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[PATCH OLK-5.10] audit: fix possible soft lockup in __audit_inode_child()
by Yi Yang 17 Oct '23

17 Oct '23

From: Gaosheng Cui <cuigaosheng1(a)huawei.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.195 commit 98ef243d5900d75a64539a2165745bffbb155d43 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I88UP7 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit b59bc6e37237e37eadf50cd5de369e913f524463 ] Tracefs or debugfs maybe cause hundreds to thousands of PATH records, too many PATH records maybe cause soft lockup. For example: 1. CONFIG_KASAN=y && CONFIG_PREEMPTION=n 2. auditctl -a exit,always -S open -k key 3. sysctl -w kernel.watchdog_thresh=5 4. mkdir /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/instances/test There may be a soft lockup as follows: watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#45 stuck for 7s! [mkdir:15498] Kernel panic - not syncing: softlockup: hung tasks Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x0/0x30c show_stack+0x20/0x30 dump_stack+0x11c/0x174 panic+0x27c/0x494 watchdog_timer_fn+0x2bc/0x390 __run_hrtimer+0x148/0x4fc __hrtimer_run_queues+0x154/0x210 hrtimer_interrupt+0x2c4/0x760 arch_timer_handler_phys+0x48/0x60 handle_percpu_devid_irq+0xe0/0x340 __handle_domain_irq+0xbc/0x130 gic_handle_irq+0x78/0x460 el1_irq+0xb8/0x140 __audit_inode_child+0x240/0x7bc tracefs_create_file+0x1b8/0x2a0 trace_create_file+0x18/0x50 event_create_dir+0x204/0x30c __trace_add_new_event+0xac/0x100 event_trace_add_tracer+0xa0/0x130 trace_array_create_dir+0x60/0x140 trace_array_create+0x1e0/0x370 instance_mkdir+0x90/0xd0 tracefs_syscall_mkdir+0x68/0xa0 vfs_mkdir+0x21c/0x34c do_mkdirat+0x1b4/0x1d4 __arm64_sys_mkdirat+0x4c/0x60 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xa8/0x240 do_el0_svc+0x8c/0xc0 el0_svc+0x20/0x30 el0_sync_handler+0xb0/0xb4 el0_sync+0x160/0x180 Therefore, we add cond_resched() to __audit_inode_child() to fix it. Fixes: 5195d8e217a7 ("audit: dynamically allocate audit_names when not enough space is in the names array") Signed-off-by: Gaosheng Cui <cuigaosheng1(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Yi Yang <yiyang13(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/auditsc.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index 07e2788bbbf1..57b982b44732 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -2203,6 +2203,8 @@ void __audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent, } } + cond_resched(); + /* is there a matching child entry? */ list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) { /* can only match entries that have a name */ -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1 0/5] Fixed five CVE vulnerabilities of ksmbd.
by ZhaoLong Wang 17 Oct '23

17 Oct '23

CVE-2023-32254 CVE-2023-32246 CVE-2023-32256 CVE-2023-32258 CVE-2023-2593 Marios Makassikis (1): ksmbd: send proper error response in smb2_tree_connect() Namjae Jeon (4): ksmbd: fix racy issue under cocurrent smb2 tree disconnect ksmbd: call rcu_barrier() in ksmbd_server_exit() ksmbd: fix racy issue from smb2 close and logoff with multichannel ksmbd: fix infinite loop in ksmbd_conn_handler_loop() fs/ksmbd/connection.c | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- fs/ksmbd/connection.h | 19 +++++++++-- fs/ksmbd/mgmt/tree_connect.c | 13 +++++++- fs/ksmbd/mgmt/tree_connect.h | 3 ++ fs/ksmbd/mgmt/user_session.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++---- fs/ksmbd/server.c | 1 + fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c | 31 ++++++++++-------- fs/ksmbd/transport_tcp.c | 5 ++- 8 files changed, 130 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-) -- 2.34.3

2 6

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/5] Fixed five CVE vulnerabilities of ksmbd
by ZhaoLong Wang 17 Oct '23

17 Oct '23

CVE-2023-32254 CVE-2023-32246 CVE-2023-32256 CVE-2023-32258 CVE-2023-2593 Marios Makassikis (1): ksmbd: send proper error response in smb2_tree_connect() Namjae Jeon (4): ksmbd: fix racy issue under cocurrent smb2 tree disconnect ksmbd: call rcu_barrier() in ksmbd_server_exit() ksmbd: fix racy issue from smb2 close and logoff with multichannel ksmbd: fix infinite loop in ksmbd_conn_handler_loop() fs/ksmbd/connection.c | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- fs/ksmbd/connection.h | 19 +++++++++-- fs/ksmbd/mgmt/tree_connect.c | 13 +++++++- fs/ksmbd/mgmt/tree_connect.h | 3 ++ fs/ksmbd/mgmt/user_session.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++---- fs/ksmbd/server.c | 1 + fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c | 31 ++++++++++-------- fs/ksmbd/transport_tcp.c | 5 ++- 8 files changed, 130 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-) -- 2.34.3

2 6

[PATCH OLK-5.10] xhci: print warning when HCE was set
by Longfang Liu 17 Oct '23

17 Oct '23

mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.2-rc1 commit 2a25e66d676dfb9b018abd503deed3d38a892dec category: feature bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I87TGP CVE: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… ---------------------------------------------------------------------- When HCE(Host Controller Error) is set, it means that the xhci hardware controller has an error at this time, but the current xhci driver software does not log this event. By adding an HCE event detection in the xhci interrupt processing interface, a warning log is output to the system, which is convenient for system device status tracking. Signed-off-by: Longfang Liu <liulongfang(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mathias Nyman <mathias.nyman(a)linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221130091944.2171610-2-mathias.nyman@linux.inte… Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c index 935368c6b31d..d99ea8492749 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c +++ b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c @@ -2935,6 +2935,11 @@ irqreturn_t xhci_irq(struct usb_hcd *hcd) if (!(status & STS_EINT)) goto out; + if (status & STS_HCE) { + xhci_warn(xhci, "WARNING: Host Controller Error\n"); + goto out; + } + if (status & STS_FATAL) { xhci_warn(xhci, "WARNING: Host System Error\n"); xhci_halt(xhci); -- 2.24.0

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS v2] audit: fix possible soft lockup in __audit_inode_child()
by Yi Yang 17 Oct '23

17 Oct '23

From: Gaosheng Cui <cuigaosheng1(a)huawei.com> stable inclusion from stable-v4.19.295 commit 1640c7bd4eddec6c72f3a99cbb74e333a2ce9f5d category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I88RR0 CVE: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit b59bc6e37237e37eadf50cd5de369e913f524463 ] Tracefs or debugfs maybe cause hundreds to thousands of PATH records, too many PATH records maybe cause soft lockup. For example: 1. CONFIG_KASAN=y && CONFIG_PREEMPTION=n 2. auditctl -a exit,always -S open -k key 3. sysctl -w kernel.watchdog_thresh=5 4. mkdir /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/instances/test There may be a soft lockup as follows: watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#45 stuck for 7s! [mkdir:15498] Kernel panic - not syncing: softlockup: hung tasks Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x0/0x30c show_stack+0x20/0x30 dump_stack+0x11c/0x174 panic+0x27c/0x494 watchdog_timer_fn+0x2bc/0x390 __run_hrtimer+0x148/0x4fc __hrtimer_run_queues+0x154/0x210 hrtimer_interrupt+0x2c4/0x760 arch_timer_handler_phys+0x48/0x60 handle_percpu_devid_irq+0xe0/0x340 __handle_domain_irq+0xbc/0x130 gic_handle_irq+0x78/0x460 el1_irq+0xb8/0x140 __audit_inode_child+0x240/0x7bc tracefs_create_file+0x1b8/0x2a0 trace_create_file+0x18/0x50 event_create_dir+0x204/0x30c __trace_add_new_event+0xac/0x100 event_trace_add_tracer+0xa0/0x130 trace_array_create_dir+0x60/0x140 trace_array_create+0x1e0/0x370 instance_mkdir+0x90/0xd0 tracefs_syscall_mkdir+0x68/0xa0 vfs_mkdir+0x21c/0x34c do_mkdirat+0x1b4/0x1d4 __arm64_sys_mkdirat+0x4c/0x60 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xa8/0x240 do_el0_svc+0x8c/0xc0 el0_svc+0x20/0x30 el0_sync_handler+0xb0/0xb4 el0_sync+0x160/0x180 Therefore, we add cond_resched() to __audit_inode_child() to fix it. Fixes: 5195d8e217a7 ("audit: dynamically allocate audit_names when not enough space is in the names array") Signed-off-by: Gaosheng Cui <cuigaosheng1(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Yi Yang <yiyang13(a)huawei.com> --- v2:Fix checkformat error --- kernel/auditsc.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index 57d30b75f7a2..61fd210f0226 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -1931,6 +1931,8 @@ void __audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent, } } + cond_resched(); + /* is there a matching child entry? */ list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) { /* can only match entries that have a name */ -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/5] Fix 5 CVE of ksmbd
by ZhaoLong Wang 17 Oct '23

17 Oct '23

CVE-2023-32254 CVE-2023-32246 CVE-2023-32256 CVE-2023-32258 CVE-2023-2593 Marios Makassikis (1): ksmbd: send proper error response in smb2_tree_connect() Namjae Jeon (4): ksmbd: fix racy issue under cocurrent smb2 tree disconnect ksmbd: call rcu_barrier() in ksmbd_server_exit() ksmbd: fix racy issue from smb2 close and logoff with multichannel ksmbd: fix infinite loop in ksmbd_conn_handler_loop() fs/ksmbd/connection.c | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- fs/ksmbd/connection.h | 19 +++++++++-- fs/ksmbd/mgmt/tree_connect.c | 13 +++++++- fs/ksmbd/mgmt/tree_connect.h | 3 ++ fs/ksmbd/mgmt/user_session.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++---- fs/ksmbd/server.c | 1 + fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c | 31 ++++++++++-------- fs/ksmbd/transport_tcp.c | 5 ++- 8 files changed, 130 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-) -- 2.34.3

1 5

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/5] Fix 5 CVE of ksmbd
by ZhaoLong Wang 17 Oct '23

17 Oct '23

CVE-2023-32254 CVE-2023-32246 CVE-2023-32256 CVE-2023-32258 CVE-2023-2593 Marios Makassikis (1): ksmbd: send proper error response in smb2_tree_connect() Namjae Jeon (4): ksmbd: fix racy issue under cocurrent smb2 tree disconnect ksmbd: call rcu_barrier() in ksmbd_server_exit() ksmbd: fix racy issue from smb2 close and logoff with multichannel ksmbd: fix infinite loop in ksmbd_conn_handler_loop() fs/ksmbd/connection.c | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- fs/ksmbd/connection.h | 19 +++++++++-- fs/ksmbd/mgmt/tree_connect.c | 13 +++++++- fs/ksmbd/mgmt/tree_connect.h | 3 ++ fs/ksmbd/mgmt/user_session.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++---- fs/ksmbd/server.c | 1 + fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c | 31 ++++++++++-------- fs/ksmbd/transport_tcp.c | 5 ++- 8 files changed, 130 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-) -- 2.34.3

1 5

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] audit: fix possible soft lockup in __audit_inode_child()
by Yi Yang 17 Oct '23

17 Oct '23

From: Gaosheng Cui <cuigaosheng1(a)huawei.com> stable inclusion from stable-v4.19.295 commit 1640c7bd4eddec6c72f3a99cbb74e333a2ce9f5d category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I88RR0 CVE: NA Reference:https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit b59bc6e37237e37eadf50cd5de369e913f524463 ] Tracefs or debugfs maybe cause hundreds to thousands of PATH records, too many PATH records maybe cause soft lockup. For example: 1. CONFIG_KASAN=y && CONFIG_PREEMPTION=n 2. auditctl -a exit,always -S open -k key 3. sysctl -w kernel.watchdog_thresh=5 4. mkdir /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/instances/test There may be a soft lockup as follows: watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#45 stuck for 7s! [mkdir:15498] Kernel panic - not syncing: softlockup: hung tasks Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x0/0x30c show_stack+0x20/0x30 dump_stack+0x11c/0x174 panic+0x27c/0x494 watchdog_timer_fn+0x2bc/0x390 __run_hrtimer+0x148/0x4fc __hrtimer_run_queues+0x154/0x210 hrtimer_interrupt+0x2c4/0x760 arch_timer_handler_phys+0x48/0x60 handle_percpu_devid_irq+0xe0/0x340 __handle_domain_irq+0xbc/0x130 gic_handle_irq+0x78/0x460 el1_irq+0xb8/0x140 __audit_inode_child+0x240/0x7bc tracefs_create_file+0x1b8/0x2a0 trace_create_file+0x18/0x50 event_create_dir+0x204/0x30c __trace_add_new_event+0xac/0x100 event_trace_add_tracer+0xa0/0x130 trace_array_create_dir+0x60/0x140 trace_array_create+0x1e0/0x370 instance_mkdir+0x90/0xd0 tracefs_syscall_mkdir+0x68/0xa0 vfs_mkdir+0x21c/0x34c do_mkdirat+0x1b4/0x1d4 __arm64_sys_mkdirat+0x4c/0x60 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xa8/0x240 do_el0_svc+0x8c/0xc0 el0_svc+0x20/0x30 el0_sync_handler+0xb0/0xb4 el0_sync+0x160/0x180 Therefore, we add cond_resched() to __audit_inode_child() to fix it. Fixes: 5195d8e217a7 ("audit: dynamically allocate audit_names when not enough space is in the names array") Signed-off-by: Gaosheng Cui <cuigaosheng1(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Yi Yang <yiyang13(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/auditsc.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index 57d30b75f7a2..61fd210f0226 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -1931,6 +1931,8 @@ void __audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent, } } + cond_resched(); + /* is there a matching child entry? */ list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) { /* can only match entries that have a name */ -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10 00/24] coresight: Add new API to allocate trace source ID values
by Junhao He 17 Oct '23

17 Oct '23

From: xiabing <xiabing12(a)h-partners.com> The current method for allocating trace source ID values to sources is to use a fixed algorithm for CPU based sources of (cpu_num * 2 + 0x10). The STM is allocated ID 0x1. This fixed algorithm is used in both the CoreSight driver code, and by perf when writing the trace metadata in the AUXTRACE_INFO record. The method needs replacing as currently:- 1. It is inefficient in using available IDs. 2. Does not scale to larger systems with many cores and the algorithm has no limits so will generate invalid trace IDs for cpu number > 44. Additionally requirements to allocate additional system IDs on some systems have been seen. This patch set introduces an API that allows the allocation of trace IDs in a dynamic manner. Architecturally reserved IDs are never allocated, and the system is limited to allocating only valid IDs. Each of the current trace sources ETM3.x, ETM4.x and STM is updated to use the new API. For the ETMx.x devices IDs are allocated on certain events a) When using sysfs, an ID will be allocated on hardware enable, or a read of sysfs TRCTRACEID register and freed when the sysfs reset is written. b) When using perf, ID is allocated on during setup AUX event, and freed on event free. IDs are communicated using the AUX_OUTPUT_HW_ID packet. The ID allocator is notified when perf sessions start and stop so CPU based IDs are kept constant throughout any perf session. Adrian Hunter (1): perf/x86: Add new event for AUX output counter index German Gomez (1): perf cs_etm: Keep separate symbols for ETMv4 and ETE parameters James Clark (4): perf cs-etm: Tidy up auxtrace info header printing perf cs-etm: Cleanup cs_etm__process_auxtrace_info() perf cs-etm: Print unknown header version as an error perf cs-etm: Print auxtrace info even if OpenCSD isn't linked Mike Leach (15): coresight: trace-id: Add API to dynamically assign Trace ID values coresight: Remove obsolete Trace ID unniqueness checks coresight: perf: traceid: Add perf ID allocation and notifiers coresight: stm: Update STM driver to use Trace ID API coresight: etm4x: Update ETM4 driver to use Trace ID API coresight: etm3x: Update ETM3 driver to use Trace ID API coresight: etmX.X: stm: Remove trace_id() callback coresight: trace id: Remove legacy get trace ID function. perf cs-etm: Move mapping of Trace ID and cpu into helper function perf cs-etm: Update record event to use new Trace ID protocol kernel: events: Export perf_report_aux_output_id() perf cs-etm: Handle PERF_RECORD_AUX_OUTPUT_HW_ID packet coresight: events: PERF_RECORD_AUX_OUTPUT_HW_ID used for Trace ID coresight: trace-id: Add debug & test macros to Trace ID allocation coresight: etm4x: Fix missing trctraceidr file in sysfs Ruidong Tian (1): coresight: perf: Release Coresight path when alloc trace id failed Suzuki K Poulose (1): coresight: perf: Output trace id only once xiabing (1): Revert "drivers/ETM: fix error in invalid cs_id" .../testing/sysfs-bus-coresight-devices-etm3x | 2 +- arch/x86/events/core.c | 6 + arch/x86/events/intel/core.c | 16 + arch/x86/events/perf_event.h | 1 + drivers/hwtracing/coresight/Makefile | 2 +- drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-core.c | 45 -- .../hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etm-perf.c | 32 + .../hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etm-perf.h | 2 + drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etm.h | 3 +- .../coresight/coresight-etm3x-core.c | 93 +-- .../coresight/coresight-etm3x-sysfs.c | 27 +- .../coresight/coresight-etm4x-core.c | 73 ++- .../coresight/coresight-etm4x-sysfs.c | 50 +- drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etm4x.h | 3 + drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-stm.c | 49 +- .../hwtracing/coresight/coresight-trace-id.c | 297 ++++++++++ .../hwtracing/coresight/coresight-trace-id.h | 156 +++++ include/linux/coresight-pmu.h | 35 +- include/linux/coresight.h | 3 - include/linux/perf_event.h | 1 + include/uapi/linux/perf_event.h | 15 + kernel/events/core.c | 31 + tools/include/linux/coresight-pmu.h | 48 +- tools/perf/arch/arm/util/cs-etm.c | 66 ++- tools/perf/util/Build | 1 + tools/perf/util/cs-etm-base.c | 191 ++++++ .../perf/util/cs-etm-decoder/cs-etm-decoder.c | 7 + tools/perf/util/cs-etm.c | 546 ++++++++++-------- tools/perf/util/cs-etm.h | 37 +- 29 files changed, 1387 insertions(+), 451 deletions(-) create mode 100644 drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-trace-id.c create mode 100644 drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-trace-id.h create mode 100644 tools/perf/util/cs-etm-base.c -- 2.30.0

2 25

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/4] CVE-2023-37453
by Lin Yujun 17 Oct '23

17 Oct '23

*** BLURB HERE *** Alan Stern (4): USB: core: Unite old scheme and new scheme descriptor reads USB: core: Change usb_get_device_descriptor() API USB: core: Fix race by not overwriting udev->descriptor in hub_port_init() USB: core: Fix oversight in SuperSpeed initialization drivers/usb/core/hcd.c | 10 +- drivers/usb/core/hub.c | 349 +++++++++++++++++++++---------------- drivers/usb/core/message.c | 29 ++- drivers/usb/core/usb.h | 4 +- 4 files changed, 223 insertions(+), 169 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 5

[PATCH] xhci: print warning when HCE was set
by Longfang Liu 17 Oct '23

17 Oct '23

mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.2-rc1 commit 2a25e66d676dfb9b018abd503deed3d38a892dec category: feature bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I87TGP CVE: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… ---------------------------------------------------------------------- When HCE(Host Controller Error) is set, it means that the xhci hardware controller has an error at this time, but the current xhci driver software does not log this event. By adding an HCE event detection in the xhci interrupt processing interface, a warning log is output to the system, which is convenient for system device status tracking. Signed-off-by: Longfang Liu <liulongfang(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mathias Nyman <mathias.nyman(a)linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221130091944.2171610-2-mathias.nyman@linux.inte… Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c index 935368c6b31d..d99ea8492749 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c +++ b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c @@ -2935,6 +2935,11 @@ irqreturn_t xhci_irq(struct usb_hcd *hcd) if (!(status & STS_EINT)) goto out; + if (status & STS_HCE) { + xhci_warn(xhci, "WARNING: Host Controller Error\n"); + goto out; + } + if (status & STS_FATAL) { xhci_warn(xhci, "WARNING: Host System Error\n"); xhci_halt(xhci); -- 2.24.0

1 0

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS v2] netfilter: xt_u32: validate user space input
by Lu Wei 17 Oct '23

17 Oct '23

From: Wander Lairson Costa <wander(a)redhat.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.6-rc1 commit 69c5d284f67089b4750d28ff6ac6f52ec224b330 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I85CAT CVE: CVE-2023-39192 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- The xt_u32 module doesn't validate the fields in the xt_u32 structure. An attacker may take advantage of this to trigger an OOB read by setting the size fields with a value beyond the arrays boundaries. Add a checkentry function to validate the structure. This was originally reported by the ZDI project (ZDI-CAN-18408). Fixes: 1b50b8a371e9 ("[NETFILTER]: Add u32 match") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Wander Lairson Costa <wander(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Lu Wei <luwei32(a)huawei.com> --- net/netfilter/xt_u32.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_u32.c b/net/netfilter/xt_u32.c index a95b50342dbb..58ba402bc0b0 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/xt_u32.c +++ b/net/netfilter/xt_u32.c @@ -95,11 +95,32 @@ static bool u32_mt(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct xt_action_param *par) return ret ^ data->invert; } +static int u32_mt_checkentry(const struct xt_mtchk_param *par) +{ + const struct xt_u32 *data = par->matchinfo; + const struct xt_u32_test *ct; + unsigned int i; + + if (data->ntests > ARRAY_SIZE(data->tests)) + return -EINVAL; + + for (i = 0; i < data->ntests; ++i) { + ct = &data->tests[i]; + + if (ct->nnums > ARRAY_SIZE(ct->location) || + ct->nvalues > ARRAY_SIZE(ct->value)) + return -EINVAL; + } + + return 0; +} + static struct xt_match xt_u32_mt_reg __read_mostly = { .name = "u32", .revision = 0, .family = NFPROTO_UNSPEC, .match = u32_mt, + .checkentry = u32_mt_checkentry, .matchsize = sizeof(struct xt_u32), .me = THIS_MODULE, }; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10 v2] netfilter: xt_u32: validate user space input
by Lu Wei 17 Oct '23

17 Oct '23

From: Wander Lairson Costa <wander(a)redhat.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.6-rc1 commit 69c5d284f67089b4750d28ff6ac6f52ec224b330 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I85CAT CVE: CVE-2023-39192 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- The xt_u32 module doesn't validate the fields in the xt_u32 structure. An attacker may take advantage of this to trigger an OOB read by setting the size fields with a value beyond the arrays boundaries. Add a checkentry function to validate the structure. This was originally reported by the ZDI project (ZDI-CAN-18408). Fixes: 1b50b8a371e9 ("[NETFILTER]: Add u32 match") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Wander Lairson Costa <wander(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Lu Wei <luwei32(a)huawei.com> --- net/netfilter/xt_u32.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_u32.c b/net/netfilter/xt_u32.c index 177b40d08098..117d4615d668 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/xt_u32.c +++ b/net/netfilter/xt_u32.c @@ -96,11 +96,32 @@ static bool u32_mt(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct xt_action_param *par) return ret ^ data->invert; } +static int u32_mt_checkentry(const struct xt_mtchk_param *par) +{ + const struct xt_u32 *data = par->matchinfo; + const struct xt_u32_test *ct; + unsigned int i; + + if (data->ntests > ARRAY_SIZE(data->tests)) + return -EINVAL; + + for (i = 0; i < data->ntests; ++i) { + ct = &data->tests[i]; + + if (ct->nnums > ARRAY_SIZE(ct->location) || + ct->nvalues > ARRAY_SIZE(ct->value)) + return -EINVAL; + } + + return 0; +} + static struct xt_match xt_u32_mt_reg __read_mostly = { .name = "u32", .revision = 0, .family = NFPROTO_UNSPEC, .match = u32_mt, + .checkentry = u32_mt_checkentry, .matchsize = sizeof(struct xt_u32), .me = THIS_MODULE, }; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/3] Fix 4 CVE of ksmbd
by ZhaoLong Wang 17 Oct '23

17 Oct '23

CVE-2023-32254 CVE-2023-32246 CVE-2023-32256 CVE-2023-32258 Namjae Jeon (3): ksmbd: fix racy issue under cocurrent smb2 tree disconnect ksmbd: call rcu_barrier() in ksmbd_server_exit() ksmbd: fix racy issue from smb2 close and logoff with multichannel fs/ksmbd/connection.c | 54 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- fs/ksmbd/connection.h | 19 +++++++++++-- fs/ksmbd/mgmt/tree_connect.c | 13 ++++++++- fs/ksmbd/mgmt/tree_connect.h | 3 ++ fs/ksmbd/mgmt/user_session.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++---- fs/ksmbd/server.c | 1 + fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c | 24 ++++++++-------- 7 files changed, 116 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-) -- 2.34.3

2 4

[PATCH OLK-5.10] crypto: drbg - Only fail when jent is unavailable in FIPS mode
by Lu Jialin 17 Oct '23

17 Oct '23

From: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.180 commit 2a67bc52cd3f0783ac412d8007ae7bdd04911b10 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I88MMY Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 686cd976b6ddedeeb1a1fb09ba53a891d3cc9a03 ] When jent initialisation fails for any reason other than ENOENT, the entire drbg fails to initialise, even when we're not in FIPS mode. This is wrong because we can still use the kernel RNG when we're not in FIPS mode. Change it so that it only fails when we are in FIPS mode. Fixes: 57225e679788 ("crypto: drbg - Use callback API for random readiness") Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au> Reviewed-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller(a)chronox.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Conflict: crypto/drbg.c Signed-off-by: Lu Jialin <lujialin4(a)huawei.com> --- crypto/drbg.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/crypto/drbg.c b/crypto/drbg.c index a4b5d6dbe99d..3019a26c5021 100644 --- a/crypto/drbg.c +++ b/crypto/drbg.c @@ -1573,7 +1573,7 @@ static int drbg_instantiate(struct drbg_state *drbg, struct drbg_string *pers, if (IS_ERR(drbg->jent)) { ret = PTR_ERR(drbg->jent); drbg->jent = NULL; - if (fips_enabled || ret != -ENOENT) + if (fips_enabled) goto free_everything; pr_info("DRBG: Continuing without Jitter RNG\n"); } -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS v2] USB: ene_usb6250: Allocate enough memory for full object
by Yipeng Zou 17 Oct '23

17 Oct '23

From: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.6-rc2 commit ce33e64c1788912976b61314b56935abd4bc97ef category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I885FJ CVE: CVE-2023-45862 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- The allocation of PageBuffer is 512 bytes in size, but the dereferencing of struct ms_bootblock_idi (also size 512) happens at a calculated offset within the allocation, which means the object could potentially extend beyond the end of the allocation. Avoid this case by just allocating enough space to catch any accesses beyond the end. Seen with GCC 13: ../drivers/usb/storage/ene_ub6250.c: In function 'ms_lib_process_bootblock': ../drivers/usb/storage/ene_ub6250.c:1050:44: warning: array subscript 'struct ms_bootblock_idi[0]' is partly outside array bounds of 'unsigned char[512]' [-Warray-bounds=] 1050 | if (le16_to_cpu(idi->wIDIgeneralConfiguration) != MS_IDI_GENERAL_CONF) | ^~ ../include/uapi/linux/byteorder/little_endian.h:37:51: note: in definition of macro '__le16_to_cpu' 37 | #define __le16_to_cpu(x) ((__force __u16)(__le16)(x)) | ^ ../drivers/usb/storage/ene_ub6250.c:1050:29: note: in expansion of macro 'le16_to_cpu' 1050 | if (le16_to_cpu(idi->wIDIgeneralConfiguration) != MS_IDI_GENERAL_CONF) | ^~~~~~~~~~~ In file included from ../drivers/usb/storage/ene_ub6250.c:5: In function 'kmalloc', inlined from 'ms_lib_process_bootblock' at ../drivers/usb/storage/ene_ub6250.c:942:15: ../include/linux/slab.h:580:24: note: at offset [256, 512] into object of size 512 allocated by 'kmalloc_trace' 580 | return kmalloc_trace( | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 581 | kmalloc_caches[kmalloc_type(flags)][index], | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 582 | flags, size); | ~~~~~~~~~~~~ Cc: Alan Stern <stern(a)rowland.harvard.edu> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230204183546.never.849-kees@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Yipeng Zou <zouyipeng(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/usb/storage/ene_ub6250.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/storage/ene_ub6250.c b/drivers/usb/storage/ene_ub6250.c index 4d261e4de9ad..e6768662c5ed 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/storage/ene_ub6250.c +++ b/drivers/usb/storage/ene_ub6250.c @@ -940,7 +940,7 @@ static int ms_lib_process_bootblock(struct us_data *us, u16 PhyBlock, u8 *PageDa struct ms_lib_type_extdat ExtraData; struct ene_ub6250_info *info = (struct ene_ub6250_info *) us->extra; - PageBuffer = kmalloc(MS_BYTES_PER_PAGE, GFP_KERNEL); + PageBuffer = kzalloc(MS_BYTES_PER_PAGE * 2, GFP_KERNEL); if (PageBuffer == NULL) return (u32)-1; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] USB: ene_usb6250: Allocate enough memory for full object
by Yipeng Zou 17 Oct '23

17 Oct '23

From: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.6-rc2 commit ce33e64c1788912976b61314b56935abd4bc97ef category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I88NEK CVE: CVE-2023-45862 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- The allocation of PageBuffer is 512 bytes in size, but the dereferencing of struct ms_bootblock_idi (also size 512) happens at a calculated offset within the allocation, which means the object could potentially extend beyond the end of the allocation. Avoid this case by just allocating enough space to catch any accesses beyond the end. Seen with GCC 13: ../drivers/usb/storage/ene_ub6250.c: In function 'ms_lib_process_bootblock': ../drivers/usb/storage/ene_ub6250.c:1050:44: warning: array subscript 'struct ms_bootblock_idi[0]' is partly outside array bounds of 'unsigned char[512]' [-Warray-bounds=] 1050 | if (le16_to_cpu(idi->wIDIgeneralConfiguration) != MS_IDI_GENERAL_CONF) | ^~ ../include/uapi/linux/byteorder/little_endian.h:37:51: note: in definition of macro '__le16_to_cpu' 37 | #define __le16_to_cpu(x) ((__force __u16)(__le16)(x)) | ^ ../drivers/usb/storage/ene_ub6250.c:1050:29: note: in expansion of macro 'le16_to_cpu' 1050 | if (le16_to_cpu(idi->wIDIgeneralConfiguration) != MS_IDI_GENERAL_CONF) | ^~~~~~~~~~~ In file included from ../drivers/usb/storage/ene_ub6250.c:5: In function 'kmalloc', inlined from 'ms_lib_process_bootblock' at ../drivers/usb/storage/ene_ub6250.c:942:15: ../include/linux/slab.h:580:24: note: at offset [256, 512] into object of size 512 allocated by 'kmalloc_trace' 580 | return kmalloc_trace( | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 581 | kmalloc_caches[kmalloc_type(flags)][index], | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 582 | flags, size); | ~~~~~~~~~~~~ Cc: Alan Stern <stern(a)rowland.harvard.edu> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230204183546.never.849-kees@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Yipeng Zou <zouyipeng(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/usb/storage/ene_ub6250.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/storage/ene_ub6250.c b/drivers/usb/storage/ene_ub6250.c index 4d261e4de9ad..e6768662c5ed 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/storage/ene_ub6250.c +++ b/drivers/usb/storage/ene_ub6250.c @@ -940,7 +940,7 @@ static int ms_lib_process_bootblock(struct us_data *us, u16 PhyBlock, u8 *PageDa struct ms_lib_type_extdat ExtraData; struct ene_ub6250_info *info = (struct ene_ub6250_info *) us->extra; - PageBuffer = kmalloc(MS_BYTES_PER_PAGE, GFP_KERNEL); + PageBuffer = kzalloc(MS_BYTES_PER_PAGE * 2, GFP_KERNEL); if (PageBuffer == NULL) return (u32)-1; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[OLK-5.10] crypto: drbg - Only fail when jent is unavailable in FIPS mode
by Lu Jialin 17 Oct '23

17 Oct '23

From: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.180 commit 2a67bc52cd3f0783ac412d8007ae7bdd04911b10 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I88MMY Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 686cd976b6ddedeeb1a1fb09ba53a891d3cc9a03 ] When jent initialisation fails for any reason other than ENOENT, the entire drbg fails to initialise, even when we're not in FIPS mode. This is wrong because we can still use the kernel RNG when we're not in FIPS mode. Change it so that it only fails when we are in FIPS mode. Fixes: 57225e679788 ("crypto: drbg - Use callback API for random readiness") Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au> Reviewed-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller(a)chronox.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Conflict: crypto/drbg.c Signed-off-by: Lu Jialin <lujialin4(a)huawei.com> --- crypto/drbg.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/crypto/drbg.c b/crypto/drbg.c index a4b5d6dbe99d..3019a26c5021 100644 --- a/crypto/drbg.c +++ b/crypto/drbg.c @@ -1573,7 +1573,7 @@ static int drbg_instantiate(struct drbg_state *drbg, struct drbg_string *pers, if (IS_ERR(drbg->jent)) { ret = PTR_ERR(drbg->jent); drbg->jent = NULL; - if (fips_enabled || ret != -ENOENT) + if (fips_enabled) goto free_everything; pr_info("DRBG: Continuing without Jitter RNG\n"); } -- 2.34.1

1 0

[PATCH v5 OLK-5.10 00/19] Introduce PBHA and PBHA bit0 to control the usage of HBM Cache precisely
by Wupeng Ma 17 Oct '23

17 Oct '23

From: Ma Wupeng <mawupeng1(a)huawei.com> Patch 1: move FDT init out of kaslr_early_init for future use. Patch 2 to 8: enable feature PBHA for arm64. Patch 9-18: Control the usage of HBM cache for kernel and task precisely. Patch 19: Enable feature PBHA for arm64 by default. Changelog since v4: - update pbha_bit0_update_pgprot to pgprot_pbha_bit0 Changelog since v3: - update desc for patch #15 Changelog since v2: - correct the error Documentation in patch #18 Changelog since v1: - fix kabi broken due to include files James Morse (7): KVM: arm64: Detect and enable PBHA for stage2 dt-bindings: Rename the description of cpu nodes cpu.yaml dt-bindings: arm: Add binding for Page Based Hardware Attributes arm64: cpufeature: Enable PBHA bits for stage1 arm64: mm: Add pgprot_pbha() to allow drivers to request PBHA values KVM: arm64: Configure PBHA bits for stage2 Documentation: arm64: Describe the support and expectations for PBHA Ma Wupeng (11): arm64: cpufeature: Enable PBHA for stage1 early via FDT arm64: mm: Detect and enable PBHA bit0 at early startup arm64: mm: Update kernel pte entries if pbha bit0 enabled arm64: mm: Show PBHA bit 59 as PBHA0 in ptdump arm64: mm: Introduce VM_PBHA_BIT0 to enable pbha bit0 for single vma arm64: mm: Set PBHA0 bit for VM_PBHA_BIT0 arm64: mm: Introduce procfs interface to update PBHA0 bit arm64: mm: Set flag VM_PBHA_BIT0 for global init task arm64: mm: Introduce prctl to control pbha behavior arm64: mm: Introduce kernel param pbha openeuler: configs: arm64: Enable PBHA by default Marc Zyngier (1): arm64: Extract early FDT mapping from kaslr_early_init() .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 8 + Documentation/arm64/index.rst | 1 + Documentation/arm64/pbha.rst | 85 +++ .../devicetree/bindings/arm/cpu.yaml | 537 ++++++++++++++++ .../devicetree/bindings/arm/cpus.yaml | 584 +++--------------- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 20 + arch/arm64/configs/openeuler_defconfig | 1 + arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h | 3 + arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 15 + arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_arm.h | 1 + arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_pgtable.h | 9 + arch/arm64/include/asm/mman.h | 10 + arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-hwdef.h | 6 + arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h | 26 + arch/arm64/include/asm/setup.h | 3 + arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/mman.h | 1 + arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 258 ++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/head.S | 6 +- arch/arm64/kernel/image-vars.h | 3 + arch/arm64/kernel/kaslr.c | 7 +- arch/arm64/kernel/setup.c | 15 + arch/arm64/kvm/reset.c | 15 +- arch/arm64/mm/hugetlbpage.c | 2 + arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c | 14 +- arch/arm64/mm/ptdump.c | 5 + .../firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub-helper.c | 3 + drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/fdt.c | 57 ++ drivers/soc/hisilicon/Makefile | 1 + drivers/soc/hisilicon/pbha.c | 204 ++++++ fs/proc/base.c | 103 +++ fs/proc/task_mmu.c | 3 + include/linux/mm.h | 8 +- include/linux/pbha.h | 66 ++ include/uapi/asm-generic/mman-common.h | 1 + include/uapi/linux/prctl.h | 2 + kernel/sys.c | 10 + mm/memory.c | 4 + mm/vmalloc.c | 5 + 38 files changed, 1579 insertions(+), 523 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/arm64/pbha.rst create mode 100644 Documentation/devicetree/bindings/arm/cpu.yaml create mode 100644 drivers/soc/hisilicon/pbha.c create mode 100644 include/linux/pbha.h -- 2.25.1

2 20

[PATCH OLK-5.10,v2] netfilter: xt_u32: validate user space input
by Lu Wei 17 Oct '23

17 Oct '23

From: Wander Lairson Costa <wander(a)redhat.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.6-rc1 commit 69c5d284f67089b4750d28ff6ac6f52ec224b330 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I85CAT CVE: CVE-2023-39192 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- The xt_u32 module doesn't validate the fields in the xt_u32 structure. An attacker may take advantage of this to trigger an OOB read by setting the size fields with a value beyond the arrays boundaries. Add a checkentry function to validate the structure. This was originally reported by the ZDI project (ZDI-CAN-18408). Fixes: 1b50b8a371e9 ("[NETFILTER]: Add u32 match") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Wander Lairson Costa <wander(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Lu Wei <luwei32(a)huawei.com> --- net/netfilter/xt_u32.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_u32.c b/net/netfilter/xt_u32.c index 177b40d08098..117d4615d668 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/xt_u32.c +++ b/net/netfilter/xt_u32.c @@ -96,11 +96,32 @@ static bool u32_mt(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct xt_action_param *par) return ret ^ data->invert; } +static int u32_mt_checkentry(const struct xt_mtchk_param *par) +{ + const struct xt_u32 *data = par->matchinfo; + const struct xt_u32_test *ct; + unsigned int i; + + if (data->ntests > ARRAY_SIZE(data->tests)) + return -EINVAL; + + for (i = 0; i < data->ntests; ++i) { + ct = &data->tests[i]; + + if (ct->nnums > ARRAY_SIZE(ct->location) || + ct->nvalues > ARRAY_SIZE(ct->value)) + return -EINVAL; + } + + return 0; +} + static struct xt_match xt_u32_mt_reg __read_mostly = { .name = "u32", .revision = 0, .family = NFPROTO_UNSPEC, .match = u32_mt, + .checkentry = u32_mt_checkentry, .matchsize = sizeof(struct xt_u32), .me = THIS_MODULE, }; -- 2.34.1

1 0

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS,v2] netfilter: xt_u32: validate user space input
by Lu Wei 17 Oct '23

17 Oct '23

From: Wander Lairson Costa <wander(a)redhat.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.6-rc1 commit 69c5d284f67089b4750d28ff6ac6f52ec224b330 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I85CAT CVE: CVE-2023-39192 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- The xt_u32 module doesn't validate the fields in the xt_u32 structure. An attacker may take advantage of this to trigger an OOB read by setting the size fields with a value beyond the arrays boundaries. Add a checkentry function to validate the structure. This was originally reported by the ZDI project (ZDI-CAN-18408). Fixes: 1b50b8a371e9 ("[NETFILTER]: Add u32 match") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Wander Lairson Costa <wander(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Lu Wei <luwei32(a)huawei.com> --- net/netfilter/xt_u32.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_u32.c b/net/netfilter/xt_u32.c index a95b50342dbb..58ba402bc0b0 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/xt_u32.c +++ b/net/netfilter/xt_u32.c @@ -95,11 +95,32 @@ static bool u32_mt(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct xt_action_param *par) return ret ^ data->invert; } +static int u32_mt_checkentry(const struct xt_mtchk_param *par) +{ + const struct xt_u32 *data = par->matchinfo; + const struct xt_u32_test *ct; + unsigned int i; + + if (data->ntests > ARRAY_SIZE(data->tests)) + return -EINVAL; + + for (i = 0; i < data->ntests; ++i) { + ct = &data->tests[i]; + + if (ct->nnums > ARRAY_SIZE(ct->location) || + ct->nvalues > ARRAY_SIZE(ct->value)) + return -EINVAL; + } + + return 0; +} + static struct xt_match xt_u32_mt_reg __read_mostly = { .name = "u32", .revision = 0, .family = NFPROTO_UNSPEC, .match = u32_mt, + .checkentry = u32_mt_checkentry, .matchsize = sizeof(struct xt_u32), .me = THIS_MODULE, }; -- 2.34.1

1 0

[PATCH v4 OLK-5.10 00/19] Introduce PBHA and PBHA bit0 to control the usage of HBM Cache precisely
by Wupeng Ma 16 Oct '23

16 Oct '23

From: Ma Wupeng <mawupeng1(a)huawei.com> Patch 1: move FDT init out of kaslr_early_init for future use. Patch 2 to 8: enable feature PBHA for arm64. Patch 9-18: Control the usage of HBM cache for kernel and task precisely. Patch 19: Enable feature PBHA for arm64 by default. Changelog since v3: - update desc for patch #15 Changelog since v2: - correct the error Documentation in patch #18 Changelog since v1: - fix kabi broken due to include files James Morse (7): KVM: arm64: Detect and enable PBHA for stage2 dt-bindings: Rename the description of cpu nodes cpu.yaml dt-bindings: arm: Add binding for Page Based Hardware Attributes arm64: cpufeature: Enable PBHA bits for stage1 arm64: mm: Add pgprot_pbha() to allow drivers to request PBHA values KVM: arm64: Configure PBHA bits for stage2 Documentation: arm64: Describe the support and expectations for PBHA Ma Wupeng (11): arm64: cpufeature: Enable PBHA for stage1 early via FDT arm64: mm: Detect and enable PBHA bit0 at early startup arm64: mm: Update kernel pte entries if pbha bit0 enabled arm64: mm: Show PBHA bit 59 as PBHA0 in ptdump arm64: mm: Introduce VM_PBHA_BIT0 to enable pbha bit0 for single vma arm64: mm: Set PBHA0 bit for VM_PBHA_BIT0 arm64: mm: Introduce procfs interface to update PBHA0 bit arm64: mm: Set flag VM_PBHA_BIT0 for global init task arm64: mm: Introduce prctl to control pbha behavior arm64: mm: Introduce kernel param pbha openeuler: configs: arm64: Enable PBHA by default Marc Zyngier (1): arm64: Extract early FDT mapping from kaslr_early_init() .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 8 + Documentation/arm64/index.rst | 1 + Documentation/arm64/pbha.rst | 85 +++ .../devicetree/bindings/arm/cpu.yaml | 537 ++++++++++++++++ .../devicetree/bindings/arm/cpus.yaml | 584 +++--------------- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 20 + arch/arm64/configs/openeuler_defconfig | 1 + arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h | 3 + arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 15 + arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_arm.h | 1 + arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_pgtable.h | 9 + arch/arm64/include/asm/mman.h | 10 + arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-hwdef.h | 6 + arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h | 26 + arch/arm64/include/asm/setup.h | 3 + arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/mman.h | 1 + arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 258 ++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/head.S | 6 +- arch/arm64/kernel/image-vars.h | 3 + arch/arm64/kernel/kaslr.c | 7 +- arch/arm64/kernel/setup.c | 15 + arch/arm64/kvm/reset.c | 15 +- arch/arm64/mm/hugetlbpage.c | 2 + arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c | 14 +- arch/arm64/mm/ptdump.c | 5 + .../firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub-helper.c | 3 + drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/fdt.c | 57 ++ drivers/soc/hisilicon/Makefile | 1 + drivers/soc/hisilicon/pbha.c | 204 ++++++ fs/proc/base.c | 103 +++ fs/proc/task_mmu.c | 3 + include/linux/mm.h | 8 +- include/linux/pbha.h | 66 ++ include/uapi/asm-generic/mman-common.h | 1 + include/uapi/linux/prctl.h | 2 + kernel/sys.c | 10 + mm/memory.c | 4 + mm/vmalloc.c | 5 + 38 files changed, 1579 insertions(+), 523 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/arm64/pbha.rst create mode 100644 Documentation/devicetree/bindings/arm/cpu.yaml create mode 100644 drivers/soc/hisilicon/pbha.c create mode 100644 include/linux/pbha.h -- 2.25.1

2 20

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] ext4: fix rec_len verify error
by Baokun Li 16 Oct '23

16 Oct '23

From: Shida Zhang <zhangshida(a)kylinos.cn> stable inclusion from stable-v4.19.296 commit 996f30b44369fa2d1fe62d30a14ef27e05b30448 category: bugfix bugzilla: 189039, https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7OXK8 CVE: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 7fda67e8c3ab6069f75888f67958a6d30454a9f6 upstream. With the configuration PAGE_SIZE 64k and filesystem blocksize 64k, a problem occurred when more than 13 million files were directly created under a directory: EXT4-fs error (device xx): ext4_dx_csum_set:492: inode #xxxx: comm xxxxx: dir seems corrupt? Run e2fsck -D. EXT4-fs error (device xx): ext4_dx_csum_verify:463: inode #xxxx: comm xxxxx: dir seems corrupt? Run e2fsck -D. EXT4-fs error (device xx): dx_probe:856: inode #xxxx: block 8188: comm xxxxx: Directory index failed checksum When enough files are created, the fake_dirent->reclen will be 0xffff. it doesn't equal to the blocksize 65536, i.e. 0x10000. But it is not the same condition when blocksize equals to 4k. when enough files are created, the fake_dirent->reclen will be 0x1000. it equals to the blocksize 4k, i.e. 0x1000. The problem seems to be related to the limitation of the 16-bit field when the blocksize is set to 64k. To address this, helpers like ext4_rec_len_{from,to}_disk has already been introduced to complete the conversion between the encoded and the plain form of rec_len. So fix this one by using the helper, and all the other in this file too. Cc: stable(a)kernel.org Fixes: dbe89444042a ("ext4: Calculate and verify checksums for htree nodes") Suggested-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger(a)dilger.ca> Suggested-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Shida Zhang <zhangshida(a)kylinos.cn> Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger(a)dilger.ca> Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong(a)kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230803060938.1929759-1-zhangshida@kylinos.cn Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso(a)mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Shida Zhang <zhangshida(a)kylinos.cn> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1(a)huawei.com> --- fs/ext4/namei.c | 26 +++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/namei.c b/fs/ext4/namei.c index 972611b72195..c55e1b64c38b 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/namei.c +++ b/fs/ext4/namei.c @@ -336,17 +336,17 @@ static struct ext4_dir_entry_tail *get_dirent_tail(struct inode *inode, struct ext4_dir_entry *de) { struct ext4_dir_entry_tail *t; + int blocksize = EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE(inode->i_sb); #ifdef PARANOID struct ext4_dir_entry *d, *top; d = de; top = (struct ext4_dir_entry *)(((void *)de) + - (EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE(inode->i_sb) - - sizeof(struct ext4_dir_entry_tail))); - while (d < top && d->rec_len) + (blocksize - sizeof(struct ext4_dir_entry_tail))); + while (d < top && ext4_rec_len_from_disk(d->rec_len, blocksize)) d = (struct ext4_dir_entry *)(((void *)d) + - le16_to_cpu(d->rec_len)); + ext4_rec_len_from_disk(d->rec_len, blocksize)); if (d != top) return NULL; @@ -357,7 +357,8 @@ static struct ext4_dir_entry_tail *get_dirent_tail(struct inode *inode, #endif if (t->det_reserved_zero1 || - le16_to_cpu(t->det_rec_len) != sizeof(struct ext4_dir_entry_tail) || + (ext4_rec_len_from_disk(t->det_rec_len, blocksize) != + sizeof(struct ext4_dir_entry_tail)) || t->det_reserved_zero2 || t->det_reserved_ft != EXT4_FT_DIR_CSUM) return NULL; @@ -439,13 +440,14 @@ static struct dx_countlimit *get_dx_countlimit(struct inode *inode, struct ext4_dir_entry *dp; struct dx_root_info *root; int count_offset; + int blocksize = EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE(inode->i_sb); + unsigned int rlen = ext4_rec_len_from_disk(dirent->rec_len, blocksize); - if (le16_to_cpu(dirent->rec_len) == EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE(inode->i_sb)) + if (rlen == blocksize) count_offset = 8; - else if (le16_to_cpu(dirent->rec_len) == 12) { + else if (rlen == 12) { dp = (struct ext4_dir_entry *)(((void *)dirent) + 12); - if (le16_to_cpu(dp->rec_len) != - EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE(inode->i_sb) - 12) + if (ext4_rec_len_from_disk(dp->rec_len, blocksize) != blocksize - 12) return NULL; root = (struct dx_root_info *)(((void *)dp + 12)); if (root->reserved_zero || @@ -1258,6 +1260,7 @@ static int dx_make_map(struct inode *dir, struct buffer_head *bh, unsigned int buflen = bh->b_size; char *base = bh->b_data; struct dx_hash_info h = *hinfo; + int blocksize = EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE(dir->i_sb); if (ext4_has_metadata_csum(dir->i_sb)) buflen -= sizeof(struct ext4_dir_entry_tail); @@ -1271,11 +1274,12 @@ static int dx_make_map(struct inode *dir, struct buffer_head *bh, map_tail--; map_tail->hash = h.hash; map_tail->offs = ((char *) de - base)>>2; - map_tail->size = le16_to_cpu(de->rec_len); + map_tail->size = ext4_rec_len_from_disk(de->rec_len, + blocksize); count++; cond_resched(); } - de = ext4_next_entry(de, dir->i_sb->s_blocksize); + de = ext4_next_entry(de, blocksize); } return count; } -- 2.31.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] netfilter: xt_u32: validate user space input
by Lu Wei 13 Oct '23

13 Oct '23

From: Wander Lairson Costa <wander(a)redhat.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.6-rc1 commit 69c5d284f67089b4750d28ff6ac6f52ec224b330 category: bugfix bugzilla: 189278 CVE: CVE-2023-39192 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- The xt_u32 module doesn't validate the fields in the xt_u32 structure. An attacker may take advantage of this to trigger an OOB read by setting the size fields with a value beyond the arrays boundaries. Add a checkentry function to validate the structure. This was originally reported by the ZDI project (ZDI-CAN-18408). Fixes: 1b50b8a371e9 ("[NETFILTER]: Add u32 match") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Wander Lairson Costa <wander(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Lu Wei <luwei32(a)huawei.com> --- net/netfilter/xt_u32.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_u32.c b/net/netfilter/xt_u32.c index a95b50342dbb..58ba402bc0b0 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/xt_u32.c +++ b/net/netfilter/xt_u32.c @@ -95,11 +95,32 @@ static bool u32_mt(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct xt_action_param *par) return ret ^ data->invert; } +static int u32_mt_checkentry(const struct xt_mtchk_param *par) +{ + const struct xt_u32 *data = par->matchinfo; + const struct xt_u32_test *ct; + unsigned int i; + + if (data->ntests > ARRAY_SIZE(data->tests)) + return -EINVAL; + + for (i = 0; i < data->ntests; ++i) { + ct = &data->tests[i]; + + if (ct->nnums > ARRAY_SIZE(ct->location) || + ct->nvalues > ARRAY_SIZE(ct->value)) + return -EINVAL; + } + + return 0; +} + static struct xt_match xt_u32_mt_reg __read_mostly = { .name = "u32", .revision = 0, .family = NFPROTO_UNSPEC, .match = u32_mt, + .checkentry = u32_mt_checkentry, .matchsize = sizeof(struct xt_u32), .me = THIS_MODULE, }; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] netfilter: xt_u32: validate user space input
by Lu Wei 13 Oct '23

13 Oct '23

From: Wander Lairson Costa <wander(a)redhat.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.6-rc1 commit 69c5d284f67089b4750d28ff6ac6f52ec224b330 category: bugfix bugzilla: 189278 CVE: CVE-2023-39192 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- The xt_u32 module doesn't validate the fields in the xt_u32 structure. An attacker may take advantage of this to trigger an OOB read by setting the size fields with a value beyond the arrays boundaries. Add a checkentry function to validate the structure. This was originally reported by the ZDI project (ZDI-CAN-18408). Fixes: 1b50b8a371e9 ("[NETFILTER]: Add u32 match") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Wander Lairson Costa <wander(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Lu Wei <luwei32(a)huawei.com> --- net/netfilter/xt_u32.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_u32.c b/net/netfilter/xt_u32.c index 177b40d08098..117d4615d668 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/xt_u32.c +++ b/net/netfilter/xt_u32.c @@ -96,11 +96,32 @@ static bool u32_mt(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct xt_action_param *par) return ret ^ data->invert; } +static int u32_mt_checkentry(const struct xt_mtchk_param *par) +{ + const struct xt_u32 *data = par->matchinfo; + const struct xt_u32_test *ct; + unsigned int i; + + if (data->ntests > ARRAY_SIZE(data->tests)) + return -EINVAL; + + for (i = 0; i < data->ntests; ++i) { + ct = &data->tests[i]; + + if (ct->nnums > ARRAY_SIZE(ct->location) || + ct->nvalues > ARRAY_SIZE(ct->value)) + return -EINVAL; + } + + return 0; +} + static struct xt_match xt_u32_mt_reg __read_mostly = { .name = "u32", .revision = 0, .family = NFPROTO_UNSPEC, .match = u32_mt, + .checkentry = u32_mt_checkentry, .matchsize = sizeof(struct xt_u32), .me = THIS_MODULE, }; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] netfilter: xt_u32: validate user space input
by Lu Wei 13 Oct '23

13 Oct '23

From: Wander Lairson Costa <wander(a)redhat.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.6-rc1 commit 04a07b7392d47dea88b6bc00389655cf26c5ef46 category: bugfix bugzilla: 189278 CVE: CVE-2023-39192 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- The xt_u32 module doesn't validate the fields in the xt_u32 structure. An attacker may take advantage of this to trigger an OOB read by setting the size fields with a value beyond the arrays boundaries. Add a checkentry function to validate the structure. This was originally reported by the ZDI project (ZDI-CAN-18408). Fixes: 1b50b8a371e9 ("[NETFILTER]: Add u32 match") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Wander Lairson Costa <wander(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Lu Wei <luwei32(a)huawei.com> --- net/netfilter/xt_u32.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_u32.c b/net/netfilter/xt_u32.c index 177b40d08098..117d4615d668 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/xt_u32.c +++ b/net/netfilter/xt_u32.c @@ -96,11 +96,32 @@ static bool u32_mt(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct xt_action_param *par) return ret ^ data->invert; } +static int u32_mt_checkentry(const struct xt_mtchk_param *par) +{ + const struct xt_u32 *data = par->matchinfo; + const struct xt_u32_test *ct; + unsigned int i; + + if (data->ntests > ARRAY_SIZE(data->tests)) + return -EINVAL; + + for (i = 0; i < data->ntests; ++i) { + ct = &data->tests[i]; + + if (ct->nnums > ARRAY_SIZE(ct->location) || + ct->nvalues > ARRAY_SIZE(ct->value)) + return -EINVAL; + } + + return 0; +} + static struct xt_match xt_u32_mt_reg __read_mostly = { .name = "u32", .revision = 0, .family = NFPROTO_UNSPEC, .match = u32_mt, + .checkentry = u32_mt_checkentry, .matchsize = sizeof(struct xt_u32), .me = THIS_MODULE, }; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] netfilter: xt_u32: validate user space input
by Lu Wei 13 Oct '23

13 Oct '23

From: Wander Lairson Costa <wander(a)redhat.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.6-rc1 commit 04a07b7392d47dea88b6bc00389655cf26c5ef46 category: bugfix bugzilla: 189278 CVE: CVE-2023-39192 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- The xt_u32 module doesn't validate the fields in the xt_u32 structure. An attacker may take advantage of this to trigger an OOB read by setting the size fields with a value beyond the arrays boundaries. Add a checkentry function to validate the structure. This was originally reported by the ZDI project (ZDI-CAN-18408). Fixes: 1b50b8a371e9 ("[NETFILTER]: Add u32 match") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Wander Lairson Costa <wander(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Lu Wei <luwei32(a)huawei.com> --- net/netfilter/xt_u32.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_u32.c b/net/netfilter/xt_u32.c index a95b50342dbb..58ba402bc0b0 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/xt_u32.c +++ b/net/netfilter/xt_u32.c @@ -95,11 +95,32 @@ static bool u32_mt(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct xt_action_param *par) return ret ^ data->invert; } +static int u32_mt_checkentry(const struct xt_mtchk_param *par) +{ + const struct xt_u32 *data = par->matchinfo; + const struct xt_u32_test *ct; + unsigned int i; + + if (data->ntests > ARRAY_SIZE(data->tests)) + return -EINVAL; + + for (i = 0; i < data->ntests; ++i) { + ct = &data->tests[i]; + + if (ct->nnums > ARRAY_SIZE(ct->location) || + ct->nvalues > ARRAY_SIZE(ct->value)) + return -EINVAL; + } + + return 0; +} + static struct xt_match xt_u32_mt_reg __read_mostly = { .name = "u32", .revision = 0, .family = NFPROTO_UNSPEC, .match = u32_mt, + .checkentry = u32_mt_checkentry, .matchsize = sizeof(struct xt_u32), .me = THIS_MODULE, }; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] netfilter: xt_sctp: validate the flag_info count
by Zhengchao Shao 13 Oct '23

13 Oct '23

From: Wander Lairson Costa <wander(a)redhat.com> stable inclusion from stable-v4.19.295 commit f25dbfadaf525d854597c16420dd753ca47b9396 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I85CAQ CVE: CVE-2023-39193 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit e99476497687ef9e850748fe6d232264f30bc8f9 upstream. sctp_mt_check doesn't validate the flag_count field. An attacker can take advantage of that to trigger a OOB read and leak memory information. Add the field validation in the checkentry function. Fixes: 2e4e6a17af35 ("[NETFILTER] x_tables: Abstraction layer for {ip,ip6,arp}_tables") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Lucas Leong <wmliang(a)infosec.exchange> Signed-off-by: Wander Lairson Costa <wander(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao(a)huawei.com> --- net/netfilter/xt_sctp.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_sctp.c b/net/netfilter/xt_sctp.c index 2d2fa1d53ea6..05495d3f47b8 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/xt_sctp.c +++ b/net/netfilter/xt_sctp.c @@ -149,6 +149,8 @@ static int sctp_mt_check(const struct xt_mtchk_param *par) { const struct xt_sctp_info *info = par->matchinfo; + if (info->flag_count > ARRAY_SIZE(info->flag_info)) + return -EINVAL; if (info->flags & ~XT_SCTP_VALID_FLAGS) return -EINVAL; if (info->invflags & ~XT_SCTP_VALID_FLAGS) -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] netfilter: xt_sctp: validate the flag_info count
by Zhengchao Shao 13 Oct '23

13 Oct '23

From: Wander Lairson Costa <wander(a)redhat.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.195 commit 5541827d13cf19b905594eaee586527476efaa61 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I85CAQ CVE: CVE-2023-39193 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit e99476497687ef9e850748fe6d232264f30bc8f9 upstream. sctp_mt_check doesn't validate the flag_count field. An attacker can take advantage of that to trigger a OOB read and leak memory information. Add the field validation in the checkentry function. Fixes: 2e4e6a17af35 ("[NETFILTER] x_tables: Abstraction layer for {ip,ip6,arp}_tables") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Lucas Leong <wmliang(a)infosec.exchange> Signed-off-by: Wander Lairson Costa <wander(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao(a)huawei.com> --- net/netfilter/xt_sctp.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_sctp.c b/net/netfilter/xt_sctp.c index 680015ba7cb6..d4bf089c9e3f 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/xt_sctp.c +++ b/net/netfilter/xt_sctp.c @@ -150,6 +150,8 @@ static int sctp_mt_check(const struct xt_mtchk_param *par) { const struct xt_sctp_info *info = par->matchinfo; + if (info->flag_count > ARRAY_SIZE(info->flag_info)) + return -EINVAL; if (info->flags & ~XT_SCTP_VALID_FLAGS) return -EINVAL; if (info->invflags & ~XT_SCTP_VALID_FLAGS) -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] netfilter: nfnetlink_osf: avoid OOB read
by Liu Jian 13 Oct '23

13 Oct '23

From: Wander Lairson Costa <wander(a)redhat.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.195 commit 780f60dde29692c42091602fee9c25e9e391f3dc category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I86MTP CVE: CVE-2023-39189 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… --------------------------- [ Upstream commit f4f8a7803119005e87b716874bec07c751efafec ] The opt_num field is controlled by user mode and is not currently validated inside the kernel. An attacker can take advantage of this to trigger an OOB read and potentially leak information. BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nf_osf_match_one+0xbed/0xd10 net/netfilter/nfnetlink_osf.c:88 Read of size 2 at addr ffff88804bc64272 by task poc/6431 CPU: 1 PID: 6431 Comm: poc Not tainted 6.0.0-rc4 #1 Call Trace: nf_osf_match_one+0xbed/0xd10 net/netfilter/nfnetlink_osf.c:88 nf_osf_find+0x186/0x2f0 net/netfilter/nfnetlink_osf.c:281 nft_osf_eval+0x37f/0x590 net/netfilter/nft_osf.c:47 expr_call_ops_eval net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c:214 nft_do_chain+0x2b0/0x1490 net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c:264 nft_do_chain_ipv4+0x17c/0x1f0 net/netfilter/nft_chain_filter.c:23 [..] Also add validation to genre, subtype and version fields. Fixes: 11eeef41d5f6 ("netfilter: passive OS fingerprint xtables match") Reported-by: Lucas Leong <wmliang(a)infosec.exchange> Signed-off-by: Wander Lairson Costa <wander(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw(a)strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Liu Jian <liujian56(a)huawei.com> --- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_osf.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_osf.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_osf.c index 51e3953b414c..260a655def34 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_osf.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_osf.c @@ -316,6 +316,14 @@ static int nfnl_osf_add_callback(struct net *net, struct sock *ctnl, f = nla_data(osf_attrs[OSF_ATTR_FINGER]); + if (f->opt_num > ARRAY_SIZE(f->opt)) + return -EINVAL; + + if (!memchr(f->genre, 0, MAXGENRELEN) || + !memchr(f->subtype, 0, MAXGENRELEN) || + !memchr(f->version, 0, MAXGENRELEN)) + return -EINVAL; + kf = kmalloc(sizeof(struct nf_osf_finger), GFP_KERNEL); if (!kf) return -ENOMEM; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] netfilter: nfnetlink_osf: avoid OOB read
by Liu Jian 13 Oct '23

13 Oct '23

From: Wander Lairson Costa <wander(a)redhat.com> stable inclusion from stable-v4.19.295 commit 40d427ffccf9e60bd7288ea3748c066404a35622 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I86MTP CVE: CVE-2023-39189 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… --------------------------- [ Upstream commit f4f8a7803119005e87b716874bec07c751efafec ] The opt_num field is controlled by user mode and is not currently validated inside the kernel. An attacker can take advantage of this to trigger an OOB read and potentially leak information. BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nf_osf_match_one+0xbed/0xd10 net/netfilter/nfnetlink_osf.c:88 Read of size 2 at addr ffff88804bc64272 by task poc/6431 CPU: 1 PID: 6431 Comm: poc Not tainted 6.0.0-rc4 #1 Call Trace: nf_osf_match_one+0xbed/0xd10 net/netfilter/nfnetlink_osf.c:88 nf_osf_find+0x186/0x2f0 net/netfilter/nfnetlink_osf.c:281 nft_osf_eval+0x37f/0x590 net/netfilter/nft_osf.c:47 expr_call_ops_eval net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c:214 nft_do_chain+0x2b0/0x1490 net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c:264 nft_do_chain_ipv4+0x17c/0x1f0 net/netfilter/nft_chain_filter.c:23 [..] Also add validation to genre, subtype and version fields. Fixes: 11eeef41d5f6 ("netfilter: passive OS fingerprint xtables match") Reported-by: Lucas Leong <wmliang(a)infosec.exchange> Signed-off-by: Wander Lairson Costa <wander(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw(a)strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Liu Jian <liujian56(a)huawei.com> --- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_osf.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_osf.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_osf.c index 917f06110c82..46713818228c 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_osf.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_osf.c @@ -318,6 +318,14 @@ static int nfnl_osf_add_callback(struct net *net, struct sock *ctnl, f = nla_data(osf_attrs[OSF_ATTR_FINGER]); + if (f->opt_num > ARRAY_SIZE(f->opt)) + return -EINVAL; + + if (!memchr(f->genre, 0, MAXGENRELEN) || + !memchr(f->subtype, 0, MAXGENRELEN) || + !memchr(f->version, 0, MAXGENRELEN)) + return -EINVAL; + kf = kmalloc(sizeof(struct nf_osf_finger), GFP_KERNEL); if (!kf) return -ENOMEM; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] xhci: print warning when HCE was set
by liulongfang 13 Oct '23

13 Oct '23

From: Longfang Liu <liulongfang(a)huawei.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.2-rc1 commit 2a25e66d676dfb9b018abd503deed3d38a892dec category: feature bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I87TGP CVE: NA Reference: https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-usb/msg231333.html ---------------------------------------------------------------------- When HCE(Host Controller Error) is set, it means that the xhci hardware controller has an error at this time, but the current xhci driver software does not log this event. By adding an HCE event detection in the xhci interrupt processing interface, a warning log is output to the system, which is convenient for system device status tracking. Signed-off-by: Longfang Liu <liulongfang(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mathias Nyman <mathias.nyman(a)linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221130091944.2171610-2-mathias.nyman@linux.inte… Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c index ad81e9a508b1..f6af479188e8 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c +++ b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-ring.c @@ -3031,6 +3031,11 @@ irqreturn_t xhci_irq(struct usb_hcd *hcd) if (!(status & STS_EINT)) goto out; + if (status & STS_HCE) { + xhci_warn(xhci, "WARNING: Host Controller Error\n"); + goto out; + } + if (status & STS_FATAL) { xhci_warn(xhci, "WARNING: Host System Error\n"); xhci_halt(xhci); -- 2.33.0

2 1

【重要】openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3 kernel 需求收集
by zhangjialin (F) 13 Oct '23

13 Oct '23

openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3 kernel 需求收集截止日期： 2023 年 10 月 27 日星期五 openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3 kernel 需求合入截止日期： 2023 年 12 月 1 日星期五目前是需求收集阶段，如果您有合入 openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3 kernel 的需求，请您尽快向 openEuler 社区 kernel sig 提交需求 issue 需求 issue 提交链接： https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues ， issue 类型选择需求， issue 标题以 [openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3] 开头我们将在 2023 年 10 月 27 日 kernel sig 双周例会上集中讨论，采纳的需求将纳入里程碑规划

1 0

[PATCH] x86/cpufeatures: Fix abi breakage caused by NCAPINTS in cpufeature header file.
by Jialin Zhang 12 Oct '23

12 Oct '23

hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I7RQ67 -------------------------------- Fix abi breakage according to the previous solution: commit ac376dd8c1af ("x86/cpufeatures: Fix abi breakage caused by NCAPINTS in cpufeature header file.") Signed-off-by: Jialin Zhang <zhangjialin11(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Yanan Wang <wangyanan55(a)huawei.com> --- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 7 ++----- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 11 ++++++----- arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 3 +-- arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h | 3 +-- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 3 --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c | 3 +++ arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 4 ++++ arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h | 13 +++++++++++++ 8 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h index 5efb04544612..f4cbc01c0bc4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h @@ -31,7 +31,6 @@ enum cpuid_leafs CPUID_7_ECX, CPUID_8000_0007_EBX, CPUID_7_EDX, - CPUID_8000_0021_EAX, }; #ifdef CONFIG_X86_FEATURE_NAMES @@ -90,9 +89,8 @@ extern const char * const x86_bug_flags[NBUGINTS*32]; CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 16, feature_bit) || \ CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 17, feature_bit) || \ CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 18, feature_bit) || \ - CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 19, feature_bit) || \ REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK || \ - BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 20)) + BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19)) #define DISABLED_MASK_BIT_SET(feature_bit) \ ( CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 0, feature_bit) || \ @@ -114,9 +112,8 @@ extern const char * const x86_bug_flags[NBUGINTS*32]; CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 16, feature_bit) || \ CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 17, feature_bit) || \ CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 18, feature_bit) || \ - CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 19, feature_bit) || \ DISABLED_MASK_CHECK || \ - BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 20)) + BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19)) #define cpu_has(c, bit) \ (__builtin_constant_p(bit) && REQUIRED_MASK_BIT_SET(bit) ? 1 : \ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index e39f64f9b52a..60102962999c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ /* * Defines x86 CPU feature bits */ -#define NCAPINTS 20 /* N 32-bit words worth of info */ +#define NCAPINTS 19 /* N 32-bit words worth of info */ #define NBUGINTS 2 /* N 32-bit bug flags */ /* @@ -409,6 +409,11 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_SUCCOR (17*32+ 1) /* Uncorrectable error containment and recovery */ #define X86_FEATURE_SMCA (17*32+ 3) /* Scalable MCA */ +/* AMD-defined SRSO vulnerability features, CPUID level 0x80000021 (EAX), word 20 */ +#define X86_FEATURE_SBPB (17*32+24) +#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE (17*32+25) +#define X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO (17*32+26) + /* AMD-defined memory encryption features, CPUID level 0x8000001f (EAX), word 19 */ #define X86_FEATURE_SME (17*32+ 27) /* AMD Secure Memory Encryption */ #define X86_FEATURE_SEV (17*32+ 28) /* AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization */ @@ -440,10 +445,6 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD (18*32+31) /* "" Speculative Store Bypass Disable */ -#define X86_FEATURE_SBPB (19*32+27) /* "" Selective Branch Prediction Barrier */ -#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE (19*32+28) /* "" MSR_PRED_CMD[IBPB] flushes all branch type predictions */ -#define X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO (19*32+29) /* "" CPU is not affected by SRSO */ - /* * BUG word(s) */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h index f7be189e9723..fb51349e45a7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h @@ -110,7 +110,6 @@ DISABLE_ENQCMD) #define DISABLED_MASK17 0 #define DISABLED_MASK18 0 -#define DISABLED_MASK19 0 -#define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 20) +#define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19) #endif /* _ASM_X86_DISABLED_FEATURES_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h index b2d504f11937..3ff0d48469f2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h @@ -101,7 +101,6 @@ #define REQUIRED_MASK16 0 #define REQUIRED_MASK17 0 #define REQUIRED_MASK18 0 -#define REQUIRED_MASK19 0 -#define REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 20) +#define REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19) #endif /* _ASM_X86_REQUIRED_FEATURES_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c index 07380b70be85..508b90371515 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -963,9 +963,6 @@ void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) if (c->extended_cpuid_level >= 0x8000000a) c->x86_capability[CPUID_8000_000A_EDX] = cpuid_edx(0x8000000a); - if (c->extended_cpuid_level >= 0x80000021) - c->x86_capability[CPUID_8000_0021_EAX] = cpuid_eax(0x80000021); - init_scattered_cpuid_features(c); init_speculation_control(c); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c index e5c34b26de64..24acb25a72c4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c @@ -50,6 +50,9 @@ static const struct cpuid_bit cpuid_bits[] = { { X86_FEATURE_VM_PAGE_FLUSH, CPUID_EAX, 2, 0x8000001f, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES, CPUID_EAX, 3, 0x8000001f, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_SME_COHERENT, CPUID_EAX, 10, 0x8000001f, 0 }, + { X86_FEATURE_SBPB, CPUID_EAX, 27, 0x80000021, 0 }, + { X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE, CPUID_EAX, 28, 0x80000021, 0 }, + { X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO, CPUID_EAX, 29, 0x80000021, 0 }, { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 } }; diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c index 0ee92d9f6018..778fcee776e4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c @@ -560,6 +560,10 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void) !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD); + if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SBPB)) + kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_SBPB); + if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE)) + kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE); if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO)) kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO); diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h index 51b658bf7054..e246dfce5da9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ */ enum kvm_only_cpuid_leafs { CPUID_12_EAX = NCAPINTS, + CPUID_8000_0021_EAX, NR_KVM_CPU_CAPS, NKVMCAPINTS = NR_KVM_CPU_CAPS - NCAPINTS, @@ -26,6 +27,11 @@ enum kvm_only_cpuid_leafs { #define KVM_X86_FEATURE_SGX2 KVM_X86_FEATURE(CPUID_12_EAX, 1) #define KVM_X86_FEATURE_SGX_EDECCSSA KVM_X86_FEATURE(CPUID_12_EAX, 11) +/* AMD-defined SRSO vulnerability features, CPUID level 0x80000021 (EAX), word 20 */ +#define KVM_X86_FEATURE_SBPB KVM_X86_FEATURE(CPUID_8000_0021_EAX, 27) +#define KVM_X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE KVM_X86_FEATURE(CPUID_8000_0021_EAX, 28) +#define KVM_X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO KVM_X86_FEATURE(CPUID_8000_0021_EAX, 29) + extern u32 kvm_cpu_caps[NR_KVM_CPU_CAPS] __read_mostly; void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void); @@ -119,6 +125,13 @@ static __always_inline u32 __feature_translate(int x86_feature) else if (x86_feature == X86_FEATURE_SGX_EDECCSSA) return KVM_X86_FEATURE_SGX_EDECCSSA; + if (x86_feature == X86_FEATURE_SBPB) + return KVM_X86_FEATURE_SBPB; + else if (x86_feature == X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE) + return KVM_X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE; + else if (x86_feature == X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO) + return KVM_X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO; + return x86_feature; } -- 2.25.1

1 0

[PATCH] x86/cpufeatures: Fix abi breakage caused by NCAPINTS in cpufeature header file.
by Jialin Zhang 12 Oct '23

12 Oct '23

hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I7RQ67 -------------------------------- Fix abi breakage according to the previous solution: commit ac376dd8c1af ("x86/cpufeatures: Fix abi breakage caused by NCAPINTS in cpufeature header file.") Signed-off-by: Jialin Zhang <zhangjialin11(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Yanan Wang <wangyanan55(a)huawei.com> --- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 7 ++----- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 11 ++++++----- arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 3 +-- arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h | 3 +-- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 3 --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c | 3 +++ arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 4 ++++ arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h | 13 +++++++++++++ 8 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h index 5efb04544612..f4cbc01c0bc4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h @@ -31,7 +31,6 @@ enum cpuid_leafs CPUID_7_ECX, CPUID_8000_0007_EBX, CPUID_7_EDX, - CPUID_8000_0021_EAX, }; #ifdef CONFIG_X86_FEATURE_NAMES @@ -90,9 +89,8 @@ extern const char * const x86_bug_flags[NBUGINTS*32]; CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 16, feature_bit) || \ CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 17, feature_bit) || \ CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 18, feature_bit) || \ - CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 19, feature_bit) || \ REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK || \ - BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 20)) + BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19)) #define DISABLED_MASK_BIT_SET(feature_bit) \ ( CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 0, feature_bit) || \ @@ -114,9 +112,8 @@ extern const char * const x86_bug_flags[NBUGINTS*32]; CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 16, feature_bit) || \ CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 17, feature_bit) || \ CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 18, feature_bit) || \ - CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 19, feature_bit) || \ DISABLED_MASK_CHECK || \ - BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 20)) + BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19)) #define cpu_has(c, bit) \ (__builtin_constant_p(bit) && REQUIRED_MASK_BIT_SET(bit) ? 1 : \ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index e39f64f9b52a..60102962999c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ /* * Defines x86 CPU feature bits */ -#define NCAPINTS 20 /* N 32-bit words worth of info */ +#define NCAPINTS 19 /* N 32-bit words worth of info */ #define NBUGINTS 2 /* N 32-bit bug flags */ /* @@ -409,6 +409,11 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_SUCCOR (17*32+ 1) /* Uncorrectable error containment and recovery */ #define X86_FEATURE_SMCA (17*32+ 3) /* Scalable MCA */ +/* AMD-defined SRSO vulnerability features, CPUID level 0x80000021 (EAX), word 20 */ +#define X86_FEATURE_SBPB (17*32+24) +#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE (17*32+25) +#define X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO (17*32+26) + /* AMD-defined memory encryption features, CPUID level 0x8000001f (EAX), word 19 */ #define X86_FEATURE_SME (17*32+ 27) /* AMD Secure Memory Encryption */ #define X86_FEATURE_SEV (17*32+ 28) /* AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization */ @@ -440,10 +445,6 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD (18*32+31) /* "" Speculative Store Bypass Disable */ -#define X86_FEATURE_SBPB (19*32+27) /* "" Selective Branch Prediction Barrier */ -#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE (19*32+28) /* "" MSR_PRED_CMD[IBPB] flushes all branch type predictions */ -#define X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO (19*32+29) /* "" CPU is not affected by SRSO */ - /* * BUG word(s) */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h index f7be189e9723..fb51349e45a7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h @@ -110,7 +110,6 @@ DISABLE_ENQCMD) #define DISABLED_MASK17 0 #define DISABLED_MASK18 0 -#define DISABLED_MASK19 0 -#define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 20) +#define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19) #endif /* _ASM_X86_DISABLED_FEATURES_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h index b2d504f11937..3ff0d48469f2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h @@ -101,7 +101,6 @@ #define REQUIRED_MASK16 0 #define REQUIRED_MASK17 0 #define REQUIRED_MASK18 0 -#define REQUIRED_MASK19 0 -#define REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 20) +#define REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 19) #endif /* _ASM_X86_REQUIRED_FEATURES_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c index 07380b70be85..508b90371515 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -963,9 +963,6 @@ void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) if (c->extended_cpuid_level >= 0x8000000a) c->x86_capability[CPUID_8000_000A_EDX] = cpuid_edx(0x8000000a); - if (c->extended_cpuid_level >= 0x80000021) - c->x86_capability[CPUID_8000_0021_EAX] = cpuid_eax(0x80000021); - init_scattered_cpuid_features(c); init_speculation_control(c); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c index e5c34b26de64..24acb25a72c4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c @@ -50,6 +50,9 @@ static const struct cpuid_bit cpuid_bits[] = { { X86_FEATURE_VM_PAGE_FLUSH, CPUID_EAX, 2, 0x8000001f, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES, CPUID_EAX, 3, 0x8000001f, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_SME_COHERENT, CPUID_EAX, 10, 0x8000001f, 0 }, + { X86_FEATURE_SBPB, CPUID_EAX, 27, 0x80000021, 0 }, + { X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE, CPUID_EAX, 28, 0x80000021, 0 }, + { X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO, CPUID_EAX, 29, 0x80000021, 0 }, { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 } }; diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c index 0ee92d9f6018..778fcee776e4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c @@ -560,6 +560,10 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void) !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD); + if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SBPB)) + kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_SBPB); + if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE)) + kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE); if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO)) kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO); diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h index 51b658bf7054..e246dfce5da9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ */ enum kvm_only_cpuid_leafs { CPUID_12_EAX = NCAPINTS, + CPUID_8000_0021_EAX, NR_KVM_CPU_CAPS, NKVMCAPINTS = NR_KVM_CPU_CAPS - NCAPINTS, @@ -26,6 +27,11 @@ enum kvm_only_cpuid_leafs { #define KVM_X86_FEATURE_SGX2 KVM_X86_FEATURE(CPUID_12_EAX, 1) #define KVM_X86_FEATURE_SGX_EDECCSSA KVM_X86_FEATURE(CPUID_12_EAX, 11) +/* AMD-defined SRSO vulnerability features, CPUID level 0x80000021 (EAX), word 20 */ +#define KVM_X86_FEATURE_SBPB KVM_X86_FEATURE(CPUID_8000_0021_EAX, 27) +#define KVM_X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE KVM_X86_FEATURE(CPUID_8000_0021_EAX, 28) +#define KVM_X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO KVM_X86_FEATURE(CPUID_8000_0021_EAX, 29) + extern u32 kvm_cpu_caps[NR_KVM_CPU_CAPS] __read_mostly; void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void); @@ -119,6 +125,13 @@ static __always_inline u32 __feature_translate(int x86_feature) else if (x86_feature == X86_FEATURE_SGX_EDECCSSA) return KVM_X86_FEATURE_SGX_EDECCSSA; + if (x86_feature == X86_FEATURE_SBPB) + return KVM_X86_FEATURE_SBPB; + else if (x86_feature == X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE) + return KVM_X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE; + else if (x86_feature == X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO) + return KVM_X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO; + return x86_feature; } -- 2.25.1

1 0

openEuler Kernel SIG双周例会
by openEuler conference 12 Oct '23

12 Oct '23

您好！ Kernel SIG 邀请您参加 2023-10-13 14:00 召开的WeLink会议(自动录制) 会议主题：openEuler Kernel SIG双周例会会议内容： 1. 进展update 2. openEuler bpftool发布件上游源修改 3. 议题征集中（新增议题可直接回复本邮件申报，也可直接填至会议看板审核）会议链接：https://bmeeting.huaweicloud.com:36443/#/j/985668321 会议纪要：https://etherpad.openeuler.org/p/Kernel-meetings 温馨提醒：建议接入会议后修改参会人的姓名，也可以使用您在gitee.com的ID 更多资讯尽在：https://openeuler.org/zh/ Hello! openEuler Kernel SIG invites you to attend the WeLink conference(auto recording) will be held at 2023-10-13 14:00, The subject of the conference is openEuler Kernel SIG双周例会, Summary: 1. 进展update 2. openEuler bpftool发布件上游源修改 3. 议题征集中（新增议题可直接回复本邮件申报，也可直接填至会议看板审核） You can join the meeting at https://bmeeting.huaweicloud.com:36443/#/j/985668321. Add topics at https://etherpad.openeuler.org/p/Kernel-meetings. Note: You are advised to change the participant name after joining the conference or use your ID at gitee.com. More information: https://openeuler.org/en/

1 0

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] efi: use 32-bit alignment for efi_guid_t literals
by Xia Fukun 11 Oct '23

11 Oct '23

From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb(a)kernel.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.198 commit 47ba0d4d2afb476e2a67f781166186e24b1e3bc1 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I878NW CVE: NA -------------------------------- commit fb98cc0b3af2ba4d87301dff2b381b12eee35d7d upstream. Commit 494c704f9af0 ("efi: Use 32-bit alignment for efi_guid_t") updated the type definition of efi_guid_t to ensure that it always appears sufficiently aligned (the UEFI spec is ambiguous about this, but given the fact that its EFI_GUID type is defined in terms of a struct carrying a uint32_t, the natural alignment is definitely >= 32 bits). However, we missed the EFI_GUID() macro which is used to instantiate efi_guid_t literals: that macro is still based on the guid_t type, which does not have a minimum alignment at all. This results in warnings such as In file included from drivers/firmware/efi/mokvar-table.c:35: include/linux/efi.h:1093:34: warning: passing 1-byte aligned argument to 4-byte aligned parameter 2 of 'get_var' may result in an unaligned pointer access [-Walign-mismatch] status = get_var(L"SecureBoot", &EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID, NULL, &size, ^ include/linux/efi.h:1101:24: warning: passing 1-byte aligned argument to 4-byte aligned parameter 2 of 'get_var' may result in an unaligned pointer access [-Walign-mismatch] get_var(L"SetupMode", &EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID, NULL, &size, &setupmode); The distinction only matters on CPUs that do not support misaligned loads fully, but 32-bit ARM's load-multiple instructions fall into that category, and these are likely to be emitted by the compiler that built the firmware for loading word-aligned 128-bit GUIDs from memory So re-implement the initializer in terms of our own efi_guid_t type, so that the alignment becomes a property of the literal's type. Fixes: 494c704f9af0 ("efi: Use 32-bit alignment for efi_guid_t") Reported-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers(a)google.com> Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan(a)kernel.org> Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan(a)kernel.org> Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/1327 Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Xia Fukun <xiafukun(a)huawei.com> --- include/linux/efi.h | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h index b90423d1128b..f40628b5f63a 100644 --- a/include/linux/efi.h +++ b/include/linux/efi.h @@ -63,8 +63,10 @@ typedef void *efi_handle_t; */ typedef guid_t efi_guid_t __aligned(__alignof__(u32)); -#define EFI_GUID(a,b,c,d0,d1,d2,d3,d4,d5,d6,d7) \ - GUID_INIT(a, b, c, d0, d1, d2, d3, d4, d5, d6, d7) +#define EFI_GUID(a, b, c, d...) (efi_guid_t){ { \ + (a) & 0xff, ((a) >> 8) & 0xff, ((a) >> 16) & 0xff, ((a) >> 24) & 0xff, \ + (b) & 0xff, ((b) >> 8) & 0xff, \ + (c) & 0xff, ((c) >> 8) & 0xff, d } } /* * Generic EFI table header -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] efi: use 32-bit alignment for efi_guid_t literals
by Xia Fukun 11 Oct '23

11 Oct '23

From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb(a)kernel.org> stable inclusion from stable-5.10.198 commit 47ba0d4d2afb476e2a67f781166186e24b1e3bc1 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I878NW CVE: NA -------------------------------- commit fb98cc0b3af2ba4d87301dff2b381b12eee35d7d upstream. Commit 494c704f9af0 ("efi: Use 32-bit alignment for efi_guid_t") updated the type definition of efi_guid_t to ensure that it always appears sufficiently aligned (the UEFI spec is ambiguous about this, but given the fact that its EFI_GUID type is defined in terms of a struct carrying a uint32_t, the natural alignment is definitely >= 32 bits). However, we missed the EFI_GUID() macro which is used to instantiate efi_guid_t literals: that macro is still based on the guid_t type, which does not have a minimum alignment at all. This results in warnings such as In file included from drivers/firmware/efi/mokvar-table.c:35: include/linux/efi.h:1093:34: warning: passing 1-byte aligned argument to 4-byte aligned parameter 2 of 'get_var' may result in an unaligned pointer access [-Walign-mismatch] status = get_var(L"SecureBoot", &EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID, NULL, &size, ^ include/linux/efi.h:1101:24: warning: passing 1-byte aligned argument to 4-byte aligned parameter 2 of 'get_var' may result in an unaligned pointer access [-Walign-mismatch] get_var(L"SetupMode", &EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID, NULL, &size, &setupmode); The distinction only matters on CPUs that do not support misaligned loads fully, but 32-bit ARM's load-multiple instructions fall into that category, and these are likely to be emitted by the compiler that built the firmware for loading word-aligned 128-bit GUIDs from memory So re-implement the initializer in terms of our own efi_guid_t type, so that the alignment becomes a property of the literal's type. Fixes: 494c704f9af0 ("efi: Use 32-bit alignment for efi_guid_t") Reported-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers(a)google.com> Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan(a)kernel.org> Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan(a)kernel.org> Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/1327 Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Xia Fukun <xiafukun(a)huawei.com> --- include/linux/efi.h | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h index b90423d1128b..f40628b5f63a 100644 --- a/include/linux/efi.h +++ b/include/linux/efi.h @@ -63,8 +63,10 @@ typedef void *efi_handle_t; */ typedef guid_t efi_guid_t __aligned(__alignof__(u32)); -#define EFI_GUID(a,b,c,d0,d1,d2,d3,d4,d5,d6,d7) \ - GUID_INIT(a, b, c, d0, d1, d2, d3, d4, d5, d6, d7) +#define EFI_GUID(a, b, c, d...) (efi_guid_t){ { \ + (a) & 0xff, ((a) >> 8) & 0xff, ((a) >> 16) & 0xff, ((a) >> 24) & 0xff, \ + (b) & 0xff, ((b) >> 8) & 0xff, \ + (c) & 0xff, ((c) >> 8) & 0xff, d } } /* * Generic EFI table header -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP2] netfilter: nf_tables: disallow rule removal from chain binding
by Ziyang Xuan 11 Oct '23

11 Oct '23

From: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.6-rc3 commit f15f29fd4779be8a418b66e9d52979bb6d6c2325 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I84NFY CVE: CVE-2023-5197 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… --------------------------- Chain binding only requires the rule addition/insertion command within the same transaction. Removal of rules from chain bindings within the same transaction makes no sense, userspace does not utilize this feature. Replace nft_chain_is_bound() check to nft_chain_binding() in rule deletion commands. Replace command implies a rule deletion, reject this command too. Rule flush command can also safely rely on this nft_chain_binding() check because unbound chains are not allowed since 62e1e94b246e ("netfilter: nf_tables: reject unbound chain set before commit phase"). Fixes: d0e2c7de92c7 ("netfilter: nf_tables: add NFT_CHAIN_BINDING") Reported-by: Kevin Rich <kevinrich1337(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> Conflicts: net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang(a)huawei.com> --- net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c | 19 +++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c index 4ac499c6ef47..121ad5981520 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c @@ -1250,7 +1250,7 @@ static int nft_flush_table(struct nft_ctx *ctx) if (!nft_is_active_next(ctx->net, chain)) continue; - if (nft_chain_is_bound(chain)) + if (nft_chain_binding(chain)) continue; ctx->chain = chain; @@ -1295,7 +1295,7 @@ static int nft_flush_table(struct nft_ctx *ctx) if (!nft_is_active_next(ctx->net, chain)) continue; - if (nft_chain_is_bound(chain)) + if (nft_chain_binding(chain)) continue; ctx->chain = chain; @@ -2579,6 +2579,9 @@ static int nf_tables_delchain(struct net *net, struct sock *nlsk, return PTR_ERR(chain); } + if (nft_chain_binding(chain)) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + if (nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_NONREC && chain->use > 0) return -EBUSY; @@ -3474,6 +3477,11 @@ static int nf_tables_newrule(struct net *net, struct sock *nlsk, } if (nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_REPLACE) { + if (nft_chain_binding(chain)) { + err = -EOPNOTSUPP; + goto err2; + } + trans = nft_trans_rule_add(&ctx, NFT_MSG_NEWRULE, rule); if (trans == NULL) { err = -ENOMEM; @@ -3580,7 +3588,7 @@ static int nf_tables_delrule(struct net *net, struct sock *nlsk, NL_SET_BAD_ATTR(extack, nla[NFTA_RULE_CHAIN]); return PTR_ERR(chain); } - if (nft_chain_is_bound(chain)) + if (nft_chain_binding(chain)) return -EOPNOTSUPP; } @@ -3610,7 +3618,7 @@ static int nf_tables_delrule(struct net *net, struct sock *nlsk, list_for_each_entry(chain, &table->chains, list) { if (!nft_is_active_next(net, chain)) continue; - if (nft_chain_is_bound(chain)) + if (nft_chain_binding(chain)) continue; ctx.chain = chain; @@ -9194,6 +9202,9 @@ static void __nft_release_table(struct net *net, struct nft_table *table) ctx.family = table->family; ctx.table = table; list_for_each_entry(chain, &table->chains, list) { + if (nft_chain_binding(chain)) + continue; + ctx.chain = chain; list_for_each_entry_safe(rule, nr, &chain->rules, list) { list_del(&rule->list); -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] netfilter: nf_tables: disallow rule removal from chain binding
by Ziyang Xuan 11 Oct '23

11 Oct '23

From: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.6-rc3 commit f15f29fd4779be8a418b66e9d52979bb6d6c2325 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I84NFY CVE: CVE-2023-5197 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… --------------------------- Chain binding only requires the rule addition/insertion command within the same transaction. Removal of rules from chain bindings within the same transaction makes no sense, userspace does not utilize this feature. Replace nft_chain_is_bound() check to nft_chain_binding() in rule deletion commands. Replace command implies a rule deletion, reject this command too. Rule flush command can also safely rely on this nft_chain_binding() check because unbound chains are not allowed since 62e1e94b246e ("netfilter: nf_tables: reject unbound chain set before commit phase"). Fixes: d0e2c7de92c7 ("netfilter: nf_tables: add NFT_CHAIN_BINDING") Reported-by: Kevin Rich <kevinrich1337(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> Conflicts: net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang(a)huawei.com> --- net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c | 19 +++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c index 74394c865105..b2d5e1dda99a 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c @@ -1250,7 +1250,7 @@ static int nft_flush_table(struct nft_ctx *ctx) if (!nft_is_active_next(ctx->net, chain)) continue; - if (nft_chain_is_bound(chain)) + if (nft_chain_binding(chain)) continue; ctx->chain = chain; @@ -1295,7 +1295,7 @@ static int nft_flush_table(struct nft_ctx *ctx) if (!nft_is_active_next(ctx->net, chain)) continue; - if (nft_chain_is_bound(chain)) + if (nft_chain_binding(chain)) continue; ctx->chain = chain; @@ -2579,6 +2579,9 @@ static int nf_tables_delchain(struct net *net, struct sock *nlsk, return PTR_ERR(chain); } + if (nft_chain_binding(chain)) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + if (nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_NONREC && chain->use > 0) return -EBUSY; @@ -3474,6 +3477,11 @@ static int nf_tables_newrule(struct net *net, struct sock *nlsk, } if (nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_REPLACE) { + if (nft_chain_binding(chain)) { + err = -EOPNOTSUPP; + goto err2; + } + trans = nft_trans_rule_add(&ctx, NFT_MSG_NEWRULE, rule); if (trans == NULL) { err = -ENOMEM; @@ -3580,7 +3588,7 @@ static int nf_tables_delrule(struct net *net, struct sock *nlsk, NL_SET_BAD_ATTR(extack, nla[NFTA_RULE_CHAIN]); return PTR_ERR(chain); } - if (nft_chain_is_bound(chain)) + if (nft_chain_binding(chain)) return -EOPNOTSUPP; } @@ -3610,7 +3618,7 @@ static int nf_tables_delrule(struct net *net, struct sock *nlsk, list_for_each_entry(chain, &table->chains, list) { if (!nft_is_active_next(net, chain)) continue; - if (nft_chain_is_bound(chain)) + if (nft_chain_binding(chain)) continue; ctx.chain = chain; @@ -9194,6 +9202,9 @@ static void __nft_release_table(struct net *net, struct nft_table *table) ctx.family = table->family; ctx.table = table; list_for_each_entry(chain, &table->chains, list) { + if (nft_chain_binding(chain)) + continue; + ctx.chain = chain; list_for_each_entry_safe(rule, nr, &chain->rules, list) { list_del(&rule->list); -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS] netfilter: nf_tables: disallow rule removal from chain binding
by Ziyang Xuan 11 Oct '23

11 Oct '23

From: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.6-rc3 commit f15f29fd4779be8a418b66e9d52979bb6d6c2325 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I84NFY CVE: CVE-2023-5197 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… --------------------------- Chain binding only requires the rule addition/insertion command within the same transaction. Removal of rules from chain bindings within the same transaction makes no sense, userspace does not utilize this feature. Replace nft_chain_is_bound() check to nft_chain_binding() in rule deletion commands. Replace command implies a rule deletion, reject this command too. Rule flush command can also safely rely on this nft_chain_binding() check because unbound chains are not allowed since 62e1e94b246e ("netfilter: nf_tables: reject unbound chain set before commit phase"). Fixes: d0e2c7de92c7 ("netfilter: nf_tables: add NFT_CHAIN_BINDING") Reported-by: Kevin Rich <kevinrich1337(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> Conflicts: net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang(a)huawei.com> --- net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c | 19 +++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c index b0bf9342b2e5..c6507d52b4eb 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c @@ -1250,7 +1250,7 @@ static int nft_flush_table(struct nft_ctx *ctx) if (!nft_is_active_next(ctx->net, chain)) continue; - if (nft_chain_is_bound(chain)) + if (nft_chain_binding(chain)) continue; ctx->chain = chain; @@ -1295,7 +1295,7 @@ static int nft_flush_table(struct nft_ctx *ctx) if (!nft_is_active_next(ctx->net, chain)) continue; - if (nft_chain_is_bound(chain)) + if (nft_chain_binding(chain)) continue; ctx->chain = chain; @@ -2577,6 +2577,9 @@ static int nf_tables_delchain(struct net *net, struct sock *nlsk, return PTR_ERR(chain); } + if (nft_chain_binding(chain)) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + if (nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_NONREC && chain->use > 0) return -EBUSY; @@ -3472,6 +3475,11 @@ static int nf_tables_newrule(struct net *net, struct sock *nlsk, } if (nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_REPLACE) { + if (nft_chain_binding(chain)) { + err = -EOPNOTSUPP; + goto err2; + } + trans = nft_trans_rule_add(&ctx, NFT_MSG_NEWRULE, rule); if (trans == NULL) { err = -ENOMEM; @@ -3578,7 +3586,7 @@ static int nf_tables_delrule(struct net *net, struct sock *nlsk, NL_SET_BAD_ATTR(extack, nla[NFTA_RULE_CHAIN]); return PTR_ERR(chain); } - if (nft_chain_is_bound(chain)) + if (nft_chain_binding(chain)) return -EOPNOTSUPP; } @@ -3608,7 +3616,7 @@ static int nf_tables_delrule(struct net *net, struct sock *nlsk, list_for_each_entry(chain, &table->chains, list) { if (!nft_is_active_next(net, chain)) continue; - if (nft_chain_is_bound(chain)) + if (nft_chain_binding(chain)) continue; ctx.chain = chain; @@ -9192,6 +9200,9 @@ static void __nft_release_table(struct net *net, struct nft_table *table) ctx.family = table->family; ctx.table = table; list_for_each_entry(chain, &table->chains, list) { + if (nft_chain_binding(chain)) + continue; + ctx.chain = chain; list_for_each_entry_safe(rule, nr, &chain->rules, list) { list_del(&rule->list); -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS 00/19] nf_table LTS
by Lu Wei 11 Oct '23

11 Oct '23

Florian Westphal (1): netfilter: nf_tables: use net_generic infra for transaction data Lu Wei (7): Revert "netfilter: nf_tables: unbind non-anonymous set if rule construction fails" Revert "netfilter: nf_tables: skip immediate deactivate in _PREPARE_ERROR" Revert "netfilter: nf_tables: add NFT_TRANS_PREPARE_ERROR to deal with bound set/chain" Revert "netfilter: nf_tables: fix chain binding transaction logic" Revert "netfilter: nf_tables: incorrect error path handling with NFT_MSG_NEWRULE" Revert "netfilter: nf_tables: skip bound chain on rule flush" Revert "netfilter: nf_tables: disallow rule addition to bound chain via NFTA_RULE_CHAIN_ID" Pablo Neira Ayuso (11): netfilter: nf_tables: incorrect error path handling with NFT_MSG_NEWRULE netfilter: nf_tables: fix chain binding transaction logic netfilter: nf_tables: add NFT_TRANS_PREPARE_ERROR to deal with bound set/chain netfilter: nf_tables: reject unbound anonymous set before commit phase netfilter: nf_tables: reject unbound chain set before commit phase netfilter: nftables: rename set element data activation/deactivation functions netfilter: nf_tables: drop map element references from preparation phase netfilter: nf_tables: unbind non-anonymous set if rule construction fails netfilter: nf_tables: skip immediate deactivate in _PREPARE_ERROR netfilter: nf_tables: skip bound chain on rule flush netfilter: nf_tables: disallow rule addition to bound chain via NFTA_RULE_CHAIN_ID include/net/netfilter/nf_tables.h | 18 +- include/net/netns/nftables.h | 14 +- net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c | 534 +++++++++++++++++++++--------- net/netfilter/nf_tables_offload.c | 30 +- net/netfilter/nft_chain_filter.c | 11 +- net/netfilter/nft_dynset.c | 6 +- net/netfilter/nft_set_bitmap.c | 5 +- net/netfilter/nft_set_hash.c | 23 +- net/netfilter/nft_set_pipapo.c | 14 +- net/netfilter/nft_set_rbtree.c | 5 +- 10 files changed, 458 insertions(+), 202 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 20

[PATCH v3 OLK-5.10 00/19] Introduce PBHA and PBHA bit0 to control the usage of HBM Cache precisely
by Wupeng Ma 11 Oct '23

11 Oct '23

From: Ma Wupeng <mawupeng1(a)huawei.com> Patch 1: move FDT init out of kaslr_early_init for future use. Patch 2 to 8: enable feature PBHA for arm64. Patch 9-18: Control the usage of HBM cache for kernel and task precisely. Patch 19: Enable feature PBHA for arm64 by default. Changelog since v2: - correct the error Documentation in patch #18 Changelog since v1: - fix kabi broken due to include files James Morse (7): KVM: arm64: Detect and enable PBHA for stage2 dt-bindings: Rename the description of cpu nodes cpu.yaml dt-bindings: arm: Add binding for Page Based Hardware Attributes arm64: cpufeature: Enable PBHA bits for stage1 arm64: mm: Add pgprot_pbha() to allow drivers to request PBHA values KVM: arm64: Configure PBHA bits for stage2 Documentation: arm64: Describe the support and expectations for PBHA Ma Wupeng (11): arm64: cpufeature: Enable PBHA for stage1 early via FDT arm64: mm: Detect and enable PBHA bit0 at early startup arm64: mm: Update kernel pte entries if pbha bit0 enabled arm64: mm: Show PBHA bit 59 as PBHA0 in ptdump arm64: mm: Introduce VM_PBHA_BIT0 to enable pbha bit0 for single vma arm64: mm: Set PBHA0 bit for VM_PBHA_BIT0 arm64: mm: Introduce sysfs interface to bypass whole task arm64: mm: Set flag VM_PBHA_BIT0 for global init task arm64: mm: Introduce prctl to control pbha behavior arm64: mm: Introduce kernel param pbha openeuler: configs: arm64: Enable PBHA by default Marc Zyngier (1): arm64: Extract early FDT mapping from kaslr_early_init() .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 8 + Documentation/arm64/index.rst | 1 + Documentation/arm64/pbha.rst | 85 +++ .../devicetree/bindings/arm/cpu.yaml | 537 ++++++++++++++++ .../devicetree/bindings/arm/cpus.yaml | 584 +++--------------- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 20 + arch/arm64/configs/openeuler_defconfig | 1 + arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h | 3 + arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 15 + arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_arm.h | 1 + arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_pgtable.h | 9 + arch/arm64/include/asm/mman.h | 10 + arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-hwdef.h | 6 + arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h | 26 + arch/arm64/include/asm/setup.h | 3 + arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/mman.h | 1 + arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 258 ++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/head.S | 6 +- arch/arm64/kernel/image-vars.h | 3 + arch/arm64/kernel/kaslr.c | 7 +- arch/arm64/kernel/setup.c | 15 + arch/arm64/kvm/reset.c | 15 +- arch/arm64/mm/hugetlbpage.c | 2 + arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c | 14 +- arch/arm64/mm/ptdump.c | 5 + .../firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub-helper.c | 3 + drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/fdt.c | 57 ++ drivers/soc/hisilicon/Makefile | 1 + drivers/soc/hisilicon/pbha.c | 204 ++++++ fs/proc/base.c | 103 +++ fs/proc/task_mmu.c | 3 + include/linux/mm.h | 8 +- include/linux/pbha.h | 66 ++ include/uapi/asm-generic/mman-common.h | 1 + include/uapi/linux/prctl.h | 2 + kernel/sys.c | 10 + mm/memory.c | 4 + mm/vmalloc.c | 5 + 38 files changed, 1579 insertions(+), 523 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/arm64/pbha.rst create mode 100644 Documentation/devicetree/bindings/arm/cpu.yaml create mode 100644 drivers/soc/hisilicon/pbha.c create mode 100644 include/linux/pbha.h -- 2.25.1

2 20

[PATCH] RDMA/core: fix kabi compatibility for SRQ resource tracing
by Chengchang Tang 11 Oct '23

11 Oct '23

From: wenglianfa <wenglianfa(a)huawei.com> In the patch related to SRQ resource tracing, members are added to the structure, which causes Kapi incompatibility. To solve this problem, perform the following operations: First, make sure that the data structure of the new member has little impact and the risk is controllable, then Use the __GENKSYMS__ macro to shield the new structure members and place the new members at the end of the data structure. Fixes: d7b7ce53b3be ("RDMA/hns: Support SRQ restrack ops for hns driver") Fixes: 788310f83ffc ("RDMA/core: Add support to dump SRQ resource in RAW format") Fixes: 31cc28f1894f ("RDMA/core: Add dedicated SRQ resource tracker function") Fixes: f54d69b7874e ("RDMA/nldev: Add QP numbers to SRQ information") Fixes: 6102284160fd ("RDMA/nldev: Return SRQ information") Fixes: 4e38b5a1267f ("RDMA/restrack: Add support to get resource tracking for SRQ") Fixes: 0c32db26a6c4 ("RDMA/nldev: Return context information") Signed-off-by: wenglianfa <wenglianfa(a)huawei.com> --- include/rdma/ib_verbs.h | 9 +++++++-- include/rdma/restrack.h | 2 ++ include/uapi/rdma/rdma_netlink.h | 4 ++++ 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/rdma/ib_verbs.h b/include/rdma/ib_verbs.h index fc32b16d5bb3..db46f3150b99 100644 --- a/include/rdma/ib_verbs.h +++ b/include/rdma/ib_verbs.h @@ -1608,10 +1608,12 @@ struct ib_srq { }; } ext; +#ifndef __GENKSYMS__ /* * Implementation details of the RDMA core, don't use in drivers: */ struct rdma_restrack_entry res; +#endif }; enum ib_raw_packet_caps { @@ -2548,8 +2550,6 @@ struct ib_device_ops { int (*fill_res_qp_entry)(struct sk_buff *msg, struct ib_qp *ibqp); int (*fill_res_qp_entry_raw)(struct sk_buff *msg, struct ib_qp *ibqp); int (*fill_res_cm_id_entry)(struct sk_buff *msg, struct rdma_cm_id *id); - int (*fill_res_srq_entry)(struct sk_buff *msg, struct ib_srq *ib_srq); - int (*fill_res_srq_entry_raw)(struct sk_buff *msg, struct ib_srq *ib_srq); /* Device lifecycle callbacks */ /* @@ -2619,6 +2619,11 @@ struct ib_device_ops { DECLARE_RDMA_OBJ_SIZE(ib_srq); DECLARE_RDMA_OBJ_SIZE(ib_ucontext); DECLARE_RDMA_OBJ_SIZE(ib_xrcd); + +#ifndef __GENKSYMS__ + int (*fill_res_srq_entry)(struct sk_buff *msg, struct ib_srq *ib_srq); + int (*fill_res_srq_entry_raw)(struct sk_buff *msg, struct ib_srq *ib_srq); +#endif }; struct ib_core_device { diff --git a/include/rdma/restrack.h b/include/rdma/restrack.h index bdfb6fce0bed..57fca78afc47 100644 --- a/include/rdma/restrack.h +++ b/include/rdma/restrack.h @@ -49,10 +49,12 @@ enum rdma_restrack_type { * @RDMA_RESTRACK_COUNTER: Statistic Counter */ RDMA_RESTRACK_COUNTER, +#ifndef __GENKSYMS__ /** * @RDMA_RESTRACK_SRQ: Shared receive queue (SRQ) */ RDMA_RESTRACK_SRQ, +#endif /** * @RDMA_RESTRACK_MAX: Last entry, used for array dclarations */ diff --git a/include/uapi/rdma/rdma_netlink.h b/include/uapi/rdma/rdma_netlink.h index 05392cd8e627..5ab830103e32 100644 --- a/include/uapi/rdma/rdma_netlink.h +++ b/include/uapi/rdma/rdma_netlink.h @@ -293,11 +293,13 @@ enum rdma_nldev_command { RDMA_NLDEV_CMD_RES_MR_GET_RAW, +#ifndef __GENKSYMS__ RDMA_NLDEV_CMD_RES_CTX_GET, /* can dump */ RDMA_NLDEV_CMD_RES_SRQ_GET, /* can dump */ RDMA_NLDEV_CMD_RES_SRQ_GET_RAW, +#endif RDMA_NLDEV_NUM_OPS }; @@ -539,6 +541,7 @@ enum rdma_nldev_attr { RDMA_NLDEV_ATTR_RES_RAW, /* binary */ +#ifndef __GENKSYMS__ RDMA_NLDEV_ATTR_RES_CTX, /* nested table */ RDMA_NLDEV_ATTR_RES_CTX_ENTRY, /* nested table */ @@ -548,6 +551,7 @@ enum rdma_nldev_attr { RDMA_NLDEV_ATTR_MIN_RANGE, /* u32 */ RDMA_NLDEV_ATTR_MAX_RANGE, /* u32 */ +#endif /* * Always the end */ -- 2.33.0

1 0

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP2 00/19] nf_table LTS
by Lu Wei 11 Oct '23

11 Oct '23

Florian Westphal (1): netfilter: nf_tables: use net_generic infra for transaction data Lu Wei (7): Revert "netfilter: nf_tables: unbind non-anonymous set if rule construction fails" Revert "netfilter: nf_tables: skip immediate deactivate in _PREPARE_ERROR" Revert "netfilter: nf_tables: add NFT_TRANS_PREPARE_ERROR to deal with bound set/chain" Revert "netfilter: nf_tables: fix chain binding transaction logic" Revert "netfilter: nf_tables: incorrect error path handling with NFT_MSG_NEWRULE" Revert "netfilter: nf_tables: skip bound chain on rule flush" Revert "netfilter: nf_tables: disallow rule addition to bound chain via NFTA_RULE_CHAIN_ID" Pablo Neira Ayuso (11): netfilter: nf_tables: incorrect error path handling with NFT_MSG_NEWRULE netfilter: nf_tables: fix chain binding transaction logic netfilter: nf_tables: add NFT_TRANS_PREPARE_ERROR to deal with bound set/chain netfilter: nf_tables: reject unbound anonymous set before commit phase netfilter: nf_tables: reject unbound chain set before commit phase netfilter: nftables: rename set element data activation/deactivation functions netfilter: nf_tables: drop map element references from preparation phase netfilter: nf_tables: unbind non-anonymous set if rule construction fails netfilter: nf_tables: skip immediate deactivate in _PREPARE_ERROR netfilter: nf_tables: skip bound chain on rule flush netfilter: nf_tables: disallow rule addition to bound chain via NFTA_RULE_CHAIN_ID include/net/netfilter/nf_tables.h | 18 +- include/net/netns/nftables.h | 14 +- net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c | 534 +++++++++++++++++++++--------- net/netfilter/nf_tables_offload.c | 30 +- net/netfilter/nft_chain_filter.c | 11 +- net/netfilter/nft_dynset.c | 6 +- net/netfilter/nft_set_bitmap.c | 5 +- net/netfilter/nft_set_hash.c | 23 +- net/netfilter/nft_set_pipapo.c | 14 +- net/netfilter/nft_set_rbtree.c | 5 +- 10 files changed, 458 insertions(+), 202 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 20

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1 00/19] nf_table LTS
by Lu Wei 11 Oct '23

11 Oct '23

Florian Westphal (1): netfilter: nf_tables: use net_generic infra for transaction data Lu Wei (7): Revert "netfilter: nf_tables: unbind non-anonymous set if rule construction fails" Revert "netfilter: nf_tables: skip immediate deactivate in _PREPARE_ERROR" Revert "netfilter: nf_tables: add NFT_TRANS_PREPARE_ERROR to deal with bound set/chain" Revert "netfilter: nf_tables: fix chain binding transaction logic" Revert "netfilter: nf_tables: incorrect error path handling with NFT_MSG_NEWRULE" Revert "netfilter: nf_tables: skip bound chain on rule flush" Revert "netfilter: nf_tables: disallow rule addition to bound chain via NFTA_RULE_CHAIN_ID" Pablo Neira Ayuso (11): netfilter: nf_tables: incorrect error path handling with NFT_MSG_NEWRULE netfilter: nf_tables: fix chain binding transaction logic netfilter: nf_tables: add NFT_TRANS_PREPARE_ERROR to deal with bound set/chain netfilter: nf_tables: reject unbound anonymous set before commit phase netfilter: nf_tables: reject unbound chain set before commit phase netfilter: nftables: rename set element data activation/deactivation functions netfilter: nf_tables: drop map element references from preparation phase netfilter: nf_tables: unbind non-anonymous set if rule construction fails netfilter: nf_tables: skip immediate deactivate in _PREPARE_ERROR netfilter: nf_tables: skip bound chain on rule flush netfilter: nf_tables: disallow rule addition to bound chain via NFTA_RULE_CHAIN_ID include/net/netfilter/nf_tables.h | 18 +- include/net/netns/nftables.h | 14 +- net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c | 534 +++++++++++++++++++++--------- net/netfilter/nf_tables_offload.c | 30 +- net/netfilter/nft_chain_filter.c | 11 +- net/netfilter/nft_dynset.c | 6 +- net/netfilter/nft_set_bitmap.c | 5 +- net/netfilter/nft_set_hash.c | 23 +- net/netfilter/nft_set_pipapo.c | 14 +- net/netfilter/nft_set_rbtree.c | 5 +- 10 files changed, 458 insertions(+), 202 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 20

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS 00/19] nf_table LTS
by Lu Wei 11 Oct '23

11 Oct '23

Florian Westphal (1): netfilter: nf_tables: use net_generic infra for transaction data Lu Wei (7): Revert "netfilter: nf_tables: unbind non-anonymous set if rule construction fails" Revert "netfilter: nf_tables: skip immediate deactivate in _PREPARE_ERROR" Revert "netfilter: nf_tables: add NFT_TRANS_PREPARE_ERROR to deal with bound set/chain" Revert "netfilter: nf_tables: fix chain binding transaction logic" Revert "netfilter: nf_tables: incorrect error path handling with NFT_MSG_NEWRULE" Revert "netfilter: nf_tables: skip bound chain on rule flush" Revert "netfilter: nf_tables: disallow rule addition to bound chain via NFTA_RULE_CHAIN_ID" Pablo Neira Ayuso (11): netfilter: nf_tables: incorrect error path handling with NFT_MSG_NEWRULE netfilter: nf_tables: fix chain binding transaction logic netfilter: nf_tables: add NFT_TRANS_PREPARE_ERROR to deal with bound set/chain netfilter: nf_tables: reject unbound anonymous set before commit phase netfilter: nf_tables: reject unbound chain set before commit phase netfilter: nftables: rename set element data activation/deactivation functions netfilter: nf_tables: drop map element references from preparation phase netfilter: nf_tables: unbind non-anonymous set if rule construction fails netfilter: nf_tables: skip immediate deactivate in _PREPARE_ERROR netfilter: nf_tables: skip bound chain on rule flush netfilter: nf_tables: disallow rule addition to bound chain via NFTA_RULE_CHAIN_ID include/net/netfilter/nf_tables.h | 18 +- include/net/netns/nftables.h | 14 +- net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c | 534 +++++++++++++++++++++--------- net/netfilter/nf_tables_offload.c | 30 +- net/netfilter/nft_chain_filter.c | 11 +- net/netfilter/nft_dynset.c | 6 +- net/netfilter/nft_set_bitmap.c | 5 +- net/netfilter/nft_set_hash.c | 23 +- net/netfilter/nft_set_pipapo.c | 14 +- net/netfilter/nft_set_rbtree.c | 5 +- 10 files changed, 458 insertions(+), 202 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

1 19

[PATCH OLK-5.10] netfilter: nf_tables: disallow rule removal from chain binding
by Ziyang Xuan 10 Oct '23

10 Oct '23

From: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.6-rc3 commit f15f29fd4779be8a418b66e9d52979bb6d6c2325 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I84NFY CVE: CVE-2023-5197 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… --------------------------- Chain binding only requires the rule addition/insertion command within the same transaction. Removal of rules from chain bindings within the same transaction makes no sense, userspace does not utilize this feature. Replace nft_chain_is_bound() check to nft_chain_binding() in rule deletion commands. Replace command implies a rule deletion, reject this command too. Rule flush command can also safely rely on this nft_chain_binding() check because unbound chains are not allowed since 62e1e94b246e ("netfilter: nf_tables: reject unbound chain set before commit phase"). Fixes: d0e2c7de92c7 ("netfilter: nf_tables: add NFT_CHAIN_BINDING") Reported-by: Kevin Rich <kevinrich1337(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> Conflicts: net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang(a)huawei.com> --- net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c | 19 +++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c index 4ac499c6ef47..121ad5981520 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c @@ -1250,7 +1250,7 @@ static int nft_flush_table(struct nft_ctx *ctx) if (!nft_is_active_next(ctx->net, chain)) continue; - if (nft_chain_is_bound(chain)) + if (nft_chain_binding(chain)) continue; ctx->chain = chain; @@ -1295,7 +1295,7 @@ static int nft_flush_table(struct nft_ctx *ctx) if (!nft_is_active_next(ctx->net, chain)) continue; - if (nft_chain_is_bound(chain)) + if (nft_chain_binding(chain)) continue; ctx->chain = chain; @@ -2579,6 +2579,9 @@ static int nf_tables_delchain(struct net *net, struct sock *nlsk, return PTR_ERR(chain); } + if (nft_chain_binding(chain)) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + if (nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_NONREC && chain->use > 0) return -EBUSY; @@ -3474,6 +3477,11 @@ static int nf_tables_newrule(struct net *net, struct sock *nlsk, } if (nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_REPLACE) { + if (nft_chain_binding(chain)) { + err = -EOPNOTSUPP; + goto err2; + } + trans = nft_trans_rule_add(&ctx, NFT_MSG_NEWRULE, rule); if (trans == NULL) { err = -ENOMEM; @@ -3580,7 +3588,7 @@ static int nf_tables_delrule(struct net *net, struct sock *nlsk, NL_SET_BAD_ATTR(extack, nla[NFTA_RULE_CHAIN]); return PTR_ERR(chain); } - if (nft_chain_is_bound(chain)) + if (nft_chain_binding(chain)) return -EOPNOTSUPP; } @@ -3610,7 +3618,7 @@ static int nf_tables_delrule(struct net *net, struct sock *nlsk, list_for_each_entry(chain, &table->chains, list) { if (!nft_is_active_next(net, chain)) continue; - if (nft_chain_is_bound(chain)) + if (nft_chain_binding(chain)) continue; ctx.chain = chain; @@ -9194,6 +9202,9 @@ static void __nft_release_table(struct net *net, struct nft_table *table) ctx.family = table->family; ctx.table = table; list_for_each_entry(chain, &table->chains, list) { + if (nft_chain_binding(chain)) + continue; + ctx.chain = chain; list_for_each_entry_safe(rule, nr, &chain->rules, list) { list_del(&rule->list); -- 2.25.1

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[PATCH OLK-5.10 00/19] nf_table LTS
by Lu Wei 10 Oct '23

10 Oct '23

Florian Westphal (1): netfilter: nf_tables: use net_generic infra for transaction data Lu Wei (7): Revert "netfilter: nf_tables: unbind non-anonymous set if rule construction fails" Revert "netfilter: nf_tables: skip immediate deactivate in _PREPARE_ERROR" Revert "netfilter: nf_tables: add NFT_TRANS_PREPARE_ERROR to deal with bound set/chain" Revert "netfilter: nf_tables: fix chain binding transaction logic" Revert "netfilter: nf_tables: incorrect error path handling with NFT_MSG_NEWRULE" Revert "netfilter: nf_tables: skip bound chain on rule flush" Revert "netfilter: nf_tables: disallow rule addition to bound chain via NFTA_RULE_CHAIN_ID" Pablo Neira Ayuso (11): netfilter: nf_tables: incorrect error path handling with NFT_MSG_NEWRULE netfilter: nf_tables: fix chain binding transaction logic netfilter: nf_tables: add NFT_TRANS_PREPARE_ERROR to deal with bound set/chain netfilter: nf_tables: reject unbound anonymous set before commit phase netfilter: nf_tables: reject unbound chain set before commit phase netfilter: nftables: rename set element data activation/deactivation functions netfilter: nf_tables: drop map element references from preparation phase netfilter: nf_tables: unbind non-anonymous set if rule construction fails netfilter: nf_tables: skip immediate deactivate in _PREPARE_ERROR netfilter: nf_tables: skip bound chain on rule flush netfilter: nf_tables: disallow rule addition to bound chain via NFTA_RULE_CHAIN_ID include/net/netfilter/nf_tables.h | 18 +- include/net/netns/nftables.h | 14 +- net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c | 534 +++++++++++++++++++++--------- net/netfilter/nf_tables_offload.c | 30 +- net/netfilter/nft_chain_filter.c | 11 +- net/netfilter/nft_dynset.c | 6 +- net/netfilter/nft_set_bitmap.c | 5 +- net/netfilter/nft_set_hash.c | 23 +- net/netfilter/nft_set_pipapo.c | 14 +- net/netfilter/nft_set_rbtree.c | 5 +- 10 files changed, 458 insertions(+), 202 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/3] scsi: mpt3sas: Driver patch set for openEuler-22.03
by Hao Zhang 10 Oct '23

10 Oct '23

Get patch set from upstream 5.10 LTS stable branch Ranjan Kumar (1): scsi: mpt3sas: Perform additional retries if doorbell read returns 0 Tomas Henzl (1): scsi: mpt3sas: Fix a memory leak Wenchao Hao (1): scsi: mpt3sas: Fix NULL pointer access in mpt3sas_transport_port_add() drivers/scsi/mpt3sas/mpt3sas_base.c | 49 +++++++++++++++++------- drivers/scsi/mpt3sas/mpt3sas_base.h | 1 + drivers/scsi/mpt3sas/mpt3sas_transport.c | 14 ++++++- 3 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) -- 2.33.0

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