- Kernel - mailweb.openeuler.org

[PATCH OLK-5.10] SUNRPC: svcauth_gss: avoid NULL deref on zero length gss_token in gss_read_proxy_verf
by Li Xiasong 31 Jan '26

31 Jan '26

From: Joshua Rogers <linux(a)joshua.hu> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.19-rc3 commit d4b69a6186b215d2dc1ebcab965ed88e8d41768d category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13435 CVE: CVE-2025-71120 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- A zero length gss_token results in pages == 0 and in_token->pages[0] is NULL. The code unconditionally evaluates page_address(in_token->pages[0]) for the initial memcpy, which can dereference NULL even when the copy length is 0. Guard the first memcpy so it only runs when length > 0. Fixes: 5866efa8cbfb ("SUNRPC: Fix svcauth_gss_proxy_init()") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Joshua Rogers <linux(a)joshua.hu> Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever(a)oracle.com> Conflicts: net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c [conflicts due to not merge c020fa695af6 ("SUNRPC: Convert server-side GSS upcall helpers to use xdr_stream").] Signed-off-by: Li Xiasong <lixiasong1(a)huawei.com> --- net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c index 406ff7f8b156..9cc7221d8693 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c @@ -1179,7 +1179,8 @@ static int gss_read_proxy_verf(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, } length = min_t(unsigned int, inlen, argv->iov_len); - memcpy(page_address(in_token->pages[0]), argv->iov_base, length); + if (length) + memcpy(page_address(in_token->pages[0]), argv->iov_base, length); inlen -= length; to_offs = length; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] rcu: Protect ->defer_qs_iw_pending from data race
by Jiacheng Yu 31 Jan '26

31 Jan '26

From: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck(a)kernel.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.241 commit f937759c7432d6151b73e1393b6517661813d506 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/8987 CVE: CVE-2025-39749 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 90c09d57caeca94e6f3f87c49e96a91edd40cbfd ] On kernels built with CONFIG_IRQ_WORK=y, when rcu_read_unlock() is invoked within an interrupts-disabled region of code [1], it will invoke rcu_read_unlock_special(), which uses an irq-work handler to force the system to notice when the RCU read-side critical section actually ends. That end won't happen until interrupts are enabled at the soonest. In some kernels, such as those booted with rcutree.use_softirq=y, the irq-work handler is used unconditionally. The per-CPU rcu_data structure's ->defer_qs_iw_pending field is updated by the irq-work handler and is both read and updated by rcu_read_unlock_special(). This resulted in the following KCSAN splat: ------------------------------------------------------------------------ BUG: KCSAN: data-race in rcu_preempt_deferred_qs_handler / rcu_read_unlock_special read to 0xffff96b95f42d8d8 of 1 bytes by task 90 on cpu 8: rcu_read_unlock_special+0x175/0x260 __rcu_read_unlock+0x92/0xa0 rt_spin_unlock+0x9b/0xc0 __local_bh_enable+0x10d/0x170 __local_bh_enable_ip+0xfb/0x150 rcu_do_batch+0x595/0xc40 rcu_cpu_kthread+0x4e9/0x830 smpboot_thread_fn+0x24d/0x3b0 kthread+0x3bd/0x410 ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 write to 0xffff96b95f42d8d8 of 1 bytes by task 88 on cpu 8: rcu_preempt_deferred_qs_handler+0x1e/0x30 irq_work_single+0xaf/0x160 run_irq_workd+0x91/0xc0 smpboot_thread_fn+0x24d/0x3b0 kthread+0x3bd/0x410 ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 no locks held by irq_work/8/88. irq event stamp: 200272 hardirqs last enabled at (200272): [<ffffffffb0f56121>] finish_task_switch+0x131/0x320 hardirqs last disabled at (200271): [<ffffffffb25c7859>] __schedule+0x129/0xd70 softirqs last enabled at (0): [<ffffffffb0ee093f>] copy_process+0x4df/0x1cc0 softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ The problem is that irq-work handlers run with interrupts enabled, which means that rcu_preempt_deferred_qs_handler() could be interrupted, and that interrupt handler might contain an RCU read-side critical section, which might invoke rcu_read_unlock_special(). In the strict KCSAN mode of operation used by RCU, this constitutes a data race on the ->defer_qs_iw_pending field. This commit therefore disables interrupts across the portion of the rcu_preempt_deferred_qs_handler() that updates the ->defer_qs_iw_pending field. This suffices because this handler is not a fast path. Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Neeraj Upadhyay (AMD) <neeraj.upadhyay(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jiacheng Yu <yujiacheng3(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h b/kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h index 87fe7f423b28..8f6afaec70db 100644 --- a/kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h +++ b/kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h @@ -585,10 +585,13 @@ static void rcu_preempt_deferred_qs(struct task_struct *t) */ static void rcu_preempt_deferred_qs_handler(struct irq_work *iwp) { + unsigned long flags; struct rcu_data *rdp; rdp = container_of(iwp, struct rcu_data, defer_qs_iw); + local_irq_save(flags); rdp->defer_qs_iw_pending = false; + local_irq_restore(flags); } /* -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] rcu: Protect ->defer_qs_iw_pending from data race
by Jiacheng Yu 31 Jan '26

31 Jan '26

From: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck(a)kernel.org> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.103 commit b55947b725f190396f475d5d0c59aa855a4d8895 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/ICXMAN CVE: CVE-2025-39749 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 90c09d57caeca94e6f3f87c49e96a91edd40cbfd ] On kernels built with CONFIG_IRQ_WORK=y, when rcu_read_unlock() is invoked within an interrupts-disabled region of code [1], it will invoke rcu_read_unlock_special(), which uses an irq-work handler to force the system to notice when the RCU read-side critical section actually ends. That end won't happen until interrupts are enabled at the soonest. In some kernels, such as those booted with rcutree.use_softirq=y, the irq-work handler is used unconditionally. The per-CPU rcu_data structure's ->defer_qs_iw_pending field is updated by the irq-work handler and is both read and updated by rcu_read_unlock_special(). This resulted in the following KCSAN splat: ------------------------------------------------------------------------ BUG: KCSAN: data-race in rcu_preempt_deferred_qs_handler / rcu_read_unlock_special read to 0xffff96b95f42d8d8 of 1 bytes by task 90 on cpu 8: rcu_read_unlock_special+0x175/0x260 __rcu_read_unlock+0x92/0xa0 rt_spin_unlock+0x9b/0xc0 __local_bh_enable+0x10d/0x170 __local_bh_enable_ip+0xfb/0x150 rcu_do_batch+0x595/0xc40 rcu_cpu_kthread+0x4e9/0x830 smpboot_thread_fn+0x24d/0x3b0 kthread+0x3bd/0x410 ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 write to 0xffff96b95f42d8d8 of 1 bytes by task 88 on cpu 8: rcu_preempt_deferred_qs_handler+0x1e/0x30 irq_work_single+0xaf/0x160 run_irq_workd+0x91/0xc0 smpboot_thread_fn+0x24d/0x3b0 kthread+0x3bd/0x410 ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 no locks held by irq_work/8/88. irq event stamp: 200272 hardirqs last enabled at (200272): [<ffffffffb0f56121>] finish_task_switch+0x131/0x320 hardirqs last disabled at (200271): [<ffffffffb25c7859>] __schedule+0x129/0xd70 softirqs last enabled at (0): [<ffffffffb0ee093f>] copy_process+0x4df/0x1cc0 softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ The problem is that irq-work handlers run with interrupts enabled, which means that rcu_preempt_deferred_qs_handler() could be interrupted, and that interrupt handler might contain an RCU read-side critical section, which might invoke rcu_read_unlock_special(). In the strict KCSAN mode of operation used by RCU, this constitutes a data race on the ->defer_qs_iw_pending field. This commit therefore disables interrupts across the portion of the rcu_preempt_deferred_qs_handler() that updates the ->defer_qs_iw_pending field. This suffices because this handler is not a fast path. Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Neeraj Upadhyay (AMD) <neeraj.upadhyay(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jiacheng Yu <yujiacheng3(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h b/kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h index 94b715139f52..de727f2568bf 100644 --- a/kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h +++ b/kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h @@ -612,10 +612,13 @@ notrace void rcu_preempt_deferred_qs(struct task_struct *t) */ static void rcu_preempt_deferred_qs_handler(struct irq_work *iwp) { + unsigned long flags; struct rcu_data *rdp; rdp = container_of(iwp, struct rcu_data, defer_qs_iw); + local_irq_save(flags); rdp->defer_qs_iw_pending = false; + local_irq_restore(flags); } /* -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] fbdev: Fix vmalloc out-of-bounds write in fast_imageblit
by Jiacheng Yu 31 Jan '26

31 Jan '26

From: Sravan Kumar Gundu <sravankumarlpu(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.17-rc1 commit af0db3c1f898144846d4c172531a199bb3ca375d category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/9085 CVE: CVE-2025-38685 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- This issue triggers when a userspace program does an ioctl FBIOPUT_CON2FBMAP by passing console number and frame buffer number. Ideally this maps console to frame buffer and updates the screen if console is visible. As part of mapping it has to do resize of console according to frame buffer info. if this resize fails and returns from vc_do_resize() and continues further. At this point console and new frame buffer are mapped and sets display vars. Despite failure still it continue to proceed updating the screen at later stages where vc_data is related to previous frame buffer and frame buffer info and display vars are mapped to new frame buffer and eventully leading to out-of-bounds write in fast_imageblit(). This bheviour is excepted only when fg_console is equal to requested console which is a visible console and updates screen with invalid struct references in fbcon_putcs(). Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+c4b7aa0513823e2ea880(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=c4b7aa0513823e2ea880 Signed-off-by: Sravan Kumar Gundu <sravankumarlpu(a)gmail.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller(a)gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Jiacheng Yu <yujiacheng3(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c index 9757276e8182..5a38f3de4ad8 100644 --- a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c +++ b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c @@ -810,7 +810,8 @@ static void con2fb_init_display(struct vc_data *vc, struct fb_info *info, fg_vc->vc_rows); } - update_screen(vc_cons[fg_console].d); + if (fg_console != unit) + update_screen(vc_cons[fg_console].d); } /** @@ -1355,6 +1356,7 @@ static void fbcon_set_disp(struct fb_info *info, struct fb_var_screeninfo *var, struct vc_data *svc; struct fbcon_ops *ops = info->fbcon_par; int rows, cols; + unsigned long ret = 0; p = &fb_display[unit]; @@ -1405,11 +1407,10 @@ static void fbcon_set_disp(struct fb_info *info, struct fb_var_screeninfo *var, rows = FBCON_SWAP(ops->rotate, info->var.yres, info->var.xres); cols /= vc->vc_font.width; rows /= vc->vc_font.height; - vc_resize(vc, cols, rows); + ret = vc_resize(vc, cols, rows); - if (con_is_visible(vc)) { + if (con_is_visible(vc) && !ret) update_screen(vc); - } } static __inline__ void ywrap_up(struct vc_data *vc, int count) -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] *** fix CVE-2025-38062 ***
by Lin Ruifeng 31 Jan '26

31 Jan '26

*** fix CVE-2025-38062 *** Jason Gunthorpe (1): genirq/msi: Store the IOMMU IOVA directly in msi_desc instead of iommu_cookie Lin Ruifeng (1): genirq/msi:: Fix kabi-break of struct msi_desc drivers/iommu/dma-iommu.c | 28 +++++++++++++--------------- include/linux/msi.h | 35 +++++++++++++++-------------------- 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-) -- 2.43.0

2 3

[PATCH OLK-5.10] scsi/hiraid: Support New Raid feature
by LinKun 31 Jan '26

31 Jan '26

From: 岳智超 <yuezhichao1(a)h-partners.com> driver inclusion category: feature bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/8290 CVE: NA -------------------------------- Set single hw queue as default Add stream detect Signed-off-by: 岳智超 <yuezhichao1(a)h-partners.com> --- drivers/scsi/hisi_raid/hiraid.h | 35 ++ drivers/scsi/hisi_raid/hiraid_main.c | 483 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 501 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/scsi/hisi_raid/hiraid.h b/drivers/scsi/hisi_raid/hiraid.h index 04b2e25..17858dc 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/hisi_raid/hiraid.h +++ b/drivers/scsi/hisi_raid/hiraid.h @@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ #ifndef __HIRAID_H_ #define __HIRAID_H_ +#include <linux/mutex.h> + #define HIRAID_HDD_PD_QD 64 #define HIRAID_HDD_VD_QD 256 #define HIRAID_SSD_PD_QD 64 @@ -760,5 +762,38 @@ struct hiraid_sdev_hostdata { u16 pend_count; }; +enum stream_type { + TYPE_TOTAL, + TYPE_WRITE, + TYPE_READ, + TYPE_CLEAN, + TYPE_BOTTOM +}; + +struct HIRAID_STREAM_S { + /* recog-window */ + u64 stream_lba; + u32 stream_len; + u16 did; + u16 type; + /* aging ctrl */ + int aging_credit; + int aging_grade; + u16 stream_id; + u16 using; +}; + +struct IO_LIST_S { + struct list_head list; + struct hiraid_scsi_io_cmd io_cmd; + struct hiraid_queue *submit_queue; + unsigned int sector_size; +}; + +struct mutex_list_head_s { + struct list_head list; + struct mutex lock; +}; + #endif diff --git a/drivers/scsi/hisi_raid/hiraid_main.c b/drivers/scsi/hisi_raid/hiraid_main.c index 2f33339..2deadba 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/hisi_raid/hiraid_main.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/hisi_raid/hiraid_main.c @@ -35,6 +35,10 @@ #include <scsi/scsi_transport.h> #include <scsi/scsi_dbg.h> #include <scsi/sg.h> +#include <linux/kthread.h> +#include <linux/mutex.h> +#include <linux/sched.h> +#include <linux/sched/prio.h> #include "hiraid.h" @@ -54,9 +58,7 @@ static bool max_io_force; module_param(max_io_force, bool, 0644); MODULE_PARM_DESC(max_io_force, "force max_hw_sectors_kb = 1024, default false(performance first)"); -static bool work_mode; -module_param(work_mode, bool, 0444); -MODULE_PARM_DESC(work_mode, "work mode switch, default false for multi hw queues"); +static bool work_mode = true; #define MAX_IO_QUEUES 128 #define MIN_IO_QUEUES 1 @@ -152,7 +154,7 @@ static struct workqueue_struct *work_queue; __func__, ##__VA_ARGS__); \ } while (0) -#define HIRAID_DRV_VERSION "1.1.0.1" +#define HIRAID_DRV_VERSION "1.1.0.2" #define ADMIN_TIMEOUT (admin_tmout * HZ) #define USRCMD_TIMEOUT (180 * HZ) @@ -169,6 +171,15 @@ static struct workqueue_struct *work_queue; #define MAX_CAN_QUEUE (4096 - 1) #define MIN_CAN_QUEUE (1024 - 1) +#define MAX_DECREASE_GRADE (-8) +#define MAX_INCREASE_GRADE 8 +#define INC_GRADE 1 +#define MIN_CREDIT 0 +#define MAX_CREDIT 64 +#define CREDIT_THRES 32 +#define MIN(a, b) (((a) < (b)) ? (a) : (b)) +#define MAX(a, b) (((a) > (b)) ? (a) : (b)) + enum SENSE_STATE_CODE { SENSE_STATE_OK = 0, SENSE_STATE_NEED_CHECK, @@ -749,6 +760,400 @@ static int hiraid_build_sgl(struct hiraid_dev *hdev, struct hiraid_scsi_io_cmd * return 0; } +#define MAX_PD_NUM (40 + 1) +#define MAX_STREAM_NUM 8 +#define PER_MB (1024 * 1024) +#define MAX_IO_NUM (200 * PER_MB) +#define STREAM_LEN (4 * PER_MB) +#define MAX_IO_NUM_ONCE 100 +#define IO_SUBMIT_TIME_OUT 100 +#define MAX_AGING_NUM 100 + +#define MIN_IO_SEND_TIME 10 +#define MAX_IO_SEND_TIME 50 + +enum io_operation_type { + TYPE_DELETE_SINGLE_IO = 1, + TYPE_DELETE_SINGLE_IO_LIST, + TYPE_DELETE_ALL_IO_LIST +}; + +struct HIRAID_STREAM_S stream_array[MAX_PD_NUM][MAX_STREAM_NUM] = {0}; +struct mutex_list_head_s io_heads_per_stream[MAX_PD_NUM * MAX_STREAM_NUM]; +spinlock_t stream_array_lock; +DEFINE_MUTEX(g_stream_operation_mutex); + +u64 g_io_transport_num[MAX_PD_NUM][MAX_STREAM_NUM] = {0}; +u16 g_io_stream_num[MAX_PD_NUM][TYPE_BOTTOM] = {0}; +u16 g_io_count = 1; + +void hiraid_inc_io_transport_num(u16 disk_id, u16 streamd_id, u16 nlb) +{ + g_io_transport_num[disk_id][streamd_id] += nlb; +} + +void hiraid_refresh_io_transport_num(u16 disk_id, u16 streamd_id) +{ + g_io_transport_num[disk_id][streamd_id] = 0; +} + +void hiraid_inc_stream_num(u16 disk_id) +{ + spin_lock(&stream_array_lock); + g_io_stream_num[disk_id][TYPE_TOTAL]++; + spin_unlock(&stream_array_lock); +} + +void hiraid_dec_stream_num(u16 disk_id) +{ + spin_lock(&stream_array_lock); + if (g_io_stream_num[disk_id][TYPE_TOTAL] > 0) + g_io_stream_num[disk_id][TYPE_TOTAL]--; + spin_unlock(&stream_array_lock); +} + +static bool hiraid_io_recog_check_stream_exceed(u16 disk_id) +{ + bool exceed_flag; + + spin_lock(&stream_array_lock); + exceed_flag = (g_io_stream_num[disk_id][TYPE_TOTAL] >= MAX_STREAM_NUM); + spin_unlock(&stream_array_lock); + return exceed_flag; +} + +static u16 hiraid_get_stream_num(u16 disk_id) +{ + return g_io_stream_num[disk_id][TYPE_TOTAL]; +} + +static inline struct HIRAID_STREAM_S *hiraid_get_stream(u16 disk_id, + u16 stream_id) +{ + return &stream_array[disk_id][stream_id]; +} + +static inline struct mutex_list_head_s *hiraid_get_io_head(u16 disk_id) +{ + return &(io_heads_per_stream[disk_id]); +} + +static bool hiraid_recognition_acknowledge(const struct HIRAID_STREAM_S *stream) +{ + return (stream->aging_credit >= CREDIT_THRES) ? true : false; +} + +void hiraid_io_recognition_init(void) +{ + u16 i; + + spin_lock_init(&stream_array_lock); + for (i = 0; i < (MAX_PD_NUM * MAX_STREAM_NUM); i++) { + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&hiraid_get_io_head(i)->list); + mutex_init(&hiraid_get_io_head(i)->lock); + } +} + +static void hiraid_io_recognition_iterator(struct HIRAID_STREAM_S *stream, + int direction) +{ + stream->aging_grade = stream->aging_grade + direction * INC_GRADE; + stream->aging_grade = MAX(stream->aging_grade, MAX_DECREASE_GRADE); + stream->aging_grade = MIN(stream->aging_grade, MAX_INCREASE_GRADE); + stream->aging_credit = stream->aging_credit + stream->aging_grade; + stream->aging_credit = MAX(stream->aging_credit, MIN_CREDIT); + stream->aging_credit = MIN(stream->aging_credit, MAX_CREDIT); +} + +struct HIRAID_STREAM_S *hiraid_io_pick_stream( + struct hiraid_scsi_rw_cmd *req, u16 type, u16 actual_id) +{ + struct HIRAID_STREAM_S *first_hit_stream = NULL; + struct HIRAID_STREAM_S *temp_stream = NULL; + u16 pick_flag = 0; + u8 i; + + for (i = 0; i < MAX_STREAM_NUM; i++) { + temp_stream = &stream_array[actual_id][i]; + temp_stream->stream_id = i; + if (req->slba < temp_stream->stream_lba || + req->slba >= temp_stream->stream_lba + + temp_stream->stream_len || + temp_stream->type != type) { + continue; + } + if (!pick_flag) { + temp_stream->stream_lba = req->slba; + first_hit_stream = temp_stream; + pick_flag = 1; + continue; + } + hiraid_dec_stream_num(actual_id); + memset(temp_stream, 0, + sizeof(struct HIRAID_STREAM_S)); // 去重影 + } + return first_hit_stream; +} + +static struct HIRAID_STREAM_S *hiraid_init_flow_stream( + struct hiraid_scsi_rw_cmd *req, u16 type, u16 actual_id) +{ + int i; + struct HIRAID_STREAM_S *stream = NULL; + + for (i = 0; i < MAX_STREAM_NUM; i++) { + stream = hiraid_get_stream(actual_id, i); + if (!stream->using) { + stream->using = 1; + stream->stream_id = i; + break; + } + } + stream->stream_lba = req->slba; + stream->did = actual_id; + stream->type = type; + stream->aging_credit = 0; + stream->aging_grade = 0; + stream->stream_len = STREAM_LEN; + return stream; +} + +static struct HIRAID_STREAM_S *hiraid_stream_detect(struct hiraid_dev *hdev, + struct hiraid_scsi_rw_cmd *io_cmd, u16 actual_id) +{ + u16 type = io_cmd->opcode == HIRAID_CMD_WRITE ? TYPE_WRITE : TYPE_READ; + struct HIRAID_STREAM_S *stream = hiraid_io_pick_stream(io_cmd, type, + actual_id); + + if (stream != NULL) { /* 可以命中一个stream */ + return stream; + } + + if (hiraid_io_recog_check_stream_exceed(actual_id)) + return NULL; + stream = hiraid_init_flow_stream(io_cmd, type, actual_id); + hiraid_inc_stream_num(actual_id); + return stream; +} + +u64 g_io_last_pull_time[MAX_PD_NUM] = {0}; + +static u16 hiraid_get_submit_io_stream(u16 did, struct hiraid_dev *hdev) +{ + u64 temp_num, i; + static u16 stream_num[MAX_PD_NUM] = {0}; + + if (g_io_last_pull_time[did] == 0) + g_io_last_pull_time[did] = jiffies_to_msecs(jiffies); + + for (i = 0; i < MAX_STREAM_NUM; i++) { + temp_num = g_io_transport_num[did][i]; + if (temp_num != 0) { + if ((temp_num < MAX_IO_NUM) && + ((jiffies_to_msecs(jiffies) - g_io_last_pull_time[did]) + < IO_SUBMIT_TIME_OUT)) { + stream_num[did] = i; + return i; + } + g_io_last_pull_time[did] = jiffies_to_msecs(jiffies); + hiraid_refresh_io_transport_num(did, i); + stream_num[did] = ((i+1) % MAX_STREAM_NUM); + return ((i+1) % MAX_STREAM_NUM); + } + } + g_io_last_pull_time[did] = jiffies_to_msecs(jiffies); + return ((stream_num[did]++) % MAX_STREAM_NUM); +} + +static void hiraid_submit_io_stream(u16 hdid, struct hiraid_dev *hdev) +{ + struct mutex_list_head_s *io_slist = NULL; + struct list_head *node = NULL; + struct list_head *next_node = NULL; + struct list_head temp_header; + struct hiraid_scsi_io_cmd io_cmd = {0}; + u16 submit_stream_id; + struct IO_LIST_S *temp_io_stream = NULL; + u16 count = 0; + + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&temp_header); + submit_stream_id = hiraid_get_submit_io_stream(hdid, hdev); + io_slist = hiraid_get_io_head(hdid * MAX_STREAM_NUM + submit_stream_id); + mutex_lock(&io_slist->lock); + list_for_each_safe(node, next_node, &io_slist->list) { + list_del(node); + list_add_tail(node, &temp_header); + if (++count >= MAX_IO_NUM_ONCE) + break; + } + mutex_unlock(&io_slist->lock); + + list_for_each_safe(node, next_node, &temp_header) { + temp_io_stream = list_entry(node, struct IO_LIST_S, list); + io_cmd = temp_io_stream->io_cmd; + hiraid_submit_cmd(temp_io_stream->submit_queue, &io_cmd); + hiraid_inc_io_transport_num(hdid, submit_stream_id, + io_cmd.rw.nlb * temp_io_stream->sector_size); + list_del(node); + kfree(temp_io_stream); + } + temp_io_stream = NULL; + list_del_init(&temp_header); +} + +static u8 hiraid_detect_if_aging(void) +{ + if (++g_io_count == MAX_AGING_NUM) { + g_io_count = 0; + return 1; + } + return 0; +} + +static void hiraid_aging(struct hiraid_dev *hdev) +{ + struct HIRAID_STREAM_S *temp_stream = NULL; + int i = 0; + int j = 0; + + for (i = 0; i < MAX_PD_NUM; i++) { + for (j = 0; j < MAX_STREAM_NUM; j++) { + temp_stream = hiraid_get_stream(i, j); + if (temp_stream->using) { + hiraid_io_recognition_iterator(temp_stream, -1); + if (temp_stream->aging_credit <= 0) { + hiraid_dec_stream_num(i); + memset(temp_stream, + 0, sizeof(struct HIRAID_STREAM_S)); // 老化 + } + } + } + } +} + +static u8 hiraid_io_list_operation(u32 hdid, u16 cid, u16 hwq, u8 operation) +{ + int i, j; + + struct mutex_list_head_s *io_slist = NULL; + struct list_head *node = NULL; + struct list_head *next_node = NULL; + struct hiraid_scsi_io_cmd *io_cmd = NULL; + struct hiraid_queue *hiraidq = NULL; + struct IO_LIST_S *temp_io_stream = NULL; + + u8 max_hd_num = operation == TYPE_DELETE_ALL_IO_LIST ? + MAX_PD_NUM : hdid + 1; + for (i = hdid; i < max_hd_num; i++) { + for (j = 0; j < MAX_STREAM_NUM; j++) { + io_slist = hiraid_get_io_head(i * MAX_STREAM_NUM + j); + mutex_lock(&io_slist->lock); + list_for_each_safe(node, next_node, &io_slist->list) { + temp_io_stream = list_entry(node, + struct IO_LIST_S, list); + io_cmd = &(temp_io_stream->io_cmd); + hiraidq = temp_io_stream->submit_queue; + if (operation >= TYPE_DELETE_SINGLE_IO_LIST) { + list_del_init(node); + kfree(temp_io_stream); + temp_io_stream = NULL; + } else { + if ((io_cmd->rw.cmd_id == cid) && + (hiraidq->qid == hwq)) { + list_del_init(node); + mutex_unlock(&io_slist->lock); + kfree(temp_io_stream); + return 1; + } + } + } + mutex_unlock(&io_slist->lock); + } + } + return 0; +} + +static u8 hiraid_check_io_list(u32 hdid, u16 cid, u16 hwq) +{ + u8 ret; + + mutex_lock(&g_stream_operation_mutex); + ret = hiraid_io_list_operation(hdid, cid, hwq, TYPE_DELETE_SINGLE_IO); + mutex_unlock(&g_stream_operation_mutex); + return ret; +} + +static u8 hiraid_delete_single_pd_io_list(u32 hdid) +{ + u8 ret; + + mutex_lock(&g_stream_operation_mutex); + ret = hiraid_io_list_operation(hdid, 0, 0, TYPE_DELETE_SINGLE_IO_LIST); + mutex_unlock(&g_stream_operation_mutex); + return ret; +} + +static u8 hiraid_delete_all_io_list(void) +{ + u8 ret; + + mutex_lock(&g_stream_operation_mutex); + ret = hiraid_io_list_operation(0, 0, 0, TYPE_DELETE_ALL_IO_LIST); + mutex_unlock(&g_stream_operation_mutex); + return ret; +} + +static u8 hiraid_add_io_to_list(struct hiraid_queue *submit_queue, + struct HIRAID_STREAM_S *tmp_stream, struct hiraid_scsi_io_cmd io_cmd, + unsigned int sector_size, u16 actual_id) +{ + struct mutex_list_head_s *io_slist = NULL; + struct IO_LIST_S *new_io_node = NULL; + + new_io_node = kmalloc(sizeof(struct IO_LIST_S), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!new_io_node) + return 0; + new_io_node->io_cmd = io_cmd; + new_io_node->submit_queue = submit_queue; + new_io_node->sector_size = sector_size; + io_slist = hiraid_get_io_head(actual_id * + MAX_STREAM_NUM + tmp_stream->stream_id); + mutex_lock(&io_slist->lock); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&(new_io_node->list)); + list_add_tail(&(new_io_node->list), &io_slist->list); + mutex_unlock(&io_slist->lock); + return 1; +} + +static void hiraid_submit_io_threading(struct hiraid_dev *hdev) +{ + int i = 0; + + while (!kthread_should_stop()) { + mutex_lock(&g_stream_operation_mutex); + for (i = 0; i < MAX_PD_NUM; i++) + hiraid_submit_io_stream(i, hdev); + mutex_unlock(&g_stream_operation_mutex); + usleep_range(MIN_IO_SEND_TIME, MAX_IO_SEND_TIME); + } +} + +static void hiraid_destroy_io_stream_resource(struct hiraid_dev *hdev) +{ + u16 i; + + for (i = 0; i < (MAX_PD_NUM * MAX_STREAM_NUM); i++) + list_del_init(&hiraid_get_io_head(i)->list); +} + +struct task_struct *g_hiraid_submit_task; +static void hiraid_init_io_stream(struct hiraid_dev *hdev) +{ + hiraid_io_recognition_init(); + g_hiraid_submit_task = kthread_run((void *)hiraid_submit_io_threading, + hdev, "hiraid_submit_thread"); +} + #define HIRAID_RW_FUA BIT(14) #define RW_LENGTH_ZERO (67) @@ -871,6 +1276,30 @@ static int hiraid_setup_nonrw_cmd(struct hiraid_dev *hdev, return 0; } +static bool hiraid_disk_is_hdd(u8 attr) +{ + switch (HIRAID_DEV_DISK_TYPE(attr)) { + case HIRAID_SAS_HDD_VD: + case HIRAID_SATA_HDD_VD: + case HIRAID_SAS_HDD_PD: + case HIRAID_SATA_HDD_PD: + return true; + default: + return false; + } +} + +static bool hiraid_disk_is_hdd_rawdrive(u8 attr) +{ + switch (HIRAID_DEV_DISK_TYPE(attr)) { + case HIRAID_SAS_HDD_PD: + case HIRAID_SATA_HDD_PD: + return true; + default: + return false; + } +} + static int hiraid_setup_io_cmd(struct hiraid_dev *hdev, struct hiraid_scsi_io_cmd *io_cmd, struct scsi_cmnd *scmd, struct hiraid_mapmange *mapbuf) @@ -1025,6 +1454,7 @@ static int hiraid_queue_command(struct Scsi_Host *shost, struct scsi_cmnd *scmd) struct hiraid_sdev_hostdata *hostdata; struct hiraid_scsi_io_cmd io_cmd; struct hiraid_queue *ioq; + struct HIRAID_STREAM_S *tmp_stm = NULL; u16 hwq, cid; int ret; @@ -1092,6 +1522,23 @@ static int hiraid_queue_command(struct Scsi_Host *shost, struct scsi_cmnd *scmd) } WRITE_ONCE(mapbuf->state, CMD_FLIGHT); + + if (hiraid_is_rw_scmd(scmd) && + hiraid_disk_is_hdd_rawdrive(hostdata->attr)) { + if (hiraid_detect_if_aging()) + hiraid_aging(hdev); + tmp_stm = hiraid_stream_detect(hdev, &(io_cmd.rw), sdev->id); + if (tmp_stm != NULL) { + hiraid_io_recognition_iterator(tmp_stm, 1); + if (hiraid_recognition_acknowledge(tmp_stm) && + (hiraid_get_stream_num(sdev->id) > 1)) { + if (hiraid_add_io_to_list(ioq, + tmp_stm, io_cmd, sdev->sector_size, sdev->id)) { + return 0; + } + } + } + } hiraid_submit_cmd(ioq, &io_cmd); return 0; @@ -1141,19 +1588,6 @@ static int hiraid_disk_qd(u8 attr) } } -static bool hiraid_disk_is_hdd(u8 attr) -{ - switch (HIRAID_DEV_DISK_TYPE(attr)) { - case HIRAID_SAS_HDD_VD: - case HIRAID_SATA_HDD_VD: - case HIRAID_SAS_HDD_PD: - case HIRAID_SATA_HDD_PD: - return true; - default: - return false; - } -} - static int hiraid_slave_alloc(struct scsi_device *sdev) { struct hiraid_sdev_hostdata *hostdata; @@ -1939,6 +2373,7 @@ static int hiraid_create_queue(struct hiraid_queue *hiraidq, u16 qid) hiraidq->cq_vector = cq_vector; ret = pci_request_irq(hdev->pdev, cq_vector, hiraid_handle_irq, NULL, hiraidq, "hiraid%d_q%d", hdev->instance, qid); + if (ret) { hiraidq->cq_vector = -1; dev_err(hdev->dev, "request queue[%d] irq failed\n", qid); @@ -3232,6 +3667,12 @@ static int hiraid_abort(struct scsi_cmnd *scmd) cid = mapbuf->cid; hwq = mapbuf->hiraidq->qid; + if (hiraid_check_io_list(hostdata->hdid, cid, hwq)) { + dev_warn(hdev->dev, "find cid[%d] qid[%d] in host, abort succ\n", + cid, hwq); + return SUCCESS; + } + dev_warn(hdev->dev, "cid[%d] qid[%d] timeout, send abort\n", cid, hwq); ret = hiraid_send_abort_cmd(hdev, hostdata->hdid, hwq, cid); if (ret != -ETIME) { @@ -3263,6 +3704,7 @@ static int hiraid_scsi_reset(struct scsi_cmnd *scmd, enum hiraid_rst_type rst) ret = hiraid_send_reset_cmd(hdev, rst, hostdata->hdid); if ((ret == 0) || (ret == FW_EH_DEV_NONE && rst == HIRAID_RESET_TARGET)) { if (rst == HIRAID_RESET_TARGET) { + hiraid_delete_single_pd_io_list(hostdata->hdid); ret = wait_tgt_reset_io_done(scmd); if (ret) { dev_warn(hdev->dev, "sdev[%d:%d] target has %d peding cmd, target reset failed\n", @@ -3300,6 +3742,7 @@ static int hiraid_host_reset(struct scsi_cmnd *scmd) dev_warn(hdev->dev, "sdev[%d:%d] send host reset\n", scmd->device->channel, scmd->device->id); + hiraid_delete_all_io_list(); if (hiraid_reset_work_sync(hdev) == -EBUSY) flush_work(&hdev->reset_work); @@ -3333,6 +3776,7 @@ static pci_ers_result_t hiraid_pci_error_detected(struct pci_dev *pdev, scsi_block_requests(hdev->shost); hiraid_dev_state_trans(hdev, DEV_RESETTING); + hiraid_delete_all_io_list(); return PCI_ERS_RESULT_NEED_RESET; case pci_channel_io_perm_failure: @@ -3906,6 +4350,7 @@ static int hiraid_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *id) goto unregist_bsg; scsi_scan_host(hdev->shost); + hiraid_init_io_stream(hdev); return 0; @@ -3937,6 +4382,10 @@ static void hiraid_remove(struct pci_dev *pdev) dev_info(hdev->dev, "enter hiraid remove\n"); + kthread_stop(g_hiraid_submit_task); + hiraid_delete_all_io_list(); + hiraid_destroy_io_stream_resource(hdev); + hiraid_dev_state_trans(hdev, DEV_DELETING); flush_work(&hdev->reset_work); -- 2.45.1.windows.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] scsi/hiraid: Support New Raid feature
by LinKun 31 Jan '26

31 Jan '26

From: 岳智超 <yuezhichao1(a)h-partners.com> driver inclusion category: feature bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/8291 CVE: NA -------------------------------- Set single hw queue as default Add stream detect Signed-off-by: 岳智超 <yuezhichao1(a)h-partners.com> --- drivers/scsi/hisi_raid/hiraid.h | 35 ++ drivers/scsi/hisi_raid/hiraid_main.c | 485 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 501 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/scsi/hisi_raid/hiraid.h b/drivers/scsi/hisi_raid/hiraid.h index 1ebc3dd..cb90d3d 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/hisi_raid/hiraid.h +++ b/drivers/scsi/hisi_raid/hiraid.h @@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ #ifndef __HIRAID_H_ #define __HIRAID_H_ +#include <linux/mutex.h> + #define HIRAID_HDD_PD_QD 64 #define HIRAID_HDD_VD_QD 256 #define HIRAID_SSD_PD_QD 64 @@ -756,5 +758,38 @@ struct hiraid_sdev_hostdata { u16 pend_count; }; +enum stream_type { + TYPE_TOTAL, + TYPE_WRITE, + TYPE_READ, + TYPE_CLEAN, + TYPE_BOTTOM +}; + +struct HIRAID_STREAM_S { + /* recog-window */ + u64 stream_lba; + u32 stream_len; + u16 did; + u16 type; + /* aging ctrl */ + int aging_credit; + int aging_grade; + u16 stream_id; + u16 using; +}; + +struct IO_LIST_S { + struct list_head list; + struct hiraid_scsi_io_cmd io_cmd; + struct hiraid_queue *submit_queue; + unsigned int sector_size; +}; + +struct mutex_list_head_s { + struct list_head list; + struct mutex lock; +}; + #endif diff --git a/drivers/scsi/hisi_raid/hiraid_main.c b/drivers/scsi/hisi_raid/hiraid_main.c index f84182f..cdba466 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/hisi_raid/hiraid_main.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/hisi_raid/hiraid_main.c @@ -35,6 +35,10 @@ #include <scsi/scsi_transport.h> #include <scsi/scsi_dbg.h> #include <scsi/sg.h> +#include <linux/kthread.h> +#include <linux/mutex.h> +#include <linux/sched.h> +#include <linux/sched/prio.h> #include "hiraid.h" @@ -54,9 +58,7 @@ static bool max_io_force; module_param(max_io_force, bool, 0644); MODULE_PARM_DESC(max_io_force, "force max_hw_sectors_kb = 1024, default false(performance first)"); -static bool work_mode; -module_param(work_mode, bool, 0444); -MODULE_PARM_DESC(work_mode, "work mode switch, default false for multi hw queues"); +static bool work_mode = true; #define MAX_IO_QUEUES 128 #define MIN_IO_QUEUES 1 @@ -153,7 +155,7 @@ static struct workqueue_struct *work_queue; __func__, ##__VA_ARGS__); \ } while (0) -#define HIRAID_DRV_VERSION "1.1.0.0" +#define HIRAID_DRV_VERSION "1.1.0.1" #define ADMIN_TIMEOUT (admin_tmout * HZ) #define USRCMD_TIMEOUT (180 * HZ) @@ -170,6 +172,15 @@ static struct workqueue_struct *work_queue; #define MAX_CAN_QUEUE (4096 - 1) #define MIN_CAN_QUEUE (1024 - 1) +#define MAX_DECREASE_GRADE (-8) +#define MAX_INCREASE_GRADE 8 +#define INC_GRADE 1 +#define MIN_CREDIT 0 +#define MAX_CREDIT 64 +#define CREDIT_THRES 32 +#define MIN(a, b) (((a) < (b)) ? (a) : (b)) +#define MAX(a, b) (((a) > (b)) ? (a) : (b)) + enum SENSE_STATE_CODE { SENSE_STATE_OK = 0, SENSE_STATE_NEED_CHECK, @@ -765,6 +776,400 @@ static int hiraid_build_sgl(struct hiraid_dev *hdev, return 0; } +#define MAX_PD_NUM (40 + 1) +#define MAX_STREAM_NUM 8 +#define PER_MB (1024 * 1024) +#define MAX_IO_NUM (200 * PER_MB) +#define STREAM_LEN (4 * PER_MB) +#define MAX_IO_NUM_ONCE 100 +#define IO_SUBMIT_TIME_OUT 100 +#define MAX_AGING_NUM 100 + +#define MIN_IO_SEND_TIME 10 +#define MAX_IO_SEND_TIME 50 + +enum io_operation_type { + TYPE_DELETE_SINGLE_IO = 1, + TYPE_DELETE_SINGLE_IO_LIST, + TYPE_DELETE_ALL_IO_LIST +}; + +struct HIRAID_STREAM_S stream_array[MAX_PD_NUM][MAX_STREAM_NUM] = {0}; +struct mutex_list_head_s io_heads_per_stream[MAX_PD_NUM * MAX_STREAM_NUM]; +spinlock_t stream_array_lock; +DEFINE_MUTEX(g_stream_operation_mutex); + +u64 g_io_transport_num[MAX_PD_NUM][MAX_STREAM_NUM] = {0}; +u16 g_io_stream_num[MAX_PD_NUM][TYPE_BOTTOM] = {0}; +u16 g_io_count = 1; + +void hiraid_inc_io_transport_num(u16 disk_id, u16 streamd_id, u16 nlb) +{ + g_io_transport_num[disk_id][streamd_id] += nlb; +} + +void hiraid_refresh_io_transport_num(u16 disk_id, u16 streamd_id) +{ + g_io_transport_num[disk_id][streamd_id] = 0; +} + +void hiraid_inc_stream_num(u16 disk_id) +{ + spin_lock(&stream_array_lock); + g_io_stream_num[disk_id][TYPE_TOTAL]++; + spin_unlock(&stream_array_lock); +} + +void hiraid_dec_stream_num(u16 disk_id) +{ + spin_lock(&stream_array_lock); + if (g_io_stream_num[disk_id][TYPE_TOTAL] > 0) + g_io_stream_num[disk_id][TYPE_TOTAL]--; + spin_unlock(&stream_array_lock); +} + +static bool hiraid_io_recog_check_stream_exceed(u16 disk_id) +{ + bool exceed_flag; + + spin_lock(&stream_array_lock); + exceed_flag = (g_io_stream_num[disk_id][TYPE_TOTAL] >= MAX_STREAM_NUM); + spin_unlock(&stream_array_lock); + return exceed_flag; +} + +static u16 hiraid_get_stream_num(u16 disk_id) +{ + return g_io_stream_num[disk_id][TYPE_TOTAL]; +} + +static inline struct HIRAID_STREAM_S *hiraid_get_stream(u16 disk_id, + u16 stream_id) +{ + return &stream_array[disk_id][stream_id]; +} + +static inline struct mutex_list_head_s *hiraid_get_io_head(u16 disk_id) +{ + return &(io_heads_per_stream[disk_id]); +} + +static bool hiraid_recognition_acknowledge(const struct HIRAID_STREAM_S *stream) +{ + return (stream->aging_credit >= CREDIT_THRES) ? true : false; +} + +void hiraid_io_recognition_init(void) +{ + u16 i; + + spin_lock_init(&stream_array_lock); + for (i = 0; i < (MAX_PD_NUM * MAX_STREAM_NUM); i++) { + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&hiraid_get_io_head(i)->list); + mutex_init(&hiraid_get_io_head(i)->lock); + } +} + +static void hiraid_io_recognition_iterator(struct HIRAID_STREAM_S *stream, + int direction) +{ + stream->aging_grade = stream->aging_grade + direction * INC_GRADE; + stream->aging_grade = MAX(stream->aging_grade, MAX_DECREASE_GRADE); + stream->aging_grade = MIN(stream->aging_grade, MAX_INCREASE_GRADE); + stream->aging_credit = stream->aging_credit + stream->aging_grade; + stream->aging_credit = MAX(stream->aging_credit, MIN_CREDIT); + stream->aging_credit = MIN(stream->aging_credit, MAX_CREDIT); +} + +struct HIRAID_STREAM_S *hiraid_io_pick_stream( + struct hiraid_scsi_rw_cmd *req, u16 type, u16 actual_id) +{ + struct HIRAID_STREAM_S *first_hit_stream = NULL; + struct HIRAID_STREAM_S *temp_stream = NULL; + u16 pick_flag = 0; + u8 i; + + for (i = 0; i < MAX_STREAM_NUM; i++) { + temp_stream = &stream_array[actual_id][i]; + temp_stream->stream_id = i; + if (req->slba < temp_stream->stream_lba || + req->slba >= temp_stream->stream_lba + + temp_stream->stream_len || + temp_stream->type != type) { + continue; + } + if (!pick_flag) { + temp_stream->stream_lba = req->slba; + first_hit_stream = temp_stream; + pick_flag = 1; + continue; + } + hiraid_dec_stream_num(actual_id); + memset(temp_stream, 0, + sizeof(struct HIRAID_STREAM_S)); // 去重影 + } + return first_hit_stream; +} + +static struct HIRAID_STREAM_S *hiraid_init_flow_stream( + struct hiraid_scsi_rw_cmd *req, u16 type, u16 actual_id) +{ + int i; + struct HIRAID_STREAM_S *stream = NULL; + + for (i = 0; i < MAX_STREAM_NUM; i++) { + stream = hiraid_get_stream(actual_id, i); + if (!stream->using) { + stream->using = 1; + stream->stream_id = i; + break; + } + } + stream->stream_lba = req->slba; + stream->did = actual_id; + stream->type = type; + stream->aging_credit = 0; + stream->aging_grade = 0; + stream->stream_len = STREAM_LEN; + return stream; +} + +static struct HIRAID_STREAM_S *hiraid_stream_detect(struct hiraid_dev *hdev, + struct hiraid_scsi_rw_cmd *io_cmd, u16 actual_id) +{ + u16 type = io_cmd->opcode == HIRAID_CMD_WRITE ? TYPE_WRITE : TYPE_READ; + struct HIRAID_STREAM_S *stream = hiraid_io_pick_stream(io_cmd, type, + actual_id); + + if (stream != NULL) { /* 可以命中一个stream */ + return stream; + } + + if (hiraid_io_recog_check_stream_exceed(actual_id)) + return NULL; + stream = hiraid_init_flow_stream(io_cmd, type, actual_id); + hiraid_inc_stream_num(actual_id); + return stream; +} + +u64 g_io_last_pull_time[MAX_PD_NUM] = {0}; + +static u16 hiraid_get_submit_io_stream(u16 did, struct hiraid_dev *hdev) +{ + u64 temp_num, i; + static u16 stream_num[MAX_PD_NUM] = {0}; + + if (g_io_last_pull_time[did] == 0) + g_io_last_pull_time[did] = jiffies_to_msecs(jiffies); + + for (i = 0; i < MAX_STREAM_NUM; i++) { + temp_num = g_io_transport_num[did][i]; + if (temp_num != 0) { + if ((temp_num < MAX_IO_NUM) && + ((jiffies_to_msecs(jiffies) - g_io_last_pull_time[did]) + < IO_SUBMIT_TIME_OUT)) { + stream_num[did] = i; + return i; + } + g_io_last_pull_time[did] = jiffies_to_msecs(jiffies); + hiraid_refresh_io_transport_num(did, i); + stream_num[did] = ((i+1) % MAX_STREAM_NUM); + return ((i+1) % MAX_STREAM_NUM); + } + } + g_io_last_pull_time[did] = jiffies_to_msecs(jiffies); + return ((stream_num[did]++) % MAX_STREAM_NUM); +} + +static void hiraid_submit_io_stream(u16 hdid, struct hiraid_dev *hdev) +{ + struct mutex_list_head_s *io_slist = NULL; + struct list_head *node = NULL; + struct list_head *next_node = NULL; + struct list_head temp_header; + struct hiraid_scsi_io_cmd io_cmd = {0}; + u16 submit_stream_id; + struct IO_LIST_S *temp_io_stream = NULL; + u16 count = 0; + + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&temp_header); + submit_stream_id = hiraid_get_submit_io_stream(hdid, hdev); + io_slist = hiraid_get_io_head(hdid * MAX_STREAM_NUM + submit_stream_id); + mutex_lock(&io_slist->lock); + list_for_each_safe(node, next_node, &io_slist->list) { + list_del(node); + list_add_tail(node, &temp_header); + if (++count >= MAX_IO_NUM_ONCE) + break; + } + mutex_unlock(&io_slist->lock); + + list_for_each_safe(node, next_node, &temp_header) { + temp_io_stream = list_entry(node, struct IO_LIST_S, list); + io_cmd = temp_io_stream->io_cmd; + hiraid_submit_cmd(temp_io_stream->submit_queue, &io_cmd); + hiraid_inc_io_transport_num(hdid, submit_stream_id, + io_cmd.rw.nlb * temp_io_stream->sector_size); + list_del(node); + kfree(temp_io_stream); + } + temp_io_stream = NULL; + list_del_init(&temp_header); +} + +static u8 hiraid_detect_if_aging(void) +{ + if (++g_io_count == MAX_AGING_NUM) { + g_io_count = 0; + return 1; + } + return 0; +} + +static void hiraid_aging(struct hiraid_dev *hdev) +{ + struct HIRAID_STREAM_S *temp_stream = NULL; + int i = 0; + int j = 0; + + for (i = 0; i < MAX_PD_NUM; i++) { + for (j = 0; j < MAX_STREAM_NUM; j++) { + temp_stream = hiraid_get_stream(i, j); + if (temp_stream->using) { + hiraid_io_recognition_iterator(temp_stream, -1); + if (temp_stream->aging_credit <= 0) { + hiraid_dec_stream_num(i); + memset(temp_stream, + 0, sizeof(struct HIRAID_STREAM_S)); // 老化 + } + } + } + } +} + +static u8 hiraid_io_list_operation(u32 hdid, u16 cid, u16 hwq, u8 operation) +{ + int i, j; + + struct mutex_list_head_s *io_slist = NULL; + struct list_head *node = NULL; + struct list_head *next_node = NULL; + struct hiraid_scsi_io_cmd *io_cmd = NULL; + struct hiraid_queue *hiraidq = NULL; + struct IO_LIST_S *temp_io_stream = NULL; + + u8 max_hd_num = operation == TYPE_DELETE_ALL_IO_LIST ? + MAX_PD_NUM : hdid + 1; + for (i = hdid; i < max_hd_num; i++) { + for (j = 0; j < MAX_STREAM_NUM; j++) { + io_slist = hiraid_get_io_head(i * MAX_STREAM_NUM + j); + mutex_lock(&io_slist->lock); + list_for_each_safe(node, next_node, &io_slist->list) { + temp_io_stream = list_entry(node, + struct IO_LIST_S, list); + io_cmd = &(temp_io_stream->io_cmd); + hiraidq = temp_io_stream->submit_queue; + if (operation >= TYPE_DELETE_SINGLE_IO_LIST) { + list_del_init(node); + kfree(temp_io_stream); + temp_io_stream = NULL; + } else { + if ((io_cmd->rw.cmd_id == cid) && + (hiraidq->qid == hwq)) { + list_del_init(node); + mutex_unlock(&io_slist->lock); + kfree(temp_io_stream); + return 1; + } + } + } + mutex_unlock(&io_slist->lock); + } + } + return 0; +} + +static u8 hiraid_check_io_list(u32 hdid, u16 cid, u16 hwq) +{ + u8 ret; + + mutex_lock(&g_stream_operation_mutex); + ret = hiraid_io_list_operation(hdid, cid, hwq, TYPE_DELETE_SINGLE_IO); + mutex_unlock(&g_stream_operation_mutex); + return ret; +} + +static u8 hiraid_delete_single_pd_io_list(u32 hdid) +{ + u8 ret; + + mutex_lock(&g_stream_operation_mutex); + ret = hiraid_io_list_operation(hdid, 0, 0, TYPE_DELETE_SINGLE_IO_LIST); + mutex_unlock(&g_stream_operation_mutex); + return ret; +} + +static u8 hiraid_delete_all_io_list(void) +{ + u8 ret; + + mutex_lock(&g_stream_operation_mutex); + ret = hiraid_io_list_operation(0, 0, 0, TYPE_DELETE_ALL_IO_LIST); + mutex_unlock(&g_stream_operation_mutex); + return ret; +} + +static u8 hiraid_add_io_to_list(struct hiraid_queue *submit_queue, + struct HIRAID_STREAM_S *tmp_stream, struct hiraid_scsi_io_cmd io_cmd, + unsigned int sector_size, u16 actual_id) +{ + struct mutex_list_head_s *io_slist = NULL; + struct IO_LIST_S *new_io_node = NULL; + + new_io_node = kmalloc(sizeof(struct IO_LIST_S), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!new_io_node) + return 0; + new_io_node->io_cmd = io_cmd; + new_io_node->submit_queue = submit_queue; + new_io_node->sector_size = sector_size; + io_slist = hiraid_get_io_head(actual_id * + MAX_STREAM_NUM + tmp_stream->stream_id); + mutex_lock(&io_slist->lock); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&(new_io_node->list)); + list_add_tail(&(new_io_node->list), &io_slist->list); + mutex_unlock(&io_slist->lock); + return 1; +} + +static void hiraid_submit_io_threading(struct hiraid_dev *hdev) +{ + int i = 0; + + while (!kthread_should_stop()) { + mutex_lock(&g_stream_operation_mutex); + for (i = 0; i < MAX_PD_NUM; i++) + hiraid_submit_io_stream(i, hdev); + mutex_unlock(&g_stream_operation_mutex); + usleep_range(MIN_IO_SEND_TIME, MAX_IO_SEND_TIME); + } +} + +static void hiraid_destroy_io_stream_resource(struct hiraid_dev *hdev) +{ + u16 i; + + for (i = 0; i < (MAX_PD_NUM * MAX_STREAM_NUM); i++) + list_del_init(&hiraid_get_io_head(i)->list); +} + +struct task_struct *g_hiraid_submit_task; +static void hiraid_init_io_stream(struct hiraid_dev *hdev) +{ + hiraid_io_recognition_init(); + g_hiraid_submit_task = kthread_run((void *)hiraid_submit_io_threading, + hdev, "hiraid_submit_thread"); +} + #define HIRAID_RW_FUA BIT(14) static int hiraid_setup_rw_cmd(struct hiraid_dev *hdev, @@ -866,6 +1271,30 @@ static int hiraid_setup_nonrw_cmd(struct hiraid_dev *hdev, return 0; } +static bool hiraid_disk_is_hdd(u8 attr) +{ + switch (HIRAID_DEV_DISK_TYPE(attr)) { + case HIRAID_SAS_HDD_VD: + case HIRAID_SATA_HDD_VD: + case HIRAID_SAS_HDD_PD: + case HIRAID_SATA_HDD_PD: + return true; + default: + return false; + } +} + +static bool hiraid_disk_is_hdd_rawdrive(u8 attr) +{ + switch (HIRAID_DEV_DISK_TYPE(attr)) { + case HIRAID_SAS_HDD_PD: + case HIRAID_SATA_HDD_PD: + return true; + default: + return false; + } +} + static int hiraid_setup_io_cmd(struct hiraid_dev *hdev, struct hiraid_scsi_io_cmd *io_cmd, struct scsi_cmnd *scmd) @@ -1023,6 +1452,7 @@ static int hiraid_queue_command(struct Scsi_Host *shost, struct hiraid_sdev_hostdata *hostdata; struct hiraid_scsi_io_cmd io_cmd; struct hiraid_queue *ioq; + struct HIRAID_STREAM_S *tmp_stm = NULL; u16 hwq, cid; int ret; @@ -1085,6 +1515,23 @@ static int hiraid_queue_command(struct Scsi_Host *shost, } WRITE_ONCE(mapbuf->state, CMD_FLIGHT); + + if (hiraid_is_rw_scmd(scmd) && + hiraid_disk_is_hdd_rawdrive(hostdata->attr)) { + if (hiraid_detect_if_aging()) + hiraid_aging(hdev); + tmp_stm = hiraid_stream_detect(hdev, &(io_cmd.rw), sdev->id); + if (tmp_stm != NULL) { + hiraid_io_recognition_iterator(tmp_stm, 1); + if (hiraid_recognition_acknowledge(tmp_stm) && + (hiraid_get_stream_num(sdev->id) > 1)) { + if (hiraid_add_io_to_list(ioq, + tmp_stm, io_cmd, sdev->sector_size, sdev->id)) { + return 0; + } + } + } + } hiraid_submit_cmd(ioq, &io_cmd); return 0; @@ -1135,19 +1582,6 @@ static int hiraid_disk_qd(u8 attr) } } -static bool hiraid_disk_is_hdd(u8 attr) -{ - switch (HIRAID_DEV_DISK_TYPE(attr)) { - case HIRAID_SAS_HDD_VD: - case HIRAID_SATA_HDD_VD: - case HIRAID_SAS_HDD_PD: - case HIRAID_SATA_HDD_PD: - return true; - default: - return false; - } -} - static int hiraid_slave_alloc(struct scsi_device *sdev) { struct hiraid_sdev_hostdata *hostdata; @@ -1593,7 +2027,6 @@ static inline bool hiraid_process_cq(struct hiraid_queue *hiraidq, u16 *start, u16 *end, int tag) { bool found = false; - *start = hiraidq->cq_head; while (!found && hiraid_cqe_pending(hiraidq)) { if (le16_to_cpu(hiraidq->cqes[hiraidq->cq_head].cmd_id) == tag) @@ -1960,6 +2393,7 @@ static int hiraid_create_queue(struct hiraid_queue *hiraidq, u16 qid) hiraidq->cq_vector = cq_vector; ret = pci_request_irq(hdev->pdev, cq_vector, hiraid_handle_irq, NULL, hiraidq, "hiraid%d_q%d", hdev->instance, qid); + if (ret) { hiraidq->cq_vector = -1; dev_err(hdev->dev, "request queue[%d] irq failed\n", qid); @@ -2125,7 +2559,6 @@ static int hiraid_setup_io_queues(struct hiraid_dev *hdev) adminq->cq_vector = -1; return ret; } - hdev->online_queues++; for (i = hdev->queue_count; i <= hdev->max_qid; i++) { @@ -3304,6 +3737,12 @@ static int hiraid_abort(struct scsi_cmnd *scmd) cid = mapbuf->cid; hwq = mapbuf->hiraidq->qid; + if (hiraid_check_io_list(hostdata->hdid, cid, hwq)) { + dev_warn(hdev->dev, "find cid[%d] qid[%d] in host, abort succ\n", + cid, hwq); + return SUCCESS; + } + dev_warn(hdev->dev, "cid[%d] qid[%d] timeout, send abort\n", cid, hwq); ret = hiraid_send_abort_cmd(hdev, hostdata->hdid, hwq, cid); if (ret != -ETIME) { @@ -3339,6 +3778,7 @@ static int hiraid_scsi_reset(struct scsi_cmnd *scmd, enum hiraid_rst_type rst) if ((ret == 0) || (ret == FW_EH_DEV_NONE && rst == HIRAID_RESET_TARGET)) { if (rst == HIRAID_RESET_TARGET) { + hiraid_delete_single_pd_io_list(hostdata->hdid); ret = wait_tgt_reset_io_done(scmd); if (ret) { dev_warn(hdev->dev, "sdev[%d:%d] target has %d peding cmd, target reset failed\n", @@ -3378,6 +3818,7 @@ static int hiraid_host_reset(struct scsi_cmnd *scmd) dev_warn(hdev->dev, "sdev[%d:%d] send host reset\n", scmd->device->channel, scmd->device->id); + hiraid_delete_all_io_list(); if (hiraid_reset_work_sync(hdev) == -EBUSY) flush_work(&hdev->reset_work); @@ -3411,6 +3852,7 @@ static pci_ers_result_t hiraid_pci_error_detected(struct pci_dev *pdev, scsi_block_requests(hdev->shost); hiraid_dev_state_trans(hdev, DEV_RESETTING); + hiraid_delete_all_io_list(); return PCI_ERS_RESULT_NEED_RESET; case pci_channel_io_perm_failure: @@ -4044,6 +4486,7 @@ static int hiraid_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *id) goto unregist_bsg; scsi_scan_host(hdev->shost); + hiraid_init_io_stream(hdev); return 0; @@ -4075,6 +4518,10 @@ static void hiraid_remove(struct pci_dev *pdev) dev_info(hdev->dev, "enter hiraid remove\n"); + kthread_stop(g_hiraid_submit_task); + hiraid_delete_all_io_list(); + hiraid_destroy_io_stream_resource(hdev); + hiraid_dev_state_trans(hdev, DEV_DELETING); flush_work(&hdev->reset_work); -- 2.45.1.windows.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] iommu/s390: Implement blocking domain
by Lin Ruifeng 31 Jan '26

31 Jan '26

From: Matthew Rosato <mjrosato(a)linux.ibm.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.13-rc1 commit ecda483339a5151e3ca30d6b82691ef6f1d17912 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/1633 CVE: CVE-2024-53232 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… --------------------------------------------------------------- This fixes a crash when surprise hot-unplugging a PCI device. This crash happens because during hot-unplug __iommu_group_set_domain_nofail() attaching the default domain fails when the platform no longer recognizes the device as it has already been removed and we end up with a NULL domain pointer and UAF. This is exactly the case referred to in the second comment in __iommu_device_set_domain() and just as stated there if we can instead attach the blocking domain the UAF is prevented as this can handle the already removed device. Implement the blocking domain to use this handling. With this change, the crash is fixed but we still hit a warning attempting to change DMA ownership on a blocked device. Fixes: c76c067e488c ("s390/pci: Use dma-iommu layer") Co-developed-by: Niklas Schnelle <schnelle(a)linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Niklas Schnelle <schnelle(a)linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Rosato <mjrosato(a)linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Niklas Schnelle <schnelle(a)linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg(a)nvidia.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240910211516.137933-1-mjrosato@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel(a)suse.de> Conflicts: drivers/iommu/s390-iommu.c arch/s390/pci/pci.c [Some context differences] Signed-off-by: Zhang Zekun <zhangzekun11(a)huawei.com> --- arch/s390/include/asm/pci.h | 4 +- arch/s390/pci/pci_debug.c | 10 ++++- drivers/iommu/s390-iommu.c | 73 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- 3 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/pci.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/pci.h index 3f74f1cf37df..e0fae2739994 100644 --- a/arch/s390/include/asm/pci.h +++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/pci.h @@ -96,7 +96,6 @@ struct zpci_bar_struct { u8 size; /* order 2 exponent */ }; -struct s390_domain; struct kvm_zdev; #define ZPCI_FUNCTIONS_PER_BUS 256 @@ -184,9 +183,10 @@ struct zpci_dev { struct dentry *debugfs_dev; /* IOMMU and passthrough */ - struct s390_domain *s390_domain; /* s390 IOMMU domain data */ + struct iommu_domain *s390_domain; /* attached IOMMU domain */ struct kvm_zdev *kzdev; struct mutex kzdev_lock; + spinlock_t dom_lock; /* protect s390_domain change */ }; static inline bool zdev_enabled(struct zpci_dev *zdev) diff --git a/arch/s390/pci/pci_debug.c b/arch/s390/pci/pci_debug.c index 6dde2263c79d..ac4d172f2740 100644 --- a/arch/s390/pci/pci_debug.c +++ b/arch/s390/pci/pci_debug.c @@ -71,17 +71,23 @@ static void pci_fmb_show(struct seq_file *m, char *name[], int length, static void pci_sw_counter_show(struct seq_file *m) { - struct zpci_iommu_ctrs *ctrs = zpci_get_iommu_ctrs(m->private); + struct zpci_dev *zdev = m->private; + struct zpci_iommu_ctrs *ctrs; atomic64_t *counter; + unsigned long flags; int i; + spin_lock_irqsave(&zdev->dom_lock, flags); + ctrs = zpci_get_iommu_ctrs(m->private); if (!ctrs) - return; + goto unlock; counter = &ctrs->mapped_pages; for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(pci_sw_names); i++, counter++) seq_printf(m, "%26s:\t%llu\n", pci_sw_names[i], atomic64_read(counter)); +unlock: + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&zdev->dom_lock, flags); } static int pci_perf_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) diff --git a/drivers/iommu/s390-iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/s390-iommu.c index 9a5196f523de..db9fc74f9027 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/s390-iommu.c +++ b/drivers/iommu/s390-iommu.c @@ -33,6 +33,8 @@ struct s390_domain { struct rcu_head rcu; }; +static struct iommu_domain blocking_domain; + static inline unsigned int calc_rtx(dma_addr_t ptr) { return ((unsigned long)ptr >> ZPCI_RT_SHIFT) & ZPCI_INDEX_MASK; @@ -369,20 +371,36 @@ static void s390_domain_free(struct iommu_domain *domain) call_rcu(&s390_domain->rcu, s390_iommu_rcu_free_domain); } -static void s390_iommu_detach_device(struct iommu_domain *domain, - struct device *dev) +static void zdev_s390_domain_update(struct zpci_dev *zdev, + struct iommu_domain *domain) +{ + unsigned long flags; + + spin_lock_irqsave(&zdev->dom_lock, flags); + zdev->s390_domain = domain; + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&zdev->dom_lock, flags); +} + +static int blocking_domain_attach_device(struct iommu_domain *domain, + struct device *dev) { - struct s390_domain *s390_domain = to_s390_domain(domain); struct zpci_dev *zdev = to_zpci_dev(dev); + struct s390_domain *s390_domain; unsigned long flags; + if (zdev->s390_domain->type == IOMMU_DOMAIN_BLOCKED) + return 0; + + s390_domain = to_s390_domain(zdev->s390_domain); spin_lock_irqsave(&s390_domain->list_lock, flags); list_del_rcu(&zdev->iommu_list); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&s390_domain->list_lock, flags); zpci_unregister_ioat(zdev, 0); - zdev->s390_domain = NULL; zdev->dma_table = NULL; + zdev_s390_domain_update(zdev, domain); + + return 0; } static int s390_iommu_attach_device(struct iommu_domain *domain, @@ -401,20 +419,15 @@ static int s390_iommu_attach_device(struct iommu_domain *domain, domain->geometry.aperture_end < zdev->start_dma)) return -EINVAL; - if (zdev->s390_domain) - s390_iommu_detach_device(&zdev->s390_domain->domain, dev); + blocking_domain_attach_device(&blocking_domain, dev); + /* If we fail now DMA remains blocked via blocking domain */ cc = zpci_register_ioat(zdev, 0, zdev->start_dma, zdev->end_dma, virt_to_phys(s390_domain->dma_table), &status); - /* - * If the device is undergoing error recovery the reset code - * will re-establish the new domain. - */ if (cc && status != ZPCI_PCI_ST_FUNC_NOT_AVAIL) return -EIO; - zdev->dma_table = s390_domain->dma_table; - zdev->s390_domain = s390_domain; + zdev_s390_domain_update(zdev, domain); spin_lock_irqsave(&s390_domain->list_lock, flags); list_add_rcu(&zdev->iommu_list, &s390_domain->devices); @@ -466,19 +479,11 @@ static struct iommu_device *s390_iommu_probe_device(struct device *dev) if (zdev->tlb_refresh) dev->iommu->shadow_on_flush = 1; - return &zdev->iommu_dev; -} + /* Start with DMA blocked */ + spin_lock_init(&zdev->dom_lock); + zdev_s390_domain_update(zdev, &blocking_domain); -static void s390_iommu_release_device(struct device *dev) -{ - struct zpci_dev *zdev = to_zpci_dev(dev); - - /* - * release_device is expected to detach any domain currently attached - * to the device, but keep it attached to other devices in the group. - */ - if (zdev) - s390_iommu_detach_device(&zdev->s390_domain->domain, dev); + return &zdev->iommu_dev; } static int zpci_refresh_all(struct zpci_dev *zdev) @@ -702,9 +707,15 @@ static void s390_iommu_probe_finalize(struct device *dev) struct zpci_iommu_ctrs *zpci_get_iommu_ctrs(struct zpci_dev *zdev) { - if (!zdev || !zdev->s390_domain) + struct s390_domain *s390_domain; + + lockdep_assert_held(&zdev->dom_lock); + + if (zdev->s390_domain->type == IOMMU_DOMAIN_BLOCKED) return NULL; - return &zdev->s390_domain->ctrs; + + s390_domain = to_s390_domain(zdev->s390_domain); + return &s390_domain->ctrs; } int zpci_init_iommu(struct zpci_dev *zdev) @@ -781,12 +792,20 @@ static int __init s390_iommu_init(void) } subsys_initcall(s390_iommu_init); +static struct iommu_domain blocking_domain = { + .type = IOMMU_DOMAIN_BLOCKED, + .ops = &(const struct iommu_domain_ops) { + .attach_dev = blocking_domain_attach_device, + } +}; + static const struct iommu_ops s390_iommu_ops = { + .blocked_domain = &blocking_domain, + .release_domain = &blocking_domain, .capable = s390_iommu_capable, .domain_alloc_paging = s390_domain_alloc_paging, .probe_device = s390_iommu_probe_device, .probe_finalize = s390_iommu_probe_finalize, - .release_device = s390_iommu_release_device, .device_group = generic_device_group, .pgsize_bitmap = SZ_4K, .get_resv_regions = s390_iommu_get_resv_regions, -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] *** fix CVE-2025-38062 ***
by Lin Ruifeng 31 Jan '26

31 Jan '26

*** fix CVE-2025-38062 *** Jason Gunthorpe (1): genirq/msi: Store the IOMMU IOVA directly in msi_desc instead of iommu_cookie Lin Ruifeng (1): genirq/msi:: Fix KABI break of struct msi_desc drivers/iommu/dma-iommu.c | 28 +++++++++++++--------------- include/linux/msi.h | 35 +++++++++++++++-------------------- 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-) -- 2.43.0

2 3

[PATCH OLK-6.6] net/mlx5e: Fix crash on profile change rollback failure
by Yi Yang 31 Jan '26

31 Jan '26

From: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm(a)nvidia.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.19-rc6 commit 4dadc4077e3f77d6d31e199a925fc7a705e7adeb category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13511 CVE: CVE-2026-23000 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- mlx5e_netdev_change_profile can fail to attach a new profile and can fail to rollback to old profile, in such case, we could end up with a dangling netdev with a fully reset netdev_priv. A retry to change profile, e.g. another attempt to call mlx5e_netdev_change_profile via switchdev mode change, will crash trying to access the now NULL priv->mdev. This fix allows mlx5e_netdev_change_profile() to handle previous failures and an empty priv, by not assuming priv is valid. Pass netdev and mdev to all flows requiring mlx5e_netdev_change_profile() and avoid passing priv. In mlx5e_netdev_change_profile() check if current priv is valid, and if not, just attach the new profile without trying to access the old one. This fixes the following oops, when enabling switchdev mode for the 2nd time after first time failure: ## Enabling switchdev mode first time: mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1: E-Switch: Supported tc chains and prios offload workqueue: Failed to create a rescuer kthread for wq "mlx5e": -EINTR mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1: mlx5e_netdev_init_profile:6214:(pid 37199): mlx5e_priv_init failed, err=-12 mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1 gpu3rdma1: mlx5e_netdev_change_profile: new profile init failed, -12 workqueue: Failed to create a rescuer kthread for wq "mlx5e": -EINTR mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1: mlx5e_netdev_init_profile:6214:(pid 37199): mlx5e_priv_init failed, err=-12 mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1 gpu3rdma1: mlx5e_netdev_change_profile: failed to rollback to orig profile, -12 ^^^^^^^^ mlx5_core 0000:00:03.0: E-Switch: Disable: mode(LEGACY), nvfs(0), necvfs(0), active vports(0) ## retry: Enabling switchdev mode 2nd time: mlx5_core 0000:00:03.0: E-Switch: Supported tc chains and prios offload BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000038 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 13 UID: 0 PID: 520 Comm: devlink Not tainted 6.18.0-rc4+ #91 PREEMPT(voluntary) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:mlx5e_detach_netdev+0x3c/0x90 Code: 50 00 00 f0 80 4f 78 02 48 8b bf e8 07 00 00 48 85 ff 74 16 48 8b 73 78 48 d1 ee 83 e6 01 83 f6 01 40 0f b6 f6 e8 c4 42 00 00 <48> 8b 45 38 48 85 c0 74 08 48 89 df e8 cc 47 40 1e 48 8b bb f0 07 RSP: 0018:ffffc90000673890 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8881036a89c0 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffff888113f63800 RSI: ffffffff822fe720 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000002dcd R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffffc900006738e8 R11: 00000000ffffffff R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff8881036a89c0 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007fdfb8384740(0000) GS:ffff88856a9d6000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000038 CR3: 0000000112ae0005 CR4: 0000000000370ef0 Call Trace: <TASK> mlx5e_netdev_change_profile+0x45/0xb0 mlx5e_vport_rep_load+0x27b/0x2d0 mlx5_esw_offloads_rep_load+0x72/0xf0 esw_offloads_enable+0x5d0/0x970 mlx5_eswitch_enable_locked+0x349/0x430 ? is_mp_supported+0x57/0xb0 mlx5_devlink_eswitch_mode_set+0x26b/0x430 devlink_nl_eswitch_set_doit+0x6f/0xf0 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xe8/0x140 genl_rcv_msg+0x18b/0x290 ? __pfx_devlink_nl_pre_doit+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_devlink_nl_eswitch_set_doit+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_devlink_nl_post_doit+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_genl_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10 netlink_rcv_skb+0x52/0x100 genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 netlink_unicast+0x282/0x3e0 ? __alloc_skb+0xd6/0x190 netlink_sendmsg+0x1f7/0x430 __sys_sendto+0x213/0x220 ? __sys_recvmsg+0x6a/0xd0 __x64_sys_sendto+0x24/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x50/0x1f0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7fdfb8495047 Fixes: c4d7eb57687f ("net/mxl5e: Add change profile method") Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm(a)nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt(a)nvidia.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260108212657.25090-2-saeed@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en.h drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_rep.c [Context conflicts.] Signed-off-by: Yi Yang <yiyang13(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en.h | 9 ++-- .../net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c | 48 +++++++++++++------ .../net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_rep.c | 11 ++--- 3 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en.h index 455d02b6500d..363809dcb4f1 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en.h +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en.h @@ -1203,9 +1203,12 @@ mlx5e_create_netdev(struct mlx5_core_dev *mdev, const struct mlx5e_profile *prof int mlx5e_attach_netdev(struct mlx5e_priv *priv); void mlx5e_detach_netdev(struct mlx5e_priv *priv); void mlx5e_destroy_netdev(struct mlx5e_priv *priv); -int mlx5e_netdev_change_profile(struct mlx5e_priv *priv, - const struct mlx5e_profile *new_profile, void *new_ppriv); -void mlx5e_netdev_attach_nic_profile(struct mlx5e_priv *priv); +int mlx5e_netdev_change_profile(struct net_device *netdev, + struct mlx5_core_dev *mdev, + const struct mlx5e_profile *new_profile, + void *new_ppriv); +void mlx5e_netdev_attach_nic_profile(struct net_device *netdev, + struct mlx5_core_dev *mdev); void mlx5e_set_netdev_mtu_boundaries(struct mlx5e_priv *priv); void mlx5e_build_nic_params(struct mlx5e_priv *priv, struct mlx5e_xsk *xsk, u16 mtu); void mlx5e_rx_dim_work(struct work_struct *work); diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c index ec1b582cb9d5..c18512dd4a83 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c @@ -5938,19 +5938,28 @@ mlx5e_netdev_attach_profile(struct net_device *netdev, struct mlx5_core_dev *mde return err; } -int mlx5e_netdev_change_profile(struct mlx5e_priv *priv, - const struct mlx5e_profile *new_profile, void *new_ppriv) +int mlx5e_netdev_change_profile(struct net_device *netdev, + struct mlx5_core_dev *mdev, + const struct mlx5e_profile *new_profile, + void *new_ppriv) { - const struct mlx5e_profile *orig_profile = priv->profile; - struct net_device *netdev = priv->netdev; - struct mlx5_core_dev *mdev = priv->mdev; - void *orig_ppriv = priv->ppriv; + struct mlx5e_priv *priv = netdev_priv(netdev); + const struct mlx5e_profile *orig_profile; int err, rollback_err; + void *orig_ppriv; - /* cleanup old profile */ - mlx5e_detach_netdev(priv); - priv->profile->cleanup(priv); - mlx5e_priv_cleanup(priv); + orig_profile = priv->profile; + orig_ppriv = priv->ppriv; + + /* NULL could happen if previous change_profile failed to rollback */ + if (priv->profile) { + WARN_ON_ONCE(priv->mdev != mdev); + /* cleanup old profile */ + mlx5e_detach_netdev(priv); + priv->profile->cleanup(priv); + mlx5e_priv_cleanup(priv); + } + /* priv members are not valid from this point ... */ if (mdev->state == MLX5_DEVICE_STATE_INTERNAL_ERROR) { mlx5e_netdev_init_profile(netdev, mdev, new_profile, new_ppriv); @@ -5967,16 +5976,25 @@ int mlx5e_netdev_change_profile(struct mlx5e_priv *priv, return 0; rollback: + if (!orig_profile) { + netdev_warn(netdev, "no original profile to rollback to\n"); + priv->profile = NULL; + return err; + } + rollback_err = mlx5e_netdev_attach_profile(netdev, mdev, orig_profile, orig_ppriv); - if (rollback_err) - netdev_err(netdev, "%s: failed to rollback to orig profile, %d\n", - __func__, rollback_err); + if (rollback_err) { + netdev_err(netdev, "failed to rollback to orig profile, %d\n", + rollback_err); + priv->profile = NULL; + } return err; } -void mlx5e_netdev_attach_nic_profile(struct mlx5e_priv *priv) +void mlx5e_netdev_attach_nic_profile(struct net_device *netdev, + struct mlx5_core_dev *mdev) { - mlx5e_netdev_change_profile(priv, &mlx5e_nic_profile, NULL); + mlx5e_netdev_change_profile(netdev, mdev, &mlx5e_nic_profile, NULL); } void mlx5e_destroy_netdev(struct mlx5e_priv *priv) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_rep.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_rep.c index 656a7b65f4c7..3708d57d757a 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_rep.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_rep.c @@ -1450,17 +1450,16 @@ mlx5e_vport_uplink_rep_load(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev, struct mlx5_eswitch_rep * { struct mlx5e_rep_priv *rpriv = mlx5e_rep_to_rep_priv(rep); struct net_device *netdev; - struct mlx5e_priv *priv; int err; netdev = mlx5_uplink_netdev_get(dev); if (!netdev) return 0; - priv = netdev_priv(netdev); - rpriv->netdev = priv->netdev; - err = mlx5e_netdev_change_profile(priv, &mlx5e_uplink_rep_profile, - rpriv); + /* must not use netdev_priv(netdev), it might not be initialized yet */ + rpriv->netdev = netdev; + err = mlx5e_netdev_change_profile(netdev, dev, + &mlx5e_uplink_rep_profile, rpriv); mlx5_uplink_netdev_put(dev, netdev); return err; } @@ -1473,7 +1472,7 @@ mlx5e_vport_uplink_rep_unload(struct mlx5e_rep_priv *rpriv) priv = netdev_priv(netdev); - mlx5e_netdev_attach_nic_profile(priv); + mlx5e_netdev_attach_nic_profile(netdev, priv->mdev); } static int -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] RDMA/mlx4: Prevent shift wrapping in set_user_sq_size()
by Yao Kai 31 Jan '26

31 Jan '26

From: Dan Carpenter <error27(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v4.19.283 commit 3d5ae269c4bd392ec1edbfb3bd031b8f42d7feff category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13202 CVE: CVE-2023-54168 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit d50b3c73f1ac20dabc53dc6e9d64ce9c79a331eb ] The ucmd->log_sq_bb_count variable is controlled by the user so this shift can wrap. Fix it by using check_shl_overflow() in the same way that it was done in commit 515f60004ed9 ("RDMA/hns: Prevent undefined behavior in hns_roce_set_user_sq_size()"). Fixes: 839041329fd3 ("IB/mlx4: Sanity check userspace send queue sizes") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <error27(a)gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/a8dfbd1d-c019-4556-930b-bab1ded73b10@kili.mountain Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Yao Kai <yaokai34(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx4/qp.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx4/qp.c b/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx4/qp.c index 6dd3cd2c2f80..e262389a05dc 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx4/qp.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx4/qp.c @@ -436,9 +436,13 @@ static int set_user_sq_size(struct mlx4_ib_dev *dev, struct mlx4_ib_qp *qp, struct mlx4_ib_create_qp *ucmd) { + u32 cnt; + /* Sanity check SQ size before proceeding */ - if ((1 << ucmd->log_sq_bb_count) > dev->dev->caps.max_wqes || - ucmd->log_sq_stride > + if (check_shl_overflow(1, ucmd->log_sq_bb_count, &cnt) || + cnt > dev->dev->caps.max_wqes) + return -EINVAL; + if (ucmd->log_sq_stride > ilog2(roundup_pow_of_two(dev->dev->caps.max_sq_desc_sz)) || ucmd->log_sq_stride < MLX4_IB_MIN_SQ_STRIDE) return -EINVAL; -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] net/mlx5e: Don't store mlx5e_priv in mlx5e_dev devlink priv
by Yi Yang 31 Jan '26

31 Jan '26

From: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm(a)nvidia.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.19-rc6 commit 123eda2e5b1638e298e3a66bb1e64a8da92de5e1 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13507 CVE: CVE-2026-22996 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- mlx5e_priv is an unstable structure that can be memset(0) if profile attaching fails, mlx5e_priv in mlx5e_dev devlink private is used to reference the netdev and mdev associated with that struct. Instead, store netdev directly into mlx5e_dev and get mdev from the containing mlx5_adev aux device structure. This fixes a kernel oops in mlx5e_remove when switchdev mode fails due to change profile failure. $ devlink dev eswitch set pci/0000:00:03.0 mode switchdev Error: mlx5_core: Failed setting eswitch to offloads. dmesg: workqueue: Failed to create a rescuer kthread for wq "mlx5e": -EINTR mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1: mlx5e_netdev_init_profile:6214:(pid 37199): mlx5e_priv_init failed, err=-12 mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1 gpu3rdma1: mlx5e_netdev_change_profile: new profile init failed, -12 workqueue: Failed to create a rescuer kthread for wq "mlx5e": -EINTR mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1: mlx5e_netdev_init_profile:6214:(pid 37199): mlx5e_priv_init failed, err=-12 mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1 gpu3rdma1: mlx5e_netdev_change_profile: failed to rollback to orig profile, -12 $ devlink dev reload pci/0000:00:03.0 ==> oops BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000520 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 521 Comm: devlink Not tainted 6.18.0-rc5+ #117 PREEMPT(voluntary) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:mlx5e_remove+0x68/0x130 RSP: 0018:ffffc900034838f0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: ffff88810283c380 RBX: ffff888101874400 RCX: ffffffff826ffc45 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffff888102d789c0 R08: ffff8881007137f0 R09: ffff888100264e10 R10: ffffc90003483898 R11: ffffc900034838a0 R12: ffff888100d261a0 R13: ffff888100d261a0 R14: ffff8881018749a0 R15: ffff888101874400 FS: 00007f8565fea740(0000) GS:ffff88856a759000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000520 CR3: 000000010b11a004 CR4: 0000000000370ef0 Call Trace: <TASK> device_release_driver_internal+0x19c/0x200 bus_remove_device+0xc6/0x130 device_del+0x160/0x3d0 ? devl_param_driverinit_value_get+0x2d/0x90 mlx5_detach_device+0x89/0xe0 mlx5_unload_one_devl_locked+0x3a/0x70 mlx5_devlink_reload_down+0xc8/0x220 devlink_reload+0x7d/0x260 devlink_nl_reload_doit+0x45b/0x5a0 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xe8/0x140 Fixes: ee75f1fc44dd ("net/mlx5e: Create separate devlink instance for ethernet auxiliary device") Fixes: c4d7eb57687f ("net/mxl5e: Add change profile method") Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm(a)nvidia.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260108212657.25090-3-saeed@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c [Commit 381978d28317 ("net/mlx5e: Create single netdev per SD group") was not merged.] Signed-off-by: Yi Yang <yiyang13(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en.h | 2 +- .../net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c | 18 ++++++++++-------- 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en.h index 455d02b6500d..ee671e16f344 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en.h +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en.h @@ -945,7 +945,7 @@ struct mlx5e_priv { }; struct mlx5e_dev { - struct mlx5e_priv *priv; + struct net_device *netdev; struct devlink_port dl_port; }; diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c index ec1b582cb9d5..0dd817780a2e 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c @@ -5991,8 +5991,8 @@ static int mlx5e_resume(struct auxiliary_device *adev) { struct mlx5_adev *edev = container_of(adev, struct mlx5_adev, adev); struct mlx5e_dev *mlx5e_dev = auxiliary_get_drvdata(adev); - struct mlx5e_priv *priv = mlx5e_dev->priv; - struct net_device *netdev = priv->netdev; + struct mlx5e_priv *priv = netdev_priv(mlx5e_dev->netdev); + struct net_device *netdev = mlx5e_dev->netdev; struct mlx5_core_dev *mdev = edev->mdev; int err; @@ -6014,10 +6014,11 @@ static int mlx5e_resume(struct auxiliary_device *adev) static int _mlx5e_suspend(struct auxiliary_device *adev, bool pre_netdev_reg) { + struct mlx5_adev *edev = container_of(adev, struct mlx5_adev, adev); struct mlx5e_dev *mlx5e_dev = auxiliary_get_drvdata(adev); - struct mlx5e_priv *priv = mlx5e_dev->priv; - struct net_device *netdev = priv->netdev; - struct mlx5_core_dev *mdev = priv->mdev; + struct mlx5e_priv *priv = netdev_priv(mlx5e_dev->netdev); + struct net_device *netdev = mlx5e_dev->netdev; + struct mlx5_core_dev *mdev = edev->mdev; if (!pre_netdev_reg && !netif_device_present(netdev)) { if (test_bit(MLX5E_STATE_DESTROYING, &priv->state)) @@ -6063,11 +6064,11 @@ static int _mlx5e_probe(struct auxiliary_device *adev) goto err_devlink_port_unregister; } SET_NETDEV_DEVLINK_PORT(netdev, &mlx5e_dev->dl_port); + mlx5e_dev->netdev = netdev; mlx5e_build_nic_netdev(netdev); priv = netdev_priv(netdev); - mlx5e_dev->priv = priv; priv->profile = profile; priv->ppriv = NULL; @@ -6117,11 +6118,12 @@ static int mlx5e_probe(struct auxiliary_device *adev, static void mlx5e_remove(struct auxiliary_device *adev) { struct mlx5e_dev *mlx5e_dev = auxiliary_get_drvdata(adev); - struct mlx5e_priv *priv = mlx5e_dev->priv; + struct net_device *netdev = mlx5e_dev->netdev; + struct mlx5e_priv *priv = netdev_priv(netdev); mlx5_core_uplink_netdev_set(priv->mdev, NULL); mlx5e_dcbnl_delete_app(priv); - unregister_netdev(priv->netdev); + unregister_netdev(netdev); _mlx5e_suspend(adev, false); /* Avoid cleanup if profile rollback failed. */ if (priv->profile) -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] PCI/AER: Fix NULL pointer access by aer_info
by Ziming Du 31 Jan '26

31 Jan '26

From: Vernon Yang <yanglincheng(a)kylinos.cn> stable inclusion from stable-v6.17.8 commit 6618243bcc3f60825f761a41ed65fef9fe97eb25 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/11501 CVE: CVE-2025-68309 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 0a27bdb14b028fed30a10cec2f945c38cb5ca4fa ] The kzalloc(GFP_KERNEL) may return NULL, so all accesses to aer_info->xxx will result in kernel panic. Fix it. Signed-off-by: Vernon Yang <yanglincheng(a)kylinos.cn> Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas(a)google.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250904182527.67371-1-vernon2gm@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: drivers/pci/pcie/aer.c [Ziming Du: context conflicts] Signed-off-by: Ziming Du <duziming2(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/pci/pcie/aer.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/pci/pcie/aer.c b/drivers/pci/pcie/aer.c index 67d36680d834..fae1b96fdaab 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/pcie/aer.c +++ b/drivers/pci/pcie/aer.c @@ -373,6 +373,10 @@ void pci_aer_init(struct pci_dev *dev) return; dev->aer_stats = kzalloc(sizeof(struct aer_stats), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!dev->aer_stats) { + dev->aer_cap = 0; + return; + } /* * We save/restore PCI_ERR_UNCOR_MASK, PCI_ERR_UNCOR_SEVER, -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/2] fix CVE-2026-22998
by Zheng Qixing 31 Jan '26

31 Jan '26

fix CVE-2026-22998 Maurizio Lombardi (1): nvmet-tcp: remove boilerplate code Shivam Kumar (1): nvme-tcp: fix NULL pointer dereferences in nvmet_tcp_build_pdu_iovec drivers/nvme/target/tcp.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) -- 2.39.2

2 3

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] fix CVE-2026-22998
by Zheng Qixing 31 Jan '26

31 Jan '26

fix CVE-2026-22998 Maurizio Lombardi (1): nvmet-tcp: remove boilerplate code Shivam Kumar (1): nvme-tcp: fix NULL pointer dereferences in nvmet_tcp_build_pdu_iovec drivers/nvme/target/tcp.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) -- 2.39.2

2 3

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] md/raid10: fix memleak of md thread
by Zheng Qixing 31 Jan '26

31 Jan '26

From: Yu Kuai <yukuai3(a)huawei.com> stable inclusion from stable-v4.19.283 commit abf4d67060c8f63caff096e5fca1564bfef1e5d4 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13133 CVE: CVE-2023-54294 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… ------------------ [ Upstream commit f0ddb83da3cbbf8a1f9087a642c448ff52ee9abd ] In raid10_run(), if setup_conf() succeed and raid10_run() failed before setting 'mddev->thread', then in the error path 'conf->thread' is not freed. Fix the problem by setting 'mddev->thread' right after setup_conf(). Fixes: 43a521238aca ("md-cluster: choose correct label when clustered layout is not supported") Signed-off-by: Yu Kuai <yukuai3(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song(a)kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230310073855.1337560-7-yukuai1@huaweicloud.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: drivers/md/raid10.c [Context conflicts.] Signed-off-by: Zheng Qixing <zhengqixing(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/md/raid10.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/md/raid10.c b/drivers/md/raid10.c index 8b7de02f5796..b46713e7e3c9 100644 --- a/drivers/md/raid10.c +++ b/drivers/md/raid10.c @@ -3824,6 +3824,9 @@ static int raid10_run(struct mddev *mddev) if (!conf) goto out; + mddev->thread = conf->thread; + conf->thread = NULL; + if (mddev_is_clustered(conf->mddev)) { int fc, fo; @@ -3836,9 +3839,6 @@ static int raid10_run(struct mddev *mddev) } } - mddev->thread = conf->thread; - conf->thread = NULL; - chunk_size = mddev->chunk_sectors << 9; if (mddev->queue) { blk_queue_max_discard_sectors(mddev->queue, -- 2.39.2

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] scsi: target: Reset t_task_cdb pointer in error case
by Zheng Qixing 31 Jan '26

31 Jan '26

From: Andrey Vatoropin <a.vatoropin(a)crpt.ru> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.120 commit 0260ad551b0815eb788d47f32899fbcd65d6f128 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13335 CVE: CVE-2025-68782 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… ------------------ commit 5053eab38a4c4543522d0c320c639c56a8b59908 upstream. If allocation of cmd->t_task_cdb fails, it remains NULL but is later dereferenced in the 'err' path. In case of error, reset NULL t_task_cdb value to point at the default fixed-size buffer. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE. Fixes: 9e95fb805dc0 ("scsi: target: Fix NULL pointer dereference") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Andrey Vatoropin <a.vatoropin(a)crpt.ru> Reviewed-by: Mike Christie <michael.christie(a)oracle.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251118084014.324940-1-a.vatoropin@crpt.ru Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Zheng Qixing <zhengqixing(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/target/target_core_transport.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/target/target_core_transport.c b/drivers/target/target_core_transport.c index fb93d74c5d0b..b9a144a59dff 100644 --- a/drivers/target/target_core_transport.c +++ b/drivers/target/target_core_transport.c @@ -1524,6 +1524,7 @@ target_cmd_init_cdb(struct se_cmd *cmd, unsigned char *cdb, gfp_t gfp) if (scsi_command_size(cdb) > sizeof(cmd->__t_task_cdb)) { cmd->t_task_cdb = kzalloc(scsi_command_size(cdb), gfp); if (!cmd->t_task_cdb) { + cmd->t_task_cdb = &cmd->__t_task_cdb[0]; pr_err("Unable to allocate cmd->t_task_cdb" " %u > sizeof(cmd->__t_task_cdb): %lu ops\n", scsi_command_size(cdb), -- 2.39.2

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] scsi: Revert "scsi: qla2xxx: Perform lockless command completion in abort path"
by Zheng Qixing 31 Jan '26

31 Jan '26

From: Tony Battersby <tonyb(a)cybernetics.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.120 commit e9e601b7df58ba0c667baf30263331df2c02ffe1 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13370 CVE: CVE-2025-68818 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… ------------------ commit b57fbc88715b6d18f379463f48a15b560b087ffe upstream. This reverts commit 0367076b0817d5c75dfb83001ce7ce5c64d803a9. The commit being reverted added code to __qla2x00_abort_all_cmds() to call sp->done() without holding a spinlock. But unlike the older code below it, this new code failed to check sp->cmd_type and just assumed TYPE_SRB, which results in a jump to an invalid pointer in target-mode with TYPE_TGT_CMD: qla2xxx [0000:65:00.0]-d034:8: qla24xx_do_nack_work create sess success 0000000009f7a79b qla2xxx [0000:65:00.0]-5003:8: ISP System Error - mbx1=1ff5h mbx2=10h mbx3=0h mbx4=0h mbx5=191h mbx6=0h mbx7=0h. qla2xxx [0000:65:00.0]-d01e:8: -> fwdump no buffer qla2xxx [0000:65:00.0]-f03a:8: qla_target(0): System error async event 0x8002 occurred qla2xxx [0000:65:00.0]-00af:8: Performing ISP error recovery - ha=0000000058183fda. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 PF: supervisor instruction fetch in kernel mode PF: error_code(0x0010) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP CPU: 2 PID: 9446 Comm: qla2xxx_8_dpc Tainted: G O 6.1.133 #1 Hardware name: Supermicro Super Server/X11SPL-F, BIOS 4.2 12/15/2023 RIP: 0010:0x0 Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0xffffffffffffffd6. RSP: 0018:ffffc90001f93dc8 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: 0000000000000282 RBX: 0000000000000355 RCX: ffff88810d16a000 RDX: ffff88810dbadaa8 RSI: 0000000000080000 RDI: ffff888169dc38c0 RBP: ffff888169dc38c0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000045 R10: ffffffffa034bdf0 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88810800bb40 R13: 0000000000001aa8 R14: ffff888100136610 R15: ffff8881070f7400 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88bf80080000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffffffffffffffd6 CR3: 000000010c8ff006 CR4: 00000000003706e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die+0x4d/0x8b ? page_fault_oops+0x91/0x180 ? trace_buffer_unlock_commit_regs+0x38/0x1a0 ? exc_page_fault+0x391/0x5e0 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 __qla2x00_abort_all_cmds+0xcb/0x3e0 [qla2xxx_scst] qla2x00_abort_all_cmds+0x50/0x70 [qla2xxx_scst] qla2x00_abort_isp_cleanup+0x3b7/0x4b0 [qla2xxx_scst] qla2x00_abort_isp+0xfd/0x860 [qla2xxx_scst] qla2x00_do_dpc+0x581/0xa40 [qla2xxx_scst] kthread+0xa8/0xd0 </TASK> Then commit 4475afa2646d ("scsi: qla2xxx: Complete command early within lock") added the spinlock back, because not having the lock caused a race and a crash. But qla2x00_abort_srb() in the switch below already checks for qla2x00_chip_is_down() and handles it the same way, so the code above the switch is now redundant and still buggy in target-mode. Remove it. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Tony Battersby <tonyb(a)cybernetics.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/3a8022dc-bcfd-4b01-9f9b-7a9ec61fa2a3@cybernetics.c… Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Zheng Qixing <zhengqixing(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_os.c | 6 ------ 1 file changed, 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_os.c b/drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_os.c index 91d12198cc6c..ef02ea87e415 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_os.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_os.c @@ -1874,12 +1874,6 @@ __qla2x00_abort_all_cmds(struct qla_qpair *qp, int res) for (cnt = 1; cnt < req->num_outstanding_cmds; cnt++) { sp = req->outstanding_cmds[cnt]; if (sp) { - if (qla2x00_chip_is_down(vha)) { - req->outstanding_cmds[cnt] = NULL; - sp->done(sp, res); - continue; - } - switch (sp->cmd_type) { case TYPE_SRB: qla2x00_abort_srb(qp, sp, res, &flags); -- 2.39.2

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] block: Use RCU in blk_mq_[un]quiesce_tagset() instead of set->tag_list_lock
by Zheng Qixing 31 Jan '26

31 Jan '26

From: Mohamed Khalfella <mkhalfella(a)purestorage.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.120 commit ca8764c0ea1fb825f17f19704af55e9e02c9f768 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13291 CVE: CVE-2025-68756 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… ------------------ [ Upstream commit 59e25ef2b413c72da6686d431e7759302cfccafa ] blk_mq_{add,del}_queue_tag_set() functions add and remove queues from tagset, the functions make sure that tagset and queues are marked as shared when two or more queues are attached to the same tagset. Initially a tagset starts as unshared and when the number of added queues reaches two, blk_mq_add_queue_tag_set() marks it as shared along with all the queues attached to it. When the number of attached queues drops to 1 blk_mq_del_queue_tag_set() need to mark both the tagset and the remaining queues as unshared. Both functions need to freeze current queues in tagset before setting on unsetting BLK_MQ_F_TAG_QUEUE_SHARED flag. While doing so, both functions hold set->tag_list_lock mutex, which makes sense as we do not want queues to be added or deleted in the process. This used to work fine until commit 98d81f0df70c ("nvme: use blk_mq_[un]quiesce_tagset") made the nvme driver quiesce tagset instead of quiscing individual queues. blk_mq_quiesce_tagset() does the job and quiesce the queues in set->tag_list while holding set->tag_list_lock also. This results in deadlock between two threads with these stacktraces: __schedule+0x47c/0xbb0 ? timerqueue_add+0x66/0xb0 schedule+0x1c/0xa0 schedule_preempt_disabled+0xa/0x10 __mutex_lock.constprop.0+0x271/0x600 blk_mq_quiesce_tagset+0x25/0xc0 nvme_dev_disable+0x9c/0x250 nvme_timeout+0x1fc/0x520 blk_mq_handle_expired+0x5c/0x90 bt_iter+0x7e/0x90 blk_mq_queue_tag_busy_iter+0x27e/0x550 ? __blk_mq_complete_request_remote+0x10/0x10 ? __blk_mq_complete_request_remote+0x10/0x10 ? __call_rcu_common.constprop.0+0x1c0/0x210 blk_mq_timeout_work+0x12d/0x170 process_one_work+0x12e/0x2d0 worker_thread+0x288/0x3a0 ? rescuer_thread+0x480/0x480 kthread+0xb8/0xe0 ? kthread_park+0x80/0x80 ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50 ? kthread_park+0x80/0x80 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 __schedule+0x47c/0xbb0 ? xas_find+0x161/0x1a0 schedule+0x1c/0xa0 blk_mq_freeze_queue_wait+0x3d/0x70 ? destroy_sched_domains_rcu+0x30/0x30 blk_mq_update_tag_set_shared+0x44/0x80 blk_mq_exit_queue+0x141/0x150 del_gendisk+0x25a/0x2d0 nvme_ns_remove+0xc9/0x170 nvme_remove_namespaces+0xc7/0x100 nvme_remove+0x62/0x150 pci_device_remove+0x23/0x60 device_release_driver_internal+0x159/0x200 unbind_store+0x99/0xa0 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x112/0x1e0 vfs_write+0x2b1/0x3d0 ksys_write+0x4e/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x160 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 The top stacktrace is showing nvme_timeout() called to handle nvme command timeout. timeout handler is trying to disable the controller and as a first step, it needs to blk_mq_quiesce_tagset() to tell blk-mq not to call queue callback handlers. The thread is stuck waiting for set->tag_list_lock as it tries to walk the queues in set->tag_list. The lock is held by the second thread in the bottom stack which is waiting for one of queues to be frozen. The queue usage counter will drop to zero after nvme_timeout() finishes, and this will not happen because the thread will wait for this mutex forever. Given that [un]quiescing queue is an operation that does not need to sleep, update blk_mq_[un]quiesce_tagset() to use RCU instead of taking set->tag_list_lock, update blk_mq_{add,del}_queue_tag_set() to use RCU safe list operations. Also, delete INIT_LIST_HEAD(&q->tag_set_list) in blk_mq_del_queue_tag_set() because we can not re-initialize it while the list is being traversed under RCU. The deleted queue will not be added/deleted to/from a tagset and it will be freed in blk_free_queue() after the end of RCU grace period. Signed-off-by: Mohamed Khalfella <mkhalfella(a)purestorage.com> Fixes: 98d81f0df70c ("nvme: use blk_mq_[un]quiesce_tagset") Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei(a)redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche(a)acm.org> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Zheng Qixing <zhengqixing(a)huawei.com> --- block/blk-mq.c | 17 ++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/block/blk-mq.c b/block/blk-mq.c index 9281c00aa8a9..8b52aa4f371f 100644 --- a/block/blk-mq.c +++ b/block/blk-mq.c @@ -281,12 +281,12 @@ void blk_mq_quiesce_tagset(struct blk_mq_tag_set *set) { struct request_queue *q; - mutex_lock(&set->tag_list_lock); - list_for_each_entry(q, &set->tag_list, tag_set_list) { + rcu_read_lock(); + list_for_each_entry_rcu(q, &set->tag_list, tag_set_list) { if (!blk_queue_skip_tagset_quiesce(q)) blk_mq_quiesce_queue_nowait(q); } - mutex_unlock(&set->tag_list_lock); + rcu_read_unlock(); blk_mq_wait_quiesce_done(set); } @@ -296,12 +296,12 @@ void blk_mq_unquiesce_tagset(struct blk_mq_tag_set *set) { struct request_queue *q; - mutex_lock(&set->tag_list_lock); - list_for_each_entry(q, &set->tag_list, tag_set_list) { + rcu_read_lock(); + list_for_each_entry_rcu(q, &set->tag_list, tag_set_list) { if (!blk_queue_skip_tagset_quiesce(q)) blk_mq_unquiesce_queue(q); } - mutex_unlock(&set->tag_list_lock); + rcu_read_unlock(); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(blk_mq_unquiesce_tagset); @@ -4198,7 +4198,7 @@ static void blk_mq_del_queue_tag_set(struct request_queue *q) struct blk_mq_tag_set *set = q->tag_set; mutex_lock(&set->tag_list_lock); - list_del(&q->tag_set_list); + list_del_rcu(&q->tag_set_list); if (list_is_singular(&set->tag_list)) { /* just transitioned to unshared */ set->flags &= ~BLK_MQ_F_TAG_QUEUE_SHARED; @@ -4206,7 +4206,6 @@ static void blk_mq_del_queue_tag_set(struct request_queue *q) blk_mq_update_tag_set_shared(set, false); } mutex_unlock(&set->tag_list_lock); - INIT_LIST_HEAD(&q->tag_set_list); } static void blk_mq_add_queue_tag_set(struct blk_mq_tag_set *set, @@ -4226,7 +4225,7 @@ static void blk_mq_add_queue_tag_set(struct blk_mq_tag_set *set, } if (set->flags & BLK_MQ_F_TAG_QUEUE_SHARED) queue_set_hctx_shared(q, true); - list_add_tail(&q->tag_set_list, &set->tag_list); + list_add_tail_rcu(&q->tag_set_list, &set->tag_list); mutex_unlock(&set->tag_list_lock); } -- 2.39.2

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/4] Fix CVE-2025-39942
by Long Li 30 Jan '26

30 Jan '26

Fix CVE-2025-39942 Namjae Jeon (1): ksmbd: smbdirect: validate data_offset and data_length field of smb_direct_data_transfer Stefan Metzmacher (3): smb: server: remove separate empty_recvmsg_queue smb: server: let recv_done() consistently call put_recvmsg/smb_direct_disconnect_rdma_connection ksmbd: smbdirect: verify remaining_data_length respects max_fragmented_recv_size fs/smb/server/transport_rdma.c | 98 +++++++++++++--------------------- 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 62 deletions(-) -- 2.39.2

2 5

[PATCH OLK-5.10] wifi: mt76: do not run mt76u_status_worker if the device is not running
by Jiacheng Yu 30 Jan '26

30 Jan '26

From: Lorenzo Bianconi <lorenzo(a)kernel.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.15.86 commit 69346de0eb956fb92949b9473de4647d9c34a54f category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/12848 CVE: CVE-2022-50735 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit bd5dac7ced5a7c9faa4dc468ac9560c3256df845 ] Fix the following NULL pointer dereference avoiding to run mt76u_status_worker thread if the device is not running yet. KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] CPU: 0 PID: 98 Comm: kworker/u2:2 Not tainted 5.14.0+ #78 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58e9a3f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Workqueue: mt76 mt76u_tx_status_data RIP: 0010:mt76x02_mac_fill_tx_status.isra.0+0x82c/0x9e0 Code: c5 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 94 01 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4d 8b 34 24 4c 89 f2 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 04 02 84 c0 74 08 3c 03 0f 8e 89 01 00 00 41 8b 16 41 0f b7 RSP: 0018:ffffc900005af988 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffffc900005afae8 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff832fc661 RDI: ffffc900005afc2a RBP: ffffc900005afae0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: fffff520000b5f3c R10: 0000000000000003 R11: fffff520000b5f3b R12: ffff88810b6132d8 R13: 000000000000ffff R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffc900005afc28 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88811aa00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fa0eda6a000 CR3: 0000000118f17000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: mt76x02_send_tx_status+0x1d2/0xeb0 mt76x02_tx_status_data+0x8e/0xd0 mt76u_tx_status_data+0xe1/0x240 process_one_work+0x92b/0x1460 worker_thread+0x95/0xe00 kthread+0x3a1/0x480 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 Modules linked in: --[ end trace 8df5d20fc5040f65 ]-- RIP: 0010:mt76x02_mac_fill_tx_status.isra.0+0x82c/0x9e0 Code: c5 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 94 01 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4d 8b 34 24 4c 89 f2 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 04 02 84 c0 74 08 3c 03 0f 8e 89 01 00 00 41 8b 16 41 0f b7 RSP: 0018:ffffc900005af988 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffffc900005afae8 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff832fc661 RDI: ffffc900005afc2a RBP: ffffc900005afae0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: fffff520000b5f3c R10: 0000000000000003 R11: fffff520000b5f3b R12: ffff88810b6132d8 R13: 000000000000ffff R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffc900005afc28 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88811aa00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fa0eda6a000 CR3: 0000000118f17000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Moreover move stat_work schedule out of the for loop. Reported-by: Dokyung Song <dokyungs(a)yonsei.ac.kr> Co-developed-by: Deren Wu <deren.wu(a)mediatek.com> Signed-off-by: Deren Wu <deren.wu(a)mediatek.com> Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Bianconi <lorenzo(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd(a)nbd.name> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/usb.c [Context conflicts.] Signed-off-by: Jiacheng Yu <yujiacheng3(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/usb.c | 11 +++++++---- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/usb.c b/drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/usb.c index f1ae9ff835b2..7426fc0894b1 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/usb.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/usb.c @@ -800,6 +800,9 @@ static void mt76u_tx_worker(struct mt76_worker *w) bool wake; int i; + if (!test_bit(MT76_STATE_RUNNING, &dev->phy.state)) + return; + for (i = 0; i < IEEE80211_NUM_ACS; i++) { q = dev->q_tx[i]; @@ -821,13 +824,13 @@ static void mt76u_tx_worker(struct mt76_worker *w) wake_up(&dev->tx_wait); mt76_txq_schedule(&dev->phy, i); - - if (dev->drv->tx_status_data && - !test_and_set_bit(MT76_READING_STATS, &dev->phy.state)) - queue_work(dev->wq, &dev->usb.stat_work); if (wake) ieee80211_wake_queue(dev->hw, i); } + + if (dev->drv->tx_status_data && + !test_and_set_bit(MT76_READING_STATS, &dev->phy.state)) + queue_work(dev->wq, &dev->usb.stat_work); } static void mt76u_tx_status_data(struct work_struct *work) -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] RDMA/bnxt_re: Prevent handling any completions after qp destroy
by Jiacheng Yu 30 Jan '26

30 Jan '26

From: Kashyap Desai <kashyap.desai(a)broadcom.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.15.124 commit b79a0e71d6e8692e0b6da05f8aaa7d69191cf7e7 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/12854 CVE: CVE-2023-54048 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit b5bbc6551297447d3cca55cf907079e206e9cd82 ] HW may generate completions that indicates QP is destroyed. Driver should not be scheduling any more completion handlers for this QP, after the QP is destroyed. Since CQs are active during the QP destroy, driver may still schedule completion handlers. This can cause a race where the destroy_cq and poll_cq running simultaneously. Snippet of kernel panic while doing bnxt_re driver load unload in loop. This indicates a poll after the CQ is freed. [77786.481636] Call Trace: [77786.481640] <TASK> [77786.481644] bnxt_re_poll_cq+0x14a/0x620 [bnxt_re] [77786.481658] ? kvm_clock_read+0x14/0x30 [77786.481693] __ib_process_cq+0x57/0x190 [ib_core] [77786.481728] ib_cq_poll_work+0x26/0x80 [ib_core] [77786.481761] process_one_work+0x1e5/0x3f0 [77786.481768] worker_thread+0x50/0x3a0 [77786.481785] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [77786.481790] kthread+0xe2/0x110 [77786.481794] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [77786.481797] ret_from_fork+0x2c/0x50 To avoid this, complete all completion handlers before returning the destroy QP. If free_cq is called soon after destroy_qp, IB stack will cancel the CQ work before invoking the destroy_cq verb and this will prevent any race mentioned. Fixes: 1ac5a4047975 ("RDMA/bnxt_re: Add bnxt_re RoCE driver") Signed-off-by: Kashyap Desai <kashyap.desai(a)broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: Selvin Xavier <selvin.xavier(a)broadcom.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1689322969-25402-2-git-send-email-selvin.xavier@b… Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: drivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c [context conflicts.] Signed-off-by: Jiacheng Yu <yujiacheng3(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c | 12 ++++++++++++ drivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/qplib_fp.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ drivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/qplib_fp.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 31 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c b/drivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c index a0d7777acb6d..867f7fadbb25 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c @@ -788,7 +788,10 @@ static int bnxt_re_destroy_gsi_sqp(struct bnxt_re_qp *qp) int bnxt_re_destroy_qp(struct ib_qp *ib_qp, struct ib_udata *udata) { struct bnxt_re_qp *qp = container_of(ib_qp, struct bnxt_re_qp, ib_qp); + struct bnxt_qplib_qp *qplib_qp = &qp->qplib_qp; struct bnxt_re_dev *rdev = qp->rdev; + struct bnxt_qplib_nq *scq_nq = NULL; + struct bnxt_qplib_nq *rcq_nq = NULL; unsigned int flags; int rc; @@ -822,6 +825,15 @@ int bnxt_re_destroy_qp(struct ib_qp *ib_qp, struct ib_udata *udata) ib_umem_release(qp->rumem); ib_umem_release(qp->sumem); + /* Flush all the entries of notification queue associated with + * given qp. + */ + scq_nq = qplib_qp->scq->nq; + rcq_nq = qplib_qp->rcq->nq; + bnxt_re_synchronize_nq(scq_nq); + if (scq_nq != rcq_nq) + bnxt_re_synchronize_nq(rcq_nq); + kfree(qp); return 0; sh_fail: diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/qplib_fp.c b/drivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/qplib_fp.c index fc560e846b47..5d4ce0a6dc69 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/qplib_fp.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/qplib_fp.c @@ -386,6 +386,24 @@ static void bnxt_qplib_service_nq(struct tasklet_struct *t) spin_unlock_bh(&hwq->lock); } +/* bnxt_re_synchronize_nq - self polling notification queue. + * @nq - notification queue pointer + * + * This function will start polling entries of a given notification queue + * for all pending entries. + * This function is useful to synchronize notification entries while resources + * are going away. + */ + +void bnxt_re_synchronize_nq(struct bnxt_qplib_nq *nq) +{ + int budget = nq->budget; + + nq->budget = nq->hwq.max_elements; + bnxt_qplib_service_nq(&nq->nq_tasklet); + nq->budget = budget; +} + static irqreturn_t bnxt_qplib_nq_irq(int irq, void *dev_instance) { struct bnxt_qplib_nq *nq = dev_instance; diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/qplib_fp.h b/drivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/qplib_fp.h index 667f93d90045..98f156a876ee 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/qplib_fp.h +++ b/drivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/qplib_fp.h @@ -546,6 +546,7 @@ int bnxt_qplib_process_flush_list(struct bnxt_qplib_cq *cq, struct bnxt_qplib_cqe *cqe, int num_cqes); void bnxt_qplib_flush_cqn_wq(struct bnxt_qplib_qp *qp); +void bnxt_re_synchronize_nq(struct bnxt_qplib_nq *nq); static inline void *bnxt_qplib_get_swqe(struct bnxt_qplib_q *que, u32 *swq_idx) { -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] net: usb: qmi_wwan: initialize MAC header offset in qmimux_rx_fixup
by Jiacheng Yu 30 Jan '26

30 Jan '26

From: Qendrim Maxhuni <qendrim.maxhuni(a)garderos.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.247 commit 0aabccdcec1f4a36f95829ea2263f845bbc77223 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/11602 CVE: CVE-2025-68192 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit e120f46768d98151ece8756ebd688b0e43dc8b29 ] Raw IP packets have no MAC header, leaving skb->mac_header uninitialized. This can trigger kernel panics on ARM64 when xfrm or other subsystems access the offset due to strict alignment checks. Initialize the MAC header to prevent such crashes. This can trigger kernel panics on ARM when running IPsec over the qmimux0 interface. Example trace: Internal error: Oops: 000000009600004f [#1] SMP CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.12.34-gbe78e49cb433 #1 Hardware name: LS1028A RDB Board (DT) pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : xfrm_input+0xde8/0x1318 lr : xfrm_input+0x61c/0x1318 sp : ffff800080003b20 Call trace: xfrm_input+0xde8/0x1318 xfrm6_rcv+0x38/0x44 xfrm6_esp_rcv+0x48/0xa8 ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x94/0x4b0 ip6_input_finish+0x44/0x70 ip6_input+0x44/0xc0 ipv6_rcv+0x6c/0x114 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x5c/0x8c __netif_receive_skb+0x18/0x60 process_backlog+0x78/0x17c __napi_poll+0x38/0x180 net_rx_action+0x168/0x2f0 Fixes: c6adf77953bc ("net: usb: qmi_wwan: add qmap mux protocol support") Signed-off-by: Qendrim Maxhuni <qendrim.maxhuni(a)garderos.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251029075744.105113-1-qendrim.maxhuni@garderos.c… Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jiacheng Yu <yujiacheng3(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c b/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c index 306ff69a10f0..0aab7a1b9886 100644 --- a/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c +++ b/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c @@ -207,6 +207,12 @@ static int qmimux_rx_fixup(struct usbnet *dev, struct sk_buff *skb) return 0; skbn->dev = net; + /* Raw IP packets don't have a MAC header, but other subsystems + * (like xfrm) may still access MAC header offsets, so they must + * be initialized. + */ + skb_reset_mac_header(skbn); + switch (skb->data[offset + qmimux_hdr_sz] & 0xf0) { case 0x40: skbn->protocol = htons(ETH_P_IP); -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] mlx5: Fix default values in create CQ
by Jiacheng Yu 30 Jan '26

30 Jan '26

From: Akiva Goldberger <agoldberger(a)nvidia.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.17.9 commit 08469f5393a1a39f26a6e2eb2e8c33187665c1f4 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/11579 CVE: CVE-2025-68209 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit e5eba42f01340f73888dfe560be2806057c25913 ] Currently, CQs without a completion function are assigned the mlx5_add_cq_to_tasklet function by default. This is problematic since only user CQs created through the mlx5_ib driver are intended to use this function. Additionally, all CQs that will use doorbells instead of polling for completions must call mlx5_cq_arm. However, the default CQ creation flow leaves a valid value in the CQ's arm_db field, allowing FW to send interrupts to polling-only CQs in certain corner cases. These two factors would allow a polling-only kernel CQ to be triggered by an EQ interrupt and call a completion function intended only for user CQs, causing a null pointer exception. Some areas in the driver have prevented this issue with one-off fixes but did not address the root cause. This patch fixes the described issue by adding defaults to the create CQ flow. It adds a default dummy completion function to protect against null pointer exceptions, and it sets an invalid command sequence number by default in kernel CQs to prevent the FW from sending an interrupt to the CQ until it is armed. User CQs are responsible for their own initialization values. Callers of mlx5_core_create_cq are responsible for changing the completion function and arming the CQ per their needs. Fixes: cdd04f4d4d71 ("net/mlx5: Add support to create SQ and CQ for ASO") Signed-off-by: Akiva Goldberger <agoldberger(a)nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Moshe Shemesh <moshe(a)nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt(a)nvidia.com> Acked-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon(a)kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/1762681743-1084694-1-git-send-email-tariqt@nvidia.… Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/cq.c drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/fpga/conn.c drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/steering/hws/send.c drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/steering/sws/dr_send.c drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/steering/dr_send.c [cq.c, conn.c context conflicts. send.c 2ca62599aa0bbc0e61595531614e0989ba6b3194 not committed. dr_send.c e03cf321882badadc77dfc428f465173523d5f79 not committed] Signed-off-by: Jiacheng Yu <yujiacheng3(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/cq.c | 11 ++++--- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/cq.c | 23 ++++++++++++-- .../net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c | 1 - .../ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/fpga/conn.c | 17 +++++------ .../mellanox/mlx5/core/steering/dr_send.c | 30 +++++-------------- drivers/vdpa/mlx5/net/mlx5_vnet.c | 6 ++-- include/linux/mlx5/cq.h | 1 + 7 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/cq.c b/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/cq.c index ee9acd58c512..0e2177323154 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/cq.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/cq.c @@ -1011,15 +1011,18 @@ int mlx5_ib_create_cq(struct ib_cq *ibcq, const struct ib_cq_init_attr *attr, if (cq->create_flags & IB_UVERBS_CQ_FLAGS_IGNORE_OVERRUN) MLX5_SET(cqc, cqc, oi, 1); + if (udata) { + cq->mcq.comp = mlx5_add_cq_to_tasklet; + cq->mcq.tasklet_ctx.comp = mlx5_ib_cq_comp; + } else { + cq->mcq.comp = mlx5_ib_cq_comp; + } + err = mlx5_core_create_cq(dev->mdev, &cq->mcq, cqb, inlen, out, sizeof(out)); if (err) goto err_cqb; mlx5_ib_dbg(dev, "cqn 0x%x\n", cq->mcq.cqn); - if (udata) - cq->mcq.tasklet_ctx.comp = mlx5_ib_cq_comp; - else - cq->mcq.comp = mlx5_ib_cq_comp; cq->mcq.event = mlx5_ib_cq_event; INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cq->wc_list); diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/cq.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/cq.c index 4caa1b6f40ba..d21c14bb3ecf 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/cq.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/cq.c @@ -66,8 +66,8 @@ void mlx5_cq_tasklet_cb(struct tasklet_struct *t) tasklet_schedule(&ctx->task); } -static void mlx5_add_cq_to_tasklet(struct mlx5_core_cq *cq, - struct mlx5_eqe *eqe) +void mlx5_add_cq_to_tasklet(struct mlx5_core_cq *cq, + struct mlx5_eqe *eqe) { unsigned long flags; struct mlx5_eq_tasklet *tasklet_ctx = cq->tasklet_ctx.priv; @@ -84,7 +84,15 @@ static void mlx5_add_cq_to_tasklet(struct mlx5_core_cq *cq, } spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tasklet_ctx->lock, flags); } +EXPORT_SYMBOL(mlx5_add_cq_to_tasklet); +static void mlx5_core_cq_dummy_cb(struct mlx5_core_cq *cq, struct mlx5_eqe *eqe) +{ + mlx5_core_err(cq->eq->core.dev, + "CQ default completion callback, CQ #%u\n", cq->cqn); +} + +#define MLX5_CQ_INIT_CMD_SN cpu_to_be32(2 << 28) /* Callers must verify outbox status in case of err */ int mlx5_create_cq(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev, struct mlx5_core_cq *cq, u32 *in, int inlen, u32 *out, int outlen) @@ -110,10 +118,19 @@ int mlx5_create_cq(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev, struct mlx5_core_cq *cq, cq->arm_sn = 0; cq->eq = eq; cq->uid = MLX5_GET(create_cq_in, in, uid); + + /* Kernel CQs must set the arm_db address prior to calling + * this function, allowing for the proper value to be + * initialized. User CQs are responsible for their own + * initialization since they do not use the arm_db field. + */ + if (cq->arm_db) + *cq->arm_db = MLX5_CQ_INIT_CMD_SN; + refcount_set(&cq->refcount, 1); init_completion(&cq->free); if (!cq->comp) - cq->comp = mlx5_add_cq_to_tasklet; + cq->comp = mlx5_core_cq_dummy_cb; /* assuming CQ will be deleted before the EQ */ cq->tasklet_ctx.priv = &eq->tasklet_ctx; INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cq->tasklet_ctx.list); diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c index ec1b582cb9d5..08f771b60014 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c @@ -1936,7 +1936,6 @@ static int mlx5e_alloc_cq_common(struct mlx5e_priv *priv, mcq->set_ci_db = cq->wq_ctrl.db.db; mcq->arm_db = cq->wq_ctrl.db.db + 1; *mcq->set_ci_db = 0; - *mcq->arm_db = 0; mcq->vector = param->eq_ix; mcq->comp = mlx5e_completion_event; mcq->event = mlx5e_cq_error_event; diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/fpga/conn.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/fpga/conn.c index c4de6bf8d1b6..4db17fa397be 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/fpga/conn.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/fpga/conn.c @@ -421,6 +421,14 @@ static int mlx5_fpga_conn_create_cq(struct mlx5_fpga_conn *conn, int cq_size) __be64 *pas; u32 i; + conn->cq.mcq.cqe_sz = 64; + conn->cq.mcq.set_ci_db = conn->cq.wq_ctrl.db.db; + conn->cq.mcq.arm_db = conn->cq.wq_ctrl.db.db + 1; + *conn->cq.mcq.set_ci_db = 0; + conn->cq.mcq.vector = 0; + conn->cq.mcq.comp = mlx5_fpga_conn_cq_complete; + conn->cq.mcq.uar = fdev->conn_res.uar; + cq_size = roundup_pow_of_two(cq_size); MLX5_SET(cqc, temp_cqc, log_cq_size, ilog2(cq_size)); @@ -468,16 +476,7 @@ static int mlx5_fpga_conn_create_cq(struct mlx5_fpga_conn *conn, int cq_size) if (err) goto err_cqwq; - conn->cq.mcq.cqe_sz = 64; - conn->cq.mcq.set_ci_db = conn->cq.wq_ctrl.db.db; - conn->cq.mcq.arm_db = conn->cq.wq_ctrl.db.db + 1; - *conn->cq.mcq.set_ci_db = 0; - *conn->cq.mcq.arm_db = 0; - conn->cq.mcq.vector = 0; - conn->cq.mcq.comp = mlx5_fpga_conn_cq_complete; - conn->cq.mcq.uar = fdev->conn_res.uar; tasklet_setup(&conn->cq.tasklet, mlx5_fpga_conn_cq_tasklet); - mlx5_fpga_dbg(fdev, "Created CQ #0x%x\n", conn->cq.mcq.cqn); goto out; diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/steering/dr_send.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/steering/dr_send.c index f57c84e5128b..30401ed45b17 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/steering/dr_send.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/steering/dr_send.c @@ -1049,12 +1049,6 @@ static int dr_prepare_qp_to_rts(struct mlx5dr_domain *dmn) return 0; } -static void dr_cq_complete(struct mlx5_core_cq *mcq, - struct mlx5_eqe *eqe) -{ - pr_err("CQ completion CQ: #%u\n", mcq->cqn); -} - static struct mlx5dr_cq *dr_create_cq(struct mlx5_core_dev *mdev, struct mlx5_uars_page *uar, size_t ncqe) @@ -1089,6 +1083,14 @@ static struct mlx5dr_cq *dr_create_cq(struct mlx5_core_dev *mdev, cqe->op_own = MLX5_CQE_INVALID << 4 | MLX5_CQE_OWNER_MASK; } + cq->mcq.cqe_sz = 64; + cq->mcq.set_ci_db = cq->wq_ctrl.db.db; + cq->mcq.arm_db = cq->wq_ctrl.db.db + 1; + *cq->mcq.set_ci_db = 0; + cq->mcq.vector = 0; + cq->mcq.uar = uar; + cq->mdev = mdev; + inlen = MLX5_ST_SZ_BYTES(create_cq_in) + sizeof(u64) * cq->wq_ctrl.buf.npages; in = kvzalloc(inlen, GFP_KERNEL); @@ -1112,28 +1114,12 @@ static struct mlx5dr_cq *dr_create_cq(struct mlx5_core_dev *mdev, pas = (__be64 *)MLX5_ADDR_OF(create_cq_in, in, pas); mlx5_fill_page_frag_array(&cq->wq_ctrl.buf, pas); - cq->mcq.comp = dr_cq_complete; - err = mlx5_core_create_cq(mdev, &cq->mcq, in, inlen, out, sizeof(out)); kvfree(in); if (err) goto err_cqwq; - cq->mcq.cqe_sz = 64; - cq->mcq.set_ci_db = cq->wq_ctrl.db.db; - cq->mcq.arm_db = cq->wq_ctrl.db.db + 1; - *cq->mcq.set_ci_db = 0; - - /* set no-zero value, in order to avoid the HW to run db-recovery on - * CQ that used in polling mode. - */ - *cq->mcq.arm_db = cpu_to_be32(2 << 28); - - cq->mcq.vector = 0; - cq->mcq.uar = uar; - cq->mdev = mdev; - return cq; err_cqwq: diff --git a/drivers/vdpa/mlx5/net/mlx5_vnet.c b/drivers/vdpa/mlx5/net/mlx5_vnet.c index e538e7e0874f..743ced205fca 100644 --- a/drivers/vdpa/mlx5/net/mlx5_vnet.c +++ b/drivers/vdpa/mlx5/net/mlx5_vnet.c @@ -553,6 +553,8 @@ static int cq_create(struct mlx5_vdpa_net *ndev, u16 idx, u32 num_ent) vcq->mcq.set_ci_db = vcq->db.db; vcq->mcq.arm_db = vcq->db.db + 1; vcq->mcq.cqe_sz = 64; + vcq->mcq.comp = mlx5_vdpa_cq_comp; + vcq->cqe = num_ent; err = cq_frag_buf_alloc(ndev, &vcq->buf, num_ent); if (err) @@ -592,10 +594,6 @@ static int cq_create(struct mlx5_vdpa_net *ndev, u16 idx, u32 num_ent) if (err) goto err_vec; - vcq->mcq.comp = mlx5_vdpa_cq_comp; - vcq->cqe = num_ent; - vcq->mcq.set_ci_db = vcq->db.db; - vcq->mcq.arm_db = vcq->db.db + 1; mlx5_cq_arm(&mvq->cq.mcq, MLX5_CQ_DB_REQ_NOT, uar_page, mvq->cq.mcq.cons_index); kfree(in); return 0; diff --git a/include/linux/mlx5/cq.h b/include/linux/mlx5/cq.h index cb15308b5cb0..804432fd0f27 100644 --- a/include/linux/mlx5/cq.h +++ b/include/linux/mlx5/cq.h @@ -183,6 +183,7 @@ static inline void mlx5_cq_put(struct mlx5_core_cq *cq) complete(&cq->free); } +void mlx5_add_cq_to_tasklet(struct mlx5_core_cq *cq, struct mlx5_eqe *eqe); int mlx5_create_cq(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev, struct mlx5_core_cq *cq, u32 *in, int inlen, u32 *out, int outlen); int mlx5_core_create_cq(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev, struct mlx5_core_cq *cq, -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] net: usb: qmi_wwan: initialize MAC header offset in qmimux_rx_fixup
by Jiacheng Yu 30 Jan '26

30 Jan '26

From: Qendrim Maxhuni <qendrim.maxhuni(a)garderos.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.117 commit dd03780c29f87c26c0e0bb7e0db528c8109461fb category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/11602 CVE: CVE-2025-68192 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit e120f46768d98151ece8756ebd688b0e43dc8b29 ] Raw IP packets have no MAC header, leaving skb->mac_header uninitialized. This can trigger kernel panics on ARM64 when xfrm or other subsystems access the offset due to strict alignment checks. Initialize the MAC header to prevent such crashes. This can trigger kernel panics on ARM when running IPsec over the qmimux0 interface. Example trace: Internal error: Oops: 000000009600004f [#1] SMP CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.12.34-gbe78e49cb433 #1 Hardware name: LS1028A RDB Board (DT) pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : xfrm_input+0xde8/0x1318 lr : xfrm_input+0x61c/0x1318 sp : ffff800080003b20 Call trace: xfrm_input+0xde8/0x1318 xfrm6_rcv+0x38/0x44 xfrm6_esp_rcv+0x48/0xa8 ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x94/0x4b0 ip6_input_finish+0x44/0x70 ip6_input+0x44/0xc0 ipv6_rcv+0x6c/0x114 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x5c/0x8c __netif_receive_skb+0x18/0x60 process_backlog+0x78/0x17c __napi_poll+0x38/0x180 net_rx_action+0x168/0x2f0 Fixes: c6adf77953bc ("net: usb: qmi_wwan: add qmap mux protocol support") Signed-off-by: Qendrim Maxhuni <qendrim.maxhuni(a)garderos.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251029075744.105113-1-qendrim.maxhuni@garderos.c… Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jiacheng Yu <yujiacheng3(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c b/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c index dc84d9029c2c..fff4e8fc72e9 100644 --- a/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c +++ b/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c @@ -192,6 +192,12 @@ static int qmimux_rx_fixup(struct usbnet *dev, struct sk_buff *skb) if (!skbn) return 0; + /* Raw IP packets don't have a MAC header, but other subsystems + * (like xfrm) may still access MAC header offsets, so they must + * be initialized. + */ + skb_reset_mac_header(skbn); + switch (skb->data[offset + qmimux_hdr_sz] & 0xf0) { case 0x40: skbn->protocol = htons(ETH_P_IP); -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/5] use SYS_CNTVCTSS_EL0 for gettimeofday
by Xinyu Zheng 30 Jan '26

30 Jan '26

Jisheng Zhang (1): arm64: vdso: remove two .altinstructions related symbols Joey Gouly (3): arm64: module: move find_section to header arm64: alternative: patch alternatives in the vDSO arm64: vdso: use SYS_CNTVCTSS_EL0 for gettimeofday Yang Yingliang (1): vdso: do cntvct workaround in the VDSO arch/arm64/include/asm/module.h | 15 ++++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/vdso.h | 3 ++ arch/arm64/include/asm/vdso/gettimeofday.h | 42 ++++++++++++++++++---- arch/arm64/kernel/alternative.c | 28 +++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/module.c | 15 -------- arch/arm64/kernel/vdso.c | 2 -- arch/arm64/kernel/vdso/vdso.lds.S | 5 +++ 7 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 6

[PATCH OLK-5.10] driver core: fix potential null-ptr-deref in device_add()
by Wang Wensheng 30 Jan '26

30 Jan '26

From: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang(a)huawei.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.3-rc1 commit f6837f34a34973ef6600c08195ed300e24e97317 category: bugfix bugzilla: CVE-2023-54321 CVE: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13118 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- I got the following null-ptr-deref report while doing fault injection test: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000058 CPU: 2 PID: 278 Comm: 37-i2c-ds2482 Tainted: G B W N 6.1.0-rc3+ RIP: 0010:klist_put+0x2d/0xd0 Call Trace: <TASK> klist_remove+0xf1/0x1c0 device_release_driver_internal+0x196/0x210 bus_remove_device+0x1bd/0x240 device_add+0xd3d/0x1100 w1_add_master_device+0x476/0x490 [wire] ds2482_probe+0x303/0x3e0 [ds2482] This is how it happened: w1_alloc_dev() // The dev->driver is set to w1_master_driver. memcpy(&dev->dev, device, sizeof(struct device)); device_add() bus_add_device() dpm_sysfs_add() // It fails, calls bus_remove_device. // error path bus_remove_device() // The dev->driver is not null, but driver is not bound. __device_release_driver() klist_remove(&dev->p->knode_driver) <-- It causes null-ptr-deref. // normal path bus_probe_device() // It's not called yet. device_bind_driver() If dev->driver is set, in the error path after calling bus_add_device() in device_add(), bus_remove_device() is called, then the device will be detached from driver. But device_bind_driver() is not called yet, so it causes null-ptr-deref while access the 'knode_driver'. To fix this, set dev->driver to null in the error path before calling bus_remove_device(). Fixes: 57eee3d23e88 ("Driver core: Call device_pm_add() after bus_add_device() in device_add()") Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang(a)huawei.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221205034904.2077765-1-yangyingliang@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Yuan Can <yuancan(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/base/core.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/base/core.c b/drivers/base/core.c index 81889d8ccbd1..7c4b4add4485 100644 --- a/drivers/base/core.c +++ b/drivers/base/core.c @@ -3052,6 +3052,7 @@ int device_add(struct device *dev) device_pm_remove(dev); dpm_sysfs_remove(dev); DPMError: + dev->driver = NULL; bus_remove_device(dev); BusError: device_remove_attrs(dev); -- 2.22.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] arch_topology: Fix incorrect error check in topology_parse_cpu_capacity()
by Wang Wensheng 30 Jan '26

30 Jan '26

From: Kaushlendra Kumar <kaushlendra.kumar(a)intel.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.246 commit 64da320252e43456cc9ec3055ff567f168467b37 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/11599 CVE: CVE-2025-40346 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 2eead19334516c8e9927c11b448fbe512b1f18a1 ] Fix incorrect use of PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO() in topology_parse_cpu_capacity() which causes the code to proceed with NULL clock pointers. The current logic uses !PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(cpu_clk) which evaluates to true for both valid pointers and NULL, leading to potential NULL pointer dereference in clk_get_rate(). Per include/linux/err.h documentation, PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(ptr) returns: "The error code within @ptr if it is an error pointer; 0 otherwise." This means PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO() returns 0 for both valid pointers AND NULL pointers. Therefore !PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(cpu_clk) evaluates to true (proceed) when cpu_clk is either valid or NULL, causing clk_get_rate(NULL) to be called when of_clk_get() returns NULL. Replace with !IS_ERR_OR_NULL(cpu_clk) which only proceeds for valid pointers, preventing potential NULL pointer dereference in clk_get_rate(). Cc: stable <stable(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kaushlendra Kumar <kaushlendra.kumar(a)intel.com> Reviewed-by: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla(a)arm.com> Fixes: b8fe128dad8f ("arch_topology: Adjust initial CPU capacities with current freq") Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250923174308.1771906-1-kaushlendra.kumar@intel.c… Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> [ Adjust context ] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Conflicts: drivers/base/arch_topology.c [46db6d4797f18 has not merged] Signed-off-by: Zhang Yuwei <zhangyuwei20(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/base/arch_topology.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/base/arch_topology.c b/drivers/base/arch_topology.c index ef77b53c2f3d..58359e7ac7e6 100644 --- a/drivers/base/arch_topology.c +++ b/drivers/base/arch_topology.c @@ -336,7 +336,7 @@ bool __init topology_parse_cpu_capacity(struct device_node *cpu_node, int cpu) * frequency (by keeping the initial capacity_freq_ref value). */ cpu_clk = of_clk_get(cpu_node, 0); - if (!PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(cpu_clk)) { + if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(cpu_clk)) { per_cpu(capacity_freq_ref, cpu) = clk_get_rate(cpu_clk) / HZ_PER_KHZ; clk_put(cpu_clk); -- 2.22.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] usb: early: xhci-dbc: Fix a potential out-of-bound memory access
by Wang Wensheng 30 Jan '26

30 Jan '26

From: Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet(a)wanadoo.fr> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.3-rc1 commit a4a97ab3db5c081eb6e7dba91306adefb461e0bd category: bugfix bugzilla: hhttps://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/11438 CVE: CVE-2023-53840 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- If xdbc_bulk_write() fails, the values in 'buf' can be anything. So the string is not guaranteed to be NULL terminated when xdbc_trace() is called. Reserve an extra byte, which will be zeroed automatically because 'buf' is a static variable, in order to avoid troubles, should it happen. Fixes: aeb9dd1de98c ("usb/early: Add driver for xhci debug capability") Signed-off-by: Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet(a)wanadoo.fr> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/d6a7562c5e839a195cee85db6dc81817f9372cb1.16750161… Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Wang Wensheng <wangwensheng4(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/usb/early/xhci-dbc.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/early/xhci-dbc.c b/drivers/usb/early/xhci-dbc.c index 6c0434100e38..b0c4071f0b16 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/early/xhci-dbc.c +++ b/drivers/usb/early/xhci-dbc.c @@ -871,7 +871,8 @@ static int xdbc_bulk_write(const char *bytes, int size) static void early_xdbc_write(struct console *con, const char *str, u32 n) { - static char buf[XDBC_MAX_PACKET]; + /* static variables are zeroed, so buf is always NULL terminated */ + static char buf[XDBC_MAX_PACKET + 1]; int chunk, ret; int use_cr = 0; -- 2.22.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/5] use SYS_CNTVCTSS_EL0 for gettimeofday
by Xinyu Zheng 30 Jan '26

30 Jan '26

Jisheng Zhang (1): arm64: vdso: remove two .altinstructions related symbols Joey Gouly (3): arm64: module: move find_section to header arm64: alternative: patch alternatives in the vDSO arm64: vdso: use SYS_CNTVCTSS_EL0 for gettimeofday Yang Yingliang (1): vdso: do cntvct workaround in the VDSO arch/arm64/include/asm/module.h | 15 ++++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/vdso.h | 3 ++ arch/arm64/include/asm/vdso/gettimeofday.h | 42 ++++++++++++++++++---- arch/arm64/kernel/alternative.c | 28 +++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/module.c | 15 -------- arch/arm64/kernel/vdso.c | 2 -- arch/arm64/kernel/vdso/vdso.lds.S | 5 +++ 7 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 6

[PATCH OLK-5.10] drivers: base: Free devm resources when unregistering a device
by Wang Wensheng 30 Jan '26

30 Jan '26

From: David Gow <davidgow(a)google.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.6-rc1 commit 699fb50d99039a50e7494de644f96c889279aca3 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/8116 CVE: CVE-2023-53596 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- In the current code, devres_release_all() only gets called if the device has a bus and has been probed. This leads to issues when using bus-less or driver-less devices where the device might never get freed if a managed resource holds a reference to the device. This is happening in the DRM framework for example. We should thus call devres_release_all() in the device_del() function to make sure that the device-managed actions are properly executed when the device is unregistered, even if it has neither a bus nor a driver. This is effectively the same change than commit 2f8d16a996da ("devres: release resources on device_del()") that got reverted by commit a525a3ddeaca ("driver core: free devres in device_release") over memory leaks concerns. This patch effectively combines the two commits mentioned above to release the resources both on device_del() and device_release() and get the best of both worlds. Fixes: a525a3ddeaca ("driver core: free devres in device_release") Signed-off-by: David Gow <davidgow(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Maxime Ripard <mripard(a)kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230720-kunit-devm-inconsistencies-test-v3-3-6aa… Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Conflicts: drivers/base/core.c drivers/base/test/platform-device-test.c drivers/base/test/root-device-test.c [context conflicts: platform-device-test.c and root-device-test.c do not exist. ed9f918174cb "driver core: bus: move bus notifier logic into bus.c" not merged] Signed-off-by: Chen Jun <chenjun102(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/base/core.c | 11 +++++++++++ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/base/core.c b/drivers/base/core.c index eb82b43181be..81889d8ccbd1 100644 --- a/drivers/base/core.c +++ b/drivers/base/core.c @@ -3210,6 +3210,17 @@ void device_del(struct device *dev) device_remove_properties(dev); device_links_purge(dev); + /* + * If a device does not have a driver attached, we need to clean + * up any managed resources. We do this in device_release(), but + * it's never called (and we leak the device) if a managed + * resource holds a reference to the device. So release all + * managed resources here, like we do in driver_detach(). We + * still need to do so again in device_release() in case someone + * adds a new resource after this point, though. + */ + devres_release_all(dev); + if (dev->bus) blocking_notifier_call_chain(&dev->bus->p->bus_notifier, BUS_NOTIFY_REMOVED_DEVICE, dev); -- 2.22.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] driver core: fix resource leak in device_add()
by Wang Wensheng 30 Jan '26

30 Jan '26

From: Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao(a)huawei.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.3-rc1 commit 6977b1a5d67097eaa4d02b0c126c04cc6e8917c0 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/8108 CVE: CVE-2023-53594 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- When calling kobject_add() failed in device_add(), it will call cleanup_glue_dir() to free resource. But in kobject_add(), dev->kobj.parent has been set to NULL. This will cause resource leak. The process is as follows: device_add() get_device_parent() class_dir_create_and_add() kobject_add() //kobject_get() ... dev->kobj.parent = kobj; ... kobject_add() //failed, but set dev->kobj.parent = NULL ... glue_dir = get_glue_dir(dev) //glue_dir = NULL, and goto //"Error" label ... cleanup_glue_dir() //becaues glue_dir is NULL, not call //kobject_put() The preceding problem may cause insmod mac80211_hwsim.ko to failed. sysfs: cannot create duplicate filename '/devices/virtual/mac80211_hwsim' Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x8e/0xd1 sysfs_warn_dup.cold+0x1c/0x29 sysfs_create_dir_ns+0x224/0x280 kobject_add_internal+0x2aa/0x880 kobject_add+0x135/0x1a0 get_device_parent+0x3d7/0x590 device_add+0x2aa/0x1cb0 device_create_groups_vargs+0x1eb/0x260 device_create+0xdc/0x110 mac80211_hwsim_new_radio+0x31e/0x4790 [mac80211_hwsim] init_mac80211_hwsim+0x48d/0x1000 [mac80211_hwsim] do_one_initcall+0x10f/0x630 do_init_module+0x19f/0x5e0 load_module+0x64b7/0x6eb0 __do_sys_finit_module+0x140/0x200 do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 </TASK> kobject_add_internal failed for mac80211_hwsim with -EEXIST, don't try to register things with the same name in the same directory. Fixes: cebf8fd16900 ("driver core: fix race between creating/querying glue dir and its cleanup") Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao(a)huawei.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221123012042.335252-1-shaozhengchao@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Yuan Can <yuancan(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Wang Wensheng <wangwensheng4(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/base/core.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/base/core.c b/drivers/base/core.c index cdd46fe88fc7..eb82b43181be 100644 --- a/drivers/base/core.c +++ b/drivers/base/core.c @@ -2959,7 +2959,7 @@ int device_add(struct device *dev) /* we require the name to be set before, and pass NULL */ error = kobject_add(&dev->kobj, dev->kobj.parent, NULL); if (error) { - glue_dir = get_glue_dir(dev); + glue_dir = kobj; goto Error; } -- 2.22.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/2] Fix CVE-2022-49309
by Wang Wensheng 30 Jan '26

30 Jan '26

The cve itself and its later fixes. Duoming Zhou (1): drivers: staging: rtl8723bs: Fix deadlock in rtw_surveydone_event_callback() Hans de Goede (1): drivers: staging: rtl8723bs: Fix locking in rtw_scan_timeout_handler() drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_mlme.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) -- 2.22.0

2 3

[PATCH OLK-5.10] kernel/resource: fix kfree() of bootmem memory again
by Wang Wensheng 30 Jan '26

30 Jan '26

From: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe(a)huawei.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.18-rc1 commit 0cbcc92917c5de80f15c24d033566539ad696892 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/486 CVE: CVE-2022-49190 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Since commit ebff7d8f270d ("mem hotunplug: fix kfree() of bootmem memory"), we could get a resource allocated during boot via alloc_resource(). And it's required to release the resource using free_resource(). Howerver, many people use kfree directly which will result in kernel BUG. In order to fix this without fixing every call site, just leak a couple of bytes in such corner case. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220217083619.19305-1-linmiaohe@huawei.com Fixes: ebff7d8f270d ("mem hotunplug: fix kfree() of bootmem memory") Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe(a)huawei.com> Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Cc: Alistair Popple <apopple(a)nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Conflicts: kernel/resource.c [Just contexts conflicts.] Signed-off-by: Wang Wensheng <wangwensheng4(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/resource.c | 41 ++++++++--------------------------------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/resource.c b/kernel/resource.c index 1087f33d70c4..ea4d7a02b8e8 100644 --- a/kernel/resource.c +++ b/kernel/resource.c @@ -53,14 +53,6 @@ struct resource_constraint { static DEFINE_RWLOCK(resource_lock); -/* - * For memory hotplug, there is no way to free resource entries allocated - * by boot mem after the system is up. So for reusing the resource entry - * we need to remember the resource. - */ -static struct resource *bootmem_resource_free; -static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(bootmem_resource_lock); - static struct resource *next_resource(struct resource *p, bool sibling_only) { /* Caller wants to traverse through siblings only */ @@ -149,36 +141,19 @@ __initcall(ioresources_init); static void free_resource(struct resource *res) { - if (!res) - return; - - if (!PageSlab(virt_to_head_page(res))) { - spin_lock(&bootmem_resource_lock); - res->sibling = bootmem_resource_free; - bootmem_resource_free = res; - spin_unlock(&bootmem_resource_lock); - } else { + /** + * If the resource was allocated using memblock early during boot + * we'll leak it here: we can only return full pages back to the + * buddy and trying to be smart and reusing them eventually in + * alloc_resource() overcomplicates resource handling. + */ + if (res && PageSlab(virt_to_head_page(res))) kfree(res); - } } static struct resource *alloc_resource(gfp_t flags) { - struct resource *res = NULL; - - spin_lock(&bootmem_resource_lock); - if (bootmem_resource_free) { - res = bootmem_resource_free; - bootmem_resource_free = res->sibling; - } - spin_unlock(&bootmem_resource_lock); - - if (res) - memset(res, 0, sizeof(struct resource)); - else - res = kzalloc(sizeof(struct resource), flags); - - return res; + return kzalloc(sizeof(struct resource), flags); } /* Return the conflict entry if you can't request it */ -- 2.22.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] drm/amd/pm/powerplay/hwmgr/vega20_thermal: Prevent division by zero
by Wang Wensheng 30 Jan '26

30 Jan '26

From: Denis Arefev <arefev(a)swemel.ru> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.237 commit ce773dd844ee19a605af27f11470887e0f2044a9 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/10438 CVE: CVE-2025-37766 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 4e3d9508c056d7e0a56b58d5c81253e2a0d22b6c upstream. The user can set any speed value. If speed is greater than UINT_MAX/8, division by zero is possible. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE. Fixes: 031db09017da ("drm/amd/powerplay/vega20: enable fan RPM and pwm settings V2") Signed-off-by: Denis Arefev <arefev(a)swemel.ru> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher(a)amd.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Liu Mingrui <liumingrui(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/pm/powerplay/hwmgr/vega20_thermal.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/pm/powerplay/hwmgr/vega20_thermal.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/pm/powerplay/hwmgr/vega20_thermal.c index 364162ddaa9c..87b7baa9492b 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/pm/powerplay/hwmgr/vega20_thermal.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/pm/powerplay/hwmgr/vega20_thermal.c @@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ int vega20_fan_ctrl_set_fan_speed_rpm(struct pp_hwmgr *hwmgr, uint32_t speed) uint32_t tach_period, crystal_clock_freq; int result = 0; - if (!speed) + if (!speed || speed > UINT_MAX/8) return -EINVAL; if (PP_CAP(PHM_PlatformCaps_MicrocodeFanControl)) { -- 2.22.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] of: check previous kernel's ima-kexec-buffer against memory bounds
by Wang Wensheng 30 Jan '26

30 Jan '26

From: Vaibhav Jain <vaibhav(a)linux.ibm.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.0-rc1 commit cbf9c4b9617b6767886a913705ca14b7600c77db category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/9735 CVE: CVE-2022-50159 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Presently ima_get_kexec_buffer() doesn't check if the previous kernel's ima-kexec-buffer lies outside the addressable memory range. This can result in a kernel panic if the new kernel is booted with 'mem=X' arg and the ima-kexec-buffer was allocated beyond that range by the previous kernel. The panic is usually of the form below: $ sudo kexec --initrd initrd vmlinux --append='mem=16G' <snip> BUG: Unable to handle kernel data access on read at 0xc000c01fff7f0000 Faulting instruction address: 0xc000000000837974 Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] <snip> NIP [c000000000837974] ima_restore_measurement_list+0x94/0x6c0 LR [c00000000083b55c] ima_load_kexec_buffer+0xac/0x160 Call Trace: [c00000000371fa80] [c00000000083b55c] ima_load_kexec_buffer+0xac/0x160 [c00000000371fb00] [c0000000020512c4] ima_init+0x80/0x108 [c00000000371fb70] [c0000000020514dc] init_ima+0x4c/0x120 [c00000000371fbf0] [c000000000012240] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x2c0 [c00000000371fcc0] [c000000002004ad0] kernel_init_freeable+0x344/0x3ec [c00000000371fda0] [c0000000000128a4] kernel_init+0x34/0x1b0 [c00000000371fe10] [c00000000000ce64] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x64 Instruction dump: f92100b8 f92100c0 90e10090 910100a0 4182050c 282a0017 3bc00000 40810330 7c0802a6 fb610198 7c9b2378 f80101d0 <a1240000> 2c090001 40820614 e9240010 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Fix this issue by checking returned PFN range of previous kernel's ima-kexec-buffer with page_is_ram() to ensure correct memory bounds. Fixes: 467d27824920 ("powerpc: ima: get the kexec buffer passed by the previous kernel") Cc: Frank Rowand <frowand.list(a)gmail.com> Cc: Prakhar Srivastava <prsriva(a)linux.microsoft.com> Cc: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas(a)linux.microsoft.com> Cc: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman(a)linux.ibm.com> Cc: Rob Herring <robh(a)kernel.org> Cc: Ritesh Harjani <ritesh.list(a)gmail.com> Cc: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy(a)arm.com> Signed-off-by: Vaibhav Jain <vaibhav(a)linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Rob Herring <robh(a)kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220531041446.3334259-1-vaibhav@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Wang Wensheng <wangwensheng4(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/of/kexec.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/of/kexec.c b/drivers/of/kexec.c index d8231c34e873..f0e6495d0536 100644 --- a/drivers/of/kexec.c +++ b/drivers/of/kexec.c @@ -133,6 +133,7 @@ int ima_get_kexec_buffer(void **addr, size_t *size) { int ret, len; unsigned long tmp_addr; + unsigned long start_pfn, end_pfn; size_t tmp_size; const void *prop; @@ -147,6 +148,22 @@ int ima_get_kexec_buffer(void **addr, size_t *size) if (ret) return ret; + /* Do some sanity on the returned size for the ima-kexec buffer */ + if (!tmp_size) + return -ENOENT; + + /* + * Calculate the PFNs for the buffer and ensure + * they are with in addressable memory. + */ + start_pfn = PHYS_PFN(tmp_addr); + end_pfn = PHYS_PFN(tmp_addr + tmp_size - 1); + if (!page_is_ram(start_pfn) || !page_is_ram(end_pfn)) { + pr_warn("IMA buffer at 0x%lx, size = 0x%zx beyond memory\n", + tmp_addr, tmp_size); + return -EINVAL; + } + *addr = __va(tmp_addr); *size = tmp_size; -- 2.22.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] HID: core: Harden s32ton() against conversion to 0 bits
by Wang Wensheng 30 Jan '26

30 Jan '26

From: Alan Stern <stern(a)rowland.harvard.edu> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.17-rc1 commit a6b87bfc2ab5bccb7ad953693c85d9062aef3fdd category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/9186 CVE: CVE-2025-38556 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- Testing by the syzbot fuzzer showed that the HID core gets a shift-out-of-bounds exception when it tries to convert a 32-bit quantity to a 0-bit quantity. Ideally this should never occur, but there are buggy devices and some might have a report field with size set to zero; we shouldn't reject the report or the device just because of that. Instead, harden the s32ton() routine so that it returns a reasonable result instead of crashing when it is called with the number of bits set to 0 -- the same as what snto32() does. Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern(a)rowland.harvard.edu> Reported-by: syzbot+b63d677d63bcac06cf90(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-usb/68753a08.050a0220.33d347.0008.GAE@google.… Tested-by: syzbot+b63d677d63bcac06cf90(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: dde5845a529f ("[PATCH] Generic HID layer - code split") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/613a66cd-4309-4bce-a4f7-2905f9bce0c9@rowland.harva… Signed-off-by: Benjamin Tissoires <bentiss(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: drivers/hid/hid-core.c [Only context conflict because of commit c653ffc283404 is not applied] Signed-off-by: Wang Wensheng <wangwensheng4(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/hid/hid-core.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-core.c b/drivers/hid/hid-core.c index 3094c33bb8f9..a602f572d458 100644 --- a/drivers/hid/hid-core.c +++ b/drivers/hid/hid-core.c @@ -1347,7 +1347,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(hid_snto32); static u32 s32ton(__s32 value, unsigned n) { - s32 a = value >> (n - 1); + s32 a; + + if (!value || !n) + return 0; + + a = value >> (n - 1); if (a && a != -1) return value < 0 ? 1 << (n - 1) : (1 << (n - 1)) - 1; return value & ((1 << n) - 1); -- 2.22.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] iommu/amd: Avoid stack buffer overflow from kernel cmdline
by Wang Wensheng 30 Jan '26

30 Jan '26

From: Kees Cook <kees(a)kernel.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.241 commit a732502bf3bbe859613b6d7b2b0313b11f0474ac category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/9098 CVE: CVE-2025-38676 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 8503d0fcb1086a7cfe26df67ca4bd9bd9e99bdec ] While the kernel command line is considered trusted in most environments, avoid writing 1 byte past the end of "acpiid" if the "str" argument is maximum length. Reported-by: Simcha Kosman <simcha.kosman(a)cyberark.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/AS8P193MB2271C4B24BCEDA31830F37AE84A52@AS8P193M… Fixes: b6b26d86c61c ("iommu/amd: Add a length limitation for the ivrs_acpihid command-line parameter") Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Ankit Soni <Ankit.Soni(a)amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250804154023.work.970-kees@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <joerg.roedel(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Wang Wensheng <wangwensheng4(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/iommu/amd/init.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/iommu/amd/init.c b/drivers/iommu/amd/init.c index d0a4ec42fd12..8e3570b77798 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/amd/init.c +++ b/drivers/iommu/amd/init.c @@ -3223,7 +3223,7 @@ static int __init parse_ivrs_acpihid(char *str) { u32 seg = 0, bus, dev, fn; char *hid, *uid, *p, *addr; - char acpiid[ACPIID_LEN] = {0}; + char acpiid[ACPIID_LEN + 1] = { }; /* size with NULL terminator */ int i; addr = strchr(str, '@'); @@ -3249,7 +3249,7 @@ static int __init parse_ivrs_acpihid(char *str) /* We have the '@', make it the terminator to get just the acpiid */ *addr++ = 0; - if (strlen(str) > ACPIID_LEN + 1) + if (strlen(str) > ACPIID_LEN) goto not_found; if (sscanf(str, "=%s", acpiid) != 1) -- 2.22.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/5] Use CNTVCTSS_EL0 in gettimeofday()
by Xinyu Zheng 30 Jan '26

30 Jan '26

Jisheng Zhang (1): arm64: vdso: remove two .altinstructions related symbols Joey Gouly (3): arm64: module: move find_section to header arm64: alternative: patch alternatives in the vDSO arm64: vdso: use SYS_CNTVCTSS_EL0 for gettimeofday Yang Yingliang (1): vdso: do cntvct workaround in the VDSO arch/arm64/include/asm/module.h | 15 ++++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/vdso.h | 3 ++ arch/arm64/include/asm/vdso/gettimeofday.h | 42 ++++++++++++++++++---- arch/arm64/kernel/alternative.c | 28 +++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/module.c | 15 -------- arch/arm64/kernel/vdso.c | 2 -- arch/arm64/kernel/vdso/vdso.lds.S | 5 +++ 7 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 6

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/2] net: xfrm: Fix CVE-2025-40215
by Dong Chenchen 30 Jan '26

30 Jan '26

Fix CVE-2025-40215 Sabrina Dubroca (2): xfrm: delete x->tunnel as we delete x xfrm: also call xfrm_state_delete_tunnel at destroy time for states that were never added include/net/xfrm.h | 1 - net/ipv4/ipcomp.c | 2 ++ net/ipv6/ipcomp6.c | 2 ++ net/ipv6/xfrm6_tunnel.c | 2 +- net/xfrm/xfrm_ipcomp.c | 1 - net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c | 20 +++++++++----------- 6 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) -- 2.25.1

2 3

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/2] net: xfrm: Fix CVE-2025-39797
by Dong Chenchen 30 Jan '26

30 Jan '26

Fix CVE-2025-39797 Aakash Kumar S (1): xfrm: Duplicate SPI Handling Sabrina Dubroca (1): xfrm: xfrm_alloc_spi shouldn't use 0 as SPI net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c | 70 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 44 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-) -- 2.25.1

2 3

[PATCH OLK-5.10] netfilter: allow exp not to be removed in nf_ct_find_expectation
by Dong Chenchen 30 Jan '26

30 Jan '26

From: Xin Long <lucien.xin(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.6-rc1 commit 4914109a8e1e494c6aa9852f9e84ec77a5fc643f category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/11115 CVE: CVE-2023-52927 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Currently nf_conntrack_in() calling nf_ct_find_expectation() will remove the exp from the hash table. However, in some scenario, we expect the exp not to be removed when the created ct will not be confirmed, like in OVS and TC conntrack in the following patches. This patch allows exp not to be removed by setting IPS_CONFIRMED in the status of the tmpl. Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin(a)gmail.com> Acked-by: Aaron Conole <aconole(a)redhat.com> Acked-by: Florian Westphal <fw(a)strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> Conflicts: net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_expect.c net/netfilter/nft_ct.c [commit 50bfbb8957ab remove pr_debug calls, which lead to conflicts in init_conntrack(). commit c53bd0e96662 move ct counter to net_generic data which not merged lead to conflict in nf_ct_find_expectation(). commit 719774377 convert to refcount_t api in conntrack, which not merged lead to conflicts] Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_expect.h | 2 +- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c | 2 +- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_expect.c | 4 ++-- net/netfilter/nft_ct.c | 2 ++ 4 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_expect.h b/include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_expect.h index 0855b60fba17..f642a87ea330 100644 --- a/include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_expect.h +++ b/include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_expect.h @@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ nf_ct_expect_find_get(struct net *net, struct nf_conntrack_expect * nf_ct_find_expectation(struct net *net, const struct nf_conntrack_zone *zone, - const struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple); + const struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple, bool unlink); void nf_ct_unlink_expect_report(struct nf_conntrack_expect *exp, u32 portid, int report); diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c index 9090d677ddfa..371aef7774f6 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c @@ -1583,7 +1583,7 @@ init_conntrack(struct net *net, struct nf_conn *tmpl, local_bh_disable(); if (net->ct.expect_count) { spin_lock(&nf_conntrack_expect_lock); - exp = nf_ct_find_expectation(net, zone, tuple); + exp = nf_ct_find_expectation(net, zone, tuple, !tmpl || nf_ct_is_confirmed(tmpl)); if (exp) { pr_debug("expectation arrives ct=%p exp=%p\n", ct, exp); diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_expect.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_expect.c index 42557d2b6a90..45f29e28aba3 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_expect.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_expect.c @@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nf_ct_expect_find_get); struct nf_conntrack_expect * nf_ct_find_expectation(struct net *net, const struct nf_conntrack_zone *zone, - const struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple) + const struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple, bool unlink) { struct nf_conntrack_expect *i, *exp = NULL; unsigned int h; @@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ nf_ct_find_expectation(struct net *net, !atomic_inc_not_zero(&exp->master->ct_general.use))) return NULL; - if (exp->flags & NF_CT_EXPECT_PERMANENT) { + if (exp->flags & NF_CT_EXPECT_PERMANENT || !unlink) { refcount_inc(&exp->use); return exp; } else if (del_timer(&exp->timeout)) { diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_ct.c b/net/netfilter/nft_ct.c index 2a8dfa68f6e2..32b83333e834 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nft_ct.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_ct.c @@ -268,6 +268,7 @@ static void nft_ct_set_zone_eval(const struct nft_expr *expr, regs->verdict.code = NF_DROP; return; } + __set_bit(IPS_CONFIRMED_BIT, &ct->status); } atomic_inc(&ct->ct_general.use); @@ -375,6 +376,7 @@ static bool nft_ct_tmpl_alloc_pcpu(void) return false; } + __set_bit(IPS_CONFIRMED_BIT, &tmp->status); atomic_set(&tmp->ct_general.use, 1); per_cpu(nft_ct_pcpu_template, cpu) = tmp; } -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] bpf, sockmap: Avoid using sk_socket after free when sending
by Dong Chenchen 30 Jan '26

30 Jan '26

From: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen(a)linux.dev> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.15-rc4 commit 8259eb0e06d8f64c700f5fbdb28a5c18e10de291 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/9634 CVE: CVE-2025-38154 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- The sk->sk_socket is not locked or referenced in backlog thread, and during the call to skb_send_sock(), there is a race condition with the release of sk_socket. All types of sockets(tcp/udp/unix/vsock) will be affected. Race conditions: ''' CPU0 CPU1 backlog::skb_send_sock sendmsg_unlocked sock_sendmsg sock_sendmsg_nosec close(fd): ... ops->release() -> sock_map_close() sk_socket->ops = NULL free(socket) sock->ops->sendmsg ^ panic here ''' The ref of psock become 0 after sock_map_close() executed. ''' void sock_map_close() { ... if (likely(psock)) { ... // !! here we remove psock and the ref of psock become 0 sock_map_remove_links(sk, psock) psock = sk_psock_get(sk); if (unlikely(!psock)) goto no_psock; <=== Control jumps here via goto ... cancel_delayed_work_sync(&psock->work); <=== not executed sk_psock_put(sk, psock); ... } ''' Based on the fact that we already wait for the workqueue to finish in sock_map_close() if psock is held, we simply increase the psock reference count to avoid race conditions. With this patch, if the backlog thread is running, sock_map_close() will wait for the backlog thread to complete and cancel all pending work. If no backlog running, any pending work that hasn't started by then will fail when invoked by sk_psock_get(), as the psock reference count have been zeroed, and sk_psock_drop() will cancel all jobs via cancel_delayed_work_sync(). In summary, we require synchronization to coordinate the backlog thread and close() thread. The panic I catched: ''' Workqueue: events sk_psock_backlog RIP: 0010:sock_sendmsg+0x21d/0x440 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffc9000521fad8 RCX: 0000000000000001 ... Call Trace: <TASK> ? die_addr+0x40/0xa0 ? exc_general_protection+0x14c/0x230 ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x26/0x30 ? sock_sendmsg+0x21d/0x440 ? sock_sendmsg+0x3e0/0x440 ? __pfx_sock_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 __skb_send_sock+0x543/0xb70 sk_psock_backlog+0x247/0xb80 ... ''' Fixes: 4b4647add7d3 ("sock_map: avoid race between sock_map_close and sk_psock_put") Reported-by: Michal Luczaj <mhal(a)rbox.co> Signed-off-by: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen(a)linux.dev> Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend(a)gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250516141713.291150-1-jiayuan.chen@linux.dev Conflicts: net/core/skmsg.c [commit 3b4f14b79428 is not backport] Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- net/core/skmsg.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/core/skmsg.c b/net/core/skmsg.c index cc6570d71911..5150fc93dd9b 100644 --- a/net/core/skmsg.c +++ b/net/core/skmsg.c @@ -543,6 +543,13 @@ static void sk_psock_backlog(struct work_struct *work) u32 len, off; int ret; + /* Increment the psock refcnt to synchronize with close(fd) path in + * sock_map_close(), ensuring we wait for backlog thread completion + * before sk_socket freed. If refcnt increment fails, it indicates + * sock_map_close() completed with sk_socket potentially already freed. + */ + if (!sk_psock_get(psock->sk)) + return; mutex_lock(&psock->work_mutex); if (unlikely(state->skb)) { spin_lock_bh(&psock->ingress_lock); @@ -586,6 +593,7 @@ static void sk_psock_backlog(struct work_struct *work) } end: mutex_unlock(&psock->work_mutex); + sk_psock_put(psock->sk, psock); } struct sk_psock *sk_psock_init(struct sock *sk, int node) -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] can: bcm: add locking for bcm_op runtime updates
by Dong Chenchen 30 Jan '26

30 Jan '26

From: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan(a)hartkopp.net> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.238 commit 7595de7bc56e0e52b74e56c90f7e247bf626d628 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/10070 CVE: CVE-2025-38004 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit c2aba69d0c36a496ab4f2e81e9c2b271f2693fd7 upstream. The CAN broadcast manager (CAN BCM) can send a sequence of CAN frames via hrtimer. The content and also the length of the sequence can be changed resp reduced at runtime where the 'currframe' counter is then set to zero. Although this appeared to be a safe operation the updates of 'currframe' can be triggered from user space and hrtimer context in bcm_can_tx(). Anderson Nascimento created a proof of concept that triggered a KASAN slab-out-of-bounds read access which can be prevented with a spin_lock_bh. At the rework of bcm_can_tx() the 'count' variable has been moved into the protected section as this variable can be modified from both contexts too. Fixes: ffd980f976e7 ("[CAN]: Add broadcast manager (bcm) protocol") Reported-by: Anderson Nascimento <anderson(a)allelesecurity.com> Tested-by: Anderson Nascimento <anderson(a)allelesecurity.com> Reviewed-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl(a)pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan(a)hartkopp.net> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250519125027.11900-1-socketcan@hartkopp.net Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl(a)pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- net/can/bcm.c | 66 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 45 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/can/bcm.c b/net/can/bcm.c index cb849b5a8c14..9ce1e5c777f2 100644 --- a/net/can/bcm.c +++ b/net/can/bcm.c @@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ #include <linux/can/skb.h> #include <linux/can/bcm.h> #include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/spinlock.h> #include <net/sock.h> #include <net/net_namespace.h> @@ -120,6 +121,7 @@ struct bcm_op { struct canfd_frame last_sframe; struct sock *sk; struct net_device *rx_reg_dev; + spinlock_t bcm_tx_lock; /* protect currframe/count in runtime updates */ }; struct bcm_sock { @@ -273,13 +275,18 @@ static void bcm_can_tx(struct bcm_op *op) { struct sk_buff *skb; struct net_device *dev; - struct canfd_frame *cf = op->frames + op->cfsiz * op->currframe; + struct canfd_frame *cf; int err; /* no target device? => exit */ if (!op->ifindex) return; + /* read currframe under lock protection */ + spin_lock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock); + cf = op->frames + op->cfsiz * op->currframe; + spin_unlock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock); + dev = dev_get_by_index(sock_net(op->sk), op->ifindex); if (!dev) { /* RFC: should this bcm_op remove itself here? */ @@ -300,6 +307,10 @@ static void bcm_can_tx(struct bcm_op *op) skb->dev = dev; can_skb_set_owner(skb, op->sk); err = can_send(skb, 1); + + /* update currframe and count under lock protection */ + spin_lock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock); + if (!err) op->frames_abs++; @@ -308,6 +319,11 @@ static void bcm_can_tx(struct bcm_op *op) /* reached last frame? */ if (op->currframe >= op->nframes) op->currframe = 0; + + if (op->count > 0) + op->count--; + + spin_unlock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock); out: dev_put(dev); } @@ -404,7 +420,7 @@ static enum hrtimer_restart bcm_tx_timeout_handler(struct hrtimer *hrtimer) struct bcm_msg_head msg_head; if (op->kt_ival1 && (op->count > 0)) { - op->count--; + bcm_can_tx(op); if (!op->count && (op->flags & TX_COUNTEVT)) { /* create notification to user */ @@ -419,7 +435,6 @@ static enum hrtimer_restart bcm_tx_timeout_handler(struct hrtimer *hrtimer) bcm_send_to_user(op, &msg_head, NULL, 0); } - bcm_can_tx(op); } else if (op->kt_ival2) { bcm_can_tx(op); @@ -909,6 +924,27 @@ static int bcm_tx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg, } op->flags = msg_head->flags; + /* only lock for unlikely count/nframes/currframe changes */ + if (op->nframes != msg_head->nframes || + op->flags & TX_RESET_MULTI_IDX || + op->flags & SETTIMER) { + + spin_lock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock); + + if (op->nframes != msg_head->nframes || + op->flags & TX_RESET_MULTI_IDX) { + /* potentially update changed nframes */ + op->nframes = msg_head->nframes; + /* restart multiple frame transmission */ + op->currframe = 0; + } + + if (op->flags & SETTIMER) + op->count = msg_head->count; + + spin_unlock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock); + } + } else { /* insert new BCM operation for the given can_id */ @@ -916,9 +952,14 @@ static int bcm_tx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg, if (!op) return -ENOMEM; + spin_lock_init(&op->bcm_tx_lock); op->can_id = msg_head->can_id; op->cfsiz = CFSIZ(msg_head->flags); op->flags = msg_head->flags; + op->nframes = msg_head->nframes; + + if (op->flags & SETTIMER) + op->count = msg_head->count; /* create array for CAN frames and copy the data */ if (msg_head->nframes > 1) { @@ -977,22 +1018,8 @@ static int bcm_tx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg, } /* if ((op = bcm_find_op(&bo->tx_ops, msg_head->can_id, ifindex))) */ - if (op->nframes != msg_head->nframes) { - op->nframes = msg_head->nframes; - /* start multiple frame transmission with index 0 */ - op->currframe = 0; - } - - /* check flags */ - - if (op->flags & TX_RESET_MULTI_IDX) { - /* start multiple frame transmission with index 0 */ - op->currframe = 0; - } - if (op->flags & SETTIMER) { /* set timer values */ - op->count = msg_head->count; op->ival1 = msg_head->ival1; op->ival2 = msg_head->ival2; op->kt_ival1 = bcm_timeval_to_ktime(msg_head->ival1); @@ -1009,11 +1036,8 @@ static int bcm_tx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg, op->flags |= TX_ANNOUNCE; } - if (op->flags & TX_ANNOUNCE) { + if (op->flags & TX_ANNOUNCE) bcm_can_tx(op); - if (op->count) - op->count--; - } if (op->flags & STARTTIMER) bcm_tx_start_timer(op); -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] RDMA/rxe: Fix slab-use-after-free Read in rxe_queue_cleanup bug
by Dong Chenchen 30 Jan '26

30 Jan '26

From: Zhu Yanjun <yanjun.zhu(a)linux.dev> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.238 commit 3a3b73e135e3bd18423d0baa72571319c7feb759 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/9719 CVE: CVE-2025-38024 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit f81b33582f9339d2dc17c69b92040d3650bb4bae ] Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x7d/0xa0 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline] print_report+0xcf/0x610 mm/kasan/report.c:489 kasan_report+0xb5/0xe0 mm/kasan/report.c:602 rxe_queue_cleanup+0xd0/0xe0 drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_queue.c:195 rxe_cq_cleanup+0x3f/0x50 drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_cq.c:132 __rxe_cleanup+0x168/0x300 drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_pool.c:232 rxe_create_cq+0x22e/0x3a0 drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_verbs.c:1109 create_cq+0x658/0xb90 drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_cmd.c:1052 ib_uverbs_create_cq+0xc7/0x120 drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_cmd.c:1095 ib_uverbs_write+0x969/0xc90 drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_main.c:679 vfs_write fs/read_write.c:677 [inline] vfs_write+0x26a/0xcc0 fs/read_write.c:659 ksys_write+0x1b8/0x200 fs/read_write.c:731 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xaa/0x1b0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f In the function rxe_create_cq, when rxe_cq_from_init fails, the function rxe_cleanup will be called to handle the allocated resources. In fact, some memory resources have already been freed in the function rxe_cq_from_init. Thus, this problem will occur. The solution is to let rxe_cleanup do all the work. Fixes: 8700e3e7c485 ("Soft RoCE driver") Link: https://paste.ubuntu.com/p/tJgC42wDf6/ Tested-by: liuyi <liuy22(a)mails.tsinghua.edu.cn> Signed-off-by: Zhu Yanjun <yanjun.zhu(a)linux.dev> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250412075714.3257358-1-yanjun.zhu@linux.dev Reviewed-by: Daisuke Matsuda <matsuda-daisuke(a)fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_cq.c | 5 +---- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_cq.c b/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_cq.c index 43394c3f29d4..129576a79698 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_cq.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_cq.c @@ -69,11 +69,8 @@ int rxe_cq_from_init(struct rxe_dev *rxe, struct rxe_cq *cq, int cqe, err = do_mmap_info(rxe, uresp ? &uresp->mi : NULL, udata, cq->queue->buf, cq->queue->buf_size, &cq->queue->ip); - if (err) { - vfree(cq->queue->buf); - kfree(cq->queue); + if (err) return err; - } if (uresp) cq->is_user = 1; -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] bpf: Check skb->transport_header is set in bpf_skb_check_mtu
by Dong Chenchen 30 Jan '26

30 Jan '26

From: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau(a)kernel.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.19-rc1 commit d946f3c98328171fa50ddb908593cf833587f725 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/12719 CVE: CVE-2025-68363 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- The bpf_skb_check_mtu helper needs to use skb->transport_header when the BPF_MTU_CHK_SEGS flag is used: bpf_skb_check_mtu(skb, ifindex, &mtu_len, 0, BPF_MTU_CHK_SEGS) The transport_header is not always set. There is a WARN_ON_ONCE report when CONFIG_DEBUG_NET is enabled + skb->gso_size is set + bpf_prog_test_run is used: WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 2216 at ./include/linux/skbuff.h:3071 skb_gso_validate_network_len bpf_skb_check_mtu bpf_prog_3920e25740a41171_tc_chk_segs_flag # A test in the next patch bpf_test_run bpf_prog_test_run_skb For a normal ingress skb (not test_run), skb_reset_transport_header is performed but there is plan to avoid setting it as described in commit 2170a1f09148 ("net: no longer reset transport_header in __netif_receive_skb_core()"). This patch fixes the bpf helper by checking skb_transport_header_was_set(). The check is done just before skb->transport_header is used, to avoid breaking the existing bpf prog. The WARN_ON_ONCE is limited to bpf_prog_test_run, so targeting bpf-next. Fixes: 34b2021cc616 ("bpf: Add BPF-helper for MTU checking") Cc: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <hawk(a)kernel.org> Reported-by: Kaiyan Mei <M202472210(a)hust.edu.cn> Reported-by: Yinhao Hu <dddddd(a)hust.edu.cn> Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau(a)kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251112232331.1566074-1-martin.lau@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- net/core/filter.c | 9 ++++++--- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c index c9d4910f3f55..c8bb4537e0fc 100644 --- a/net/core/filter.c +++ b/net/core/filter.c @@ -6360,9 +6360,12 @@ BPF_CALL_5(bpf_skb_check_mtu, struct sk_buff *, skb, */ if (skb_is_gso(skb)) { ret = BPF_MTU_CHK_RET_SUCCESS; - if (flags & BPF_MTU_CHK_SEGS && - !skb_gso_validate_network_len(skb, mtu)) - ret = BPF_MTU_CHK_RET_SEGS_TOOBIG; + if (flags & BPF_MTU_CHK_SEGS) { + if (!skb_transport_header_was_set(skb)) + return -EINVAL; + if (!skb_gso_validate_network_len(skb, mtu)) + ret = BPF_MTU_CHK_RET_SEGS_TOOBIG; + } } out: *mtu_len = mtu; -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] bpf: Do not let BPF test infra emit invalid GSO types to stack
by Dong Chenchen 30 Jan '26

30 Jan '26

From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.19-rc1 commit 04a899573fb87273a656f178b5f920c505f68875 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/12743 CVE: CVE-2025-68725 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Yinhao et al. reported that their fuzzer tool was able to trigger a skb_warn_bad_offload() from netif_skb_features() -> gso_features_check(). When a BPF program - triggered via BPF test infra - pushes the packet to the loopback device via bpf_clone_redirect() then mentioned offload warning can be seen. GSO-related features are then rightfully disabled. We get into this situation due to convert___skb_to_skb() setting gso_segs and gso_size but not gso_type. Technically, it makes sense that this warning triggers since the GSO properties are malformed due to the gso_type. Potentially, the gso_type could be marked non-trustworthy through setting it at least to SKB_GSO_DODGY without any other specific assumptions, but that also feels wrong given we should not go further into the GSO engine in the first place. The checks were added in 121d57af308d ("gso: validate gso_type in GSO handlers") because there were malicious (syzbot) senders that combine a protocol with a non-matching gso_type. If we would want to drop such packets, gso_features_check() currently only returns feature flags via netif_skb_features(), so one location for potentially dropping such skbs could be validate_xmit_unreadable_skb(), but then otoh it would be an additional check in the fast-path for a very corner case. Given bpf_clone_redirect() is the only place where BPF test infra could emit such packets, lets reject them right there. Fixes: 850a88cc4096 ("bpf: Expose __sk_buff wire_len/gso_segs to BPF_PROG_TEST_RUN") Fixes: cf62089b0edd ("bpf: Add gso_size to __sk_buff") Reported-by: Yinhao Hu <dddddd(a)hust.edu.cn> Reported-by: Kaiyan Mei <M202472210(a)hust.edu.cn> Reported-by: Dongliang Mu <dzm91(a)hust.edu.cn> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau(a)kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251020075441.127980-1-daniel@iogearbox.net Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- net/bpf/test_run.c | 5 +++++ net/core/filter.c | 7 +++++++ 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/bpf/test_run.c b/net/bpf/test_run.c index 73fb9db55798..5394313c04ef 100644 --- a/net/bpf/test_run.c +++ b/net/bpf/test_run.c @@ -914,6 +914,11 @@ static int convert___skb_to_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct __sk_buff *__skb) if (__skb->gso_segs > GSO_MAX_SEGS) return -EINVAL; + + /* Currently GSO type is zero/unset. If this gets extended with + * a small list of accepted GSO types in future, the filter for + * an unset GSO type in bpf_clone_redirect() can be lifted. + */ skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_segs = __skb->gso_segs; skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size = __skb->gso_size; skb_shinfo(skb)->hwtstamps.hwtstamp = __skb->hwtstamp; diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c index c9d4910f3f55..f3ae3f1babac 100644 --- a/net/core/filter.c +++ b/net/core/filter.c @@ -2451,6 +2451,13 @@ BPF_CALL_3(bpf_clone_redirect, struct sk_buff *, skb, u32, ifindex, u64, flags) if (unlikely(flags & (~(BPF_F_INGRESS) | BPF_F_REDIRECT_INTERNAL))) return -EINVAL; + /* BPF test infra's convert___skb_to_skb() can create type-less + * GSO packets. gso_features_check() will detect this as a bad + * offload. However, lets not leak them out in the first place. + */ + if (unlikely(skb_is_gso(skb) && !skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type)) + return -EBADMSG; + dev = dev_get_by_index_rcu(dev_net(skb->dev), ifindex); if (unlikely(!dev)) return -EINVAL; -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] tcp: use dst_dev_rcu() in tcp_fastopen_active_disable_ofo_check()
by Dong Chenchen 30 Jan '26

30 Jan '26

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.18-rc1 commit b62a59c18b692f892dcb8109c1c2e653b2abc95c category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/11624 CVE: CVE-2025-68188 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Use RCU to avoid a pair of atomic operations and a potential UAF on dst_dev()->flags. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern(a)kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250828195823.3958522-8-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen.c [commit a74fc62eec15 is not backport] Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen.c | 9 ++++++--- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen.c index 408985eb74ee..f9460e7531ba 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen.c @@ -558,6 +558,7 @@ bool tcp_fastopen_active_should_disable(struct sock *sk) void tcp_fastopen_active_disable_ofo_check(struct sock *sk) { struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk); + struct net_device *dev; struct dst_entry *dst; struct sk_buff *skb; @@ -574,10 +575,12 @@ void tcp_fastopen_active_disable_ofo_check(struct sock *sk) } } else if (tp->syn_fastopen_ch && atomic_read(&sock_net(sk)->ipv4.tfo_active_disable_times)) { - dst = sk_dst_get(sk); - if (!(dst && dst->dev && (dst->dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK))) + rcu_read_lock(); + dst = __sk_dst_get(sk); + dev = dst ? dst_dev_rcu(dst) : NULL; + if (!(dev && (dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK))) atomic_set(&sock_net(sk)->ipv4.tfo_active_disable_times, 0); - dst_release(dst); + rcu_read_unlock(); } } -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] netfilter: nft_ct: add seqadj extension for natted connections
by Dong Chenchen 30 Jan '26

30 Jan '26

From: Andrii Melnychenko <a.melnychenko(a)vyos.io> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.18-rc4 commit 90918e3b6404c2a37837b8f11692471b4c512de2 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/11571 CVE: CVE-2025-68206 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Sequence adjustment may be required for FTP traffic with PASV/EPSV modes. due to need to re-write packet payload (IP, port) on the ftp control connection. This can require changes to the TCP length and expected seq / ack_seq. The easiest way to reproduce this issue is with PASV mode. Example ruleset: table inet ftp_nat { ct helper ftp_helper { type "ftp" protocol tcp l3proto inet } chain prerouting { type filter hook prerouting priority 0; policy accept; tcp dport 21 ct state new ct helper set "ftp_helper" } } table ip nat { chain prerouting { type nat hook prerouting priority -100; policy accept; tcp dport 21 dnat ip prefix to ip daddr map { 192.168.100.1 : 192.168.13.2/32 } } chain postrouting { type nat hook postrouting priority 100 ; policy accept; tcp sport 21 snat ip prefix to ip saddr map { 192.168.13.2 : 192.168.100.1/32 } } } Note that the ftp helper gets assigned *after* the dnat setup. The inverse (nat after helper assign) is handled by an existing check in nf_nat_setup_info() and will not show the problem. Topoloy: +-------------------+ +----------------------------------+ | FTP: 192.168.13.2 | <-> | NAT: 192.168.13.3, 192.168.100.1 | +-------------------+ +----------------------------------+ | +-----------------------+ | Client: 192.168.100.2 | +-----------------------+ ftp nat changes do not work as expected in this case: Connected to 192.168.100.1. [..] ftp> epsv EPSV/EPRT on IPv4 off. ftp> ls 227 Entering passive mode (192,168,100,1,209,129). 421 Service not available, remote server has closed connection. Kernel logs: Missing nfct_seqadj_ext_add() setup call WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_seqadj.c:41 [..] __nf_nat_mangle_tcp_packet+0x100/0x160 [nf_nat] nf_nat_ftp+0x142/0x280 [nf_nat_ftp] help+0x4d1/0x880 [nf_conntrack_ftp] nf_confirm+0x122/0x2e0 [nf_conntrack] nf_hook_slow+0x3c/0xb0 .. Fix this by adding the required extension when a conntrack helper is assigned to a connection that has a nat binding. Fixes: 1a64edf54f55 ("netfilter: nft_ct: add helper set support") Signed-off-by: Andrii Melnychenko <a.melnychenko(a)vyos.io> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw(a)strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- net/netfilter/nft_ct.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_ct.c b/net/netfilter/nft_ct.c index ab1214da99ff..a3750cc7099a 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nft_ct.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_ct.c @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ #include <net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_timeout.h> #include <net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_l4proto.h> #include <net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_expect.h> +#include <net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_seqadj.h> struct nft_ct_helper_obj { struct nf_conntrack_helper *helper4; @@ -1173,6 +1174,10 @@ static void nft_ct_helper_obj_eval(struct nft_object *obj, if (help) { rcu_assign_pointer(help->helper, to_assign); set_bit(IPS_HELPER_BIT, &ct->status); + + if ((ct->status & IPS_NAT_MASK) && !nfct_seqadj(ct)) + if (!nfct_seqadj_ext_add(ct)) + regs->verdict.code = NF_DROP; } } -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] net: xfrm: Fix CVE-2025-40215
by Dong Chenchen 30 Jan '26

30 Jan '26

Fix CVE-2025-40215 Sabrina Dubroca (2): xfrm: delete x->tunnel as we delete x xfrm: also call xfrm_state_delete_tunnel at destroy time for states that were never added include/net/xfrm.h | 1 - net/ipv4/ipcomp.c | 2 ++ net/ipv6/ipcomp6.c | 2 ++ net/ipv6/xfrm6_tunnel.c | 2 +- net/xfrm/xfrm_ipcomp.c | 1 - net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c | 20 +++++++++----------- 6 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) -- 2.25.1

2 3