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[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP2] net: hsr: remove WARN_ONCE() in send_hsr_supervision_frame()
by Guo Mengqi 15 May '24

15 May '24

From: Nikita Zhandarovich <n.zhandarovich(a)fintech.ru> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.210 commit 0d8011a878fdf96123bc0d6a12e2fe7ced5fddfb category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9E2FK Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 37e8c97e539015637cb920d3e6f1e404f707a06e upstream. Syzkaller reported [1] hitting a warning after failing to allocate resources for skb in hsr_init_skb(). Since a WARN_ONCE() call will not help much in this case, it might be prudent to switch to netdev_warn_once(). At the very least it will suppress syzkaller reports such as [1]. Just in case, use netdev_warn_once() in send_prp_supervision_frame() for similar reasons. [1] HSR: Could not send supervision frame WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 85 at net/hsr/hsr_device.c:294 send_hsr_supervision_frame+0x60a/0x810 net/hsr/hsr_device.c:294 RIP: 0010:send_hsr_supervision_frame+0x60a/0x810 net/hsr/hsr_device.c:294 ... Call Trace: <IRQ> hsr_announce+0x114/0x370 net/hsr/hsr_device.c:382 call_timer_fn+0x193/0x590 kernel/time/timer.c:1700 expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1751 [inline] __run_timers+0x764/0xb20 kernel/time/timer.c:2022 run_timer_softirq+0x58/0xd0 kernel/time/timer.c:2035 __do_softirq+0x21a/0x8de kernel/softirq.c:553 invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:427 [inline] __irq_exit_rcu kernel/softirq.c:632 [inline] irq_exit_rcu+0xb7/0x120 kernel/softirq.c:644 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x95/0xb0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1076 </IRQ> <TASK> asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:649 ... This issue is also found in older kernels (at least up to 5.10). Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: syzbot+3ae0a3f42c84074b7c8e(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 121c33b07b31 ("net: hsr: introduce common code for skb initialization") Signed-off-by: Nikita Zhandarovich <n.zhandarovich(a)fintech.ru> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Wang Hai <wanghai38(a)huawei.com> --- net/hsr/hsr_device.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/hsr/hsr_device.c b/net/hsr/hsr_device.c index 84e6ef4f3525..c5a4c5fb7293 100644 --- a/net/hsr/hsr_device.c +++ b/net/hsr/hsr_device.c @@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ static void send_hsr_supervision_frame(struct hsr_port *master, skb = hsr_init_skb(master); if (!skb) { - WARN_ONCE(1, "HSR: Could not send supervision frame\n"); + netdev_warn_once(master->dev, "HSR: Could not send supervision frame\n"); return; } @@ -338,7 +338,7 @@ static void send_prp_supervision_frame(struct hsr_port *master, skb = hsr_init_skb(master); if (!skb) { - WARN_ONCE(1, "PRP: Could not send supervision frame\n"); + netdev_warn_once(master->dev, "PRP: Could not send supervision frame\n"); return; } -- 2.17.1

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[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP2] powerpc/kasan: Fix addr error caused by page alignment
by Guo Mengqi 15 May '24

15 May '24

From: Jiangfeng Xiao <xiaojiangfeng(a)huawei.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.8-rc5 commit 4a7aee96200ad281a5cc4cf5c7a2e2a49d2b97b0 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9E2FQ Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- In kasan_init_region, when k_start is not page aligned, at the begin of for loop, k_cur = k_start & PAGE_MASK is less than k_start, and then `va = block + k_cur - k_start` is less than block, the addr va is invalid, because the memory address space from va to block is not alloced by memblock_alloc, which will not be reserved by memblock_reserve later, it will be used by other places. As a result, memory overwriting occurs. for example: int __init __weak kasan_init_region(void *start, size_t size) { [...] /* if say block(dcd97000) k_start(feef7400) k_end(feeff3fe) */ block = memblock_alloc(k_end - k_start, PAGE_SIZE); [...] for (k_cur = k_start & PAGE_MASK; k_cur < k_end; k_cur += PAGE_SIZE) { /* at the begin of for loop * block(dcd97000) va(dcd96c00) k_cur(feef7000) k_start(feef7400) * va(dcd96c00) is less than block(dcd97000), va is invalid */ void *va = block + k_cur - k_start; [...] } [...] } Therefore, page alignment is performed on k_start before memblock_alloc() to ensure the validity of the VA address. Fixes: 663c0c9496a6 ("powerpc/kasan: Fix shadow area set up for modules.") Signed-off-by: Jiangfeng Xiao <xiaojiangfeng(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe(a)ellerman.id.au> Link: https://msgid.link/1705974359-43790-1-git-send-email-xiaojiangfeng@huawei.c… Signed-off-by: Jiangfeng Xiao <xiaojiangfeng(a)huawei.com> --- arch/powerpc/mm/kasan/kasan_init_32.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/mm/kasan/kasan_init_32.c b/arch/powerpc/mm/kasan/kasan_init_32.c index f3e4d069e0ba..643fc525897d 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/mm/kasan/kasan_init_32.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/mm/kasan/kasan_init_32.c @@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ int __init __weak kasan_init_region(void *start, size_t size) if (ret) return ret; + k_start = k_start & PAGE_MASK; block = memblock_alloc(k_end - k_start, PAGE_SIZE); if (!block) return -ENOMEM; -- 2.17.1

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[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] powerpc/kasan: Fix addr error caused by page alignment
by Guo Mengqi 15 May '24

15 May '24

From: Jiangfeng Xiao <xiaojiangfeng(a)huawei.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.8-rc5 commit 4a7aee96200ad281a5cc4cf5c7a2e2a49d2b97b0 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9E2FQ Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- In kasan_init_region, when k_start is not page aligned, at the begin of for loop, k_cur = k_start & PAGE_MASK is less than k_start, and then `va = block + k_cur - k_start` is less than block, the addr va is invalid, because the memory address space from va to block is not alloced by memblock_alloc, which will not be reserved by memblock_reserve later, it will be used by other places. As a result, memory overwriting occurs. for example: int __init __weak kasan_init_region(void *start, size_t size) { [...] /* if say block(dcd97000) k_start(feef7400) k_end(feeff3fe) */ block = memblock_alloc(k_end - k_start, PAGE_SIZE); [...] for (k_cur = k_start & PAGE_MASK; k_cur < k_end; k_cur += PAGE_SIZE) { /* at the begin of for loop * block(dcd97000) va(dcd96c00) k_cur(feef7000) k_start(feef7400) * va(dcd96c00) is less than block(dcd97000), va is invalid */ void *va = block + k_cur - k_start; [...] } [...] } Therefore, page alignment is performed on k_start before memblock_alloc() to ensure the validity of the VA address. Fixes: 663c0c9496a6 ("powerpc/kasan: Fix shadow area set up for modules.") Signed-off-by: Jiangfeng Xiao <xiaojiangfeng(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe(a)ellerman.id.au> Link: https://msgid.link/1705974359-43790-1-git-send-email-xiaojiangfeng@huawei.c… Signed-off-by: Jiangfeng Xiao <xiaojiangfeng(a)huawei.com> --- arch/powerpc/mm/kasan/kasan_init_32.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/mm/kasan/kasan_init_32.c b/arch/powerpc/mm/kasan/kasan_init_32.c index f3e4d069e0ba..643fc525897d 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/mm/kasan/kasan_init_32.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/mm/kasan/kasan_init_32.c @@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ int __init __weak kasan_init_region(void *start, size_t size) if (ret) return ret; + k_start = k_start & PAGE_MASK; block = memblock_alloc(k_end - k_start, PAGE_SIZE); if (!block) return -ENOMEM; -- 2.17.1

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[PATCH OLK-5.10] powerpc/kasan: Fix addr error caused by page alignment
by Guo Mengqi 15 May '24

15 May '24

From: Jiangfeng Xiao <xiaojiangfeng(a)huawei.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.8-rc5 commit 4a7aee96200ad281a5cc4cf5c7a2e2a49d2b97b0 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9E2FQ Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- In kasan_init_region, when k_start is not page aligned, at the begin of for loop, k_cur = k_start & PAGE_MASK is less than k_start, and then `va = block + k_cur - k_start` is less than block, the addr va is invalid, because the memory address space from va to block is not alloced by memblock_alloc, which will not be reserved by memblock_reserve later, it will be used by other places. As a result, memory overwriting occurs. for example: int __init __weak kasan_init_region(void *start, size_t size) { [...] /* if say block(dcd97000) k_start(feef7400) k_end(feeff3fe) */ block = memblock_alloc(k_end - k_start, PAGE_SIZE); [...] for (k_cur = k_start & PAGE_MASK; k_cur < k_end; k_cur += PAGE_SIZE) { /* at the begin of for loop * block(dcd97000) va(dcd96c00) k_cur(feef7000) k_start(feef7400) * va(dcd96c00) is less than block(dcd97000), va is invalid */ void *va = block + k_cur - k_start; [...] } [...] } Therefore, page alignment is performed on k_start before memblock_alloc() to ensure the validity of the VA address. Fixes: 663c0c9496a6 ("powerpc/kasan: Fix shadow area set up for modules.") Signed-off-by: Jiangfeng Xiao <xiaojiangfeng(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe(a)ellerman.id.au> Link: https://msgid.link/1705974359-43790-1-git-send-email-xiaojiangfeng@huawei.c… Signed-off-by: Jiangfeng Xiao <xiaojiangfeng(a)huawei.com> --- arch/powerpc/mm/kasan/kasan_init_32.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/mm/kasan/kasan_init_32.c b/arch/powerpc/mm/kasan/kasan_init_32.c index f3e4d069e0ba..643fc525897d 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/mm/kasan/kasan_init_32.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/mm/kasan/kasan_init_32.c @@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ int __init __weak kasan_init_region(void *start, size_t size) if (ret) return ret; + k_start = k_start & PAGE_MASK; block = memblock_alloc(k_end - k_start, PAGE_SIZE); if (!block) return -ENOMEM; -- 2.17.1

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[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS] powerpc/kasan: Fix addr error caused by page alignment
by Guo Mengqi 15 May '24

15 May '24

From: Jiangfeng Xiao <xiaojiangfeng(a)huawei.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.8-rc5 commit 4a7aee96200ad281a5cc4cf5c7a2e2a49d2b97b0 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9E2FQ Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- In kasan_init_region, when k_start is not page aligned, at the begin of for loop, k_cur = k_start & PAGE_MASK is less than k_start, and then `va = block + k_cur - k_start` is less than block, the addr va is invalid, because the memory address space from va to block is not alloced by memblock_alloc, which will not be reserved by memblock_reserve later, it will be used by other places. As a result, memory overwriting occurs. for example: int __init __weak kasan_init_region(void *start, size_t size) { [...] /* if say block(dcd97000) k_start(feef7400) k_end(feeff3fe) */ block = memblock_alloc(k_end - k_start, PAGE_SIZE); [...] for (k_cur = k_start & PAGE_MASK; k_cur < k_end; k_cur += PAGE_SIZE) { /* at the begin of for loop * block(dcd97000) va(dcd96c00) k_cur(feef7000) k_start(feef7400) * va(dcd96c00) is less than block(dcd97000), va is invalid */ void *va = block + k_cur - k_start; [...] } [...] } Therefore, page alignment is performed on k_start before memblock_alloc() to ensure the validity of the VA address. Fixes: 663c0c9496a6 ("powerpc/kasan: Fix shadow area set up for modules.") Signed-off-by: Jiangfeng Xiao <xiaojiangfeng(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe(a)ellerman.id.au> Link: https://msgid.link/1705974359-43790-1-git-send-email-xiaojiangfeng@huawei.c… Signed-off-by: Jiangfeng Xiao <xiaojiangfeng(a)huawei.com> --- arch/powerpc/mm/kasan/kasan_init_32.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/mm/kasan/kasan_init_32.c b/arch/powerpc/mm/kasan/kasan_init_32.c index f3e4d069e0ba..643fc525897d 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/mm/kasan/kasan_init_32.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/mm/kasan/kasan_init_32.c @@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ int __init __weak kasan_init_region(void *start, size_t size) if (ret) return ret; + k_start = k_start & PAGE_MASK; block = memblock_alloc(k_end - k_start, PAGE_SIZE); if (!block) return -ENOMEM; -- 2.17.1

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[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] KVM: s390: vsie: fix race during shadow creation
by Guo Mengqi 15 May '24

15 May '24

From: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger(a)linux.ibm.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.1.82 commit 5df3b81a567eb565029563f26f374ae3803a1dfc category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9E2GQ CVE: CVE-2023-52639 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit fe752331d4b361d43cfd0b89534b4b2176057c32 ] Right now it is possible to see gmap->private being zero in kvm_s390_vsie_gmap_notifier resulting in a crash. This is due to the fact that we add gmap->private == kvm after creation: static int acquire_gmap_shadow(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vsie_page *vsie_page) { [...] gmap = gmap_shadow(vcpu->arch.gmap, asce, edat); if (IS_ERR(gmap)) return PTR_ERR(gmap); gmap->private = vcpu->kvm; Let children inherit the private field of the parent. Reported-by: Marc Hartmayer <mhartmay(a)linux.ibm.com> Fixes: a3508fbe9dc6 ("KVM: s390: vsie: initial support for nested virtualization") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <frankja(a)linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda(a)linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger(a)linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231220125317.4258-1-borntraeger@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> conflicts: arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c Signed-off-by: Cui GaoSheng <cuigaosheng1(a)huawei.com> --- arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c | 1 - arch/s390/mm/gmap.c | 1 + 2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c b/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c index 3fbf7081c000..ebfc4386d140 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c +++ b/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c @@ -1197,7 +1197,6 @@ static int acquire_gmap_shadow(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gmap = gmap_shadow(vcpu->arch.gmap, asce, edat); if (IS_ERR(gmap)) return PTR_ERR(gmap); - gmap->private = vcpu->kvm; WRITE_ONCE(vsie_page->gmap, gmap); return 0; } diff --git a/arch/s390/mm/gmap.c b/arch/s390/mm/gmap.c index 03e561608eed..ac74cb6206a1 100644 --- a/arch/s390/mm/gmap.c +++ b/arch/s390/mm/gmap.c @@ -1663,6 +1663,7 @@ struct gmap *gmap_shadow(struct gmap *parent, unsigned long asce, return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); new->mm = parent->mm; new->parent = gmap_get(parent); + new->private = parent->private; new->orig_asce = asce; new->edat_level = edat_level; new->initialized = false; -- 2.17.1

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[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP2] KVM: s390: vsie: fix race during shadow creation
by Guo Mengqi 15 May '24

15 May '24

From: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger(a)linux.ibm.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.1.82 commit 5df3b81a567eb565029563f26f374ae3803a1dfc category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9E2GQ CVE: CVE-2023-52639 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit fe752331d4b361d43cfd0b89534b4b2176057c32 ] Right now it is possible to see gmap->private being zero in kvm_s390_vsie_gmap_notifier resulting in a crash. This is due to the fact that we add gmap->private == kvm after creation: static int acquire_gmap_shadow(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vsie_page *vsie_page) { [...] gmap = gmap_shadow(vcpu->arch.gmap, asce, edat); if (IS_ERR(gmap)) return PTR_ERR(gmap); gmap->private = vcpu->kvm; Let children inherit the private field of the parent. Reported-by: Marc Hartmayer <mhartmay(a)linux.ibm.com> Fixes: a3508fbe9dc6 ("KVM: s390: vsie: initial support for nested virtualization") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <frankja(a)linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda(a)linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger(a)linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231220125317.4258-1-borntraeger@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> conflicts: arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c Signed-off-by: Cui GaoSheng <cuigaosheng1(a)huawei.com> --- arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c | 1 - arch/s390/mm/gmap.c | 1 + 2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c b/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c index ff58decfef5e..359659d6684d 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c +++ b/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c @@ -1199,7 +1199,6 @@ static int acquire_gmap_shadow(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gmap = gmap_shadow(vcpu->arch.gmap, asce, edat); if (IS_ERR(gmap)) return PTR_ERR(gmap); - gmap->private = vcpu->kvm; WRITE_ONCE(vsie_page->gmap, gmap); return 0; } diff --git a/arch/s390/mm/gmap.c b/arch/s390/mm/gmap.c index 0ba3af22bfe5..9168dfe7a767 100644 --- a/arch/s390/mm/gmap.c +++ b/arch/s390/mm/gmap.c @@ -1663,6 +1663,7 @@ struct gmap *gmap_shadow(struct gmap *parent, unsigned long asce, return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); new->mm = parent->mm; new->parent = gmap_get(parent); + new->private = parent->private; new->orig_asce = asce; new->edat_level = edat_level; new->initialized = false; -- 2.17.1

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[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS] KVM: s390: vsie: fix race during shadow creation
by Guo Mengqi 15 May '24

15 May '24

From: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger(a)linux.ibm.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.1.82 commit 5df3b81a567eb565029563f26f374ae3803a1dfc category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9E2GQ CVE: CVE-2023-52639 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit fe752331d4b361d43cfd0b89534b4b2176057c32 ] Right now it is possible to see gmap->private being zero in kvm_s390_vsie_gmap_notifier resulting in a crash. This is due to the fact that we add gmap->private == kvm after creation: static int acquire_gmap_shadow(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vsie_page *vsie_page) { [...] gmap = gmap_shadow(vcpu->arch.gmap, asce, edat); if (IS_ERR(gmap)) return PTR_ERR(gmap); gmap->private = vcpu->kvm; Let children inherit the private field of the parent. Reported-by: Marc Hartmayer <mhartmay(a)linux.ibm.com> Fixes: a3508fbe9dc6 ("KVM: s390: vsie: initial support for nested virtualization") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <frankja(a)linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda(a)linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger(a)linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231220125317.4258-1-borntraeger@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> conflicts: arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c Signed-off-by: Cui GaoSheng <cuigaosheng1(a)huawei.com> --- arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c | 1 - arch/s390/mm/gmap.c | 1 + 2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c b/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c index 3fbf7081c000..ebfc4386d140 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c +++ b/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c @@ -1197,7 +1197,6 @@ static int acquire_gmap_shadow(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gmap = gmap_shadow(vcpu->arch.gmap, asce, edat); if (IS_ERR(gmap)) return PTR_ERR(gmap); - gmap->private = vcpu->kvm; WRITE_ONCE(vsie_page->gmap, gmap); return 0; } diff --git a/arch/s390/mm/gmap.c b/arch/s390/mm/gmap.c index 03e561608eed..ac74cb6206a1 100644 --- a/arch/s390/mm/gmap.c +++ b/arch/s390/mm/gmap.c @@ -1663,6 +1663,7 @@ struct gmap *gmap_shadow(struct gmap *parent, unsigned long asce, return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); new->mm = parent->mm; new->parent = gmap_get(parent); + new->private = parent->private; new->orig_asce = asce; new->edat_level = edat_level; new->initialized = false; -- 2.17.1

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[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP2] RDMA/mlx5: Fix fortify source warning while accessing Eth segment
by Guo Mengqi 15 May '24

15 May '24

From: Leon Romanovsky <leonro(a)nvidia.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.214 commit d27c48dc309da72c3b46351a1205d89687272baa category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9HK6L CVE: CVE-2024-26907 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 4d5e86a56615cc387d21c629f9af8fb0e958d350 ] ------------[ cut here ]------------ memcpy: detected field-spanning write (size 56) of single field "eseg->inline_hdr.start" at /var/lib/dkms/mlnx-ofed-kernel/5.8/build/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/wr.c:131 (size 2) WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 293779 at /var/lib/dkms/mlnx-ofed-kernel/5.8/build/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/wr.c:131 mlx5_ib_post_send+0x191b/0x1a60 [mlx5_ib] Modules linked in: 8021q garp mrp stp llc rdma_ucm(OE) rdma_cm(OE) iw_cm(OE) ib_ipoib(OE) ib_cm(OE) ib_umad(OE) mlx5_ib(OE) ib_uverbs(OE) ib_core(OE) mlx5_core(OE) pci_hyperv_intf mlxdevm(OE) mlx_compat(OE) tls mlxfw(OE) psample nft_fib_inet nft_fib_ipv4 nft_fib_ipv6 nft_fib nft_reject_inet nf_reject_ipv4 nf_reject_ipv6 nft_reject nft_ct nft_chain_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 ip_set nf_tables libcrc32c nfnetlink mst_pciconf(OE) knem(OE) vfio_pci vfio_pci_core vfio_iommu_type1 vfio iommufd irqbypass cuse nfsv3 nfs fscache netfs xfrm_user xfrm_algo ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler binfmt_misc crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul polyval_clmulni polyval_generic ghash_clmulni_intel sha512_ssse3 snd_pcsp aesni_intel crypto_simd cryptd snd_pcm snd_timer joydev snd soundcore input_leds serio_raw evbug nfsd auth_rpcgss nfs_acl lockd grace sch_fq_codel sunrpc drm efi_pstore ip_tables x_tables autofs4 psmouse virtio_net net_failover failover floppy [last unloaded: mlx_compat(OE)] CPU: 0 PID: 293779 Comm: ssh Tainted: G OE 6.2.0-32-generic #32~22.04.1-Ubuntu Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:mlx5_ib_post_send+0x191b/0x1a60 [mlx5_ib] Code: 0c 01 00 a8 01 75 25 48 8b 75 a0 b9 02 00 00 00 48 c7 c2 10 5b fd c0 48 c7 c7 80 5b fd c0 c6 05 57 0c 03 00 01 e8 95 4d 93 da <0f> 0b 44 8b 4d b0 4c 8b 45 c8 48 8b 4d c0 e9 49 fb ff ff 41 0f b7 RSP: 0018:ffffb5b48478b570 EFLAGS: 00010046 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffffb5b48478b628 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffb5b48478b5e8 R13: ffff963a3c609b5e R14: ffff9639c3fbd800 R15: ffffb5b480475a80 FS: 00007fc03b444c80(0000) GS:ffff963a3dc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000556f46bdf000 CR3: 0000000006ac6003 CR4: 00000000003706f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> ? show_regs+0x72/0x90 ? mlx5_ib_post_send+0x191b/0x1a60 [mlx5_ib] ? __warn+0x8d/0x160 ? mlx5_ib_post_send+0x191b/0x1a60 [mlx5_ib] ? report_bug+0x1bb/0x1d0 ? handle_bug+0x46/0x90 ? exc_invalid_op+0x19/0x80 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1b/0x20 ? mlx5_ib_post_send+0x191b/0x1a60 [mlx5_ib] mlx5_ib_post_send_nodrain+0xb/0x20 [mlx5_ib] ipoib_send+0x2ec/0x770 [ib_ipoib] ipoib_start_xmit+0x5a0/0x770 [ib_ipoib] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x8e/0x1e0 ? validate_xmit_skb_list+0x4d/0x80 sch_direct_xmit+0x116/0x3a0 __dev_xmit_skb+0x1fd/0x580 __dev_queue_xmit+0x284/0x6b0 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0xe/0x50 ? __flush_work.isra.0+0x20d/0x370 ? push_pseudo_header+0x17/0x40 [ib_ipoib] neigh_connected_output+0xcd/0x110 ip_finish_output2+0x179/0x480 ? __smp_call_single_queue+0x61/0xa0 __ip_finish_output+0xc3/0x190 ip_finish_output+0x2e/0xf0 ip_output+0x78/0x110 ? __pfx_ip_finish_output+0x10/0x10 ip_local_out+0x64/0x70 __ip_queue_xmit+0x18a/0x460 ip_queue_xmit+0x15/0x30 __tcp_transmit_skb+0x914/0x9c0 tcp_write_xmit+0x334/0x8d0 tcp_push_one+0x3c/0x60 tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x2e1/0xac0 tcp_sendmsg+0x2d/0x50 inet_sendmsg+0x43/0x90 sock_sendmsg+0x68/0x80 sock_write_iter+0x93/0x100 vfs_write+0x326/0x3c0 ksys_write+0xbd/0xf0 ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x90 __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x59/0x90 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x1d0/0x640 ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x3b/0xd0 ? irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0x9/0x20 ? irqentry_exit+0x43/0x50 ? exc_page_fault+0x92/0x1b0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc RIP: 0033:0x7fc03ad14a37 Code: 10 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b7 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 51 c3 48 83 ec 28 48 89 54 24 18 48 89 74 24 RSP: 002b:00007ffdf8697fe8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000008024 RCX: 00007fc03ad14a37 RDX: 0000000000008024 RSI: 0000556f46bd8270 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 0000556f46bb1800 R08: 0000000000007fe3 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000002 R13: 0000556f46bc66b0 R14: 000000000000000a R15: 0000556f46bb2f50 </TASK> ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/8228ad34bd1a25047586270f7b1fb4ddcd046282.17064339… Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro(a)nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/wr.c | 2 +- include/linux/mlx5/qp.h | 5 ++++- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/wr.c b/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/wr.c index d6038fb6c50c..19fd440a6ce3 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/wr.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/wr.c @@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ static void set_eth_seg(const struct ib_send_wr *wr, struct mlx5_ib_qp *qp, */ copysz = min_t(u64, *cur_edge - (void *)eseg->inline_hdr.start, left); - memcpy(eseg->inline_hdr.start, pdata, copysz); + memcpy(eseg->inline_hdr.data, pdata, copysz); stride = ALIGN(sizeof(struct mlx5_wqe_eth_seg) - sizeof(eseg->inline_hdr.start) + copysz, 16); *size += stride / 16; diff --git a/include/linux/mlx5/qp.h b/include/linux/mlx5/qp.h index d75ef8aa8fac..28d44061d670 100644 --- a/include/linux/mlx5/qp.h +++ b/include/linux/mlx5/qp.h @@ -261,7 +261,10 @@ struct mlx5_wqe_eth_seg { union { struct { __be16 sz; - u8 start[2]; + union { + u8 start[2]; + DECLARE_FLEX_ARRAY(u8, data); + }; } inline_hdr; struct { __be16 type; -- 2.17.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] RDMA/mlx5: Fix fortify source warning while accessing Eth segment
by Guo Mengqi 15 May '24

15 May '24

From: Leon Romanovsky <leonro(a)nvidia.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.214 commit d27c48dc309da72c3b46351a1205d89687272baa category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9HK6L CVE: CVE-2024-26907 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 4d5e86a56615cc387d21c629f9af8fb0e958d350 ] ------------[ cut here ]------------ memcpy: detected field-spanning write (size 56) of single field "eseg->inline_hdr.start" at /var/lib/dkms/mlnx-ofed-kernel/5.8/build/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/wr.c:131 (size 2) WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 293779 at /var/lib/dkms/mlnx-ofed-kernel/5.8/build/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/wr.c:131 mlx5_ib_post_send+0x191b/0x1a60 [mlx5_ib] Modules linked in: 8021q garp mrp stp llc rdma_ucm(OE) rdma_cm(OE) iw_cm(OE) ib_ipoib(OE) ib_cm(OE) ib_umad(OE) mlx5_ib(OE) ib_uverbs(OE) ib_core(OE) mlx5_core(OE) pci_hyperv_intf mlxdevm(OE) mlx_compat(OE) tls mlxfw(OE) psample nft_fib_inet nft_fib_ipv4 nft_fib_ipv6 nft_fib nft_reject_inet nf_reject_ipv4 nf_reject_ipv6 nft_reject nft_ct nft_chain_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 ip_set nf_tables libcrc32c nfnetlink mst_pciconf(OE) knem(OE) vfio_pci vfio_pci_core vfio_iommu_type1 vfio iommufd irqbypass cuse nfsv3 nfs fscache netfs xfrm_user xfrm_algo ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler binfmt_misc crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul polyval_clmulni polyval_generic ghash_clmulni_intel sha512_ssse3 snd_pcsp aesni_intel crypto_simd cryptd snd_pcm snd_timer joydev snd soundcore input_leds serio_raw evbug nfsd auth_rpcgss nfs_acl lockd grace sch_fq_codel sunrpc drm efi_pstore ip_tables x_tables autofs4 psmouse virtio_net net_failover failover floppy [last unloaded: mlx_compat(OE)] CPU: 0 PID: 293779 Comm: ssh Tainted: G OE 6.2.0-32-generic #32~22.04.1-Ubuntu Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:mlx5_ib_post_send+0x191b/0x1a60 [mlx5_ib] Code: 0c 01 00 a8 01 75 25 48 8b 75 a0 b9 02 00 00 00 48 c7 c2 10 5b fd c0 48 c7 c7 80 5b fd c0 c6 05 57 0c 03 00 01 e8 95 4d 93 da <0f> 0b 44 8b 4d b0 4c 8b 45 c8 48 8b 4d c0 e9 49 fb ff ff 41 0f b7 RSP: 0018:ffffb5b48478b570 EFLAGS: 00010046 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffffb5b48478b628 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffb5b48478b5e8 R13: ffff963a3c609b5e R14: ffff9639c3fbd800 R15: ffffb5b480475a80 FS: 00007fc03b444c80(0000) GS:ffff963a3dc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000556f46bdf000 CR3: 0000000006ac6003 CR4: 00000000003706f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> ? show_regs+0x72/0x90 ? mlx5_ib_post_send+0x191b/0x1a60 [mlx5_ib] ? __warn+0x8d/0x160 ? mlx5_ib_post_send+0x191b/0x1a60 [mlx5_ib] ? report_bug+0x1bb/0x1d0 ? handle_bug+0x46/0x90 ? exc_invalid_op+0x19/0x80 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1b/0x20 ? mlx5_ib_post_send+0x191b/0x1a60 [mlx5_ib] mlx5_ib_post_send_nodrain+0xb/0x20 [mlx5_ib] ipoib_send+0x2ec/0x770 [ib_ipoib] ipoib_start_xmit+0x5a0/0x770 [ib_ipoib] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x8e/0x1e0 ? validate_xmit_skb_list+0x4d/0x80 sch_direct_xmit+0x116/0x3a0 __dev_xmit_skb+0x1fd/0x580 __dev_queue_xmit+0x284/0x6b0 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0xe/0x50 ? __flush_work.isra.0+0x20d/0x370 ? push_pseudo_header+0x17/0x40 [ib_ipoib] neigh_connected_output+0xcd/0x110 ip_finish_output2+0x179/0x480 ? __smp_call_single_queue+0x61/0xa0 __ip_finish_output+0xc3/0x190 ip_finish_output+0x2e/0xf0 ip_output+0x78/0x110 ? __pfx_ip_finish_output+0x10/0x10 ip_local_out+0x64/0x70 __ip_queue_xmit+0x18a/0x460 ip_queue_xmit+0x15/0x30 __tcp_transmit_skb+0x914/0x9c0 tcp_write_xmit+0x334/0x8d0 tcp_push_one+0x3c/0x60 tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x2e1/0xac0 tcp_sendmsg+0x2d/0x50 inet_sendmsg+0x43/0x90 sock_sendmsg+0x68/0x80 sock_write_iter+0x93/0x100 vfs_write+0x326/0x3c0 ksys_write+0xbd/0xf0 ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x90 __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x59/0x90 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x1d0/0x640 ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x3b/0xd0 ? irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0x9/0x20 ? irqentry_exit+0x43/0x50 ? exc_page_fault+0x92/0x1b0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc RIP: 0033:0x7fc03ad14a37 Code: 10 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b7 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 51 c3 48 83 ec 28 48 89 54 24 18 48 89 74 24 RSP: 002b:00007ffdf8697fe8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000008024 RCX: 00007fc03ad14a37 RDX: 0000000000008024 RSI: 0000556f46bd8270 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 0000556f46bb1800 R08: 0000000000007fe3 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000002 R13: 0000556f46bc66b0 R14: 000000000000000a R15: 0000556f46bb2f50 </TASK> ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/8228ad34bd1a25047586270f7b1fb4ddcd046282.17064339… Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro(a)nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/wr.c | 2 +- include/linux/mlx5/qp.h | 5 ++++- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/wr.c b/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/wr.c index d6038fb6c50c..19fd440a6ce3 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/wr.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/wr.c @@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ static void set_eth_seg(const struct ib_send_wr *wr, struct mlx5_ib_qp *qp, */ copysz = min_t(u64, *cur_edge - (void *)eseg->inline_hdr.start, left); - memcpy(eseg->inline_hdr.start, pdata, copysz); + memcpy(eseg->inline_hdr.data, pdata, copysz); stride = ALIGN(sizeof(struct mlx5_wqe_eth_seg) - sizeof(eseg->inline_hdr.start) + copysz, 16); *size += stride / 16; diff --git a/include/linux/mlx5/qp.h b/include/linux/mlx5/qp.h index d75ef8aa8fac..28d44061d670 100644 --- a/include/linux/mlx5/qp.h +++ b/include/linux/mlx5/qp.h @@ -261,7 +261,10 @@ struct mlx5_wqe_eth_seg { union { struct { __be16 sz; - u8 start[2]; + union { + u8 start[2]; + DECLARE_FLEX_ARRAY(u8, data); + }; } inline_hdr; struct { __be16 type; -- 2.17.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] wireguard: receive: annotate data-race around receiving_counter.counter
by Guo Mengqi 15 May '24

15 May '24

From: Nikita Zhandarovich <n.zhandarovich(a)fintech.ru> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.214 commit f87884e0dffd61b47e58bc6e1e2f6843c212b0cc category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9HK8D Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit bba045dc4d996d03dce6fe45726e78a1a1f6d4c3 ] Syzkaller with KCSAN identified a data-race issue when accessing keypair->receiving_counter.counter. Use READ_ONCE() and WRITE_ONCE() annotations to mark the data race as intentional. BUG: KCSAN: data-race in wg_packet_decrypt_worker / wg_packet_rx_poll write to 0xffff888107765888 of 8 bytes by interrupt on cpu 0: counter_validate drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c:321 [inline] wg_packet_rx_poll+0x3ac/0xf00 drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c:461 __napi_poll+0x60/0x3b0 net/core/dev.c:6536 napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6605 [inline] net_rx_action+0x32b/0x750 net/core/dev.c:6738 __do_softirq+0xc4/0x279 kernel/softirq.c:553 do_softirq+0x5e/0x90 kernel/softirq.c:454 __local_bh_enable_ip+0x64/0x70 kernel/softirq.c:381 __raw_spin_unlock_bh include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:167 [inline] _raw_spin_unlock_bh+0x36/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:210 spin_unlock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:396 [inline] ptr_ring_consume_bh include/linux/ptr_ring.h:367 [inline] wg_packet_decrypt_worker+0x6c5/0x700 drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c:499 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:2633 [inline] ... read to 0xffff888107765888 of 8 bytes by task 3196 on cpu 1: decrypt_packet drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c:252 [inline] wg_packet_decrypt_worker+0x220/0x700 drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c:501 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:2633 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0x5b8/0xa30 kernel/workqueue.c:2706 worker_thread+0x525/0x730 kernel/workqueue.c:2787 ... Fixes: a9e90d9931f3 ("wireguard: noise: separate receive counter from send counter") Reported-by: syzbot+d1de830e4ecdaac83d89(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Nikita Zhandarovich <n.zhandarovich(a)fintech.ru> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri(a)nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Wang Hai <wanghai38(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c b/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c index d38b24339a1f..ed274e9bdf3c 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c @@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ static bool decrypt_packet(struct sk_buff *skb, struct noise_keypair *keypair) if (unlikely(!READ_ONCE(keypair->receiving.is_valid) || wg_birthdate_has_expired(keypair->receiving.birthdate, REJECT_AFTER_TIME) || - keypair->receiving_counter.counter >= REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES)) { + READ_ONCE(keypair->receiving_counter.counter) >= REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES)) { WRITE_ONCE(keypair->receiving.is_valid, false); return false; } @@ -325,7 +325,7 @@ static bool counter_validate(struct noise_replay_counter *counter, u64 their_cou for (i = 1; i <= top; ++i) counter->backtrack[(i + index_current) & ((COUNTER_BITS_TOTAL / BITS_PER_LONG) - 1)] = 0; - counter->counter = their_counter; + WRITE_ONCE(counter->counter, their_counter); } index &= (COUNTER_BITS_TOTAL / BITS_PER_LONG) - 1; @@ -470,7 +470,7 @@ int wg_packet_rx_poll(struct napi_struct *napi, int budget) net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: Packet has invalid nonce %llu (max %llu)\n", peer->device->dev->name, PACKET_CB(skb)->nonce, - keypair->receiving_counter.counter); + READ_ONCE(keypair->receiving_counter.counter)); goto next; } -- 2.17.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] wireguard: receive: annotate data-race around receiving_counter.counter
by Guo Mengqi 15 May '24

15 May '24

From: Nikita Zhandarovich <n.zhandarovich(a)fintech.ru> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.214 commit f87884e0dffd61b47e58bc6e1e2f6843c212b0cc category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9HK8D Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit bba045dc4d996d03dce6fe45726e78a1a1f6d4c3 ] Syzkaller with KCSAN identified a data-race issue when accessing keypair->receiving_counter.counter. Use READ_ONCE() and WRITE_ONCE() annotations to mark the data race as intentional. BUG: KCSAN: data-race in wg_packet_decrypt_worker / wg_packet_rx_poll write to 0xffff888107765888 of 8 bytes by interrupt on cpu 0: counter_validate drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c:321 [inline] wg_packet_rx_poll+0x3ac/0xf00 drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c:461 __napi_poll+0x60/0x3b0 net/core/dev.c:6536 napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6605 [inline] net_rx_action+0x32b/0x750 net/core/dev.c:6738 __do_softirq+0xc4/0x279 kernel/softirq.c:553 do_softirq+0x5e/0x90 kernel/softirq.c:454 __local_bh_enable_ip+0x64/0x70 kernel/softirq.c:381 __raw_spin_unlock_bh include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:167 [inline] _raw_spin_unlock_bh+0x36/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:210 spin_unlock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:396 [inline] ptr_ring_consume_bh include/linux/ptr_ring.h:367 [inline] wg_packet_decrypt_worker+0x6c5/0x700 drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c:499 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:2633 [inline] ... read to 0xffff888107765888 of 8 bytes by task 3196 on cpu 1: decrypt_packet drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c:252 [inline] wg_packet_decrypt_worker+0x220/0x700 drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c:501 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:2633 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0x5b8/0xa30 kernel/workqueue.c:2706 worker_thread+0x525/0x730 kernel/workqueue.c:2787 ... Fixes: a9e90d9931f3 ("wireguard: noise: separate receive counter from send counter") Reported-by: syzbot+d1de830e4ecdaac83d89(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Nikita Zhandarovich <n.zhandarovich(a)fintech.ru> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri(a)nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Wang Hai <wanghai38(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c b/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c index 7b8df406c773..ce4fc5b5eef5 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c @@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ static bool decrypt_packet(struct sk_buff *skb, struct noise_keypair *keypair) if (unlikely(!READ_ONCE(keypair->receiving.is_valid) || wg_birthdate_has_expired(keypair->receiving.birthdate, REJECT_AFTER_TIME) || - keypair->receiving_counter.counter >= REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES)) { + READ_ONCE(keypair->receiving_counter.counter) >= REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES)) { WRITE_ONCE(keypair->receiving.is_valid, false); return false; } @@ -325,7 +325,7 @@ static bool counter_validate(struct noise_replay_counter *counter, u64 their_cou for (i = 1; i <= top; ++i) counter->backtrack[(i + index_current) & ((COUNTER_BITS_TOTAL / BITS_PER_LONG) - 1)] = 0; - counter->counter = their_counter; + WRITE_ONCE(counter->counter, their_counter); } index &= (COUNTER_BITS_TOTAL / BITS_PER_LONG) - 1; @@ -470,7 +470,7 @@ int wg_packet_rx_poll(struct napi_struct *napi, int budget) net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: Packet has invalid nonce %llu (max %llu)\n", peer->device->dev->name, PACKET_CB(skb)->nonce, - keypair->receiving_counter.counter); + READ_ONCE(keypair->receiving_counter.counter)); goto next; } -- 2.17.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP2] wireguard: receive: annotate data-race around receiving_counter.counter
by Guo Mengqi 15 May '24

15 May '24

From: Nikita Zhandarovich <n.zhandarovich(a)fintech.ru> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.214 commit f87884e0dffd61b47e58bc6e1e2f6843c212b0cc category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9HK8D Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit bba045dc4d996d03dce6fe45726e78a1a1f6d4c3 ] Syzkaller with KCSAN identified a data-race issue when accessing keypair->receiving_counter.counter. Use READ_ONCE() and WRITE_ONCE() annotations to mark the data race as intentional. BUG: KCSAN: data-race in wg_packet_decrypt_worker / wg_packet_rx_poll write to 0xffff888107765888 of 8 bytes by interrupt on cpu 0: counter_validate drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c:321 [inline] wg_packet_rx_poll+0x3ac/0xf00 drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c:461 __napi_poll+0x60/0x3b0 net/core/dev.c:6536 napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6605 [inline] net_rx_action+0x32b/0x750 net/core/dev.c:6738 __do_softirq+0xc4/0x279 kernel/softirq.c:553 do_softirq+0x5e/0x90 kernel/softirq.c:454 __local_bh_enable_ip+0x64/0x70 kernel/softirq.c:381 __raw_spin_unlock_bh include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:167 [inline] _raw_spin_unlock_bh+0x36/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:210 spin_unlock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:396 [inline] ptr_ring_consume_bh include/linux/ptr_ring.h:367 [inline] wg_packet_decrypt_worker+0x6c5/0x700 drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c:499 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:2633 [inline] ... read to 0xffff888107765888 of 8 bytes by task 3196 on cpu 1: decrypt_packet drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c:252 [inline] wg_packet_decrypt_worker+0x220/0x700 drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c:501 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:2633 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0x5b8/0xa30 kernel/workqueue.c:2706 worker_thread+0x525/0x730 kernel/workqueue.c:2787 ... Fixes: a9e90d9931f3 ("wireguard: noise: separate receive counter from send counter") Reported-by: syzbot+d1de830e4ecdaac83d89(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Nikita Zhandarovich <n.zhandarovich(a)fintech.ru> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri(a)nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Wang Hai <wanghai38(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c b/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c index 7b8df406c773..ce4fc5b5eef5 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c @@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ static bool decrypt_packet(struct sk_buff *skb, struct noise_keypair *keypair) if (unlikely(!READ_ONCE(keypair->receiving.is_valid) || wg_birthdate_has_expired(keypair->receiving.birthdate, REJECT_AFTER_TIME) || - keypair->receiving_counter.counter >= REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES)) { + READ_ONCE(keypair->receiving_counter.counter) >= REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES)) { WRITE_ONCE(keypair->receiving.is_valid, false); return false; } @@ -325,7 +325,7 @@ static bool counter_validate(struct noise_replay_counter *counter, u64 their_cou for (i = 1; i <= top; ++i) counter->backtrack[(i + index_current) & ((COUNTER_BITS_TOTAL / BITS_PER_LONG) - 1)] = 0; - counter->counter = their_counter; + WRITE_ONCE(counter->counter, their_counter); } index &= (COUNTER_BITS_TOTAL / BITS_PER_LONG) - 1; @@ -470,7 +470,7 @@ int wg_packet_rx_poll(struct napi_struct *napi, int budget) net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: Packet has invalid nonce %llu (max %llu)\n", peer->device->dev->name, PACKET_CB(skb)->nonce, - keypair->receiving_counter.counter); + READ_ONCE(keypair->receiving_counter.counter)); goto next; } -- 2.17.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS] RDMA/mlx5: Fix fortify source warning while accessing Eth segment
by Guo Mengqi 15 May '24

15 May '24

From: Leon Romanovsky <leonro(a)nvidia.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.214 commit d27c48dc309da72c3b46351a1205d89687272baa category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9HK6L CVE: CVE-2024-26907 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 4d5e86a56615cc387d21c629f9af8fb0e958d350 ] ------------[ cut here ]------------ memcpy: detected field-spanning write (size 56) of single field "eseg->inline_hdr.start" at /var/lib/dkms/mlnx-ofed-kernel/5.8/build/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/wr.c:131 (size 2) WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 293779 at /var/lib/dkms/mlnx-ofed-kernel/5.8/build/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/wr.c:131 mlx5_ib_post_send+0x191b/0x1a60 [mlx5_ib] Modules linked in: 8021q garp mrp stp llc rdma_ucm(OE) rdma_cm(OE) iw_cm(OE) ib_ipoib(OE) ib_cm(OE) ib_umad(OE) mlx5_ib(OE) ib_uverbs(OE) ib_core(OE) mlx5_core(OE) pci_hyperv_intf mlxdevm(OE) mlx_compat(OE) tls mlxfw(OE) psample nft_fib_inet nft_fib_ipv4 nft_fib_ipv6 nft_fib nft_reject_inet nf_reject_ipv4 nf_reject_ipv6 nft_reject nft_ct nft_chain_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 ip_set nf_tables libcrc32c nfnetlink mst_pciconf(OE) knem(OE) vfio_pci vfio_pci_core vfio_iommu_type1 vfio iommufd irqbypass cuse nfsv3 nfs fscache netfs xfrm_user xfrm_algo ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler binfmt_misc crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul polyval_clmulni polyval_generic ghash_clmulni_intel sha512_ssse3 snd_pcsp aesni_intel crypto_simd cryptd snd_pcm snd_timer joydev snd soundcore input_leds serio_raw evbug nfsd auth_rpcgss nfs_acl lockd grace sch_fq_codel sunrpc drm efi_pstore ip_tables x_tables autofs4 psmouse virtio_net net_failover failover floppy [last unloaded: mlx_compat(OE)] CPU: 0 PID: 293779 Comm: ssh Tainted: G OE 6.2.0-32-generic #32~22.04.1-Ubuntu Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:mlx5_ib_post_send+0x191b/0x1a60 [mlx5_ib] Code: 0c 01 00 a8 01 75 25 48 8b 75 a0 b9 02 00 00 00 48 c7 c2 10 5b fd c0 48 c7 c7 80 5b fd c0 c6 05 57 0c 03 00 01 e8 95 4d 93 da <0f> 0b 44 8b 4d b0 4c 8b 45 c8 48 8b 4d c0 e9 49 fb ff ff 41 0f b7 RSP: 0018:ffffb5b48478b570 EFLAGS: 00010046 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffffb5b48478b628 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffb5b48478b5e8 R13: ffff963a3c609b5e R14: ffff9639c3fbd800 R15: ffffb5b480475a80 FS: 00007fc03b444c80(0000) GS:ffff963a3dc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000556f46bdf000 CR3: 0000000006ac6003 CR4: 00000000003706f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> ? show_regs+0x72/0x90 ? mlx5_ib_post_send+0x191b/0x1a60 [mlx5_ib] ? __warn+0x8d/0x160 ? mlx5_ib_post_send+0x191b/0x1a60 [mlx5_ib] ? report_bug+0x1bb/0x1d0 ? handle_bug+0x46/0x90 ? exc_invalid_op+0x19/0x80 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1b/0x20 ? mlx5_ib_post_send+0x191b/0x1a60 [mlx5_ib] mlx5_ib_post_send_nodrain+0xb/0x20 [mlx5_ib] ipoib_send+0x2ec/0x770 [ib_ipoib] ipoib_start_xmit+0x5a0/0x770 [ib_ipoib] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x8e/0x1e0 ? validate_xmit_skb_list+0x4d/0x80 sch_direct_xmit+0x116/0x3a0 __dev_xmit_skb+0x1fd/0x580 __dev_queue_xmit+0x284/0x6b0 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0xe/0x50 ? __flush_work.isra.0+0x20d/0x370 ? push_pseudo_header+0x17/0x40 [ib_ipoib] neigh_connected_output+0xcd/0x110 ip_finish_output2+0x179/0x480 ? __smp_call_single_queue+0x61/0xa0 __ip_finish_output+0xc3/0x190 ip_finish_output+0x2e/0xf0 ip_output+0x78/0x110 ? __pfx_ip_finish_output+0x10/0x10 ip_local_out+0x64/0x70 __ip_queue_xmit+0x18a/0x460 ip_queue_xmit+0x15/0x30 __tcp_transmit_skb+0x914/0x9c0 tcp_write_xmit+0x334/0x8d0 tcp_push_one+0x3c/0x60 tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x2e1/0xac0 tcp_sendmsg+0x2d/0x50 inet_sendmsg+0x43/0x90 sock_sendmsg+0x68/0x80 sock_write_iter+0x93/0x100 vfs_write+0x326/0x3c0 ksys_write+0xbd/0xf0 ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x90 __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x59/0x90 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x1d0/0x640 ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x3b/0xd0 ? irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0x9/0x20 ? irqentry_exit+0x43/0x50 ? exc_page_fault+0x92/0x1b0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc RIP: 0033:0x7fc03ad14a37 Code: 10 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b7 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 51 c3 48 83 ec 28 48 89 54 24 18 48 89 74 24 RSP: 002b:00007ffdf8697fe8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000008024 RCX: 00007fc03ad14a37 RDX: 0000000000008024 RSI: 0000556f46bd8270 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 0000556f46bb1800 R08: 0000000000007fe3 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000002 R13: 0000556f46bc66b0 R14: 000000000000000a R15: 0000556f46bb2f50 </TASK> ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/8228ad34bd1a25047586270f7b1fb4ddcd046282.17064339… Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro(a)nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/wr.c | 2 +- include/linux/mlx5/qp.h | 5 ++++- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/wr.c b/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/wr.c index d6038fb6c50c..19fd440a6ce3 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/wr.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/wr.c @@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ static void set_eth_seg(const struct ib_send_wr *wr, struct mlx5_ib_qp *qp, */ copysz = min_t(u64, *cur_edge - (void *)eseg->inline_hdr.start, left); - memcpy(eseg->inline_hdr.start, pdata, copysz); + memcpy(eseg->inline_hdr.data, pdata, copysz); stride = ALIGN(sizeof(struct mlx5_wqe_eth_seg) - sizeof(eseg->inline_hdr.start) + copysz, 16); *size += stride / 16; diff --git a/include/linux/mlx5/qp.h b/include/linux/mlx5/qp.h index d75ef8aa8fac..28d44061d670 100644 --- a/include/linux/mlx5/qp.h +++ b/include/linux/mlx5/qp.h @@ -261,7 +261,10 @@ struct mlx5_wqe_eth_seg { union { struct { __be16 sz; - u8 start[2]; + union { + u8 start[2]; + DECLARE_FLEX_ARRAY(u8, data); + }; } inline_hdr; struct { __be16 type; -- 2.17.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS] wireguard: receive: annotate data-race around receiving_counter.counter
by Guo Mengqi 15 May '24

15 May '24

From: Nikita Zhandarovich <n.zhandarovich(a)fintech.ru> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.214 commit f87884e0dffd61b47e58bc6e1e2f6843c212b0cc category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9HK8D Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit bba045dc4d996d03dce6fe45726e78a1a1f6d4c3 ] Syzkaller with KCSAN identified a data-race issue when accessing keypair->receiving_counter.counter. Use READ_ONCE() and WRITE_ONCE() annotations to mark the data race as intentional. BUG: KCSAN: data-race in wg_packet_decrypt_worker / wg_packet_rx_poll write to 0xffff888107765888 of 8 bytes by interrupt on cpu 0: counter_validate drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c:321 [inline] wg_packet_rx_poll+0x3ac/0xf00 drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c:461 __napi_poll+0x60/0x3b0 net/core/dev.c:6536 napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6605 [inline] net_rx_action+0x32b/0x750 net/core/dev.c:6738 __do_softirq+0xc4/0x279 kernel/softirq.c:553 do_softirq+0x5e/0x90 kernel/softirq.c:454 __local_bh_enable_ip+0x64/0x70 kernel/softirq.c:381 __raw_spin_unlock_bh include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:167 [inline] _raw_spin_unlock_bh+0x36/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:210 spin_unlock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:396 [inline] ptr_ring_consume_bh include/linux/ptr_ring.h:367 [inline] wg_packet_decrypt_worker+0x6c5/0x700 drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c:499 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:2633 [inline] ... read to 0xffff888107765888 of 8 bytes by task 3196 on cpu 1: decrypt_packet drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c:252 [inline] wg_packet_decrypt_worker+0x220/0x700 drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c:501 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:2633 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0x5b8/0xa30 kernel/workqueue.c:2706 worker_thread+0x525/0x730 kernel/workqueue.c:2787 ... Fixes: a9e90d9931f3 ("wireguard: noise: separate receive counter from send counter") Reported-by: syzbot+d1de830e4ecdaac83d89(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Nikita Zhandarovich <n.zhandarovich(a)fintech.ru> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason(a)zx2c4.com> Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri(a)nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Wang Hai <wanghai38(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c b/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c index 7b8df406c773..ce4fc5b5eef5 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c @@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ static bool decrypt_packet(struct sk_buff *skb, struct noise_keypair *keypair) if (unlikely(!READ_ONCE(keypair->receiving.is_valid) || wg_birthdate_has_expired(keypair->receiving.birthdate, REJECT_AFTER_TIME) || - keypair->receiving_counter.counter >= REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES)) { + READ_ONCE(keypair->receiving_counter.counter) >= REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES)) { WRITE_ONCE(keypair->receiving.is_valid, false); return false; } @@ -325,7 +325,7 @@ static bool counter_validate(struct noise_replay_counter *counter, u64 their_cou for (i = 1; i <= top; ++i) counter->backtrack[(i + index_current) & ((COUNTER_BITS_TOTAL / BITS_PER_LONG) - 1)] = 0; - counter->counter = their_counter; + WRITE_ONCE(counter->counter, their_counter); } index &= (COUNTER_BITS_TOTAL / BITS_PER_LONG) - 1; @@ -470,7 +470,7 @@ int wg_packet_rx_poll(struct napi_struct *napi, int budget) net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: Packet has invalid nonce %llu (max %llu)\n", peer->device->dev->name, PACKET_CB(skb)->nonce, - keypair->receiving_counter.counter); + READ_ONCE(keypair->receiving_counter.counter)); goto next; } -- 2.17.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] iommu/vt-d: Don't issue ATS Invalidation request when device is disconnected
by Guo Mengqi 15 May '24

15 May '24

From: Ethan Zhao <haifeng.zhao(a)linux.intel.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.214 commit f873b85ec762c5a6abe94a7ddb31df5d3ba07d85 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9HJYJ Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 4fc82cd907ac075648789cc3a00877778aa1838b ] For those endpoint devices connect to system via hotplug capable ports, users could request a hot reset to the device by flapping device's link through setting the slot's link control register, as pciehp_ist() DLLSC interrupt sequence response, pciehp will unload the device driver and then power it off. thus cause an IOMMU device-TLB invalidation (Intel VT-d spec, or ATS Invalidation in PCIe spec r6.1) request for non-existence target device to be sent and deadly loop to retry that request after ITE fault triggered in interrupt context. That would cause following continuous hard lockup warning and system hang [ 4211.433662] pcieport 0000:17:01.0: pciehp: Slot(108): Link Down [ 4211.433664] pcieport 0000:17:01.0: pciehp: Slot(108): Card not present [ 4223.822591] NMI watchdog: Watchdog detected hard LOCKUP on cpu 144 [ 4223.822622] CPU: 144 PID: 1422 Comm: irq/57-pciehp Kdump: loaded Tainted: G S OE kernel version xxxx [ 4223.822623] Hardware name: vendorname xxxx 666-106, BIOS 01.01.02.03.01 05/15/2023 [ 4223.822623] RIP: 0010:qi_submit_sync+0x2c0/0x490 [ 4223.822624] Code: 48 be 00 00 00 00 00 08 00 00 49 85 74 24 20 0f 95 c1 48 8b 57 10 83 c1 04 83 3c 1a 03 0f 84 a2 01 00 00 49 8b 04 24 8b 70 34 <40> f6 c6 1 0 74 17 49 8b 04 24 8b 80 80 00 00 00 89 c2 d3 fa 41 39 [ 4223.822624] RSP: 0018:ffffc4f074f0bbb8 EFLAGS: 00000093 [ 4223.822625] RAX: ffffc4f040059000 RBX: 0000000000000014 RCX: 0000000000000005 [ 4223.822625] RDX: ffff9f3841315800 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff9f38401a8340 [ 4223.822625] RBP: ffff9f38401a8340 R08: ffffc4f074f0bc00 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 4223.822626] R10: 0000000000000010 R11: 0000000000000018 R12: ffff9f384005e200 [ 4223.822626] R13: 0000000000000004 R14: 0000000000000046 R15: 0000000000000004 [ 4223.822626] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa237ae400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 4223.822627] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 4223.822627] CR2: 00007ffe86515d80 CR3: 000002fd3000a001 CR4: 0000000000770ee0 [ 4223.822627] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 4223.822628] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe07f0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 4223.822628] PKRU: 55555554 [ 4223.822628] Call Trace: [ 4223.822628] qi_flush_dev_iotlb+0xb1/0xd0 [ 4223.822628] __dmar_remove_one_dev_info+0x224/0x250 [ 4223.822629] dmar_remove_one_dev_info+0x3e/0x50 [ 4223.822629] intel_iommu_release_device+0x1f/0x30 [ 4223.822629] iommu_release_device+0x33/0x60 [ 4223.822629] iommu_bus_notifier+0x7f/0x90 [ 4223.822630] blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x60/0x90 [ 4223.822630] device_del+0x2e5/0x420 [ 4223.822630] pci_remove_bus_device+0x70/0x110 [ 4223.822630] pciehp_unconfigure_device+0x7c/0x130 [ 4223.822631] pciehp_disable_slot+0x6b/0x100 [ 4223.822631] pciehp_handle_presence_or_link_change+0xd8/0x320 [ 4223.822631] pciehp_ist+0x176/0x180 [ 4223.822631] ? irq_finalize_oneshot.part.50+0x110/0x110 [ 4223.822632] irq_thread_fn+0x19/0x50 [ 4223.822632] irq_thread+0x104/0x190 [ 4223.822632] ? irq_forced_thread_fn+0x90/0x90 [ 4223.822632] ? irq_thread_check_affinity+0xe0/0xe0 [ 4223.822633] kthread+0x114/0x130 [ 4223.822633] ? __kthread_cancel_work+0x40/0x40 [ 4223.822633] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [ 4223.822633] Kernel panic - not syncing: Hard LOCKUP [ 4223.822634] CPU: 144 PID: 1422 Comm: irq/57-pciehp Kdump: loaded Tainted: G S OE kernel version xxxx [ 4223.822634] Hardware name: vendorname xxxx 666-106, BIOS 01.01.02.03.01 05/15/2023 [ 4223.822634] Call Trace: [ 4223.822634] <NMI> [ 4223.822635] dump_stack+0x6d/0x88 [ 4223.822635] panic+0x101/0x2d0 [ 4223.822635] ? ret_from_fork+0x11/0x30 [ 4223.822635] nmi_panic.cold.14+0xc/0xc [ 4223.822636] watchdog_overflow_callback.cold.8+0x6d/0x81 [ 4223.822636] __perf_event_overflow+0x4f/0xf0 [ 4223.822636] handle_pmi_common+0x1ef/0x290 [ 4223.822636] ? __set_pte_vaddr+0x28/0x40 [ 4223.822637] ? flush_tlb_one_kernel+0xa/0x20 [ 4223.822637] ? __native_set_fixmap+0x24/0x30 [ 4223.822637] ? ghes_copy_tofrom_phys+0x70/0x100 [ 4223.822637] ? __ghes_peek_estatus.isra.16+0x49/0xa0 [ 4223.822637] intel_pmu_handle_irq+0xba/0x2b0 [ 4223.822638] perf_event_nmi_handler+0x24/0x40 [ 4223.822638] nmi_handle+0x4d/0xf0 [ 4223.822638] default_do_nmi+0x49/0x100 [ 4223.822638] exc_nmi+0x134/0x180 [ 4223.822639] end_repeat_nmi+0x16/0x67 [ 4223.822639] RIP: 0010:qi_submit_sync+0x2c0/0x490 [ 4223.822639] Code: 48 be 00 00 00 00 00 08 00 00 49 85 74 24 20 0f 95 c1 48 8b 57 10 83 c1 04 83 3c 1a 03 0f 84 a2 01 00 00 49 8b 04 24 8b 70 34 <40> f6 c6 10 74 17 49 8b 04 24 8b 80 80 00 00 00 89 c2 d3 fa 41 39 [ 4223.822640] RSP: 0018:ffffc4f074f0bbb8 EFLAGS: 00000093 [ 4223.822640] RAX: ffffc4f040059000 RBX: 0000000000000014 RCX: 0000000000000005 [ 4223.822640] RDX: ffff9f3841315800 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff9f38401a8340 [ 4223.822641] RBP: ffff9f38401a8340 R08: ffffc4f074f0bc00 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 4223.822641] R10: 0000000000000010 R11: 0000000000000018 R12: ffff9f384005e200 [ 4223.822641] R13: 0000000000000004 R14: 0000000000000046 R15: 0000000000000004 [ 4223.822641] ? qi_submit_sync+0x2c0/0x490 [ 4223.822642] ? qi_submit_sync+0x2c0/0x490 [ 4223.822642] </NMI> [ 4223.822642] qi_flush_dev_iotlb+0xb1/0xd0 [ 4223.822642] __dmar_remove_one_dev_info+0x224/0x250 [ 4223.822643] dmar_remove_one_dev_info+0x3e/0x50 [ 4223.822643] intel_iommu_release_device+0x1f/0x30 [ 4223.822643] iommu_release_device+0x33/0x60 [ 4223.822643] iommu_bus_notifier+0x7f/0x90 [ 4223.822644] blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x60/0x90 [ 4223.822644] device_del+0x2e5/0x420 [ 4223.822644] pci_remove_bus_device+0x70/0x110 [ 4223.822644] pciehp_unconfigure_device+0x7c/0x130 [ 4223.822644] pciehp_disable_slot+0x6b/0x100 [ 4223.822645] pciehp_handle_presence_or_link_change+0xd8/0x320 [ 4223.822645] pciehp_ist+0x176/0x180 [ 4223.822645] ? irq_finalize_oneshot.part.50+0x110/0x110 [ 4223.822645] irq_thread_fn+0x19/0x50 [ 4223.822646] irq_thread+0x104/0x190 [ 4223.822646] ? irq_forced_thread_fn+0x90/0x90 [ 4223.822646] ? irq_thread_check_affinity+0xe0/0xe0 [ 4223.822646] kthread+0x114/0x130 [ 4223.822647] ? __kthread_cancel_work+0x40/0x40 [ 4223.822647] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [ 4223.822647] Kernel Offset: 0x6400000 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff) Such issue could be triggered by all kinds of regular surprise removal hotplug operation. like: 1. pull EP(endpoint device) out directly. 2. turn off EP's power. 3. bring the link down. etc. this patch aims to work for regular safe removal and surprise removal unplug. these hot unplug handling process could be optimized for fix the ATS Invalidation hang issue by calling pci_dev_is_disconnected() in function devtlb_invalidation_with_pasid() to check target device state to avoid sending meaningless ATS Invalidation request to iommu when device is gone. (see IMPLEMENTATION NOTE in PCIe spec r6.1 section 10.3.1) For safe removal, device wouldn't be removed until the whole software handling process is done, it wouldn't trigger the hard lock up issue caused by too long ATS Invalidation timeout wait. In safe removal path, device state isn't set to pci_channel_io_perm_failure in pciehp_unconfigure_device() by checking 'presence' parameter, calling pci_dev_is_disconnected() in devtlb_invalidation_with_pasid() will return false there, wouldn't break the function. For surprise removal, device state is set to pci_channel_io_perm_failure in pciehp_unconfigure_device(), means device is already gone (disconnected) call pci_dev_is_disconnected() in devtlb_invalidation_with_pasid() will return true to break the function not to send ATS Invalidation request to the disconnected device blindly, thus avoid to trigger further ITE fault, and ITE fault will block all invalidation request to be handled. furthermore retry the timeout request could trigger hard lockup. safe removal (present) & surprise removal (not present) pciehp_ist() pciehp_handle_presence_or_link_change() pciehp_disable_slot() remove_board() pciehp_unconfigure_device(presence) { if (!presence) pci_walk_bus(parent, pci_dev_set_disconnected, NULL); } this patch works for regular safe removal and surprise removal of ATS capable endpoint on PCIe switch downstream ports. Fixes: 6f7db75e1c46 ("iommu/vt-d: Add second level page table interface") Reviewed-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter(a)linaro.org> Tested-by: Haorong Ye <yehaorong(a)bytedance.com> Signed-off-by: Ethan Zhao <haifeng.zhao(a)linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240301080727.3529832-3-haifeng.zhao@linux.intel… Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu(a)linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel(a)suse.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Wang Hai <wanghai38(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c b/drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c index 9b24e8224379..586b289cf468 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c +++ b/drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c @@ -489,6 +489,9 @@ devtlb_invalidation_with_pasid(struct intel_iommu *iommu, if (!info || !info->ats_enabled) return; + if (pci_dev_is_disconnected(to_pci_dev(dev))) + return; + sid = info->bus << 8 | info->devfn; qdep = info->ats_qdep; pfsid = info->pfsid; -- 2.17.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP2] iommu/vt-d: Don't issue ATS Invalidation request when device is disconnected
by Guo Mengqi 15 May '24

15 May '24

From: Ethan Zhao <haifeng.zhao(a)linux.intel.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.214 commit f873b85ec762c5a6abe94a7ddb31df5d3ba07d85 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9HJYJ Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 4fc82cd907ac075648789cc3a00877778aa1838b ] For those endpoint devices connect to system via hotplug capable ports, users could request a hot reset to the device by flapping device's link through setting the slot's link control register, as pciehp_ist() DLLSC interrupt sequence response, pciehp will unload the device driver and then power it off. thus cause an IOMMU device-TLB invalidation (Intel VT-d spec, or ATS Invalidation in PCIe spec r6.1) request for non-existence target device to be sent and deadly loop to retry that request after ITE fault triggered in interrupt context. That would cause following continuous hard lockup warning and system hang [ 4211.433662] pcieport 0000:17:01.0: pciehp: Slot(108): Link Down [ 4211.433664] pcieport 0000:17:01.0: pciehp: Slot(108): Card not present [ 4223.822591] NMI watchdog: Watchdog detected hard LOCKUP on cpu 144 [ 4223.822622] CPU: 144 PID: 1422 Comm: irq/57-pciehp Kdump: loaded Tainted: G S OE kernel version xxxx [ 4223.822623] Hardware name: vendorname xxxx 666-106, BIOS 01.01.02.03.01 05/15/2023 [ 4223.822623] RIP: 0010:qi_submit_sync+0x2c0/0x490 [ 4223.822624] Code: 48 be 00 00 00 00 00 08 00 00 49 85 74 24 20 0f 95 c1 48 8b 57 10 83 c1 04 83 3c 1a 03 0f 84 a2 01 00 00 49 8b 04 24 8b 70 34 <40> f6 c6 1 0 74 17 49 8b 04 24 8b 80 80 00 00 00 89 c2 d3 fa 41 39 [ 4223.822624] RSP: 0018:ffffc4f074f0bbb8 EFLAGS: 00000093 [ 4223.822625] RAX: ffffc4f040059000 RBX: 0000000000000014 RCX: 0000000000000005 [ 4223.822625] RDX: ffff9f3841315800 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff9f38401a8340 [ 4223.822625] RBP: ffff9f38401a8340 R08: ffffc4f074f0bc00 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 4223.822626] R10: 0000000000000010 R11: 0000000000000018 R12: ffff9f384005e200 [ 4223.822626] R13: 0000000000000004 R14: 0000000000000046 R15: 0000000000000004 [ 4223.822626] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa237ae400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 4223.822627] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 4223.822627] CR2: 00007ffe86515d80 CR3: 000002fd3000a001 CR4: 0000000000770ee0 [ 4223.822627] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 4223.822628] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe07f0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 4223.822628] PKRU: 55555554 [ 4223.822628] Call Trace: [ 4223.822628] qi_flush_dev_iotlb+0xb1/0xd0 [ 4223.822628] __dmar_remove_one_dev_info+0x224/0x250 [ 4223.822629] dmar_remove_one_dev_info+0x3e/0x50 [ 4223.822629] intel_iommu_release_device+0x1f/0x30 [ 4223.822629] iommu_release_device+0x33/0x60 [ 4223.822629] iommu_bus_notifier+0x7f/0x90 [ 4223.822630] blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x60/0x90 [ 4223.822630] device_del+0x2e5/0x420 [ 4223.822630] pci_remove_bus_device+0x70/0x110 [ 4223.822630] pciehp_unconfigure_device+0x7c/0x130 [ 4223.822631] pciehp_disable_slot+0x6b/0x100 [ 4223.822631] pciehp_handle_presence_or_link_change+0xd8/0x320 [ 4223.822631] pciehp_ist+0x176/0x180 [ 4223.822631] ? irq_finalize_oneshot.part.50+0x110/0x110 [ 4223.822632] irq_thread_fn+0x19/0x50 [ 4223.822632] irq_thread+0x104/0x190 [ 4223.822632] ? irq_forced_thread_fn+0x90/0x90 [ 4223.822632] ? irq_thread_check_affinity+0xe0/0xe0 [ 4223.822633] kthread+0x114/0x130 [ 4223.822633] ? __kthread_cancel_work+0x40/0x40 [ 4223.822633] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [ 4223.822633] Kernel panic - not syncing: Hard LOCKUP [ 4223.822634] CPU: 144 PID: 1422 Comm: irq/57-pciehp Kdump: loaded Tainted: G S OE kernel version xxxx [ 4223.822634] Hardware name: vendorname xxxx 666-106, BIOS 01.01.02.03.01 05/15/2023 [ 4223.822634] Call Trace: [ 4223.822634] <NMI> [ 4223.822635] dump_stack+0x6d/0x88 [ 4223.822635] panic+0x101/0x2d0 [ 4223.822635] ? ret_from_fork+0x11/0x30 [ 4223.822635] nmi_panic.cold.14+0xc/0xc [ 4223.822636] watchdog_overflow_callback.cold.8+0x6d/0x81 [ 4223.822636] __perf_event_overflow+0x4f/0xf0 [ 4223.822636] handle_pmi_common+0x1ef/0x290 [ 4223.822636] ? __set_pte_vaddr+0x28/0x40 [ 4223.822637] ? flush_tlb_one_kernel+0xa/0x20 [ 4223.822637] ? __native_set_fixmap+0x24/0x30 [ 4223.822637] ? ghes_copy_tofrom_phys+0x70/0x100 [ 4223.822637] ? __ghes_peek_estatus.isra.16+0x49/0xa0 [ 4223.822637] intel_pmu_handle_irq+0xba/0x2b0 [ 4223.822638] perf_event_nmi_handler+0x24/0x40 [ 4223.822638] nmi_handle+0x4d/0xf0 [ 4223.822638] default_do_nmi+0x49/0x100 [ 4223.822638] exc_nmi+0x134/0x180 [ 4223.822639] end_repeat_nmi+0x16/0x67 [ 4223.822639] RIP: 0010:qi_submit_sync+0x2c0/0x490 [ 4223.822639] Code: 48 be 00 00 00 00 00 08 00 00 49 85 74 24 20 0f 95 c1 48 8b 57 10 83 c1 04 83 3c 1a 03 0f 84 a2 01 00 00 49 8b 04 24 8b 70 34 <40> f6 c6 10 74 17 49 8b 04 24 8b 80 80 00 00 00 89 c2 d3 fa 41 39 [ 4223.822640] RSP: 0018:ffffc4f074f0bbb8 EFLAGS: 00000093 [ 4223.822640] RAX: ffffc4f040059000 RBX: 0000000000000014 RCX: 0000000000000005 [ 4223.822640] RDX: ffff9f3841315800 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff9f38401a8340 [ 4223.822641] RBP: ffff9f38401a8340 R08: ffffc4f074f0bc00 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 4223.822641] R10: 0000000000000010 R11: 0000000000000018 R12: ffff9f384005e200 [ 4223.822641] R13: 0000000000000004 R14: 0000000000000046 R15: 0000000000000004 [ 4223.822641] ? qi_submit_sync+0x2c0/0x490 [ 4223.822642] ? qi_submit_sync+0x2c0/0x490 [ 4223.822642] </NMI> [ 4223.822642] qi_flush_dev_iotlb+0xb1/0xd0 [ 4223.822642] __dmar_remove_one_dev_info+0x224/0x250 [ 4223.822643] dmar_remove_one_dev_info+0x3e/0x50 [ 4223.822643] intel_iommu_release_device+0x1f/0x30 [ 4223.822643] iommu_release_device+0x33/0x60 [ 4223.822643] iommu_bus_notifier+0x7f/0x90 [ 4223.822644] blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x60/0x90 [ 4223.822644] device_del+0x2e5/0x420 [ 4223.822644] pci_remove_bus_device+0x70/0x110 [ 4223.822644] pciehp_unconfigure_device+0x7c/0x130 [ 4223.822644] pciehp_disable_slot+0x6b/0x100 [ 4223.822645] pciehp_handle_presence_or_link_change+0xd8/0x320 [ 4223.822645] pciehp_ist+0x176/0x180 [ 4223.822645] ? irq_finalize_oneshot.part.50+0x110/0x110 [ 4223.822645] irq_thread_fn+0x19/0x50 [ 4223.822646] irq_thread+0x104/0x190 [ 4223.822646] ? irq_forced_thread_fn+0x90/0x90 [ 4223.822646] ? irq_thread_check_affinity+0xe0/0xe0 [ 4223.822646] kthread+0x114/0x130 [ 4223.822647] ? __kthread_cancel_work+0x40/0x40 [ 4223.822647] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [ 4223.822647] Kernel Offset: 0x6400000 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff) Such issue could be triggered by all kinds of regular surprise removal hotplug operation. like: 1. pull EP(endpoint device) out directly. 2. turn off EP's power. 3. bring the link down. etc. this patch aims to work for regular safe removal and surprise removal unplug. these hot unplug handling process could be optimized for fix the ATS Invalidation hang issue by calling pci_dev_is_disconnected() in function devtlb_invalidation_with_pasid() to check target device state to avoid sending meaningless ATS Invalidation request to iommu when device is gone. (see IMPLEMENTATION NOTE in PCIe spec r6.1 section 10.3.1) For safe removal, device wouldn't be removed until the whole software handling process is done, it wouldn't trigger the hard lock up issue caused by too long ATS Invalidation timeout wait. In safe removal path, device state isn't set to pci_channel_io_perm_failure in pciehp_unconfigure_device() by checking 'presence' parameter, calling pci_dev_is_disconnected() in devtlb_invalidation_with_pasid() will return false there, wouldn't break the function. For surprise removal, device state is set to pci_channel_io_perm_failure in pciehp_unconfigure_device(), means device is already gone (disconnected) call pci_dev_is_disconnected() in devtlb_invalidation_with_pasid() will return true to break the function not to send ATS Invalidation request to the disconnected device blindly, thus avoid to trigger further ITE fault, and ITE fault will block all invalidation request to be handled. furthermore retry the timeout request could trigger hard lockup. safe removal (present) & surprise removal (not present) pciehp_ist() pciehp_handle_presence_or_link_change() pciehp_disable_slot() remove_board() pciehp_unconfigure_device(presence) { if (!presence) pci_walk_bus(parent, pci_dev_set_disconnected, NULL); } this patch works for regular safe removal and surprise removal of ATS capable endpoint on PCIe switch downstream ports. Fixes: 6f7db75e1c46 ("iommu/vt-d: Add second level page table interface") Reviewed-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter(a)linaro.org> Tested-by: Haorong Ye <yehaorong(a)bytedance.com> Signed-off-by: Ethan Zhao <haifeng.zhao(a)linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240301080727.3529832-3-haifeng.zhao@linux.intel… Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu(a)linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel(a)suse.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Wang Hai <wanghai38(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c b/drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c index 80d6412e2c54..ba9fa219a35a 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c +++ b/drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c @@ -489,6 +489,9 @@ devtlb_invalidation_with_pasid(struct intel_iommu *iommu, if (!info || !info->ats_enabled) return; + if (pci_dev_is_disconnected(to_pci_dev(dev))) + return; + sid = info->bus << 8 | info->devfn; qdep = info->ats_qdep; pfsid = info->pfsid; -- 2.17.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] iommu/vt-d: Don't issue ATS Invalidation request when device is disconnected
by Guo Mengqi 15 May '24

15 May '24

From: Ethan Zhao <haifeng.zhao(a)linux.intel.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.214 commit f873b85ec762c5a6abe94a7ddb31df5d3ba07d85 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9HJYJ Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 4fc82cd907ac075648789cc3a00877778aa1838b ] For those endpoint devices connect to system via hotplug capable ports, users could request a hot reset to the device by flapping device's link through setting the slot's link control register, as pciehp_ist() DLLSC interrupt sequence response, pciehp will unload the device driver and then power it off. thus cause an IOMMU device-TLB invalidation (Intel VT-d spec, or ATS Invalidation in PCIe spec r6.1) request for non-existence target device to be sent and deadly loop to retry that request after ITE fault triggered in interrupt context. That would cause following continuous hard lockup warning and system hang [ 4211.433662] pcieport 0000:17:01.0: pciehp: Slot(108): Link Down [ 4211.433664] pcieport 0000:17:01.0: pciehp: Slot(108): Card not present [ 4223.822591] NMI watchdog: Watchdog detected hard LOCKUP on cpu 144 [ 4223.822622] CPU: 144 PID: 1422 Comm: irq/57-pciehp Kdump: loaded Tainted: G S OE kernel version xxxx [ 4223.822623] Hardware name: vendorname xxxx 666-106, BIOS 01.01.02.03.01 05/15/2023 [ 4223.822623] RIP: 0010:qi_submit_sync+0x2c0/0x490 [ 4223.822624] Code: 48 be 00 00 00 00 00 08 00 00 49 85 74 24 20 0f 95 c1 48 8b 57 10 83 c1 04 83 3c 1a 03 0f 84 a2 01 00 00 49 8b 04 24 8b 70 34 <40> f6 c6 1 0 74 17 49 8b 04 24 8b 80 80 00 00 00 89 c2 d3 fa 41 39 [ 4223.822624] RSP: 0018:ffffc4f074f0bbb8 EFLAGS: 00000093 [ 4223.822625] RAX: ffffc4f040059000 RBX: 0000000000000014 RCX: 0000000000000005 [ 4223.822625] RDX: ffff9f3841315800 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff9f38401a8340 [ 4223.822625] RBP: ffff9f38401a8340 R08: ffffc4f074f0bc00 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 4223.822626] R10: 0000000000000010 R11: 0000000000000018 R12: ffff9f384005e200 [ 4223.822626] R13: 0000000000000004 R14: 0000000000000046 R15: 0000000000000004 [ 4223.822626] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa237ae400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 4223.822627] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 4223.822627] CR2: 00007ffe86515d80 CR3: 000002fd3000a001 CR4: 0000000000770ee0 [ 4223.822627] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 4223.822628] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe07f0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 4223.822628] PKRU: 55555554 [ 4223.822628] Call Trace: [ 4223.822628] qi_flush_dev_iotlb+0xb1/0xd0 [ 4223.822628] __dmar_remove_one_dev_info+0x224/0x250 [ 4223.822629] dmar_remove_one_dev_info+0x3e/0x50 [ 4223.822629] intel_iommu_release_device+0x1f/0x30 [ 4223.822629] iommu_release_device+0x33/0x60 [ 4223.822629] iommu_bus_notifier+0x7f/0x90 [ 4223.822630] blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x60/0x90 [ 4223.822630] device_del+0x2e5/0x420 [ 4223.822630] pci_remove_bus_device+0x70/0x110 [ 4223.822630] pciehp_unconfigure_device+0x7c/0x130 [ 4223.822631] pciehp_disable_slot+0x6b/0x100 [ 4223.822631] pciehp_handle_presence_or_link_change+0xd8/0x320 [ 4223.822631] pciehp_ist+0x176/0x180 [ 4223.822631] ? irq_finalize_oneshot.part.50+0x110/0x110 [ 4223.822632] irq_thread_fn+0x19/0x50 [ 4223.822632] irq_thread+0x104/0x190 [ 4223.822632] ? irq_forced_thread_fn+0x90/0x90 [ 4223.822632] ? irq_thread_check_affinity+0xe0/0xe0 [ 4223.822633] kthread+0x114/0x130 [ 4223.822633] ? __kthread_cancel_work+0x40/0x40 [ 4223.822633] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [ 4223.822633] Kernel panic - not syncing: Hard LOCKUP [ 4223.822634] CPU: 144 PID: 1422 Comm: irq/57-pciehp Kdump: loaded Tainted: G S OE kernel version xxxx [ 4223.822634] Hardware name: vendorname xxxx 666-106, BIOS 01.01.02.03.01 05/15/2023 [ 4223.822634] Call Trace: [ 4223.822634] <NMI> [ 4223.822635] dump_stack+0x6d/0x88 [ 4223.822635] panic+0x101/0x2d0 [ 4223.822635] ? ret_from_fork+0x11/0x30 [ 4223.822635] nmi_panic.cold.14+0xc/0xc [ 4223.822636] watchdog_overflow_callback.cold.8+0x6d/0x81 [ 4223.822636] __perf_event_overflow+0x4f/0xf0 [ 4223.822636] handle_pmi_common+0x1ef/0x290 [ 4223.822636] ? __set_pte_vaddr+0x28/0x40 [ 4223.822637] ? flush_tlb_one_kernel+0xa/0x20 [ 4223.822637] ? __native_set_fixmap+0x24/0x30 [ 4223.822637] ? ghes_copy_tofrom_phys+0x70/0x100 [ 4223.822637] ? __ghes_peek_estatus.isra.16+0x49/0xa0 [ 4223.822637] intel_pmu_handle_irq+0xba/0x2b0 [ 4223.822638] perf_event_nmi_handler+0x24/0x40 [ 4223.822638] nmi_handle+0x4d/0xf0 [ 4223.822638] default_do_nmi+0x49/0x100 [ 4223.822638] exc_nmi+0x134/0x180 [ 4223.822639] end_repeat_nmi+0x16/0x67 [ 4223.822639] RIP: 0010:qi_submit_sync+0x2c0/0x490 [ 4223.822639] Code: 48 be 00 00 00 00 00 08 00 00 49 85 74 24 20 0f 95 c1 48 8b 57 10 83 c1 04 83 3c 1a 03 0f 84 a2 01 00 00 49 8b 04 24 8b 70 34 <40> f6 c6 10 74 17 49 8b 04 24 8b 80 80 00 00 00 89 c2 d3 fa 41 39 [ 4223.822640] RSP: 0018:ffffc4f074f0bbb8 EFLAGS: 00000093 [ 4223.822640] RAX: ffffc4f040059000 RBX: 0000000000000014 RCX: 0000000000000005 [ 4223.822640] RDX: ffff9f3841315800 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff9f38401a8340 [ 4223.822641] RBP: ffff9f38401a8340 R08: ffffc4f074f0bc00 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 4223.822641] R10: 0000000000000010 R11: 0000000000000018 R12: ffff9f384005e200 [ 4223.822641] R13: 0000000000000004 R14: 0000000000000046 R15: 0000000000000004 [ 4223.822641] ? qi_submit_sync+0x2c0/0x490 [ 4223.822642] ? qi_submit_sync+0x2c0/0x490 [ 4223.822642] </NMI> [ 4223.822642] qi_flush_dev_iotlb+0xb1/0xd0 [ 4223.822642] __dmar_remove_one_dev_info+0x224/0x250 [ 4223.822643] dmar_remove_one_dev_info+0x3e/0x50 [ 4223.822643] intel_iommu_release_device+0x1f/0x30 [ 4223.822643] iommu_release_device+0x33/0x60 [ 4223.822643] iommu_bus_notifier+0x7f/0x90 [ 4223.822644] blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x60/0x90 [ 4223.822644] device_del+0x2e5/0x420 [ 4223.822644] pci_remove_bus_device+0x70/0x110 [ 4223.822644] pciehp_unconfigure_device+0x7c/0x130 [ 4223.822644] pciehp_disable_slot+0x6b/0x100 [ 4223.822645] pciehp_handle_presence_or_link_change+0xd8/0x320 [ 4223.822645] pciehp_ist+0x176/0x180 [ 4223.822645] ? irq_finalize_oneshot.part.50+0x110/0x110 [ 4223.822645] irq_thread_fn+0x19/0x50 [ 4223.822646] irq_thread+0x104/0x190 [ 4223.822646] ? irq_forced_thread_fn+0x90/0x90 [ 4223.822646] ? irq_thread_check_affinity+0xe0/0xe0 [ 4223.822646] kthread+0x114/0x130 [ 4223.822647] ? __kthread_cancel_work+0x40/0x40 [ 4223.822647] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [ 4223.822647] Kernel Offset: 0x6400000 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff) Such issue could be triggered by all kinds of regular surprise removal hotplug operation. like: 1. pull EP(endpoint device) out directly. 2. turn off EP's power. 3. bring the link down. etc. this patch aims to work for regular safe removal and surprise removal unplug. these hot unplug handling process could be optimized for fix the ATS Invalidation hang issue by calling pci_dev_is_disconnected() in function devtlb_invalidation_with_pasid() to check target device state to avoid sending meaningless ATS Invalidation request to iommu when device is gone. (see IMPLEMENTATION NOTE in PCIe spec r6.1 section 10.3.1) For safe removal, device wouldn't be removed until the whole software handling process is done, it wouldn't trigger the hard lock up issue caused by too long ATS Invalidation timeout wait. In safe removal path, device state isn't set to pci_channel_io_perm_failure in pciehp_unconfigure_device() by checking 'presence' parameter, calling pci_dev_is_disconnected() in devtlb_invalidation_with_pasid() will return false there, wouldn't break the function. For surprise removal, device state is set to pci_channel_io_perm_failure in pciehp_unconfigure_device(), means device is already gone (disconnected) call pci_dev_is_disconnected() in devtlb_invalidation_with_pasid() will return true to break the function not to send ATS Invalidation request to the disconnected device blindly, thus avoid to trigger further ITE fault, and ITE fault will block all invalidation request to be handled. furthermore retry the timeout request could trigger hard lockup. safe removal (present) & surprise removal (not present) pciehp_ist() pciehp_handle_presence_or_link_change() pciehp_disable_slot() remove_board() pciehp_unconfigure_device(presence) { if (!presence) pci_walk_bus(parent, pci_dev_set_disconnected, NULL); } this patch works for regular safe removal and surprise removal of ATS capable endpoint on PCIe switch downstream ports. Fixes: 6f7db75e1c46 ("iommu/vt-d: Add second level page table interface") Reviewed-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter(a)linaro.org> Tested-by: Haorong Ye <yehaorong(a)bytedance.com> Signed-off-by: Ethan Zhao <haifeng.zhao(a)linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240301080727.3529832-3-haifeng.zhao@linux.intel… Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu(a)linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel(a)suse.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Wang Hai <wanghai38(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c b/drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c index fb911b6c418f..f85326a7a269 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c +++ b/drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c @@ -477,6 +477,9 @@ devtlb_invalidation_with_pasid(struct intel_iommu *iommu, if (!info || !info->ats_enabled) return; + if (pci_dev_is_disconnected(to_pci_dev(dev))) + return; + sid = info->bus << 8 | info->devfn; qdep = info->ats_qdep; pfsid = info->pfsid; -- 2.17.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS] iommu/vt-d: Don't issue ATS Invalidation request when device is disconnected
by Guo Mengqi 15 May '24

15 May '24

From: Ethan Zhao <haifeng.zhao(a)linux.intel.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.214 commit f873b85ec762c5a6abe94a7ddb31df5d3ba07d85 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9HJYJ Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 4fc82cd907ac075648789cc3a00877778aa1838b ] For those endpoint devices connect to system via hotplug capable ports, users could request a hot reset to the device by flapping device's link through setting the slot's link control register, as pciehp_ist() DLLSC interrupt sequence response, pciehp will unload the device driver and then power it off. thus cause an IOMMU device-TLB invalidation (Intel VT-d spec, or ATS Invalidation in PCIe spec r6.1) request for non-existence target device to be sent and deadly loop to retry that request after ITE fault triggered in interrupt context. That would cause following continuous hard lockup warning and system hang [ 4211.433662] pcieport 0000:17:01.0: pciehp: Slot(108): Link Down [ 4211.433664] pcieport 0000:17:01.0: pciehp: Slot(108): Card not present [ 4223.822591] NMI watchdog: Watchdog detected hard LOCKUP on cpu 144 [ 4223.822622] CPU: 144 PID: 1422 Comm: irq/57-pciehp Kdump: loaded Tainted: G S OE kernel version xxxx [ 4223.822623] Hardware name: vendorname xxxx 666-106, BIOS 01.01.02.03.01 05/15/2023 [ 4223.822623] RIP: 0010:qi_submit_sync+0x2c0/0x490 [ 4223.822624] Code: 48 be 00 00 00 00 00 08 00 00 49 85 74 24 20 0f 95 c1 48 8b 57 10 83 c1 04 83 3c 1a 03 0f 84 a2 01 00 00 49 8b 04 24 8b 70 34 <40> f6 c6 1 0 74 17 49 8b 04 24 8b 80 80 00 00 00 89 c2 d3 fa 41 39 [ 4223.822624] RSP: 0018:ffffc4f074f0bbb8 EFLAGS: 00000093 [ 4223.822625] RAX: ffffc4f040059000 RBX: 0000000000000014 RCX: 0000000000000005 [ 4223.822625] RDX: ffff9f3841315800 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff9f38401a8340 [ 4223.822625] RBP: ffff9f38401a8340 R08: ffffc4f074f0bc00 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 4223.822626] R10: 0000000000000010 R11: 0000000000000018 R12: ffff9f384005e200 [ 4223.822626] R13: 0000000000000004 R14: 0000000000000046 R15: 0000000000000004 [ 4223.822626] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa237ae400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 4223.822627] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 4223.822627] CR2: 00007ffe86515d80 CR3: 000002fd3000a001 CR4: 0000000000770ee0 [ 4223.822627] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 4223.822628] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe07f0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 4223.822628] PKRU: 55555554 [ 4223.822628] Call Trace: [ 4223.822628] qi_flush_dev_iotlb+0xb1/0xd0 [ 4223.822628] __dmar_remove_one_dev_info+0x224/0x250 [ 4223.822629] dmar_remove_one_dev_info+0x3e/0x50 [ 4223.822629] intel_iommu_release_device+0x1f/0x30 [ 4223.822629] iommu_release_device+0x33/0x60 [ 4223.822629] iommu_bus_notifier+0x7f/0x90 [ 4223.822630] blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x60/0x90 [ 4223.822630] device_del+0x2e5/0x420 [ 4223.822630] pci_remove_bus_device+0x70/0x110 [ 4223.822630] pciehp_unconfigure_device+0x7c/0x130 [ 4223.822631] pciehp_disable_slot+0x6b/0x100 [ 4223.822631] pciehp_handle_presence_or_link_change+0xd8/0x320 [ 4223.822631] pciehp_ist+0x176/0x180 [ 4223.822631] ? irq_finalize_oneshot.part.50+0x110/0x110 [ 4223.822632] irq_thread_fn+0x19/0x50 [ 4223.822632] irq_thread+0x104/0x190 [ 4223.822632] ? irq_forced_thread_fn+0x90/0x90 [ 4223.822632] ? irq_thread_check_affinity+0xe0/0xe0 [ 4223.822633] kthread+0x114/0x130 [ 4223.822633] ? __kthread_cancel_work+0x40/0x40 [ 4223.822633] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [ 4223.822633] Kernel panic - not syncing: Hard LOCKUP [ 4223.822634] CPU: 144 PID: 1422 Comm: irq/57-pciehp Kdump: loaded Tainted: G S OE kernel version xxxx [ 4223.822634] Hardware name: vendorname xxxx 666-106, BIOS 01.01.02.03.01 05/15/2023 [ 4223.822634] Call Trace: [ 4223.822634] <NMI> [ 4223.822635] dump_stack+0x6d/0x88 [ 4223.822635] panic+0x101/0x2d0 [ 4223.822635] ? ret_from_fork+0x11/0x30 [ 4223.822635] nmi_panic.cold.14+0xc/0xc [ 4223.822636] watchdog_overflow_callback.cold.8+0x6d/0x81 [ 4223.822636] __perf_event_overflow+0x4f/0xf0 [ 4223.822636] handle_pmi_common+0x1ef/0x290 [ 4223.822636] ? __set_pte_vaddr+0x28/0x40 [ 4223.822637] ? flush_tlb_one_kernel+0xa/0x20 [ 4223.822637] ? __native_set_fixmap+0x24/0x30 [ 4223.822637] ? ghes_copy_tofrom_phys+0x70/0x100 [ 4223.822637] ? __ghes_peek_estatus.isra.16+0x49/0xa0 [ 4223.822637] intel_pmu_handle_irq+0xba/0x2b0 [ 4223.822638] perf_event_nmi_handler+0x24/0x40 [ 4223.822638] nmi_handle+0x4d/0xf0 [ 4223.822638] default_do_nmi+0x49/0x100 [ 4223.822638] exc_nmi+0x134/0x180 [ 4223.822639] end_repeat_nmi+0x16/0x67 [ 4223.822639] RIP: 0010:qi_submit_sync+0x2c0/0x490 [ 4223.822639] Code: 48 be 00 00 00 00 00 08 00 00 49 85 74 24 20 0f 95 c1 48 8b 57 10 83 c1 04 83 3c 1a 03 0f 84 a2 01 00 00 49 8b 04 24 8b 70 34 <40> f6 c6 10 74 17 49 8b 04 24 8b 80 80 00 00 00 89 c2 d3 fa 41 39 [ 4223.822640] RSP: 0018:ffffc4f074f0bbb8 EFLAGS: 00000093 [ 4223.822640] RAX: ffffc4f040059000 RBX: 0000000000000014 RCX: 0000000000000005 [ 4223.822640] RDX: ffff9f3841315800 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff9f38401a8340 [ 4223.822641] RBP: ffff9f38401a8340 R08: ffffc4f074f0bc00 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 4223.822641] R10: 0000000000000010 R11: 0000000000000018 R12: ffff9f384005e200 [ 4223.822641] R13: 0000000000000004 R14: 0000000000000046 R15: 0000000000000004 [ 4223.822641] ? qi_submit_sync+0x2c0/0x490 [ 4223.822642] ? qi_submit_sync+0x2c0/0x490 [ 4223.822642] </NMI> [ 4223.822642] qi_flush_dev_iotlb+0xb1/0xd0 [ 4223.822642] __dmar_remove_one_dev_info+0x224/0x250 [ 4223.822643] dmar_remove_one_dev_info+0x3e/0x50 [ 4223.822643] intel_iommu_release_device+0x1f/0x30 [ 4223.822643] iommu_release_device+0x33/0x60 [ 4223.822643] iommu_bus_notifier+0x7f/0x90 [ 4223.822644] blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x60/0x90 [ 4223.822644] device_del+0x2e5/0x420 [ 4223.822644] pci_remove_bus_device+0x70/0x110 [ 4223.822644] pciehp_unconfigure_device+0x7c/0x130 [ 4223.822644] pciehp_disable_slot+0x6b/0x100 [ 4223.822645] pciehp_handle_presence_or_link_change+0xd8/0x320 [ 4223.822645] pciehp_ist+0x176/0x180 [ 4223.822645] ? irq_finalize_oneshot.part.50+0x110/0x110 [ 4223.822645] irq_thread_fn+0x19/0x50 [ 4223.822646] irq_thread+0x104/0x190 [ 4223.822646] ? irq_forced_thread_fn+0x90/0x90 [ 4223.822646] ? irq_thread_check_affinity+0xe0/0xe0 [ 4223.822646] kthread+0x114/0x130 [ 4223.822647] ? __kthread_cancel_work+0x40/0x40 [ 4223.822647] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [ 4223.822647] Kernel Offset: 0x6400000 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff) Such issue could be triggered by all kinds of regular surprise removal hotplug operation. like: 1. pull EP(endpoint device) out directly. 2. turn off EP's power. 3. bring the link down. etc. this patch aims to work for regular safe removal and surprise removal unplug. these hot unplug handling process could be optimized for fix the ATS Invalidation hang issue by calling pci_dev_is_disconnected() in function devtlb_invalidation_with_pasid() to check target device state to avoid sending meaningless ATS Invalidation request to iommu when device is gone. (see IMPLEMENTATION NOTE in PCIe spec r6.1 section 10.3.1) For safe removal, device wouldn't be removed until the whole software handling process is done, it wouldn't trigger the hard lock up issue caused by too long ATS Invalidation timeout wait. In safe removal path, device state isn't set to pci_channel_io_perm_failure in pciehp_unconfigure_device() by checking 'presence' parameter, calling pci_dev_is_disconnected() in devtlb_invalidation_with_pasid() will return false there, wouldn't break the function. For surprise removal, device state is set to pci_channel_io_perm_failure in pciehp_unconfigure_device(), means device is already gone (disconnected) call pci_dev_is_disconnected() in devtlb_invalidation_with_pasid() will return true to break the function not to send ATS Invalidation request to the disconnected device blindly, thus avoid to trigger further ITE fault, and ITE fault will block all invalidation request to be handled. furthermore retry the timeout request could trigger hard lockup. safe removal (present) & surprise removal (not present) pciehp_ist() pciehp_handle_presence_or_link_change() pciehp_disable_slot() remove_board() pciehp_unconfigure_device(presence) { if (!presence) pci_walk_bus(parent, pci_dev_set_disconnected, NULL); } this patch works for regular safe removal and surprise removal of ATS capable endpoint on PCIe switch downstream ports. Fixes: 6f7db75e1c46 ("iommu/vt-d: Add second level page table interface") Reviewed-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter(a)linaro.org> Tested-by: Haorong Ye <yehaorong(a)bytedance.com> Signed-off-by: Ethan Zhao <haifeng.zhao(a)linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240301080727.3529832-3-haifeng.zhao@linux.intel… Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu(a)linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel(a)suse.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Wang Hai <wanghai38(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c b/drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c index fb911b6c418f..f85326a7a269 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c +++ b/drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c @@ -477,6 +477,9 @@ devtlb_invalidation_with_pasid(struct intel_iommu *iommu, if (!info || !info->ats_enabled) return; + if (pci_dev_is_disconnected(to_pci_dev(dev))) + return; + sid = info->bus << 8 | info->devfn; qdep = info->ats_qdep; pfsid = info->pfsid; -- 2.17.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] llc: make llc_ui_sendmsg() more robust against bonding changes
by Guo Mengqi 14 May '24

14 May '24

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.210 commit 04f2a74b562f3a7498be0399309669f342793d8c category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I99JVI CVE: CVE-2024-26636 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… --------------------------- [ Upstream commit dad555c816a50c6a6a8a86be1f9177673918c647 ] syzbot was able to trick llc_ui_sendmsg(), allocating an skb with no headroom, but subsequently trying to push 14 bytes of Ethernet header [1] Like some others, llc_ui_sendmsg() releases the socket lock before calling sock_alloc_send_skb(). Then it acquires it again, but does not redo all the sanity checks that were performed. This fix: - Uses LL_RESERVED_SPACE() to reserve space. - Check all conditions again after socket lock is held again. - Do not account Ethernet header for mtu limitation. [1] skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffff800088baa334 len:1514 put:14 head:ffff0000c9c37000 data:ffff0000c9c36ff2 tail:0x5dc end:0x6c0 dev:bond0 kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:193 ! Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 6875 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.7.0-rc8-syzkaller-00101-g0802e17d9aca-dirty #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 11/17/2023 pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : skb_panic net/core/skbuff.c:189 [inline] pc : skb_under_panic+0x13c/0x140 net/core/skbuff.c:203 lr : skb_panic net/core/skbuff.c:189 [inline] lr : skb_under_panic+0x13c/0x140 net/core/skbuff.c:203 sp : ffff800096f97000 x29: ffff800096f97010 x28: ffff80008cc8d668 x27: dfff800000000000 x26: ffff0000cb970c90 x25: 00000000000005dc x24: ffff0000c9c36ff2 x23: ffff0000c9c37000 x22: 00000000000005ea x21: 00000000000006c0 x20: 000000000000000e x19: ffff800088baa334 x18: 1fffe000368261ce x17: ffff80008e4ed000 x16: ffff80008a8310f8 x15: 0000000000000001 x14: 1ffff00012df2d58 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 x11: 0000000000000001 x10: 0000000000ff0100 x9 : e28a51f1087e8400 x8 : e28a51f1087e8400 x7 : ffff80008028f8d0 x6 : 0000000000000000 x5 : 0000000000000001 x4 : 0000000000000001 x3 : ffff800082b78714 x2 : 0000000000000001 x1 : 0000000100000000 x0 : 0000000000000089 Call trace: skb_panic net/core/skbuff.c:189 [inline] skb_under_panic+0x13c/0x140 net/core/skbuff.c:203 skb_push+0xf0/0x108 net/core/skbuff.c:2451 eth_header+0x44/0x1f8 net/ethernet/eth.c:83 dev_hard_header include/linux/netdevice.h:3188 [inline] llc_mac_hdr_init+0x110/0x17c net/llc/llc_output.c:33 llc_sap_action_send_xid_c+0x170/0x344 net/llc/llc_s_ac.c:85 llc_exec_sap_trans_actions net/llc/llc_sap.c:153 [inline] llc_sap_next_state net/llc/llc_sap.c:182 [inline] llc_sap_state_process+0x1ec/0x774 net/llc/llc_sap.c:209 llc_build_and_send_xid_pkt+0x12c/0x1c0 net/llc/llc_sap.c:270 llc_ui_sendmsg+0x7bc/0xb1c net/llc/af_llc.c:997 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0x194/0x274 net/socket.c:767 splice_to_socket+0x7cc/0xd58 fs/splice.c:881 do_splice_from fs/splice.c:933 [inline] direct_splice_actor+0xe4/0x1c0 fs/splice.c:1142 splice_direct_to_actor+0x2a0/0x7e4 fs/splice.c:1088 do_splice_direct+0x20c/0x348 fs/splice.c:1194 do_sendfile+0x4bc/0xc70 fs/read_write.c:1254 __do_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1322 [inline] __se_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1308 [inline] __arm64_sys_sendfile64+0x160/0x3b4 fs/read_write.c:1308 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:37 [inline] invoke_syscall+0x98/0x2b8 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:51 el0_svc_common+0x130/0x23c arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:136 do_el0_svc+0x48/0x58 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:155 el0_svc+0x54/0x158 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:678 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xfc arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:696 el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:595 Code: aa1803e6 aa1903e7 a90023f5 94792f6a (d4210000) Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+2a7024e9502df538e8ef(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu(a)amazon.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240118183625.4007013-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Liu Jian <liujian56(a)huawei.com> --- net/llc/af_llc.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/llc/af_llc.c b/net/llc/af_llc.c index bde7b5b822a8..eea29cb65502 100644 --- a/net/llc/af_llc.c +++ b/net/llc/af_llc.c @@ -927,14 +927,15 @@ static int llc_ui_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, */ static int llc_ui_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len) { + DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_llc *, addr, msg->msg_name); struct sock *sk = sock->sk; struct llc_sock *llc = llc_sk(sk); - DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_llc *, addr, msg->msg_name); int flags = msg->msg_flags; int noblock = flags & MSG_DONTWAIT; + int rc = -EINVAL, copied = 0, hdrlen, hh_len; struct sk_buff *skb = NULL; + struct net_device *dev; size_t size = 0; - int rc = -EINVAL, copied = 0, hdrlen; dprintk("%s: sending from %02X to %02X\n", __func__, llc->laddr.lsap, llc->daddr.lsap); @@ -954,22 +955,29 @@ static int llc_ui_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len) if (rc) goto out; } - hdrlen = llc->dev->hard_header_len + llc_ui_header_len(sk, addr); + dev = llc->dev; + hh_len = LL_RESERVED_SPACE(dev); + hdrlen = llc_ui_header_len(sk, addr); size = hdrlen + len; - if (size > llc->dev->mtu) - size = llc->dev->mtu; + size = min_t(size_t, size, READ_ONCE(dev->mtu)); copied = size - hdrlen; rc = -EINVAL; if (copied < 0) goto out; release_sock(sk); - skb = sock_alloc_send_skb(sk, size, noblock, &rc); + skb = sock_alloc_send_skb(sk, hh_len + size, noblock, &rc); lock_sock(sk); if (!skb) goto out; - skb->dev = llc->dev; + if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED) || + llc->dev != dev || + hdrlen != llc_ui_header_len(sk, addr) || + hh_len != LL_RESERVED_SPACE(dev) || + size > READ_ONCE(dev->mtu)) + goto out; + skb->dev = dev; skb->protocol = llc_proto_type(addr->sllc_arphrd); - skb_reserve(skb, hdrlen); + skb_reserve(skb, hh_len + hdrlen); rc = memcpy_from_msg(skb_put(skb, copied), msg, copied); if (rc) goto out; -- 2.17.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS] llc: Drop support for ETH_P_TR_802_2.
by Guo Mengqi 14 May '24

14 May '24

From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu(a)amazon.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.210 commit 9ccdef19cf9497c2803b005369668feb91cacdfd category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I99JSA CVE: CVE-2024-26635 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… --------------------------- [ Upstream commit e3f9bed9bee261e3347131764e42aeedf1ffea61 ] syzbot reported an uninit-value bug below. [0] llc supports ETH_P_802_2 (0x0004) and used to support ETH_P_TR_802_2 (0x0011), and syzbot abused the latter to trigger the bug. write$tun(r0, &(0x7f0000000040)={@val={0x0, 0x11}, @val, @mpls={[], @llc={@snap={0xaa, 0x1, ')', "90e5dd"}}}}, 0x16) llc_conn_handler() initialises local variables {saddr,daddr}.mac based on skb in llc_pdu_decode_sa()/llc_pdu_decode_da() and passes them to __llc_lookup(). However, the initialisation is done only when skb->protocol is htons(ETH_P_802_2), otherwise, __llc_lookup_established() and __llc_lookup_listener() will read garbage. The missing initialisation existed prior to commit 211ed865108e ("net: delete all instances of special processing for token ring"). It removed the part to kick out the token ring stuff but forgot to close the door allowing ETH_P_TR_802_2 packets to sneak into llc_rcv(). Let's remove llc_tr_packet_type and complete the deprecation. [0]: BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in __llc_lookup_established+0xe9d/0xf90 __llc_lookup_established+0xe9d/0xf90 __llc_lookup net/llc/llc_conn.c:611 [inline] llc_conn_handler+0x4bd/0x1360 net/llc/llc_conn.c:791 llc_rcv+0xfbb/0x14a0 net/llc/llc_input.c:206 __netif_receive_skb_one_core net/core/dev.c:5527 [inline] __netif_receive_skb+0x1a6/0x5a0 net/core/dev.c:5641 netif_receive_skb_internal net/core/dev.c:5727 [inline] netif_receive_skb+0x58/0x660 net/core/dev.c:5786 tun_rx_batched+0x3ee/0x980 drivers/net/tun.c:1555 tun_get_user+0x53af/0x66d0 drivers/net/tun.c:2002 tun_chr_write_iter+0x3af/0x5d0 drivers/net/tun.c:2048 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2020 [inline] new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:491 [inline] vfs_write+0x8ef/0x1490 fs/read_write.c:584 ksys_write+0x20f/0x4c0 fs/read_write.c:637 __do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:649 [inline] __se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:646 [inline] __x64_sys_write+0x93/0xd0 fs/read_write.c:646 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x44/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:82 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b Local variable daddr created at: llc_conn_handler+0x53/0x1360 net/llc/llc_conn.c:783 llc_rcv+0xfbb/0x14a0 net/llc/llc_input.c:206 CPU: 1 PID: 5004 Comm: syz-executor994 Not tainted 6.6.0-syzkaller-14500-g1c41041124bd #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/09/2023 Fixes: 211ed865108e ("net: delete all instances of special processing for token ring") Reported-by: syzbot+b5ad66046b913bc04c6f(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=b5ad66046b913bc04c6f Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu(a)amazon.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240119015515.61898-1-kuniyu@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Liu Jian <liujian56(a)huawei.com> --- include/net/llc_pdu.h | 6 ++---- net/llc/llc_core.c | 7 ------- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/llc_pdu.h b/include/net/llc_pdu.h index 49aa79c7b278..581cd37aa98b 100644 --- a/include/net/llc_pdu.h +++ b/include/net/llc_pdu.h @@ -262,8 +262,7 @@ static inline void llc_pdu_header_init(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 type, */ static inline void llc_pdu_decode_sa(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *sa) { - if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_802_2)) - memcpy(sa, eth_hdr(skb)->h_source, ETH_ALEN); + memcpy(sa, eth_hdr(skb)->h_source, ETH_ALEN); } /** @@ -275,8 +274,7 @@ static inline void llc_pdu_decode_sa(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *sa) */ static inline void llc_pdu_decode_da(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *da) { - if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_802_2)) - memcpy(da, eth_hdr(skb)->h_dest, ETH_ALEN); + memcpy(da, eth_hdr(skb)->h_dest, ETH_ALEN); } /** diff --git a/net/llc/llc_core.c b/net/llc/llc_core.c index 64d4bef04e73..4900a27b5176 100644 --- a/net/llc/llc_core.c +++ b/net/llc/llc_core.c @@ -135,22 +135,15 @@ static struct packet_type llc_packet_type __read_mostly = { .func = llc_rcv, }; -static struct packet_type llc_tr_packet_type __read_mostly = { - .type = cpu_to_be16(ETH_P_TR_802_2), - .func = llc_rcv, -}; - static int __init llc_init(void) { dev_add_pack(&llc_packet_type); - dev_add_pack(&llc_tr_packet_type); return 0; } static void __exit llc_exit(void) { dev_remove_pack(&llc_packet_type); - dev_remove_pack(&llc_tr_packet_type); } module_init(llc_init); -- 2.17.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP2] llc: Drop support for ETH_P_TR_802_2.
by Guo Mengqi 14 May '24

14 May '24

From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu(a)amazon.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.210 commit 9ccdef19cf9497c2803b005369668feb91cacdfd category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I99JSA CVE: CVE-2024-26635 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… --------------------------- [ Upstream commit e3f9bed9bee261e3347131764e42aeedf1ffea61 ] syzbot reported an uninit-value bug below. [0] llc supports ETH_P_802_2 (0x0004) and used to support ETH_P_TR_802_2 (0x0011), and syzbot abused the latter to trigger the bug. write$tun(r0, &(0x7f0000000040)={@val={0x0, 0x11}, @val, @mpls={[], @llc={@snap={0xaa, 0x1, ')', "90e5dd"}}}}, 0x16) llc_conn_handler() initialises local variables {saddr,daddr}.mac based on skb in llc_pdu_decode_sa()/llc_pdu_decode_da() and passes them to __llc_lookup(). However, the initialisation is done only when skb->protocol is htons(ETH_P_802_2), otherwise, __llc_lookup_established() and __llc_lookup_listener() will read garbage. The missing initialisation existed prior to commit 211ed865108e ("net: delete all instances of special processing for token ring"). It removed the part to kick out the token ring stuff but forgot to close the door allowing ETH_P_TR_802_2 packets to sneak into llc_rcv(). Let's remove llc_tr_packet_type and complete the deprecation. [0]: BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in __llc_lookup_established+0xe9d/0xf90 __llc_lookup_established+0xe9d/0xf90 __llc_lookup net/llc/llc_conn.c:611 [inline] llc_conn_handler+0x4bd/0x1360 net/llc/llc_conn.c:791 llc_rcv+0xfbb/0x14a0 net/llc/llc_input.c:206 __netif_receive_skb_one_core net/core/dev.c:5527 [inline] __netif_receive_skb+0x1a6/0x5a0 net/core/dev.c:5641 netif_receive_skb_internal net/core/dev.c:5727 [inline] netif_receive_skb+0x58/0x660 net/core/dev.c:5786 tun_rx_batched+0x3ee/0x980 drivers/net/tun.c:1555 tun_get_user+0x53af/0x66d0 drivers/net/tun.c:2002 tun_chr_write_iter+0x3af/0x5d0 drivers/net/tun.c:2048 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2020 [inline] new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:491 [inline] vfs_write+0x8ef/0x1490 fs/read_write.c:584 ksys_write+0x20f/0x4c0 fs/read_write.c:637 __do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:649 [inline] __se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:646 [inline] __x64_sys_write+0x93/0xd0 fs/read_write.c:646 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x44/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:82 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b Local variable daddr created at: llc_conn_handler+0x53/0x1360 net/llc/llc_conn.c:783 llc_rcv+0xfbb/0x14a0 net/llc/llc_input.c:206 CPU: 1 PID: 5004 Comm: syz-executor994 Not tainted 6.6.0-syzkaller-14500-g1c41041124bd #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/09/2023 Fixes: 211ed865108e ("net: delete all instances of special processing for token ring") Reported-by: syzbot+b5ad66046b913bc04c6f(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=b5ad66046b913bc04c6f Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu(a)amazon.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240119015515.61898-1-kuniyu@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Liu Jian <liujian56(a)huawei.com> --- include/net/llc_pdu.h | 6 ++---- net/llc/llc_core.c | 7 ------- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/llc_pdu.h b/include/net/llc_pdu.h index 49aa79c7b278..581cd37aa98b 100644 --- a/include/net/llc_pdu.h +++ b/include/net/llc_pdu.h @@ -262,8 +262,7 @@ static inline void llc_pdu_header_init(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 type, */ static inline void llc_pdu_decode_sa(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *sa) { - if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_802_2)) - memcpy(sa, eth_hdr(skb)->h_source, ETH_ALEN); + memcpy(sa, eth_hdr(skb)->h_source, ETH_ALEN); } /** @@ -275,8 +274,7 @@ static inline void llc_pdu_decode_sa(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *sa) */ static inline void llc_pdu_decode_da(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *da) { - if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_802_2)) - memcpy(da, eth_hdr(skb)->h_dest, ETH_ALEN); + memcpy(da, eth_hdr(skb)->h_dest, ETH_ALEN); } /** diff --git a/net/llc/llc_core.c b/net/llc/llc_core.c index 64d4bef04e73..4900a27b5176 100644 --- a/net/llc/llc_core.c +++ b/net/llc/llc_core.c @@ -135,22 +135,15 @@ static struct packet_type llc_packet_type __read_mostly = { .func = llc_rcv, }; -static struct packet_type llc_tr_packet_type __read_mostly = { - .type = cpu_to_be16(ETH_P_TR_802_2), - .func = llc_rcv, -}; - static int __init llc_init(void) { dev_add_pack(&llc_packet_type); - dev_add_pack(&llc_tr_packet_type); return 0; } static void __exit llc_exit(void) { dev_remove_pack(&llc_packet_type); - dev_remove_pack(&llc_tr_packet_type); } module_init(llc_init); -- 2.17.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP2] llc: make llc_ui_sendmsg() more robust against bonding changes
by Guo Mengqi 14 May '24

14 May '24

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.210 commit 04f2a74b562f3a7498be0399309669f342793d8c category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I99JVI CVE: CVE-2024-26636 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… --------------------------- [ Upstream commit dad555c816a50c6a6a8a86be1f9177673918c647 ] syzbot was able to trick llc_ui_sendmsg(), allocating an skb with no headroom, but subsequently trying to push 14 bytes of Ethernet header [1] Like some others, llc_ui_sendmsg() releases the socket lock before calling sock_alloc_send_skb(). Then it acquires it again, but does not redo all the sanity checks that were performed. This fix: - Uses LL_RESERVED_SPACE() to reserve space. - Check all conditions again after socket lock is held again. - Do not account Ethernet header for mtu limitation. [1] skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffff800088baa334 len:1514 put:14 head:ffff0000c9c37000 data:ffff0000c9c36ff2 tail:0x5dc end:0x6c0 dev:bond0 kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:193 ! Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 6875 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.7.0-rc8-syzkaller-00101-g0802e17d9aca-dirty #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 11/17/2023 pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : skb_panic net/core/skbuff.c:189 [inline] pc : skb_under_panic+0x13c/0x140 net/core/skbuff.c:203 lr : skb_panic net/core/skbuff.c:189 [inline] lr : skb_under_panic+0x13c/0x140 net/core/skbuff.c:203 sp : ffff800096f97000 x29: ffff800096f97010 x28: ffff80008cc8d668 x27: dfff800000000000 x26: ffff0000cb970c90 x25: 00000000000005dc x24: ffff0000c9c36ff2 x23: ffff0000c9c37000 x22: 00000000000005ea x21: 00000000000006c0 x20: 000000000000000e x19: ffff800088baa334 x18: 1fffe000368261ce x17: ffff80008e4ed000 x16: ffff80008a8310f8 x15: 0000000000000001 x14: 1ffff00012df2d58 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 x11: 0000000000000001 x10: 0000000000ff0100 x9 : e28a51f1087e8400 x8 : e28a51f1087e8400 x7 : ffff80008028f8d0 x6 : 0000000000000000 x5 : 0000000000000001 x4 : 0000000000000001 x3 : ffff800082b78714 x2 : 0000000000000001 x1 : 0000000100000000 x0 : 0000000000000089 Call trace: skb_panic net/core/skbuff.c:189 [inline] skb_under_panic+0x13c/0x140 net/core/skbuff.c:203 skb_push+0xf0/0x108 net/core/skbuff.c:2451 eth_header+0x44/0x1f8 net/ethernet/eth.c:83 dev_hard_header include/linux/netdevice.h:3188 [inline] llc_mac_hdr_init+0x110/0x17c net/llc/llc_output.c:33 llc_sap_action_send_xid_c+0x170/0x344 net/llc/llc_s_ac.c:85 llc_exec_sap_trans_actions net/llc/llc_sap.c:153 [inline] llc_sap_next_state net/llc/llc_sap.c:182 [inline] llc_sap_state_process+0x1ec/0x774 net/llc/llc_sap.c:209 llc_build_and_send_xid_pkt+0x12c/0x1c0 net/llc/llc_sap.c:270 llc_ui_sendmsg+0x7bc/0xb1c net/llc/af_llc.c:997 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0x194/0x274 net/socket.c:767 splice_to_socket+0x7cc/0xd58 fs/splice.c:881 do_splice_from fs/splice.c:933 [inline] direct_splice_actor+0xe4/0x1c0 fs/splice.c:1142 splice_direct_to_actor+0x2a0/0x7e4 fs/splice.c:1088 do_splice_direct+0x20c/0x348 fs/splice.c:1194 do_sendfile+0x4bc/0xc70 fs/read_write.c:1254 __do_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1322 [inline] __se_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1308 [inline] __arm64_sys_sendfile64+0x160/0x3b4 fs/read_write.c:1308 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:37 [inline] invoke_syscall+0x98/0x2b8 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:51 el0_svc_common+0x130/0x23c arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:136 do_el0_svc+0x48/0x58 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:155 el0_svc+0x54/0x158 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:678 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xfc arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:696 el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:595 Code: aa1803e6 aa1903e7 a90023f5 94792f6a (d4210000) Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+2a7024e9502df538e8ef(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu(a)amazon.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240118183625.4007013-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Liu Jian <liujian56(a)huawei.com> --- net/llc/af_llc.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/llc/af_llc.c b/net/llc/af_llc.c index 90a32864401c..dae978badd26 100644 --- a/net/llc/af_llc.c +++ b/net/llc/af_llc.c @@ -929,14 +929,15 @@ static int llc_ui_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, */ static int llc_ui_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len) { + DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_llc *, addr, msg->msg_name); struct sock *sk = sock->sk; struct llc_sock *llc = llc_sk(sk); - DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_llc *, addr, msg->msg_name); int flags = msg->msg_flags; int noblock = flags & MSG_DONTWAIT; + int rc = -EINVAL, copied = 0, hdrlen, hh_len; struct sk_buff *skb = NULL; + struct net_device *dev; size_t size = 0; - int rc = -EINVAL, copied = 0, hdrlen; dprintk("%s: sending from %02X to %02X\n", __func__, llc->laddr.lsap, llc->daddr.lsap); @@ -956,22 +957,29 @@ static int llc_ui_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len) if (rc) goto out; } - hdrlen = llc->dev->hard_header_len + llc_ui_header_len(sk, addr); + dev = llc->dev; + hh_len = LL_RESERVED_SPACE(dev); + hdrlen = llc_ui_header_len(sk, addr); size = hdrlen + len; - if (size > llc->dev->mtu) - size = llc->dev->mtu; + size = min_t(size_t, size, READ_ONCE(dev->mtu)); copied = size - hdrlen; rc = -EINVAL; if (copied < 0) goto out; release_sock(sk); - skb = sock_alloc_send_skb(sk, size, noblock, &rc); + skb = sock_alloc_send_skb(sk, hh_len + size, noblock, &rc); lock_sock(sk); if (!skb) goto out; - skb->dev = llc->dev; + if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED) || + llc->dev != dev || + hdrlen != llc_ui_header_len(sk, addr) || + hh_len != LL_RESERVED_SPACE(dev) || + size > READ_ONCE(dev->mtu)) + goto out; + skb->dev = dev; skb->protocol = llc_proto_type(addr->sllc_arphrd); - skb_reserve(skb, hdrlen); + skb_reserve(skb, hh_len + hdrlen); rc = memcpy_from_msg(skb_put(skb, copied), msg, copied); if (rc) goto out; -- 2.17.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS] llc: make llc_ui_sendmsg() more robust against bonding changes
by Guo Mengqi 14 May '24

14 May '24

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.210 commit 04f2a74b562f3a7498be0399309669f342793d8c category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I99JVI CVE: CVE-2024-26636 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… --------------------------- [ Upstream commit dad555c816a50c6a6a8a86be1f9177673918c647 ] syzbot was able to trick llc_ui_sendmsg(), allocating an skb with no headroom, but subsequently trying to push 14 bytes of Ethernet header [1] Like some others, llc_ui_sendmsg() releases the socket lock before calling sock_alloc_send_skb(). Then it acquires it again, but does not redo all the sanity checks that were performed. This fix: - Uses LL_RESERVED_SPACE() to reserve space. - Check all conditions again after socket lock is held again. - Do not account Ethernet header for mtu limitation. [1] skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffff800088baa334 len:1514 put:14 head:ffff0000c9c37000 data:ffff0000c9c36ff2 tail:0x5dc end:0x6c0 dev:bond0 kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:193 ! Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 6875 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.7.0-rc8-syzkaller-00101-g0802e17d9aca-dirty #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 11/17/2023 pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : skb_panic net/core/skbuff.c:189 [inline] pc : skb_under_panic+0x13c/0x140 net/core/skbuff.c:203 lr : skb_panic net/core/skbuff.c:189 [inline] lr : skb_under_panic+0x13c/0x140 net/core/skbuff.c:203 sp : ffff800096f97000 x29: ffff800096f97010 x28: ffff80008cc8d668 x27: dfff800000000000 x26: ffff0000cb970c90 x25: 00000000000005dc x24: ffff0000c9c36ff2 x23: ffff0000c9c37000 x22: 00000000000005ea x21: 00000000000006c0 x20: 000000000000000e x19: ffff800088baa334 x18: 1fffe000368261ce x17: ffff80008e4ed000 x16: ffff80008a8310f8 x15: 0000000000000001 x14: 1ffff00012df2d58 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 x11: 0000000000000001 x10: 0000000000ff0100 x9 : e28a51f1087e8400 x8 : e28a51f1087e8400 x7 : ffff80008028f8d0 x6 : 0000000000000000 x5 : 0000000000000001 x4 : 0000000000000001 x3 : ffff800082b78714 x2 : 0000000000000001 x1 : 0000000100000000 x0 : 0000000000000089 Call trace: skb_panic net/core/skbuff.c:189 [inline] skb_under_panic+0x13c/0x140 net/core/skbuff.c:203 skb_push+0xf0/0x108 net/core/skbuff.c:2451 eth_header+0x44/0x1f8 net/ethernet/eth.c:83 dev_hard_header include/linux/netdevice.h:3188 [inline] llc_mac_hdr_init+0x110/0x17c net/llc/llc_output.c:33 llc_sap_action_send_xid_c+0x170/0x344 net/llc/llc_s_ac.c:85 llc_exec_sap_trans_actions net/llc/llc_sap.c:153 [inline] llc_sap_next_state net/llc/llc_sap.c:182 [inline] llc_sap_state_process+0x1ec/0x774 net/llc/llc_sap.c:209 llc_build_and_send_xid_pkt+0x12c/0x1c0 net/llc/llc_sap.c:270 llc_ui_sendmsg+0x7bc/0xb1c net/llc/af_llc.c:997 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0x194/0x274 net/socket.c:767 splice_to_socket+0x7cc/0xd58 fs/splice.c:881 do_splice_from fs/splice.c:933 [inline] direct_splice_actor+0xe4/0x1c0 fs/splice.c:1142 splice_direct_to_actor+0x2a0/0x7e4 fs/splice.c:1088 do_splice_direct+0x20c/0x348 fs/splice.c:1194 do_sendfile+0x4bc/0xc70 fs/read_write.c:1254 __do_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1322 [inline] __se_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1308 [inline] __arm64_sys_sendfile64+0x160/0x3b4 fs/read_write.c:1308 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:37 [inline] invoke_syscall+0x98/0x2b8 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:51 el0_svc_common+0x130/0x23c arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:136 do_el0_svc+0x48/0x58 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:155 el0_svc+0x54/0x158 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:678 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xfc arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:696 el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:595 Code: aa1803e6 aa1903e7 a90023f5 94792f6a (d4210000) Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+2a7024e9502df538e8ef(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu(a)amazon.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240118183625.4007013-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Liu Jian <liujian56(a)huawei.com> --- net/llc/af_llc.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/llc/af_llc.c b/net/llc/af_llc.c index bde7b5b822a8..eea29cb65502 100644 --- a/net/llc/af_llc.c +++ b/net/llc/af_llc.c @@ -927,14 +927,15 @@ static int llc_ui_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, */ static int llc_ui_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len) { + DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_llc *, addr, msg->msg_name); struct sock *sk = sock->sk; struct llc_sock *llc = llc_sk(sk); - DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_llc *, addr, msg->msg_name); int flags = msg->msg_flags; int noblock = flags & MSG_DONTWAIT; + int rc = -EINVAL, copied = 0, hdrlen, hh_len; struct sk_buff *skb = NULL; + struct net_device *dev; size_t size = 0; - int rc = -EINVAL, copied = 0, hdrlen; dprintk("%s: sending from %02X to %02X\n", __func__, llc->laddr.lsap, llc->daddr.lsap); @@ -954,22 +955,29 @@ static int llc_ui_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len) if (rc) goto out; } - hdrlen = llc->dev->hard_header_len + llc_ui_header_len(sk, addr); + dev = llc->dev; + hh_len = LL_RESERVED_SPACE(dev); + hdrlen = llc_ui_header_len(sk, addr); size = hdrlen + len; - if (size > llc->dev->mtu) - size = llc->dev->mtu; + size = min_t(size_t, size, READ_ONCE(dev->mtu)); copied = size - hdrlen; rc = -EINVAL; if (copied < 0) goto out; release_sock(sk); - skb = sock_alloc_send_skb(sk, size, noblock, &rc); + skb = sock_alloc_send_skb(sk, hh_len + size, noblock, &rc); lock_sock(sk); if (!skb) goto out; - skb->dev = llc->dev; + if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED) || + llc->dev != dev || + hdrlen != llc_ui_header_len(sk, addr) || + hh_len != LL_RESERVED_SPACE(dev) || + size > READ_ONCE(dev->mtu)) + goto out; + skb->dev = dev; skb->protocol = llc_proto_type(addr->sllc_arphrd); - skb_reserve(skb, hdrlen); + skb_reserve(skb, hh_len + hdrlen); rc = memcpy_from_msg(skb_put(skb, copied), msg, copied); if (rc) goto out; -- 2.17.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] llc: Drop support for ETH_P_TR_802_2.
by Guo Mengqi 14 May '24

14 May '24

From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu(a)amazon.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.210 commit 9ccdef19cf9497c2803b005369668feb91cacdfd category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I99JSA CVE: CVE-2024-26635 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… --------------------------- [ Upstream commit e3f9bed9bee261e3347131764e42aeedf1ffea61 ] syzbot reported an uninit-value bug below. [0] llc supports ETH_P_802_2 (0x0004) and used to support ETH_P_TR_802_2 (0x0011), and syzbot abused the latter to trigger the bug. write$tun(r0, &(0x7f0000000040)={@val={0x0, 0x11}, @val, @mpls={[], @llc={@snap={0xaa, 0x1, ')', "90e5dd"}}}}, 0x16) llc_conn_handler() initialises local variables {saddr,daddr}.mac based on skb in llc_pdu_decode_sa()/llc_pdu_decode_da() and passes them to __llc_lookup(). However, the initialisation is done only when skb->protocol is htons(ETH_P_802_2), otherwise, __llc_lookup_established() and __llc_lookup_listener() will read garbage. The missing initialisation existed prior to commit 211ed865108e ("net: delete all instances of special processing for token ring"). It removed the part to kick out the token ring stuff but forgot to close the door allowing ETH_P_TR_802_2 packets to sneak into llc_rcv(). Let's remove llc_tr_packet_type and complete the deprecation. [0]: BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in __llc_lookup_established+0xe9d/0xf90 __llc_lookup_established+0xe9d/0xf90 __llc_lookup net/llc/llc_conn.c:611 [inline] llc_conn_handler+0x4bd/0x1360 net/llc/llc_conn.c:791 llc_rcv+0xfbb/0x14a0 net/llc/llc_input.c:206 __netif_receive_skb_one_core net/core/dev.c:5527 [inline] __netif_receive_skb+0x1a6/0x5a0 net/core/dev.c:5641 netif_receive_skb_internal net/core/dev.c:5727 [inline] netif_receive_skb+0x58/0x660 net/core/dev.c:5786 tun_rx_batched+0x3ee/0x980 drivers/net/tun.c:1555 tun_get_user+0x53af/0x66d0 drivers/net/tun.c:2002 tun_chr_write_iter+0x3af/0x5d0 drivers/net/tun.c:2048 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2020 [inline] new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:491 [inline] vfs_write+0x8ef/0x1490 fs/read_write.c:584 ksys_write+0x20f/0x4c0 fs/read_write.c:637 __do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:649 [inline] __se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:646 [inline] __x64_sys_write+0x93/0xd0 fs/read_write.c:646 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x44/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:82 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b Local variable daddr created at: llc_conn_handler+0x53/0x1360 net/llc/llc_conn.c:783 llc_rcv+0xfbb/0x14a0 net/llc/llc_input.c:206 CPU: 1 PID: 5004 Comm: syz-executor994 Not tainted 6.6.0-syzkaller-14500-g1c41041124bd #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/09/2023 Fixes: 211ed865108e ("net: delete all instances of special processing for token ring") Reported-by: syzbot+b5ad66046b913bc04c6f(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=b5ad66046b913bc04c6f Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu(a)amazon.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240119015515.61898-1-kuniyu@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Liu Jian <liujian56(a)huawei.com> --- include/net/llc_pdu.h | 6 ++---- net/llc/llc_core.c | 7 ------- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/llc_pdu.h b/include/net/llc_pdu.h index 49aa79c7b278..581cd37aa98b 100644 --- a/include/net/llc_pdu.h +++ b/include/net/llc_pdu.h @@ -262,8 +262,7 @@ static inline void llc_pdu_header_init(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 type, */ static inline void llc_pdu_decode_sa(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *sa) { - if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_802_2)) - memcpy(sa, eth_hdr(skb)->h_source, ETH_ALEN); + memcpy(sa, eth_hdr(skb)->h_source, ETH_ALEN); } /** @@ -275,8 +274,7 @@ static inline void llc_pdu_decode_sa(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *sa) */ static inline void llc_pdu_decode_da(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *da) { - if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_802_2)) - memcpy(da, eth_hdr(skb)->h_dest, ETH_ALEN); + memcpy(da, eth_hdr(skb)->h_dest, ETH_ALEN); } /** diff --git a/net/llc/llc_core.c b/net/llc/llc_core.c index 64d4bef04e73..4900a27b5176 100644 --- a/net/llc/llc_core.c +++ b/net/llc/llc_core.c @@ -135,22 +135,15 @@ static struct packet_type llc_packet_type __read_mostly = { .func = llc_rcv, }; -static struct packet_type llc_tr_packet_type __read_mostly = { - .type = cpu_to_be16(ETH_P_TR_802_2), - .func = llc_rcv, -}; - static int __init llc_init(void) { dev_add_pack(&llc_packet_type); - dev_add_pack(&llc_tr_packet_type); return 0; } static void __exit llc_exit(void) { dev_remove_pack(&llc_packet_type); - dev_remove_pack(&llc_tr_packet_type); } module_init(llc_init); -- 2.17.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP2] binder: fix race between mmput() and do_exit()
by Guo Mengqi 14 May '24

14 May '24

From: Carlos Llamas <cmllamas(a)google.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.209 commit 7e7a0d86542b0ea903006d3f42f33c4f7ead6918 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I99JWJ Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 9a9ab0d963621d9d12199df9817e66982582d5a5 upstream. Task A calls binder_update_page_range() to allocate and insert pages on a remote address space from Task B. For this, Task A pins the remote mm via mmget_not_zero() first. This can race with Task B do_exit() and the final mmput() refcount decrement will come from Task A. Task A | Task B ------------------+------------------ mmget_not_zero() | | do_exit() | exit_mm() | mmput() mmput() | exit_mmap() | remove_vma() | fput() | In this case, the work of ____fput() from Task B is queued up in Task A as TWA_RESUME. So in theory, Task A returns to userspace and the cleanup work gets executed. However, Task A instead sleep, waiting for a reply from Task B that never comes (it's dead). This means the binder_deferred_release() is blocked until an unrelated binder event forces Task A to go back to userspace. All the associated death notifications will also be delayed until then. In order to fix this use mmput_async() that will schedule the work in the corresponding mm->async_put_work WQ instead of Task A. Fixes: 457b9a6f09f0 ("Staging: android: add binder driver") Reviewed-by: Alice Ryhl <aliceryhl(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas <cmllamas(a)google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231201172212.1813387-4-cmllamas@google.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Wang Hai <wanghai38(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/android/binder_alloc.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/android/binder_alloc.c b/drivers/android/binder_alloc.c index 3c93e6c05c4d..c534b332c8d3 100644 --- a/drivers/android/binder_alloc.c +++ b/drivers/android/binder_alloc.c @@ -271,7 +271,7 @@ static int binder_update_page_range(struct binder_alloc *alloc, int allocate, } if (mm) { mmap_write_unlock(mm); - mmput(mm); + mmput_async(mm); } return 0; @@ -304,7 +304,7 @@ static int binder_update_page_range(struct binder_alloc *alloc, int allocate, err_no_vma: if (mm) { mmap_write_unlock(mm); - mmput(mm); + mmput_async(mm); } return vma ? -ENOMEM : -ESRCH; } -- 2.17.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] binder: fix race between mmput() and do_exit()
by Guo Mengqi 14 May '24

14 May '24

From: Carlos Llamas <cmllamas(a)google.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.209 commit 7e7a0d86542b0ea903006d3f42f33c4f7ead6918 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I99JWJ Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 9a9ab0d963621d9d12199df9817e66982582d5a5 upstream. Task A calls binder_update_page_range() to allocate and insert pages on a remote address space from Task B. For this, Task A pins the remote mm via mmget_not_zero() first. This can race with Task B do_exit() and the final mmput() refcount decrement will come from Task A. Task A | Task B ------------------+------------------ mmget_not_zero() | | do_exit() | exit_mm() | mmput() mmput() | exit_mmap() | remove_vma() | fput() | In this case, the work of ____fput() from Task B is queued up in Task A as TWA_RESUME. So in theory, Task A returns to userspace and the cleanup work gets executed. However, Task A instead sleep, waiting for a reply from Task B that never comes (it's dead). This means the binder_deferred_release() is blocked until an unrelated binder event forces Task A to go back to userspace. All the associated death notifications will also be delayed until then. In order to fix this use mmput_async() that will schedule the work in the corresponding mm->async_put_work WQ instead of Task A. Fixes: 457b9a6f09f0 ("Staging: android: add binder driver") Reviewed-by: Alice Ryhl <aliceryhl(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas <cmllamas(a)google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231201172212.1813387-4-cmllamas@google.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Wang Hai <wanghai38(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/android/binder_alloc.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/android/binder_alloc.c b/drivers/android/binder_alloc.c index 3c93e6c05c4d..c534b332c8d3 100644 --- a/drivers/android/binder_alloc.c +++ b/drivers/android/binder_alloc.c @@ -271,7 +271,7 @@ static int binder_update_page_range(struct binder_alloc *alloc, int allocate, } if (mm) { mmap_write_unlock(mm); - mmput(mm); + mmput_async(mm); } return 0; @@ -304,7 +304,7 @@ static int binder_update_page_range(struct binder_alloc *alloc, int allocate, err_no_vma: if (mm) { mmap_write_unlock(mm); - mmput(mm); + mmput_async(mm); } return vma ? -ENOMEM : -ESRCH; } -- 2.17.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS] binder: fix race between mmput() and do_exit()
by Guo Mengqi 14 May '24

14 May '24

From: Carlos Llamas <cmllamas(a)google.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.209 commit 7e7a0d86542b0ea903006d3f42f33c4f7ead6918 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I99JWJ Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 9a9ab0d963621d9d12199df9817e66982582d5a5 upstream. Task A calls binder_update_page_range() to allocate and insert pages on a remote address space from Task B. For this, Task A pins the remote mm via mmget_not_zero() first. This can race with Task B do_exit() and the final mmput() refcount decrement will come from Task A. Task A | Task B ------------------+------------------ mmget_not_zero() | | do_exit() | exit_mm() | mmput() mmput() | exit_mmap() | remove_vma() | fput() | In this case, the work of ____fput() from Task B is queued up in Task A as TWA_RESUME. So in theory, Task A returns to userspace and the cleanup work gets executed. However, Task A instead sleep, waiting for a reply from Task B that never comes (it's dead). This means the binder_deferred_release() is blocked until an unrelated binder event forces Task A to go back to userspace. All the associated death notifications will also be delayed until then. In order to fix this use mmput_async() that will schedule the work in the corresponding mm->async_put_work WQ instead of Task A. Fixes: 457b9a6f09f0 ("Staging: android: add binder driver") Reviewed-by: Alice Ryhl <aliceryhl(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas <cmllamas(a)google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231201172212.1813387-4-cmllamas@google.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Wang Hai <wanghai38(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/android/binder_alloc.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/android/binder_alloc.c b/drivers/android/binder_alloc.c index 3c93e6c05c4d..c534b332c8d3 100644 --- a/drivers/android/binder_alloc.c +++ b/drivers/android/binder_alloc.c @@ -271,7 +271,7 @@ static int binder_update_page_range(struct binder_alloc *alloc, int allocate, } if (mm) { mmap_write_unlock(mm); - mmput(mm); + mmput_async(mm); } return 0; @@ -304,7 +304,7 @@ static int binder_update_page_range(struct binder_alloc *alloc, int allocate, err_no_vma: if (mm) { mmap_write_unlock(mm); - mmput(mm); + mmput_async(mm); } return vma ? -ENOMEM : -ESRCH; } -- 2.17.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] crypto: scomp - fix req->dst buffer overflow
by Guo Mengqi 14 May '24

14 May '24

From: Chengming Zhou <zhouchengming(a)bytedance.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.209 commit 4518dc468cdd796757190515a9be7408adc8911e category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I99K14 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 744e1885922a9943458954cfea917b31064b4131 ] The req->dst buffer size should be checked before copying from the scomp_scratch->dst to avoid req->dst buffer overflow problem. Fixes: 1ab53a77b772 ("crypto: acomp - add driver-side scomp interface") Reported-by: syzbot+3eff5e51bf1db122a16e(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/0000000000000b05cd060d6b5511@google.com/ Signed-off-by: Chengming Zhou <zhouchengming(a)bytedance.com> Reviewed-by: Barry Song <v-songbaohua(a)oppo.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Wang Hai <wanghai38(a)huawei.com> --- crypto/scompress.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/crypto/scompress.c b/crypto/scompress.c index 738f4f8f0f41..4d6366a44400 100644 --- a/crypto/scompress.c +++ b/crypto/scompress.c @@ -124,6 +124,7 @@ static int scomp_acomp_comp_decomp(struct acomp_req *req, int dir) struct crypto_scomp *scomp = *tfm_ctx; void **ctx = acomp_request_ctx(req); struct scomp_scratch *scratch; + unsigned int dlen; int ret; if (!req->src || !req->slen || req->slen > SCOMP_SCRATCH_SIZE) @@ -135,6 +136,8 @@ static int scomp_acomp_comp_decomp(struct acomp_req *req, int dir) if (!req->dlen || req->dlen > SCOMP_SCRATCH_SIZE) req->dlen = SCOMP_SCRATCH_SIZE; + dlen = req->dlen; + scratch = raw_cpu_ptr(&scomp_scratch); spin_lock(&scratch->lock); @@ -152,6 +155,9 @@ static int scomp_acomp_comp_decomp(struct acomp_req *req, int dir) ret = -ENOMEM; goto out; } + } else if (req->dlen > dlen) { + ret = -ENOSPC; + goto out; } scatterwalk_map_and_copy(scratch->dst, req->dst, 0, req->dlen, 1); -- 2.17.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS] crypto: scomp - fix req->dst buffer overflow
by Guo Mengqi 14 May '24

14 May '24

From: Chengming Zhou <zhouchengming(a)bytedance.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.209 commit 4518dc468cdd796757190515a9be7408adc8911e category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I99K14 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 744e1885922a9943458954cfea917b31064b4131 ] The req->dst buffer size should be checked before copying from the scomp_scratch->dst to avoid req->dst buffer overflow problem. Fixes: 1ab53a77b772 ("crypto: acomp - add driver-side scomp interface") Reported-by: syzbot+3eff5e51bf1db122a16e(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/0000000000000b05cd060d6b5511@google.com/ Signed-off-by: Chengming Zhou <zhouchengming(a)bytedance.com> Reviewed-by: Barry Song <v-songbaohua(a)oppo.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Wang Hai <wanghai38(a)huawei.com> --- crypto/scompress.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/crypto/scompress.c b/crypto/scompress.c index 738f4f8f0f41..4d6366a44400 100644 --- a/crypto/scompress.c +++ b/crypto/scompress.c @@ -124,6 +124,7 @@ static int scomp_acomp_comp_decomp(struct acomp_req *req, int dir) struct crypto_scomp *scomp = *tfm_ctx; void **ctx = acomp_request_ctx(req); struct scomp_scratch *scratch; + unsigned int dlen; int ret; if (!req->src || !req->slen || req->slen > SCOMP_SCRATCH_SIZE) @@ -135,6 +136,8 @@ static int scomp_acomp_comp_decomp(struct acomp_req *req, int dir) if (!req->dlen || req->dlen > SCOMP_SCRATCH_SIZE) req->dlen = SCOMP_SCRATCH_SIZE; + dlen = req->dlen; + scratch = raw_cpu_ptr(&scomp_scratch); spin_lock(&scratch->lock); @@ -152,6 +155,9 @@ static int scomp_acomp_comp_decomp(struct acomp_req *req, int dir) ret = -ENOMEM; goto out; } + } else if (req->dlen > dlen) { + ret = -ENOSPC; + goto out; } scatterwalk_map_and_copy(scratch->dst, req->dst, 0, req->dlen, 1); -- 2.17.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP2] crypto: scomp - fix req->dst buffer overflow
by Guo Mengqi 14 May '24

14 May '24

From: Chengming Zhou <zhouchengming(a)bytedance.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.209 commit 4518dc468cdd796757190515a9be7408adc8911e category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I99K14 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 744e1885922a9943458954cfea917b31064b4131 ] The req->dst buffer size should be checked before copying from the scomp_scratch->dst to avoid req->dst buffer overflow problem. Fixes: 1ab53a77b772 ("crypto: acomp - add driver-side scomp interface") Reported-by: syzbot+3eff5e51bf1db122a16e(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/0000000000000b05cd060d6b5511@google.com/ Signed-off-by: Chengming Zhou <zhouchengming(a)bytedance.com> Reviewed-by: Barry Song <v-songbaohua(a)oppo.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Wang Hai <wanghai38(a)huawei.com> --- crypto/scompress.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/crypto/scompress.c b/crypto/scompress.c index 738f4f8f0f41..4d6366a44400 100644 --- a/crypto/scompress.c +++ b/crypto/scompress.c @@ -124,6 +124,7 @@ static int scomp_acomp_comp_decomp(struct acomp_req *req, int dir) struct crypto_scomp *scomp = *tfm_ctx; void **ctx = acomp_request_ctx(req); struct scomp_scratch *scratch; + unsigned int dlen; int ret; if (!req->src || !req->slen || req->slen > SCOMP_SCRATCH_SIZE) @@ -135,6 +136,8 @@ static int scomp_acomp_comp_decomp(struct acomp_req *req, int dir) if (!req->dlen || req->dlen > SCOMP_SCRATCH_SIZE) req->dlen = SCOMP_SCRATCH_SIZE; + dlen = req->dlen; + scratch = raw_cpu_ptr(&scomp_scratch); spin_lock(&scratch->lock); @@ -152,6 +155,9 @@ static int scomp_acomp_comp_decomp(struct acomp_req *req, int dir) ret = -ENOMEM; goto out; } + } else if (req->dlen > dlen) { + ret = -ENOSPC; + goto out; } scatterwalk_map_and_copy(scratch->dst, req->dst, 0, req->dlen, 1); -- 2.17.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP2] block/rnbd-srv: Check for unlikely string overflow
by Guo Mengqi 14 May '24

14 May '24

From: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.8-rc1 commit 9e4bf6a08d1e127bcc4bd72557f2dfafc6bc7f41 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I99K1F CVE: CVE-2023-52618 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Since "dev_search_path" can technically be as large as PATH_MAX, there was a risk of truncation when copying it and a second string into "full_path" since it was also PATH_MAX sized. The W=1 builds were reporting this warning: drivers/block/rnbd/rnbd-srv.c: In function 'process_msg_open.isra': drivers/block/rnbd/rnbd-srv.c:616:51: warning: '%s' directive output may be truncated writing up to 254 bytes into a region of size between 0 and 4095 [-Wformat-truncation=] 616 | snprintf(full_path, PATH_MAX, "%s/%s", | ^~ In function 'rnbd_srv_get_full_path', inlined from 'process_msg_open.isra' at drivers/block/rnbd/rnbd-srv.c:721:14: drivers/block/rnbd/rnbd-srv.c:616:17: note: 'snprintf' output between 2 and 4351 bytes into a destination of size 4096 616 | snprintf(full_path, PATH_MAX, "%s/%s", | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 617 | dev_search_path, dev_name); | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ To fix this, unconditionally check for truncation (as was already done for the case where "%SESSNAME%" was present). Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp(a)intel.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202312100355.lHoJPgKy-lkp@intel.com/ Cc: Md. Haris Iqbal <haris.iqbal(a)ionos.com> Cc: Jack Wang <jinpu.wang(a)ionos.com> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk> Cc: <linux-block(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org> Acked-by: Guoqing Jiang <guoqing.jiang(a)linux.dev> Acked-by: Jack Wang <jinpu.wang(a)ionos.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231212214738.work.169-kees@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Li Lingfeng <lilingfeng3(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/block/rnbd/rnbd-srv.c | 19 ++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/block/rnbd/rnbd-srv.c b/drivers/block/rnbd/rnbd-srv.c index e1bc8b4cd592..9c5d52335e17 100644 --- a/drivers/block/rnbd/rnbd-srv.c +++ b/drivers/block/rnbd/rnbd-srv.c @@ -591,6 +591,7 @@ static char *rnbd_srv_get_full_path(struct rnbd_srv_session *srv_sess, { char *full_path; char *a, *b; + int len; full_path = kmalloc(PATH_MAX, GFP_KERNEL); if (!full_path) @@ -602,19 +603,19 @@ static char *rnbd_srv_get_full_path(struct rnbd_srv_session *srv_sess, */ a = strnstr(dev_search_path, "%SESSNAME%", sizeof(dev_search_path)); if (a) { - int len = a - dev_search_path; + len = a - dev_search_path; len = snprintf(full_path, PATH_MAX, "%.*s/%s/%s", len, dev_search_path, srv_sess->sessname, dev_name); - if (len >= PATH_MAX) { - pr_err("Too long path: %s, %s, %s\n", - dev_search_path, srv_sess->sessname, dev_name); - kfree(full_path); - return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); - } } else { - snprintf(full_path, PATH_MAX, "%s/%s", - dev_search_path, dev_name); + len = snprintf(full_path, PATH_MAX, "%s/%s", + dev_search_path, dev_name); + } + if (len >= PATH_MAX) { + pr_err("Too long path: %s, %s, %s\n", + dev_search_path, srv_sess->sessname, dev_name); + kfree(full_path); + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); } /* eliminitate duplicated slashes */ -- 2.17.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] crypto: scomp - fix req->dst buffer overflow
by Guo Mengqi 14 May '24

14 May '24

From: Chengming Zhou <zhouchengming(a)bytedance.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.209 commit 4518dc468cdd796757190515a9be7408adc8911e category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I99K14 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 744e1885922a9943458954cfea917b31064b4131 ] The req->dst buffer size should be checked before copying from the scomp_scratch->dst to avoid req->dst buffer overflow problem. Fixes: 1ab53a77b772 ("crypto: acomp - add driver-side scomp interface") Reported-by: syzbot+3eff5e51bf1db122a16e(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/0000000000000b05cd060d6b5511@google.com/ Signed-off-by: Chengming Zhou <zhouchengming(a)bytedance.com> Reviewed-by: Barry Song <v-songbaohua(a)oppo.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Wang Hai <wanghai38(a)huawei.com> --- crypto/scompress.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/crypto/scompress.c b/crypto/scompress.c index 738f4f8f0f41..4d6366a44400 100644 --- a/crypto/scompress.c +++ b/crypto/scompress.c @@ -124,6 +124,7 @@ static int scomp_acomp_comp_decomp(struct acomp_req *req, int dir) struct crypto_scomp *scomp = *tfm_ctx; void **ctx = acomp_request_ctx(req); struct scomp_scratch *scratch; + unsigned int dlen; int ret; if (!req->src || !req->slen || req->slen > SCOMP_SCRATCH_SIZE) @@ -135,6 +136,8 @@ static int scomp_acomp_comp_decomp(struct acomp_req *req, int dir) if (!req->dlen || req->dlen > SCOMP_SCRATCH_SIZE) req->dlen = SCOMP_SCRATCH_SIZE; + dlen = req->dlen; + scratch = raw_cpu_ptr(&scomp_scratch); spin_lock(&scratch->lock); @@ -152,6 +155,9 @@ static int scomp_acomp_comp_decomp(struct acomp_req *req, int dir) ret = -ENOMEM; goto out; } + } else if (req->dlen > dlen) { + ret = -ENOSPC; + goto out; } scatterwalk_map_and_copy(scratch->dst, req->dst, 0, req->dlen, 1); -- 2.17.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] block/rnbd-srv: Check for unlikely string overflow
by Guo Mengqi 14 May '24

14 May '24

From: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.8-rc1 commit 9e4bf6a08d1e127bcc4bd72557f2dfafc6bc7f41 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I99K1F CVE: CVE-2023-52618 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Since "dev_search_path" can technically be as large as PATH_MAX, there was a risk of truncation when copying it and a second string into "full_path" since it was also PATH_MAX sized. The W=1 builds were reporting this warning: drivers/block/rnbd/rnbd-srv.c: In function 'process_msg_open.isra': drivers/block/rnbd/rnbd-srv.c:616:51: warning: '%s' directive output may be truncated writing up to 254 bytes into a region of size between 0 and 4095 [-Wformat-truncation=] 616 | snprintf(full_path, PATH_MAX, "%s/%s", | ^~ In function 'rnbd_srv_get_full_path', inlined from 'process_msg_open.isra' at drivers/block/rnbd/rnbd-srv.c:721:14: drivers/block/rnbd/rnbd-srv.c:616:17: note: 'snprintf' output between 2 and 4351 bytes into a destination of size 4096 616 | snprintf(full_path, PATH_MAX, "%s/%s", | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 617 | dev_search_path, dev_name); | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ To fix this, unconditionally check for truncation (as was already done for the case where "%SESSNAME%" was present). Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp(a)intel.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202312100355.lHoJPgKy-lkp@intel.com/ Cc: Md. Haris Iqbal <haris.iqbal(a)ionos.com> Cc: Jack Wang <jinpu.wang(a)ionos.com> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk> Cc: <linux-block(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org> Acked-by: Guoqing Jiang <guoqing.jiang(a)linux.dev> Acked-by: Jack Wang <jinpu.wang(a)ionos.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231212214738.work.169-kees@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Li Lingfeng <lilingfeng3(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/block/rnbd/rnbd-srv.c | 19 ++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/block/rnbd/rnbd-srv.c b/drivers/block/rnbd/rnbd-srv.c index e1bc8b4cd592..9c5d52335e17 100644 --- a/drivers/block/rnbd/rnbd-srv.c +++ b/drivers/block/rnbd/rnbd-srv.c @@ -591,6 +591,7 @@ static char *rnbd_srv_get_full_path(struct rnbd_srv_session *srv_sess, { char *full_path; char *a, *b; + int len; full_path = kmalloc(PATH_MAX, GFP_KERNEL); if (!full_path) @@ -602,19 +603,19 @@ static char *rnbd_srv_get_full_path(struct rnbd_srv_session *srv_sess, */ a = strnstr(dev_search_path, "%SESSNAME%", sizeof(dev_search_path)); if (a) { - int len = a - dev_search_path; + len = a - dev_search_path; len = snprintf(full_path, PATH_MAX, "%.*s/%s/%s", len, dev_search_path, srv_sess->sessname, dev_name); - if (len >= PATH_MAX) { - pr_err("Too long path: %s, %s, %s\n", - dev_search_path, srv_sess->sessname, dev_name); - kfree(full_path); - return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); - } } else { - snprintf(full_path, PATH_MAX, "%s/%s", - dev_search_path, dev_name); + len = snprintf(full_path, PATH_MAX, "%s/%s", + dev_search_path, dev_name); + } + if (len >= PATH_MAX) { + pr_err("Too long path: %s, %s, %s\n", + dev_search_path, srv_sess->sessname, dev_name); + kfree(full_path); + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); } /* eliminitate duplicated slashes */ -- 2.17.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS] block/rnbd-srv: Check for unlikely string overflow
by Guo Mengqi 14 May '24

14 May '24

From: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.8-rc1 commit 9e4bf6a08d1e127bcc4bd72557f2dfafc6bc7f41 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I99K1F CVE: CVE-2023-52618 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Since "dev_search_path" can technically be as large as PATH_MAX, there was a risk of truncation when copying it and a second string into "full_path" since it was also PATH_MAX sized. The W=1 builds were reporting this warning: drivers/block/rnbd/rnbd-srv.c: In function 'process_msg_open.isra': drivers/block/rnbd/rnbd-srv.c:616:51: warning: '%s' directive output may be truncated writing up to 254 bytes into a region of size between 0 and 4095 [-Wformat-truncation=] 616 | snprintf(full_path, PATH_MAX, "%s/%s", | ^~ In function 'rnbd_srv_get_full_path', inlined from 'process_msg_open.isra' at drivers/block/rnbd/rnbd-srv.c:721:14: drivers/block/rnbd/rnbd-srv.c:616:17: note: 'snprintf' output between 2 and 4351 bytes into a destination of size 4096 616 | snprintf(full_path, PATH_MAX, "%s/%s", | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 617 | dev_search_path, dev_name); | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ To fix this, unconditionally check for truncation (as was already done for the case where "%SESSNAME%" was present). Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp(a)intel.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202312100355.lHoJPgKy-lkp@intel.com/ Cc: Md. Haris Iqbal <haris.iqbal(a)ionos.com> Cc: Jack Wang <jinpu.wang(a)ionos.com> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk> Cc: <linux-block(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org> Acked-by: Guoqing Jiang <guoqing.jiang(a)linux.dev> Acked-by: Jack Wang <jinpu.wang(a)ionos.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231212214738.work.169-kees@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Li Lingfeng <lilingfeng3(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/block/rnbd/rnbd-srv.c | 19 ++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/block/rnbd/rnbd-srv.c b/drivers/block/rnbd/rnbd-srv.c index e1bc8b4cd592..9c5d52335e17 100644 --- a/drivers/block/rnbd/rnbd-srv.c +++ b/drivers/block/rnbd/rnbd-srv.c @@ -591,6 +591,7 @@ static char *rnbd_srv_get_full_path(struct rnbd_srv_session *srv_sess, { char *full_path; char *a, *b; + int len; full_path = kmalloc(PATH_MAX, GFP_KERNEL); if (!full_path) @@ -602,19 +603,19 @@ static char *rnbd_srv_get_full_path(struct rnbd_srv_session *srv_sess, */ a = strnstr(dev_search_path, "%SESSNAME%", sizeof(dev_search_path)); if (a) { - int len = a - dev_search_path; + len = a - dev_search_path; len = snprintf(full_path, PATH_MAX, "%.*s/%s/%s", len, dev_search_path, srv_sess->sessname, dev_name); - if (len >= PATH_MAX) { - pr_err("Too long path: %s, %s, %s\n", - dev_search_path, srv_sess->sessname, dev_name); - kfree(full_path); - return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); - } } else { - snprintf(full_path, PATH_MAX, "%s/%s", - dev_search_path, dev_name); + len = snprintf(full_path, PATH_MAX, "%s/%s", + dev_search_path, dev_name); + } + if (len >= PATH_MAX) { + pr_err("Too long path: %s, %s, %s\n", + dev_search_path, srv_sess->sessname, dev_name); + kfree(full_path); + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); } /* eliminitate duplicated slashes */ -- 2.17.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS] Bluetooth: Fix atomicity violation in {min,max}_key_size_set
by Guo Mengqi 14 May '24

14 May '24

From: Gui-Dong Han <2045gemini(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.209 commit 394c6c0b6d9bdd7d6ebca35ca9cfbabf44c0c257 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I917MX Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit da9065caa594d19b26e1a030fd0cc27bd365d685 upstream. In min_key_size_set(): if (val > hdev->le_max_key_size || val < SMP_MIN_ENC_KEY_SIZE) return -EINVAL; hci_dev_lock(hdev); hdev->le_min_key_size = val; hci_dev_unlock(hdev); In max_key_size_set(): if (val > SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE || val < hdev->le_min_key_size) return -EINVAL; hci_dev_lock(hdev); hdev->le_max_key_size = val; hci_dev_unlock(hdev); The atomicity violation occurs due to concurrent execution of set_min and set_max funcs.Consider a scenario where setmin writes a new, valid 'min' value, and concurrently, setmax writes a value that is greater than the old 'min' but smaller than the new 'min'. In this case, setmax might check against the old 'min' value (before acquiring the lock) but write its value after the 'min' has been updated by setmin. This leads to a situation where the 'max' value ends up being smaller than the 'min' value, which is an inconsistency. This possible bug is found by an experimental static analysis tool developed by our team, BassCheck[1]. This tool analyzes the locking APIs to extract function pairs that can be concurrently executed, and then analyzes the instructions in the paired functions to identify possible concurrency bugs including data races and atomicity violations. The above possible bug is reported when our tool analyzes the source code of Linux 5.17. To resolve this issue, it is suggested to encompass the validity checks within the locked sections in both set_min and set_max funcs. The modification ensures that the validation of 'val' against the current min/max values is atomic, thus maintaining the integrity of the settings. With this patch applied, our tool no longer reports the bug, with the kernel configuration allyesconfig for x86_64. Due to the lack of associated hardware, we cannot test the patch in runtime testing, and just verify it according to the code logic. [1] https://sites.google.com/view/basscheck/ Fixes: 18f81241b74f ("Bluetooth: Move {min,max}_key_size debugfs ...") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Gui-Dong Han <2045gemini(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Wang Hai <wanghai38(a)huawei.com> --- net/bluetooth/hci_debugfs.c | 12 ++++++++---- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_debugfs.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_debugfs.c index 338833f12365..d4efc4aa55af 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/hci_debugfs.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_debugfs.c @@ -994,10 +994,12 @@ static int min_key_size_set(void *data, u64 val) { struct hci_dev *hdev = data; - if (val > hdev->le_max_key_size || val < SMP_MIN_ENC_KEY_SIZE) + hci_dev_lock(hdev); + if (val > hdev->le_max_key_size || val < SMP_MIN_ENC_KEY_SIZE) { + hci_dev_unlock(hdev); return -EINVAL; + } - hci_dev_lock(hdev); hdev->le_min_key_size = val; hci_dev_unlock(hdev); @@ -1022,10 +1024,12 @@ static int max_key_size_set(void *data, u64 val) { struct hci_dev *hdev = data; - if (val > SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE || val < hdev->le_min_key_size) + hci_dev_lock(hdev); + if (val > SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE || val < hdev->le_min_key_size) { + hci_dev_unlock(hdev); return -EINVAL; + } - hci_dev_lock(hdev); hdev->le_max_key_size = val; hci_dev_unlock(hdev); -- 2.17.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP2] Bluetooth: Fix atomicity violation in {min,max}_key_size_set
by Guo Mengqi 14 May '24

14 May '24

From: Gui-Dong Han <2045gemini(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.209 commit 394c6c0b6d9bdd7d6ebca35ca9cfbabf44c0c257 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I917MX Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit da9065caa594d19b26e1a030fd0cc27bd365d685 upstream. In min_key_size_set(): if (val > hdev->le_max_key_size || val < SMP_MIN_ENC_KEY_SIZE) return -EINVAL; hci_dev_lock(hdev); hdev->le_min_key_size = val; hci_dev_unlock(hdev); In max_key_size_set(): if (val > SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE || val < hdev->le_min_key_size) return -EINVAL; hci_dev_lock(hdev); hdev->le_max_key_size = val; hci_dev_unlock(hdev); The atomicity violation occurs due to concurrent execution of set_min and set_max funcs.Consider a scenario where setmin writes a new, valid 'min' value, and concurrently, setmax writes a value that is greater than the old 'min' but smaller than the new 'min'. In this case, setmax might check against the old 'min' value (before acquiring the lock) but write its value after the 'min' has been updated by setmin. This leads to a situation where the 'max' value ends up being smaller than the 'min' value, which is an inconsistency. This possible bug is found by an experimental static analysis tool developed by our team, BassCheck[1]. This tool analyzes the locking APIs to extract function pairs that can be concurrently executed, and then analyzes the instructions in the paired functions to identify possible concurrency bugs including data races and atomicity violations. The above possible bug is reported when our tool analyzes the source code of Linux 5.17. To resolve this issue, it is suggested to encompass the validity checks within the locked sections in both set_min and set_max funcs. The modification ensures that the validation of 'val' against the current min/max values is atomic, thus maintaining the integrity of the settings. With this patch applied, our tool no longer reports the bug, with the kernel configuration allyesconfig for x86_64. Due to the lack of associated hardware, we cannot test the patch in runtime testing, and just verify it according to the code logic. [1] https://sites.google.com/view/basscheck/ Fixes: 18f81241b74f ("Bluetooth: Move {min,max}_key_size debugfs ...") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Gui-Dong Han <2045gemini(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Wang Hai <wanghai38(a)huawei.com> --- net/bluetooth/hci_debugfs.c | 12 ++++++++---- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_debugfs.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_debugfs.c index 338833f12365..d4efc4aa55af 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/hci_debugfs.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_debugfs.c @@ -994,10 +994,12 @@ static int min_key_size_set(void *data, u64 val) { struct hci_dev *hdev = data; - if (val > hdev->le_max_key_size || val < SMP_MIN_ENC_KEY_SIZE) + hci_dev_lock(hdev); + if (val > hdev->le_max_key_size || val < SMP_MIN_ENC_KEY_SIZE) { + hci_dev_unlock(hdev); return -EINVAL; + } - hci_dev_lock(hdev); hdev->le_min_key_size = val; hci_dev_unlock(hdev); @@ -1022,10 +1024,12 @@ static int max_key_size_set(void *data, u64 val) { struct hci_dev *hdev = data; - if (val > SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE || val < hdev->le_min_key_size) + hci_dev_lock(hdev); + if (val > SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE || val < hdev->le_min_key_size) { + hci_dev_unlock(hdev); return -EINVAL; + } - hci_dev_lock(hdev); hdev->le_max_key_size = val; hci_dev_unlock(hdev); -- 2.17.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] Bluetooth: Fix atomicity violation in {min,max}_key_size_set
by Guo Mengqi 14 May '24

14 May '24

From: Gui-Dong Han <2045gemini(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.209 commit 394c6c0b6d9bdd7d6ebca35ca9cfbabf44c0c257 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I917MX Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit da9065caa594d19b26e1a030fd0cc27bd365d685 upstream. In min_key_size_set(): if (val > hdev->le_max_key_size || val < SMP_MIN_ENC_KEY_SIZE) return -EINVAL; hci_dev_lock(hdev); hdev->le_min_key_size = val; hci_dev_unlock(hdev); In max_key_size_set(): if (val > SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE || val < hdev->le_min_key_size) return -EINVAL; hci_dev_lock(hdev); hdev->le_max_key_size = val; hci_dev_unlock(hdev); The atomicity violation occurs due to concurrent execution of set_min and set_max funcs.Consider a scenario where setmin writes a new, valid 'min' value, and concurrently, setmax writes a value that is greater than the old 'min' but smaller than the new 'min'. In this case, setmax might check against the old 'min' value (before acquiring the lock) but write its value after the 'min' has been updated by setmin. This leads to a situation where the 'max' value ends up being smaller than the 'min' value, which is an inconsistency. This possible bug is found by an experimental static analysis tool developed by our team, BassCheck[1]. This tool analyzes the locking APIs to extract function pairs that can be concurrently executed, and then analyzes the instructions in the paired functions to identify possible concurrency bugs including data races and atomicity violations. The above possible bug is reported when our tool analyzes the source code of Linux 5.17. To resolve this issue, it is suggested to encompass the validity checks within the locked sections in both set_min and set_max funcs. The modification ensures that the validation of 'val' against the current min/max values is atomic, thus maintaining the integrity of the settings. With this patch applied, our tool no longer reports the bug, with the kernel configuration allyesconfig for x86_64. Due to the lack of associated hardware, we cannot test the patch in runtime testing, and just verify it according to the code logic. [1] https://sites.google.com/view/basscheck/ Fixes: 18f81241b74f ("Bluetooth: Move {min,max}_key_size debugfs ...") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Gui-Dong Han <2045gemini(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Wang Hai <wanghai38(a)huawei.com> --- net/bluetooth/hci_debugfs.c | 12 ++++++++---- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_debugfs.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_debugfs.c index 338833f12365..d4efc4aa55af 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/hci_debugfs.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_debugfs.c @@ -994,10 +994,12 @@ static int min_key_size_set(void *data, u64 val) { struct hci_dev *hdev = data; - if (val > hdev->le_max_key_size || val < SMP_MIN_ENC_KEY_SIZE) + hci_dev_lock(hdev); + if (val > hdev->le_max_key_size || val < SMP_MIN_ENC_KEY_SIZE) { + hci_dev_unlock(hdev); return -EINVAL; + } - hci_dev_lock(hdev); hdev->le_min_key_size = val; hci_dev_unlock(hdev); @@ -1022,10 +1024,12 @@ static int max_key_size_set(void *data, u64 val) { struct hci_dev *hdev = data; - if (val > SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE || val < hdev->le_min_key_size) + hci_dev_lock(hdev); + if (val > SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE || val < hdev->le_min_key_size) { + hci_dev_unlock(hdev); return -EINVAL; + } - hci_dev_lock(hdev); hdev->le_max_key_size = val; hci_dev_unlock(hdev); -- 2.17.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP2] ip6_tunnel: fix NEXTHDR_FRAGMENT handling in ip6_tnl_parse_tlv_enc_lim()
by Guo Mengqi 14 May '24

14 May '24

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.209 commit da23bd709b46168f7dfc36055801011222b076cd category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I99K08 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit d375b98e0248980681e5e56b712026174d617198 ] syzbot pointed out [1] that NEXTHDR_FRAGMENT handling is broken. Reading frag_off can only be done if we pulled enough bytes to skb->head. Currently we might access garbage. [1] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in ip6_tnl_parse_tlv_enc_lim+0x94f/0xbb0 ip6_tnl_parse_tlv_enc_lim+0x94f/0xbb0 ipxip6_tnl_xmit net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c:1326 [inline] ip6_tnl_start_xmit+0xab2/0x1a70 net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c:1432 __netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4940 [inline] netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4954 [inline] xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3548 [inline] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x247/0xa10 net/core/dev.c:3564 __dev_queue_xmit+0x33b8/0x5130 net/core/dev.c:4349 dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3134 [inline] neigh_connected_output+0x569/0x660 net/core/neighbour.c:1592 neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:542 [inline] ip6_finish_output2+0x23a9/0x2b30 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:137 ip6_finish_output+0x855/0x12b0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:222 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:303 [inline] ip6_output+0x323/0x610 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:243 dst_output include/net/dst.h:451 [inline] ip6_local_out+0xe9/0x140 net/ipv6/output_core.c:155 ip6_send_skb net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1952 [inline] ip6_push_pending_frames+0x1f9/0x560 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1972 rawv6_push_pending_frames+0xbe8/0xdf0 net/ipv6/raw.c:582 rawv6_sendmsg+0x2b66/0x2e70 net/ipv6/raw.c:920 inet_sendmsg+0x105/0x190 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:847 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline] ____sys_sendmsg+0x9c2/0xd60 net/socket.c:2584 ___sys_sendmsg+0x28d/0x3c0 net/socket.c:2638 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2667 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2676 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2674 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x307/0x490 net/socket.c:2674 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x44/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b Uninit was created at: slab_post_alloc_hook+0x129/0xa70 mm/slab.h:768 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3478 [inline] __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x5c9/0x970 mm/slub.c:3517 __do_kmalloc_node mm/slab_common.c:1006 [inline] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x118/0x3c0 mm/slab_common.c:1027 kmalloc_reserve+0x249/0x4a0 net/core/skbuff.c:582 pskb_expand_head+0x226/0x1a00 net/core/skbuff.c:2098 __pskb_pull_tail+0x13b/0x2310 net/core/skbuff.c:2655 pskb_may_pull_reason include/linux/skbuff.h:2673 [inline] pskb_may_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2681 [inline] ip6_tnl_parse_tlv_enc_lim+0x901/0xbb0 net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c:408 ipxip6_tnl_xmit net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c:1326 [inline] ip6_tnl_start_xmit+0xab2/0x1a70 net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c:1432 __netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4940 [inline] netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4954 [inline] xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3548 [inline] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x247/0xa10 net/core/dev.c:3564 __dev_queue_xmit+0x33b8/0x5130 net/core/dev.c:4349 dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3134 [inline] neigh_connected_output+0x569/0x660 net/core/neighbour.c:1592 neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:542 [inline] ip6_finish_output2+0x23a9/0x2b30 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:137 ip6_finish_output+0x855/0x12b0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:222 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:303 [inline] ip6_output+0x323/0x610 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:243 dst_output include/net/dst.h:451 [inline] ip6_local_out+0xe9/0x140 net/ipv6/output_core.c:155 ip6_send_skb net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1952 [inline] ip6_push_pending_frames+0x1f9/0x560 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1972 rawv6_push_pending_frames+0xbe8/0xdf0 net/ipv6/raw.c:582 rawv6_sendmsg+0x2b66/0x2e70 net/ipv6/raw.c:920 inet_sendmsg+0x105/0x190 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:847 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline] ____sys_sendmsg+0x9c2/0xd60 net/socket.c:2584 ___sys_sendmsg+0x28d/0x3c0 net/socket.c:2638 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2667 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2676 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2674 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x307/0x490 net/socket.c:2674 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x44/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b CPU: 0 PID: 7345 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 6.7.0-rc8-syzkaller-00024-gac865f00af29 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 11/17/2023 Fixes: fbfa743a9d2a ("ipv6: fix ip6_tnl_parse_tlv_enc_lim()") Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller(a)googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb(a)google.com> Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb(a)google.com> Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Wang Hai <wanghai38(a)huawei.com> --- net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c | 26 +++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c index a03a322e0cc1..edf4a842506f 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c +++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c @@ -427,7 +427,7 @@ __u16 ip6_tnl_parse_tlv_enc_lim(struct sk_buff *skb, __u8 *raw) const struct ipv6hdr *ipv6h = (const struct ipv6hdr *)raw; unsigned int nhoff = raw - skb->data; unsigned int off = nhoff + sizeof(*ipv6h); - u8 next, nexthdr = ipv6h->nexthdr; + u8 nexthdr = ipv6h->nexthdr; while (ipv6_ext_hdr(nexthdr) && nexthdr != NEXTHDR_NONE) { struct ipv6_opt_hdr *hdr; @@ -438,25 +438,25 @@ __u16 ip6_tnl_parse_tlv_enc_lim(struct sk_buff *skb, __u8 *raw) hdr = (struct ipv6_opt_hdr *)(skb->data + off); if (nexthdr == NEXTHDR_FRAGMENT) { - struct frag_hdr *frag_hdr = (struct frag_hdr *) hdr; - if (frag_hdr->frag_off) - break; optlen = 8; } else if (nexthdr == NEXTHDR_AUTH) { optlen = ipv6_authlen(hdr); } else { optlen = ipv6_optlen(hdr); } - /* cache hdr->nexthdr, since pskb_may_pull() might - * invalidate hdr - */ - next = hdr->nexthdr; - if (nexthdr == NEXTHDR_DEST) { - u16 i = 2; - /* Remember : hdr is no longer valid at this point. */ - if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, off + optlen)) + if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, off + optlen)) + break; + + hdr = (struct ipv6_opt_hdr *)(skb->data + off); + if (nexthdr == NEXTHDR_FRAGMENT) { + struct frag_hdr *frag_hdr = (struct frag_hdr *)hdr; + + if (frag_hdr->frag_off) break; + } + if (nexthdr == NEXTHDR_DEST) { + u16 i = 2; while (1) { struct ipv6_tlv_tnl_enc_lim *tel; @@ -477,7 +477,7 @@ __u16 ip6_tnl_parse_tlv_enc_lim(struct sk_buff *skb, __u8 *raw) i++; } } - nexthdr = next; + nexthdr = hdr->nexthdr; off += optlen; } return 0; -- 2.17.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] ip6_tunnel: fix NEXTHDR_FRAGMENT handling in ip6_tnl_parse_tlv_enc_lim()
by Guo Mengqi 14 May '24

14 May '24

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.209 commit da23bd709b46168f7dfc36055801011222b076cd category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I99K08 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit d375b98e0248980681e5e56b712026174d617198 ] syzbot pointed out [1] that NEXTHDR_FRAGMENT handling is broken. Reading frag_off can only be done if we pulled enough bytes to skb->head. Currently we might access garbage. [1] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in ip6_tnl_parse_tlv_enc_lim+0x94f/0xbb0 ip6_tnl_parse_tlv_enc_lim+0x94f/0xbb0 ipxip6_tnl_xmit net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c:1326 [inline] ip6_tnl_start_xmit+0xab2/0x1a70 net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c:1432 __netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4940 [inline] netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4954 [inline] xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3548 [inline] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x247/0xa10 net/core/dev.c:3564 __dev_queue_xmit+0x33b8/0x5130 net/core/dev.c:4349 dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3134 [inline] neigh_connected_output+0x569/0x660 net/core/neighbour.c:1592 neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:542 [inline] ip6_finish_output2+0x23a9/0x2b30 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:137 ip6_finish_output+0x855/0x12b0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:222 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:303 [inline] ip6_output+0x323/0x610 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:243 dst_output include/net/dst.h:451 [inline] ip6_local_out+0xe9/0x140 net/ipv6/output_core.c:155 ip6_send_skb net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1952 [inline] ip6_push_pending_frames+0x1f9/0x560 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1972 rawv6_push_pending_frames+0xbe8/0xdf0 net/ipv6/raw.c:582 rawv6_sendmsg+0x2b66/0x2e70 net/ipv6/raw.c:920 inet_sendmsg+0x105/0x190 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:847 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline] ____sys_sendmsg+0x9c2/0xd60 net/socket.c:2584 ___sys_sendmsg+0x28d/0x3c0 net/socket.c:2638 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2667 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2676 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2674 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x307/0x490 net/socket.c:2674 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x44/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b Uninit was created at: slab_post_alloc_hook+0x129/0xa70 mm/slab.h:768 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3478 [inline] __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x5c9/0x970 mm/slub.c:3517 __do_kmalloc_node mm/slab_common.c:1006 [inline] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x118/0x3c0 mm/slab_common.c:1027 kmalloc_reserve+0x249/0x4a0 net/core/skbuff.c:582 pskb_expand_head+0x226/0x1a00 net/core/skbuff.c:2098 __pskb_pull_tail+0x13b/0x2310 net/core/skbuff.c:2655 pskb_may_pull_reason include/linux/skbuff.h:2673 [inline] pskb_may_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2681 [inline] ip6_tnl_parse_tlv_enc_lim+0x901/0xbb0 net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c:408 ipxip6_tnl_xmit net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c:1326 [inline] ip6_tnl_start_xmit+0xab2/0x1a70 net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c:1432 __netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4940 [inline] netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4954 [inline] xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3548 [inline] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x247/0xa10 net/core/dev.c:3564 __dev_queue_xmit+0x33b8/0x5130 net/core/dev.c:4349 dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3134 [inline] neigh_connected_output+0x569/0x660 net/core/neighbour.c:1592 neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:542 [inline] ip6_finish_output2+0x23a9/0x2b30 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:137 ip6_finish_output+0x855/0x12b0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:222 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:303 [inline] ip6_output+0x323/0x610 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:243 dst_output include/net/dst.h:451 [inline] ip6_local_out+0xe9/0x140 net/ipv6/output_core.c:155 ip6_send_skb net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1952 [inline] ip6_push_pending_frames+0x1f9/0x560 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1972 rawv6_push_pending_frames+0xbe8/0xdf0 net/ipv6/raw.c:582 rawv6_sendmsg+0x2b66/0x2e70 net/ipv6/raw.c:920 inet_sendmsg+0x105/0x190 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:847 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline] ____sys_sendmsg+0x9c2/0xd60 net/socket.c:2584 ___sys_sendmsg+0x28d/0x3c0 net/socket.c:2638 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2667 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2676 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2674 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x307/0x490 net/socket.c:2674 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x44/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b CPU: 0 PID: 7345 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 6.7.0-rc8-syzkaller-00024-gac865f00af29 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 11/17/2023 Fixes: fbfa743a9d2a ("ipv6: fix ip6_tnl_parse_tlv_enc_lim()") Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller(a)googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb(a)google.com> Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb(a)google.com> Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Wang Hai <wanghai38(a)huawei.com> --- net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c | 26 +++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c index 3a2741569b84..fab133d67e6c 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c +++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c @@ -427,7 +427,7 @@ __u16 ip6_tnl_parse_tlv_enc_lim(struct sk_buff *skb, __u8 *raw) const struct ipv6hdr *ipv6h = (const struct ipv6hdr *)raw; unsigned int nhoff = raw - skb->data; unsigned int off = nhoff + sizeof(*ipv6h); - u8 next, nexthdr = ipv6h->nexthdr; + u8 nexthdr = ipv6h->nexthdr; while (ipv6_ext_hdr(nexthdr) && nexthdr != NEXTHDR_NONE) { struct ipv6_opt_hdr *hdr; @@ -438,25 +438,25 @@ __u16 ip6_tnl_parse_tlv_enc_lim(struct sk_buff *skb, __u8 *raw) hdr = (struct ipv6_opt_hdr *)(skb->data + off); if (nexthdr == NEXTHDR_FRAGMENT) { - struct frag_hdr *frag_hdr = (struct frag_hdr *) hdr; - if (frag_hdr->frag_off) - break; optlen = 8; } else if (nexthdr == NEXTHDR_AUTH) { optlen = ipv6_authlen(hdr); } else { optlen = ipv6_optlen(hdr); } - /* cache hdr->nexthdr, since pskb_may_pull() might - * invalidate hdr - */ - next = hdr->nexthdr; - if (nexthdr == NEXTHDR_DEST) { - u16 i = 2; - /* Remember : hdr is no longer valid at this point. */ - if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, off + optlen)) + if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, off + optlen)) + break; + + hdr = (struct ipv6_opt_hdr *)(skb->data + off); + if (nexthdr == NEXTHDR_FRAGMENT) { + struct frag_hdr *frag_hdr = (struct frag_hdr *)hdr; + + if (frag_hdr->frag_off) break; + } + if (nexthdr == NEXTHDR_DEST) { + u16 i = 2; while (1) { struct ipv6_tlv_tnl_enc_lim *tel; @@ -477,7 +477,7 @@ __u16 ip6_tnl_parse_tlv_enc_lim(struct sk_buff *skb, __u8 *raw) i++; } } - nexthdr = next; + nexthdr = hdr->nexthdr; off += optlen; } return 0; -- 2.17.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] thermal: intel: hfi: Add syscore callbacks for system-wide PM
by Guo Mengqi 14 May '24

14 May '24

From: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon(a)linux.intel.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.8-rc1 commit 97566d09fd02d2ab329774bb89a2cdf2267e86d9 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9BV4D CVE: CVE-2024-26646 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- The kernel allocates a memory buffer and provides its location to the hardware, which uses it to update the HFI table. This allocation occurs during boot and remains constant throughout runtime. When resuming from hibernation, the restore kernel allocates a second memory buffer and reprograms the HFI hardware with the new location as part of a normal boot. The location of the second memory buffer may differ from the one allocated by the image kernel. When the restore kernel transfers control to the image kernel, its HFI buffer becomes invalid, potentially leading to memory corruption if the hardware writes to it (the hardware continues to use the buffer from the restore kernel). It is also possible that the hardware "forgets" the address of the memory buffer when resuming from "deep" suspend. Memory corruption may also occur in such a scenario. To prevent the described memory corruption, disable HFI when preparing to suspend or hibernate. Enable it when resuming. Add syscore callbacks to handle the package of the boot CPU (packages of non-boot CPUs are handled via CPU offline). Syscore ops always run on the boot CPU. Additionally, HFI only needs to be disabled during "deep" suspend and hibernation. Syscore ops only run in these cases. Cc: 6.1+ <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # 6.1+ Signed-off-by: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon(a)linux.intel.com> [ rjw: Comment adjustment, subject and changelog edits ] Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Zhao Wenhui <zhaowenhui8(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/thermal/intel/intel_hfi.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/thermal/intel/intel_hfi.c b/drivers/thermal/intel/intel_hfi.c index 158a2b7c6b6f..d442d639a900 100644 --- a/drivers/thermal/intel/intel_hfi.c +++ b/drivers/thermal/intel/intel_hfi.c @@ -33,7 +33,9 @@ #include <linux/processor.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/spinlock.h> +#include <linux/suspend.h> #include <linux/string.h> +#include <linux/syscore_ops.h> #include <linux/topology.h> #include <linux/workqueue.h> @@ -524,6 +526,30 @@ static __init int hfi_parse_features(void) return 0; } +static void hfi_do_enable(void) +{ + /* This code runs only on the boot CPU. */ + struct hfi_cpu_info *info = &per_cpu(hfi_cpu_info, 0); + struct hfi_instance *hfi_instance = info->hfi_instance; + + /* No locking needed. There is no concurrency with CPU online. */ + hfi_set_hw_table(hfi_instance); + hfi_enable(); +} + +static int hfi_do_disable(void) +{ + /* No locking needed. There is no concurrency with CPU offline. */ + hfi_disable(); + + return 0; +} + +static struct syscore_ops hfi_pm_ops = { + .resume = hfi_do_enable, + .suspend = hfi_do_disable, +}; + void __init intel_hfi_init(void) { struct hfi_instance *hfi_instance; @@ -555,6 +581,8 @@ void __init intel_hfi_init(void) if (!hfi_updates_wq) goto err_nomem; + register_syscore_ops(&hfi_pm_ops); + return; err_nomem: -- 2.17.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS] ip6_tunnel: fix NEXTHDR_FRAGMENT handling in ip6_tnl_parse_tlv_enc_lim()
by Guo Mengqi 14 May '24

14 May '24

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.209 commit da23bd709b46168f7dfc36055801011222b076cd category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I99K08 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit d375b98e0248980681e5e56b712026174d617198 ] syzbot pointed out [1] that NEXTHDR_FRAGMENT handling is broken. Reading frag_off can only be done if we pulled enough bytes to skb->head. Currently we might access garbage. [1] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in ip6_tnl_parse_tlv_enc_lim+0x94f/0xbb0 ip6_tnl_parse_tlv_enc_lim+0x94f/0xbb0 ipxip6_tnl_xmit net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c:1326 [inline] ip6_tnl_start_xmit+0xab2/0x1a70 net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c:1432 __netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4940 [inline] netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4954 [inline] xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3548 [inline] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x247/0xa10 net/core/dev.c:3564 __dev_queue_xmit+0x33b8/0x5130 net/core/dev.c:4349 dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3134 [inline] neigh_connected_output+0x569/0x660 net/core/neighbour.c:1592 neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:542 [inline] ip6_finish_output2+0x23a9/0x2b30 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:137 ip6_finish_output+0x855/0x12b0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:222 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:303 [inline] ip6_output+0x323/0x610 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:243 dst_output include/net/dst.h:451 [inline] ip6_local_out+0xe9/0x140 net/ipv6/output_core.c:155 ip6_send_skb net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1952 [inline] ip6_push_pending_frames+0x1f9/0x560 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1972 rawv6_push_pending_frames+0xbe8/0xdf0 net/ipv6/raw.c:582 rawv6_sendmsg+0x2b66/0x2e70 net/ipv6/raw.c:920 inet_sendmsg+0x105/0x190 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:847 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline] ____sys_sendmsg+0x9c2/0xd60 net/socket.c:2584 ___sys_sendmsg+0x28d/0x3c0 net/socket.c:2638 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2667 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2676 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2674 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x307/0x490 net/socket.c:2674 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x44/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b Uninit was created at: slab_post_alloc_hook+0x129/0xa70 mm/slab.h:768 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3478 [inline] __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x5c9/0x970 mm/slub.c:3517 __do_kmalloc_node mm/slab_common.c:1006 [inline] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x118/0x3c0 mm/slab_common.c:1027 kmalloc_reserve+0x249/0x4a0 net/core/skbuff.c:582 pskb_expand_head+0x226/0x1a00 net/core/skbuff.c:2098 __pskb_pull_tail+0x13b/0x2310 net/core/skbuff.c:2655 pskb_may_pull_reason include/linux/skbuff.h:2673 [inline] pskb_may_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2681 [inline] ip6_tnl_parse_tlv_enc_lim+0x901/0xbb0 net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c:408 ipxip6_tnl_xmit net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c:1326 [inline] ip6_tnl_start_xmit+0xab2/0x1a70 net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c:1432 __netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4940 [inline] netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4954 [inline] xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3548 [inline] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x247/0xa10 net/core/dev.c:3564 __dev_queue_xmit+0x33b8/0x5130 net/core/dev.c:4349 dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3134 [inline] neigh_connected_output+0x569/0x660 net/core/neighbour.c:1592 neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:542 [inline] ip6_finish_output2+0x23a9/0x2b30 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:137 ip6_finish_output+0x855/0x12b0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:222 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:303 [inline] ip6_output+0x323/0x610 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:243 dst_output include/net/dst.h:451 [inline] ip6_local_out+0xe9/0x140 net/ipv6/output_core.c:155 ip6_send_skb net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1952 [inline] ip6_push_pending_frames+0x1f9/0x560 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1972 rawv6_push_pending_frames+0xbe8/0xdf0 net/ipv6/raw.c:582 rawv6_sendmsg+0x2b66/0x2e70 net/ipv6/raw.c:920 inet_sendmsg+0x105/0x190 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:847 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline] ____sys_sendmsg+0x9c2/0xd60 net/socket.c:2584 ___sys_sendmsg+0x28d/0x3c0 net/socket.c:2638 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2667 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2676 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2674 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x307/0x490 net/socket.c:2674 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x44/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b CPU: 0 PID: 7345 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 6.7.0-rc8-syzkaller-00024-gac865f00af29 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 11/17/2023 Fixes: fbfa743a9d2a ("ipv6: fix ip6_tnl_parse_tlv_enc_lim()") Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller(a)googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb(a)google.com> Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb(a)google.com> Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Wang Hai <wanghai38(a)huawei.com> --- net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c | 26 +++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c index 3a2741569b84..fab133d67e6c 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c +++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c @@ -427,7 +427,7 @@ __u16 ip6_tnl_parse_tlv_enc_lim(struct sk_buff *skb, __u8 *raw) const struct ipv6hdr *ipv6h = (const struct ipv6hdr *)raw; unsigned int nhoff = raw - skb->data; unsigned int off = nhoff + sizeof(*ipv6h); - u8 next, nexthdr = ipv6h->nexthdr; + u8 nexthdr = ipv6h->nexthdr; while (ipv6_ext_hdr(nexthdr) && nexthdr != NEXTHDR_NONE) { struct ipv6_opt_hdr *hdr; @@ -438,25 +438,25 @@ __u16 ip6_tnl_parse_tlv_enc_lim(struct sk_buff *skb, __u8 *raw) hdr = (struct ipv6_opt_hdr *)(skb->data + off); if (nexthdr == NEXTHDR_FRAGMENT) { - struct frag_hdr *frag_hdr = (struct frag_hdr *) hdr; - if (frag_hdr->frag_off) - break; optlen = 8; } else if (nexthdr == NEXTHDR_AUTH) { optlen = ipv6_authlen(hdr); } else { optlen = ipv6_optlen(hdr); } - /* cache hdr->nexthdr, since pskb_may_pull() might - * invalidate hdr - */ - next = hdr->nexthdr; - if (nexthdr == NEXTHDR_DEST) { - u16 i = 2; - /* Remember : hdr is no longer valid at this point. */ - if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, off + optlen)) + if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, off + optlen)) + break; + + hdr = (struct ipv6_opt_hdr *)(skb->data + off); + if (nexthdr == NEXTHDR_FRAGMENT) { + struct frag_hdr *frag_hdr = (struct frag_hdr *)hdr; + + if (frag_hdr->frag_off) break; + } + if (nexthdr == NEXTHDR_DEST) { + u16 i = 2; while (1) { struct ipv6_tlv_tnl_enc_lim *tel; @@ -477,7 +477,7 @@ __u16 ip6_tnl_parse_tlv_enc_lim(struct sk_buff *skb, __u8 *raw) i++; } } - nexthdr = next; + nexthdr = hdr->nexthdr; off += optlen; } return 0; -- 2.17.1

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[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP2] netfilter: nf_tables: disallow anonymous set with timeout flag
by Guo Mengqi 14 May '24

14 May '24

From: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.8 commit 16603605b667b70da974bea8216c93e7db043bf1 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9AK56 CVE: CVE-2024-26642 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Anonymous sets are never used with timeout from userspace, reject this. Exception to this rule is NFT_SET_EVAL to ensure legacy meters still work. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 761da2935d6e ("netfilter: nf_tables: add set timeout API support") Reported-by: lonial con <kongln9170(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang(a)huawei.com> --- net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c index c17c1990234f..023fbe6de305 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c @@ -4358,6 +4358,9 @@ static int nf_tables_newset(struct net *net, struct sock *nlsk, if ((flags & (NFT_SET_EVAL | NFT_SET_OBJECT)) == (NFT_SET_EVAL | NFT_SET_OBJECT)) return -EOPNOTSUPP; + if ((flags & (NFT_SET_ANONYMOUS | NFT_SET_TIMEOUT | NFT_SET_EVAL)) == + (NFT_SET_ANONYMOUS | NFT_SET_TIMEOUT)) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; } dtype = 0; -- 2.17.1

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[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] netfilter: nf_tables: disallow anonymous set with timeout flag
by Guo Mengqi 14 May '24

14 May '24

From: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.8 commit 16603605b667b70da974bea8216c93e7db043bf1 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9AK56 CVE: CVE-2024-26642 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Anonymous sets are never used with timeout from userspace, reject this. Exception to this rule is NFT_SET_EVAL to ensure legacy meters still work. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 761da2935d6e ("netfilter: nf_tables: add set timeout API support") Reported-by: lonial con <kongln9170(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang(a)huawei.com> --- net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c index 231e710ec55e..6d64694168ec 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c @@ -4358,6 +4358,9 @@ static int nf_tables_newset(struct net *net, struct sock *nlsk, if ((flags & (NFT_SET_EVAL | NFT_SET_OBJECT)) == (NFT_SET_EVAL | NFT_SET_OBJECT)) return -EOPNOTSUPP; + if ((flags & (NFT_SET_ANONYMOUS | NFT_SET_TIMEOUT | NFT_SET_EVAL)) == + (NFT_SET_ANONYMOUS | NFT_SET_TIMEOUT)) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; } dtype = 0; -- 2.17.1

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[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS] netfilter: nf_tables: disallow anonymous set with timeout flag
by Guo Mengqi 14 May '24

14 May '24

From: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.8 commit 16603605b667b70da974bea8216c93e7db043bf1 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9AK56 CVE: CVE-2024-26642 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Anonymous sets are never used with timeout from userspace, reject this. Exception to this rule is NFT_SET_EVAL to ensure legacy meters still work. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 761da2935d6e ("netfilter: nf_tables: add set timeout API support") Reported-by: lonial con <kongln9170(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang(a)huawei.com> --- net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c index 0f117e44bf05..78f2c5fc8efc 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c @@ -4356,6 +4356,9 @@ static int nf_tables_newset(struct net *net, struct sock *nlsk, if ((flags & (NFT_SET_EVAL | NFT_SET_OBJECT)) == (NFT_SET_EVAL | NFT_SET_OBJECT)) return -EOPNOTSUPP; + if ((flags & (NFT_SET_ANONYMOUS | NFT_SET_TIMEOUT | NFT_SET_EVAL)) == + (NFT_SET_ANONYMOUS | NFT_SET_TIMEOUT)) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; } dtype = 0; -- 2.17.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP2] netfilter: nf_tables: disallow timeout for anonymous sets
by Guo Mengqi 14 May '24

14 May '24

From: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.4-rc2 commit e26d3009efda338f19016df4175f354a9bd0a4ab category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9AK6C CVE: CVE-2023-52620 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Never used from userspace, disallow these parameters. Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> Conflicts: net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao(a)huawei.com> --- net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c index 566053c7dc2e..c17c1990234f 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c @@ -4399,6 +4399,9 @@ static int nf_tables_newset(struct net *net, struct sock *nlsk, if (!(flags & NFT_SET_TIMEOUT)) return -EINVAL; + if (flags & NFT_SET_ANONYMOUS) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + err = nf_msecs_to_jiffies64(nla[NFTA_SET_TIMEOUT], &timeout); if (err) return err; @@ -4407,6 +4410,10 @@ static int nf_tables_newset(struct net *net, struct sock *nlsk, if (nla[NFTA_SET_GC_INTERVAL] != NULL) { if (!(flags & NFT_SET_TIMEOUT)) return -EINVAL; + + if (flags & NFT_SET_ANONYMOUS) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + gc_int = ntohl(nla_get_be32(nla[NFTA_SET_GC_INTERVAL])); } -- 2.17.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS] netfilter: nf_tables: disallow timeout for anonymous sets
by Guo Mengqi 14 May '24

14 May '24

From: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.4-rc2 commit e26d3009efda338f19016df4175f354a9bd0a4ab category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9AK6C CVE: CVE-2023-52620 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Never used from userspace, disallow these parameters. Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> Conflicts: net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao(a)huawei.com> --- net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c index c547d7beb6d1..0f117e44bf05 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c @@ -4397,6 +4397,9 @@ static int nf_tables_newset(struct net *net, struct sock *nlsk, if (!(flags & NFT_SET_TIMEOUT)) return -EINVAL; + if (flags & NFT_SET_ANONYMOUS) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + err = nf_msecs_to_jiffies64(nla[NFTA_SET_TIMEOUT], &timeout); if (err) return err; @@ -4405,6 +4408,10 @@ static int nf_tables_newset(struct net *net, struct sock *nlsk, if (nla[NFTA_SET_GC_INTERVAL] != NULL) { if (!(flags & NFT_SET_TIMEOUT)) return -EINVAL; + + if (flags & NFT_SET_ANONYMOUS) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + gc_int = ntohl(nla_get_be32(nla[NFTA_SET_GC_INTERVAL])); } -- 2.17.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] netfilter: nf_tables: disallow timeout for anonymous sets
by Guo Mengqi 14 May '24

14 May '24

From: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.4-rc2 commit e26d3009efda338f19016df4175f354a9bd0a4ab category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9AK6C CVE: CVE-2023-52620 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Never used from userspace, disallow these parameters. Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> Conflicts: net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao(a)huawei.com> --- net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c index 07355fd7b2a2..231e710ec55e 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c @@ -4399,6 +4399,9 @@ static int nf_tables_newset(struct net *net, struct sock *nlsk, if (!(flags & NFT_SET_TIMEOUT)) return -EINVAL; + if (flags & NFT_SET_ANONYMOUS) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + err = nf_msecs_to_jiffies64(nla[NFTA_SET_TIMEOUT], &timeout); if (err) return err; @@ -4407,6 +4410,10 @@ static int nf_tables_newset(struct net *net, struct sock *nlsk, if (nla[NFTA_SET_GC_INTERVAL] != NULL) { if (!(flags & NFT_SET_TIMEOUT)) return -EINVAL; + + if (flags & NFT_SET_ANONYMOUS) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + gc_int = ntohl(nla_get_be32(nla[NFTA_SET_GC_INTERVAL])); } -- 2.17.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] netfilter: nf_tables: mark set as dead when unbinding anonymous set with timeout
by Guo Mengqi 14 May '24

14 May '24

From: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.8 commit 552705a3650bbf46a22b1adedc1b04181490fc36 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9AK7L CVE: CVE-2024-26643 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… --------------------------- While the rhashtable set gc runs asynchronously, a race allows it to collect elements from anonymous sets with timeouts while it is being released from the commit path. Mingi Cho originally reported this issue in a different path in 6.1.x with a pipapo set with low timeouts which is not possible upstream since 7395dfacfff6 ("netfilter: nf_tables: use timestamp to check for set element timeout"). Fix this by setting on the dead flag for anonymous sets to skip async gc in this case. According to 08e4c8c5919f ("netfilter: nf_tables: mark newset as dead on transaction abort"), Florian plans to accelerate abort path by releasing objects via workqueue, therefore, this sets on the dead flag for abort path too. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 5f68718b34a5 ("netfilter: nf_tables: GC transaction API to avoid race with control plane") Reported-by: Mingi Cho <mgcho.minic(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Liu Jian <liujian56(a)huawei.com> --- net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c index 0a7f7ed33406..07355fd7b2a2 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c @@ -4674,6 +4674,7 @@ static void nf_tables_unbind_set(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, struct nft_set *set, if (list_empty(&set->bindings) && nft_set_is_anonymous(set)) { list_del_rcu(&set->list); + set->dead = 1; if (event) nf_tables_set_notify(ctx, set, NFT_MSG_DELSET, GFP_KERNEL); -- 2.17.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP2] netfilter: nf_tables: mark set as dead when unbinding anonymous set with timeout
by Guo Mengqi 14 May '24

14 May '24

From: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.8 commit 552705a3650bbf46a22b1adedc1b04181490fc36 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9AK7L CVE: CVE-2024-26643 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… --------------------------- While the rhashtable set gc runs asynchronously, a race allows it to collect elements from anonymous sets with timeouts while it is being released from the commit path. Mingi Cho originally reported this issue in a different path in 6.1.x with a pipapo set with low timeouts which is not possible upstream since 7395dfacfff6 ("netfilter: nf_tables: use timestamp to check for set element timeout"). Fix this by setting on the dead flag for anonymous sets to skip async gc in this case. According to 08e4c8c5919f ("netfilter: nf_tables: mark newset as dead on transaction abort"), Florian plans to accelerate abort path by releasing objects via workqueue, therefore, this sets on the dead flag for abort path too. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 5f68718b34a5 ("netfilter: nf_tables: GC transaction API to avoid race with control plane") Reported-by: Mingi Cho <mgcho.minic(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Liu Jian <liujian56(a)huawei.com> --- net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c index 3667b4daf1bb..566053c7dc2e 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c @@ -4674,6 +4674,7 @@ static void nf_tables_unbind_set(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, struct nft_set *set, if (list_empty(&set->bindings) && nft_set_is_anonymous(set)) { list_del_rcu(&set->list); + set->dead = 1; if (event) nf_tables_set_notify(ctx, set, NFT_MSG_DELSET, GFP_KERNEL); -- 2.17.1

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