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[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS v3 00/10] CVE-2026-31431
by GONG Ruiqi 30 Apr '26

30 Apr '26

Douya Le (1): crypto: algif_aead - snapshot IV for async AEAD requests Eric Biggers (3): crypto: scatterwalk - Backport memcpy_sglist() crypto: algif_aead - use memcpy_sglist() instead of null skcipher crypto: authenc - use memcpy_sglist() instead of null skcipher Herbert Xu (5): crypto: algif_aead - Revert to operating out-of-place crypto: authencesn - Do not place hiseq at end of dst for out-of-place decryption crypto: authencesn - Fix src offset when decrypting in-place crypto: af_alg - Fix page reassignment overflow in af_alg_pull_tsgl crypto: algif_aead - Fix minimum RX size check for decryption Randy Dunlap (1): crypto: doc - fix kernel-doc notation in chacha.c and af_alg.c crypto/Kconfig | 2 - crypto/af_alg.c | 138 +++++++++++------------- crypto/algif_aead.c | 203 ++++++++--------------------------- crypto/algif_skcipher.c | 6 +- crypto/authenc.c | 32 +----- crypto/authencesn.c | 84 ++++++--------- crypto/scatterwalk.c | 98 +++++++++++++++++ include/crypto/if_alg.h | 5 +- include/crypto/scatterwalk.h | 32 ++++++ 9 files changed, 270 insertions(+), 330 deletions(-) -- 2.43.0

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[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS 00/10] CVE-2026-31431
by GONG Ruiqi 30 Apr '26

30 Apr '26

Douya Le (1): crypto: algif_aead - snapshot IV for async AEAD requests Eric Biggers (3): crypto: scatterwalk - Backport memcpy_sglist() crypto: algif_aead - use memcpy_sglist() instead of null skcipher crypto: authenc - use memcpy_sglist() instead of null skcipher Herbert Xu (5): crypto: algif_aead - Revert to operating out-of-place crypto: authencesn - Do not place hiseq at end of dst for out-of-place decryption crypto: authencesn - Fix src offset when decrypting in-place crypto: af_alg - Fix page reassignment overflow in af_alg_pull_tsgl crypto: algif_aead - Fix minimum RX size check for decryption Randy Dunlap (1): crypto: doc - fix kernel-doc notation in chacha.c and af_alg.c crypto/Kconfig | 2 - crypto/af_alg.c | 138 +++++++++++------------- crypto/algif_aead.c | 203 ++++++++--------------------------- crypto/algif_skcipher.c | 6 +- crypto/authenc.c | 32 +----- crypto/authencesn.c | 84 ++++++--------- crypto/scatterwalk.c | 98 +++++++++++++++++ include/crypto/if_alg.h | 5 +- include/crypto/scatterwalk.h | 32 ++++++ 9 files changed, 270 insertions(+), 330 deletions(-) -- 2.43.0

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[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS 00/10] CVE-2026-31431
by GONG Ruiqi 30 Apr '26

30 Apr '26

CVE-2026-31431 Douya Le (1): crypto: algif_aead - snapshot IV for async AEAD requests Eric Biggers (3): crypto: scatterwalk - Backport memcpy_sglist() crypto: algif_aead - use memcpy_sglist() instead of null skcipher crypto: authenc - use memcpy_sglist() instead of null skcipher Herbert Xu (5): crypto: algif_aead - Revert to operating out-of-place crypto: authencesn - Do not place hiseq at end of dst for out-of-place decryption crypto: authencesn - Fix src offset when decrypting in-place crypto: af_alg - Fix page reassignment overflow in af_alg_pull_tsgl crypto: algif_aead - Fix minimum RX size check for decryption Randy Dunlap (1): crypto: doc - fix kernel-doc notation in chacha.c and af_alg.c crypto/Kconfig | 2 - crypto/af_alg.c | 138 +++++++++++------------- crypto/algif_aead.c | 203 ++++++++--------------------------- crypto/algif_skcipher.c | 6 +- crypto/authenc.c | 32 +----- crypto/authencesn.c | 84 ++++++--------- crypto/scatterwalk.c | 98 +++++++++++++++++ include/crypto/if_alg.h | 5 +- include/crypto/scatterwalk.h | 32 ++++++ 9 files changed, 270 insertions(+), 330 deletions(-) -- 2.43.0

2 11

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/8] Fix CVE-2026-31431
by Tengda Wu 30 Apr '26

30 Apr '26

fix CVE-2026-31431. Douya Le (1): crypto: algif_aead - snapshot IV for async AEAD requests Eric Biggers (3): crypto: scatterwalk - Backport memcpy_sglist() crypto: algif_aead - use memcpy_sglist() instead of null skcipher crypto: authenc - use memcpy_sglist() instead of null skcipher Herbert Xu (4): crypto: algif_aead - Revert to operating out-of-place crypto: authencesn - Do not place hiseq at end of dst for out-of-place decryption crypto: authencesn - Fix src offset when decrypting in-place crypto: af_alg - Fix page reassignment overflow in af_alg_pull_tsgl crypto/Kconfig | 2 - crypto/af_alg.c | 51 ++------- crypto/algif_aead.c | 203 +++++++---------------------------- crypto/algif_skcipher.c | 6 +- crypto/authenc.c | 32 +----- crypto/authencesn.c | 84 ++++++--------- crypto/scatterwalk.c | 94 ++++++++++++++++ include/crypto/if_alg.h | 5 +- include/crypto/scatterwalk.h | 31 ++++++ 9 files changed, 215 insertions(+), 293 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 9

[PATCH OLK-5.10 00/11] Fix CVE-2026-31431
by Tengda Wu 30 Apr '26

30 Apr '26

fix CVE-2026-31431. Douya Le (1): crypto: algif_aead - snapshot IV for async AEAD requests Eric Biggers (3): crypto: scatterwalk - Backport memcpy_sglist() crypto: algif_aead - use memcpy_sglist() instead of null skcipher crypto: authenc - use memcpy_sglist() instead of null skcipher Herbert Xu (5): crypto: algif_aead - Revert to operating out-of-place crypto: authencesn - Do not place hiseq at end of dst for out-of-place decryption crypto: authencesn - Fix src offset when decrypting in-place crypto: af_alg - Fix page reassignment overflow in af_alg_pull_tsgl crypto: algif_aead - Fix minimum RX size check for decryption Randy Dunlap (1): crypto: doc - fix kernel-doc notation in chacha.c and af_alg.c Taeyang Lee (1): crypto: authencesn - reject too-short AAD (assoclen<8) to match ESP/ESN spec crypto/Kconfig | 2 - crypto/af_alg.c | 137 +++++++++++------------ crypto/algif_aead.c | 203 ++++++++--------------------------- crypto/algif_skcipher.c | 6 +- crypto/authenc.c | 32 +----- crypto/authencesn.c | 88 +++++++-------- crypto/scatterwalk.c | 98 +++++++++++++++++ include/crypto/if_alg.h | 5 +- include/crypto/scatterwalk.h | 32 ++++++ lib/crypto/chacha.c | 4 +- 10 files changed, 277 insertions(+), 330 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 13

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] crypto: algif_aead - Revert to operating out-of-place
by Yi Yang 30 Apr '26

30 Apr '26

From: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.0-rc7 commit a664bf3d603dc3bdcf9ae47cc21e0daec706d7a5 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14174 CVE: CVE-2026-31431 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- This mostly reverts commit 72548b093ee3 except for the copying of the associated data. There is no benefit in operating in-place in algif_aead since the source and destination come from different mappings. Get rid of all the complexity added for in-place operation and just copy the AD directly. Fixes: 72548b093ee3 ("crypto: algif_aead - copy AAD from src to dst") Reported-by: Taeyang Lee <0wn(a)theori.io> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au> Conflicts: crypto/af_alg.c crypto/algif_aead.c crypto/algif_skcipher.c include/crypto/if_alg.h [Commit 99bd99d3e3a7 ("crypto: algif_skcipher - Fix stream cipher chaining") was not merged.Context conflicts.] Signed-off-by: Yi Yang <yiyang13(a)huawei.com> --- crypto/af_alg.c | 48 ++++-------------- crypto/algif_aead.c | 108 ++++++++-------------------------------- crypto/algif_skcipher.c | 6 +-- include/crypto/if_alg.h | 5 +- 4 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 130 deletions(-) diff --git a/crypto/af_alg.c b/crypto/af_alg.c index 69c21b047566..1d66daf3c735 100644 --- a/crypto/af_alg.c +++ b/crypto/af_alg.c @@ -525,15 +525,13 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(af_alg_alloc_tsgl); /** * aead_count_tsgl - Count number of TX SG entries * - * The counting starts from the beginning of the SGL to @bytes. If - * an offset is provided, the counting of the SG entries starts at the offset. + * The counting starts from the beginning of the SGL to @bytes. * * @sk socket of connection to user space * @bytes Count the number of SG entries holding given number of bytes. - * @offset Start the counting of SG entries from the given offset. * @return Number of TX SG entries found given the constraints */ -unsigned int af_alg_count_tsgl(struct sock *sk, size_t bytes, size_t offset) +unsigned int af_alg_count_tsgl(struct sock *sk, size_t bytes) { struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk); struct af_alg_ctx *ctx = ask->private; @@ -548,25 +546,12 @@ unsigned int af_alg_count_tsgl(struct sock *sk, size_t bytes, size_t offset) struct scatterlist *sg = sgl->sg; for (i = 0; i < sgl->cur; i++) { - size_t bytes_count; - /* Skip offset */ - if (offset >= sg[i].length) { - offset -= sg[i].length; - bytes -= sg[i].length; - continue; - } - - bytes_count = sg[i].length - offset; - - offset = 0; sgl_count++; - - /* If we have seen requested number of bytes, stop */ - if (bytes_count >= bytes) + if (sg[i].length >= bytes) return sgl_count; - bytes -= bytes_count; + bytes -= sg[i].length; } } @@ -578,19 +563,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(af_alg_count_tsgl); * aead_pull_tsgl - Release the specified buffers from TX SGL * * If @dst is non-null, reassign the pages to dst. The caller must release - * the pages. If @dst_offset is given only reassign the pages to @dst starting - * at the @dst_offset (byte). The caller must ensure that @dst is large - * enough (e.g. by using af_alg_count_tsgl with the same offset). + * the pages. * * @sk socket of connection to user space * @used Number of bytes to pull from TX SGL * @dst If non-NULL, buffer is reassigned to dst SGL instead of releasing. The * caller must release the buffers in dst. - * @dst_offset Reassign the TX SGL from given offset. All buffers before - * reaching the offset is released. */ -void af_alg_pull_tsgl(struct sock *sk, size_t used, struct scatterlist *dst, - size_t dst_offset) +void af_alg_pull_tsgl(struct sock *sk, size_t used, struct scatterlist *dst) { struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk); struct af_alg_ctx *ctx = ask->private; @@ -615,18 +595,10 @@ void af_alg_pull_tsgl(struct sock *sk, size_t used, struct scatterlist *dst, * SG entries in dst. */ if (dst) { - if (dst_offset >= plen) { - /* discard page before offset */ - dst_offset -= plen; - } else { - /* reassign page to dst after offset */ - get_page(page); - sg_set_page(dst + j, page, - plen - dst_offset, - sg[i].offset + dst_offset); - dst_offset = 0; - j++; - } + /* reassign page to dst after offset */ + get_page(page); + sg_set_page(dst + j, page, plen, sg[i].offset); + j++; } sg[i].length -= plen; diff --git a/crypto/algif_aead.c b/crypto/algif_aead.c index 43a861a79209..3cb0cb6b815a 100644 --- a/crypto/algif_aead.c +++ b/crypto/algif_aead.c @@ -30,7 +30,6 @@ #include <crypto/internal/aead.h> #include <crypto/scatterwalk.h> #include <crypto/if_alg.h> -#include <crypto/skcipher.h> #include <crypto/null.h> #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/list.h> @@ -100,9 +99,8 @@ static int _aead_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct aead_tfm *aeadc = pask->private; struct crypto_aead *tfm = aeadc->aead; struct crypto_skcipher *null_tfm = aeadc->null_tfm; - unsigned int i, as = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm); + unsigned int as = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm); struct af_alg_async_req *areq; - struct af_alg_tsgl *tsgl, *tmp; struct scatterlist *rsgl_src, *tsgl_src = NULL; int err = 0; size_t used = 0; /* [in] TX bufs to be en/decrypted */ @@ -182,23 +180,24 @@ static int _aead_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, outlen -= less; } + /* + * Create a per request TX SGL for this request which tracks the + * SG entries from the global TX SGL. + */ processed = used + ctx->aead_assoclen; - list_for_each_entry_safe(tsgl, tmp, &ctx->tsgl_list, list) { - for (i = 0; i < tsgl->cur; i++) { - struct scatterlist *process_sg = tsgl->sg + i; - - if (!(process_sg->length) || !sg_page(process_sg)) - continue; - tsgl_src = process_sg; - break; - } - if (tsgl_src) - break; - } - if (processed && !tsgl_src) { - err = -EFAULT; + areq->tsgl_entries = af_alg_count_tsgl(sk, processed); + if (!areq->tsgl_entries) + areq->tsgl_entries = 1; + areq->tsgl = sock_kmalloc(sk, array_size(sizeof(*areq->tsgl), + areq->tsgl_entries), + GFP_KERNEL); + if (!areq->tsgl) { + err = -ENOMEM; goto free; } + sg_init_table(areq->tsgl, areq->tsgl_entries); + af_alg_pull_tsgl(sk, processed, areq->tsgl); + tsgl_src = areq->tsgl; /* * Copy of AAD from source to destination @@ -207,81 +206,18 @@ static int _aead_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, * when user space uses an in-place cipher operation, the kernel * will copy the data as it does not see whether such in-place operation * is initiated. - * - * To ensure efficiency, the following implementation ensure that the - * ciphers are invoked to perform a crypto operation in-place. This - * is achieved by memory management specified as follows. */ /* Use the RX SGL as source (and destination) for crypto op. */ rsgl_src = areq->first_rsgl.sgl.sg; - if (ctx->enc) { - /* - * Encryption operation - The in-place cipher operation is - * achieved by the following operation: - * - * TX SGL: AAD || PT - * | | - * | copy | - * v v - * RX SGL: AAD || PT || Tag - */ - err = crypto_aead_copy_sgl(null_tfm, tsgl_src, - areq->first_rsgl.sgl.sg, processed); - if (err) - goto free; - af_alg_pull_tsgl(sk, processed, NULL, 0); - } else { - /* - * Decryption operation - To achieve an in-place cipher - * operation, the following SGL structure is used: - * - * TX SGL: AAD || CT || Tag - * | | ^ - * | copy | | Create SGL link. - * v v | - * RX SGL: AAD || CT ----+ - */ - - /* Copy AAD || CT to RX SGL buffer for in-place operation. */ - err = crypto_aead_copy_sgl(null_tfm, tsgl_src, - areq->first_rsgl.sgl.sg, outlen); - if (err) - goto free; - - /* Create TX SGL for tag and chain it to RX SGL. */ - areq->tsgl_entries = af_alg_count_tsgl(sk, processed, - processed - as); - if (!areq->tsgl_entries) - areq->tsgl_entries = 1; - areq->tsgl = sock_kmalloc(sk, array_size(sizeof(*areq->tsgl), - areq->tsgl_entries), - GFP_KERNEL); - if (!areq->tsgl) { - err = -ENOMEM; - goto free; - } - sg_init_table(areq->tsgl, areq->tsgl_entries); - - /* Release TX SGL, except for tag data and reassign tag data. */ - af_alg_pull_tsgl(sk, processed, areq->tsgl, processed - as); - - /* chain the areq TX SGL holding the tag with RX SGL */ - if (usedpages) { - /* RX SGL present */ - struct af_alg_sgl *sgl_prev = &areq->last_rsgl->sgl; - - sg_unmark_end(sgl_prev->sg + sgl_prev->npages - 1); - sg_chain(sgl_prev->sg, sgl_prev->npages + 1, - areq->tsgl); - } else - /* no RX SGL present (e.g. authentication only) */ - rsgl_src = areq->tsgl; - } + err = crypto_aead_copy_sgl(null_tfm, tsgl_src, + areq->first_rsgl.sgl.sg, ctx->aead_assoclen); + if (err) + goto free; /* Initialize the crypto operation */ - aead_request_set_crypt(&areq->cra_u.aead_req, rsgl_src, + aead_request_set_crypt(&areq->cra_u.aead_req, tsgl_src, areq->first_rsgl.sgl.sg, used, ctx->iv); aead_request_set_ad(&areq->cra_u.aead_req, ctx->aead_assoclen); aead_request_set_tfm(&areq->cra_u.aead_req, tfm); @@ -536,7 +472,7 @@ static void aead_sock_destruct(struct sock *sk) struct crypto_aead *tfm = aeadc->aead; unsigned int ivlen = crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm); - af_alg_pull_tsgl(sk, ctx->used, NULL, 0); + af_alg_pull_tsgl(sk, ctx->used, NULL); sock_kzfree_s(sk, ctx->iv, ivlen); sock_kfree_s(sk, ctx, ctx->len); af_alg_release_parent(sk); diff --git a/crypto/algif_skcipher.c b/crypto/algif_skcipher.c index c5813e14e905..e4c3aab2de4e 100644 --- a/crypto/algif_skcipher.c +++ b/crypto/algif_skcipher.c @@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ static int _skcipher_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, * Create a per request TX SGL for this request which tracks the * SG entries from the global TX SGL. */ - areq->tsgl_entries = af_alg_count_tsgl(sk, len, 0); + areq->tsgl_entries = af_alg_count_tsgl(sk, len); if (!areq->tsgl_entries) areq->tsgl_entries = 1; areq->tsgl = sock_kmalloc(sk, array_size(sizeof(*areq->tsgl), @@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ static int _skcipher_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, goto free; } sg_init_table(areq->tsgl, areq->tsgl_entries); - af_alg_pull_tsgl(sk, len, areq->tsgl, 0); + af_alg_pull_tsgl(sk, len, areq->tsgl); /* Initialize the crypto operation */ skcipher_request_set_tfm(&areq->cra_u.skcipher_req, tfm); @@ -328,7 +328,7 @@ static void skcipher_sock_destruct(struct sock *sk) struct alg_sock *pask = alg_sk(psk); struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = pask->private; - af_alg_pull_tsgl(sk, ctx->used, NULL, 0); + af_alg_pull_tsgl(sk, ctx->used, NULL); sock_kzfree_s(sk, ctx->iv, crypto_skcipher_ivsize(tfm)); sock_kfree_s(sk, ctx, ctx->len); af_alg_release_parent(sk); diff --git a/include/crypto/if_alg.h b/include/crypto/if_alg.h index ca3cd8118639..17447b4600f9 100644 --- a/include/crypto/if_alg.h +++ b/include/crypto/if_alg.h @@ -238,9 +238,8 @@ static inline bool af_alg_readable(struct sock *sk) } int af_alg_alloc_tsgl(struct sock *sk); -unsigned int af_alg_count_tsgl(struct sock *sk, size_t bytes, size_t offset); -void af_alg_pull_tsgl(struct sock *sk, size_t used, struct scatterlist *dst, - size_t dst_offset); +unsigned int af_alg_count_tsgl(struct sock *sk, size_t bytes); +void af_alg_pull_tsgl(struct sock *sk, size_t used, struct scatterlist *dst); void af_alg_free_areq_sgls(struct af_alg_async_req *areq); int af_alg_wait_for_wmem(struct sock *sk, unsigned int flags); void af_alg_wmem_wakeup(struct sock *sk); -- 2.25.1

2 2

[PATCH OLK-5.10] crypto: algif_aead - Revert to operating out-of-place
by Yi Yang 30 Apr '26

30 Apr '26

From: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.0-rc7 commit a664bf3d603dc3bdcf9ae47cc21e0daec706d7a5 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14174 CVE: CVE-2026-31431 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- This mostly reverts commit 72548b093ee3 except for the copying of the associated data. There is no benefit in operating in-place in algif_aead since the source and destination come from different mappings. Get rid of all the complexity added for in-place operation and just copy the AD directly. Fixes: 72548b093ee3 ("crypto: algif_aead - copy AAD from src to dst") Reported-by: Taeyang Lee <0wn(a)theori.io> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au> Conflicts: crypto/af_alg.c crypto/algif_aead.c crypto/algif_skcipher.c include/crypto/if_alg.h [Commit 99bd99d3e3a7 ("crypto: algif_skcipher - Fix stream cipher chaining") was not merged.Context conflicts.] Signed-off-by: Yi Yang <yiyang13(a)huawei.com> --- crypto/af_alg.c | 49 ++++-------------- crypto/algif_aead.c | 109 +++++++++------------------------------- crypto/algif_skcipher.c | 6 +-- include/crypto/if_alg.h | 5 +- 4 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 131 deletions(-) diff --git a/crypto/af_alg.c b/crypto/af_alg.c index b7e132967650..7fc775249ae3 100644 --- a/crypto/af_alg.c +++ b/crypto/af_alg.c @@ -527,15 +527,13 @@ static int af_alg_alloc_tsgl(struct sock *sk) /** * aead_count_tsgl - Count number of TX SG entries * - * The counting starts from the beginning of the SGL to @bytes. If - * an offset is provided, the counting of the SG entries starts at the offset. + * The counting starts from the beginning of the SGL to @bytes. * * @sk socket of connection to user space * @bytes Count the number of SG entries holding given number of bytes. - * @offset Start the counting of SG entries from the given offset. * @return Number of TX SG entries found given the constraints */ -unsigned int af_alg_count_tsgl(struct sock *sk, size_t bytes, size_t offset) +unsigned int af_alg_count_tsgl(struct sock *sk, size_t bytes) { const struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk); const struct af_alg_ctx *ctx = ask->private; @@ -550,25 +548,11 @@ unsigned int af_alg_count_tsgl(struct sock *sk, size_t bytes, size_t offset) const struct scatterlist *sg = sgl->sg; for (i = 0; i < sgl->cur; i++) { - size_t bytes_count; - - /* Skip offset */ - if (offset >= sg[i].length) { - offset -= sg[i].length; - bytes -= sg[i].length; - continue; - } - - bytes_count = sg[i].length - offset; - - offset = 0; sgl_count++; - - /* If we have seen requested number of bytes, stop */ - if (bytes_count >= bytes) + if (sg[i].length >= bytes) return sgl_count; - bytes -= bytes_count; + bytes -= sg[i].length; } } @@ -580,19 +564,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(af_alg_count_tsgl); * aead_pull_tsgl - Release the specified buffers from TX SGL * * If @dst is non-null, reassign the pages to dst. The caller must release - * the pages. If @dst_offset is given only reassign the pages to @dst starting - * at the @dst_offset (byte). The caller must ensure that @dst is large - * enough (e.g. by using af_alg_count_tsgl with the same offset). + * the pages. * * @sk socket of connection to user space * @used Number of bytes to pull from TX SGL * @dst If non-NULL, buffer is reassigned to dst SGL instead of releasing. The * caller must release the buffers in dst. - * @dst_offset Reassign the TX SGL from given offset. All buffers before - * reaching the offset is released. */ -void af_alg_pull_tsgl(struct sock *sk, size_t used, struct scatterlist *dst, - size_t dst_offset) +void af_alg_pull_tsgl(struct sock *sk, size_t used, struct scatterlist *dst) { struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk); struct af_alg_ctx *ctx = ask->private; @@ -617,18 +596,10 @@ void af_alg_pull_tsgl(struct sock *sk, size_t used, struct scatterlist *dst, * SG entries in dst. */ if (dst) { - if (dst_offset >= plen) { - /* discard page before offset */ - dst_offset -= plen; - } else { - /* reassign page to dst after offset */ - get_page(page); - sg_set_page(dst + j, page, - plen - dst_offset, - sg[i].offset + dst_offset); - dst_offset = 0; - j++; - } + /* reassign page to dst after offset */ + get_page(page); + sg_set_page(dst + j, page, plen, sg[i].offset); + j++; } sg[i].length -= plen; diff --git a/crypto/algif_aead.c b/crypto/algif_aead.c index 42493b4d8ce4..5d98db4e7558 100644 --- a/crypto/algif_aead.c +++ b/crypto/algif_aead.c @@ -26,7 +26,6 @@ #include <crypto/internal/aead.h> #include <crypto/scatterwalk.h> #include <crypto/if_alg.h> -#include <crypto/skcipher.h> #include <crypto/null.h> #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/list.h> @@ -96,9 +95,8 @@ static int _aead_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct aead_tfm *aeadc = pask->private; struct crypto_aead *tfm = aeadc->aead; struct crypto_sync_skcipher *null_tfm = aeadc->null_tfm; - unsigned int i, as = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm); + unsigned int as = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm); struct af_alg_async_req *areq; - struct af_alg_tsgl *tsgl, *tmp; struct scatterlist *rsgl_src, *tsgl_src = NULL; int err = 0; size_t used = 0; /* [in] TX bufs to be en/decrypted */ @@ -178,23 +176,24 @@ static int _aead_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, outlen -= less; } + /* + * Create a per request TX SGL for this request which tracks the + * SG entries from the global TX SGL. + */ processed = used + ctx->aead_assoclen; - list_for_each_entry_safe(tsgl, tmp, &ctx->tsgl_list, list) { - for (i = 0; i < tsgl->cur; i++) { - struct scatterlist *process_sg = tsgl->sg + i; - - if (!(process_sg->length) || !sg_page(process_sg)) - continue; - tsgl_src = process_sg; - break; - } - if (tsgl_src) - break; - } - if (processed && !tsgl_src) { - err = -EFAULT; + areq->tsgl_entries = af_alg_count_tsgl(sk, processed); + if (!areq->tsgl_entries) + areq->tsgl_entries = 1; + areq->tsgl = sock_kmalloc(sk, array_size(sizeof(*areq->tsgl), + areq->tsgl_entries), + GFP_KERNEL); + if (!areq->tsgl) { + err = -ENOMEM; goto free; } + sg_init_table(areq->tsgl, areq->tsgl_entries); + af_alg_pull_tsgl(sk, processed, areq->tsgl); + tsgl_src = areq->tsgl; /* * Copy of AAD from source to destination @@ -203,81 +202,19 @@ static int _aead_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, * when user space uses an in-place cipher operation, the kernel * will copy the data as it does not see whether such in-place operation * is initiated. - * - * To ensure efficiency, the following implementation ensure that the - * ciphers are invoked to perform a crypto operation in-place. This - * is achieved by memory management specified as follows. */ /* Use the RX SGL as source (and destination) for crypto op. */ rsgl_src = areq->first_rsgl.sgl.sg; - if (ctx->enc) { - /* - * Encryption operation - The in-place cipher operation is - * achieved by the following operation: - * - * TX SGL: AAD || PT - * | | - * | copy | - * v v - * RX SGL: AAD || PT || Tag - */ - err = crypto_aead_copy_sgl(null_tfm, tsgl_src, - areq->first_rsgl.sgl.sg, processed); - if (err) - goto free; - af_alg_pull_tsgl(sk, processed, NULL, 0); - } else { - /* - * Decryption operation - To achieve an in-place cipher - * operation, the following SGL structure is used: - * - * TX SGL: AAD || CT || Tag - * | | ^ - * | copy | | Create SGL link. - * v v | - * RX SGL: AAD || CT ----+ - */ - - /* Copy AAD || CT to RX SGL buffer for in-place operation. */ - err = crypto_aead_copy_sgl(null_tfm, tsgl_src, - areq->first_rsgl.sgl.sg, outlen); - if (err) - goto free; - - /* Create TX SGL for tag and chain it to RX SGL. */ - areq->tsgl_entries = af_alg_count_tsgl(sk, processed, - processed - as); - if (!areq->tsgl_entries) - areq->tsgl_entries = 1; - areq->tsgl = sock_kmalloc(sk, array_size(sizeof(*areq->tsgl), - areq->tsgl_entries), - GFP_KERNEL); - if (!areq->tsgl) { - err = -ENOMEM; - goto free; - } - sg_init_table(areq->tsgl, areq->tsgl_entries); - - /* Release TX SGL, except for tag data and reassign tag data. */ - af_alg_pull_tsgl(sk, processed, areq->tsgl, processed - as); - - /* chain the areq TX SGL holding the tag with RX SGL */ - if (usedpages) { - /* RX SGL present */ - struct af_alg_sgl *sgl_prev = &areq->last_rsgl->sgl; - - sg_unmark_end(sgl_prev->sg + sgl_prev->npages - 1); - sg_chain(sgl_prev->sg, sgl_prev->npages + 1, - areq->tsgl); - } else - /* no RX SGL present (e.g. authentication only) */ - rsgl_src = areq->tsgl; - } + err = crypto_aead_copy_sgl(null_tfm, tsgl_src, + areq->first_rsgl.sgl.sg, + ctx->aead_assoclen); + if (err) + goto free; /* Initialize the crypto operation */ - aead_request_set_crypt(&areq->cra_u.aead_req, rsgl_src, + aead_request_set_crypt(&areq->cra_u.aead_req, tsgl_src, areq->first_rsgl.sgl.sg, used, ctx->iv); aead_request_set_ad(&areq->cra_u.aead_req, ctx->aead_assoclen); aead_request_set_tfm(&areq->cra_u.aead_req, tfm); @@ -526,7 +463,7 @@ static void aead_sock_destruct(struct sock *sk) struct crypto_aead *tfm = aeadc->aead; unsigned int ivlen = crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm); - af_alg_pull_tsgl(sk, ctx->used, NULL, 0); + af_alg_pull_tsgl(sk, ctx->used, NULL); sock_kzfree_s(sk, ctx->iv, ivlen); sock_kfree_s(sk, ctx, ctx->len); af_alg_release_parent(sk); diff --git a/crypto/algif_skcipher.c b/crypto/algif_skcipher.c index bd9401e37706..edbdc19cdb31 100644 --- a/crypto/algif_skcipher.c +++ b/crypto/algif_skcipher.c @@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ static int _skcipher_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, * Create a per request TX SGL for this request which tracks the * SG entries from the global TX SGL. */ - areq->tsgl_entries = af_alg_count_tsgl(sk, len, 0); + areq->tsgl_entries = af_alg_count_tsgl(sk, len); if (!areq->tsgl_entries) areq->tsgl_entries = 1; areq->tsgl = sock_kmalloc(sk, array_size(sizeof(*areq->tsgl), @@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ static int _skcipher_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, goto free; } sg_init_table(areq->tsgl, areq->tsgl_entries); - af_alg_pull_tsgl(sk, len, areq->tsgl, 0); + af_alg_pull_tsgl(sk, len, areq->tsgl); /* Initialize the crypto operation */ skcipher_request_set_tfm(&areq->cra_u.skcipher_req, tfm); @@ -319,7 +319,7 @@ static void skcipher_sock_destruct(struct sock *sk) struct alg_sock *pask = alg_sk(psk); struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = pask->private; - af_alg_pull_tsgl(sk, ctx->used, NULL, 0); + af_alg_pull_tsgl(sk, ctx->used, NULL); sock_kzfree_s(sk, ctx->iv, crypto_skcipher_ivsize(tfm)); sock_kfree_s(sk, ctx, ctx->len); af_alg_release_parent(sk); diff --git a/include/crypto/if_alg.h b/include/crypto/if_alg.h index a406e281ae57..719a38d7e8bb 100644 --- a/include/crypto/if_alg.h +++ b/include/crypto/if_alg.h @@ -228,9 +228,8 @@ static inline bool af_alg_readable(struct sock *sk) return PAGE_SIZE <= af_alg_rcvbuf(sk); } -unsigned int af_alg_count_tsgl(struct sock *sk, size_t bytes, size_t offset); -void af_alg_pull_tsgl(struct sock *sk, size_t used, struct scatterlist *dst, - size_t dst_offset); +unsigned int af_alg_count_tsgl(struct sock *sk, size_t bytes); +void af_alg_pull_tsgl(struct sock *sk, size_t used, struct scatterlist *dst); void af_alg_wmem_wakeup(struct sock *sk); int af_alg_wait_for_data(struct sock *sk, unsigned flags, unsigned min); int af_alg_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size, -- 2.25.1

2 2

[PATCH OLK-6.6] crypto: algif_aead - Revert to operating out-of-place
by Yi Yang 30 Apr '26

30 Apr '26

From: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.0-rc7 commit a664bf3d603dc3bdcf9ae47cc21e0daec706d7a5 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14174 CVE: CVE-2026-31431 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- This mostly reverts commit 72548b093ee3 except for the copying of the associated data. There is no benefit in operating in-place in algif_aead since the source and destination come from different mappings. Get rid of all the complexity added for in-place operation and just copy the AD directly. Fixes: 72548b093ee3 ("crypto: algif_aead - copy AAD from src to dst") Reported-by: Taeyang Lee <0wn(a)theori.io> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au> Conflicts: crypto/algif_aead.c crypto/algif_skcipher.c [Commit 99bd99d3e3a7 ("crypto: algif_skcipher - Fix stream cipher chaining") was not merged.Context conflicts.] Signed-off-by: Yi Yang <yiyang13(a)huawei.com> --- crypto/af_alg.c | 49 ++++-------------- crypto/algif_aead.c | 111 +++++++++------------------------------- crypto/algif_skcipher.c | 6 +-- include/crypto/if_alg.h | 5 +- 4 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 133 deletions(-) diff --git a/crypto/af_alg.c b/crypto/af_alg.c index 55e58dfbcca1..ed8751bb3456 100644 --- a/crypto/af_alg.c +++ b/crypto/af_alg.c @@ -634,15 +634,13 @@ static int af_alg_alloc_tsgl(struct sock *sk) /** * af_alg_count_tsgl - Count number of TX SG entries * - * The counting starts from the beginning of the SGL to @bytes. If - * an @offset is provided, the counting of the SG entries starts at the @offset. + * The counting starts from the beginning of the SGL to @bytes. * * @sk: socket of connection to user space * @bytes: Count the number of SG entries holding given number of bytes. - * @offset: Start the counting of SG entries from the given offset. * Return: Number of TX SG entries found given the constraints */ -unsigned int af_alg_count_tsgl(struct sock *sk, size_t bytes, size_t offset) +unsigned int af_alg_count_tsgl(struct sock *sk, size_t bytes) { const struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk); const struct af_alg_ctx *ctx = ask->private; @@ -657,25 +655,11 @@ unsigned int af_alg_count_tsgl(struct sock *sk, size_t bytes, size_t offset) const struct scatterlist *sg = sgl->sg; for (i = 0; i < sgl->cur; i++) { - size_t bytes_count; - - /* Skip offset */ - if (offset >= sg[i].length) { - offset -= sg[i].length; - bytes -= sg[i].length; - continue; - } - - bytes_count = sg[i].length - offset; - - offset = 0; sgl_count++; - - /* If we have seen requested number of bytes, stop */ - if (bytes_count >= bytes) + if (sg[i].length >= bytes) return sgl_count; - bytes -= bytes_count; + bytes -= sg[i].length; } } @@ -687,19 +671,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(af_alg_count_tsgl); * af_alg_pull_tsgl - Release the specified buffers from TX SGL * * If @dst is non-null, reassign the pages to @dst. The caller must release - * the pages. If @dst_offset is given only reassign the pages to @dst starting - * at the @dst_offset (byte). The caller must ensure that @dst is large - * enough (e.g. by using af_alg_count_tsgl with the same offset). + * the pages. * * @sk: socket of connection to user space * @used: Number of bytes to pull from TX SGL * @dst: If non-NULL, buffer is reassigned to dst SGL instead of releasing. The * caller must release the buffers in dst. - * @dst_offset: Reassign the TX SGL from given offset. All buffers before - * reaching the offset is released. */ -void af_alg_pull_tsgl(struct sock *sk, size_t used, struct scatterlist *dst, - size_t dst_offset) +void af_alg_pull_tsgl(struct sock *sk, size_t used, struct scatterlist *dst) { struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk); struct af_alg_ctx *ctx = ask->private; @@ -724,18 +703,10 @@ void af_alg_pull_tsgl(struct sock *sk, size_t used, struct scatterlist *dst, * SG entries in dst. */ if (dst) { - if (dst_offset >= plen) { - /* discard page before offset */ - dst_offset -= plen; - } else { - /* reassign page to dst after offset */ - get_page(page); - sg_set_page(dst + j, page, - plen - dst_offset, - sg[i].offset + dst_offset); - dst_offset = 0; - j++; - } + /* reassign page to dst after offset */ + get_page(page); + sg_set_page(dst + j, page, plen, sg[i].offset); + j++; } sg[i].length -= plen; diff --git a/crypto/algif_aead.c b/crypto/algif_aead.c index 7d58cbbce4af..1c6d98b2832b 100644 --- a/crypto/algif_aead.c +++ b/crypto/algif_aead.c @@ -26,7 +26,6 @@ #include <crypto/internal/aead.h> #include <crypto/scatterwalk.h> #include <crypto/if_alg.h> -#include <crypto/skcipher.h> #include <crypto/null.h> #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/list.h> @@ -96,9 +95,8 @@ static int _aead_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct aead_tfm *aeadc = pask->private; struct crypto_aead *tfm = aeadc->aead; struct crypto_sync_skcipher *null_tfm = aeadc->null_tfm; - unsigned int i, as = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm); + unsigned int as = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm); struct af_alg_async_req *areq; - struct af_alg_tsgl *tsgl, *tmp; struct scatterlist *rsgl_src, *tsgl_src = NULL; int err = 0; size_t used = 0; /* [in] TX bufs to be en/decrypted */ @@ -178,23 +176,24 @@ static int _aead_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, outlen -= less; } + /* + * Create a per request TX SGL for this request which tracks the + * SG entries from the global TX SGL. + */ processed = used + ctx->aead_assoclen; - list_for_each_entry_safe(tsgl, tmp, &ctx->tsgl_list, list) { - for (i = 0; i < tsgl->cur; i++) { - struct scatterlist *process_sg = tsgl->sg + i; - - if (!(process_sg->length) || !sg_page(process_sg)) - continue; - tsgl_src = process_sg; - break; - } - if (tsgl_src) - break; - } - if (processed && !tsgl_src) { - err = -EFAULT; + areq->tsgl_entries = af_alg_count_tsgl(sk, processed); + if (!areq->tsgl_entries) + areq->tsgl_entries = 1; + areq->tsgl = sock_kmalloc(sk, array_size(sizeof(*areq->tsgl), + areq->tsgl_entries), + GFP_KERNEL); + if (!areq->tsgl) { + err = -ENOMEM; goto free; } + sg_init_table(areq->tsgl, areq->tsgl_entries); + af_alg_pull_tsgl(sk, processed, areq->tsgl); + tsgl_src = areq->tsgl; /* * Copy of AAD from source to destination @@ -203,83 +202,19 @@ static int _aead_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, * when user space uses an in-place cipher operation, the kernel * will copy the data as it does not see whether such in-place operation * is initiated. - * - * To ensure efficiency, the following implementation ensure that the - * ciphers are invoked to perform a crypto operation in-place. This - * is achieved by memory management specified as follows. */ /* Use the RX SGL as source (and destination) for crypto op. */ rsgl_src = areq->first_rsgl.sgl.sgt.sgl; - if (ctx->enc) { - /* - * Encryption operation - The in-place cipher operation is - * achieved by the following operation: - * - * TX SGL: AAD || PT - * | | - * | copy | - * v v - * RX SGL: AAD || PT || Tag - */ - err = crypto_aead_copy_sgl(null_tfm, tsgl_src, - areq->first_rsgl.sgl.sgt.sgl, - processed); - if (err) - goto free; - af_alg_pull_tsgl(sk, processed, NULL, 0); - } else { - /* - * Decryption operation - To achieve an in-place cipher - * operation, the following SGL structure is used: - * - * TX SGL: AAD || CT || Tag - * | | ^ - * | copy | | Create SGL link. - * v v | - * RX SGL: AAD || CT ----+ - */ - - /* Copy AAD || CT to RX SGL buffer for in-place operation. */ - err = crypto_aead_copy_sgl(null_tfm, tsgl_src, - areq->first_rsgl.sgl.sgt.sgl, - outlen); - if (err) - goto free; - - /* Create TX SGL for tag and chain it to RX SGL. */ - areq->tsgl_entries = af_alg_count_tsgl(sk, processed, - processed - as); - if (!areq->tsgl_entries) - areq->tsgl_entries = 1; - areq->tsgl = sock_kmalloc(sk, array_size(sizeof(*areq->tsgl), - areq->tsgl_entries), - GFP_KERNEL); - if (!areq->tsgl) { - err = -ENOMEM; - goto free; - } - sg_init_table(areq->tsgl, areq->tsgl_entries); - - /* Release TX SGL, except for tag data and reassign tag data. */ - af_alg_pull_tsgl(sk, processed, areq->tsgl, processed - as); - - /* chain the areq TX SGL holding the tag with RX SGL */ - if (usedpages) { - /* RX SGL present */ - struct af_alg_sgl *sgl_prev = &areq->last_rsgl->sgl; - struct scatterlist *sg = sgl_prev->sgt.sgl; - - sg_unmark_end(sg + sgl_prev->sgt.nents - 1); - sg_chain(sg, sgl_prev->sgt.nents + 1, areq->tsgl); - } else - /* no RX SGL present (e.g. authentication only) */ - rsgl_src = areq->tsgl; - } + err = crypto_aead_copy_sgl(null_tfm, tsgl_src, + areq->first_rsgl.sgl.sgt.sgl, + ctx->aead_assoclen); + if (err) + goto free; /* Initialize the crypto operation */ - aead_request_set_crypt(&areq->cra_u.aead_req, rsgl_src, + aead_request_set_crypt(&areq->cra_u.aead_req, tsgl_src, areq->first_rsgl.sgl.sgt.sgl, used, ctx->iv); aead_request_set_ad(&areq->cra_u.aead_req, ctx->aead_assoclen); aead_request_set_tfm(&areq->cra_u.aead_req, tfm); @@ -514,7 +449,7 @@ static void aead_sock_destruct(struct sock *sk) struct crypto_aead *tfm = aeadc->aead; unsigned int ivlen = crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm); - af_alg_pull_tsgl(sk, ctx->used, NULL, 0); + af_alg_pull_tsgl(sk, ctx->used, NULL); sock_kzfree_s(sk, ctx->iv, ivlen); sock_kfree_s(sk, ctx, ctx->len); af_alg_release_parent(sk); diff --git a/crypto/algif_skcipher.c b/crypto/algif_skcipher.c index 097ad4f9a077..2ef20d9b3f44 100644 --- a/crypto/algif_skcipher.c +++ b/crypto/algif_skcipher.c @@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ static int _skcipher_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, * Create a per request TX SGL for this request which tracks the * SG entries from the global TX SGL. */ - areq->tsgl_entries = af_alg_count_tsgl(sk, len, 0); + areq->tsgl_entries = af_alg_count_tsgl(sk, len); if (!areq->tsgl_entries) areq->tsgl_entries = 1; areq->tsgl = sock_kmalloc(sk, array_size(sizeof(*areq->tsgl), @@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ static int _skcipher_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, goto free; } sg_init_table(areq->tsgl, areq->tsgl_entries); - af_alg_pull_tsgl(sk, len, areq->tsgl, 0); + af_alg_pull_tsgl(sk, len, areq->tsgl); /* Initialize the crypto operation */ skcipher_request_set_tfm(&areq->cra_u.skcipher_req, tfm); @@ -305,7 +305,7 @@ static void skcipher_sock_destruct(struct sock *sk) struct alg_sock *pask = alg_sk(psk); struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = pask->private; - af_alg_pull_tsgl(sk, ctx->used, NULL, 0); + af_alg_pull_tsgl(sk, ctx->used, NULL); sock_kzfree_s(sk, ctx->iv, crypto_skcipher_ivsize(tfm)); sock_kfree_s(sk, ctx, ctx->len); af_alg_release_parent(sk); diff --git a/include/crypto/if_alg.h b/include/crypto/if_alg.h index 2e43d7704d1d..33da71c1d2a1 100644 --- a/include/crypto/if_alg.h +++ b/include/crypto/if_alg.h @@ -237,9 +237,8 @@ static inline bool af_alg_readable(struct sock *sk) return PAGE_SIZE <= af_alg_rcvbuf(sk); } -unsigned int af_alg_count_tsgl(struct sock *sk, size_t bytes, size_t offset); -void af_alg_pull_tsgl(struct sock *sk, size_t used, struct scatterlist *dst, - size_t dst_offset); +unsigned int af_alg_count_tsgl(struct sock *sk, size_t bytes); +void af_alg_pull_tsgl(struct sock *sk, size_t used, struct scatterlist *dst); void af_alg_wmem_wakeup(struct sock *sk); int af_alg_wait_for_data(struct sock *sk, unsigned flags, unsigned min); int af_alg_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size, -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] CVE-2026-31503
by Li Xiasong 30 Apr '26

30 Apr '26

Kuniyuki Iwashima (1): tcp: Rearrange tests in inet_csk_bind_conflict(). Martin KaFai Lau (1): udp: Fix wildcard bind conflict check when using hash2 include/net/inet_hashtables.h | 14 ++++++++ net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c | 58 ++++++++++++--------------------- net/ipv4/udp.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 5

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] net: fix fanout UAF in packet_release() via NETDEV_UP race
by Li Xiasong 30 Apr '26

30 Apr '26

From: Yochai Eisenrich <echelonh(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.0-rc6 commit 42156f93d123436f2a27c468f18c966b7e5db796 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14240--cate CVE: CVE-2026-31504 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- `packet_release()` has a race window where `NETDEV_UP` can re-register a socket into a fanout group's `arr[]` array. The re-registration is not cleaned up by `fanout_release()`, leaving a dangling pointer in the fanout array. `packet_release()` does NOT zero `po->num` in its `bind_lock` section. After releasing `bind_lock`, `po->num` is still non-zero and `po->ifindex` still matches the bound device. A concurrent `packet_notifier(NETDEV_UP)` that already found the socket in `sklist` can re-register the hook. For fanout sockets, this re-registration calls `__fanout_link(sk, po)` which adds the socket back into `f->arr[]` and increments `f->num_members`, but does NOT increment `f->sk_ref`. The fix sets `po->num` to zero in `packet_release` while `bind_lock` is held to prevent NETDEV_UP from linking, preventing the race window. This bug was found following an additional audit with Claude Code based on CVE-2025-38617. Fixes: ce06b03e60fc ("packet: Add helpers to register/unregister ->prot_hook") Link: https://blog.calif.io/p/a-race-within-a-race-exploiting-cve Signed-off-by: Yochai Eisenrich <echelonh(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb(a)google.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260319200610.25101-1-echelonh@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: net/packet/af_packet.c [conflicts due to not merge f1d9268e0618 ("net: add net device refcount tracker to struct packet_type") and d62607c3fe45 ("net: rename reference+tracking helpers") and b3cb764aa1d7 ("net: drop nopreempt requirement on sock_prot_inuse_add()").] Signed-off-by: Li Xiasong <lixiasong1(a)huawei.com> --- net/packet/af_packet.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/net/packet/af_packet.c b/net/packet/af_packet.c index 3938c9df92da..f8f8728cff53 100644 --- a/net/packet/af_packet.c +++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c @@ -3052,6 +3052,7 @@ static int packet_release(struct socket *sock) spin_lock(&po->bind_lock); unregister_prot_hook(sk, false); + WRITE_ONCE(po->num, 0); packet_cached_dev_reset(po); if (po->prot_hook.dev) { -- 2.34.1

2 2

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] CVE-2026-31414
by Li Xiasong 30 Apr '26

30 Apr '26

Pablo Neira Ayuso (2): netfilter: nf_conntrack_expect: honor expectation helper field netfilter: nf_conntrack_expect: use expect->helper include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_expect.h | 2 +- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_broadcast.c | 2 +- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_expect.c | 16 +++++++++++-- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_h323_main.c | 12 +++++----- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_helper.c | 11 +++++---- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 26 +++++++++------------ net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_sip.c | 4 ++-- 7 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 3

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/3] CVE-2026-31419
by Li Xiasong 30 Apr '26

30 Apr '26

Hangbin Liu (1): bonding: do not set usable_slaves for broadcast mode Tonghao Zhang (1): net: bonding: update the slave array for broadcast mode Xiang Mei (1): net: bonding: fix use-after-free in bond_xmit_broadcast() drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 4

[PATCH OLK-6.6] futex: Clear stale exiting pointer in futex_lock_pi() retry path
by Jiacheng Yu 29 Apr '26

29 Apr '26

From: Davidlohr Bueso <dave(a)stgolabs.net> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.131 commit de7c0c04ad868f2cee6671b11c0a6d20421af1da category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14301 CVE: CVE-2026-31555 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 210d36d892de5195e6766c45519dfb1e65f3eb83 upstream. Fuzzying/stressing futexes triggered: WARNING: kernel/futex/core.c:825 at wait_for_owner_exiting+0x7a/0x80, CPU#11: futex_lock_pi_s/524 When futex_lock_pi_atomic() sees the owner is exiting, it returns -EBUSY and stores a refcounted task pointer in 'exiting'. After wait_for_owner_exiting() consumes that reference, the local pointer is never reset to nil. Upon a retry, if futex_lock_pi_atomic() returns a different error, the bogus pointer is passed to wait_for_owner_exiting(). CPU0 CPU1 CPU2 futex_lock_pi(uaddr) // acquires the PI futex exit() futex_cleanup_begin() futex_state = EXITING; futex_lock_pi(uaddr) futex_lock_pi_atomic() attach_to_pi_owner() // observes EXITING *exiting = owner; // takes ref return -EBUSY wait_for_owner_exiting(-EBUSY, owner) put_task_struct(); // drops ref // exiting still points to owner goto retry; futex_lock_pi_atomic() lock_pi_update_atomic() cmpxchg(uaddr) *uaddr ^= WAITERS // whatever // value changed return -EAGAIN; wait_for_owner_exiting(-EAGAIN, exiting) // stale WARN_ON_ONCE(exiting) Fix this by resetting upon retry, essentially aligning it with requeue_pi. Fixes: 3ef240eaff36 ("futex: Prevent exit livelock") Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave(a)stgolabs.net> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)kernel.org> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260326001759.4129680-1-dave@stgolabs.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Jiacheng Yu <yujiacheng3(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/futex/pi.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/futex/pi.c b/kernel/futex/pi.c index ce2889f123755..9496084b6dcd8 100644 --- a/kernel/futex/pi.c +++ b/kernel/futex/pi.c @@ -930,9 +930,9 @@ int fixup_pi_owner(u32 __user *uaddr, struct futex_q *q, int locked) int futex_lock_pi(u32 __user *uaddr, unsigned int flags, ktime_t *time, int trylock) { struct hrtimer_sleeper timeout, *to; - struct task_struct *exiting = NULL; struct rt_mutex_waiter rt_waiter; struct futex_hash_bucket *hb; + struct task_struct *exiting; struct futex_q q = futex_q_init; int res, ret; @@ -945,6 +945,7 @@ int futex_lock_pi(u32 __user *uaddr, unsigned int flags, ktime_t *time, int tryl to = futex_setup_timer(time, &timeout, flags, 0); retry: + exiting = NULL; ret = get_futex_key(uaddr, flags & FLAGS_SHARED, &q.key, FUTEX_WRITE); if (unlikely(ret != 0)) goto out; -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] drivers:misc:sdma-dae: Write the CQ head pointer correctly.
by Jiacheng Yu 29 Apr '26

29 Apr '26

From: wangzijian970910 <wangzijian22(a)huawei.com> kunpeng inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14439 CVE: NA ----------------------------------------------------------------- When writing the CQ head pointer for SDMA, the passed-in val should be written to the register.However, the code currently hardcodes the CQ head pointer to 1.This bug causes the CQ head and tail pointers to never match during driver unloading, resulting in an infinite loop. Fixes: 42aacec658a8 ("drivers:misc:sdma-dae: optimize kernel code") Signed-off-by: wangzijian970910 <wangzijian22(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/misc/sdma-dae/sdma_hal.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/misc/sdma-dae/sdma_hal.h b/drivers/misc/sdma-dae/sdma_hal.h index 437fb755bca3c..8924ad0c5f103 100644 --- a/drivers/misc/sdma-dae/sdma_hal.h +++ b/drivers/misc/sdma-dae/sdma_hal.h @@ -270,7 +270,7 @@ static inline void sdma_channel_set_cq_head(struct hisi_sdma_channel *pchan, u32 u32 reg_val = readl(pchan->io_base + HISI_SDMA_CH_CQHDBR_REG); reg_val &= ~HISI_SDMA_U32_MSK; - reg_val |= FIELD_PREP(HISI_SDMA_U32_MSK, 1); + reg_val |= FIELD_PREP(HISI_SDMA_U32_MSK, val); writel(reg_val, pchan->io_base + HISI_SDMA_CH_CQHDBR_REG); } -- 2.43.0

2 4

[PATCH OLK-6.6] futex: Clear stale exiting pointer in futex_lock_pi() retry path
by Jiacheng Yu 29 Apr '26

29 Apr '26

From: Davidlohr Bueso <dave(a)stgolabs.net> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.131 commit de7c0c04ad868f2cee6671b11c0a6d20421af1da category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14301 CVE: CVE-2026-31555 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 210d36d892de5195e6766c45519dfb1e65f3eb83 upstream. Fuzzying/stressing futexes triggered: WARNING: kernel/futex/core.c:825 at wait_for_owner_exiting+0x7a/0x80, CPU#11: futex_lock_pi_s/524 When futex_lock_pi_atomic() sees the owner is exiting, it returns -EBUSY and stores a refcounted task pointer in 'exiting'. After wait_for_owner_exiting() consumes that reference, the local pointer is never reset to nil. Upon a retry, if futex_lock_pi_atomic() returns a different error, the bogus pointer is passed to wait_for_owner_exiting(). CPU0 CPU1 CPU2 futex_lock_pi(uaddr) // acquires the PI futex exit() futex_cleanup_begin() futex_state = EXITING; futex_lock_pi(uaddr) futex_lock_pi_atomic() attach_to_pi_owner() // observes EXITING *exiting = owner; // takes ref return -EBUSY wait_for_owner_exiting(-EBUSY, owner) put_task_struct(); // drops ref // exiting still points to owner goto retry; futex_lock_pi_atomic() lock_pi_update_atomic() cmpxchg(uaddr) *uaddr ^= WAITERS // whatever // value changed return -EAGAIN; wait_for_owner_exiting(-EAGAIN, exiting) // stale WARN_ON_ONCE(exiting) Fix this by resetting upon retry, essentially aligning it with requeue_pi. Fixes: 3ef240eaff36 ("futex: Prevent exit livelock") Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave(a)stgolabs.net> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)kernel.org> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260326001759.4129680-1-dave@stgolabs.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Jiacheng Yu <yujiacheng3(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/futex/pi.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/futex/pi.c b/kernel/futex/pi.c index ce2889f123755..9496084b6dcd8 100644 --- a/kernel/futex/pi.c +++ b/kernel/futex/pi.c @@ -930,9 +930,9 @@ int fixup_pi_owner(u32 __user *uaddr, struct futex_q *q, int locked) int futex_lock_pi(u32 __user *uaddr, unsigned int flags, ktime_t *time, int trylock) { struct hrtimer_sleeper timeout, *to; - struct task_struct *exiting = NULL; struct rt_mutex_waiter rt_waiter; struct futex_hash_bucket *hb; + struct task_struct *exiting; struct futex_q q = futex_q_init; int res, ret; @@ -945,6 +945,7 @@ int futex_lock_pi(u32 __user *uaddr, unsigned int flags, ktime_t *time, int tryl to = futex_setup_timer(time, &timeout, flags, 0); retry: + exiting = NULL; ret = get_futex_key(uaddr, flags & FLAGS_SHARED, &q.key, FUTEX_WRITE); if (unlikely(ret != 0)) goto out; -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] Bluetooth: hci_sync: fix double unlock in hci_discovery_filter_clear()
by Fanhua Li 29 Apr '26

29 Apr '26

hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/9070 -------------------------------- hci_discovery_filter_clear() acquires hdev->discovery.lock only once, but due to the patch being applied repeatedly, spin_unlock() is called twice. This leads to an unmatched unlock and may cause preempt count underflow, resulting in scheduling warnings or other unexpected behavior. Delete the extra spin_unlock() at the end of the function. Fixes: ec03e0b8aa81 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: fix double free in 'hci_discovery_filter_clear()'") Fixes: 5b70b93fc768 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: fix double free in 'hci_discovery_filter_clear()'") Signed-off-by: Fanhua Li <lifanhua5(a)huawei.com> --- include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h b/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h index 9a15072d77f8..4d4923d43cb1 100644 --- a/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h +++ b/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h @@ -903,7 +903,6 @@ static inline void hci_discovery_filter_clear(struct hci_dev *hdev) hdev->discovery.scan_start = 0; hdev->discovery.scan_duration = 0; - spin_unlock(&hdev->discovery.lock); } bool hci_discovery_active(struct hci_dev *hdev); -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] device property: Make modifications of fwnode "flags" thread safe
by Chen Jinghuang 29 Apr '26

29 Apr '26

From: Douglas Anderson <dianders(a)chromium.org> mainline inclusion fromt mainline-v7.1-rc2 commit f72e77c33e4b5657af35125e75bab249256030f3 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/9069 CVE: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… ---------------------------------------------------------------------- In various places in the kernel, we modify the fwnode "flags" member by doing either: fwnode->flags |= SOME_FLAG; fwnode->flags &= ~SOME_FLAG; This type of modification is not thread-safe. If two threads are both mucking with the flags at the same time then one can clobber the other. While flags are often modified while under the "fwnode_link_lock", this is not universally true. Create some accessor functions for setting, clearing, and testing the FWNODE flags and move all users to these accessor functions. New accessor functions use set_bit() and clear_bit(), which are thread-safe. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: c2c724c868c4 ("driver core: Add fw_devlink_parse_fwtree()") Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko(a)linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Mark Brown <broonie(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa+renesas(a)sang-engineering.com> Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders(a)chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Rafael J. Wysocki (Intel) <rafael(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Saravana Kannan <saravanak(a)kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260317090112.v2.1.I0a4d03104ecd5103df3d76f66c8d2… [ Fix fwnode_clear_flag() argument alignment, restore dropped blank line in fwnode_dev_initialized(), and remove unnecessary parentheses around fwnode_test_flag() calls. - Danilo ] Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich <dakr(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: include/linux/fwnode.h drivers/of/platform.c [context conflicts] Signed-off-by: Chen Jinghuang <chenjinghuang2(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/base/core.c | 24 ++++++++++----------- drivers/bus/imx-weim.c | 2 +- drivers/i2c/i2c-core-of.c | 2 +- drivers/of/base.c | 2 +- drivers/of/dynamic.c | 2 +- drivers/of/platform.c | 2 +- drivers/spi/spi.c | 2 +- include/linux/fwnode.h | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- 8 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/base/core.c b/drivers/base/core.c index 8a4c3bc7bafa..35bcac9b6597 100644 --- a/drivers/base/core.c +++ b/drivers/base/core.c @@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ void fw_devlink_purge_absent_suppliers(struct fwnode_handle *fwnode) if (fwnode->dev) return; - fwnode->flags |= FWNODE_FLAG_NOT_DEVICE; + fwnode_set_flag(fwnode, FWNODE_FLAG_NOT_DEVICE); fwnode_links_purge_consumers(fwnode); fwnode_for_each_available_child_node(fwnode, child) @@ -237,7 +237,7 @@ static void __fw_devlink_pickup_dangling_consumers(struct fwnode_handle *fwnode, if (fwnode->dev && fwnode->dev->bus) return; - fwnode->flags |= FWNODE_FLAG_NOT_DEVICE; + fwnode_set_flag(fwnode, FWNODE_FLAG_NOT_DEVICE); __fwnode_links_move_consumers(fwnode, new_sup); fwnode_for_each_available_child_node(fwnode, child) @@ -1019,7 +1019,7 @@ static void device_links_missing_supplier(struct device *dev) static bool dev_is_best_effort(struct device *dev) { return (fw_devlink_best_effort && dev->can_match) || - (dev->fwnode && (dev->fwnode->flags & FWNODE_FLAG_BEST_EFFORT)); + (dev->fwnode && fwnode_test_flag(dev->fwnode, FWNODE_FLAG_BEST_EFFORT)); } static struct fwnode_handle *fwnode_links_check_suppliers( @@ -1735,11 +1735,11 @@ bool fw_devlink_is_strict(void) static void fw_devlink_parse_fwnode(struct fwnode_handle *fwnode) { - if (fwnode->flags & FWNODE_FLAG_LINKS_ADDED) + if (fwnode_test_flag(fwnode, FWNODE_FLAG_LINKS_ADDED)) return; fwnode_call_int_op(fwnode, add_links); - fwnode->flags |= FWNODE_FLAG_LINKS_ADDED; + fwnode_set_flag(fwnode, FWNODE_FLAG_LINKS_ADDED); } static void fw_devlink_parse_fwtree(struct fwnode_handle *fwnode) @@ -1898,7 +1898,7 @@ static bool fwnode_init_without_drv(struct fwnode_handle *fwnode) struct device *dev; bool ret; - if (!(fwnode->flags & FWNODE_FLAG_INITIALIZED)) + if (!fwnode_test_flag(fwnode, FWNODE_FLAG_INITIALIZED)) return false; dev = get_dev_from_fwnode(fwnode); @@ -1957,10 +1957,10 @@ static bool __fw_devlink_relax_cycles(struct fwnode_handle *con_handle, * We aren't trying to find all cycles. Just a cycle between con and * sup_handle. */ - if (sup_handle->flags & FWNODE_FLAG_VISITED) + if (fwnode_test_flag(sup_handle, FWNODE_FLAG_VISITED)) return false; - sup_handle->flags |= FWNODE_FLAG_VISITED; + fwnode_set_flag(sup_handle, FWNODE_FLAG_VISITED); /* Termination condition. */ if (sup_handle == con_handle) { @@ -2030,7 +2030,7 @@ static bool __fw_devlink_relax_cycles(struct fwnode_handle *con_handle, } out: - sup_handle->flags &= ~FWNODE_FLAG_VISITED; + fwnode_clear_flag(sup_handle, FWNODE_FLAG_VISITED); put_device(sup_dev); put_device(con_dev); put_device(par_dev); @@ -2083,7 +2083,7 @@ static int fw_devlink_create_devlink(struct device *con, * When such a flag is set, we can't create device links where P is the * supplier of C as that would delay the probe of C. */ - if (sup_handle->flags & FWNODE_FLAG_NEEDS_CHILD_BOUND_ON_ADD && + if (fwnode_test_flag(sup_handle, FWNODE_FLAG_NEEDS_CHILD_BOUND_ON_ADD) && fwnode_is_ancestor_of(sup_handle, con->fwnode)) return -EINVAL; @@ -2106,7 +2106,7 @@ static int fw_devlink_create_devlink(struct device *con, else flags = FW_DEVLINK_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE; - if (sup_handle->flags & FWNODE_FLAG_NOT_DEVICE) + if (fwnode_test_flag(sup_handle, FWNODE_FLAG_NOT_DEVICE)) sup_dev = fwnode_get_next_parent_dev(sup_handle); else sup_dev = get_dev_from_fwnode(sup_handle); @@ -2118,7 +2118,7 @@ static int fw_devlink_create_devlink(struct device *con, * supplier device indefinitely. */ if (sup_dev->links.status == DL_DEV_NO_DRIVER && - sup_handle->flags & FWNODE_FLAG_INITIALIZED) { + fwnode_test_flag(sup_handle, FWNODE_FLAG_INITIALIZED)) { dev_dbg(con, "Not linking %pfwf - dev might never probe\n", sup_handle); diff --git a/drivers/bus/imx-weim.c b/drivers/bus/imx-weim.c index f9fd1582f150..5244013d328f 100644 --- a/drivers/bus/imx-weim.c +++ b/drivers/bus/imx-weim.c @@ -335,7 +335,7 @@ static int of_weim_notify(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long action, * fw_devlink doesn't skip adding consumers to this * device. */ - rd->dn->fwnode.flags &= ~FWNODE_FLAG_NOT_DEVICE; + fwnode_clear_flag(&rd->dn->fwnode, FWNODE_FLAG_NOT_DEVICE); if (!of_platform_device_create(rd->dn, NULL, &pdev->dev)) { dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Failed to create child device '%pOF'\n", diff --git a/drivers/i2c/i2c-core-of.c b/drivers/i2c/i2c-core-of.c index a6c407d36800..50e97e2ed2cf 100644 --- a/drivers/i2c/i2c-core-of.c +++ b/drivers/i2c/i2c-core-of.c @@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ static int of_i2c_notify(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long action, * Clear the flag before adding the device so that fw_devlink * doesn't skip adding consumers to this device. */ - rd->dn->fwnode.flags &= ~FWNODE_FLAG_NOT_DEVICE; + fwnode_clear_flag(&rd->dn->fwnode, FWNODE_FLAG_NOT_DEVICE); client = of_i2c_register_device(adap, rd->dn); if (IS_ERR(client)) { dev_err(&adap->dev, "failed to create client for '%pOF'\n", diff --git a/drivers/of/base.c b/drivers/of/base.c index ccadc22f18c0..bbe05053c7f1 100644 --- a/drivers/of/base.c +++ b/drivers/of/base.c @@ -1759,7 +1759,7 @@ void of_alias_scan(void * (*dt_alloc)(u64 size, u64 align)) if (name) of_stdout = of_find_node_opts_by_path(name, &of_stdout_options); if (of_stdout) - of_stdout->fwnode.flags |= FWNODE_FLAG_BEST_EFFORT; + fwnode_set_flag(&of_stdout->fwnode, FWNODE_FLAG_BEST_EFFORT); } if (!of_aliases) diff --git a/drivers/of/dynamic.c b/drivers/of/dynamic.c index 18393800546c..ab109bb92cf4 100644 --- a/drivers/of/dynamic.c +++ b/drivers/of/dynamic.c @@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ static void __of_attach_node(struct device_node *np) np->sibling = np->parent->child; np->parent->child = np; of_node_clear_flag(np, OF_DETACHED); - np->fwnode.flags |= FWNODE_FLAG_NOT_DEVICE; + fwnode_set_flag(&np->fwnode, FWNODE_FLAG_NOT_DEVICE); raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&devtree_lock, flags); diff --git a/drivers/of/platform.c b/drivers/of/platform.c index 89a44f6bdc7e..77940d41d101 100644 --- a/drivers/of/platform.c +++ b/drivers/of/platform.c @@ -788,7 +788,7 @@ static int of_platform_notify(struct notifier_block *nb, * Clear the flag before adding the device so that fw_devlink * doesn't skip adding consumers to this device. */ - rd->dn->fwnode.flags &= ~FWNODE_FLAG_NOT_DEVICE; + fwnode_clear_flag(&rd->dn->fwnode, FWNODE_FLAG_NOT_DEVICE); /* pdev_parent may be NULL when no bus platform device */ pdev_parent = of_find_device_by_node(rd->dn->parent); pdev = of_platform_device_create(rd->dn, NULL, diff --git a/drivers/spi/spi.c b/drivers/spi/spi.c index 2ca4ea45e3b2..9ec4426ffe1b 100644 --- a/drivers/spi/spi.c +++ b/drivers/spi/spi.c @@ -4528,7 +4528,7 @@ static int of_spi_notify(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long action, * Clear the flag before adding the device so that fw_devlink * doesn't skip adding consumers to this device. */ - rd->dn->fwnode.flags &= ~FWNODE_FLAG_NOT_DEVICE; + fwnode_clear_flag(&rd->dn->fwnode, FWNODE_FLAG_NOT_DEVICE); spi = of_register_spi_device(ctlr, rd->dn); put_device(&ctlr->dev); diff --git a/include/linux/fwnode.h b/include/linux/fwnode.h index ec86debcefe5..4ab0682ae3bf 100644 --- a/include/linux/fwnode.h +++ b/include/linux/fwnode.h @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ #include <linux/types.h> #include <linux/list.h> #include <linux/bits.h> +#include <linux/bitops.h> #include <linux/err.h> #include <linux/kabi.h> @@ -32,12 +33,12 @@ struct device; * suppliers. Only enforce ordering with suppliers that have * drivers. */ -#define FWNODE_FLAG_LINKS_ADDED BIT(0) -#define FWNODE_FLAG_NOT_DEVICE BIT(1) -#define FWNODE_FLAG_INITIALIZED BIT(2) -#define FWNODE_FLAG_NEEDS_CHILD_BOUND_ON_ADD BIT(3) -#define FWNODE_FLAG_BEST_EFFORT BIT(4) -#define FWNODE_FLAG_VISITED BIT(5) +#define FWNODE_FLAG_LINKS_ADDED 0 +#define FWNODE_FLAG_NOT_DEVICE 1 +#define FWNODE_FLAG_INITIALIZED 2 +#define FWNODE_FLAG_NEEDS_CHILD_BOUND_ON_ADD 3 +#define FWNODE_FLAG_BEST_EFFORT 4 +#define FWNODE_FLAG_VISITED 5 struct fwnode_handle { struct fwnode_handle *secondary; @@ -45,8 +46,7 @@ struct fwnode_handle { struct device *dev; struct list_head suppliers; struct list_head consumers; - u8 flags; - KABI_RESERVE(1) + KABI_USE(1, unsigned long flags) KABI_RESERVE(2) }; @@ -204,16 +204,37 @@ static inline void fwnode_init(struct fwnode_handle *fwnode, INIT_LIST_HEAD(&fwnode->suppliers); } +static inline void fwnode_set_flag(struct fwnode_handle *fwnode, + unsigned int bit) +{ + set_bit(bit, &fwnode->flags); +} + +static inline void fwnode_clear_flag(struct fwnode_handle *fwnode, + unsigned int bit) +{ + clear_bit(bit, &fwnode->flags); +} + +static inline void fwnode_assign_flag(struct fwnode_handle *fwnode, + unsigned int bit, bool value) +{ + assign_bit(bit, &fwnode->flags, value); +} + +static inline bool fwnode_test_flag(struct fwnode_handle *fwnode, + unsigned int bit) +{ + return test_bit(bit, &fwnode->flags); +} + static inline void fwnode_dev_initialized(struct fwnode_handle *fwnode, bool initialized) { if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(fwnode)) return; - if (initialized) - fwnode->flags |= FWNODE_FLAG_INITIALIZED; - else - fwnode->flags &= ~FWNODE_FLAG_INITIALIZED; + fwnode_assign_flag(fwnode, FWNODE_FLAG_INITIALIZED, initialized); } extern bool fw_devlink_is_strict(void); -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/1] Revert "cpufreq: Fix re-boost issue after hotplugging a CPU"
by Lifeng Zheng 29 Apr '26

29 Apr '26

From: Hongye Lin <linhongye(a)h-partners.com> driver inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/8995 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Lifeng Zheng (1): Revert "cpufreq: Fix re-boost issue after hotplugging a CPU" drivers/cpufreq/cpufreq.c | 4 ---- 1 file changed, 4 deletions(-) -- 2.33.0

2 2

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/1] cpufreq: conservative: Reset requested_freq on limits change
by Lifeng Zheng 29 Apr '26

29 Apr '26

From: Hongye Lin <linhongye(a)h-partners.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.0-rc6 commit 6a28fb8cb28b9eb39a392e531d938a889eacafc5 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/8993 CVE: NA Reference: https://web.git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/comm… ---------------------------------------------------------------------- A recently reported issue highlighted that the cached requested_freq is not guaranteed to stay in sync with policy->cur. If the platform changes the actual CPU frequency after the governor sets one (e.g. due to platform-specific frequency scaling) and a re-sync occurs later, policy->cur may diverge from requested_freq. This can lead to incorrect behavior in the conservative governor. For example, the governor may assume the CPU is already running at the maximum frequency and skip further increases even though there is still headroom. Avoid this by resetting the cached requested_freq to policy->cur on detecting a change in policy limits. Viresh Kumar (1): cpufreq: conservative: Reset requested_freq on limits change drivers/cpufreq/cpufreq_conservative.c | 12 ++++++++++++ drivers/cpufreq/cpufreq_governor.c | 3 +++ drivers/cpufreq/cpufreq_governor.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+) -- 2.33.0

2 2

[PATCH OLK-5.10] NFSD: Hold net reference for the lifetime of /proc/fs/nfs/exports fd
by Li Lingfeng 29 Apr '26

29 Apr '26

From: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever(a)oracle.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.253 commit 76740c28050dc6db2f5550f1325b00a11bbb3255 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14129 CVE: CVE-2026-31403 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit e7fcf179b82d3a3730fd8615da01b087cc654d0b ] The /proc/fs/nfs/exports proc entry is created at module init and persists for the module's lifetime. exports_proc_open() captures the caller's current network namespace and stores its svc_export_cache in seq->private, but takes no reference on the namespace. If the namespace is subsequently torn down (e.g. container destruction after the opener does setns() to a different namespace), nfsd_net_exit() calls nfsd_export_shutdown() which frees the cache. Subsequent reads on the still-open fd dereference the freed cache_detail, walking a freed hash table. Hold a reference on the struct net for the lifetime of the open file descriptor. This prevents nfsd_net_exit() from running -- and thus prevents nfsd_export_shutdown() from freeing the cache -- while any exports fd is open. cache_detail already stores its net pointer (cd->net, set by cache_create_net()), so exports_release() can retrieve it without additional per-file storage. Reported-by: Misbah Anjum N <misanjum(a)linux.ibm.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-nfs/dcd371d3a95815a84ba7de52cef447b8@linux.ib… Fixes: 96d851c4d28d ("nfsd: use proper net while reading "exports" file") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: NeilBrown <neil(a)brown.name> Tested-by: Olga Kornievskaia <okorniev(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Conflicts: fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c [Commit 97a32539b956 ("proc: convert everything to "struct proc_ops"") convert exports_proc_operations to exports_proc_ops.] Signed-off-by: Li Lingfeng <lilingfeng3(a)huawei.com> --- fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c b/fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c index e84c8cf8e2c0..2bfd200bcd05 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c @@ -149,9 +149,19 @@ static int exports_net_open(struct net *net, struct file *file) seq = file->private_data; seq->private = nn->svc_export_cache; + get_net(net); return 0; } +static int exports_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) +{ + struct seq_file *seq = file->private_data; + struct cache_detail *cd = seq->private; + + put_net(cd->net); + return seq_release(inode, file); +} + static int exports_proc_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) { return exports_net_open(current->nsproxy->net_ns, file); @@ -161,7 +171,7 @@ static const struct proc_ops exports_proc_ops = { .proc_open = exports_proc_open, .proc_read = seq_read, .proc_lseek = seq_lseek, - .proc_release = seq_release, + .proc_release = exports_release, }; static int exports_nfsd_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) @@ -173,7 +183,7 @@ static const struct file_operations exports_nfsd_operations = { .open = exports_nfsd_open, .read = seq_read, .llseek = seq_lseek, - .release = seq_release, + .release = exports_release, }; static int export_features_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) -- 2.52.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] KVM: x86: Use scratch field in MMIO fragment to hold small write values
by Xinyu Zheng 29 Apr '26

29 Apr '26

From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.1-rc1 commit 0b16e69d17d8c35c5c9d5918bf596c75a44655d3 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14416 CVE: CVE-2026-31588 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- When exiting to userspace to service an emulated MMIO write, copy the to-be-written value to a scratch field in the MMIO fragment if the size of the data payload is 8 bytes or less, i.e. can fit in a single chunk, instead of pointing the fragment directly at the source value. This fixes a class of use-after-free bugs that occur when the emulator initiates a write using an on-stack, local variable as the source, the write splits a page boundary, *and* both pages are MMIO pages. Because KVM's ABI only allows for physically contiguous MMIO requests, accesses that split MMIO pages are separated into two fragments, and are sent to userspace one at a time. When KVM attempts to complete userspace MMIO in response to KVM_RUN after the first fragment, KVM will detect the second fragment and generate a second userspace exit, and reference the on-stack variable. The issue is most visible if the second KVM_RUN is performed by a separate task, in which case the stack of the initiating task can show up as truly freed data. ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in complete_emulated_mmio+0x305/0x420 Read of size 1 at addr ffff888009c378d1 by task syz-executor417/984 CPU: 1 PID: 984 Comm: syz-executor417 Not tainted 5.10.0-182.0.0.95.h2627.eulerosv2r13.x86_64 #3 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.15.0-0-g2dd4b9b3f840-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0xbe/0xfd print_address_description.constprop.0+0x19/0x170 __kasan_report.cold+0x6c/0x84 kasan_report+0x3a/0x50 check_memory_region+0xfd/0x1f0 memcpy+0x20/0x60 complete_emulated_mmio+0x305/0x420 kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x63f/0x6d0 kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x413/0xb20 __se_sys_ioctl+0x111/0x160 do_syscall_64+0x30/0x40 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x67/0xd1 RIP: 0033:0x42477d Code: <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007faa8e6890e8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004d7338 RCX: 000000000042477d RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000ae80 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 00000000004d7330 R08: 00007fff28d546df R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000004d733c R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 000000000040a200 R15: 00007fff28d54720 The buggy address belongs to the page: page:0000000029f6a428 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x9c37 flags: 0xfffffc0000000(node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x1fffff) raw: 000fffffc0000000 0000000000000000 ffffea0000270dc8 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888009c37780: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ffff888009c37800: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff >ffff888009c37880: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ^ ffff888009c37900: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ffff888009c37980: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ================================================================== The bug can also be reproduced with a targeted KVM-Unit-Test by hacking KVM to fill a large on-stack variable in complete_emulated_mmio(), i.e. by overwrite the data value with garbage. Limit the use of the scratch fields to 8-byte or smaller accesses, and to just writes, as larger accesses and reads are not affected thanks to implementation details in the emulator, but add a sanity check to ensure those details don't change in the future. Specifically, KVM never uses on-stack variables for accesses larger that 8 bytes, e.g. uses an operand in the emulator context, and *all* reads are buffered through the mem_read cache. Note! Using the scratch field for reads is not only unnecessary, it's also extremely difficult to handle correctly. As above, KVM buffers all reads through the mem_read cache, and heavily relies on that behavior when re-emulating the instruction after a userspace MMIO read exit. If a read splits a page, the first page is NOT an MMIO page, and the second page IS an MMIO page, then the MMIO fragment needs to point at _just_ the second chunk of the destination, i.e. its position in the mem_read cache. Taking the "obvious" approach of copying the fragment value into the destination when re-emulating the instruction would clobber the first chunk of the destination, i.e. would clobber the data that was read from guest memory. Fixes: f78146b0f923 ("KVM: Fix page-crossing MMIO") Suggested-by: Yashu Zhang <zhangjiaji1(a)huawei.com> Reported-by: Yashu Zhang <zhangjiaji1(a)huawei.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/369eaaa2b3c1425c85e8477066391bc7@huawei.com Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky(a)gmail.com> Tested-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe(a)intel.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260225012049.920665-2-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Xinyu Zheng <zhengxinyu6(a)huawei.com> --- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 14 +++++++++++++- include/linux/kvm_host.h | 3 ++- 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c index 947dae594ddb..18b733c8bb5f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -7814,7 +7814,13 @@ static int emulator_read_write_onepage(unsigned long addr, void *val, WARN_ON(vcpu->mmio_nr_fragments >= KVM_MAX_MMIO_FRAGMENTS); frag = &vcpu->mmio_fragments[vcpu->mmio_nr_fragments++]; frag->gpa = gpa; - frag->data = val; + if (write && bytes <= 8u) { + frag->val = 0; + frag->data = &frag->val; + memcpy(&frag->val, val, bytes); + } else { + frag->data = val; + } frag->len = bytes; return X86EMUL_CONTINUE; } @@ -7829,6 +7835,9 @@ static int emulator_read_write(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, gpa_t gpa; int rc; + if (WARN_ON_ONCE((bytes > 8u || !ops->write) && object_is_on_stack(val))) + return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE; + if (ops->read_write_prepare && ops->read_write_prepare(vcpu, val, bytes)) return X86EMUL_CONTINUE; @@ -11272,6 +11281,9 @@ static int complete_emulated_mmio(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) frag++; vcpu->mmio_cur_fragment++; } else { + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(frag->data == &frag->val)) + return -EIO; + /* Go forward to the next mmio piece. */ frag->data += len; frag->gpa += len; diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h index 480196639480..ae7053b044f7 100644 --- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h +++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h @@ -317,7 +317,8 @@ static inline bool kvm_vcpu_can_poll(ktime_t cur, ktime_t stop) struct kvm_mmio_fragment { gpa_t gpa; void *data; - unsigned len; + u64 val; + unsigned int len; }; struct kvm_vcpu { -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] KVM: x86: Use scratch field in MMIO fragment to hold small write values
by Xinyu Zheng 29 Apr '26

29 Apr '26

From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.1-rc1 commit 0b16e69d17d8c35c5c9d5918bf596c75a44655d3 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14416 CVE: CVE-2026-31588 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- When exiting to userspace to service an emulated MMIO write, copy the to-be-written value to a scratch field in the MMIO fragment if the size of the data payload is 8 bytes or less, i.e. can fit in a single chunk, instead of pointing the fragment directly at the source value. This fixes a class of use-after-free bugs that occur when the emulator initiates a write using an on-stack, local variable as the source, the write splits a page boundary, *and* both pages are MMIO pages. Because KVM's ABI only allows for physically contiguous MMIO requests, accesses that split MMIO pages are separated into two fragments, and are sent to userspace one at a time. When KVM attempts to complete userspace MMIO in response to KVM_RUN after the first fragment, KVM will detect the second fragment and generate a second userspace exit, and reference the on-stack variable. The issue is most visible if the second KVM_RUN is performed by a separate task, in which case the stack of the initiating task can show up as truly freed data. ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in complete_emulated_mmio+0x305/0x420 Read of size 1 at addr ffff888009c378d1 by task syz-executor417/984 CPU: 1 PID: 984 Comm: syz-executor417 Not tainted 5.10.0-182.0.0.95.h2627.eulerosv2r13.x86_64 #3 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.15.0-0-g2dd4b9b3f840-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0xbe/0xfd print_address_description.constprop.0+0x19/0x170 __kasan_report.cold+0x6c/0x84 kasan_report+0x3a/0x50 check_memory_region+0xfd/0x1f0 memcpy+0x20/0x60 complete_emulated_mmio+0x305/0x420 kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x63f/0x6d0 kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x413/0xb20 __se_sys_ioctl+0x111/0x160 do_syscall_64+0x30/0x40 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x67/0xd1 RIP: 0033:0x42477d Code: <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007faa8e6890e8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004d7338 RCX: 000000000042477d RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000ae80 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 00000000004d7330 R08: 00007fff28d546df R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000004d733c R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 000000000040a200 R15: 00007fff28d54720 The buggy address belongs to the page: page:0000000029f6a428 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x9c37 flags: 0xfffffc0000000(node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x1fffff) raw: 000fffffc0000000 0000000000000000 ffffea0000270dc8 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888009c37780: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ffff888009c37800: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff >ffff888009c37880: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ^ ffff888009c37900: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ffff888009c37980: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ================================================================== The bug can also be reproduced with a targeted KVM-Unit-Test by hacking KVM to fill a large on-stack variable in complete_emulated_mmio(), i.e. by overwrite the data value with garbage. Limit the use of the scratch fields to 8-byte or smaller accesses, and to just writes, as larger accesses and reads are not affected thanks to implementation details in the emulator, but add a sanity check to ensure those details don't change in the future. Specifically, KVM never uses on-stack variables for accesses larger that 8 bytes, e.g. uses an operand in the emulator context, and *all* reads are buffered through the mem_read cache. Note! Using the scratch field for reads is not only unnecessary, it's also extremely difficult to handle correctly. As above, KVM buffers all reads through the mem_read cache, and heavily relies on that behavior when re-emulating the instruction after a userspace MMIO read exit. If a read splits a page, the first page is NOT an MMIO page, and the second page IS an MMIO page, then the MMIO fragment needs to point at _just_ the second chunk of the destination, i.e. its position in the mem_read cache. Taking the "obvious" approach of copying the fragment value into the destination when re-emulating the instruction would clobber the first chunk of the destination, i.e. would clobber the data that was read from guest memory. Fixes: f78146b0f923 ("KVM: Fix page-crossing MMIO") Suggested-by: Yashu Zhang <zhangjiaji1(a)huawei.com> Reported-by: Yashu Zhang <zhangjiaji1(a)huawei.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/369eaaa2b3c1425c85e8477066391bc7@huawei.com Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky(a)gmail.com> Tested-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe(a)intel.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260225012049.920665-2-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Xinyu Zheng <zhengxinyu6(a)huawei.com> --- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 14 +++++++++++++- include/linux/kvm_host.h | 3 ++- 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c index 947dae594ddb..18b733c8bb5f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -7814,7 +7814,13 @@ static int emulator_read_write_onepage(unsigned long addr, void *val, WARN_ON(vcpu->mmio_nr_fragments >= KVM_MAX_MMIO_FRAGMENTS); frag = &vcpu->mmio_fragments[vcpu->mmio_nr_fragments++]; frag->gpa = gpa; - frag->data = val; + if (write && bytes <= 8u) { + frag->val = 0; + frag->data = &frag->val; + memcpy(&frag->val, val, bytes); + } else { + frag->data = val; + } frag->len = bytes; return X86EMUL_CONTINUE; } @@ -7829,6 +7835,9 @@ static int emulator_read_write(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, gpa_t gpa; int rc; + if (WARN_ON_ONCE((bytes > 8u || !ops->write) && object_is_on_stack(val))) + return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE; + if (ops->read_write_prepare && ops->read_write_prepare(vcpu, val, bytes)) return X86EMUL_CONTINUE; @@ -11272,6 +11281,9 @@ static int complete_emulated_mmio(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) frag++; vcpu->mmio_cur_fragment++; } else { + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(frag->data == &frag->val)) + return -EIO; + /* Go forward to the next mmio piece. */ frag->data += len; frag->gpa += len; diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h index 480196639480..ae7053b044f7 100644 --- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h +++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h @@ -317,7 +317,8 @@ static inline bool kvm_vcpu_can_poll(ktime_t cur, ktime_t stop) struct kvm_mmio_fragment { gpa_t gpa; void *data; - unsigned len; + u64 val; + unsigned int len; }; struct kvm_vcpu { -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] [Backport] KVM: x86: Use scratch field in MMIO fragment to hold small write values
by Xinyu Zheng 29 Apr '26

29 Apr '26

From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.1-rc1 commit 0b16e69d17d8c35c5c9d5918bf596c75a44655d3 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14416 CVE: CVE-2026-31588 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- When exiting to userspace to service an emulated MMIO write, copy the to-be-written value to a scratch field in the MMIO fragment if the size of the data payload is 8 bytes or less, i.e. can fit in a single chunk, instead of pointing the fragment directly at the source value. This fixes a class of use-after-free bugs that occur when the emulator initiates a write using an on-stack, local variable as the source, the write splits a page boundary, *and* both pages are MMIO pages. Because KVM's ABI only allows for physically contiguous MMIO requests, accesses that split MMIO pages are separated into two fragments, and are sent to userspace one at a time. When KVM attempts to complete userspace MMIO in response to KVM_RUN after the first fragment, KVM will detect the second fragment and generate a second userspace exit, and reference the on-stack variable. The issue is most visible if the second KVM_RUN is performed by a separate task, in which case the stack of the initiating task can show up as truly freed data. ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in complete_emulated_mmio+0x305/0x420 Read of size 1 at addr ffff888009c378d1 by task syz-executor417/984 CPU: 1 PID: 984 Comm: syz-executor417 Not tainted 5.10.0-182.0.0.95.h2627.eulerosv2r13.x86_64 #3 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.15.0-0-g2dd4b9b3f840-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0xbe/0xfd print_address_description.constprop.0+0x19/0x170 __kasan_report.cold+0x6c/0x84 kasan_report+0x3a/0x50 check_memory_region+0xfd/0x1f0 memcpy+0x20/0x60 complete_emulated_mmio+0x305/0x420 kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x63f/0x6d0 kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x413/0xb20 __se_sys_ioctl+0x111/0x160 do_syscall_64+0x30/0x40 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x67/0xd1 RIP: 0033:0x42477d Code: <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007faa8e6890e8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004d7338 RCX: 000000000042477d RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000ae80 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 00000000004d7330 R08: 00007fff28d546df R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000004d733c R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 000000000040a200 R15: 00007fff28d54720 The buggy address belongs to the page: page:0000000029f6a428 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x9c37 flags: 0xfffffc0000000(node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x1fffff) raw: 000fffffc0000000 0000000000000000 ffffea0000270dc8 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888009c37780: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ffff888009c37800: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff >ffff888009c37880: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ^ ffff888009c37900: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ffff888009c37980: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ================================================================== The bug can also be reproduced with a targeted KVM-Unit-Test by hacking KVM to fill a large on-stack variable in complete_emulated_mmio(), i.e. by overwrite the data value with garbage. Limit the use of the scratch fields to 8-byte or smaller accesses, and to just writes, as larger accesses and reads are not affected thanks to implementation details in the emulator, but add a sanity check to ensure those details don't change in the future. Specifically, KVM never uses on-stack variables for accesses larger that 8 bytes, e.g. uses an operand in the emulator context, and *all* reads are buffered through the mem_read cache. Note! Using the scratch field for reads is not only unnecessary, it's also extremely difficult to handle correctly. As above, KVM buffers all reads through the mem_read cache, and heavily relies on that behavior when re-emulating the instruction after a userspace MMIO read exit. If a read splits a page, the first page is NOT an MMIO page, and the second page IS an MMIO page, then the MMIO fragment needs to point at _just_ the second chunk of the destination, i.e. its position in the mem_read cache. Taking the "obvious" approach of copying the fragment value into the destination when re-emulating the instruction would clobber the first chunk of the destination, i.e. would clobber the data that was read from guest memory. Fixes: f78146b0f923 ("KVM: Fix page-crossing MMIO") Suggested-by: Yashu Zhang <zhangjiaji1(a)huawei.com> Reported-by: Yashu Zhang <zhangjiaji1(a)huawei.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/369eaaa2b3c1425c85e8477066391bc7@huawei.com Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky(a)gmail.com> Tested-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe(a)intel.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260225012049.920665-2-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Xinyu Zheng <zhengxinyu6(a)huawei.com> --- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 14 +++++++++++++- include/linux/kvm_host.h | 3 ++- 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c index 947dae594ddb..18b733c8bb5f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -7814,7 +7814,13 @@ static int emulator_read_write_onepage(unsigned long addr, void *val, WARN_ON(vcpu->mmio_nr_fragments >= KVM_MAX_MMIO_FRAGMENTS); frag = &vcpu->mmio_fragments[vcpu->mmio_nr_fragments++]; frag->gpa = gpa; - frag->data = val; + if (write && bytes <= 8u) { + frag->val = 0; + frag->data = &frag->val; + memcpy(&frag->val, val, bytes); + } else { + frag->data = val; + } frag->len = bytes; return X86EMUL_CONTINUE; } @@ -7829,6 +7835,9 @@ static int emulator_read_write(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, gpa_t gpa; int rc; + if (WARN_ON_ONCE((bytes > 8u || !ops->write) && object_is_on_stack(val))) + return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE; + if (ops->read_write_prepare && ops->read_write_prepare(vcpu, val, bytes)) return X86EMUL_CONTINUE; @@ -11272,6 +11281,9 @@ static int complete_emulated_mmio(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) frag++; vcpu->mmio_cur_fragment++; } else { + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(frag->data == &frag->val)) + return -EIO; + /* Go forward to the next mmio piece. */ frag->data += len; frag->gpa += len; diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h index 480196639480..ae7053b044f7 100644 --- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h +++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h @@ -317,7 +317,8 @@ static inline bool kvm_vcpu_can_poll(ktime_t cur, ktime_t stop) struct kvm_mmio_fragment { gpa_t gpa; void *data; - unsigned len; + u64 val; + unsigned int len; }; struct kvm_vcpu { -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] [Backport] KVM: x86: Use scratch field in MMIO fragment to hold small write values
by Xinyu Zheng 29 Apr '26

29 Apr '26

From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.1-rc1 commit 0b16e69d17d8c35c5c9d5918bf596c75a44655d3 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14416 CVE: CVE-2026-31588 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- When exiting to userspace to service an emulated MMIO write, copy the to-be-written value to a scratch field in the MMIO fragment if the size of the data payload is 8 bytes or less, i.e. can fit in a single chunk, instead of pointing the fragment directly at the source value. This fixes a class of use-after-free bugs that occur when the emulator initiates a write using an on-stack, local variable as the source, the write splits a page boundary, *and* both pages are MMIO pages. Because KVM's ABI only allows for physically contiguous MMIO requests, accesses that split MMIO pages are separated into two fragments, and are sent to userspace one at a time. When KVM attempts to complete userspace MMIO in response to KVM_RUN after the first fragment, KVM will detect the second fragment and generate a second userspace exit, and reference the on-stack variable. The issue is most visible if the second KVM_RUN is performed by a separate task, in which case the stack of the initiating task can show up as truly freed data. ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in complete_emulated_mmio+0x305/0x420 Read of size 1 at addr ffff888009c378d1 by task syz-executor417/984 CPU: 1 PID: 984 Comm: syz-executor417 Not tainted 5.10.0-182.0.0.95.h2627.eulerosv2r13.x86_64 #3 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.15.0-0-g2dd4b9b3f840-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0xbe/0xfd print_address_description.constprop.0+0x19/0x170 __kasan_report.cold+0x6c/0x84 kasan_report+0x3a/0x50 check_memory_region+0xfd/0x1f0 memcpy+0x20/0x60 complete_emulated_mmio+0x305/0x420 kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x63f/0x6d0 kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x413/0xb20 __se_sys_ioctl+0x111/0x160 do_syscall_64+0x30/0x40 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x67/0xd1 RIP: 0033:0x42477d Code: <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007faa8e6890e8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004d7338 RCX: 000000000042477d RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000ae80 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 00000000004d7330 R08: 00007fff28d546df R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000004d733c R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 000000000040a200 R15: 00007fff28d54720 The buggy address belongs to the page: page:0000000029f6a428 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x9c37 flags: 0xfffffc0000000(node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x1fffff) raw: 000fffffc0000000 0000000000000000 ffffea0000270dc8 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888009c37780: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ffff888009c37800: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff >ffff888009c37880: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ^ ffff888009c37900: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ffff888009c37980: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ================================================================== The bug can also be reproduced with a targeted KVM-Unit-Test by hacking KVM to fill a large on-stack variable in complete_emulated_mmio(), i.e. by overwrite the data value with garbage. Limit the use of the scratch fields to 8-byte or smaller accesses, and to just writes, as larger accesses and reads are not affected thanks to implementation details in the emulator, but add a sanity check to ensure those details don't change in the future. Specifically, KVM never uses on-stack variables for accesses larger that 8 bytes, e.g. uses an operand in the emulator context, and *all* reads are buffered through the mem_read cache. Note! Using the scratch field for reads is not only unnecessary, it's also extremely difficult to handle correctly. As above, KVM buffers all reads through the mem_read cache, and heavily relies on that behavior when re-emulating the instruction after a userspace MMIO read exit. If a read splits a page, the first page is NOT an MMIO page, and the second page IS an MMIO page, then the MMIO fragment needs to point at _just_ the second chunk of the destination, i.e. its position in the mem_read cache. Taking the "obvious" approach of copying the fragment value into the destination when re-emulating the instruction would clobber the first chunk of the destination, i.e. would clobber the data that was read from guest memory. Fixes: f78146b0f923 ("KVM: Fix page-crossing MMIO") Suggested-by: Yashu Zhang <zhangjiaji1(a)huawei.com> Reported-by: Yashu Zhang <zhangjiaji1(a)huawei.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/369eaaa2b3c1425c85e8477066391bc7@huawei.com Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky(a)gmail.com> Tested-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe(a)intel.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260225012049.920665-2-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Xinyu Zheng <zhengxinyu6(a)huawei.com> --- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 14 +++++++++++++- include/linux/kvm_host.h | 3 ++- 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c index 947dae594ddb..18b733c8bb5f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -7814,7 +7814,13 @@ static int emulator_read_write_onepage(unsigned long addr, void *val, WARN_ON(vcpu->mmio_nr_fragments >= KVM_MAX_MMIO_FRAGMENTS); frag = &vcpu->mmio_fragments[vcpu->mmio_nr_fragments++]; frag->gpa = gpa; - frag->data = val; + if (write && bytes <= 8u) { + frag->val = 0; + frag->data = &frag->val; + memcpy(&frag->val, val, bytes); + } else { + frag->data = val; + } frag->len = bytes; return X86EMUL_CONTINUE; } @@ -7829,6 +7835,9 @@ static int emulator_read_write(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, gpa_t gpa; int rc; + if (WARN_ON_ONCE((bytes > 8u || !ops->write) && object_is_on_stack(val))) + return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE; + if (ops->read_write_prepare && ops->read_write_prepare(vcpu, val, bytes)) return X86EMUL_CONTINUE; @@ -11272,6 +11281,9 @@ static int complete_emulated_mmio(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) frag++; vcpu->mmio_cur_fragment++; } else { + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(frag->data == &frag->val)) + return -EIO; + /* Go forward to the next mmio piece. */ frag->data += len; frag->gpa += len; diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h index 480196639480..ae7053b044f7 100644 --- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h +++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h @@ -317,7 +317,8 @@ static inline bool kvm_vcpu_can_poll(ktime_t cur, ktime_t stop) struct kvm_mmio_fragment { gpa_t gpa; void *data; - unsigned len; + u64 val; + unsigned int len; }; struct kvm_vcpu { -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] NFSD: Defer sub-object cleanup in export put callbacks
by Li Lingfeng 29 Apr '26

29 Apr '26

From: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever(a)oracle.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.0-rc5 commit 48db892356d6cb80f6942885545de4a6dd8d2a29 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14130 CVE: CVE-2026-31404 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- svc_export_put() calls path_put() and auth_domain_put() immediately when the last reference drops, before the RCU grace period. RCU readers in e_show() and c_show() access both ex_path (via seq_path/d_path) and ex_client->name (via seq_escape) without holding a reference. If cache_clean removes the entry and drops the last reference concurrently, the sub-objects are freed while still in use, producing a NULL pointer dereference in d_path. Commit 2530766492ec ("nfsd: fix UAF when access ex_uuid or ex_stats") moved kfree of ex_uuid and ex_stats into the call_rcu callback, but left path_put() and auth_domain_put() running before the grace period because both may sleep and call_rcu callbacks execute in softirq context. Replace call_rcu/kfree_rcu with queue_rcu_work(), which defers the callback until after the RCU grace period and executes it in process context where sleeping is permitted. This allows path_put() and auth_domain_put() to be moved into the deferred callback alongside the other resource releases. Apply the same fix to expkey_put(), which has the identical pattern with ek_path and ek_client. A dedicated workqueue scopes the shutdown drain to only NFSD export release work items; flushing the shared system_unbound_wq would stall on unrelated work from other subsystems. nfsd_export_shutdown() uses rcu_barrier() followed by flush_workqueue() to ensure all deferred release callbacks complete before the export caches are destroyed. Reported-by: Misbah Anjum N <misanjum(a)linux.ibm.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-nfs/dcd371d3a95815a84ba7de52cef447b8@linux.ib… Fixes: c224edca7af0 ("nfsd: no need get cache ref when protected by rcu") Fixes: 1b10f0b603c0 ("SUNRPC: no need get cache ref when protected by rcu") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reviwed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: NeilBrown <neil(a)brown.name> Tested-by: Olga Kornievskaia <okorniev(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever(a)oracle.com> Conflicts: fs/nfsd/export.c fs/nfsd/export.h fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c [Commit 20ad856e4732 ("nfsd: report per-export stats") add EXP_STATS_COUNTERS_NUM in export_stats_reset(); commit 20ad856e4732 ("nfsd: report per-export stats") add "percpu_counter.h" in fs/nfsd/export.h; commit f7fb730cac9a ("NFSD: fix race between nfsd registration and exports_proc") move create_proc_exports_entry() down in init_nfsd().] Signed-off-by: Li Lingfeng <lilingfeng3(a)huawei.com> --- fs/nfsd/export.c | 63 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- fs/nfsd/export.h | 7 ++++-- fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c | 8 +++++- 3 files changed, 66 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/nfsd/export.c b/fs/nfsd/export.c index 0e1caf71296e..5eba1cd9a72e 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/export.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/export.c @@ -36,19 +36,30 @@ * second map contains a reference to the entry in the first map. */ +static struct workqueue_struct *nfsd_export_wq; + #define EXPKEY_HASHBITS 8 #define EXPKEY_HASHMAX (1 << EXPKEY_HASHBITS) #define EXPKEY_HASHMASK (EXPKEY_HASHMAX -1) -static void expkey_put(struct kref *ref) +static void expkey_release(struct work_struct *work) { - struct svc_expkey *key = container_of(ref, struct svc_expkey, h.ref); + struct svc_expkey *key = container_of(to_rcu_work(work), + struct svc_expkey, ek_rwork); if (test_bit(CACHE_VALID, &key->h.flags) && !test_bit(CACHE_NEGATIVE, &key->h.flags)) path_put(&key->ek_path); auth_domain_put(key->ek_client); - kfree_rcu(key, ek_rcu); + kfree(key); +} + +static void expkey_put(struct kref *ref) +{ + struct svc_expkey *key = container_of(ref, struct svc_expkey, h.ref); + + INIT_RCU_WORK(&key->ek_rwork, expkey_release); + queue_rcu_work(nfsd_export_wq, &key->ek_rwork); } static int expkey_upcall(struct cache_detail *cd, struct cache_head *h) @@ -331,11 +342,13 @@ static void nfsd4_fslocs_free(struct nfsd4_fs_locations *fsloc) fsloc->locations = NULL; } -static void svc_export_release(struct rcu_head *rcu_head) +static void svc_export_release(struct work_struct *work) { - struct svc_export *exp = container_of(rcu_head, struct svc_export, - ex_rcu); + struct svc_export *exp = container_of(to_rcu_work(work), + struct svc_export, ex_rwork); + path_put(&exp->ex_path); + auth_domain_put(exp->ex_client); nfsd4_fslocs_free(&exp->ex_fslocs); kfree(exp->ex_uuid); kfree(exp); @@ -345,9 +358,8 @@ static void svc_export_put(struct kref *ref) { struct svc_export *exp = container_of(ref, struct svc_export, h.ref); - path_put(&exp->ex_path); - auth_domain_put(exp->ex_client); - call_rcu(&exp->ex_rcu, svc_export_release); + INIT_RCU_WORK(&exp->ex_rwork, svc_export_release); + queue_rcu_work(nfsd_export_wq, &exp->ex_rwork); } static int svc_export_upcall(struct cache_detail *cd, struct cache_head *h) @@ -1268,6 +1280,36 @@ const struct seq_operations nfs_exports_op = { .show = e_show, }; +/** + * nfsd_export_wq_init - allocate the export release workqueue + * + * Called once at module load. The workqueue runs deferred svc_export and + * svc_expkey release work scheduled by queue_rcu_work() in the cache put + * callbacks. + * + * Return values: + * %0: workqueue allocated + * %-ENOMEM: allocation failed + */ +int nfsd_export_wq_init(void) +{ + nfsd_export_wq = alloc_workqueue("nfsd_export", WQ_UNBOUND, 0); + if (!nfsd_export_wq) + return -ENOMEM; + return 0; +} + +/** + * nfsd_export_wq_shutdown - drain and free the export release workqueue + * + * Called once at module unload. Per-namespace teardown in + * nfsd_export_shutdown() has already drained all deferred work. + */ +void nfsd_export_wq_shutdown(void) +{ + destroy_workqueue(nfsd_export_wq); +} + /* * Initialize the exports module. */ @@ -1329,6 +1371,9 @@ nfsd_export_shutdown(struct net *net) cache_unregister_net(nn->svc_expkey_cache, net); cache_unregister_net(nn->svc_export_cache, net); + /* Drain deferred export and expkey release work. */ + rcu_barrier(); + flush_workqueue(nfsd_export_wq); cache_destroy_net(nn->svc_expkey_cache, net); cache_destroy_net(nn->svc_export_cache, net); svcauth_unix_purge(net); diff --git a/fs/nfsd/export.h b/fs/nfsd/export.h index e7daa1f246f0..d87fd4b57ea2 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/export.h +++ b/fs/nfsd/export.h @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ #define NFSD_EXPORT_H #include <linux/sunrpc/cache.h> +#include <linux/workqueue.h> #include <uapi/linux/nfsd/export.h> #include <linux/nfs4.h> @@ -61,7 +62,7 @@ struct svc_export { u32 ex_layout_types; struct nfsd4_deviceid_map *ex_devid_map; struct cache_detail *cd; - struct rcu_head ex_rcu; + struct rcu_work ex_rwork; }; /* an "export key" (expkey) maps a filehandlefragement to an @@ -76,7 +77,7 @@ struct svc_expkey { u32 ek_fsid[6]; struct path ek_path; - struct rcu_head ek_rcu; + struct rcu_work ek_rwork; }; #define EX_ISSYNC(exp) (!((exp)->ex_flags & NFSEXP_ASYNC)) @@ -89,6 +90,8 @@ __be32 check_nfsd_access(struct svc_export *exp, struct svc_rqst *rqstp); /* * Function declarations */ +int nfsd_export_wq_init(void); +void nfsd_export_wq_shutdown(void); int nfsd_export_init(struct net *); void nfsd_export_shutdown(struct net *); void nfsd_export_flush(struct net *); diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c b/fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c index e84c8cf8e2c0..7ede258033a1 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c @@ -1529,9 +1529,12 @@ static int __init init_nfsd(void) if (retval) goto out_free_stat; nfsd_lockd_init(); /* lockd->nfsd callbacks */ - retval = create_proc_exports_entry(); + retval = nfsd_export_wq_init(); if (retval) goto out_free_lockd; + retval = create_proc_exports_entry(); + if (retval) + goto out_free_export_wq; retval = register_pernet_subsys(&nfsd_net_ops); if (retval < 0) goto out_free_exports; @@ -1549,6 +1552,8 @@ static int __init init_nfsd(void) out_free_exports: remove_proc_entry("fs/nfs/exports", NULL); remove_proc_entry("fs/nfs", NULL); +out_free_export_wq: + nfsd_export_wq_shutdown(); out_free_lockd: nfsd_lockd_shutdown(); nfsd_drc_slab_free(); @@ -1566,6 +1571,7 @@ static void __exit exit_nfsd(void) unregister_filesystem(&nfsd_fs_type); unregister_cld_notifier(); unregister_pernet_subsys(&nfsd_net_ops); + nfsd_export_wq_shutdown(); nfsd_drc_slab_free(); remove_proc_entry("fs/nfs/exports", NULL); remove_proc_entry("fs/nfs", NULL); -- 2.52.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] bpf: Fix the use of prog->axu->sleepable
by Luo Gengkun 28 Apr '26

28 Apr '26

hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/8335 CVE: NA -------------------------------- After commit 137a3f0724c8 ("bpf: move sleepable flag from bpf_prog_aux to bpf_prog"), the sleepable variable is no longer usable. However, commit 038a41427a20 ("bpf: Reject sleepable kprobe_multi programs at attach time") uses it accidentally. Fix it by using prog->sleepable. Fixes: 137a3f0724c8 ("bpf: move sleepable flag from bpf_prog_aux to bpf_prog") Signed-off-by: Luo Gengkun <luogengkun2(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c index 52cb76dd27c8..768159fad93c 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c +++ b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c @@ -2900,7 +2900,7 @@ int bpf_kprobe_multi_link_attach(const union bpf_attr *attr, struct bpf_prog *pr return -EOPNOTSUPP; /* kprobe_multi is not allowed to be sleepable. */ - if (prog->aux->sleepable) + if (prog->sleepable) return -EINVAL; if (prog->expected_attach_type != BPF_TRACE_KPROBE_MULTI) -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] bpf: Fix the use of prog->axu->sleepable
by Luo Gengkun 28 Apr '26

28 Apr '26

hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/8335 CVE: NA -------------------------------- After commit 137a3f0724c8 ("bpf: move sleepable flag from bpf_prog_aux to bpf_prog"), the sleepable variable is no longer usable. However, commit 038a41427a20 ("bpf: Reject sleepable kprobe_multi programs at attach time") uses it accidentally. Fix it by using prog->sleepable. Signed-off-by: Luo Gengkun <luogengkun2(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c index 52cb76dd27c8..768159fad93c 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c +++ b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c @@ -2900,7 +2900,7 @@ int bpf_kprobe_multi_link_attach(const union bpf_attr *attr, struct bpf_prog *pr return -EOPNOTSUPP; /* kprobe_multi is not allowed to be sleepable. */ - if (prog->aux->sleepable) + if (prog->sleepable) return -EINVAL; if (prog->expected_attach_type != BPF_TRACE_KPROBE_MULTI) -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] KVM: x86: Use scratch field in MMIO fragment to hold small write values
by Xinyu Zheng 28 Apr '26

28 Apr '26

From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.1-rc1 commit 0b16e69d17d8c35c5c9d5918bf596c75a44655d3 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14416 CVE: CVE-2026-31588 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- When exiting to userspace to service an emulated MMIO write, copy the to-be-written value to a scratch field in the MMIO fragment if the size of the data payload is 8 bytes or less, i.e. can fit in a single chunk, instead of pointing the fragment directly at the source value. This fixes a class of use-after-free bugs that occur when the emulator initiates a write using an on-stack, local variable as the source, the write splits a page boundary, *and* both pages are MMIO pages. Because KVM's ABI only allows for physically contiguous MMIO requests, accesses that split MMIO pages are separated into two fragments, and are sent to userspace one at a time. When KVM attempts to complete userspace MMIO in response to KVM_RUN after the first fragment, KVM will detect the second fragment and generate a second userspace exit, and reference the on-stack variable. The issue is most visible if the second KVM_RUN is performed by a separate task, in which case the stack of the initiating task can show up as truly freed data. ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in complete_emulated_mmio+0x305/0x420 Read of size 1 at addr ffff888009c378d1 by task syz-executor417/984 CPU: 1 PID: 984 Comm: syz-executor417 Not tainted 5.10.0-182.0.0.95.h2627.eulerosv2r13.x86_64 #3 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.15.0-0-g2dd4b9b3f840-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0xbe/0xfd print_address_description.constprop.0+0x19/0x170 __kasan_report.cold+0x6c/0x84 kasan_report+0x3a/0x50 check_memory_region+0xfd/0x1f0 memcpy+0x20/0x60 complete_emulated_mmio+0x305/0x420 kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x63f/0x6d0 kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x413/0xb20 __se_sys_ioctl+0x111/0x160 do_syscall_64+0x30/0x40 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x67/0xd1 RIP: 0033:0x42477d Code: <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007faa8e6890e8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004d7338 RCX: 000000000042477d RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000ae80 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 00000000004d7330 R08: 00007fff28d546df R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000004d733c R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 000000000040a200 R15: 00007fff28d54720 The buggy address belongs to the page: page:0000000029f6a428 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x9c37 flags: 0xfffffc0000000(node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x1fffff) raw: 000fffffc0000000 0000000000000000 ffffea0000270dc8 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888009c37780: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ffff888009c37800: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff >ffff888009c37880: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ^ ffff888009c37900: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ffff888009c37980: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ================================================================== The bug can also be reproduced with a targeted KVM-Unit-Test by hacking KVM to fill a large on-stack variable in complete_emulated_mmio(), i.e. by overwrite the data value with garbage. Limit the use of the scratch fields to 8-byte or smaller accesses, and to just writes, as larger accesses and reads are not affected thanks to implementation details in the emulator, but add a sanity check to ensure those details don't change in the future. Specifically, KVM never uses on-stack variables for accesses larger that 8 bytes, e.g. uses an operand in the emulator context, and *all* reads are buffered through the mem_read cache. Note! Using the scratch field for reads is not only unnecessary, it's also extremely difficult to handle correctly. As above, KVM buffers all reads through the mem_read cache, and heavily relies on that behavior when re-emulating the instruction after a userspace MMIO read exit. If a read splits a page, the first page is NOT an MMIO page, and the second page IS an MMIO page, then the MMIO fragment needs to point at _just_ the second chunk of the destination, i.e. its position in the mem_read cache. Taking the "obvious" approach of copying the fragment value into the destination when re-emulating the instruction would clobber the first chunk of the destination, i.e. would clobber the data that was read from guest memory. Fixes: f78146b0f923 ("KVM: Fix page-crossing MMIO") Suggested-by: Yashu Zhang <zhangjiaji1(a)huawei.com> Reported-by: Yashu Zhang <zhangjiaji1(a)huawei.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/369eaaa2b3c1425c85e8477066391bc7@huawei.com Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky(a)gmail.com> Tested-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe(a)intel.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260225012049.920665-2-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com> Conflicts: include/linux/kvm_host.h [context conflicts] Signed-off-by: Xinyu Zheng <zhengxinyu6(a)huawei.com> --- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 14 +++++++++++++- include/linux/kvm_host.h | 3 ++- 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c index 83d215d43eb3..c4de9cc7bfce 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -5425,7 +5425,13 @@ static int emulator_read_write_onepage(unsigned long addr, void *val, WARN_ON(vcpu->mmio_nr_fragments >= KVM_MAX_MMIO_FRAGMENTS); frag = &vcpu->mmio_fragments[vcpu->mmio_nr_fragments++]; frag->gpa = gpa; - frag->data = val; + if (write && bytes <= 8u) { + frag->val = 0; + frag->data = &frag->val; + memcpy(&frag->val, val, bytes); + } else { + frag->data = val; + } frag->len = bytes; return X86EMUL_CONTINUE; } @@ -5440,6 +5446,9 @@ static int emulator_read_write(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, gpa_t gpa; int rc; + if (WARN_ON_ONCE((bytes > 8u || !ops->write) && object_is_on_stack(val))) + return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE; + if (ops->read_write_prepare && ops->read_write_prepare(vcpu, val, bytes)) return X86EMUL_CONTINUE; @@ -8086,6 +8095,9 @@ static int complete_emulated_mmio(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) frag++; vcpu->mmio_cur_fragment++; } else { + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(frag->data == &frag->val)) + return -EIO; + /* Go forward to the next mmio piece. */ frag->data += len; frag->gpa += len; diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h index f34f0989e453..23731239a228 100644 --- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h +++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h @@ -234,7 +234,8 @@ enum { struct kvm_mmio_fragment { gpa_t gpa; void *data; - unsigned len; + u64 val; + unsigned int len; }; struct kvm_vcpu { -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] KVM: x86: Use scratch field in MMIO fragment to hold small write values
by Xinyu Zheng 28 Apr '26

28 Apr '26

From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.1-rc1 commit 0b16e69d17d8c35c5c9d5918bf596c75a44655d3 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14416 CVE: CVE-2026-31588 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- When exiting to userspace to service an emulated MMIO write, copy the to-be-written value to a scratch field in the MMIO fragment if the size of the data payload is 8 bytes or less, i.e. can fit in a single chunk, instead of pointing the fragment directly at the source value. This fixes a class of use-after-free bugs that occur when the emulator initiates a write using an on-stack, local variable as the source, the write splits a page boundary, *and* both pages are MMIO pages. Because KVM's ABI only allows for physically contiguous MMIO requests, accesses that split MMIO pages are separated into two fragments, and are sent to userspace one at a time. When KVM attempts to complete userspace MMIO in response to KVM_RUN after the first fragment, KVM will detect the second fragment and generate a second userspace exit, and reference the on-stack variable. The issue is most visible if the second KVM_RUN is performed by a separate task, in which case the stack of the initiating task can show up as truly freed data. ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in complete_emulated_mmio+0x305/0x420 Read of size 1 at addr ffff888009c378d1 by task syz-executor417/984 CPU: 1 PID: 984 Comm: syz-executor417 Not tainted 5.10.0-182.0.0.95.h2627.eulerosv2r13.x86_64 #3 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.15.0-0-g2dd4b9b3f840-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0xbe/0xfd print_address_description.constprop.0+0x19/0x170 __kasan_report.cold+0x6c/0x84 kasan_report+0x3a/0x50 check_memory_region+0xfd/0x1f0 memcpy+0x20/0x60 complete_emulated_mmio+0x305/0x420 kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x63f/0x6d0 kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x413/0xb20 __se_sys_ioctl+0x111/0x160 do_syscall_64+0x30/0x40 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x67/0xd1 RIP: 0033:0x42477d Code: <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007faa8e6890e8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004d7338 RCX: 000000000042477d RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000ae80 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 00000000004d7330 R08: 00007fff28d546df R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000004d733c R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 000000000040a200 R15: 00007fff28d54720 The buggy address belongs to the page: page:0000000029f6a428 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x9c37 flags: 0xfffffc0000000(node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x1fffff) raw: 000fffffc0000000 0000000000000000 ffffea0000270dc8 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888009c37780: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ffff888009c37800: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff >ffff888009c37880: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ^ ffff888009c37900: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ffff888009c37980: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ================================================================== The bug can also be reproduced with a targeted KVM-Unit-Test by hacking KVM to fill a large on-stack variable in complete_emulated_mmio(), i.e. by overwrite the data value with garbage. Limit the use of the scratch fields to 8-byte or smaller accesses, and to just writes, as larger accesses and reads are not affected thanks to implementation details in the emulator, but add a sanity check to ensure those details don't change in the future. Specifically, KVM never uses on-stack variables for accesses larger that 8 bytes, e.g. uses an operand in the emulator context, and *all* reads are buffered through the mem_read cache. Note! Using the scratch field for reads is not only unnecessary, it's also extremely difficult to handle correctly. As above, KVM buffers all reads through the mem_read cache, and heavily relies on that behavior when re-emulating the instruction after a userspace MMIO read exit. If a read splits a page, the first page is NOT an MMIO page, and the second page IS an MMIO page, then the MMIO fragment needs to point at _just_ the second chunk of the destination, i.e. its position in the mem_read cache. Taking the "obvious" approach of copying the fragment value into the destination when re-emulating the instruction would clobber the first chunk of the destination, i.e. would clobber the data that was read from guest memory. Fixes: 9c7af565c58e ["centos 8.1: import linux-4.18.0-147.5.1.el8_1"] Suggested-by: Yashu Zhang <zhangjiaji1(a)huawei.com> Reported-by: Yashu Zhang <zhangjiaji1(a)huawei.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/369eaaa2b3c1425c85e8477066391bc7@huawei.com Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky(a)gmail.com> Tested-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe(a)intel.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260225012049.920665-2-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com> Conflicts: include/linux/kvm_host.h [context conflicts] Signed-off-by: Xinyu Zheng <zhengxinyu6(a)huawei.com> --- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 14 +++++++++++++- include/linux/kvm_host.h | 3 ++- 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c index 83d215d43eb3..c4de9cc7bfce 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -5425,7 +5425,13 @@ static int emulator_read_write_onepage(unsigned long addr, void *val, WARN_ON(vcpu->mmio_nr_fragments >= KVM_MAX_MMIO_FRAGMENTS); frag = &vcpu->mmio_fragments[vcpu->mmio_nr_fragments++]; frag->gpa = gpa; - frag->data = val; + if (write && bytes <= 8u) { + frag->val = 0; + frag->data = &frag->val; + memcpy(&frag->val, val, bytes); + } else { + frag->data = val; + } frag->len = bytes; return X86EMUL_CONTINUE; } @@ -5440,6 +5446,9 @@ static int emulator_read_write(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, gpa_t gpa; int rc; + if (WARN_ON_ONCE((bytes > 8u || !ops->write) && object_is_on_stack(val))) + return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE; + if (ops->read_write_prepare && ops->read_write_prepare(vcpu, val, bytes)) return X86EMUL_CONTINUE; @@ -8086,6 +8095,9 @@ static int complete_emulated_mmio(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) frag++; vcpu->mmio_cur_fragment++; } else { + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(frag->data == &frag->val)) + return -EIO; + /* Go forward to the next mmio piece. */ frag->data += len; frag->gpa += len; diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h index f34f0989e453..23731239a228 100644 --- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h +++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h @@ -234,7 +234,8 @@ enum { struct kvm_mmio_fragment { gpa_t gpa; void *data; - unsigned len; + u64 val; + unsigned int len; }; struct kvm_vcpu { -- 2.34.1

2 2

[PATCH OLK-5.10] ALSA: ctxfi: Limit PTP to a single page
by Zhang Yuwei 28 Apr '26

28 Apr '26

From: Harin Lee <me(a)harin.net> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.0-rc4 commit e9418da50d9e5c496c22fe392e4ad74c038a94eb category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14346 CVE: CVE-2026-31602 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Commit 391e69143d0a increased CT_PTP_NUM from 1 to 4 to support 256 playback streams, but the additional pages are not used by the card correctly. The CT20K2 hardware already has multiple VMEM_PTPAL registers, but using them separately would require refactoring the entire virtual memory allocation logic. ct_vm_map() always uses PTEs in vm->ptp[0].area regardless of CT_PTP_NUM. On AMD64 systems, a single PTP covers 512 PTEs (2M). When aggregate memory allocations exceed this limit, ct_vm_map() tries to access beyond the allocated space and causes a page fault: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffd4ae8a10a000 Oops: Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP PTI RIP: 0010:ct_vm_map+0x17c/0x280 [snd_ctxfi] Call Trace: atc_pcm_playback_prepare+0x225/0x3b0 ct_pcm_playback_prepare+0x38/0x60 snd_pcm_do_prepare+0x2f/0x50 snd_pcm_action_single+0x36/0x90 snd_pcm_action_nonatomic+0xbf/0xd0 snd_pcm_ioctl+0x28/0x40 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x97/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0x81/0x610 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Revert CT_PTP_NUM to 1. The 256 SRC_RESOURCE_NUM and playback_count remain unchanged. Fixes: 391e69143d0a ("ALSA: ctxfi: Bump playback substreams to 256") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Harin Lee <me(a)harin.net> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260406074857.216034-1-me@harin.net Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai(a)suse.de> Signed-off-by: Zhang Yuwei <zhangyuwei20(a)huawei.com> --- sound/pci/ctxfi/ctvmem.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/sound/pci/ctxfi/ctvmem.h b/sound/pci/ctxfi/ctvmem.h index 54818a3c245d..a3154e55bd44 100644 --- a/sound/pci/ctxfi/ctvmem.h +++ b/sound/pci/ctxfi/ctvmem.h @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ #ifndef CTVMEM_H #define CTVMEM_H -#define CT_PTP_NUM 4 /* num of device page table pages */ +#define CT_PTP_NUM 1 /* num of device page table pages */ #include <linux/mutex.h> #include <linux/list.h> -- 2.22.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] ALSA: ctxfi: Limit PTP to a single page
by Zhang Yuwei 28 Apr '26

28 Apr '26

From: Harin Lee <me(a)harin.net> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.0-rc4 commit e9418da50d9e5c496c22fe392e4ad74c038a94eb category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14346 CVE: CVE-2026-31602 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Commit 391e69143d0a increased CT_PTP_NUM from 1 to 4 to support 256 playback streams, but the additional pages are not used by the card correctly. The CT20K2 hardware already has multiple VMEM_PTPAL registers, but using them separately would require refactoring the entire virtual memory allocation logic. ct_vm_map() always uses PTEs in vm->ptp[0].area regardless of CT_PTP_NUM. On AMD64 systems, a single PTP covers 512 PTEs (2M). When aggregate memory allocations exceed this limit, ct_vm_map() tries to access beyond the allocated space and causes a page fault: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffd4ae8a10a000 Oops: Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP PTI RIP: 0010:ct_vm_map+0x17c/0x280 [snd_ctxfi] Call Trace: atc_pcm_playback_prepare+0x225/0x3b0 ct_pcm_playback_prepare+0x38/0x60 snd_pcm_do_prepare+0x2f/0x50 snd_pcm_action_single+0x36/0x90 snd_pcm_action_nonatomic+0xbf/0xd0 snd_pcm_ioctl+0x28/0x40 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x97/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0x81/0x610 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Revert CT_PTP_NUM to 1. The 256 SRC_RESOURCE_NUM and playback_count remain unchanged. Fixes: 391e69143d0a ("ALSA: ctxfi: Bump playback substreams to 256") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Harin Lee <me(a)harin.net> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260406074857.216034-1-me@harin.net Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai(a)suse.de> Signed-off-by: Zhang Yuwei <zhangyuwei20(a)huawei.com> --- sound/pci/ctxfi/ctvmem.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/sound/pci/ctxfi/ctvmem.h b/sound/pci/ctxfi/ctvmem.h index da54cbcdb0be..43a0065b40c3 100644 --- a/sound/pci/ctxfi/ctvmem.h +++ b/sound/pci/ctxfi/ctvmem.h @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ #ifndef CTVMEM_H #define CTVMEM_H -#define CT_PTP_NUM 4 /* num of device page table pages */ +#define CT_PTP_NUM 1 /* num of device page table pages */ #include <linux/mutex.h> #include <linux/list.h> -- 2.22.0

2 1

[PATCH v3 OLK-6.6 0/2] critical err extend
by Wupeng Ma 28 Apr '26

28 Apr '26

1. mark node as critical_err on remote RAS error 2. add sysfs interface to set/clear node's critical err status changelog since v2: - remote unsless config check in patch #1 since stub exists changelog since v1: - fix incorrect patch changelog Wupeng Ma (2): mm: mark node as critical_err on remote RAS error numa: add critical_err sysfs interface for remote node recovery drivers/acpi/apei/ghes.c | 14 +++++++---- drivers/base/numa_remote.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- include/linux/mm.h | 19 +++++++++++++++ include/linux/mmzone.h | 4 ++++ mm/migrate.c | 3 +++ 5 files changed, 79 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) -- 2.43.0

2 3

[PATCH OLK-6.6] nvmet: move async event work off nvmet-wq
by Zizhi Wo 27 Apr '26

27 Apr '26

From: Chaitanya Kulkarni <kch(a)nvidia.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.12.80 commit 49c7c50ee6325a084216e94395e067ecde8088fa category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14303 CVE: CVE-2026-31557 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 2922e3507f6d5caa7f1d07f145e186fc6f317a4e ] For target nvmet_ctrl_free() flushes ctrl->async_event_work. If nvmet_ctrl_free() runs on nvmet-wq, the flush re-enters workqueue completion for the same worker:- A. Async event work queued on nvmet-wq (prior to disconnect): nvmet_execute_async_event() queue_work(nvmet_wq, &ctrl->async_event_work) nvmet_add_async_event() queue_work(nvmet_wq, &ctrl->async_event_work) B. Full pre-work chain (RDMA CM path): nvmet_rdma_cm_handler() nvmet_rdma_queue_disconnect() __nvmet_rdma_queue_disconnect() queue_work(nvmet_wq, &queue->release_work) process_one_work() lock((wq_completion)nvmet-wq) <--------- 1st nvmet_rdma_release_queue_work() C. Recursive path (same worker): nvmet_rdma_release_queue_work() nvmet_rdma_free_queue() nvmet_sq_destroy() nvmet_ctrl_put() nvmet_ctrl_free() flush_work(&ctrl->async_event_work) __flush_work() touch_wq_lockdep_map() lock((wq_completion)nvmet-wq) <--------- 2nd Lockdep splat: ============================================ WARNING: possible recursive locking detected 6.19.0-rc3nvme+ #14 Tainted: G N -------------------------------------------- kworker/u192:42/44933 is trying to acquire lock: ffff888118a00948 ((wq_completion)nvmet-wq){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: touch_wq_lockdep_map+0x26/0x90 but task is already holding lock: ffff888118a00948 ((wq_completion)nvmet-wq){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x53e/0x660 3 locks held by kworker/u192:42/44933: #0: ffff888118a00948 ((wq_completion)nvmet-wq){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x53e/0x660 #1: ffffc9000e6cbe28 ((work_completion)(&queue->release_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1c5/0x660 #2: ffffffff82d4db60 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: __flush_work+0x62/0x530 Workqueue: nvmet-wq nvmet_rdma_release_queue_work [nvmet_rdma] Call Trace: __flush_work+0x268/0x530 nvmet_ctrl_free+0x140/0x310 [nvmet] nvmet_cq_put+0x74/0x90 [nvmet] nvmet_rdma_free_queue+0x23/0xe0 [nvmet_rdma] nvmet_rdma_release_queue_work+0x19/0x50 [nvmet_rdma] process_one_work+0x206/0x660 worker_thread+0x184/0x320 kthread+0x10c/0x240 ret_from_fork+0x319/0x390 Move async event work to a dedicated nvmet-aen-wq to avoid reentrant flush on nvmet-wq. Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch(a)lst.de> Signed-off-by: Chaitanya Kulkarni <kch(a)nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: drivers/nvme/target/core.c [nvme-debugfs has not supported, not affect this patch.] Signed-off-by: Zizhi Wo <wozizhi(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/nvme/target/admin-cmd.c | 2 +- drivers/nvme/target/core.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- drivers/nvme/target/nvmet.h | 1 + drivers/nvme/target/rdma.c | 1 + 4 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/nvme/target/admin-cmd.c b/drivers/nvme/target/admin-cmd.c index 39cb570f833d..096bb9f4dd34 100644 --- a/drivers/nvme/target/admin-cmd.c +++ b/drivers/nvme/target/admin-cmd.c @@ -973,11 +973,11 @@ void nvmet_execute_async_event(struct nvmet_req *req) return; } ctrl->async_event_cmds[ctrl->nr_async_event_cmds++] = req; mutex_unlock(&ctrl->lock); - queue_work(nvmet_wq, &ctrl->async_event_work); + queue_work(nvmet_aen_wq, &ctrl->async_event_work); } void nvmet_execute_keep_alive(struct nvmet_req *req) { struct nvmet_ctrl *ctrl = req->sq->ctrl; diff --git a/drivers/nvme/target/core.c b/drivers/nvme/target/core.c index 1cf6dfac1836..5939480842ca 100644 --- a/drivers/nvme/target/core.c +++ b/drivers/nvme/target/core.c @@ -23,10 +23,12 @@ struct workqueue_struct *zbd_wq; static const struct nvmet_fabrics_ops *nvmet_transports[NVMF_TRTYPE_MAX]; static DEFINE_IDA(cntlid_ida); struct workqueue_struct *nvmet_wq; EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvmet_wq); +struct workqueue_struct *nvmet_aen_wq; +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvmet_aen_wq); /* * This read/write semaphore is used to synchronize access to configuration * information on a target system that will result in discovery log page * information change for at least one host. @@ -209,11 +211,11 @@ void nvmet_add_async_event(struct nvmet_ctrl *ctrl, u8 event_type, mutex_lock(&ctrl->lock); list_add_tail(&aen->entry, &ctrl->async_events); mutex_unlock(&ctrl->lock); - queue_work(nvmet_wq, &ctrl->async_event_work); + queue_work(nvmet_aen_wq, &ctrl->async_event_work); } static void nvmet_add_to_changed_ns_log(struct nvmet_ctrl *ctrl, __le32 nsid) { u32 i; @@ -1680,21 +1682,28 @@ static int __init nvmet_init(void) nvmet_wq = alloc_workqueue("nvmet-wq", WQ_MEM_RECLAIM, 0); if (!nvmet_wq) goto out_free_buffered_work_queue; + nvmet_aen_wq = alloc_workqueue("nvmet-aen-wq", + WQ_MEM_RECLAIM | WQ_UNBOUND, 0); + if (!nvmet_aen_wq) + goto out_free_nvmet_work_queue; + error = nvmet_init_discovery(); if (error) - goto out_free_nvmet_work_queue; + goto out_free_nvmet_aen_work_queue; error = nvmet_init_configfs(); if (error) goto out_exit_discovery; return 0; out_exit_discovery: nvmet_exit_discovery(); +out_free_nvmet_aen_work_queue: + destroy_workqueue(nvmet_aen_wq); out_free_nvmet_work_queue: destroy_workqueue(nvmet_wq); out_free_buffered_work_queue: destroy_workqueue(buffered_io_wq); out_free_zbd_work_queue: @@ -1707,10 +1716,11 @@ static int __init nvmet_init(void) static void __exit nvmet_exit(void) { nvmet_exit_configfs(); nvmet_exit_discovery(); ida_destroy(&cntlid_ida); + destroy_workqueue(nvmet_aen_wq); destroy_workqueue(nvmet_wq); destroy_workqueue(buffered_io_wq); destroy_workqueue(zbd_wq); kmem_cache_destroy(nvmet_bvec_cache); diff --git a/drivers/nvme/target/nvmet.h b/drivers/nvme/target/nvmet.h index 3539f8e2d2d3..1a874ba90d1b 100644 --- a/drivers/nvme/target/nvmet.h +++ b/drivers/nvme/target/nvmet.h @@ -399,10 +399,11 @@ struct nvmet_req { #define NVMET_MAX_MPOOL_BVEC 16 extern struct kmem_cache *nvmet_bvec_cache; extern struct workqueue_struct *buffered_io_wq; extern struct workqueue_struct *zbd_wq; extern struct workqueue_struct *nvmet_wq; +extern struct workqueue_struct *nvmet_aen_wq; static inline void nvmet_set_result(struct nvmet_req *req, u32 result) { req->cqe->result.u32 = cpu_to_le32(result); } diff --git a/drivers/nvme/target/rdma.c b/drivers/nvme/target/rdma.c index 298c46834a53..5942949c18af 100644 --- a/drivers/nvme/target/rdma.c +++ b/drivers/nvme/target/rdma.c @@ -2057,10 +2057,11 @@ static void nvmet_rdma_remove_one(struct ib_device *ib_device, void *client_data __nvmet_rdma_queue_disconnect(queue); } mutex_unlock(&nvmet_rdma_queue_mutex); flush_workqueue(nvmet_wq); + flush_workqueue(nvmet_aen_wq); } static struct ib_client nvmet_rdma_ib_client = { .name = "nvmet_rdma", .remove = nvmet_rdma_remove_one -- 2.52.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] smb: client: fix OOB reads parsing symlink error response
by Li Lingfeng 27 Apr '26

27 Apr '26

From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.1-rc1 commit 3df690bba28edec865cf7190be10708ad0ddd67e category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14418 CVE: CVE-2026-31613 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- When a CREATE returns STATUS_STOPPED_ON_SYMLINK, smb2_check_message() returns success without any length validation, leaving the symlink parsers as the only defense against an untrusted server. symlink_data() walks SMB 3.1.1 error contexts with the loop test "p < end", but reads p->ErrorId at offset 4 and p->ErrorDataLength at offset 0. When the server-controlled ErrorDataLength advances p to within 1-7 bytes of end, the next iteration will read past it. When the matching context is found, sym->SymLinkErrorTag is read at offset 4 from p->ErrorContextData with no check that the symlink header itself fits. smb2_parse_symlink_response() then bounds-checks the substitute name using SMB2_SYMLINK_STRUCT_SIZE as the offset of PathBuffer from iov_base. That value is computed as sizeof(smb2_err_rsp) + sizeof(smb2_symlink_err_rsp), which is correct only when ErrorContextCount == 0. With at least one error context the symlink data sits 8 bytes deeper, and each skipped non-matching context shifts it further by 8 + ALIGN(ErrorDataLength, 8). The check is too short, allowing the substitute name read to run past iov_len. The out-of-bound heap bytes are UTF-16-decoded into the symlink target and returned to userspace via readlink(2). Fix this all up by making the loops test require the full context header to fit, rejecting sym if its header runs past end, and bound the substitute name against the actual position of sym->PathBuffer rather than a fixed offset. Because sub_offs and sub_len are 16bits, the pointer math will not overflow here with the new greater-than. Cc: Ronnie Sahlberg <ronniesahlberg(a)gmail.com> Cc: Shyam Prasad N <sprasad(a)microsoft.com> Cc: Tom Talpey <tom(a)talpey.com> Cc: Bharath SM <bharathsm(a)microsoft.com> Cc: linux-cifs(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: samba-technical(a)lists.samba.org Cc: stable <stable(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Paulo Alcantara (Red Hat) <pc(a)manguebit.org> Assisted-by: gregkh_clanker_t1000 Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench(a)microsoft.com> Conflicts: fs/smb/client/smb2file.c [Commit 215b7f9ecb8d ("smb: client: correctly handle ErrorContextData as a flexible array") change the type of ErrorContextData.] Signed-off-by: Li Lingfeng <lilingfeng3(a)huawei.com> --- fs/smb/client/smb2file.c | 20 ++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/smb/client/smb2file.c b/fs/smb/client/smb2file.c index 4e7d5c612256..dc91d75aa1bf 100644 --- a/fs/smb/client/smb2file.c +++ b/fs/smb/client/smb2file.c @@ -27,10 +27,11 @@ static struct smb2_symlink_err_rsp *symlink_data(const struct kvec *iov) { struct smb2_err_rsp *err = iov->iov_base; struct smb2_symlink_err_rsp *sym = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + u8 *end = (u8 *)err + iov->iov_len; u32 len; if (err->ErrorContextCount) { - struct smb2_error_context_rsp *p, *end; + struct smb2_error_context_rsp *p; len = (u32)err->ErrorContextCount * (offsetof(struct smb2_error_context_rsp, ErrorContextData) + @@ -39,8 +40,7 @@ static struct smb2_symlink_err_rsp *symlink_data(const struct kvec *iov) return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); p = (struct smb2_error_context_rsp *)err->ErrorData; - end = (struct smb2_error_context_rsp *)((u8 *)err + iov->iov_len); - do { + while ((u8 *)p + sizeof(*p) <= end) { if (le32_to_cpu(p->ErrorId) == SMB2_ERROR_ID_DEFAULT) { sym = (struct smb2_symlink_err_rsp *)&p->ErrorContextData; break; @@ -50,14 +50,16 @@ static struct smb2_symlink_err_rsp *symlink_data(const struct kvec *iov) len = ALIGN(le32_to_cpu(p->ErrorDataLength), 8); p = (struct smb2_error_context_rsp *)((u8 *)&p->ErrorContextData + len); - } while (p < end); + }; } else if (le32_to_cpu(err->ByteCount) >= sizeof(*sym) && iov->iov_len >= SMB2_SYMLINK_STRUCT_SIZE) { sym = (struct smb2_symlink_err_rsp *)err->ErrorData; } - if (!IS_ERR(sym) && (le32_to_cpu(sym->SymLinkErrorTag) != SYMLINK_ERROR_TAG || - le32_to_cpu(sym->ReparseTag) != IO_REPARSE_TAG_SYMLINK)) + if (!IS_ERR(sym) && + ((u8 *)sym + sizeof(*sym) > end || + le32_to_cpu(sym->SymLinkErrorTag) != SYMLINK_ERROR_TAG || + le32_to_cpu(sym->ReparseTag) != IO_REPARSE_TAG_SYMLINK)) sym = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); return sym; @@ -82,8 +84,10 @@ int smb2_parse_symlink_response(struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb, const struct kvec print_len = le16_to_cpu(sym->PrintNameLength); print_offs = le16_to_cpu(sym->PrintNameOffset); - if (iov->iov_len < SMB2_SYMLINK_STRUCT_SIZE + sub_offs + sub_len || - iov->iov_len < SMB2_SYMLINK_STRUCT_SIZE + print_offs + print_len) + if ((char *)sym->PathBuffer + sub_offs + sub_len > + (char *)iov->iov_base + iov->iov_len || + (char *)sym->PathBuffer + print_offs + print_len > + (char *)iov->iov_base + iov->iov_len) return -EINVAL; return smb2_parse_native_symlink(path, -- 2.52.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] smb: client: fix off-by-8 bounds check in check_wsl_eas()
by Li Lingfeng 27 Apr '26

27 Apr '26

From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.1-rc1 commit 3d8b9d06bd3ac4c6846f5498800b0f5f8062e53b category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14356 CVE: CVE-2026-31614 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- The bounds check uses (u8 *)ea + nlen + 1 + vlen as the end of the EA name and value, but ea_data sits at offset sizeof(struct smb2_file_full_ea_info) = 8 from ea, not at offset 0. The strncmp() later reads ea->ea_data[0..nlen-1] and the value bytes follow at ea_data[nlen+1..nlen+vlen], so the actual end is ea->ea_data + nlen + 1 + vlen. Isn't pointer math fun? The earlier check (u8 *)ea > end - sizeof(*ea) only guarantees the 8-byte header is in bounds, but since the last EA is placed within 8 bytes of the end of the response, the name and value bytes are read past the end of iov. Fix this mess all up by using ea->ea_data as the base for the bounds check. An "untrusted" server can use this to leak up to 8 bytes of kernel heap into the EA name comparison and influence which WSL xattr the data is interpreted as. Cc: Ronnie Sahlberg <ronniesahlberg(a)gmail.com> Cc: Shyam Prasad N <sprasad(a)microsoft.com> Cc: Tom Talpey <tom(a)talpey.com> Cc: Bharath SM <bharathsm(a)microsoft.com> Cc: linux-cifs(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: samba-technical(a)lists.samba.org Cc: stable <stable(a)kernel.org> Assisted-by: gregkh_clanker_t1000 Reviewed-by: Paulo Alcantara (Red Hat) <pc(a)manguebit.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench(a)microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Li Lingfeng <lilingfeng3(a)huawei.com> --- fs/smb/client/smb2inode.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/smb/client/smb2inode.c b/fs/smb/client/smb2inode.c index d6086394d0b8..cb2fc520f3e5 100644 --- a/fs/smb/client/smb2inode.c +++ b/fs/smb/client/smb2inode.c @@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ static int check_wsl_eas(struct kvec *rsp_iov) nlen = ea->ea_name_length; vlen = le16_to_cpu(ea->ea_value_length); if (nlen != SMB2_WSL_XATTR_NAME_LEN || - (u8 *)ea + nlen + 1 + vlen > end) + (u8 *)ea->ea_data + nlen + 1 + vlen > end) return -EINVAL; switch (vlen) { -- 2.52.0

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS 0/3] FIX CVE-2026-31449
by Zizhi Wo 27 Apr '26

27 Apr '26

FIX CVE-2026-31449 Baokun Li (2): ext4: refactor ext4_ext_rm_idx() to index 'path' ext4: prevent partial update of the extents path Tejas Bharambe (1): ext4: validate p_idx bounds in ext4_ext_correct_indexes fs/ext4/extents.c | 78 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 57 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) -- 2.52.0

2 5

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] ext4: publish jinode after initialization
by Zizhi Wo 27 Apr '26

27 Apr '26

From: Li Chen <me(a)linux.beauty> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.253 commit 2d2b648960147d078b000b9a7494017082024366 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14193 CVE: CVE-2026-31450 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 1aec30021edd410b986c156f195f3d23959a9d11 ] ext4_inode_attach_jinode() publishes ei->jinode to concurrent users. It used to set ei->jinode before jbd2_journal_init_jbd_inode(), allowing a reader to observe a non-NULL jinode with i_vfs_inode still unset. The fast commit flush path can then pass this jinode to jbd2_wait_inode_data(), which dereferences i_vfs_inode->i_mapping and may crash. Below is the crash I observe: ``` BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 000000010beb47f4 PGD 110e51067 P4D 110e51067 PUD 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 4850 Comm: fc_fsync_bench_ Not tainted 6.18.0-00764-g795a690c06a5 #1 PREEMPT(voluntary) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Arch Linux 1.17.0-2-2 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:xas_find_marked+0x3d/0x2e0 Code: e0 03 48 83 f8 02 0f 84 f0 01 00 00 48 8b 47 08 48 89 c3 48 39 c6 0f 82 fd 01 00 00 48 85 c9 74 3d 48 83 f9 03 77 63 4c 8b 0f <49> 8b 71 08 48 c7 47 18 00 00 00 00 48 89 f1 83 e1 03 48 83 f9 02 RSP: 0018:ffffbbee806e7bf0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 000000000010beb4 RBX: 000000000010beb4 RCX: 0000000000000003 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000002000300000 RDI: ffffbbee806e7c10 RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000002000300000 R09: 000000010beb47ec R10: ffff9ea494590090 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000002000300000 R13: ffffbbee806e7c90 R14: ffff9ea494513788 R15: ffffbbee806e7c88 FS: 00007fc2f9e3e6c0(0000) GS:ffff9ea6b1444000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000000010beb47f4 CR3: 0000000119ac5000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> filemap_get_folios_tag+0x87/0x2a0 __filemap_fdatawait_range+0x5f/0xd0 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? __schedule+0x3e7/0x10c0 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? preempt_count_sub+0x5f/0x80 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? cap_safe_nice+0x37/0x70 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? preempt_count_sub+0x5f/0x80 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 filemap_fdatawait_range_keep_errors+0x12/0x40 ext4_fc_commit+0x697/0x8b0 ? ext4_file_write_iter+0x64b/0x950 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? preempt_count_sub+0x5f/0x80 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? vfs_write+0x356/0x480 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? preempt_count_sub+0x5f/0x80 ext4_sync_file+0xf7/0x370 do_fsync+0x3b/0x80 ? syscall_trace_enter+0x108/0x1d0 __x64_sys_fdatasync+0x16/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x62/0x2c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e ... ``` Fix this by initializing the jbd2_inode first. Use smp_wmb() and WRITE_ONCE() to publish ei->jinode after initialization. Readers use READ_ONCE() to fetch the pointer. Fixes: a361293f5fede ("jbd2: Fix oops in jbd2_journal_file_inode()") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Li Chen <me(a)linux.beauty> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack(a)suse.cz> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260225082617.147957-1-me@linux.beauty Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso(a)mit.edu> Cc: stable(a)kernel.org [ adapted READ_ONCE(jinode) wrapping to split ext4_fc_submit_inode_data_all() and ext4_fc_wait_inode_data_all() ] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Conflicts: fs/ext4/fast_commit.c [This kernel version has not support fast_commit.] Signed-off-by: Zizhi Wo <wozizhi(a)huawei.com> --- fs/ext4/inode.c | 15 +++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/inode.c b/fs/ext4/inode.c index 8f38837f41f3..737f04bc2be6 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/inode.c +++ b/fs/ext4/inode.c @@ -121,21 +121,23 @@ static void ext4_inode_csum_set(struct inode *inode, struct ext4_inode *raw, } static inline int ext4_begin_ordered_truncate(struct inode *inode, loff_t new_size) { + struct jbd2_inode *jinode = READ_ONCE(EXT4_I(inode)->jinode); + trace_ext4_begin_ordered_truncate(inode, new_size); /* * If jinode is zero, then we never opened the file for * writing, so there's no need to call * jbd2_journal_begin_ordered_truncate() since there's no * outstanding writes we need to flush. */ - if (!EXT4_I(inode)->jinode) + if (!jinode) return 0; return jbd2_journal_begin_ordered_truncate(EXT4_JOURNAL(inode), - EXT4_I(inode)->jinode, + jinode, new_size); } static void ext4_invalidatepage(struct page *page, unsigned int offset, unsigned int length); @@ -4446,12 +4448,17 @@ int ext4_inode_attach_jinode(struct inode *inode) if (!ei->jinode) { if (!jinode) { spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock); return -ENOMEM; } - ei->jinode = jinode; - jbd2_journal_init_jbd_inode(ei->jinode, inode); + jbd2_journal_init_jbd_inode(jinode, inode); + /* + * Publish ->jinode only after it is fully initialized so that + * readers never observe a partially initialized jbd2_inode. + */ + smp_wmb(); + WRITE_ONCE(ei->jinode, jinode); jinode = NULL; } spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock); if (unlikely(jinode != NULL)) jbd2_free_inode(jinode); -- 2.52.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/3] Fix CVE-2026-31449
by Zizhi Wo 27 Apr '26

27 Apr '26

Fix CVE-2026-31449 Baokun Li (2): ext4: refactor ext4_ext_rm_idx() to index 'path' ext4: prevent partial update of the extents path Tejas Bharambe (1): ext4: validate p_idx bounds in ext4_ext_correct_indexes fs/ext4/extents.c | 78 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 57 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) -- 2.52.0

2 4

[PATCH v2 OLK-6.6 0/2] critical err extend
by Wupeng Ma 27 Apr '26

27 Apr '26

1. mark node as critical_err on remote RAS error 2. add sysfs interface to set/clear node's critical err status changelog since v1: - fix incorrect patch changelog Wupeng Ma (2): mm: mark node as critical_err on remote RAS error numa: add critical_err sysfs interface for remote node recovery drivers/acpi/apei/ghes.c | 14 +++++++---- drivers/base/numa_remote.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- include/linux/mm.h | 19 +++++++++++++++ include/linux/mmzone.h | 4 ++++ mm/migrate.c | 4 ++++ 5 files changed, 80 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) -- 2.43.0

2 3

[PATCH OLK-6.6] bpf: Load vmlinux btf for any struct_ops map
by Luo Gengkun 27 Apr '26

27 Apr '26

From: David Vernet <void(a)manifault.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.8-rc1 commit 8b7b0e5fe47de90ba6c350f9abece589fb637f79 category: feature bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/8335 CVE: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… ---------------------------------------------------------------------- In libbpf, when determining whether we need to load vmlinux btf, we're currently (among other things) checking whether there is any struct_ops program present in the object. This works for most realistic struct_ops maps, as a struct_ops map is of course typically composed of one or more struct_ops programs. However, that technically need not be the case. A struct_ops interface could be defined which allows a map to be specified which one or more non-prog fields, and which provides default behavior if no struct_ops progs is actually provided otherwise. For sched_ext, for example, you technically only need to specify the name of the scheduler in the struct_ops map, with the core scheduler logic providing default behavior if no prog is actually specified. If we were to define and try to load such a struct_ops map, we would crash in libbpf when initializing it as obj->btf_vmlinux will be NULL: Reading symbols from minimal... (gdb) r Starting program: minimal_example [Thread debugging using libthread_db enabled] Using host libthread_db library "/usr/lib/libthread_db.so.1". Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. 0x000055555558308c in btf__type_cnt (btf=0x0) at btf.c:612 612 return btf->start_id + btf->nr_types; (gdb) bt type_name=0x5555555d99e3 "sched_ext_ops", kind=4) at btf.c:914 kind=4) at btf.c:942 type=0x7fffffffe558, type_id=0x7fffffffe548, ... data_member=0x7fffffffe568) at libbpf.c:948 kern_btf=0x0) at libbpf.c:1017 at libbpf.c:8059 So as to account for such bare-bones struct_ops maps, let's update obj_needs_vmlinux_btf() to also iterate over an obj's maps and check whether any of them are struct_ops maps. Signed-off-by: David Vernet <void(a)manifault.com> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Alan Maguire <alan.maguire(a)oracle.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20231208061704.400463-1-void@manifault.com Signed-off-by: Luo Gengkun <luogengkun2(a)huawei.com> --- tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.c | 11 +++++++++++ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+) diff --git a/tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.c b/tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.c index 5f8f0dd589e7..034b4074d690 100644 --- a/tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.c +++ b/tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.c @@ -3083,9 +3083,15 @@ static bool prog_needs_vmlinux_btf(struct bpf_program *prog) return false; } +static bool map_needs_vmlinux_btf(struct bpf_map *map) +{ + return bpf_map__is_struct_ops(map); +} + static bool obj_needs_vmlinux_btf(const struct bpf_object *obj) { struct bpf_program *prog; + struct bpf_map *map; int i; /* CO-RE relocations need kernel BTF, only when btf_custom_path @@ -3110,6 +3116,11 @@ static bool obj_needs_vmlinux_btf(const struct bpf_object *obj) return true; } + bpf_object__for_each_map(map, obj) { + if (map_needs_vmlinux_btf(map)) + return true; + } + return false; } -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] bpf: Use kallsyms to find the function name of a struct_ops's stub function
by Luo Gengkun 27 Apr '26

27 Apr '26

From: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau(a)kernel.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.15-rc1 commit 12fdd29d5d71d2987a1aec434b704d850a4d7fcb category: feature bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/8335 CVE: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… ---------------------------------------------------------------------- In commit 1611603537a4 ("bpf: Create argument information for nullable arguments."), it introduced a "__nullable" tagging at the argument name of a stub function. Some background on the commit: it requires to tag the stub function instead of directly tagging the "ops" of a struct. This is because the btf func_proto of the "ops" does not have the argument name and the "__nullable" is tagged at the argument name. To find the stub function of a "ops", it currently relies on a naming convention on the stub function "st_ops__ops_name". e.g. tcp_congestion_ops__ssthresh. However, the new kernel sub system implementing bpf_struct_ops have missed this and have been surprised that the "__nullable" and the to-be-landed "__ref" tagging was not effective. One option would be to give a warning whenever the stub function does not follow the naming convention, regardless if it requires arg tagging or not. Instead, this patch uses the kallsyms_lookup approach and removes the requirement on the naming convention. The st_ops->cfi_stubs has all the stub function kernel addresses. kallsyms_lookup() is used to lookup the function name. With the function name, BTF can be used to find the BTF func_proto. The existing "__nullable" arg name searching logic will then fall through. One notable change is, if it failed in kallsyms_lookup or it failed in looking up the stub function name from the BTF, the bpf_struct_ops registration will fail. This is different from the previous behavior that it silently ignored the "st_ops__ops_name" function not found error. The "tcp_congestion_ops", "sched_ext_ops", and "hid_bpf_ops" can still be registered successfully after this patch. There is struct_ops_maybe_null selftest to cover the "__nullable" tagging. Other minor changes: 1. Removed the "%s__%s" format from the pr_warn because the naming convention is removed. 2. The existing bpf_struct_ops_supported() is also moved earlier because prepare_arg_info needs to use it to decide if the stub function is NULL before calling the prepare_arg_info. Cc: Tejun Heo <tj(a)kernel.org> Cc: Benjamin Tissoires <bentiss(a)kernel.org> Cc: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song(a)linux.dev> Cc: Amery Hung <ameryhung(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Amery Hung <ameryhung(a)gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250127222719.2544255-1-martin.lau@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: kernel/bpf/bpf_struct_ops.c [Fix conflict because e42ac1418055 ("bpf: Check unsupported ops from the bpf_struct_ops's cfi_stubs'") is not merged.] Signed-off-by: Luo Gengkun <luogengkun2(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/bpf/bpf_struct_ops.c | 91 ++++++++++++++++++------------------- 1 file changed, 44 insertions(+), 47 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/bpf_struct_ops.c b/kernel/bpf/bpf_struct_ops.c index 32143bc7f73b..a1387f47997d 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/bpf_struct_ops.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/bpf_struct_ops.c @@ -143,39 +143,6 @@ void bpf_struct_ops_image_free(void *image) } #define MAYBE_NULL_SUFFIX "__nullable" -#define MAX_STUB_NAME 128 - -/* Return the type info of a stub function, if it exists. - * - * The name of a stub function is made up of the name of the struct_ops and - * the name of the function pointer member, separated by "__". For example, - * if the struct_ops type is named "foo_ops" and the function pointer - * member is named "bar", the stub function name would be "foo_ops__bar". - */ -static const struct btf_type * -find_stub_func_proto(const struct btf *btf, const char *st_op_name, - const char *member_name) -{ - char stub_func_name[MAX_STUB_NAME]; - const struct btf_type *func_type; - s32 btf_id; - int cp; - - cp = snprintf(stub_func_name, MAX_STUB_NAME, "%s__%s", - st_op_name, member_name); - if (cp >= MAX_STUB_NAME) { - pr_warn("Stub function name too long\n"); - return NULL; - } - btf_id = btf_find_by_name_kind(btf, stub_func_name, BTF_KIND_FUNC); - if (btf_id < 0) - return NULL; - func_type = btf_type_by_id(btf, btf_id); - if (!func_type) - return NULL; - - return btf_type_by_id(btf, func_type->type); /* FUNC_PROTO */ -} /* Prepare argument info for every nullable argument of a member of a * struct_ops type. @@ -200,27 +167,42 @@ find_stub_func_proto(const struct btf *btf, const char *st_op_name, static int prepare_arg_info(struct btf *btf, const char *st_ops_name, const char *member_name, - const struct btf_type *func_proto, + const struct btf_type *func_proto, void *stub_func_addr, struct bpf_struct_ops_arg_info *arg_info) { const struct btf_type *stub_func_proto, *pointed_type; const struct btf_param *stub_args, *args; struct bpf_ctx_arg_aux *info, *info_buf; u32 nargs, arg_no, info_cnt = 0; + char ksym[KSYM_SYMBOL_LEN]; + const char *stub_fname; + s32 stub_func_id; u32 arg_btf_id; int offset; - stub_func_proto = find_stub_func_proto(btf, st_ops_name, member_name); - if (!stub_func_proto) - return 0; + stub_fname = kallsyms_lookup((unsigned long)stub_func_addr, NULL, NULL, NULL, ksym); + if (!stub_fname) { + pr_warn("Cannot find the stub function name for the %s in struct %s\n", + member_name, st_ops_name); + return -ENOENT; + } + + stub_func_id = btf_find_by_name_kind(btf, stub_fname, BTF_KIND_FUNC); + if (stub_func_id < 0) { + pr_warn("Cannot find the stub function %s in btf\n", stub_fname); + return -ENOENT; + } + + stub_func_proto = btf_type_by_id(btf, stub_func_id); + stub_func_proto = btf_type_by_id(btf, stub_func_proto->type); /* Check if the number of arguments of the stub function is the same * as the number of arguments of the function pointer. */ nargs = btf_type_vlen(func_proto); if (nargs != btf_type_vlen(stub_func_proto)) { - pr_warn("the number of arguments of the stub function %s__%s does not match the number of arguments of the member %s of struct %s\n", - st_ops_name, member_name, member_name, st_ops_name); + pr_warn("the number of arguments of the stub function %s does not match the number of arguments of the member %s of struct %s\n", + stub_fname, member_name, st_ops_name); return -EINVAL; } @@ -250,21 +232,21 @@ static int prepare_arg_info(struct btf *btf, &arg_btf_id); if (!pointed_type || !btf_type_is_struct(pointed_type)) { - pr_warn("stub function %s__%s has %s tagging to an unsupported type\n", - st_ops_name, member_name, MAYBE_NULL_SUFFIX); + pr_warn("stub function %s has %s tagging to an unsupported type\n", + stub_fname, MAYBE_NULL_SUFFIX); goto err_out; } offset = btf_ctx_arg_offset(btf, func_proto, arg_no); if (offset < 0) { - pr_warn("stub function %s__%s has an invalid trampoline ctx offset for arg#%u\n", - st_ops_name, member_name, arg_no); + pr_warn("stub function %s has an invalid trampoline ctx offset for arg#%u\n", + stub_fname, arg_no); goto err_out; } if (args[arg_no].type != stub_args[arg_no].type) { - pr_warn("arg#%u type in stub function %s__%s does not match with its original func_proto\n", - arg_no, st_ops_name, member_name); + pr_warn("arg#%u type in stub function %s does not match with its original func_proto\n", + arg_no, stub_fname); goto err_out; } @@ -321,6 +303,13 @@ static bool is_module_member(const struct btf *btf, u32 id) return !strcmp(btf_name_by_offset(btf, t->name_off), "module"); } +int bpf_struct_ops_supported(const struct bpf_struct_ops *st_ops, u32 moff) +{ + void *func_ptr = *(void **)(st_ops->cfi_stubs + moff); + + return func_ptr ? 0 : -ENOTSUPP; +} + int bpf_struct_ops_desc_init(struct bpf_struct_ops_desc *st_ops_desc, struct btf *btf, struct bpf_verifier_log *log) @@ -379,7 +368,10 @@ int bpf_struct_ops_desc_init(struct bpf_struct_ops_desc *st_ops_desc, for_each_member(i, t, member) { const struct btf_type *func_proto; + void **stub_func_addr; + u32 moff; + moff = __btf_member_bit_offset(t, member) / 8; mname = btf_name_by_offset(btf, member->name_off); if (!*mname) { pr_warn("anon member in struct %s is not supported\n", @@ -405,7 +397,11 @@ int bpf_struct_ops_desc_init(struct bpf_struct_ops_desc *st_ops_desc, func_proto = btf_type_resolve_func_ptr(btf, member->type, NULL); - if (!func_proto) + + /* The member is not a function pointer or + * the function pointer is not supported. + */ + if (!func_proto || bpf_struct_ops_supported(st_ops, moff)) continue; if (btf_distill_func_proto(log, btf, @@ -417,8 +413,9 @@ int bpf_struct_ops_desc_init(struct bpf_struct_ops_desc *st_ops_desc, goto errout; } + stub_func_addr = *(void **)(st_ops->cfi_stubs + moff); err = prepare_arg_info(btf, st_ops->name, mname, - func_proto, + func_proto, stub_func_addr, arg_info + i); if (err) goto errout; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] critical err extend
by Wupeng Ma 27 Apr '26

27 Apr '26

1. mark node as critical_err on remote RAS error 2. add sysfs interface to set/clear node's critical err status Wupeng Ma (2): mm: mark node as critical_err on remote RAS error numa: add critical_err sysfs interface for remote node recovery drivers/acpi/apei/ghes.c | 14 +++++++---- drivers/base/numa_remote.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- include/linux/mm.h | 19 +++++++++++++++ include/linux/mmzone.h | 4 ++++ mm/migrate.c | 4 ++++ 5 files changed, 80 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) -- 2.43.0

2 3

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/3] Fix CVE-2026-31449
by Zizhi Wo 27 Apr '26

27 Apr '26

Fix CVE-2026-31449 Baokun Li (2): ext4: refactor ext4_ext_rm_idx() to index 'path' ext4: prevent partial update of the extents path Tejas Bharambe (1): ext4: validate p_idx bounds in ext4_ext_correct_indexes fs/ext4/extents.c | 78 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 57 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) -- 2.52.0

2 4

openEuler Kernel SIG双周例会
by openEuler conference 27 Apr '26

27 Apr '26

您好！ Kernel 邀请您参加 2026-05-08 14:00 召开的WeLink会议(自动录制) 会议主题：openEuler Kernel SIG双周例会会议发起人： LiaoTao_Wave 会议内容： 1. 进展update 2. 议题征集中（新增议题可直接填报至会议纪要看板）会议链接：https://meeting.huaweicloud.com:36443/#/j/961112036 会议纪要&签到链接：https://etherpad.openeuler.org/p/Kernel-meetings 更多资讯尽在：https://www.openeuler.org/zh/ Hello! Kernel invites you to attend the WeLink conference(auto recording) will be held at 2026-05-08 14:00 The subject of the conference is openEuler Kernel SIG双周例会 The sponsor of the conference is LiaoTao_Wave Summary: 1. 进展update 2. 议题征集中（新增议题可直接填报至会议纪要看板） You can join the meeting at https://meeting.huaweicloud.com:36443/#/j/961112036 Add topics at https://etherpad.openeuler.org/p/Kernel-meetings More information: https://www.openeuler.org/en/

1 0

[PATCH OLK-6.6] kprobes: avoid crash when rmmod/insmod after ftrace killed
by Tengda Wu 27 Apr '26

27 Apr '26

From: "Masami Hiramatsu (Google)" <mhiramat(a)kernel.org> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.135 commit 8b6767e4141b2a42745b544d4555cf1614ba1a2d category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/9015 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit e113f0b46d19626ec15388bcb91432c9a4fd6261 upstream. After we hit ftrace is killed by some errors, the kernel crash if we remove modules in which kprobe probes. BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffbfff805000d PGD 817fcc067 P4D 817fcc067 PUD 817fc8067 PMD 101555067 PTE 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 2012 Comm: rmmod Tainted: G W OE Tainted: [W]=WARN, [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE RIP: 0010:kprobes_module_callback+0x89/0x790 RSP: 0018:ffff88812e157d30 EFLAGS: 00010a02 RAX: 1ffffffff805000d RBX: dffffc0000000000 RCX: ffffffff86a8de90 RDX: ffffed1025c2af9b RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffffffc0280068 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed1025c2af9a R10: ffff88812e157cd7 R11: 205d323130325420 R12: 0000000000000002 R13: ffffffffc0290488 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: ffffffffc0280040 FS: 00007fbc450dd740(0000) GS:ffff888420331000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: fffffbfff805000d CR3: 000000010f624000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: <TASK> notifier_call_chain+0xc6/0x280 blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x60/0x90 __do_sys_delete_module.constprop.0+0x32a/0x4e0 do_syscall_64+0x5d/0xfa0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e This is because the kprobe on ftrace does not correctly handles the kprobe_ftrace_disabled flag set by ftrace_kill(). To prevent this error, check kprobe_ftrace_disabled in __disarm_kprobe_ftrace() and skip all ftrace related operations. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/176473947565.1727781.13110060700668331950.stgit… Reported-by: Ye Bin <yebin10(a)huawei.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251125020536.2484381-1-yebin@huaweicloud.com/ Fixes: ae6aa16fdc16 ("kprobes: introduce ftrace based optimization") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat(a)kernel.org> Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt(a)goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Tengda Wu <wutengda2(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/kprobes.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/kernel/kprobes.c b/kernel/kprobes.c index 367da1154fb1..a4a9846cd495 100644 --- a/kernel/kprobes.c +++ b/kernel/kprobes.c @@ -1116,6 +1116,10 @@ static int __disarm_kprobe_ftrace(struct kprobe *p, struct ftrace_ops *ops, int ret; lockdep_assert_held(&kprobe_mutex); + if (unlikely(kprobe_ftrace_disabled)) { + /* Now ftrace is disabled forever, disarm is already done. */ + return 0; + } if (*cnt == 1) { ret = unregister_ftrace_function(ops); -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] netfilter: xt_CT: drop pending enqueued packets on template removal
by Dong Chenchen 27 Apr '26

27 Apr '26

From: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.0-rc3 commit f62a218a946b19bb59abdd5361da85fa4606b96b category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14022 CVE: CVE-2026-23391 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Templates refer to objects that can go away while packets are sitting in nfqueue refer to: - helper, this can be an issue on module removal. - timeout policy, nfnetlink_cttimeout might remove it. The use of templates with zone and event cache filter are safe, since this just copies values. Flush these enqueued packets in case the template rule gets removed. Fixes: 24de58f46516 ("netfilter: xt_CT: allow to attach timeout policy + glue code") Reported-by: Yiming Qian <yimingqian591(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw(a)strlen.de> Conflicts: net/netfilter/xt_CT.c [commit e14575fa7529 is not backport] Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- net/netfilter/xt_CT.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_CT.c b/net/netfilter/xt_CT.c index d4deee39158b..cb071354d247 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/xt_CT.c +++ b/net/netfilter/xt_CT.c @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ #include <net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_ecache.h> #include <net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_timeout.h> #include <net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_zones.h> +#include "nf_internals.h" static inline int xt_ct_target(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nf_conn *ct) { @@ -271,6 +272,9 @@ static void xt_ct_tg_destroy(const struct xt_tgdtor_param *par, struct nf_conn_help *help; if (ct) { + if (info->helper[0] || info->timeout[0]) + nf_queue_nf_hook_drop(par->net); + help = nfct_help(ct); if (help) nf_conntrack_helper_put(help->helper); -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] netfilter: xt_IDLETIMER: reject rev0 reuse of ALARM timer labels
by Dong Chenchen 27 Apr '26

27 Apr '26

From: Yuan Tan <tanyuan98(a)outlook.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.0-rc2 commit 329f0b9b48ee6ab59d1ab72fef55fe8c6463a6cf category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13902 CVE: CVE-2026-23274 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- IDLETIMER revision 0 rules reuse existing timers by label and always call mod_timer() on timer->timer. If the label was created first by revision 1 with XT_IDLETIMER_ALARM, the object uses alarm timer semantics and timer->timer is never initialized. Reusing that object from revision 0 causes mod_timer() on an uninitialized timer_list, triggering debugobjects warnings and possible panic when panic_on_warn=1. Fix this by rejecting revision 0 rule insertion when an existing timer with the same label is of ALARM type. Fixes: 68983a354a65 ("netfilter: xtables: Add snapshot of hardidletimer target") Co-developed-by: Yifan Wu <yifanwucs(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Yifan Wu <yifanwucs(a)gmail.com> Co-developed-by: Juefei Pu <tomapufckgml(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Juefei Pu <tomapufckgml(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Yuan Tan <tanyuan98(a)outlook.com> Signed-off-by: Xin Liu <dstsmallbird(a)foxmail.com> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw(a)strlen.de> Conflicts: net/netfilter/xt_IDLETIMER.c [commit f4293c2baf6f is not backport] Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- net/netfilter/xt_IDLETIMER.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_IDLETIMER.c b/net/netfilter/xt_IDLETIMER.c index 2f7cf5ecebf4..d35ff0a2cad8 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/xt_IDLETIMER.c +++ b/net/netfilter/xt_IDLETIMER.c @@ -320,6 +320,12 @@ static int idletimer_tg_checkentry(const struct xt_tgchk_param *par) info->timer = __idletimer_tg_find_by_label(info->label); if (info->timer) { + if (info->timer->timer_type & XT_IDLETIMER_ALARM) { + pr_debug("Adding/Replacing rule with same label and different timer type is not allowed\n"); + mutex_unlock(&list_mutex); + return -EINVAL; + } + info->timer->refcnt++; mod_timer(&info->timer->timer, msecs_to_jiffies(info->timeout * 1000) + jiffies); -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] netfilter: nf_tables: unconditionally bump set->nelems before insertion
by Dong Chenchen 27 Apr '26

27 Apr '26

From: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.0-rc1 commit def602e498a4f951da95c95b1b8ce8ae68aa733a category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13901 CVE: CVE-2026-23272 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- In case that the set is full, a new element gets published then removed without waiting for the RCU grace period, while RCU reader can be walking over it already. To address this issue, add the element transaction even if set is full, but toggle the set_full flag to report -ENFILE so the abort path safely unwinds the set to its previous state. As for element updates, decrement set->nelems to restore it. A simpler fix is to call synchronize_rcu() in the error path. However, with a large batch adding elements to already maxed-out set, this could cause noticeable slowdown of such batches. Fixes: 35d0ac9070ef ("netfilter: nf_tables: fix set->nelems counting with no NLM_F_EXCL") Reported-by: Inseo An <y0un9sa(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw(a)strlen.de> Conflicts: net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c [commit 664899e85c13, 078996fcd657, 34aae2c2fb1e, 4201f3938914, d4b7f29eb85c and 4ee29181216d are not backport] Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c | 19 +++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c index 649b27999102..2beef989cced 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c @@ -5581,6 +5581,7 @@ static int nft_add_set_elem(struct nft_ctx *ctx, struct nft_set *set, struct nft_data_desc desc; enum nft_registers dreg; struct nft_trans *trans; + bool set_full = false; u32 flags = 0; u64 timeout; u64 expiration; @@ -5785,10 +5786,14 @@ static int nft_add_set_elem(struct nft_ctx *ctx, struct nft_set *set, goto err_elem_expr; expr = NULL; + if (set->size && + atomic_inc_return(&set->nelems) > (set->size + set->ndeact)) + set_full = true; + trans = nft_trans_elem_alloc(ctx, NFT_MSG_NEWSETELEM, set); if (trans == NULL) { err = -ENOMEM; - goto err_elem_expr; + goto err_set_size; } ext->genmask = nft_genmask_cur(ctx->net); @@ -5820,20 +5825,14 @@ static int nft_add_set_elem(struct nft_ctx *ctx, struct nft_set *set, goto err_element_clash; } - if (set->size && - !atomic_add_unless(&set->nelems, 1, set->size + set->ndeact)) { - err = -ENFILE; - goto err_set_full; - } - nft_trans_elem(trans) = elem; nft_trans_commit_list_add_tail(ctx->net, trans); - return 0; + return set_full ? -ENFILE : 0; -err_set_full: - set->ops->remove(ctx->net, set, &elem); err_element_clash: kfree(trans); +err_set_size: + atomic_dec(&set->nelems); err_elem_expr: nf_tables_set_elem_destroy(ctx, set, elem.priv); err_parse_data: -- 2.25.1

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[PATCH OLK-5.10] net: sched: avoid qdisc_reset_all_tx_gt() vs dequeue race for lockless qdiscs
by Dong Chenchen 27 Apr '26

27 Apr '26

From: Koichiro Den <den(a)valinux.co.jp> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.0-rc1 commit 7f083faf59d14c04e01ec05a7507f036c965acf8 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13941 CVE: CVE-2026-23340 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- When shrinking the number of real tx queues, netif_set_real_num_tx_queues() calls qdisc_reset_all_tx_gt() to flush qdiscs for queues which will no longer be used. qdisc_reset_all_tx_gt() currently serializes qdisc_reset() with qdisc_lock(). However, for lockless qdiscs, the dequeue path is serialized by qdisc_run_begin/end() using qdisc->seqlock instead, so qdisc_reset() can run concurrently with __qdisc_run() and free skbs while they are still being dequeued, leading to UAF. This can easily be reproduced on e.g. virtio-net by imposing heavy traffic while frequently changing the number of queue pairs: iperf3 -ub0 -c $peer -t 0 & while :; do ethtool -L eth0 combined 1 ethtool -L eth0 combined 2 done With KASAN enabled, this leads to reports like: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __qdisc_run+0x133f/0x1760 ... Call Trace: <TASK> ... __qdisc_run+0x133f/0x1760 __dev_queue_xmit+0x248f/0x3550 ip_finish_output2+0xa42/0x2110 ip_output+0x1a7/0x410 ip_send_skb+0x2e6/0x480 udp_send_skb+0xb0a/0x1590 udp_sendmsg+0x13c9/0x1fc0 ... </TASK> Allocated by task 1270 on cpu 5 at 44.558414s: ... alloc_skb_with_frags+0x84/0x7c0 sock_alloc_send_pskb+0x69a/0x830 __ip_append_data+0x1b86/0x48c0 ip_make_skb+0x1e8/0x2b0 udp_sendmsg+0x13a6/0x1fc0 ... Freed by task 1306 on cpu 3 at 44.558445s: ... kmem_cache_free+0x117/0x5e0 pfifo_fast_reset+0x14d/0x580 qdisc_reset+0x9e/0x5f0 netif_set_real_num_tx_queues+0x303/0x840 virtnet_set_channels+0x1bf/0x260 [virtio_net] ethnl_set_channels+0x684/0xae0 ethnl_default_set_doit+0x31a/0x890 ... Serialize qdisc_reset_all_tx_gt() against the lockless dequeue path by taking qdisc->seqlock for TCQ_F_NOLOCK qdiscs, matching the serialization model already used by dev_reset_queue(). Additionally clear QDISC_STATE_NON_EMPTY after reset so the qdisc state reflects an empty queue, avoiding needless re-scheduling. Fixes: 6b3ba9146fe6 ("net: sched: allow qdiscs to handle locking") Signed-off-by: Koichiro Den <den(a)valinux.co.jp> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260228145307.3955532-1-den@valinux.co.jp Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: include/net/sch_generic.h [commit c4fef01ba479 is not backport] Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- include/net/sch_generic.h | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/net/sch_generic.h b/include/net/sch_generic.h index 46afe852c455..d010017d69f1 100644 --- a/include/net/sch_generic.h +++ b/include/net/sch_generic.h @@ -751,13 +751,22 @@ static inline bool skb_skip_tc_classify(struct sk_buff *skb) static inline void qdisc_reset_all_tx_gt(struct net_device *dev, unsigned int i) { struct Qdisc *qdisc; + bool nolock; for (; i < dev->num_tx_queues; i++) { qdisc = rtnl_dereference(netdev_get_tx_queue(dev, i)->qdisc); if (qdisc) { + nolock = qdisc->flags & TCQ_F_NOLOCK; + + if (nolock) + spin_lock_bh(&qdisc->seqlock); spin_lock_bh(qdisc_lock(qdisc)); qdisc_reset(qdisc); spin_unlock_bh(qdisc_lock(qdisc)); + if (nolock) { + clear_bit(__QDISC_STATE_MISSED, &qdisc->state); + spin_unlock_bh(&qdisc->seqlock); + } } } } -- 2.25.1

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[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/2] netfilter: Fix CVE-2026-23351
by Dong Chenchen 27 Apr '26

27 Apr '26

Fix CVE-2026-23351 Florian Westphal (2): netfilter: nf_tables: de-constify set commit ops function argument netfilter: nft_set_pipapo: split gc into unlink and reclaim phase include/net/netfilter/nf_tables.h | 7 +++- net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c | 5 --- net/netfilter/nft_set_pipapo.c | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------- net/netfilter/nft_set_pipapo.h | 2 ++ 4 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) -- 2.25.1

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