user(), reading past the user buffer when size < 36. Fix both issues by: - Returning -ENODEV when connector->base.state or state->crtc is NULL - Clamping write_size to min(size, sizeof(data)) Fixes: c7ba3653e977 ("drm/amd/display: Generic SDP message access in amdgpu") Assisted-by: Copilot:claude-opus-4.6 Reviewed-by: Alex Hung <alex.hung(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Harry Wentland <harry.wentland(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Ray Wu <ray.wu(a)amd.com> Tested-by: Daniel Wheeler <daniel.wheeler(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher(a)amd.com> (cherry picked from commit 6ab4c36a522842ff70474a1c0af2e40e50fc8300) Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Zhang Hongtao <zhanghongtao35(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm_debugfs.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm_debugfs.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm_debugfs.c index f4a1ad8959b7d..8b27ccae62b34 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm_debugfs.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm_debugfs.c @@ -895,8 +895,13 @@ static ssize_t dp_sdp_message_debugfs_write(struct file *f, const char __user *b if (size == 0) return 0; + if (!connector->base.state || !connector->base.state->crtc) + return -ENODEV; + acrtc_state = to_dm_crtc_state(connector->base.state->crtc->state); + write_size = min_t(size_t, size, sizeof(data)); + r = copy_from_user(data, buf, write_size); write_size -= r; -- 2.43.0

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[PATCH OLK-6.6] KVM: x86: Fix shadow paging use-after-free due to unexpected role
by Zhang Kunbo 08 Jul '26

08 Jul '26

From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini(a)redhat.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.144 commit 9291654d69e08542de37755cebe4d5b02c3170d1 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/16072 CVE: CVE-2026-53359 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 81ccda30b4e83d8f5cc4fd50503c44e3a33abfeb upstream. Commit 0cb2af2ea66ad ("KVM: x86: Fix shadow paging use-after-free due to unexpected GFN") fixed a shadow paging mismatch between stored and computed GFNs; the bug could be triggered by changing a PDE mapping from outside the guest, and then deleting a memslot. The rmap_remove() call would miss entries created after the PDE change because the GFN of the leaf SPTE does not match the GFN of the struct kvm_mmu_page. A similar hole however remains if the modified PDE points to a non-leaf page. In this case the gfn can be made to match, but the role does not match: the original large 2MB page creates a kvm_mmu_page with direct=1, while the new 4KB needs a kvm_mmu_page with direct=0. However, kvm_mmu_get_child_sp() does not compare the role, and therefore reuses the page. The next step is installing a leaf (4KB) SPTE on the new path which records an rmap entry under the gfn resolved by the walk. But when that child is zapped its parent kvm_mmu_page has direct=1 and kvm_mmu_page_get_gfn() computes the gfn for the 4KB page as sp->gfn + index instead of using sp->shadowed_translation[] (or sp->gfns[] in older kernels). It therefore fails to remove the recorded entry. When the memslot is dropped the shadow page is freed but the rmap entry survives, as in the scenario that was already fixed. Code that later walks that gfn (dirty logging, MMU notifier invalidation, and so on) dereferences an sptep that lies in the freed page, causing the use-after-free. Fixes: 2032a93d66fa ("KVM: MMU: Don't allocate gfns page for direct mmu pages") Reported-by: Hyunwoo Kim <imv4bel(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Zhang Kunbo <zhangkunbo(a)huawei.com> --- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c index beef195edfe0..99d5810c8210 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c @@ -2347,13 +2347,15 @@ static struct kvm_mmu_page *kvm_mmu_get_child_sp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *sptep, gfn_t gfn, bool direct, unsigned int access) { - union kvm_mmu_page_role role; + union kvm_mmu_page_role role = kvm_mmu_child_role(sptep, direct, access); - if (is_shadow_present_pte(*sptep) && !is_large_pte(*sptep) && - spte_to_child_sp(*sptep) && spte_to_child_sp(*sptep)->gfn == gfn) + if (is_shadow_present_pte(*sptep) && + !is_large_pte(*sptep) && + spte_to_child_sp(*sptep) && + spte_to_child_sp(*sptep)->gfn == gfn && + spte_to_child_sp(*sptep)->role.word == role.word) return ERR_PTR(-EEXIST); - role = kvm_mmu_child_role(sptep, direct, access); return kvm_mmu_get_shadow_page(vcpu, gfn, role); } -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/2] *** CVE-2026-53359 ***
by Zhang Kunbo 08 Jul '26

08 Jul '26

*** BLURB HERE *** Paolo Bonzini (1): KVM: x86: Fix shadow paging use-after-free due to unexpected role Sean Christopherson (1): KVM: x86: Fix shadow paging use-after-free due to unexpected GFN arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++++----------------------- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH OLK-6.6 v2 0/2] CVE-2026-53090
by Pu Lehui 08 Jul '26

08 Jul '26

Daniel Borkmann (2): bpf: Fix ld_{abs,ind} failure path analysis in subprogs selftests/bpf: Add tests for ld_{abs,ind} failure path in subprogs kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 17 +++ .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_ld_ind.c | 142 ++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 159 insertions(+) -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH OLK-5.10 v2] bpf: Fix ld_{abs,ind} failure path analysis in subprogs
by Pu Lehui 08 Jul '26

08 Jul '26

From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.1-rc1 commit ee861486e377edc55361c08dcbceab3f6b6577bd category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15793 CVE: CVE-2026-53090 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Usage of ld_{abs,ind} instructions got extended into subprogs some time ago via commit 09b28d76eac4 ("bpf: Add abnormal return checks."). These are only allowed in subprograms when the latter are BTF annotated and have scalar return types. The code generator in bpf_gen_ld_abs() has an abnormal exit path (r0=0 + exit) from legacy cBPF times. While the enforcement is on scalar return types, the verifier must also simulate the path of abnormal exit if the packet data load via ld_{abs,ind} failed. This is currently not the case. Fix it by having the verifier simulate both success and failure paths, and extend it in similar ways as we do for tail calls. The success path (r0=unknown, continue to next insn) is pushed onto stack for later validation and the r0=0 and return to the caller is done on the fall-through side. Fixes: 09b28d76eac4 ("bpf: Add abnormal return checks.") Reported-by: STAR Labs SG <info(a)starlabs.sg> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260408191242.526279-2-daniel@iogearbox.net Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: kernel/bpf/verifier.c [The current version does not introduce consumers corresponding to the output of jump tables; therefore, the assignment of jump tables is not involved. And mark_reg_scratched is for logging, so no need to backport it.] Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui <pulehui(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index edeff06b04d4..9183cb84307e 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -8769,6 +8769,22 @@ static int check_ld_abs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); /* ld_abs load up to 32-bit skb data. */ regs[BPF_REG_0].subreg_def = env->insn_idx + 1; + /* + * See bpf_gen_ld_abs() which emits a hidden BPF_EXIT with r0=0 + * which must be explored by the verifier when in a subprog. + */ + if (env->cur_state->curframe) { + struct bpf_verifier_state *branch; + + branch = push_stack(env, env->insn_idx + 1, env->insn_idx, false); + if (!branch) + return -EFAULT; + mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); + err = prepare_func_exit(env, &env->insn_idx); + if (err) + return err; + env->insn_idx--; + } return 0; } -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] l2tp: pppol2tp: hold reference to session in pppol2tp_ioctl()
by Gu Bowen 08 Jul '26

08 Jul '26

From: Lee Jones <lee(a)kernel.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.1-rc7 commit a213a8950414c684999dcf03edeea6c46ede172e category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15948 CVE: CVE-2026-53262 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- pppol2tp_ioctl() read sock->sk->sk_user_data directly without any locks or reference counting. If a controllable sleep was induced during copy_from_user() (e.g. via a userfaultfd page fault sleep), a concurrent socket close could trigger pppol2tp_session_close() asynchronously. This frees the l2tp_session structure via the l2tp_session_del_work workqueue. Upon resuming, the ioctl thread dereferences the stale session pointer, resulting in a Use-After-Free (UAF). Fix this by securely fetching the session reference using the RCU-safe, refcounted helper pppol2tp_sock_to_session(sk) on entry. This locks the session's refcount across the sleep. We structured the function to exit via standard err breaks, guaranteeing that l2tp_session_put() is cleanly called on all return paths to drop the reference. To preserve existing behavior we validate the session and its magic signature only for the specific L2TP commands that require it. This ensures that generic/unknown ioctls called on an unconnected socket still return -ENOIOCTLCMD and correctly fall back to generic handlers (e.g. in sock_do_ioctl()). Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee(a)kernel.org> Fixes: fd558d186df2 ("l2tp: Split pppol2tp patch into separate l2tp and ppp parts") Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260527133630.2120612-1-lee@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c [Function l2tp_session_put() conflicts due to mainline commit abe7a1a7d0b6 ("l2tp: improve tunnel/session refcount helpers") and commit c5cbaef992d64 ("l2tp: refactor ppp socket/session relationship") not merge.] Signed-off-by: Gu Bowen <gubowen5(a)huawei.com> --- net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c | 82 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 50 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c index 7ee095e854ae..de10e7783334 100644 --- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c +++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c @@ -1055,64 +1055,76 @@ static int pppol2tp_ioctl(struct socket *sock, unsigned int cmd, { struct pppol2tp_ioc_stats stats; struct l2tp_session *session; + int err = 0; + + session = pppol2tp_sock_to_session(sock->sk); + /* Validate session presence and magic integrity ONLY for commands + * that belong to L2TP and require a valid session. + */ switch (cmd) { case PPPIOCGMRU: case PPPIOCGFLAGS: - session = sock->sk->sk_user_data; + case PPPIOCSMRU: + case PPPIOCSFLAGS: + case PPPIOCGL2TPSTATS: if (!session) return -ENOTCONN; - if (WARN_ON(session->magic != L2TP_SESSION_MAGIC)) + if (session->magic != L2TP_SESSION_MAGIC) { + sock_put(sock->sk); return -EBADF; + } + break; + default: + break; + } + switch (cmd) { + case PPPIOCGMRU: + case PPPIOCGFLAGS: /* Not defined for tunnels */ - if (!session->session_id && !session->peer_session_id) - return -ENOSYS; + if (!session->session_id && !session->peer_session_id) { + err = -ENOSYS; + break; + } - if (put_user(0, (int __user *)arg)) - return -EFAULT; + if (put_user(0, (int __user *)arg)) { + err = -EFAULT; + break; + } break; case PPPIOCSMRU: case PPPIOCSFLAGS: - session = sock->sk->sk_user_data; - if (!session) - return -ENOTCONN; - - if (WARN_ON(session->magic != L2TP_SESSION_MAGIC)) - return -EBADF; - /* Not defined for tunnels */ - if (!session->session_id && !session->peer_session_id) - return -ENOSYS; + if (!session->session_id && !session->peer_session_id) { + err = -ENOSYS; + break; + } - if (!access_ok((int __user *)arg, sizeof(int))) - return -EFAULT; + if (!access_ok((int __user *)arg, sizeof(int))) { + err = -EFAULT; + break; + } break; case PPPIOCGL2TPSTATS: - session = sock->sk->sk_user_data; - if (!session) - return -ENOTCONN; - - if (WARN_ON(session->magic != L2TP_SESSION_MAGIC)) - return -EBADF; - /* Session 0 represents the parent tunnel */ if (!session->session_id && !session->peer_session_id) { u32 session_id; - int err; if (copy_from_user(&stats, (void __user *)arg, - sizeof(stats))) - return -EFAULT; + sizeof(stats))) { + err = -EFAULT; + break; + } session_id = stats.session_id; err = pppol2tp_tunnel_copy_stats(&stats, session->tunnel); if (err < 0) - return err; + break; stats.session_id = session_id; } else { @@ -1122,15 +1134,21 @@ static int pppol2tp_ioctl(struct socket *sock, unsigned int cmd, stats.tunnel_id = session->tunnel->tunnel_id; stats.using_ipsec = l2tp_tunnel_uses_xfrm(session->tunnel); - if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg, &stats, sizeof(stats))) - return -EFAULT; + if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg, &stats, sizeof(stats))) { + err = -EFAULT; + break; + } break; default: - return -ENOIOCTLCMD; + err = -ENOIOCTLCMD; + break; } - return 0; + if (session) + sock_put(sock->sk); + + return err; } /***************************************************************************** -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/2] CVE-2026-52918
by Xia Fukun 07 Jul '26

07 Jul '26

CVE-2026-52918 Jiexun Wang (1): Bluetooth: serialize accept_q access Luiz Augusto von Dentz (1): Bluetooth: Init sk_peer_* on bt_sock_alloc include/net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h | 1 + net/bluetooth/af_bluetooth.c | 111 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------ net/bluetooth/hidp/sock.c | 10 +-- net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c | 19 ----- 4 files changed, 91 insertions(+), 50 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 3

[PATCH OLK-6.6] arm64: stacktrace: Don't WARN when unwinding other tasks
by Tengda Wu 07 Jul '26

07 Jul '26

From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland(a)arm.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.13-rc3 commit 65ac33bed8b9255213b08ed153dbe9c0ca3535e6 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/9572 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- The arm64 stacktrace code has a few error conditions where a WARN_ON_ONCE() is triggered before the stacktrace is terminated and an error is returned to the caller. The conditions shouldn't be triggered when unwinding the current task, but it is possible to trigger these when unwinding another task which is not blocked, as the stack of that task is concurrently modified. Kent reports that these warnings can be triggered while running filesystem tests on bcachefs, which calls the stacktrace code directly. To produce a meaningful stacktrace of another task, the task in question should be blocked, but the stacktrace code is expected to be robust to cases where it is not blocked. Note that this is purely about not unuduly scaring the user and/or crashing the kernel; stacktraces in such cases are meaningless and may leak kernel secrets from the stack of the task being unwound. Ideally we'd pin the task in a blocked state during the unwind, as we do for /proc/${PID}/wchan since commit: 42a20f86dc19f928 ("sched: Add wrapper for get_wchan() to keep task blocked") ... but a bunch of places don't do that, notably /proc/${PID}/stack, where we don't pin the task in a blocked state, but do restrict the output to privileged users since commit: f8a00cef17206ecd ("proc: restrict kernel stack dumps to root") ... and so it's possible to trigger these warnings accidentally, e.g. by reading /proc/*/stack (as root): | for n in $(seq 1 10); do | while true; do cat /proc/*/stack > /dev/null 2>&1; done & | done | ------------[ cut here ]------------ | WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 166 at arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:207 arch_stack_walk+0x1c8/0x370 | Modules linked in: | CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 166 Comm: cat Not tainted 6.13.0-rc2-00003-g3dafa7a7925d #2 | Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) | pstate: 81400005 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) | pc : arch_stack_walk+0x1c8/0x370 | lr : arch_stack_walk+0x1b0/0x370 | sp : ffff800080773890 | x29: ffff800080773930 x28: fff0000005c44500 x27: fff00000058fa038 | x26: 000000007ffff000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000000 | x23: ffffa35a8d9600ec x22: 0000000000000000 x21: fff00000043a33c0 | x20: ffff800080773970 x19: ffffa35a8d960168 x18: 0000000000000000 | x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000000 | x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 | x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : 0000000000000000 | x8 : ffff8000807738e0 x7 : ffff8000806e3800 x6 : ffff8000806e3818 | x5 : ffff800080773920 x4 : ffff8000806e4000 x3 : ffff8000807738e0 | x2 : 0000000000000018 x1 : ffff8000806e3800 x0 : 0000000000000000 | Call trace: | arch_stack_walk+0x1c8/0x370 (P) | stack_trace_save_tsk+0x8c/0x108 | proc_pid_stack+0xb0/0x134 | proc_single_show+0x60/0x120 | seq_read_iter+0x104/0x438 | seq_read+0xf8/0x140 | vfs_read+0xc4/0x31c | ksys_read+0x70/0x108 | __arm64_sys_read+0x1c/0x28 | invoke_syscall+0x48/0x104 | el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x40/0xe0 | do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28 | el0_svc+0x30/0xcc | el0t_64_sync_handler+0x10c/0x138 | el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c | ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Fix this by only warning when unwinding the current task. When unwinding another task the error conditions will be handled by returning an error without producing a warning. The two warnings in kunwind_next_frame_record_meta() were added recently as part of commit: c2c6b27b5aa14fa2 ("arm64: stacktrace: unwind exception boundaries") The warning when recovering the fgraph return address has changed form many times, but was originally introduced back in commit: 9f416319f40cd857 ("arm64: fix unwind_frame() for filtered out fn for function graph tracing") Fixes: c2c6b27b5aa1 ("arm64: stacktrace: unwind exception boundaries") Fixes: 9f416319f40c ("arm64: fix unwind_frame() for filtered out fn for function graph tracing") Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland(a)arm.com> Reported-by: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet(a)linux.dev> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will(a)kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241211140704.2498712-3-mark.rutland@arm.com Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas(a)arm.com> Conflicts: arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c [c2c6b27b5aa1 ("arm64: stacktrace: unwind exception boundaries") This commit introduces an unwind-boundary feature that is not required for this backport.] Signed-off-by: Tengda Wu <wutengda2(a)huawei.com> --- arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c index 17f66a74c745..80cd45e4a922 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c @@ -81,8 +81,10 @@ unwind_recover_return_address(struct unwind_state *state) unsigned long orig_pc; orig_pc = ftrace_graph_ret_addr(state->task, NULL, state->pc, (void *)state->fp); - if (WARN_ON_ONCE(state->pc == orig_pc)) + if (state->pc == orig_pc) { + WARN_ON_ONCE(state->task == current); return -EINVAL; + } state->pc = orig_pc; } #endif /* CONFIG_FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER */ -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] bpf: Fix ld_{abs,ind} failure path analysis in subprogs
by Pu Lehui 07 Jul '26

07 Jul '26

From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.1-rc1 commit ee861486e377edc55361c08dcbceab3f6b6577bd category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15793 CVE: CVE-2026-53090 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Usage of ld_{abs,ind} instructions got extended into subprogs some time ago via commit 09b28d76eac4 ("bpf: Add abnormal return checks."). These are only allowed in subprograms when the latter are BTF annotated and have scalar return types. The code generator in bpf_gen_ld_abs() has an abnormal exit path (r0=0 + exit) from legacy cBPF times. While the enforcement is on scalar return types, the verifier must also simulate the path of abnormal exit if the packet data load via ld_{abs,ind} failed. This is currently not the case. Fix it by having the verifier simulate both success and failure paths, and extend it in similar ways as we do for tail calls. The success path (r0=unknown, continue to next insn) is pushed onto stack for later validation and the r0=0 and return to the caller is done on the fall-through side. Fixes: 09b28d76eac4 ("bpf: Add abnormal return checks.") Reported-by: STAR Labs SG <info(a)starlabs.sg> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260408191242.526279-2-daniel@iogearbox.net Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: kernel/bpf/verifier.c [The current version does not introduce consumers corresponding to the output of jump tables; therefore, the assignment of jump tables is not involved. And mark_reg_scratched is for logging, so no need to backport it.] Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui <pulehui(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index edeff06b04d4..ad90fe6224db 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -8769,6 +8769,22 @@ static int check_ld_abs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); /* ld_abs load up to 32-bit skb data. */ regs[BPF_REG_0].subreg_def = env->insn_idx + 1; + /* + * See bpf_gen_ld_abs() which emits a hidden BPF_EXIT with r0=0 + * which must be explored by the verifier when in a subprog. + */ + if (env->cur_state->curframe) { + struct bpf_verifier_state *branch; + + branch = push_stack(env, env->insn_idx + 1, env->insn_idx, false); + if (IS_ERR(branch)) + return PTR_ERR(branch); + mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); + err = prepare_func_exit(env, &env->insn_idx); + if (err) + return err; + env->insn_idx--; + } return 0; } -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] CVE-2026-53090
by Pu Lehui 07 Jul '26

07 Jul '26

Daniel Borkmann (2): bpf: Fix ld_{abs,ind} failure path analysis in subprogs selftests/bpf: Add tests for ld_{abs,ind} failure path in subprogs kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 17 +++ .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_ld_ind.c | 142 ++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 159 insertions(+) -- 2.34.1

2 3

[PATCH OLK-6.6] USB: serial: io_ti: fix heap overflow in get_manuf_info()
by Liu Mingrui 07 Jul '26

07 Jul '26

From: Adrian Korwel <adriank20047(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.143 commit d92f17af7097d10bdeddf26f66f34b354104b277 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15882 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 183c1076eca43bbb3e7bdf597456f91d81c73e74 upstream. get_manuf_info() reads le16_to_cpu(rom_desc->Size) bytes from the device I2C EEPROM into a buffer allocated with kmalloc_obj(), which is sizeof(struct edge_ti_manuf_descriptor) = 10 bytes. The Size field comes from the device and is only validated (in check_i2c_image()) to make sure the descriptor fits within TI_MAX_I2C_SIZE (16384 bytes), not against the destination buffer size. A malicious USB device can therefore set Size to any value up to 16377, causing a heap overflow of up to 16367 bytes when plugged into a host running this driver. valid_csum() is called after read_rom() and also iterates buffer[0..Size-1], compounding the out-of-bounds access. Fix by rejecting descriptors with unexpected length before calling read_rom(). Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Adrian Korwel <adriank20047(a)gmail.com> [ johan: amend commit message; also check for short descriptors ] Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mingrui Liu <liumingrui(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/usb/serial/io_ti.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/io_ti.c b/drivers/usb/serial/io_ti.c index c41fbc321b35..45184faf02bc 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/serial/io_ti.c +++ b/drivers/usb/serial/io_ti.c @@ -773,6 +773,12 @@ static int get_manuf_info(struct edgeport_serial *serial, u8 *buffer) } /* Read the descriptor data */ + if (le16_to_cpu(rom_desc->Size) != sizeof(struct edge_ti_manuf_descriptor)) { + dev_err(dev, "unexpected Edge descriptor length: %u\n", + le16_to_cpu(rom_desc->Size)); + status = -EINVAL; + goto exit; + } status = read_rom(serial, start_address+sizeof(struct ti_i2c_desc), le16_to_cpu(rom_desc->Size), buffer); if (status) -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] drm/amd/display: Wrap DCN32 phantom-plane allocation in DC_RUN_WITH_PREEMPTION_ENABLED
by Jiacheng Yu 07 Jul '26

07 Jul '26

From: Mikhail Gavrilov <mikhail.v.gavrilov(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.1-rc4 commit 183182235f6d53bac62c6c39014738a54a68dfa6 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15974 CVE: CVE-2026-53285 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- [Why] dcn32_validate_bandwidth() wraps dcn32_internal_validate_bw() with DC_FP_START()/DC_FP_END(). In x86 non-RT, DC_FP_START takes fpregs_lock(), which disables local softirqs. The DML1 path through dcn32_enable_phantom_plane() calls kvzalloc() to allocate ~335 KiB for dc_plane_state. This triggers the vmalloc path, which calls BUG_ON(in_interrupt()) because it's invoked within the FPU-enabled (softirq disabled) region, leading to a kernel crash. [How] Wrap the dc_state_create_phantom_plane() call with the DC_RUN_WITH_PREEMPTION_ENABLED() macro to allow preemption during this memory allocation. Fixes: 235c67634230 ("drm/amd/display: add DCN32/321 specific files for Display Core") Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/amd/-/work_items/4470 Reviewed-by: Aurabindo Pillai <aurabindo.pillai(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Mikhail Gavrilov <mikhail.v.gavrilov(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: James Lin <pinglei.lin(a)amd.com> Tested-by: Daniel Wheeler <daniel.wheeler(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher(a)amd.com> (cherry picked from commit 885ccbef7b94a8b38f69c4211c679021aa27ad11) Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Conflicts: drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/dc_fpu.h drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/dc_fpu.c drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dcn32/dcn32_resource.c drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/resource/dcn32/dcn32_resource.c [3539437f354b drm/amd/display: Move FPU Guards From DML To DC - Part 1, not commited.] Signed-off-by: Jiacheng Yu <yujiacheng3(a)huawei.com> --- .../gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/dc_fpu.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ .../gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/dc_fpu.h | 15 +++++++++++++++ .../drm/amd/display/dc/dcn32/dcn32_resource.c | 9 ++++++++- 3 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/dc_fpu.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/dc_fpu.c index 172aa10a8800..e4455be0c99a 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/dc_fpu.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/dc_fpu.c @@ -69,6 +69,25 @@ inline void dc_assert_fp_enabled(void) ASSERT(depth >= 1); } +/** + * dc_is_fp_enabled - Check if FPU protection is enabled + * + * This function tells if the code is already under FPU protection or not. A + * function that works as an API for a set of FPU operations can use this + * function for checking if the caller invoked it after DC_FP_START(). For + * example, take a look at dcn20_fpu.c file. + * + * Similar to dc_assert_fp_enabled, but does not assert, returns status instead. + */ +inline bool dc_is_fp_enabled(void) +{ + int depth; + + depth = this_cpu_read(fpu_recursion_depth); + + return (depth >= 1); +} + /** * dc_fpu_begin - Enables FPU protection * @function_name: A string containing the function name for debug purposes diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/dc_fpu.h b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/dc_fpu.h index b8275b397920..e968589d75ef 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/dc_fpu.h +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/dc_fpu.h @@ -28,7 +28,22 @@ #define __DC_FPU_H__ void dc_assert_fp_enabled(void); +bool dc_is_fp_enabled(void); void dc_fpu_begin(const char *function_name, const int line); void dc_fpu_end(const char *function_name, const int line); +#ifdef CONFIG_DRM_AMD_DC_FP +#define DC_RUN_WITH_PREEMPTION_ENABLED(code) \ + do { \ + bool dc_fp_enabled = dc_is_fp_enabled(); \ + if (dc_fp_enabled) \ + dc_fpu_end(__func__, __LINE__); \ + code; \ + if (dc_fp_enabled) \ + dc_fpu_begin(__func__, __LINE__); \ + } while (0) +#else +#define DC_RUN_WITH_PREEMPTION_ENABLED(code) code +#endif /* CONFIG_DRM_AMD_DC_FP */ + #endif /* __DC_FPU_H__ */ diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dcn32/dcn32_resource.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dcn32/dcn32_resource.c index ab6b4f44f537..bdd1fc574d6a 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dcn32/dcn32_resource.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dcn32/dcn32_resource.c @@ -89,6 +89,12 @@ #include "dcn20/dcn20_vmid.h" #include "dml/dcn32/dcn32_fpu.h" +#include "amdgpu_dm/dc_fpu.h" + +#if !defined(DC_RUN_WITH_PREEMPTION_ENABLED) +#define DC_RUN_WITH_PREEMPTION_ENABLED(code) code +#endif + #define DC_LOGGER_INIT(logger) enum dcn32_clk_src_array_id { @@ -1643,7 +1649,8 @@ static void dcn32_enable_phantom_plane(struct dc *dc, if (curr_pipe->top_pipe && curr_pipe->top_pipe->plane_state == curr_pipe->plane_state) phantom_plane = prev_phantom_plane; else - phantom_plane = dc_create_plane_state(dc); + DC_RUN_WITH_PREEMPTION_ENABLED(phantom_plane = + dc_create_plane_state(dc)); if (!phantom_plane) continue; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] drm/amd/display: Avoid NULL dereference in dc_dmub_srv error paths
by Jiacheng Yu 07 Jul '26

07 Jul '26

From: Srinivasan Shanmugam <srinivasan.shanmugam(a)amd.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.1-rc1 commit 4ae3e16f4b3bf64140f773629b765d605ee079a9 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/16001 CVE: CVE-2026-53313 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- In dc_dmub_srv_log_diagnostic_data() and dc_dmub_srv_enable_dpia_trace(). Both functions check: if (!dc_dmub_srv || !dc_dmub_srv->dmub) and then call DC_LOG_ERROR() inside that block. DC_LOG_ERROR() uses dc_dmub_srv->ctx internally. So if dc_dmub_srv is NULL, the logging itself can dereference a NULL pointer and cause a crash. Fix this by splitting the checks. First check if dc_dmub_srv is NULL and return immediately. Then check dc_dmub_srv->dmub and log the error only when dc_dmub_srv is valid. Fixes the below: ../display/dc/dc_dmub_srv.c:962 dc_dmub_srv_log_diagnostic_data() error: we previously assumed 'dc_dmub_srv' could be null (see line 961) ../display/dc/dc_dmub_srv.c:1167 dc_dmub_srv_enable_dpia_trace() error: we previously assumed 'dc_dmub_srv' could be null (see line 1166) Fixes: 2631ac1ac328 ("drm/amd/display: add DMUB registers to crash dump diagnostic data.") Fixes: 71ba6b577a35 ("drm/amd/display: Add interface to enable DPIA trace") Cc: Roman Li <roman.li(a)amd.com> Cc: Alex Hung <alex.hung(a)amd.com> Cc: Tom Chung <chiahsuan.chung(a)amd.com> Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter(a)linaro.org> Cc: Aurabindo Pillai <aurabindo.pillai(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Srinivasan Shanmugam <srinivasan.shanmugam(a)amd.com> Reviewed-by: Alex Hung <alex.hung(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher(a)amd.com> Conflicts: drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dc_dmub_srv.c [context conflicts] Signed-off-by: Jiacheng Yu <yujiacheng3(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dc_dmub_srv.c | 10 ++++++++-- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dc_dmub_srv.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dc_dmub_srv.c index 8344957d7449..a579366e7698 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dc_dmub_srv.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dc_dmub_srv.c @@ -796,7 +796,10 @@ void dc_dmub_srv_log_diagnostic_data(struct dc_dmub_srv *dc_dmub_srv) { struct dmub_diagnostic_data diag_data = {0}; - if (!dc_dmub_srv || !dc_dmub_srv->dmub) { + if (!dc_dmub_srv) + return; + + if (!dc_dmub_srv->dmub) { DC_LOG_ERROR("%s: invalid parameters.", __func__); return; } @@ -1037,7 +1040,10 @@ void dc_dmub_srv_enable_dpia_trace(const struct dc *dc) enum dmub_status status; static const uint32_t timeout_us = 30; - if (!dc_dmub_srv || !dc_dmub_srv->dmub) { + if (!dc_dmub_srv) + return; + + if (!dc_dmub_srv->dmub) { DC_LOG_ERROR("%s: invalid parameters.", __func__); return; } -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] Bluetooth: serialize accept_q access
by Xia Fukun 07 Jul '26

07 Jul '26

From: Jiexun Wang <wangjiexun2025(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.142 commit be43e6b4043113c3b3cf887c3c8350f67140274c category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15621 CVE: CVE-2026-52918 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit e83f5e24da741fa9405aeeff00b08c5ee7c37b88 upstream. bt_sock_poll() walks the accept queue without synchronization, while child teardown can unlink the same socket and drop its last reference. The unsynchronized accept queue walk has existed since the initial Bluetooth import. Protect accept_q with a dedicated lock for queue updates and polling. Also rework bt_accept_dequeue() to take temporary child references under the queue lock before dropping it and locking the child socket. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com> Reported-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098(a)gmail.com> Reported-by: Yifan Wu <yifanwucs(a)gmail.com> Reported-by: Juefei Pu <tomapufckgml(a)gmail.com> Reported-by: Xin Liu <bird(a)lzu.edu.cn> Signed-off-by: Jiexun Wang <wangjiexun2025(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Ren Wei <n05ec(a)lzu.edu.cn> Signed-off-by: Jiexun Wang <wangjiexun2025(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Xia Fukun <xiafukun(a)huawei.com> --- include/net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h | 1 + net/bluetooth/af_bluetooth.c | 87 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 2 files changed, 66 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h b/include/net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h index c25f9f4cac80..7673228cd697 100644 --- a/include/net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h +++ b/include/net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h @@ -380,6 +380,7 @@ void baswap(bdaddr_t *dst, const bdaddr_t *src); struct bt_sock { struct sock sk; struct list_head accept_q; + spinlock_t accept_q_lock; /* protects accept_q */ struct sock *parent; unsigned long flags; void (*skb_msg_name)(struct sk_buff *, void *, int *); diff --git a/net/bluetooth/af_bluetooth.c b/net/bluetooth/af_bluetooth.c index 69047e533db1..53a4792ae75d 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/af_bluetooth.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/af_bluetooth.c @@ -151,6 +151,7 @@ struct sock *bt_sock_alloc(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, sock_init_data(sock, sk); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&bt_sk(sk)->accept_q); + spin_lock_init(&bt_sk(sk)->accept_q_lock); sock_reset_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED); @@ -211,6 +212,7 @@ void bt_accept_enqueue(struct sock *parent, struct sock *sk, bool bh) { const struct cred *old_cred; struct pid *old_pid; + struct bt_sock *par = bt_sk(parent); BT_DBG("parent %p, sk %p", parent, sk); @@ -221,9 +223,13 @@ void bt_accept_enqueue(struct sock *parent, struct sock *sk, bool bh) else lock_sock_nested(sk, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING); - list_add_tail(&bt_sk(sk)->accept_q, &bt_sk(parent)->accept_q); bt_sk(sk)->parent = parent; + spin_lock_bh(&par->accept_q_lock); + list_add_tail(&bt_sk(sk)->accept_q, &par->accept_q); + sk_acceptq_added(parent); + spin_unlock_bh(&par->accept_q_lock); + /* Copy credentials from parent since for incoming connections the * socket is allocated by the kernel. */ @@ -241,8 +247,6 @@ void bt_accept_enqueue(struct sock *parent, struct sock *sk, bool bh) bh_unlock_sock(sk); else release_sock(sk); - - sk_acceptq_added(parent); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(bt_accept_enqueue); @@ -251,45 +255,72 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(bt_accept_enqueue); */ void bt_accept_unlink(struct sock *sk) { + struct sock *parent = bt_sk(sk)->parent; + BT_DBG("sk %p state %d", sk, sk->sk_state); + spin_lock_bh(&bt_sk(parent)->accept_q_lock); list_del_init(&bt_sk(sk)->accept_q); - sk_acceptq_removed(bt_sk(sk)->parent); + sk_acceptq_removed(parent); + spin_unlock_bh(&bt_sk(parent)->accept_q_lock); bt_sk(sk)->parent = NULL; sock_put(sk); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(bt_accept_unlink); +static struct sock *bt_accept_get(struct sock *parent, struct sock *sk) +{ + struct bt_sock *bt = bt_sk(parent); + struct sock *next = NULL; + + /* accept_q is modified from child teardown paths too, so take a + * temporary reference before dropping the queue lock. + */ + spin_lock_bh(&bt->accept_q_lock); + + if (sk) { + if (bt_sk(sk)->parent != parent) + goto out; + + if (!list_is_last(&bt_sk(sk)->accept_q, &bt->accept_q)) { + next = &list_next_entry(bt_sk(sk), accept_q)->sk; + sock_hold(next); + } + } else if (!list_empty(&bt->accept_q)) { + next = &list_first_entry(&bt->accept_q, + struct bt_sock, accept_q)->sk; + sock_hold(next); + } + +out: + spin_unlock_bh(&bt->accept_q_lock); + return next; +} + struct sock *bt_accept_dequeue(struct sock *parent, struct socket *newsock) { - struct bt_sock *s, *n; - struct sock *sk; + struct sock *sk, *next; BT_DBG("parent %p", parent); restart: - list_for_each_entry_safe(s, n, &bt_sk(parent)->accept_q, accept_q) { - sk = (struct sock *)s; - + for (sk = bt_accept_get(parent, NULL); sk; sk = next) { /* Prevent early freeing of sk due to unlink and sock_kill */ - sock_hold(sk); lock_sock(sk); /* Check sk has not already been unlinked via * bt_accept_unlink() due to serialisation caused by sk locking */ - if (!bt_sk(sk)->parent) { + if (bt_sk(sk)->parent != parent) { BT_DBG("sk %p, already unlinked", sk); release_sock(sk); sock_put(sk); - /* Restart the loop as sk is no longer in the list - * and also avoid a potential infinite loop because - * list_for_each_entry_safe() is not thread safe. - */ goto restart; } + next = bt_accept_get(parent, sk); + /* sk is safely in the parent list so reduce reference count */ sock_put(sk); @@ -317,6 +348,8 @@ struct sock *bt_accept_dequeue(struct sock *parent, struct socket *newsock) sock_hold(sk); release_sock(sk); + if (next) + sock_put(next); return sk; } @@ -518,18 +551,28 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(bt_sock_stream_recvmsg); static inline __poll_t bt_accept_poll(struct sock *parent) { - struct bt_sock *s, *n; + struct bt_sock *bt = bt_sk(parent); + struct bt_sock *s; struct sock *sk; + __poll_t mask = 0; + + spin_lock_bh(&bt->accept_q_lock); + list_for_each_entry(s, &bt->accept_q, accept_q) { + int state; - list_for_each_entry_safe(s, n, &bt_sk(parent)->accept_q, accept_q) { sk = (struct sock *)s; - if (sk->sk_state == BT_CONNECTED || - (test_bit(BT_SK_DEFER_SETUP, &bt_sk(parent)->flags) && - sk->sk_state == BT_CONNECT2)) - return EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM; + state = READ_ONCE(sk->sk_state); + + if (state == BT_CONNECTED || + (test_bit(BT_SK_DEFER_SETUP, &bt->flags) && + state == BT_CONNECT2)) { + mask = EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM; + break; + } } + spin_unlock_bh(&bt->accept_q_lock); - return 0; + return mask; } __poll_t bt_sock_poll(struct file *file, struct socket *sock, -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] l2tp: pppol2tp: hold reference to session in pppol2tp_ioctl()
by Gu Bowen 07 Jul '26

07 Jul '26

From: Lee Jones <lee(a)kernel.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.1-rc7 commit a213a8950414c684999dcf03edeea6c46ede172e category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15948 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- pppol2tp_ioctl() read sock->sk->sk_user_data directly without any locks or reference counting. If a controllable sleep was induced during copy_from_user() (e.g. via a userfaultfd page fault sleep), a concurrent socket close could trigger pppol2tp_session_close() asynchronously. This frees the l2tp_session structure via the l2tp_session_del_work workqueue. Upon resuming, the ioctl thread dereferences the stale session pointer, resulting in a Use-After-Free (UAF). Fix this by securely fetching the session reference using the RCU-safe, refcounted helper pppol2tp_sock_to_session(sk) on entry. This locks the session's refcount across the sleep. We structured the function to exit via standard err breaks, guaranteeing that l2tp_session_put() is cleanly called on all return paths to drop the reference. To preserve existing behavior we validate the session and its magic signature only for the specific L2TP commands that require it. This ensures that generic/unknown ioctls called on an unconnected socket still return -ENOIOCTLCMD and correctly fall back to generic handlers (e.g. in sock_do_ioctl()). Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee(a)kernel.org> Fixes: fd558d186df2 ("l2tp: Split pppol2tp patch into separate l2tp and ppp parts") Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260527133630.2120612-1-lee@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c [Function l2tp_session_put() conflicts due to mainline commit abe7a1a7d0b6 ("l2tp: improve tunnel/session refcount helpers") and commit c5cbaef992d64 ("l2tp: refactor ppp socket/session relationship") not merge.] Signed-off-by: Gu Bowen <gubowen5(a)huawei.com> --- net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c | 82 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 50 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c index 7ee095e854ae..de10e7783334 100644 --- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c +++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c @@ -1055,64 +1055,76 @@ static int pppol2tp_ioctl(struct socket *sock, unsigned int cmd, { struct pppol2tp_ioc_stats stats; struct l2tp_session *session; + int err = 0; + + session = pppol2tp_sock_to_session(sock->sk); + /* Validate session presence and magic integrity ONLY for commands + * that belong to L2TP and require a valid session. + */ switch (cmd) { case PPPIOCGMRU: case PPPIOCGFLAGS: - session = sock->sk->sk_user_data; + case PPPIOCSMRU: + case PPPIOCSFLAGS: + case PPPIOCGL2TPSTATS: if (!session) return -ENOTCONN; - if (WARN_ON(session->magic != L2TP_SESSION_MAGIC)) + if (session->magic != L2TP_SESSION_MAGIC) { + sock_put(sock->sk); return -EBADF; + } + break; + default: + break; + } + switch (cmd) { + case PPPIOCGMRU: + case PPPIOCGFLAGS: /* Not defined for tunnels */ - if (!session->session_id && !session->peer_session_id) - return -ENOSYS; + if (!session->session_id && !session->peer_session_id) { + err = -ENOSYS; + break; + } - if (put_user(0, (int __user *)arg)) - return -EFAULT; + if (put_user(0, (int __user *)arg)) { + err = -EFAULT; + break; + } break; case PPPIOCSMRU: case PPPIOCSFLAGS: - session = sock->sk->sk_user_data; - if (!session) - return -ENOTCONN; - - if (WARN_ON(session->magic != L2TP_SESSION_MAGIC)) - return -EBADF; - /* Not defined for tunnels */ - if (!session->session_id && !session->peer_session_id) - return -ENOSYS; + if (!session->session_id && !session->peer_session_id) { + err = -ENOSYS; + break; + } - if (!access_ok((int __user *)arg, sizeof(int))) - return -EFAULT; + if (!access_ok((int __user *)arg, sizeof(int))) { + err = -EFAULT; + break; + } break; case PPPIOCGL2TPSTATS: - session = sock->sk->sk_user_data; - if (!session) - return -ENOTCONN; - - if (WARN_ON(session->magic != L2TP_SESSION_MAGIC)) - return -EBADF; - /* Session 0 represents the parent tunnel */ if (!session->session_id && !session->peer_session_id) { u32 session_id; - int err; if (copy_from_user(&stats, (void __user *)arg, - sizeof(stats))) - return -EFAULT; + sizeof(stats))) { + err = -EFAULT; + break; + } session_id = stats.session_id; err = pppol2tp_tunnel_copy_stats(&stats, session->tunnel); if (err < 0) - return err; + break; stats.session_id = session_id; } else { @@ -1122,15 +1134,21 @@ static int pppol2tp_ioctl(struct socket *sock, unsigned int cmd, stats.tunnel_id = session->tunnel->tunnel_id; stats.using_ipsec = l2tp_tunnel_uses_xfrm(session->tunnel); - if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg, &stats, sizeof(stats))) - return -EFAULT; + if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg, &stats, sizeof(stats))) { + err = -EFAULT; + break; + } break; default: - return -ENOIOCTLCMD; + err = -ENOIOCTLCMD; + break; } - return 0; + if (session) + sock_put(sock->sk); + + return err; } /***************************************************************************** -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] drm/amd/display: Clamp HDMI HDCP2 rx_id_list read to buffer size
by Jiacheng Yu 07 Jul '26

07 Jul '26

From: Harry Wentland <harry.wentland(a)amd.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.1-rc7 commit f0f3981c43b32cadfe373d636d9e9ca522bb3702 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15831 CVE: CVE-2026-53137 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- [Why & How] During HDCP 2.x repeater authentication over HDMI, the driver reads the sink's RxStatus register and extracts a 10-bit message size field (max value 1023). This value is used as the read length for the ReceiverID list without being clamped to the size of the destination buffer rx_id_list[177]. A malicious HDMI repeater could advertise a message size larger than the buffer, causing an out-of-bounds write during the I2C read. Clamp the read length in mod_hdcp_read_rx_id_list() to the size of the rx_id_list buffer, matching the approach already used in the DP branch. Fixes: eff682f83c9c ("drm/amd/display: Add DDC handles for HDCP2.2") Assisted-by: Copilot:claude-opus-4.6 Reviewed-by: Alex Hung <alex.hung(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Harry Wentland <harry.wentland(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Ray Wu <ray.wu(a)amd.com> Tested-by: Daniel Wheeler <daniel.wheeler(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher(a)amd.com> (cherry picked from commit 229212219e4247d9486f8ba41ef087358490be09) Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jiacheng Yu <yujiacheng3(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/modules/hdcp/hdcp_ddc.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/modules/hdcp/hdcp_ddc.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/modules/hdcp/hdcp_ddc.c index 1b2df97226a3..26956be604c3 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/modules/hdcp/hdcp_ddc.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/modules/hdcp/hdcp_ddc.c @@ -531,7 +531,8 @@ enum mod_hdcp_status mod_hdcp_read_rx_id_list(struct mod_hdcp *hdcp) } else { status = read(hdcp, MOD_HDCP_MESSAGE_ID_READ_REPEATER_AUTH_SEND_RECEIVERID_LIST, hdcp->auth.msg.hdcp2.rx_id_list, - hdcp->auth.msg.hdcp2.rx_id_list_size); + MIN(hdcp->auth.msg.hdcp2.rx_id_list_size, + sizeof(hdcp->auth.msg.hdcp2.rx_id_list))); } return status; } -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] drm/amd/display: Wrap DCN32 phantom-plane allocation in DC_RUN_WITH_PREEMPTION_ENABLED
by Jiacheng Yu 07 Jul '26

07 Jul '26

From: Mikhail Gavrilov <mikhail.v.gavrilov(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.1-rc4 commit 183182235f6d53bac62c6c39014738a54a68dfa6 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15974 CVE: CVE-2026-53285 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- [Why] dcn32_validate_bandwidth() wraps dcn32_internal_validate_bw() with DC_FP_START()/DC_FP_END(). In x86 non-RT, DC_FP_START takes fpregs_lock(), which disables local softirqs. The DML1 path through dcn32_enable_phantom_plane() calls kvzalloc() to allocate ~335 KiB for dc_plane_state. This triggers the vmalloc path, which calls BUG_ON(in_interrupt()) because it's invoked within the FPU-enabled (softirq disabled) region, leading to a kernel crash. [How] Wrap the dc_state_create_phantom_plane() call with the DC_RUN_WITH_PREEMPTION_ENABLED() macro to allow preemption during this memory allocation. Fixes: 235c67634230 ("drm/amd/display: add DCN32/321 specific files for Display Core") Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/amd/-/work_items/4470 Reviewed-by: Aurabindo Pillai <aurabindo.pillai(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Mikhail Gavrilov <mikhail.v.gavrilov(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: James Lin <pinglei.lin(a)amd.com> Tested-by: Daniel Wheeler <daniel.wheeler(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher(a)amd.com> (cherry picked from commit 885ccbef7b94a8b38f69c4211c679021aa27ad11) Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Conflicts: drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/dc_fpu.c drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/dc_fpu.c drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dcn32/dcn32_resource.c [3539437f354b drm/amd/display: Move FPU Guards From DML To DC - Part 1, not commited.] Signed-off-by: Jiacheng Yu <yujiacheng3(a)huawei.com> --- .../gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/dc_fpu.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ .../gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/dc_fpu.h | 15 +++++++++++++++ .../drm/amd/display/dc/dcn32/dcn32_resource.c | 9 ++++++++- 3 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/dc_fpu.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/dc_fpu.c index 172aa10a8800..e4455be0c99a 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/dc_fpu.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/dc_fpu.c @@ -69,6 +69,25 @@ inline void dc_assert_fp_enabled(void) ASSERT(depth >= 1); } +/** + * dc_is_fp_enabled - Check if FPU protection is enabled + * + * This function tells if the code is already under FPU protection or not. A + * function that works as an API for a set of FPU operations can use this + * function for checking if the caller invoked it after DC_FP_START(). For + * example, take a look at dcn20_fpu.c file. + * + * Similar to dc_assert_fp_enabled, but does not assert, returns status instead. + */ +inline bool dc_is_fp_enabled(void) +{ + int depth; + + depth = this_cpu_read(fpu_recursion_depth); + + return (depth >= 1); +} + /** * dc_fpu_begin - Enables FPU protection * @function_name: A string containing the function name for debug purposes diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/dc_fpu.h b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/dc_fpu.h index b8275b397920..e968589d75ef 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/dc_fpu.h +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/dc_fpu.h @@ -28,7 +28,22 @@ #define __DC_FPU_H__ void dc_assert_fp_enabled(void); +bool dc_is_fp_enabled(void); void dc_fpu_begin(const char *function_name, const int line); void dc_fpu_end(const char *function_name, const int line); +#ifdef CONFIG_DRM_AMD_DC_FP +#define DC_RUN_WITH_PREEMPTION_ENABLED(code) \ + do { \ + bool dc_fp_enabled = dc_is_fp_enabled(); \ + if (dc_fp_enabled) \ + dc_fpu_end(__func__, __LINE__); \ + code; \ + if (dc_fp_enabled) \ + dc_fpu_begin(__func__, __LINE__); \ + } while (0) +#else +#define DC_RUN_WITH_PREEMPTION_ENABLED(code) code +#endif /* CONFIG_DRM_AMD_DC_FP */ + #endif /* __DC_FPU_H__ */ diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dcn32/dcn32_resource.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dcn32/dcn32_resource.c index ab6b4f44f537..bdd1fc574d6a 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dcn32/dcn32_resource.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dcn32/dcn32_resource.c @@ -89,6 +89,12 @@ #include "dcn20/dcn20_vmid.h" #include "dml/dcn32/dcn32_fpu.h" +#include "amdgpu_dm/dc_fpu.h" + +#if !defined(DC_RUN_WITH_PREEMPTION_ENABLED) +#define DC_RUN_WITH_PREEMPTION_ENABLED(code) code +#endif + #define DC_LOGGER_INIT(logger) enum dcn32_clk_src_array_id { @@ -1643,7 +1649,8 @@ static void dcn32_enable_phantom_plane(struct dc *dc, if (curr_pipe->top_pipe && curr_pipe->top_pipe->plane_state == curr_pipe->plane_state) phantom_plane = prev_phantom_plane; else - phantom_plane = dc_create_plane_state(dc); + DC_RUN_WITH_PREEMPTION_ENABLED(phantom_plane = + dc_create_plane_state(dc)); if (!phantom_plane) continue; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] drm/amd/display: Wrap DCN32 phantom-plane allocation in DC_RUN_WITH_PREEMPTION_ENABLED
by Jiacheng Yu 07 Jul '26

07 Jul '26

From: Mikhail Gavrilov <mikhail.v.gavrilov(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.1-rc4 commit 183182235f6d53bac62c6c39014738a54a68dfa6 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15974 CVE: CVE-2026-53285 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- [Why] dcn32_validate_bandwidth() wraps dcn32_internal_validate_bw() with DC_FP_START()/DC_FP_END(). In x86 non-RT, DC_FP_START takes fpregs_lock(), which disables local softirqs. The DML1 path through dcn32_enable_phantom_plane() calls kvzalloc() to allocate ~335 KiB for dc_plane_state. This triggers the vmalloc path, which calls BUG_ON(in_interrupt()) because it's invoked within the FPU-enabled (softirq disabled) region, leading to a kernel crash. [How] Wrap the dc_state_create_phantom_plane() call with the DC_RUN_WITH_PREEMPTION_ENABLED() macro to allow preemption during this memory allocation. Fixes: 235c67634230 ("drm/amd/display: add DCN32/321 specific files for Display Core") Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/amd/-/work_items/4470 Reviewed-by: Aurabindo Pillai <aurabindo.pillai(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Mikhail Gavrilov <mikhail.v.gavrilov(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: James Lin <pinglei.lin(a)amd.com> Tested-by: Daniel Wheeler <daniel.wheeler(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher(a)amd.com> (cherry picked from commit 885ccbef7b94a8b38f69c4211c679021aa27ad11) Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Conflicts: drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dcn32/dcn32_resource.c [context conflicts.] Signed-off-by: Jiacheng Yu <yujiacheng3(a)huawei.com> --- .../gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dcn32/dcn32_resource.c | 12 +++++++++++- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dcn32/dcn32_resource.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dcn32/dcn32_resource.c index ab6b4f44f537..3d30608e98e7 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dcn32/dcn32_resource.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dcn32/dcn32_resource.c @@ -89,6 +89,15 @@ #include "dcn20/dcn20_vmid.h" #include "dml/dcn32/dcn32_fpu.h" +#include "dc_state_priv.h" +#include "dc_fpu.h" + +#include "dml2_0/dml2_wrapper.h" + +#if !defined(DC_RUN_WITH_PREEMPTION_ENABLED) +#define DC_RUN_WITH_PREEMPTION_ENABLED(code) code +#endif + #define DC_LOGGER_INIT(logger) enum dcn32_clk_src_array_id { @@ -1643,7 +1652,8 @@ static void dcn32_enable_phantom_plane(struct dc *dc, if (curr_pipe->top_pipe && curr_pipe->top_pipe->plane_state == curr_pipe->plane_state) phantom_plane = prev_phantom_plane; else - phantom_plane = dc_create_plane_state(dc); + DC_RUN_WITH_PREEMPTION_ENABLED(phantom_plane = + dc_create_plane_state(dc)); if (!phantom_plane) continue; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/3] CVE-2026-53358
by Chen Jinghuang 07 Jul '26

07 Jul '26

*** BLURB HERE *** Marco Elver (1): Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix UAF in channel timeout by holding conn ref Siwei Zhang (2): Bluetooth: L2CAP: use chan timer to close channels in cleanup_listen() Bluetooth: L2CAP: fix chan ref leak in l2cap_chan_timeout() on !conn include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h | 1 + net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++-------------- net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c | 16 +++++++++------- 3 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 4

[PATCH OLK-6.6] l2tp: pppol2tp: hold reference to session in pppol2tp_ioctl()
by Gu Bowen 07 Jul '26

07 Jul '26

From: Lee Jones <lee(a)kernel.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.1-rc7 commit a213a8950414c684999dcf03edeea6c46ede172e category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15948 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- pppol2tp_ioctl() read sock->sk->sk_user_data directly without any locks or reference counting. If a controllable sleep was induced during copy_from_user() (e.g. via a userfaultfd page fault sleep), a concurrent socket close could trigger pppol2tp_session_close() asynchronously. This frees the l2tp_session structure via the l2tp_session_del_work workqueue. Upon resuming, the ioctl thread dereferences the stale session pointer, resulting in a Use-After-Free (UAF). Fix this by securely fetching the session reference using the RCU-safe, refcounted helper pppol2tp_sock_to_session(sk) on entry. This locks the session's refcount across the sleep. We structured the function to exit via standard err breaks, guaranteeing that l2tp_session_put() is cleanly called on all return paths to drop the reference. To preserve existing behavior we validate the session and its magic signature only for the specific L2TP commands that require it. This ensures that generic/unknown ioctls called on an unconnected socket still return -ENOIOCTLCMD and correctly fall back to generic handlers (e.g. in sock_do_ioctl()). Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee(a)kernel.org> Fixes: fd558d186df2 ("l2tp: Split pppol2tp patch into separate l2tp and ppp parts") Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260527133630.2120612-1-lee@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c [Function l2tp_session_put() conflicts due to mainline commit abe7a1a7d0b6 ("l2tp: improve tunnel/session refcount helpers") not merge.] Signed-off-by: Gu Bowen <gubowen5(a)huawei.com> --- net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c | 82 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 50 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c index 7ee095e854ae..1bdac5a6fd1e 100644 --- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c +++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c @@ -1055,64 +1055,76 @@ static int pppol2tp_ioctl(struct socket *sock, unsigned int cmd, { struct pppol2tp_ioc_stats stats; struct l2tp_session *session; + int err = 0; + + session = pppol2tp_sock_to_session(sock->sk); + /* Validate session presence and magic integrity ONLY for commands + * that belong to L2TP and require a valid session. + */ switch (cmd) { case PPPIOCGMRU: case PPPIOCGFLAGS: - session = sock->sk->sk_user_data; + case PPPIOCSMRU: + case PPPIOCSFLAGS: + case PPPIOCGL2TPSTATS: if (!session) return -ENOTCONN; - if (WARN_ON(session->magic != L2TP_SESSION_MAGIC)) + if (session->magic != L2TP_SESSION_MAGIC) { + l2tp_session_dec_refcount(session); return -EBADF; + } + break; + default: + break; + } + switch (cmd) { + case PPPIOCGMRU: + case PPPIOCGFLAGS: /* Not defined for tunnels */ - if (!session->session_id && !session->peer_session_id) - return -ENOSYS; + if (!session->session_id && !session->peer_session_id) { + err = -ENOSYS; + break; + } - if (put_user(0, (int __user *)arg)) - return -EFAULT; + if (put_user(0, (int __user *)arg)) { + err = -EFAULT; + break; + } break; case PPPIOCSMRU: case PPPIOCSFLAGS: - session = sock->sk->sk_user_data; - if (!session) - return -ENOTCONN; - - if (WARN_ON(session->magic != L2TP_SESSION_MAGIC)) - return -EBADF; - /* Not defined for tunnels */ - if (!session->session_id && !session->peer_session_id) - return -ENOSYS; + if (!session->session_id && !session->peer_session_id) { + err = -ENOSYS; + break; + } - if (!access_ok((int __user *)arg, sizeof(int))) - return -EFAULT; + if (!access_ok((int __user *)arg, sizeof(int))) { + err = -EFAULT; + break; + } break; case PPPIOCGL2TPSTATS: - session = sock->sk->sk_user_data; - if (!session) - return -ENOTCONN; - - if (WARN_ON(session->magic != L2TP_SESSION_MAGIC)) - return -EBADF; - /* Session 0 represents the parent tunnel */ if (!session->session_id && !session->peer_session_id) { u32 session_id; - int err; if (copy_from_user(&stats, (void __user *)arg, - sizeof(stats))) - return -EFAULT; + sizeof(stats))) { + err = -EFAULT; + break; + } session_id = stats.session_id; err = pppol2tp_tunnel_copy_stats(&stats, session->tunnel); if (err < 0) - return err; + break; stats.session_id = session_id; } else { @@ -1122,15 +1134,21 @@ static int pppol2tp_ioctl(struct socket *sock, unsigned int cmd, stats.tunnel_id = session->tunnel->tunnel_id; stats.using_ipsec = l2tp_tunnel_uses_xfrm(session->tunnel); - if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg, &stats, sizeof(stats))) - return -EFAULT; + if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg, &stats, sizeof(stats))) { + err = -EFAULT; + break; + } break; default: - return -ENOIOCTLCMD; + err = -ENOIOCTLCMD; + break; } - return 0; + if (session) + l2tp_session_dec_refcount(session); + + return err; } /***************************************************************************** -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH 0/3] *** CVE-2026-53358 ***
by Chen Jinghuang 07 Jul '26

07 Jul '26

*** BLURB HERE *** Marco Elver (1): Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix UAF in channel timeout by holding conn ref Siwei Zhang (2): Bluetooth: L2CAP: use chan timer to close channels in cleanup_listen() Bluetooth: L2CAP: fix chan ref leak in l2cap_chan_timeout() on !conn include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h | 1 + net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++-------------- net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c | 16 +++++++++------- 3 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

1 3

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] ext4: validate readdir offset before accessing dirent
by Yao Kai 06 Jul '26

06 Jul '26

Offering: HULK hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/9553 ------------------------ A corrupted directory can trigger the following KASAN report when ext4_readdir() resumes from an invalid position: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __ext4_check_dir_entry+0x5ef/0x820 Read of size 2 at addr ffff88810a646000 by task repro_linear/509 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x53/0x70 print_report+0xd0/0x630 kasan_report+0xce/0x100 __ext4_check_dir_entry+0x5ef/0x820 ext4_readdir+0xcde/0x2b70 iterate_dir+0x1a1/0x520 __x64_sys_getdents64+0x12b/0x220 do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x540 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f </TASK> KASAN reports use-after-free because the out-of-bounds access lands in an adjacent freed page. The directory buffer itself is still referenced. ext4_dir_llseek() invalidates the directory cookie so that ext4_readdir() rescans directory entries from the start of the block. The rescan checks only the lower bound of rec_len before advancing. A corrupted rec_len can therefore place the offset where the block has insufficient space for a complete directory entry. The rescan itself may dereference that truncated entry, or the main loop may pass it to __ext4_check_dir_entry(). The latter reads de->rec_len before validating the range. For example: block offset 0 4092 4096 |---- de1.rec_len = 4092 -----|----| de2.inode | de2.rec_len ^ OOB, reported as UAF de2 starts at offset 4092 in this 4 KiB block. Its four-byte inode fits in the block, but its rec_len starts at offset 4096 and crosses the boundary. The minimum safe length is inode-dependent. Encrypted and casefolded directory entries need eight additional hash bytes, while a valid metadata checksum tail is only 12 bytes. Cache the metadata checksum feature state and derive the minimum directory entry length from the on-disk format. Use it to bound both the rescan and the offset passed to the main loop. Report an offset in a truncated block tail and skip the remainder of the block, while continuing to accept an offset exactly at the block boundary. Reported-by: syzbot+5322c5c260eb44d209ed(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=5322c5c260eb44d209ed Fixes: ac27a0ec112a ("[PATCH] ext4: initial copy of files from ext3") Signed-off-by: Yao Kai <yaokai34(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack(a)suse.cz> Reviewed-by: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang(a)huawei.com> --- fs/ext4/dir.c | 15 ++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/dir.c b/fs/ext4/dir.c index 5def57966807..9c5ff45bfd6b 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/dir.c +++ b/fs/ext4/dir.c @@ -216,7 +216,9 @@ static int ext4_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) * dirent right now. Scan from the start of the block * to make sure. */ if (!inode_eq_iversion(inode, file->f_version)) { - for (i = 0; i < sb->s_blocksize && i < offset; ) { + for (i = 0; + i <= sb->s_blocksize - EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(1) && + i < offset;) { de = (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *) (bh->b_data + i); /* It's too expensive to do a full @@ -237,6 +239,16 @@ static int ext4_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) file->f_version = inode_query_iversion(inode); } + if (unlikely(offset < sb->s_blocksize && + offset > sb->s_blocksize - EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(1))) { + EXT4_ERROR_FILE(file, bh->b_blocknr, + "bad entry in directory: %s - offset=%u, size=%lu", + "directory entry too close to block end", + offset, sb->s_blocksize); + ctx->pos = round_up(ctx->pos, sb->s_blocksize); + goto next_block; + } + while (ctx->pos < inode->i_size && offset < sb->s_blocksize) { de = (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *) (bh->b_data + offset); @@ -282,6 +294,7 @@ static int ext4_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) ctx->pos += ext4_rec_len_from_disk(de->rec_len, sb->s_blocksize); } +next_block: if ((ctx->pos < inode->i_size) && !dir_relax_shared(inode)) goto done; brelse(bh); -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] ext4: validate readdir offset before accessing dirent
by Yao Kai 06 Jul '26

06 Jul '26

Offering: HULK hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/9553 ------------------------ A corrupted directory can trigger the following KASAN report when ext4_readdir() resumes from an invalid position: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __ext4_check_dir_entry+0x5ef/0x820 Read of size 2 at addr ffff88810a646000 by task repro_linear/509 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x53/0x70 print_report+0xd0/0x630 kasan_report+0xce/0x100 __ext4_check_dir_entry+0x5ef/0x820 ext4_readdir+0xcde/0x2b70 iterate_dir+0x1a1/0x520 __x64_sys_getdents64+0x12b/0x220 do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x540 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f </TASK> KASAN reports use-after-free because the out-of-bounds access lands in an adjacent freed page. The directory buffer itself is still referenced. ext4_dir_llseek() invalidates the directory cookie so that ext4_readdir() rescans directory entries from the start of the block. The rescan checks only the lower bound of rec_len before advancing. A corrupted rec_len can therefore place the offset where the block has insufficient space for a complete directory entry. The rescan itself may dereference that truncated entry, or the main loop may pass it to __ext4_check_dir_entry(). The latter reads de->rec_len before validating the range. For example: block offset 0 4092 4096 |---- de1.rec_len = 4092 -----|----| de2.inode | de2.rec_len ^ OOB, reported as UAF de2 starts at offset 4092 in this 4 KiB block. Its four-byte inode fits in the block, but its rec_len starts at offset 4096 and crosses the boundary. The minimum safe length is inode-dependent. Encrypted and casefolded directory entries need eight additional hash bytes, while a valid metadata checksum tail is only 12 bytes. Cache the metadata checksum feature state and derive the minimum directory entry length from the on-disk format. Use it to bound both the rescan and the offset passed to the main loop. Report an offset in a truncated block tail and skip the remainder of the block, while continuing to accept an offset exactly at the block boundary. Reported-by: syzbot+5322c5c260eb44d209ed(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=5322c5c260eb44d209ed Fixes: ac27a0ec112a ("[PATCH] ext4: initial copy of files from ext3") Signed-off-by: Yao Kai <yaokai34(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack(a)suse.cz> Reviewed-by: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang(a)huawei.com> --- fs/ext4/dir.c | 15 ++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/dir.c b/fs/ext4/dir.c index 513360234b14..c2e0b7c9562e 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/dir.c +++ b/fs/ext4/dir.c @@ -219,7 +219,9 @@ static int ext4_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) * dirent right now. Scan from the start of the block * to make sure. */ if (!inode_eq_iversion(inode, file->f_version)) { - for (i = 0; i < sb->s_blocksize && i < offset; ) { + for (i = 0; + i <= sb->s_blocksize - EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(1) && + i < offset;) { de = (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *) (bh->b_data + i); /* It's too expensive to do a full @@ -240,6 +242,16 @@ static int ext4_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) file->f_version = inode_query_iversion(inode); } + if (unlikely(offset < sb->s_blocksize && + offset > sb->s_blocksize - EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(1))) { + EXT4_ERROR_FILE(file, bh->b_blocknr, + "bad entry in directory: %s - offset=%u, size=%lu", + "directory entry too close to block end", + offset, sb->s_blocksize); + ctx->pos = round_up(ctx->pos, sb->s_blocksize); + goto next_block; + } + while (ctx->pos < inode->i_size && offset < sb->s_blocksize) { de = (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *) (bh->b_data + offset); @@ -285,6 +297,7 @@ static int ext4_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) ctx->pos += ext4_rec_len_from_disk(de->rec_len, sb->s_blocksize); } +next_block: if ((ctx->pos < inode->i_size) && !dir_relax_shared(inode)) goto done; brelse(bh); -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] ext4: validate readdir offset before accessing dirent
by Yao Kai 06 Jul '26

06 Jul '26

Offering: HULK hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/9553 ------------------------ A corrupted directory can trigger the following KASAN report when ext4_readdir() resumes from an invalid position: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __ext4_check_dir_entry+0x5ef/0x820 Read of size 2 at addr ffff88810a646000 by task repro_linear/509 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x53/0x70 print_report+0xd0/0x630 kasan_report+0xce/0x100 __ext4_check_dir_entry+0x5ef/0x820 ext4_readdir+0xcde/0x2b70 iterate_dir+0x1a1/0x520 __x64_sys_getdents64+0x12b/0x220 do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x540 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f </TASK> KASAN reports use-after-free because the out-of-bounds access lands in an adjacent freed page. The directory buffer itself is still referenced. ext4_dir_llseek() invalidates the directory cookie so that ext4_readdir() rescans directory entries from the start of the block. The rescan checks only the lower bound of rec_len before advancing. A corrupted rec_len can therefore place the offset where the block has insufficient space for a complete directory entry. The rescan itself may dereference that truncated entry, or the main loop may pass it to __ext4_check_dir_entry(). The latter reads de->rec_len before validating the range. For example: block offset 0 4092 4096 |---- de1.rec_len = 4092 -----|----| de2.inode | de2.rec_len ^ OOB, reported as UAF de2 starts at offset 4092 in this 4 KiB block. Its four-byte inode fits in the block, but its rec_len starts at offset 4096 and crosses the boundary. The minimum safe length is inode-dependent. Encrypted and casefolded directory entries need eight additional hash bytes, while a valid metadata checksum tail is only 12 bytes. Cache the metadata checksum feature state and derive the minimum directory entry length from the on-disk format. Use it to bound both the rescan and the offset passed to the main loop. Report an offset in a truncated block tail and skip the remainder of the block, while continuing to accept an offset exactly at the block boundary. Reported-by: syzbot+5322c5c260eb44d209ed(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=5322c5c260eb44d209ed Fixes: ac27a0ec112a ("[PATCH] ext4: initial copy of files from ext3") Signed-off-by: Yao Kai <yaokai34(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack(a)suse.cz> Reviewed-by: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang(a)huawei.com> --- fs/ext4/dir.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/dir.c b/fs/ext4/dir.c index 6682b8ab11f1..bc53ea82161d 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/dir.c +++ b/fs/ext4/dir.c @@ -136,6 +136,7 @@ static int ext4_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb; struct buffer_head *bh = NULL; struct fscrypt_str fstr = FSTR_INIT(NULL, 0); + bool has_csum = ext4_has_metadata_csum(sb); err = fscrypt_prepare_readdir(inode); if (err) @@ -147,7 +148,7 @@ static int ext4_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) return err; /* Can we just clear INDEX flag to ignore htree information? */ - if (!ext4_has_metadata_csum(sb)) { + if (!has_csum) { /* * We don't set the inode dirty flag since it's not * critical that it gets flushed back to the disk. @@ -233,7 +234,10 @@ static int ext4_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) * dirent right now. Scan from the start of the block * to make sure. */ if (!inode_eq_iversion(inode, file->f_version)) { - for (i = 0; i < sb->s_blocksize && i < offset; ) { + for (i = 0; + i <= sb->s_blocksize - + ext4_dir_rec_len(1, has_csum ? NULL : inode) && + i < offset;) { de = (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *) (bh->b_data + i); /* It's too expensive to do a full @@ -255,6 +259,17 @@ static int ext4_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) file->f_version = inode_query_iversion(inode); } + if (unlikely(offset < sb->s_blocksize && + offset > sb->s_blocksize - + ext4_dir_rec_len(1, has_csum ? NULL : inode))) { + EXT4_ERROR_FILE(file, bh->b_blocknr, + "bad entry in directory: %s - offset=%u, size=%lu", + "directory entry too close to block end", + offset, sb->s_blocksize); + ctx->pos = round_up(ctx->pos, sb->s_blocksize); + goto next_block; + } + while (ctx->pos < inode->i_size && offset < sb->s_blocksize) { de = (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *) (bh->b_data + offset); @@ -310,6 +325,7 @@ static int ext4_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) ctx->pos += ext4_rec_len_from_disk(de->rec_len, sb->s_blocksize); } +next_block: if ((ctx->pos < inode->i_size) && !dir_relax_shared(inode)) goto done; brelse(bh); -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] thunderbolt: Reject zero-length property entries in validator
by Wupeng Ma 06 Jul '26

06 Jul '26

From: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.143 commit 5f56bc6bddffe8710ba0ba8844023b5a44ca90e4 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/16031 CVE: CVE-2026-53150 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit cff8eb65d1eafe7793e54b4d0cf6bf831644630b upstream. tb_property_entry_valid() accepts entries with length == 0 for DIRECTORY, DATA, and TEXT types. A zero-length TEXT entry passes validation but causes an underflow in the null-termination logic: property->value.text[property->length * 4 - 1] = '\0'; When property->length is 0 this writes to offset -1 relative to the allocation. Reject zero-length entries early in the validator since they have no valid representation in the XDomain property protocol. Fixes: cdae7c07e3e3 ("thunderbolt: Add support for XDomain properties") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg(a)linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Wupeng Ma <mawupeng1(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/thunderbolt/property.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/thunderbolt/property.c b/drivers/thunderbolt/property.c index dc555cda98e68..bf750bee23694 100644 --- a/drivers/thunderbolt/property.c +++ b/drivers/thunderbolt/property.c @@ -56,6 +56,8 @@ static bool tb_property_entry_valid(const struct tb_property_entry *entry, case TB_PROPERTY_TYPE_DIRECTORY: case TB_PROPERTY_TYPE_DATA: case TB_PROPERTY_TYPE_TEXT: + if (!entry->length) + return false; if (entry->length > block_len) return false; if (entry->value + entry->length > block_len) -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] sctp: purge outqueue on stale COOKIE-ECHO handling
by Wupeng Ma 06 Jul '26

06 Jul '26

From: Xin Long <lucien.xin(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.143 commit 2afc9e684dc7fecf73db1edc937ebbc47b4b68dc category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15640 CVE: CVE-2026-52924 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit e374b22e9b07b72a25909621464ff74096151bfb ] sctp_stream_update() is only invoked when the association is moved into COOKIE_WAIT during association setup/reconfiguration. In this path, the outbound stream scheduler state (stream->out_curr) is expected to be clean, since no user data should have been transmitted yet unless the state machine has already partially progressed. However, a corner case exists in sctp_sf_do_5_2_6_stale(): when a Stale Cookie ERROR is received, the association is rolled back from COOKIE_ECHOED to COOKIE_WAIT. In this scenario, user data may already have been queued and even bundled with the COOKIE-ECHO chunk. During the rollback, sctp_stream_update() frees the old stream table and installs a new one, but it does not invalidate stream->out_curr. As a result, out_curr may still point to a freed sctp_stream_out entry from the previous stream state. Later, SCTP scheduler dequeue paths (FCFS, RR, PRIO, etc.) rely on stream->out_curr->ext, which can lead to use-after-free once the old stream state has been released via sctp_stream_free(). This results in crashes such as (reported by Yuqi): BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sctp_sched_fcfs_dequeue+0x13a/0x140 Read of size 8 at addr ff1100004d4d3208 by task mini_poc/9312 CPU: 1 UID: 1001 PID: 9312 Comm: mini_poc Not tainted 7.1.0-rc1-00305-gbd3a4795d574 #5 PREEMPT(full) sctp_sched_fcfs_dequeue+0x13a/0x140 sctp_outq_flush+0x1603/0x33e0 sctp_do_sm+0x31c9/0x5d30 sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x392/0x6f0 sctp_inq_push+0x1db/0x270 sctp_rcv+0x138d/0x3c10 Fix this by fully purging the association outqueue when handling the Stale Cookie case. This ensures all pending transmit and retransmit state is dropped, and any scheduler cached pointers are invalidated, making it safe to rebuild stream state during COOKIE_WAIT restart. Updating only stream->out_curr would be insufficient, since queued and retransmittable data would still reference the old stream state and trigger later use-after-free in dequeue paths. Fixes: 5bbbbe32a431 ("sctp: introduce stream scheduler foundations") Reported-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098(a)gmail.com> Reported-by: Yifan Wu <yifanwucs(a)gmail.com> Reported-by: Juefei Pu <tomapufckgml(a)gmail.com> Reported-by: Zhengchuan Liang <zcliangcn(a)gmail.com> Reported-by: Xin Liu <bird(a)lzu.edu.cn> Reported-by: Yuqi Xu <xuyq21(a)lenovo.com> Reported-by: Ren Wei <n05ec(a)lzu.edu.cn> Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin(a)gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/94318159b9052907a6cbb7256aee8b5f8dfbfccb.178051030… Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Wupeng Ma <mawupeng1(a)huawei.com> --- net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c | 6 +----- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c index 5e9449b0c7907..583d83dcb8426 100644 --- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c +++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c @@ -2597,11 +2597,7 @@ static enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_5_2_6_stale( */ sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_DEL_NON_PRIMARY, SCTP_NULL()); - /* If we've sent any data bundled with COOKIE-ECHO we will need to - * resend - */ - sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_T1_RETRAN, - SCTP_TRANSPORT(asoc->peer.primary_path)); + sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_PURGE_OUTQUEUE, SCTP_NULL()); /* Cast away the const modifier, as we want to just * rerun it through as a sideffect. -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] [Backport] gtp: disable BH before calling udp_tunnel_xmit_skb()
by Wupeng Ma 06 Jul '26

06 Jul '26

From: David Carlier <devnexen(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.12.88 commit 0e550caa4bf575a06417de1e2b03a25f2caf88b6 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15772 CVE: CVE-2026-53070 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 5638504a2aa9e1b9d72af9060df1a160cce2d379 ] gtp_genl_send_echo_req() runs as a generic netlink doit handler in process context with BH not disabled. It calls udp_tunnel_xmit_skb(), which eventually invokes iptunnel_xmit() — that uses __this_cpu_inc/dec on softnet_data.xmit.recursion to track the tunnel xmit recursion level. Without local_bh_disable(), the task may migrate between dev_xmit_recursion_inc() and dev_xmit_recursion_dec(), breaking the per-CPU counter pairing. The result is stale or negative recursion levels that can later produce false-positive SKB_DROP_REASON_RECURSION_LIMIT drops on either CPU. The other udp_tunnel_xmit_skb() call sites in gtp.c are unaffected: the data path runs under ndo_start_xmit and the echo response handlers run from the UDP encap rx softirq, both with BH already disabled. Fix it by disabling BH around the udp_tunnel_xmit_skb() call, mirroring commit 2cd7e6971fc2 ("sctp: disable BH before calling udp_tunnel_xmit_skb()"). Fixes: 6f1a9140ecda ("net: add xmit recursion limit to tunnel xmit functions") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: David Carlier <devnexen(a)gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260417055408.4667-1-devnexen@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> [ Context ] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Wupeng Ma <mawupeng1(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/net/gtp.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/gtp.c b/drivers/net/gtp.c index 3684044547dc6..c6fe44be47d9f 100644 --- a/drivers/net/gtp.c +++ b/drivers/net/gtp.c @@ -1809,6 +1809,7 @@ static int gtp_genl_send_echo_req(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info) return -ENODEV; } + local_bh_disable(); udp_tunnel_xmit_skb(rt, sk, skb_to_send, fl4.saddr, fl4.daddr, fl4.flowi4_tos, @@ -1818,6 +1819,7 @@ static int gtp_genl_send_echo_req(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info) !net_eq(sock_net(sk), dev_net(gtp->dev)), false); + local_bh_enable(); return 0; } -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] drm/amd/display: Avoid NULL dereference in dc_dmub_srv error paths
by Jiacheng Yu 06 Jul '26

06 Jul '26

From: Srinivasan Shanmugam <srinivasan.shanmugam(a)amd.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.1-rc1 commit 4ae3e16f4b3bf64140f773629b765d605ee079a9 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/16001 CVE: CVE-2026-53313 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- In dc_dmub_srv_log_diagnostic_data() and dc_dmub_srv_enable_dpia_trace(). Both functions check: if (!dc_dmub_srv || !dc_dmub_srv->dmub) and then call DC_LOG_ERROR() inside that block. DC_LOG_ERROR() uses dc_dmub_srv->ctx internally. So if dc_dmub_srv is NULL, the logging itself can dereference a NULL pointer and cause a crash. Fix this by splitting the checks. First check if dc_dmub_srv is NULL and return immediately. Then check dc_dmub_srv->dmub and log the error only when dc_dmub_srv is valid. Fixes the below: ../display/dc/dc_dmub_srv.c:962 dc_dmub_srv_log_diagnostic_data() error: we previously assumed 'dc_dmub_srv' could be null (see line 961) ../display/dc/dc_dmub_srv.c:1167 dc_dmub_srv_enable_dpia_trace() error: we previously assumed 'dc_dmub_srv' could be null (see line 1166) Fixes: 2631ac1ac328 ("drm/amd/display: add DMUB registers to crash dump diagnostic data.") Fixes: 71ba6b577a35 ("drm/amd/display: Add interface to enable DPIA trace") Cc: Roman Li <roman.li(a)amd.com> Cc: Alex Hung <alex.hung(a)amd.com> Cc: Tom Chung <chiahsuan.chung(a)amd.com> Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter(a)linaro.org> Cc: Aurabindo Pillai <aurabindo.pillai(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Srinivasan Shanmugam <srinivasan.shanmugam(a)amd.com> Reviewed-by: Alex Hung <alex.hung(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Jiacheng Yu <yujiacheng3(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dc_dmub_srv.c | 10 ++++++++-- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dc_dmub_srv.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dc_dmub_srv.c index 8344957d7449..a579366e7698 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dc_dmub_srv.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dc_dmub_srv.c @@ -796,7 +796,10 @@ void dc_dmub_srv_log_diagnostic_data(struct dc_dmub_srv *dc_dmub_srv) { struct dmub_diagnostic_data diag_data = {0}; - if (!dc_dmub_srv || !dc_dmub_srv->dmub) { + if (!dc_dmub_srv) + return; + + if (!dc_dmub_srv->dmub) { DC_LOG_ERROR("%s: invalid parameters.", __func__); return; } @@ -1037,7 +1040,10 @@ void dc_dmub_srv_enable_dpia_trace(const struct dc *dc) enum dmub_status status; static const uint32_t timeout_us = 30; - if (!dc_dmub_srv || !dc_dmub_srv->dmub) { + if (!dc_dmub_srv) + return; + + if (!dc_dmub_srv->dmub) { DC_LOG_ERROR("%s: invalid parameters.", __func__); return; } -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] locking/rtmutex: Skip remove_waiter() when waiter is not enqueued
by Jiacheng Yu 06 Jul '26

06 Jul '26

From: Davidlohr Bueso <dave(a)stgolabs.net> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.1-rc7 commit 40a25d59e85b3c8709ac2424d44f65610467871e category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15848 CVE: CVE-2026-53163 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- syzbot triggered the following splat in remove_waiter() via FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE_PI: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000a88-0x0000000000000a8f] class_raw_spinlock_constructor remove_waiter+0x159/0x1200 kernel/locking/rtmutex.c:1561 rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock+0x103/0x120 futex_requeue+0x10e4/0x20d0 __x64_sys_futex+0x34f/0x4d0 task_blocks_on_rt_mutex() does not arm the waiter upon deadlock detection, leaving waiter->task nil, where 3bfdc63936dd ("rtmutex: Use waiter::task instead of current in remove_waiter()") made this fatal. Furthermore, rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock() should not be calling into remove_waiter() upon a successfully grabbing the rtmutex. 1a1fb985f2e2 ("futex: Handle early deadlock return correctly"), moved the remove_waiter() out of __rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock() (where 'ret' was only ever 0 or < 0) into the wrapper. Tighten this check to account for try_to_take_rt_mutex(). Fixes: 3bfdc63936dd ("rtmutex: Use waiter::task instead of current in remove_waiter()") Reported-by: syzbot+78147abe6c524f183ee9(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave(a)stgolabs.net> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)kernel.org> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/69f114ac.050a0220.ac8b.0003.GAE@google.com/ Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260507112913.1019537-1-dave@stgolabs.net Conflicts: kernel/locking/rtmutex_api.c [context conflicts.] Signed-off-by: Jiacheng Yu <yujiacheng3(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/locking/rtmutex.c | 3 +++ kernel/locking/rtmutex_api.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/locking/rtmutex.c b/kernel/locking/rtmutex.c index def1f8fbc85c..6df2f674712a 100644 --- a/kernel/locking/rtmutex.c +++ b/kernel/locking/rtmutex.c @@ -1524,6 +1524,9 @@ static void __sched remove_waiter(struct rt_mutex_base *lock, lockdep_assert_held(&lock->wait_lock); + if (!waiter_task) /* never enqueued */ + return; + scoped_guard(raw_spinlock, &waiter_task->pi_lock) { rt_mutex_dequeue(lock, waiter); waiter_task->pi_blocked_on = NULL; diff --git a/kernel/locking/rtmutex_api.c b/kernel/locking/rtmutex_api.c index d0433287effd..74b24ecdbeea 100644 --- a/kernel/locking/rtmutex_api.c +++ b/kernel/locking/rtmutex_api.c @@ -344,7 +344,7 @@ int __sched rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock(struct rt_mutex_base *lock, raw_spin_lock_irq(&lock->wait_lock); ret = __rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock(lock, waiter, task); - if (unlikely(ret)) + if (unlikely(ret < 0)) remove_waiter(lock, waiter); raw_spin_unlock_irq(&lock->wait_lock); -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] locking/rtmutex: Skip remove_waiter() when waiter is not enqueued
by Jiacheng Yu 06 Jul '26

06 Jul '26

From: Davidlohr Bueso <dave(a)stgolabs.net> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.1-rc7 commit 40a25d59e85b3c8709ac2424d44f65610467871e category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15848 CVE: CVE-2026-53163 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- syzbot triggered the following splat in remove_waiter() via FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE_PI: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000a88-0x0000000000000a8f] class_raw_spinlock_constructor remove_waiter+0x159/0x1200 kernel/locking/rtmutex.c:1561 rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock+0x103/0x120 futex_requeue+0x10e4/0x20d0 __x64_sys_futex+0x34f/0x4d0 task_blocks_on_rt_mutex() does not arm the waiter upon deadlock detection, leaving waiter->task nil, where 3bfdc63936dd ("rtmutex: Use waiter::task instead of current in remove_waiter()") made this fatal. Furthermore, rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock() should not be calling into remove_waiter() upon a successfully grabbing the rtmutex. 1a1fb985f2e2 ("futex: Handle early deadlock return correctly"), moved the remove_waiter() out of __rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock() (where 'ret' was only ever 0 or < 0) into the wrapper. Tighten this check to account for try_to_take_rt_mutex(). Fixes: 3bfdc63936dd ("rtmutex: Use waiter::task instead of current in remove_waiter()") Reported-by: syzbot+78147abe6c524f183ee9(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave(a)stgolabs.net> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)kernel.org> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/69f114ac.050a0220.ac8b.0003.GAE@google.com/ Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260507112913.1019537-1-dave@stgolabs.net Conflicts: kernel/locking/rtmutex.c kernel/locking/rtmutex_api.c [context conflicts.] Signed-off-by: Jiacheng Yu <yujiacheng3(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/locking/rtmutex.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/locking/rtmutex.c b/kernel/locking/rtmutex.c index 109a9e21b4e1..fb41115bfa99 100644 --- a/kernel/locking/rtmutex.c +++ b/kernel/locking/rtmutex.c @@ -1113,6 +1113,9 @@ static void remove_waiter(struct rt_mutex *lock, lockdep_assert_held(&lock->wait_lock); + if (!waiter_task) /* never enqueued */ + return; + raw_spin_lock(&waiter_task->pi_lock); rt_mutex_dequeue(lock, waiter); waiter_task->pi_blocked_on = NULL; @@ -1842,7 +1845,7 @@ int rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock(struct rt_mutex *lock, raw_spin_lock_irq(&lock->wait_lock); ret = __rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock(lock, waiter, task); - if (unlikely(ret)) + if (unlikely(ret < 0)) remove_waiter(lock, waiter); raw_spin_unlock_irq(&lock->wait_lock); -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] drm/virtio: Fix driver removal with disabled KMS
by Fanhua Li 06 Jul '26

06 Jul '26

From: Dmitry Osipenko <dmitry.osipenko(a)collabora.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.143 commit ed3e134700a2e07caa99b9bc0683ebbe0327c562 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/16056 CVE: CVE-2026-53347 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit f329e8325e054bd6d84d10904f8dd51137281b92 ] DRM atomic and modesetting aren't initialized if virtio-gpu driver built with disabled KMS, leading to access of uninitialized data on driver removal/unbinding and crashing kernel. Fix it by skipping shutting down atomic core with unavailable KMS. Fixes: 72122c69d717 ("drm/virtio: Add option to disable KMS support") Signed-off-by: Dmitry Osipenko <dmitry.osipenko(a)collabora.com> Tested-by: Ryosuke Yasuoka <ryasuoka(a)redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Ryosuke Yasuoka <ryasuoka(a)redhat.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260604122743.13383-1-dmitry.osipenko@collabora.c… Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: drivers/gpu/drm/virtio/virtgpu_drv.c [Fanhua Li: context conflict] Signed-off-by: Fanhua Li <lifanhua5(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/gpu/drm/virtio/virtgpu_drv.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/virtio/virtgpu_drv.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/virtio/virtgpu_drv.c index c6a62ad6c1a92..c9054e51c859b 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/virtio/virtgpu_drv.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/virtio/virtgpu_drv.c @@ -118,7 +118,10 @@ static void virtio_gpu_remove(struct virtio_device *vdev) struct drm_device *dev = vdev->priv; drm_dev_unplug(dev); - drm_atomic_helper_shutdown(dev); + + if (drm_core_check_feature(dev, DRIVER_ATOMIC)) + drm_atomic_helper_shutdown(dev); + virtio_gpu_deinit(dev); drm_dev_put(dev); } -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] drm/virtio: Fix driver removal with disabled KMS
by Fanhua Li 06 Jul '26

06 Jul '26

From: Dmitry Osipenko <dmitry.osipenko(a)collabora.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.143 commit ed3e134700a2e07caa99b9bc0683ebbe0327c562 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/16056 CVE: CVE-2026-53347 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit f329e8325e054bd6d84d10904f8dd51137281b92 ] DRM atomic and modesetting aren't initialized if virtio-gpu driver built with disabled KMS, leading to access of uninitialized data on driver removal/unbinding and crashing kernel. Fix it by skipping shutting down atomic core with unavailable KMS. Fixes: 72122c69d717 ("drm/virtio: Add option to disable KMS support") Signed-off-by: Dmitry Osipenko <dmitry.osipenko(a)collabora.com> Tested-by: Ryosuke Yasuoka <ryasuoka(a)redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Ryosuke Yasuoka <ryasuoka(a)redhat.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260604122743.13383-1-dmitry.osipenko@collabora.c… Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Fanhua Li <lifanhua5(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/gpu/drm/virtio/virtgpu_drv.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/virtio/virtgpu_drv.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/virtio/virtgpu_drv.c index c6a62ad6c1a92..c9054e51c859b 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/virtio/virtgpu_drv.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/virtio/virtgpu_drv.c @@ -118,7 +118,10 @@ static void virtio_gpu_remove(struct virtio_device *vdev) struct drm_device *dev = vdev->priv; drm_dev_unplug(dev); - drm_atomic_helper_shutdown(dev); + + if (drm_core_check_feature(dev, DRIVER_ATOMIC)) + drm_atomic_helper_shutdown(dev); + virtio_gpu_deinit(dev); drm_dev_put(dev); } -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10 v2] netfilter: nf_conntrack: destroy stale expectfn expectations
by superdcc97＠163.com 06 Jul '26

06 Jul '26

From: Weiming Shi <bestswngs(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.2-rc1 commit c3009418f9fa1dcb3eb86f4d8c92583537b5faa3 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/16058 CVE: CVE-2026-53349 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- NAT helpers such as nf_nat_h323 store a raw pointer to module text in exp->expectfn (e.g. ip_nat_q931_expect). nf_ct_helper_expectfn_unregister() only unlinks the callback descriptor and never walks the expectation table, so an expectation pending at module removal survives with a dangling exp->expectfn into freed module text. When the expected connection arrives, init_conntrack() invokes exp->expectfn(), now a stale pointer into the unloaded module. Reproduced on a KASAN build by loading the H.323 helpers, creating a Q.931 expectation, unloading nf_nat_h323, then connecting to the expected port: Oops: int3: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI RIP: 0010:0xffffffffa06102d1 init_conntrack.isra.0 (net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c:1862) nf_conntrack_in (net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c:2049) ipv4_conntrack_local (net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto.c:223) nf_hook_slow (net/netfilter/core.c:619) __ip_local_out (net/ipv4/ip_output.c:120) __tcp_transmit_skb (net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:1715) tcp_connect (net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:4374) tcp_v4_connect (net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:345) __sys_connect (net/socket.c:2167) Modules linked in: nf_conntrack_h323 [last unloaded: nf_nat_h323] Reaching the dangling state requires CAP_SYS_MODULE in the initial user namespace to remove a NAT helper that still has live expectations, so this is a robustness fix; leaving an expectation pointing at freed text is wrong regardless. Add nf_ct_helper_expectfn_destroy(), which walks the expectation table and drops every expectation whose ->expectfn matches the descriptor being torn down. Call it from each NAT helper's exit path after the existing RCU grace period, so no expectation outlives the code it points at and no extra synchronize_rcu() is introduced. With the fix, the same reproducer runs to completion without the Oops. Fixes: f587de0e2feb ("[NETFILTER]: nf_conntrack/nf_nat: add H.323 helper port") Reported-by: Xiang Mei <xmei5(a)asu.edu> Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8 Signed-off-by: Weiming Shi <bestswngs(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> Conflicts: net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_h323.c net/netfilter/nf_nat_core.c [commit cbc1dd5b659f is not backport] Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_helper.h | 1 + net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_h323.c | 2 ++ net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_helper.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ net/netfilter/nf_nat_core.c | 2 ++ net/netfilter/nf_nat_sip.c | 1 + 5 files changed, 25 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_helper.h b/include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_helper.h index 37f0fbefb060..3932f09f8801 100644 --- a/include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_helper.h +++ b/include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_helper.h @@ -152,6 +152,7 @@ void nf_ct_helper_log(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct, void nf_ct_helper_expectfn_register(struct nf_ct_helper_expectfn *n); void nf_ct_helper_expectfn_unregister(struct nf_ct_helper_expectfn *n); +void nf_ct_helper_expectfn_destroy(const struct nf_ct_helper_expectfn *n); struct nf_ct_helper_expectfn * nf_ct_helper_expectfn_find_by_name(const char *name); struct nf_ct_helper_expectfn * diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_h323.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_h323.c index 3e2685c120c7..d028cbae11e8 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_h323.c +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_h323.c @@ -621,6 +621,8 @@ static void __exit fini(void) nf_ct_helper_expectfn_unregister(&q931_nat); nf_ct_helper_expectfn_unregister(&callforwarding_nat); synchronize_rcu(); + nf_ct_helper_expectfn_destroy(&q931_nat); + nf_ct_helper_expectfn_destroy(&callforwarding_nat); } /****************************************************************************/ diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_helper.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_helper.c index 862a782ec931..24a945cfb2e8 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_helper.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_helper.c @@ -332,6 +332,25 @@ void nf_ct_helper_expectfn_unregister(struct nf_ct_helper_expectfn *n) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nf_ct_helper_expectfn_unregister); +static bool expect_iter_expectfn(struct nf_conntrack_expect *exp, void *data) +{ + const struct nf_ct_helper_expectfn *n = data; + + /* Relies on registered expectfn descriptors having unique ->expectfn + * pointers, which holds for the in-tree NAT helpers. + */ + return exp->expectfn == n->expectfn; +} + +/* Destroy expectations still pointing at @n->expectfn; call after the + * caller's RCU grace period so none outlives the (often modular) callback. + */ +void nf_ct_helper_expectfn_destroy(const struct nf_ct_helper_expectfn *n) +{ + nf_ct_expect_iterate_destroy(expect_iter_expectfn, (void *)n); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nf_ct_helper_expectfn_destroy); + /* Caller should hold the rcu lock */ struct nf_ct_helper_expectfn * nf_ct_helper_expectfn_find_by_name(const char *name) diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_nat_core.c b/net/netfilter/nf_nat_core.c index b7c3c902290f..ddc2b59ff43c 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_nat_core.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_nat_core.c @@ -1179,6 +1179,7 @@ static int __init nf_nat_init(void) } nf_ct_helper_expectfn_register(&follow_master_nat); + nf_ct_helper_expectfn_destroy(&follow_master_nat); WARN_ON(nf_nat_hook != NULL); RCU_INIT_POINTER(nf_nat_hook, &nat_hook); @@ -1197,6 +1198,7 @@ static void __exit nf_nat_cleanup(void) RCU_INIT_POINTER(nf_nat_hook, NULL); synchronize_net(); + nf_ct_helper_expectfn_destroy(&follow_master_nat); kvfree(nf_nat_bysource); unregister_pernet_subsys(&nat_net_ops); } diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_nat_sip.c b/net/netfilter/nf_nat_sip.c index 390ff2d3c6bc..80afbff649be 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_nat_sip.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_nat_sip.c @@ -667,6 +667,7 @@ static void __exit nf_nat_sip_fini(void) RCU_INIT_POINTER(nf_nat_sip_hooks, NULL); nf_ct_helper_expectfn_unregister(&sip_nat); synchronize_rcu(); + nf_ct_helper_expectfn_destroy(&sip_nat); } static const struct nf_nat_sip_hooks sip_hooks = { -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] vdpa: use generic driver_override infrastructure
by Lin Ruifeng 06 Jul '26

06 Jul '26

From: Danilo Krummrich <dakr(a)kernel.org> stable inclusion from stable-v6.18.33 commit 654ef9c33e138ede6734ac286282df9faf83cd11 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15815 CVE: CVE-2026-53118 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 85bb534ff12aab6916058897b39c748940a7a4c6 ] When a driver is probed through __driver_attach(), the bus' match() callback is called without the device lock held, thus accessing the driver_override field without a lock, which can cause a UAF. Fix this by using the driver-core driver_override infrastructure taking care of proper locking internally. Note that calling match() from __driver_attach() without the device lock held is intentional. [1] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/driver-core/DGRGTIRHA62X.3RY09D9SOK77P@kernel.org/ [1] Reported-by: Gui-Dong Han <hanguidong02(a)gmail.com> Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=220789 Fixes: 539fec78edb4 ("vdpa: add driver_override support") Acked-by: Eugenio Pérez <eperezma(a)redhat.com> Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst(a)redhat.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260324005919.2408620-9-dakr@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich <dakr(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: drivers/vdpa/vdpa.c include/linux/vdpa.h [Context Conflicts] Signed-off-by: Lin Ruifeng <linruifeng4(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/vdpa/vdpa.c | 70 ++++---------------------------------------- include/linux/vdpa.h | 2 -- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 67 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/vdpa/vdpa.c b/drivers/vdpa/vdpa.c index 5c9e37061fce..2c68dad26c56 100644 --- a/drivers/vdpa/vdpa.c +++ b/drivers/vdpa/vdpa.c @@ -64,79 +64,20 @@ static int vdpa_dev_remove(struct device *d) static int vdpa_dev_match(struct device *dev, struct device_driver *drv) { - struct vdpa_device *vdev = dev_to_vdpa(dev); + int ret; /* Check override first, and if set, only use the named driver */ - if (vdev->driver_override) - return strcmp(vdev->driver_override, drv->name) == 0; + ret = device_match_driver_override(dev, drv); + if (ret >= 0) + return ret; /* Currently devices must be supported by all vDPA bus drivers */ return 1; } -static ssize_t driver_override_store(struct device *dev, - struct device_attribute *attr, - const char *buf, size_t count) -{ - struct vdpa_device *vdev = dev_to_vdpa(dev); - const char *driver_override, *old; - char *cp; - - /* We need to keep extra room for a newline */ - if (count >= (PAGE_SIZE - 1)) - return -EINVAL; - - driver_override = kstrndup(buf, count, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!driver_override) - return -ENOMEM; - - cp = strchr(driver_override, '\n'); - if (cp) - *cp = '\0'; - - device_lock(dev); - old = vdev->driver_override; - if (strlen(driver_override)) { - vdev->driver_override = driver_override; - } else { - kfree(driver_override); - vdev->driver_override = NULL; - } - device_unlock(dev); - - kfree(old); - - return count; -} - -static ssize_t driver_override_show(struct device *dev, - struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) -{ - struct vdpa_device *vdev = dev_to_vdpa(dev); - ssize_t len; - - device_lock(dev); - len = snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%s\n", vdev->driver_override); - device_unlock(dev); - - return len; -} -static DEVICE_ATTR_RW(driver_override); - -static struct attribute *vdpa_dev_attrs[] = { - &dev_attr_driver_override.attr, - NULL, -}; - -static const struct attribute_group vdpa_dev_group = { - .attrs = vdpa_dev_attrs, -}; -__ATTRIBUTE_GROUPS(vdpa_dev); - - static struct bus_type vdpa_bus = { .name = "vdpa", - .dev_groups = vdpa_dev_groups, + .driver_override = true, .match = vdpa_dev_match, .probe = vdpa_dev_probe, .remove = vdpa_dev_remove, @@ -151,7 +92,6 @@ static void vdpa_release_dev(struct device *d) ops->free(vdev); ida_simple_remove(&vdpa_index_ida, vdev->index); - kfree(vdev->driver_override); kfree(vdev); } diff --git a/include/linux/vdpa.h b/include/linux/vdpa.h index ef53829c7a7a..825b88740eb1 100644 --- a/include/linux/vdpa.h +++ b/include/linux/vdpa.h @@ -64,7 +64,6 @@ struct vdpa_mgmt_dev; * struct vdpa_device - representation of a vDPA device * @dev: underlying device * @dma_dev: the actual device that is performing DMA - * @driver_override: driver name to force a match * @config: the configuration ops for this device. * @cf_lock: Protects get and set access to configuration layout. * @index: device index @@ -79,7 +78,6 @@ struct vdpa_mgmt_dev; struct vdpa_device { struct device dev; struct device *dma_dev; - const char *driver_override; const struct vdpa_config_ops *config; struct rw_semaphore cf_lock; /* Protects get/set config */ unsigned int index; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] netfilter: nf_conntrack: destroy stale expectfn expectations
by superdcc97＠163.com 06 Jul '26

06 Jul '26

From: Weiming Shi <bestswngs(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.2-rc1 commit c3009418f9fa1dcb3eb86f4d8c92583537b5faa3 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/16058 CVE: CVE-2026-53349 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- NAT helpers such as nf_nat_h323 store a raw pointer to module text in exp->expectfn (e.g. ip_nat_q931_expect). nf_ct_helper_expectfn_unregister() only unlinks the callback descriptor and never walks the expectation table, so an expectation pending at module removal survives with a dangling exp->expectfn into freed module text. When the expected connection arrives, init_conntrack() invokes exp->expectfn(), now a stale pointer into the unloaded module. Reproduced on a KASAN build by loading the H.323 helpers, creating a Q.931 expectation, unloading nf_nat_h323, then connecting to the expected port: Oops: int3: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI RIP: 0010:0xffffffffa06102d1 init_conntrack.isra.0 (net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c:1862) nf_conntrack_in (net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c:2049) ipv4_conntrack_local (net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto.c:223) nf_hook_slow (net/netfilter/core.c:619) __ip_local_out (net/ipv4/ip_output.c:120) __tcp_transmit_skb (net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:1715) tcp_connect (net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:4374) tcp_v4_connect (net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:345) __sys_connect (net/socket.c:2167) Modules linked in: nf_conntrack_h323 [last unloaded: nf_nat_h323] Reaching the dangling state requires CAP_SYS_MODULE in the initial user namespace to remove a NAT helper that still has live expectations, so this is a robustness fix; leaving an expectation pointing at freed text is wrong regardless. Add nf_ct_helper_expectfn_destroy(), which walks the expectation table and drops every expectation whose ->expectfn matches the descriptor being torn down. Call it from each NAT helper's exit path after the existing RCU grace period, so no expectation outlives the code it points at and no extra synchronize_rcu() is introduced. With the fix, the same reproducer runs to completion without the Oops. Fixes: f587de0e2feb ("[NETFILTER]: nf_conntrack/nf_nat: add H.323 helper port") Reported-by: Xiang Mei <xmei5(a)asu.edu> Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8 Signed-off-by: Weiming Shi <bestswngs(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> Conflicts: net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_h323.c net/netfilter/nf_nat_core.c [context differs on OLK-5.10] Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_helper.h | 1 + net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_h323.c | 2 ++ net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_helper.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ net/netfilter/nf_nat_core.c | 2 ++ net/netfilter/nf_nat_sip.c | 1 + 5 files changed, 25 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_helper.h b/include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_helper.h index 37f0fbefb060..3932f09f8801 100644 --- a/include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_helper.h +++ b/include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_helper.h @@ -152,6 +152,7 @@ void nf_ct_helper_log(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct, void nf_ct_helper_expectfn_register(struct nf_ct_helper_expectfn *n); void nf_ct_helper_expectfn_unregister(struct nf_ct_helper_expectfn *n); +void nf_ct_helper_expectfn_destroy(const struct nf_ct_helper_expectfn *n); struct nf_ct_helper_expectfn * nf_ct_helper_expectfn_find_by_name(const char *name); struct nf_ct_helper_expectfn * diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_h323.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_h323.c index 3e2685c120c7..d028cbae11e8 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_h323.c +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_h323.c @@ -621,6 +621,8 @@ static void __exit fini(void) nf_ct_helper_expectfn_unregister(&q931_nat); nf_ct_helper_expectfn_unregister(&callforwarding_nat); synchronize_rcu(); + nf_ct_helper_expectfn_destroy(&q931_nat); + nf_ct_helper_expectfn_destroy(&callforwarding_nat); } /****************************************************************************/ diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_helper.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_helper.c index 862a782ec931..24a945cfb2e8 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_helper.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_helper.c @@ -332,6 +332,25 @@ void nf_ct_helper_expectfn_unregister(struct nf_ct_helper_expectfn *n) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nf_ct_helper_expectfn_unregister); +static bool expect_iter_expectfn(struct nf_conntrack_expect *exp, void *data) +{ + const struct nf_ct_helper_expectfn *n = data; + + /* Relies on registered expectfn descriptors having unique ->expectfn + * pointers, which holds for the in-tree NAT helpers. + */ + return exp->expectfn == n->expectfn; +} + +/* Destroy expectations still pointing at @n->expectfn; call after the + * caller's RCU grace period so none outlives the (often modular) callback. + */ +void nf_ct_helper_expectfn_destroy(const struct nf_ct_helper_expectfn *n) +{ + nf_ct_expect_iterate_destroy(expect_iter_expectfn, (void *)n); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nf_ct_helper_expectfn_destroy); + /* Caller should hold the rcu lock */ struct nf_ct_helper_expectfn * nf_ct_helper_expectfn_find_by_name(const char *name) diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_nat_core.c b/net/netfilter/nf_nat_core.c index b7c3c902290f..62356dcd694b 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_nat_core.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_nat_core.c @@ -1341,6 +1341,7 @@ static int __init nf_nat_init(void) RCU_INIT_POINTER(nf_nat_hook, NULL); nf_ct_helper_expectfn_unregister(&follow_master_nat); synchronize_net(); + nf_ct_helper_expectfn_destroy(&follow_master_nat); unregister_pernet_subsys(&nat_net_ops); kvfree(nf_nat_bysource); } @@ -1358,6 +1359,7 @@ static void __exit nf_nat_cleanup(void) RCU_INIT_POINTER(nf_nat_hook, NULL); synchronize_net(); + nf_ct_helper_expectfn_destroy(&follow_master_nat); kvfree(nf_nat_bysource); unregister_pernet_subsys(&nat_net_ops); } diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_nat_sip.c b/net/netfilter/nf_nat_sip.c index 15d4267cf49f..71e75a751c09 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_nat_sip.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_nat_sip.c @@ -666,6 +666,7 @@ static void __exit nf_nat_sip_fini(void) RCU_INIT_POINTER(nf_nat_sip_hooks, NULL); nf_ct_helper_expectfn_unregister(&sip_nat); synchronize_rcu(); + nf_ct_helper_expectfn_destroy(&sip_nat); } static const struct nf_nat_sip_hooks sip_hooks = { -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] drm/amd/display: Fix NULL deref and buffer over-read in SDP debugfs
by Hongtao Zhang 06 Jul '26

06 Jul '26

From: Harry Wentland <harry.wentland(a)amd.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.143 commit 7fc4fab4acc307ad2903312c195872b2953d32c3 category: bugfix bugzilla: 15829 CVE: CVE-2026-53135 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit adf67034b1f61f7119295208085bfd43f85f56af upstream. [Why & How] dp_sdp_message_debugfs_write() dereferences connector->base.state->crtc without checking for NULL. A connector can be connected but not bound to any CRTC (e.g. after hot-plug before the next atomic commit), causing a kernel crash when writing to the sdp_message debugfs node. The function also ignores the user-provided size argument and always passes 36 bytes to copy_from_user(), reading past the user buffer when size < 36. Fix both issues by: - Returning -ENODEV when connector->base.state or state->crtc is NULL - Clamping write_size to min(size, sizeof(data)) Fixes: c7ba3653e977 ("drm/amd/display: Generic SDP message access in amdgpu") Assisted-by: Copilot:claude-opus-4.6 Reviewed-by: Alex Hung <alex.hung(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Harry Wentland <harry.wentland(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Ray Wu <ray.wu(a)amd.com> Tested-by: Daniel Wheeler <daniel.wheeler(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher(a)amd.com> (cherry picked from commit 6ab4c36a522842ff70474a1c0af2e40e50fc8300) Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Zhang Hongtao <zhanghongtao35(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm_debugfs.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm_debugfs.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm_debugfs.c index c8609595f324b..4b8101bf62e9d 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm_debugfs.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm_debugfs.c @@ -1230,8 +1230,13 @@ static ssize_t dp_sdp_message_debugfs_write(struct file *f, const char __user *b if (size == 0) return 0; + if (!connector->base.state || !connector->base.state->crtc) + return -ENODEV; + acrtc_state = to_dm_crtc_state(connector->base.state->crtc->state); + write_size = min_t(size_t, size, sizeof(data)); + r = copy_from_user(data, buf, write_size); write_size -= r; -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] drm/amd/display: Fix NULL deref and buffer over-read in SDP debugfs
by Hongtao Zhang 06 Jul '26

06 Jul '26

From: Harry Wentland <harry.wentland(a)amd.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.259 commit ee9cfcf77a8e8af637396dc00966df5f701e661c category: bugfix bugzilla: 15829 CVE: CVE-2026-53135 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit adf67034b1f61f7119295208085bfd43f85f56af upstream. [Why & How] dp_sdp_message_debugfs_write() dereferences connector->base.state->crtc without checking for NULL. A connector can be connected but not bound to any CRTC (e.g. after hot-plug before the next atomic commit), causing a kernel crash when writing to the sdp_message debugfs node. The function also ignores the user-provided size argument and always passes 36 bytes to copy_from_user(), reading past the user buffer when size < 36. Fix both issues by: - Returning -ENODEV when connector->base.state or state->crtc is NULL - Clamping write_size to min(size, sizeof(data)) Fixes: c7ba3653e977 ("drm/amd/display: Generic SDP message access in amdgpu") Assisted-by: Copilot:claude-opus-4.6 Reviewed-by: Alex Hung <alex.hung(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Harry Wentland <harry.wentland(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Ray Wu <ray.wu(a)amd.com> Tested-by: Daniel Wheeler <daniel.wheeler(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher(a)amd.com> (cherry picked from commit 6ab4c36a522842ff70474a1c0af2e40e50fc8300) Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Zhang Hongtao <zhanghongtao35(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm_debugfs.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm_debugfs.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm_debugfs.c index f4a1ad8959b7d..8b27ccae62b34 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm_debugfs.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm_debugfs.c @@ -895,8 +895,13 @@ static ssize_t dp_sdp_message_debugfs_write(struct file *f, const char __user *b if (size == 0) return 0; + if (!connector->base.state || !connector->base.state->crtc) + return -ENODEV; + acrtc_state = to_dm_crtc_state(connector->base.state->crtc->state); + write_size = min_t(size_t, size, sizeof(data)); + r = copy_from_user(data, buf, write_size); write_size -= r; -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] drm/amd/display: Fix out-of-bounds read in dp_get_eq_aux_rd_interval()
by Hongtao Zhang 06 Jul '26

06 Jul '26

From: Harry Wentland <harry.wentland(a)amd.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.1-rc7 commit e8b4d37eba05141ee01794fc6b7f2da808cee83b category: bugfix bugzilla: 16039 CVE: CVE-2026-53330 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [Why & How] The aux_rd_interval array in struct dc_lttpr_caps is declared with MAX_REPEATER_CNT - 1 (7) elements, indexed 0..6. However, the offset parameter passed to dp_get_eq_aux_rd_interval() can be as large as MAX_REPEATER_CNT (8) when a sink reports 8 LTTPR repeaters via DPCD. This leads to an out-of-bounds read of aux_rd_interval[7] when offset is 8. Fix this by growing aux_rd_interval to MAX_REPEATER_CNT elements to accommodate the full range of valid repeater counts defined by the DP spec. Assisted-by: GitHub Copilot:Claude claude-4-opus Signed-off-by: Harry Wentland <harry.wentland(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Ray Wu <ray.wu(a)amd.com> Tested-by: Daniel Wheeler <daniel.wheeler(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher(a)amd.com> (cherry picked from commit a55a458a8df37a65ffda5cf721d554a8f74f6b04) Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Conflicts: drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dc_dp_types.h [conflicts due to not mergered de84d580126eb ("drm/amd/display: Read LTTPR ALPM caps during link cap retrieval")] Signed-off-by: Zhang Hongtao <zhanghongtao35(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dc_dp_types.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dc_dp_types.h b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dc_dp_types.h index 83719f5bea495..f834c0fa3b17c 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dc_dp_types.h +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dc_dp_types.h @@ -1156,7 +1156,7 @@ struct dc_lttpr_caps { uint8_t max_ext_timeout; union dp_main_link_channel_coding_lttpr_cap main_link_channel_coding; union dp_128b_132b_supported_lttpr_link_rates supported_128b_132b_rates; - uint8_t aux_rd_interval[MAX_REPEATER_CNT - 1]; + uint8_t aux_rd_interval[MAX_REPEATER_CNT]; }; struct dc_dongle_dfp_cap_ext { -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] RDMA/srp: bound SRP_RSP sense copy by the received length
by Chen Jinghuang 06 Jul '26

06 Jul '26

From: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.259 commit 3889517c2ec7f364914aea8209abfff735f7ecde category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15871 CVE: CVE-2026-53186 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 13e91fd076306f5d0cdfa14f53d69e37274723c4 upstream. srp_process_rsp() copies sense data from rsp->data + resp_data_len, where resp_data_len is the full 32-bit value supplied by the SRP target and is never checked against the number of bytes actually received (wc->byte_len). The copy length is bounded to SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE, so at most 96 bytes are copied, but the source offset is not bounded. A malicious or compromised SRP target on the InfiniBand/RoCE fabric that the initiator has logged into can return an SRP_RSP with SRP_RSP_FLAG_SNSVALID set and a large resp_data_len. The receive buffer is allocated at the target-chosen max_ti_iu_len, so the source of the sense copy lands past the bytes actually received; with resp_data_len near 0xFFFFFFFF it is gigabytes past the buffer and the read faults. Copy the sense data only if it has not been truncated, that is, only if the response header, the response data, and the sense region fit within the bytes actually received; otherwise drop the sense and log. The in-tree iSER and NVMe-RDMA receive paths already bound their parse by wc->byte_len; this brings ib_srp into line with them. Fixes: aef9ec39c47f ("IB: Add SCSI RDMA Protocol (SRP) initiator") Link: https://patch.msgid.link/r/20260602220457.2542840-1-michael.bommarito@gmail… Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8 Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche(a)acm.org> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg(a)nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Conflicts: drivers/infiniband/ulp/srp/ib_srp.c [Fix type-mismatch build error using min_t for explicit casting and kernel safety.] Signed-off-by: Chen Jinghuang <chenjinghuang2(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/infiniband/ulp/srp/ib_srp.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/ulp/srp/ib_srp.c b/drivers/infiniband/ulp/srp/ib_srp.c index 68df080263f2..2348555cb041 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/ulp/srp/ib_srp.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/ulp/srp/ib_srp.c @@ -1929,7 +1929,8 @@ static int srp_post_recv(struct srp_rdma_ch *ch, struct srp_iu *iu) return ib_post_recv(ch->qp, &wr, NULL); } -static void srp_process_rsp(struct srp_rdma_ch *ch, struct srp_rsp *rsp) +static void srp_process_rsp(struct srp_rdma_ch *ch, struct srp_rsp *rsp, + u32 byte_len) { struct srp_target_port *target = ch->target; struct srp_request *req; @@ -1970,10 +1971,27 @@ static void srp_process_rsp(struct srp_rdma_ch *ch, struct srp_rsp *rsp) scmnd->result = rsp->status; if (rsp->flags & SRP_RSP_FLAG_SNSVALID) { - memcpy(scmnd->sense_buffer, rsp->data + - be32_to_cpu(rsp->resp_data_len), - min_t(int, be32_to_cpu(rsp->sense_data_len), - SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE)); + u32 resp_len = be32_to_cpu(rsp->resp_data_len); + u32 sense_len = be32_to_cpu(rsp->sense_data_len); + + /* + * The sense data starts resp_data_len bytes past the + * response data area; both lengths come from the + * target-controlled response. Copy the sense data + * only if it has not been truncated, that is, only if + * the full sense region fits within the bytes actually + * received. Otherwise the copy source would run past + * the receive buffer (sized to the target-chosen + * max_ti_iu_len), reading out of bounds. + */ + if (sizeof(*rsp) + (u64)resp_len + sense_len <= byte_len) + memcpy(scmnd->sense_buffer, + rsp->data + resp_len, + min_t(u32, sense_len, SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE)); + else + shost_printk(KERN_ERR, target->scsi_host, + "dropping truncated sense data (resp_data_len %u sense_data_len %u, %u bytes received)\n", + resp_len, sense_len, byte_len); } if (unlikely(rsp->flags & SRP_RSP_FLAG_DIUNDER)) @@ -2083,7 +2101,7 @@ static void srp_recv_done(struct ib_cq *cq, struct ib_wc *wc) switch (opcode) { case SRP_RSP: - srp_process_rsp(ch, iu->buf); + srp_process_rsp(ch, iu->buf, wc->byte_len); break; case SRP_CRED_REQ: -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] vdpa: use generic driver_override infrastructure
by Lin Ruifeng 06 Jul '26

06 Jul '26

From: Danilo Krummrich <dakr(a)kernel.org> stable inclusion from stable-v6.18.33 commit 654ef9c33e138ede6734ac286282df9faf83cd11 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15815 CVE: CVE-2026-53118 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 85bb534ff12aab6916058897b39c748940a7a4c6 ] When a driver is probed through __driver_attach(), the bus' match() callback is called without the device lock held, thus accessing the driver_override field without a lock, which can cause a UAF. Fix this by using the driver-core driver_override infrastructure taking care of proper locking internally. Note that calling match() from __driver_attach() without the device lock held is intentional. [1] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/driver-core/DGRGTIRHA62X.3RY09D9SOK77P@kernel.org/ [1] Reported-by: Gui-Dong Han <hanguidong02(a)gmail.com> Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=220789 Fixes: 539fec78edb4 ("vdpa: add driver_override support") Acked-by: Eugenio Pérez <eperezma(a)redhat.com> Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst(a)redhat.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260324005919.2408620-9-dakr@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich <dakr(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: drivers/vdpa/vdpa.c include/linux/vdpa.h [Context Conflicts] Signed-off-by: Lin Ruifeng <linruifeng4(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/vdpa/vdpa.c | 69 ++++---------------------------------------- include/linux/vdpa.h | 2 -- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 66 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/vdpa/vdpa.c b/drivers/vdpa/vdpa.c index 5c9e37061fce..021daa026990 100644 --- a/drivers/vdpa/vdpa.c +++ b/drivers/vdpa/vdpa.c @@ -65,78 +65,20 @@ static int vdpa_dev_remove(struct device *d) static int vdpa_dev_match(struct device *dev, struct device_driver *drv) { struct vdpa_device *vdev = dev_to_vdpa(dev); + int ret; /* Check override first, and if set, only use the named driver */ - if (vdev->driver_override) - return strcmp(vdev->driver_override, drv->name) == 0; + ret = device_match_driver_override(dev, drv); + if (ret >= 0) + return ret; /* Currently devices must be supported by all vDPA bus drivers */ return 1; } -static ssize_t driver_override_store(struct device *dev, - struct device_attribute *attr, - const char *buf, size_t count) -{ - struct vdpa_device *vdev = dev_to_vdpa(dev); - const char *driver_override, *old; - char *cp; - - /* We need to keep extra room for a newline */ - if (count >= (PAGE_SIZE - 1)) - return -EINVAL; - - driver_override = kstrndup(buf, count, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!driver_override) - return -ENOMEM; - - cp = strchr(driver_override, '\n'); - if (cp) - *cp = '\0'; - - device_lock(dev); - old = vdev->driver_override; - if (strlen(driver_override)) { - vdev->driver_override = driver_override; - } else { - kfree(driver_override); - vdev->driver_override = NULL; - } - device_unlock(dev); - - kfree(old); - - return count; -} - -static ssize_t driver_override_show(struct device *dev, - struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) -{ - struct vdpa_device *vdev = dev_to_vdpa(dev); - ssize_t len; - - device_lock(dev); - len = snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%s\n", vdev->driver_override); - device_unlock(dev); - - return len; -} -static DEVICE_ATTR_RW(driver_override); - -static struct attribute *vdpa_dev_attrs[] = { - &dev_attr_driver_override.attr, - NULL, -}; - -static const struct attribute_group vdpa_dev_group = { - .attrs = vdpa_dev_attrs, -}; -__ATTRIBUTE_GROUPS(vdpa_dev); - - static struct bus_type vdpa_bus = { .name = "vdpa", - .dev_groups = vdpa_dev_groups, + .driver_override = true, .match = vdpa_dev_match, .probe = vdpa_dev_probe, .remove = vdpa_dev_remove, @@ -151,7 +93,6 @@ static void vdpa_release_dev(struct device *d) ops->free(vdev); ida_simple_remove(&vdpa_index_ida, vdev->index); - kfree(vdev->driver_override); kfree(vdev); } diff --git a/include/linux/vdpa.h b/include/linux/vdpa.h index ef53829c7a7a..825b88740eb1 100644 --- a/include/linux/vdpa.h +++ b/include/linux/vdpa.h @@ -64,7 +64,6 @@ struct vdpa_mgmt_dev; * struct vdpa_device - representation of a vDPA device * @dev: underlying device * @dma_dev: the actual device that is performing DMA - * @driver_override: driver name to force a match * @config: the configuration ops for this device. * @cf_lock: Protects get and set access to configuration layout. * @index: device index @@ -79,7 +78,6 @@ struct vdpa_mgmt_dev; struct vdpa_device { struct device dev; struct device *dma_dev; - const char *driver_override; const struct vdpa_config_ops *config; struct rw_semaphore cf_lock; /* Protects get/set config */ unsigned int index; -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/3] CVE-2026-53084 and CVE-2026-53085
by Pu Lehui 05 Jul '26

05 Jul '26

Puranjay Mohan (3): bpf: fix mm lifecycle in open-coded task_vma iterator bpf: switch task_vma iterator from mmap_lock to per-VMA locks bpf: return VMA snapshot from task_vma iterator kernel/bpf/task_iter.c | 151 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 136 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/3] CVE-2026-53084
by Pu Lehui 05 Jul '26

05 Jul '26

Puranjay Mohan (3): bpf: fix mm lifecycle in open-coded task_vma iterator bpf: switch task_vma iterator from mmap_lock to per-VMA locks bpf: return VMA snapshot from task_vma iterator kernel/bpf/task_iter.c | 151 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 136 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

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