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[PATCH OLK-6.6] x86/bugs: Enable IBPB flush on BPF JIT allocation
by Zhang Kunbo 08 Aug '26

08 Aug '26

From: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta(a)linux.intel.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.145 commit cb27f3bf915cc0f20fc0c48da9059304e39ebd35 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/16808 CVE: CVE-2026-64507 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit a3af84b0fa00ead01fcd0e28b5d773ff25990a0d upstream. Enable hardening against JIT spraying when Spectre-v2 mitigations are in use. Specifically, issue an IBPB flush on BPF JIT memory reuse. Skip enabling the IBPB flush if the BPF dispatcher is already using a retpoline sequence. This hardening applies only when BPF-JIT is in use. Guard the enabling under CONFIG_BPF_JIT so that bugs.c still builds with CONFIG_BPF_JIT=n. [ pawan: Use entry_ibpb() instead of write_ibpb(). JIT hardening enable moved to spectre_v2_select_mitigation() because there is no spectre_v2_apply_mitigation()] Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta(a)linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h [context conflicts and use `write_ibpb` instead of `entry_ibpb` due to 13235d6d50bb ("x86/bugs: Rename entry_ibpb() to write_ibpb()") ] Signed-off-by: Zhang Kunbo <zhangkunbo(a)huawei.com> --- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 4 +++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 2 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index 58dda23aee1b..d4eae71b2ab7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -408,6 +408,10 @@ extern void srso_alias_untrain_ret(void); extern void entry_untrain_ret(void); extern void write_ibpb(void); +#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_JIT +extern void bpf_arch_ibpb(void); +#endif + #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 extern void clear_bhb_loop(void); #endif diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 212408f6de11..d5dd360ee330 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ #include <linux/sched/smt.h> #include <linux/pgtable.h> #include <linux/bpf.h> +#include <linux/filter.h> #include <asm/spec-ctrl.h> #include <asm/cmdline.h> @@ -1312,8 +1313,21 @@ static inline const char *spectre_v2_module_string(void) { return spectre_v2_bad_module ? " - vulnerable module loaded" : ""; } + +/* + * The "retpoline sequence" is the "call;mov;ret" sequence that + * replaces normal indirect branch instructions. Differentiate + * *the* retpoline sequence from the LFENCE-prefixed indirect + * branches that simply use the retpoline infrastructure. + */ +static inline bool retpoline_seq_enabled(void) +{ + return boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE); +} + #else static inline const char *spectre_v2_module_string(void) { return ""; } +static inline bool retpoline_seq_enabled(void) { return false; } #endif #define SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE_MSG "WARNING: LFENCE mitigation is not recommended for this CPU, data leaks possible!\n" @@ -1787,8 +1801,7 @@ static void __init bhi_select_mitigation(void) return; /* Retpoline mitigates against BHI unless the CPU has RRSBA behavior */ - if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) && - !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE)) { + if (retpoline_seq_enabled()) { spec_ctrl_disable_kernel_rrsba(); if (rrsba_disabled) return; @@ -1810,6 +1823,27 @@ static void __init bhi_select_mitigation(void) pr_info("Spectre BHI mitigation: SW BHB clearing on syscall\n"); } +#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_JIT +static void __bpf_arch_ibpb(void *unused) +{ + write_ibpb(); +} + +void bpf_arch_ibpb(void) +{ + on_each_cpu(__bpf_arch_ibpb, NULL, 1); +} + +static bool __init cpu_wants_ibpb_bpf(void) +{ + /* A genuine retpoline already neutralizes ring0 indirect predictions */ + if (retpoline_seq_enabled()) + return false; + + return boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB); +} +#endif + static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) { enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(); @@ -1955,6 +1989,14 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) pr_info("Enabling Restricted Speculation for firmware calls\n"); } +#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_JIT + if (cpu_wants_ibpb_bpf()) { + static_call_update(bpf_arch_pred_flush, bpf_arch_ibpb); + static_branch_enable(&bpf_pred_flush_enabled); + pr_info("Enabling IBPB for BPF\n"); + } +#endif + /* Set up IBPB and STIBP depending on the general spectre V2 command */ spectre_v2_cmd = cmd; } @@ -3113,9 +3155,7 @@ static const char *spectre_bhi_state(void) return "; BHI: BHI_DIS_S"; else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP)) return "; BHI: SW loop, KVM: SW loop"; - else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) && - !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE) && - rrsba_disabled) + else if (retpoline_seq_enabled() && rrsba_disabled) return "; BHI: Retpoline"; else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT)) return "; BHI: Vulnerable, KVM: SW loop"; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] USB: serial: mct_u232: fix memory corruption with small endpoint
by Zhang Kunbo 08 Aug '26

08 Aug '26

From: Johan Hovold <johan(a)kernel.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.259 commit 94edbbc5fe00d03cfe1d4e690d7d2cd36317a935 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/16226 CVE: CVE-2026-63898 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 915b36d701950503c4ea0f6e314b10868e59fce3 upstream. The driver overrides the maximum transfer size for a specific device which only accepts 16 byte packets for its 32 byte bulk-out endpoint. Make sure to never increase the maximum transfer size to prevent slab corruption should a malicious device report a smaller endpoint max packet size than expected. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Zhang Kunbo <zhangkunbo(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/usb/serial/mct_u232.c | 21 +++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/mct_u232.c b/drivers/usb/serial/mct_u232.c index 04f16d4a0a68..8842a1db72b3 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/serial/mct_u232.c +++ b/drivers/usb/serial/mct_u232.c @@ -378,6 +378,7 @@ static int mct_u232_port_probe(struct usb_serial_port *port) { struct usb_serial *serial = port->serial; struct mct_u232_private *priv; + u16 pid; /* check first to simplify error handling */ if (!serial->port[1] || !serial->port[1]->interrupt_in_urb) { @@ -385,6 +386,16 @@ static int mct_u232_port_probe(struct usb_serial_port *port) return -ENODEV; } + /* + * Compensate for a hardware bug: although the Sitecom U232-P25 + * device reports a maximum output packet size of 32 bytes, + * it seems to be able to accept only 16 bytes (and that's what + * SniffUSB says too...) + */ + pid = le16_to_cpu(serial->dev->descriptor.idProduct); + if (pid == MCT_U232_SITECOM_PID) + port->bulk_out_size = min(16, port->bulk_out_size); + priv = kzalloc(sizeof(*priv), GFP_KERNEL); if (!priv) return -ENOMEM; @@ -412,7 +423,6 @@ static int mct_u232_port_remove(struct usb_serial_port *port) static int mct_u232_open(struct tty_struct *tty, struct usb_serial_port *port) { - struct usb_serial *serial = port->serial; struct mct_u232_private *priv = usb_get_serial_port_data(port); int retval = 0; unsigned int control_state; @@ -420,15 +430,6 @@ static int mct_u232_open(struct tty_struct *tty, struct usb_serial_port *port) unsigned char last_lcr; unsigned char last_msr; - /* Compensate for a hardware bug: although the Sitecom U232-P25 - * device reports a maximum output packet size of 32 bytes, - * it seems to be able to accept only 16 bytes (and that's what - * SniffUSB says too...) - */ - if (le16_to_cpu(serial->dev->descriptor.idProduct) - == MCT_U232_SITECOM_PID) - port->bulk_out_size = 16; - /* Do a defined restart: the normal serial device seems to * always turn on DTR and RTS here, so do the same. I'm not * sure if this is really necessary. But it should not harm -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] USB: serial: mct_u232: fix memory corruption with small endpoint
by Zhang Kunbo 08 Aug '26

08 Aug '26

From: Johan Hovold <johan(a)kernel.org> commit 915b36d701950503c4ea0f6e314b10868e59fce3 upstream. The driver overrides the maximum transfer size for a specific device which only accepts 16 byte packets for its 32 byte bulk-out endpoint. Make sure to never increase the maximum transfer size to prevent slab corruption should a malicious device report a smaller endpoint max packet size than expected. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> --- drivers/usb/serial/mct_u232.c | 21 +++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/mct_u232.c b/drivers/usb/serial/mct_u232.c index 04f16d4a0a68..8842a1db72b3 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/serial/mct_u232.c +++ b/drivers/usb/serial/mct_u232.c @@ -378,6 +378,7 @@ static int mct_u232_port_probe(struct usb_serial_port *port) { struct usb_serial *serial = port->serial; struct mct_u232_private *priv; + u16 pid; /* check first to simplify error handling */ if (!serial->port[1] || !serial->port[1]->interrupt_in_urb) { @@ -385,6 +386,16 @@ static int mct_u232_port_probe(struct usb_serial_port *port) return -ENODEV; } + /* + * Compensate for a hardware bug: although the Sitecom U232-P25 + * device reports a maximum output packet size of 32 bytes, + * it seems to be able to accept only 16 bytes (and that's what + * SniffUSB says too...) + */ + pid = le16_to_cpu(serial->dev->descriptor.idProduct); + if (pid == MCT_U232_SITECOM_PID) + port->bulk_out_size = min(16, port->bulk_out_size); + priv = kzalloc(sizeof(*priv), GFP_KERNEL); if (!priv) return -ENOMEM; @@ -412,7 +423,6 @@ static int mct_u232_port_remove(struct usb_serial_port *port) static int mct_u232_open(struct tty_struct *tty, struct usb_serial_port *port) { - struct usb_serial *serial = port->serial; struct mct_u232_private *priv = usb_get_serial_port_data(port); int retval = 0; unsigned int control_state; @@ -420,15 +430,6 @@ static int mct_u232_open(struct tty_struct *tty, struct usb_serial_port *port) unsigned char last_lcr; unsigned char last_msr; - /* Compensate for a hardware bug: although the Sitecom U232-P25 - * device reports a maximum output packet size of 32 bytes, - * it seems to be able to accept only 16 bytes (and that's what - * SniffUSB says too...) - */ - if (le16_to_cpu(serial->dev->descriptor.idProduct) - == MCT_U232_SITECOM_PID) - port->bulk_out_size = 16; - /* Do a defined restart: the normal serial device seems to * always turn on DTR and RTS here, so do the same. I'm not * sure if this is really necessary. But it should not harm -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] KVM: SVM: Fix page overflow in sev_dbg_crypt() for ENCRYPT path
by Zhang Kunbo 08 Aug '26

08 Aug '26

From: Ashutosh Desai <ashutoshdesai993(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.260 commit f701ae476cb92a3a3d8844bb39bb63b4512684c8 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/16125 CVE: CVE-2026-63794 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 78ee2d50185a037b3d2452a97f3dad69c3f7f389 upstream. In sev_dbg_crypt(), the per-iteration transfer length is bounded by the source page offset (PAGE_SIZE - s_off) but not by the destination page offset (PAGE_SIZE - d_off). When d_off > s_off, the encrypt path (__sev_dbg_encrypt_user) performs a read-modify-write using a single-page intermediate buffer (dst_tpage): 1. __sev_dbg_decrypt() expands the size to round_up(len + (d_off & 15), 16) before issuing the PSP command. If len + (d_off & 15) > PAGE_SIZE, the PSP writes beyond the end of the 4096-byte dst_tpage allocation. 2. The subsequent memcpy()/copy_from_user() into page_address(dst_tpage) + (d_off & 15) of 'len' bytes overflows by up to 15 bytes under the same condition. Trigger example: s_off = 0, d_off = 1, debug.len = PAGE_SIZE - the PSP is instructed to write round_up(4097, 16) = 4112 bytes to a 4096-byte buffer. Fix by also bounding len by (PAGE_SIZE - d_off), the same check that sev_send_update_data() already performs for its single-page guest region. ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sev_dbg_crypt+0x993/0xd10 [kvm_amd] Write of size 4095 at addr ff110062293bb009 by task sev_dbg_test/228214 CPU: 96 UID: 0 PID: 228214 Comm: sev_dbg_test Tainted: G U W 7.0.0-smp--5ce9b0c48211-dbg #156 PREEMPTLAZY Tainted: [U]=USER, [W]=WARN Hardware name: Google Astoria/astoria, BIOS 0.20250817.1-0 08/25/2025 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x54/0x70 print_report+0xbc/0x260 kasan_report+0xa2/0xd0 kasan_check_range+0x25f/0x2c0 __asan_memcpy+0x40/0x70 sev_dbg_crypt+0x993/0xd10 [kvm_amd] sev_mem_enc_ioctl+0x33c/0x450 [kvm_amd] kvm_vm_ioctl+0x65d/0x6d0 [kvm] __se_sys_ioctl+0xb2/0x100 do_syscall_64+0xe8/0x870 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 </TASK> The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x7fe72b6a0 pfn:0x62293bb memcg:ff11000112827d82 flags: 0x1400000000000000(node=1|zone=1) raw: 1400000000000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000 raw: 00000007fe72b6a0 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff ff11000112827d82 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ff110062293bbf00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ff110062293bbf80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 >ff110062293bc000: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ^ ff110062293bc080: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ff110062293bc100: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ================================================================== Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint Fixes: 24f41fb23a39 ("KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV DEBUG_DECRYPT command") Fixes: 7d1594f5d94b ("KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV DEBUG_ENCRYPT command") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ashutosh Desai <ashutoshdesai993(a)gmail.com> [sean: add sample KASAN splat, Fixes, and stable@] Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260501203537.2120074-2-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Zhang Kunbo <zhangkunbo(a)huawei.com> --- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c index 79ebbe8cf0b4..a3a68ec8ab63 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c @@ -975,6 +975,7 @@ static int sev_dbg_crypt(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp, bool dec) s_off = vaddr & ~PAGE_MASK; d_off = dst_vaddr & ~PAGE_MASK; len = min_t(size_t, (PAGE_SIZE - s_off), size); + len = min_t(size_t, len, PAGE_SIZE - d_off); if (dec) ret = __sev_dbg_decrypt_user(kvm, -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] arm64: Add runtime PAN control for user copy optimization
by Qi Xi 07 Aug '26

07 Aug '26

Signed-off-by: Qi Xi <xiqi2(a)huawei.com> arm64: Optimize copy_from/to_user with batched LDP/STP Signed-off-by: Qi Xi <xiqi2(a)huawei.com> --- arch/arm64/include/asm/asm-uaccess.h | 16 +++ arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 25 +++- arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile | 2 +- arch/arm64/kernel/copy_opt.c | 100 ++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/lib/Makefile | 1 + arch/arm64/lib/copy_from_user_opt.S | 75 ++++++++++ arch/arm64/lib/copy_to_user_opt.S | 75 ++++++++++ arch/arm64/lib/copy_user_template.S | 196 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 8 files changed, 485 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/arm64/kernel/copy_opt.c create mode 100644 arch/arm64/lib/copy_from_user_opt.S create mode 100644 arch/arm64/lib/copy_to_user_opt.S create mode 100644 arch/arm64/lib/copy_user_template.S diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/asm-uaccess.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/asm-uaccess.h index 46b8d2585980..f51f0d0aadc4 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/asm-uaccess.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/asm-uaccess.h @@ -92,4 +92,20 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif _asm_mc_extable 8888b,\l; .endm + + .macro user_ldst_index l, inst, reg, addr, val +8888: \inst \reg, [\addr, \val]; + + _asm_extable 8888b,\l; + + _asm_mc_extable 8888b,\l; + .endm + + .macro user_ldst_pair_index l, inst, reg1, reg2, addr, val +8888: \inst \reg1, \reg2, [\addr, \val]; + + _asm_extable 8888b,\l; + + _asm_mc_extable 8888b,\l; + .endm #endif diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h index 03c2db710f92..d6d21d6bc6d6 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h @@ -386,24 +386,41 @@ do { \ goto err_label; \ } while(0) +#define COPY_OPT_THRESHOLD 4096 +extern bool kernel_copy_opt_enabled(void); extern unsigned long __must_check __arch_copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n); +extern unsigned long __must_check __arch_copy_from_user_opt(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n); #define raw_copy_from_user(to, from, n) \ ({ \ unsigned long __acfu_ret; \ - uaccess_ttbr0_enable(); \ - __acfu_ret = __arch_copy_from_user((to), \ - __uaccess_mask_ptr(from), (n)); \ + if ((n) >= COPY_OPT_THRESHOLD && kernel_copy_opt_enabled()) { \ + uaccess_enable_privileged(); \ + __acfu_ret = __arch_copy_from_user_opt((to), \ + __uaccess_mask_ptr(from), (n)); \ + uaccess_disable_privileged(); \ + } else { \ + __acfu_ret = __arch_copy_from_user((to), \ + __uaccess_mask_ptr(from), n); \ + } \ uaccess_ttbr0_disable(); \ __acfu_ret; \ }) extern unsigned long __must_check __arch_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n); +extern unsigned long __must_check __arch_copy_to_user_opt(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n); #define raw_copy_to_user(to, from, n) \ ({ \ unsigned long __actu_ret; \ uaccess_ttbr0_enable(); \ - __actu_ret = __arch_copy_to_user(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), \ + if ((n) >= COPY_OPT_THRESHOLD && kernel_copy_opt_enabled()) { \ + uaccess_enable_privileged(); \ + __actu_ret = __arch_copy_to_user_opt(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to),\ + (from), (n)); \ + uaccess_disable_privileged(); \ + } else { \ + __actu_ret = __arch_copy_to_user(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to),\ (from), (n)); \ + } \ uaccess_ttbr0_disable(); \ __actu_ret; \ }) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile b/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile index a5fb42a6c8d7..04e84437d3e5 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ obj-y := debug-monitors.o entry.o irq.o fpsimd.o \ return_address.o cpuinfo.o cpu_errata.o \ cpufeature.o alternative.o cacheinfo.o \ smp.o smp_spin_table.o topology.o smccc-call.o \ - syscall.o proton-pack.o ipi_nmi.o + syscall.o proton-pack.o ipi_nmi.o copy_opt.o targets += efi-entry.o diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/copy_opt.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/copy_opt.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..3eeae607956d --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/copy_opt.c @@ -0,0 +1,100 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * Copy to/from user optimization. + * + * Copyright (C) 2026 Huawei Ltd. + */ + +#include <linux/bitmap.h> +#include <linux/bitops.h> +#include <linux/bottom_half.h> +#include <linux/bug.h> +#include <linux/cache.h> +#include <linux/compat.h> +#include <linux/compiler.h> +#include <linux/cpu.h> +#include <linux/cpu_pm.h> +#include <linux/ctype.h> +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/linkage.h> +#include <linux/irqflags.h> +#include <linux/init.h> +#include <linux/percpu.h> +#include <linux/prctl.h> +#include <linux/preempt.h> +#include <linux/ptrace.h> +#include <linux/sched/signal.h> +#include <linux/sched/task_stack.h> +#include <linux/signal.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/stddef.h> +#include <linux/sysctl.h> +#include <linux/swab.h> + +#include <asm/esr.h> +#include <asm/exception.h> +#include <asm/fpsimd.h> +#include <asm/cpufeature.h> +#include <asm/cputype.h> +#include <asm/neon.h> +#include <asm/processor.h> +#include <asm/simd.h> +#include <asm/sigcontext.h> +#include <asm/sysreg.h> +#include <asm/traps.h> +#include <asm/virt.h> + +DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(use_copy_opt); +bool kernel_copy_opt_enabled(void) +{ + return static_key_enabled(&use_copy_opt); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_copy_opt_enabled); + +static int copy_opt_sysctl_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write, + void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos) +{ + int ret, val; + struct ctl_table tmp = { + .data = &val, + .maxlen = sizeof(val), + .mode = table->mode, + .extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO, + .extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE, + }; + + if (write && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; + + if (!write) { + if (static_key_enabled(&use_copy_opt)) + val = 1; + else + val = 0; + } + ret = proc_dointvec_minmax(&tmp, write, buffer, lenp, ppos); + if (write && !ret) { + if (val) + static_branch_enable(&use_copy_opt); + else + static_branch_disable(&use_copy_opt); + } + return 0; +} + +static struct ctl_table copy_opt_sysctl_table[] = { + { + .procname = "copy_opt_user", + .mode = 0644, + .proc_handler = copy_opt_sysctl_handler, + }, + { } +}; + +static int __init copy_opt_sysctl_init(void) +{ + if (!register_sysctl("kernel", copy_opt_sysctl_table)) + return -EINVAL; + return 0; +} +core_initcall(copy_opt_sysctl_init); diff --git a/arch/arm64/lib/Makefile b/arch/arm64/lib/Makefile index e2dbef587c9b..c69993a77e78 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/lib/Makefile +++ b/arch/arm64/lib/Makefile @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 lib-y := clear_user.o delay.o copy_from_user.o \ copy_to_user.o copy_in_user.o copy_page.o \ + copy_to_user_opt.o copy_from_user_opt.o \ clear_page.o csum.o memchr.o memcpy.o memcpy_mc.o memmove.o \ memset.o memcmp.o strcmp.o strncmp.o strlen.o \ strnlen.o strchr.o strrchr.o tishift.o diff --git a/arch/arm64/lib/copy_from_user_opt.S b/arch/arm64/lib/copy_from_user_opt.S new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..94cfc09b89d7 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/arm64/lib/copy_from_user_opt.S @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2012 ARM Ltd. + */ + +#include <linux/linkage.h> + +#include <asm/asm-uaccess.h> +#include <asm/assembler.h> +#include <asm/cache.h> + +/* + * Copy from user space to a kernel buffer (alignment handled by the hardware) + * + * Parameters: + * x0 - to + * x1 - from + * x2 - n + * Returns: + * x0 - bytes not copied + */ + + .macro ldrb1 reg, ptr, val + user_ldst 9998f, ldtrb, \reg, \ptr, \val + .endm + + .macro strb1 reg, ptr, val + USER_MC(9998f, strb \reg, [\ptr], \val) + .endm + + .macro ldrh1 reg, ptr, val + user_ldst 9997f, ldtrh, \reg, \ptr, \val + .endm + + .macro strh1 reg, ptr, val + USER_MC(9998f, strh \reg, [\ptr], \val) + .endm + + .macro ldr1 reg, ptr, val + user_ldst 9997f, ldtr, \reg, \ptr, \val + .endm + + .macro str1 reg, ptr, val + USER_MC(9998f, str \reg, [\ptr], \val) + .endm + + .macro ldp2 reg1, reg2, ptr, val + user_ldst_pair_index 9997f, ldp, \reg1, \reg2, \ptr, \val + .endm + + .macro stp2 reg1, reg2, ptr, val + USER_MC(9998f, stp \reg1, \reg2, [\ptr, \val]) + .endm + +end .req x5 +srcin .req x15 +SYM_FUNC_START(__arch_copy_from_user_opt) + add end, x0, x2 + mov srcin, x1 +#include "copy_user_template.S" + mov x0, #0 // Nothing to copy + ret +SYM_FUNC_END(__arch_copy_from_user_opt) +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__arch_copy_from_user_opt) + + .section .fixup,"ax" + .align 2 +9997: cmp dst, dstin + b.ne 9998f + // Before being absolutely sure we couldn't copy anything, try harder +USER(9998f, ldtrb tmp1w, [srcin]) + strb tmp1w, [dst], #1 +9998: sub x0, end, dst // bytes not copied + ret + .previous diff --git a/arch/arm64/lib/copy_to_user_opt.S b/arch/arm64/lib/copy_to_user_opt.S new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..57a47383df20 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/arm64/lib/copy_to_user_opt.S @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2012 ARM Ltd. + */ + +#include <linux/linkage.h> + +#include <asm/asm-uaccess.h> +#include <asm/assembler.h> +#include <asm/cache.h> + +/* + * Copy to user space from a kernel buffer (alignment handled by the hardware) + * + * Parameters: + * x0 - to + * x1 - from + * x2 - n + * Returns: + * x0 - bytes not copied + */ + .macro ldrb1 reg, ptr, val + USER_MC(9998f, ldrb \reg, [\ptr], \val) + .endm + + .macro strb1 reg, ptr, val + user_ldst 9998f, sttrb, \reg, \ptr, \val + .endm + + .macro ldrh1 reg, ptr, val + USER_MC(9998f, ldrh \reg, [\ptr], \val) + .endm + + .macro strh1 reg, ptr, val + user_ldst 9997f, sttrh, \reg, \ptr, \val + .endm + + .macro ldr1 reg, ptr, val + USER_MC(9998f, ldr \reg, [\ptr], \val) + .endm + + .macro str1 reg, ptr, val + user_ldst 9997f, sttr, \reg, \ptr, \val + .endm + + .macro ldp2 reg1, reg2, ptr, val + USER_MC(9998f, ldp \reg1, \reg2, [\ptr, \val]) + .endm + + .macro stp2 reg1, reg2, ptr, val + user_ldst_pair_index 9997f, stp, \reg1, \reg2, \ptr, \val + .endm + +end .req x5 +srcin .req x15 +SYM_FUNC_START(__arch_copy_to_user_opt) + add end, x0, x2 + mov srcin, x1 +#include "copy_user_template.S" + mov x0, #0 + ret +SYM_FUNC_END(__arch_copy_to_user_opt) +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__arch_copy_to_user_opt) + + .section .fixup,"ax" + .align 2 +9997: cmp dst, dstin + b.ne 9998f + // Before being absolutely sure we couldn't copy anything, try harder +USER_MC(9998f, ldrb tmp1w, [srcin]) +USER(9998f, sttrb tmp1w, [dst]) + add dst, dst, #1 +9998: sub x0, end, dst // bytes not copied + ret + .previous diff --git a/arch/arm64/lib/copy_user_template.S b/arch/arm64/lib/copy_user_template.S new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..72983eb658b3 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/arm64/lib/copy_user_template.S @@ -0,0 +1,196 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2013 ARM Ltd. + * Copyright (C) 2013 Linaro. + * + * This code is based on glibc cortex strings work originally authored by Linaro + * be found @ + * + * http://bazaar.launchpad.net/~linaro-toolchain-dev/cortex-strings/trunk/ + * files/head:/src/aarch64/ + */ + +/* + * Copy a buffer from src to dest (alignment handled by the hardware) + * + * Parameters: + * x0 - dest + * x1 - src + * x2 - n + * Returns: + * x0 - dest + */ +dstin .req x0 +src .req x1 +count .req x2 +tmp1 .req x3 +tmp1w .req w3 +tmp2 .req x4 +tmp2w .req w4 +dst .req x6 + +A_l .req x7 +A_h .req x8 +B_l .req x9 +B_h .req x10 +C_l .req x11 +C_h .req x12 +D_l .req x13 +D_h .req x14 + + mov dst, dstin + cmp count, #16 + /*When memory length is less than 16, the accessed are not aligned.*/ + b.lo .Ltiny15 + + neg tmp2, src + ands tmp2, tmp2, #15/* Bytes to reach alignment. */ + b.eq .LSrcAligned + sub count, count, tmp2 + /* + * Copy the leading memory data from src to dst in an increasing + * address order.By this way,the risk of overwriting the source + * memory data is eliminated when the distance between src and + * dst is less than 16. The memory accesses here are alignment. + */ + tbz tmp2, #0, 1f + ldrb1 tmp1w, src, #1 + strb1 tmp1w, dst, #1 +1: + tbz tmp2, #1, 2f + ldrh1 tmp1w, src, #2 + strh1 tmp1w, dst, #2 +2: + tbz tmp2, #2, 3f + ldr1 tmp1w, src, #4 + str1 tmp1w, dst, #4 +3: + tbz tmp2, #3, .LSrcAligned + ldr1 tmp1, src, #8 + str1 tmp1, dst, #8 + +.LSrcAligned: + cmp count, #64 + b.ge .Lcpy_over64 + /* + * Deal with small copies quickly by dropping straight into the + * exit block. + */ +.Ltail63: + /* + * Copy up to 48 bytes of data. At this point we only need the + * bottom 6 bits of count to be accurate. + */ + ands tmp1, count, #0x30 + b.eq .Ltiny15 + cmp tmp1w, #0x20 + b.eq 1f + b.lt 2f + ldp2 A_l, A_h, src, #0 + stp2 A_l, A_h, dst, #0 + add src, src, #16 + add dst, dst, #16 +1: + ldp2 A_l, A_h, src, #0 + stp2 A_l, A_h, dst, #0 + add src, src, #16 + add dst, dst, #16 +2: + ldp2 A_l, A_h, src, #0 + stp2 A_l, A_h, dst, #0 + add src, src, #16 + add dst, dst, #16 +.Ltiny15: + /* + * Prefer to break one ldp/stp into several load/store to access + * memory in an increasing address order,rather than to load/store 16 + * bytes from (src-16) to (dst-16) and to backward the src to aligned + * address,which way is used in original cortex memcpy. If keeping + * the original memcpy process here, memmove need to satisfy the + * precondition that src address is at least 16 bytes bigger than dst + * address,otherwise some source data will be overwritten when memove + * call memcpy directly. To make memmove simpler and decouple the + * memcpy's dependency on memmove, withdrew the original process. + */ + tbz count, #3, 1f + ldr1 tmp1, src, #8 + str1 tmp1, dst, #8 +1: + tbz count, #2, 2f + ldr1 tmp1w, src, #4 + str1 tmp1w, dst, #4 +2: + tbz count, #1, 3f + ldrh1 tmp1w, src, #2 + strh1 tmp1w, dst, #2 +3: + tbz count, #0, .Lexitfunc + ldrb1 tmp1w, src, #1 + strb1 tmp1w, dst, #1 + + b .Lexitfunc + +.Lcpy_over64: + subs count, count, #128 + b.ge .Lcpy_body_large + /* + * Less than 128 bytes to copy, so handle 64 here and then jump + * to the tail. + */ + ldp2 A_l, A_h, src, #0 + stp2 A_l, A_h, dst, #0 + ldp2 B_l, B_h, src, #16 + ldp2 C_l, C_h, src, #32 + stp2 B_l, B_h, dst, #16 + stp2 C_l, C_h, dst, #32 + ldp2 D_l, D_h, src, #48 + stp2 D_l, D_h, dst, #48 + add src, src, #64 + add dst, dst, #64 + + tst count, #0x3f + b.ne .Ltail63 + b .Lexitfunc + + /* + * Critical loop. Start at a new cache line boundary. Assuming + * 64 bytes per line this ensures the entire loop is in one line. + */ + .p2align L1_CACHE_SHIFT +.Lcpy_body_large: + + /* pre-get 64 bytes data. */ + ldp2 A_l, A_h, src, #0 + ldp2 B_l, B_h, src, #16 + ldp2 C_l, C_h, src, #32 + ldp2 D_l, D_h, src, #48 + add src, src, #64 +1: + /* + * interlace the load of next 64 bytes data block with store of the last + * loaded 64 bytes data. + */ + stp2 A_l, A_h, dst, #0 + ldp2 A_l, A_h, src, #0 + stp2 B_l, B_h, dst, #16 + ldp2 B_l, B_h, src, #16 + stp2 C_l, C_h, dst, #32 + ldp2 C_l, C_h, src, #32 + stp2 D_l, D_h, dst, #48 + ldp2 D_l, D_h, src, #48 + add dst, dst, #64 + add src, src, #64 + subs count, count, #64 + b.ge 1b + + /* Post-loop: store the last block of data using stp2 */ + /* (without post-increment) */ + stp2 A_l, A_h, dst, #0 + stp2 B_l, B_h, dst, #16 + stp2 C_l, C_h, dst, #32 + stp2 D_l, D_h, dst, #48 + add dst, dst, #64 + + tst count, #0x3f + b.ne .Ltail63 +.Lexitfunc: -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] [Backport] mm: refactor mm_access() to not return NULL
by Tang Hui 07 Aug '26

07 Aug '26

From: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes(a)oracle.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.146 commit d8a1f7420d2d58fcbde479bd72d0900fb512cb2d category: bugfix bugzilla: NA CVE: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit cd3f8467afd470ccab0de2fbc7c76664af4a0bac ] mm_access() can return NULL if the mm is not found, but this is handled the same as an error in all callers, with some translating this into an -ESRCH error. Only proc_mem_open() returns NULL if no mm is found, however in this case it is clearer and makes more sense to explicitly handle the error. Additionally we take the opportunity to refactor the function to eliminate unnecessary nesting. d8a1f7420d2d58fcbde479bd72d0900fb512cb2d Simplify things by simply returning -ESRCH if no mm is found - this both eliminates confusing use of the IS_ERR_OR_NULL() macro, and simplifies callers which would return -ESRCH by returning this error directly. [lorenzo.stoakes(a)oracle.com: prefer neater pointer error comparison] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/2fae1834-749a-45e1-8594-5e5979cf7103@lucifer.local Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240924201023.193135-1-lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes(a)oracle.com> Suggested-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd(a)arndb.de> Cc: Al Viro <viro(a)zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Tang Hui <tanghui20(a)huawei.com> --- fs/proc/base.c | 26 ++++++++++++++------------ kernel/fork.c | 5 +++-- mm/madvise.c | 4 ++-- mm/process_vm_access.c | 4 ++-- 4 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c index cac883cf29fa..7ee2285910bb 100644 --- a/fs/proc/base.c +++ b/fs/proc/base.c @@ -815,19 +815,21 @@ static const struct file_operations proc_single_file_operations = { struct mm_struct *proc_mem_open(struct inode *inode, unsigned int mode) { struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(inode); - struct mm_struct *mm = ERR_PTR(-ESRCH); + struct mm_struct *mm; - if (task) { - mm = mm_access(task, mode | PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS); - put_task_struct(task); + if (!task) + return ERR_PTR(-ESRCH); - if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(mm)) { - /* ensure this mm_struct can't be freed */ - mmgrab(mm); - /* but do not pin its memory */ - mmput(mm); - } - } + mm = mm_access(task, mode | PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS); + put_task_struct(task); + + if (IS_ERR(mm)) + return mm == ERR_PTR(-ESRCH) ? NULL : mm; + + /* ensure this mm_struct can't be freed */ + mmgrab(mm); + /* but do not pin its memory */ + mmput(mm); return mm; } @@ -2205,7 +2207,7 @@ static int map_files_d_revalidate(struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags) goto out_notask; mm = mm_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS); - if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(mm)) + if (IS_ERR(mm)) goto out; if (!dname_to_vma_addr(dentry, &vm_start, &vm_end)) { diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c index e92ddc0a0c66..7f188d166f35 100644 --- a/kernel/fork.c +++ b/kernel/fork.c @@ -1676,8 +1676,9 @@ struct mm_struct *mm_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode) return ERR_PTR(err); mm = get_task_mm(task); - if (mm && mm != current->mm && - !ptrace_may_access(task, mode)) { + if (!mm) { + mm = ERR_PTR(-ESRCH); + } else if (mm != current->mm && !ptrace_may_access(task, mode)) { mmput(mm); mm = ERR_PTR(-EACCES); } diff --git a/mm/madvise.c b/mm/madvise.c index 4b7956dd6357..7fb856fc7eec 100644 --- a/mm/madvise.c +++ b/mm/madvise.c @@ -1846,8 +1846,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(process_madvise, int, pidfd, const struct iovec __user *, vec, /* Require PTRACE_MODE_READ to avoid leaking ASLR metadata. */ mm = mm_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS); - if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(mm)) { - ret = IS_ERR(mm) ? PTR_ERR(mm) : -ESRCH; + if (IS_ERR(mm)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(mm); goto release_task; } diff --git a/mm/process_vm_access.c b/mm/process_vm_access.c index 0523edab03a6..5be8e91aa872 100644 --- a/mm/process_vm_access.c +++ b/mm/process_vm_access.c @@ -200,8 +200,8 @@ static ssize_t process_vm_rw_core(pid_t pid, struct iov_iter *iter, } mm = mm_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS); - if (!mm || IS_ERR(mm)) { - rc = IS_ERR(mm) ? PTR_ERR(mm) : -ESRCH; + if (IS_ERR(mm)) { + rc = PTR_ERR(mm); /* * Explicitly map EACCES to EPERM as EPERM is a more * appropriate error code for process_vw_readv/writev -- 2.34.1

1 0

[PATCH OLK-6.6] erofs: fix stack-out-of-bounds in erofs_put_metabuf
by Liu Mingrui 07 Aug '26

07 Aug '26

From: Mingrui Liu <liumingrui(a)huawei.com> Offering: HULK hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/16872 -------------------------------- Commit 1d4b040dd8ee moved erofs_put_metabuf() to out_unlock, but some error paths jump there before buf is initialized, unlike mainline where buf is always set. This triggers : BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in erofs_put_metabuf+0x54/0x158 [erofs] Call Trace: dump_backtrace+0xa0/0x128 show_stack+0x20/0x38 dump_stack_lvl+0x78/0xc8 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x84/0x3c8 print_report+0xb0/0x280 kasan_report+0x84/0xd0 __asan_load8+0x9c/0xc0 erofs_put_metabuf+0x54/0x158 [erofs] erofs_init_inode_xattrs+0x194/0x560 [erofs] erofs_getxattr+0xc8/0x238 [erofs] erofs_get_acl+0x6c/0x150 [erofs] __get_acl.part.0+0x218/0x390 vfs_get_acl+0xd0/0x150 do_get_acl+0x38/0x2a0 do_getxattr+0x9c/0x250 getxattr+0xe0/0x148 path_getxattr+0xdc/0x150 __arm64_sys_getxattr+0x60/0x80 invoke_syscall+0x64/0x178 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x11c/0x150 do_el0_svc+0x38/0x50 el0_svc+0x44/0x228 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x100/0x130 el0t_64_sync+0x3c8/0x3d0 Fix by zero-initializing buf at declaration so erofs_put_metabuf() can safely handle it. Fixes: 1d4b040dd8ee ("[Backport] erofs: fix metabuf leak in inode xattr initialization") Signed-off-by: Mingrui Liu <liumingrui(a)huawei.com> --- fs/erofs/xattr.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/erofs/xattr.c b/fs/erofs/xattr.c index b270226be379..abd23e990a3a 100644 --- a/fs/erofs/xattr.c +++ b/fs/erofs/xattr.c @@ -34,6 +34,8 @@ static int erofs_init_inode_xattrs(struct inode *inode) struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb; int ret = 0; + it.buf = __EROFS_BUF_INITIALIZER; + /* the most case is that xattrs of this inode are initialized. */ if (test_bit(EROFS_I_EA_INITED_BIT, &vi->flags)) { /* @@ -76,7 +78,6 @@ static int erofs_init_inode_xattrs(struct inode *inode) goto out_unlock; } - it.buf = __EROFS_BUF_INITIALIZER; erofs_init_metabuf(&it.buf, sb); it.pos = erofs_iloc(inode) + vi->inode_isize; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] Backport CVE-2026-64361 fixes from 6.6 LTS
by Pan Taixi 07 Aug '26

07 Aug '26

Bacport "hfs/hfsplus: fix u32 overflow in check_and_correct_requested_length" and its antecedent patch "hfs/hfsplus: prevent getting negative values of offset/length" Tristan Madani (1): hfs/hfsplus: fix u32 overflow in check_and_correct_requested_length Viacheslav Dubeyko (1): hfs/hfsplus: prevent getting negative values of offset/length fs/hfs/bfind.c | 2 +- fs/hfs/bnode.c | 54 ++++++++++++------------- fs/hfs/brec.c | 2 +- fs/hfs/btree.c | 2 +- fs/hfs/btree.h | 71 +++++++++++++++++---------------- fs/hfs/hfs_fs.h | 88 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------- fs/hfs/inode.c | 3 +- fs/hfsplus/bfind.c | 2 +- fs/hfsplus/bnode.c | 60 ++++++++++++++-------------- fs/hfsplus/brec.c | 2 +- fs/hfsplus/btree.c | 2 +- fs/hfsplus/hfsplus_fs.h | 40 +++++++++---------- 12 files changed, 173 insertions(+), 155 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 3

[PATCH OLK-6.6] sched: Add the qos schduler's cgroup v2 interface
by Chen Jinghuang 07 Aug '26

07 Aug '26

hulk inclusion category: feature bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I8MF4R -------------------------------- Add the qos schduler's cgroup v2 interface. Cgroup v2 use the qos scheduler, as follows: offline group: echo -1 > /sys/fs/cgroup/xxxx/offline/cpu.qos_level online group: /sys/fs/cgroup/xxxx/online/cpu.qos_level Signed-off-by: Chen Jinghuang <chenjinghuang2(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/sched/core.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/kernel/sched/core.c b/kernel/sched/core.c index cdc931c14930..fd8fdaaf7cbb 100644 --- a/kernel/sched/core.c +++ b/kernel/sched/core.c @@ -10660,6 +10660,14 @@ static struct cftype cpu_files[] = { .write = cpu_uclamp_max_write, }, #endif +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_QOS_SCHED + { + .name = "qos_level", + .flags = CFTYPE_NOT_ON_ROOT, + .read_s64 = cpu_qos_read, + .write_s64 = cpu_qos_write, + }, #ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_SOFT_DOMAIN { .name = "soft_domain", -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] Backport CVE-2026-64361 fixes from 6.6 LTS
by Pan Taixi 07 Aug '26

07 Aug '26

Bacport "hfs/hfsplus: fix u32 overflow in check_and_correct_requested_length" and its antecedent patch "hfs/hfsplus: prevent getting negative values of offset/length" Tristan Madani (1): hfs/hfsplus: fix u32 overflow in check_and_correct_requested_length Viacheslav Dubeyko (1): hfs/hfsplus: prevent getting negative values of offset/length fs/hfs/bfind.c | 2 +- fs/hfs/bnode.c | 54 ++++++++++++------------- fs/hfs/brec.c | 2 +- fs/hfs/btree.c | 2 +- fs/hfs/btree.h | 71 +++++++++++++++++---------------- fs/hfs/hfs_fs.h | 88 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------- fs/hfs/inode.c | 3 +- fs/hfsplus/bfind.c | 2 +- fs/hfsplus/bnode.c | 60 ++++++++++++++-------------- fs/hfsplus/brec.c | 2 +- fs/hfsplus/btree.c | 2 +- fs/hfsplus/hfsplus_fs.h | 40 +++++++++---------- 12 files changed, 173 insertions(+), 155 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 3

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] NFSv4/flexfiles: reject zero filehandle version count
by Zhou Minqiang 07 Aug '26

07 Aug '26

mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.2-rc1 commit 2c6bb3c40bc24f6aa8dfbe6fe98c3ad6389203f2 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/16112 CVE: CVE-2026-53392 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- ff_layout_alloc_lseg() decodes the filehandle-version array count from the flexfiles layout body. The value is used as the count for kzalloc_objs(), and the current code only rejects NULL. A zero count yields ZERO_SIZE_PTR, which can be stored in dss_info->fh_versions even though later flexfiles paths assume that at least one filehandle version exists. Reject fh_count == 0 before the allocation, matching the existing zero version_count validation in the flexfiles GETDEVICEINFO parser. A QEMU/KASAN run with a malformed flexfiles layout hit: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000010-0x0000000000000017] RIP: 0010:ff_layout_encode_ff_layoutupdate.isra.0+0x15f/0x750 ff_layout_encode_layoutreturn+0x683/0x970 nfs4_xdr_enc_layoutreturn+0x278/0x3a0 Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception The patched kernel rejects the malformed layout without KASAN/oops/panic, and a valid fh_count=1 regression still opens, reads, and unmounts cleanly. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: d67ae825a59d ("pnfs/flexfiles: Add the FlexFile Layout Driver") Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <anna.schumaker(a)hammerspace.com> Signed-off-by: Zhou Minqiang <zhouminqiang2(a)huawei.com> --- fs/nfs/flexfilelayout/flexfilelayout.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/nfs/flexfilelayout/flexfilelayout.c b/fs/nfs/flexfilelayout/flexfilelayout.c index 81843dd8b0ee..73ef9a88208f 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/flexfilelayout/flexfilelayout.c +++ b/fs/nfs/flexfilelayout/flexfilelayout.c @@ -459,6 +459,10 @@ ff_layout_alloc_lseg(struct pnfs_layout_hdr *lh, if (!p) goto out_err_free; fh_count = be32_to_cpup(p); + if (fh_count == 0) { + rc = -EINVAL; + goto out_err_free; + } fls->mirror_array[i]->fh_versions = kcalloc(fh_count, sizeof(struct nfs_fh), -- 2.52.0

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] smb/client: fix chown/chgrp with SMB3 POSIX Extensions
by Zhou Minqiang 07 Aug '26

07 Aug '26

mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.2-rc1 commit 760ef2c579c2609cf17fb1cd5392f64d42d43d33 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/16820 CVE: CVE-2026-64388 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Ownership (chown) and group (chgrp) modifications were being ignored when mounting with SMB3 POSIX Extensions unless CIFS_MOUNT_CIFS_ACL or CIFS_MOUNT_MODE_FROM_SID were also explicitly set. Fix this by checking for posix_extensions in cifs_setattr_nounix() when updating UID and GID, ensuring that id_mode_to_cifs_acl() is called to map and set the ownership/group information on the server. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow(a)samba.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench(a)microsoft.com> Conflicts: fs/cifs/inode.c fs/smb/client/inode.c [cxt conflicts] Signed-off-by: Zhou Minqiang <zhouminqiang2(a)huawei.com> --- fs/cifs/inode.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/cifs/inode.c b/fs/cifs/inode.c index d30eb4350656..e5d0066f6125 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/inode.c +++ b/fs/cifs/inode.c @@ -2447,7 +2447,8 @@ cifs_setattr_nounix(struct dentry *direntry, struct iattr *attrs) gid = attrs->ia_gid; #ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_ACL - if (cifs_sb->mnt_cifs_flags & CIFS_MOUNT_CIFS_ACL) { + if ((cifs_sb->mnt_cifs_flags & CIFS_MOUNT_CIFS_ACL) || + cifs_sb_master_tcon(cifs_sb)->posix_extensions) { if (uid_valid(uid) || gid_valid(gid)) { rc = id_mode_to_cifs_acl(inode, full_path, NO_CHANGE_64, uid, gid); -- 2.52.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/5] CVE-2026-53120
by Ziming Du 07 Aug '26

07 Aug '26

patches for CVE-2026-53120 Danilo Krummrich (1): PCI: use generic driver_override infrastructure Samiullah Khawaja (1): PCI: Initialize temporary device in new_id_store() Zhenzhong Duan (2): PCI: Move pci_match_device() ahead of new_id_store() PCI: Avoid duplicate IDs in driver dynamic IDs list Ziming Du (1): [Huawei] PCI: fix kabi breakage due to driver_override removal drivers/pci/pci-driver.c | 161 +++++++++++++++-------------- drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c | 48 --------- drivers/pci/probe.c | 1 - drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.c | 4 +- drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pci_stub.c | 6 +- include/linux/pci.h | 2 +- 6 files changed, 93 insertions(+), 129 deletions(-) -- 2.43.0

2 6

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/3] CVE-2026-53120
by Ziming Du 07 Aug '26

07 Aug '26

CVE-2026-53120 Danilo Krummrich (1): PCI: use generic driver_override infrastructure Samiullah Khawaja (1): PCI: Initialize temporary device in new_id_store() Ziming Du (1): PCI: fix kabi breakage due to driver_override removal drivers/pci/pci-driver.c | 20 +++++++++++++++----- drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c | 28 ---------------------------- drivers/pci/probe.c | 1 - drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_core.c | 4 ++-- drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pci_stub.c | 6 ++++-- include/linux/pci.h | 7 +------ 6 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-) -- 2.43.0

2 4

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/4] CVE-2026-64405 fixes
by Tang Hui 06 Aug '26

06 Aug '26

CVE-2026-64405 fixes. Luiz Augusto von Dentz (2): [Backport] Bluetooth: hci_core: Remove check of BDADDR_ANY in hci_conn_hash_lookup_big_state [Backport] Bluetooth: hci_sync: Fix attempting to send HCI_Disconnect to BIS handle Pauli Virtanen (1): [Backport] Bluetooth: separate CIS_LINK and BIS_LINK link types Siwei Zhang (1): [Backport] Bluetooth: hci_conn: Fix null ptr deref in hci_abort_conn() include/net/bluetooth/hci.h | 3 +- include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h | 38 ++++---- net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c | 56 +++++------- net/bluetooth/hci_core.c | 21 +++-- net/bluetooth/hci_event.c | 25 +++--- net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c | 149 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- net/bluetooth/iso.c | 4 +- net/bluetooth/mgmt.c | 3 +- 8 files changed, 206 insertions(+), 93 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

1 4

[PATCH OLK-5.10] KVM: SEV: Ignore Port I/O requests of length '0'
by Zhang Kunbo 06 Aug '26

06 Aug '26

From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.12.95 commit 3b6035bc6bff20e89752ce4358bc4c9a9d5883f2 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/16267 CVE: CVE-2026-63940 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 3988bd2723de407ae90fa7a6f6029b4e60238c58 upstream. Explicitly ignore Port I/O requests of length '0' (or count '0'), so that setting up the software scratch area (and other code) doesn't have to worry about underflowing the length, and to allow for WARNing on trying to configure the scratch area with len==0. Fixes: 291bd20d5d88 ("KVM: SVM: Add initial support for a VMGEXIT VMEXIT") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com> Message-ID: <20260501202250.2115252-5-seanjc(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jack Wang <jinpu.wang(a)ionos.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Zhang Kunbo <zhangkunbo(a)huawei.com> --- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c index c711a6369c13..79ebbe8cf0b4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c @@ -2791,6 +2791,11 @@ int sev_handle_vmgexit(struct vcpu_svm *svm) "vmgexit: unsupported event - exit_info_1=%#llx, exit_info_2=%#llx\n", control->exit_info_1, control->exit_info_2); break; + case SVM_EXIT_IOIO: + if (!((control->exit_info_1 & SVM_IOIO_SIZE_MASK) >> SVM_IOIO_SIZE_SHIFT)) + return 1; + + fallthrough; default: ret = svm_invoke_exit_handler(svm, exit_code); } @@ -2810,6 +2815,9 @@ int sev_es_string_io(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int size, unsigned int port, int in) if (unlikely(check_mul_overflow(count, size, &bytes))) return -EINVAL; + if (!bytes) + return 1; + if (!setup_vmgexit_scratch(svm, in, bytes)) return -EINVAL; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] x86/bugs: Enable IBPB flush on BPF JIT allocation
by Zhang Kunbo 06 Aug '26

06 Aug '26

From: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta(a)linux.intel.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.145 commit cb27f3bf915cc0f20fc0c48da9059304e39ebd35 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/16808 CVE: CVE-2026-64507 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit a3af84b0fa00ead01fcd0e28b5d773ff25990a0d upstream. Enable hardening against JIT spraying when Spectre-v2 mitigations are in use. Specifically, issue an IBPB flush on BPF JIT memory reuse. Skip enabling the IBPB flush if the BPF dispatcher is already using a retpoline sequence. This hardening applies only when BPF-JIT is in use. Guard the enabling under CONFIG_BPF_JIT so that bugs.c still builds with CONFIG_BPF_JIT=n. [ pawan: Use entry_ibpb() instead of write_ibpb(). JIT hardening enable moved to spectre_v2_select_mitigation() because there is no spectre_v2_apply_mitigation()] Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta(a)linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h [context conflicts] Signed-off-by: Zhang Kunbo <zhangkunbo(a)huawei.com> --- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 4 +++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 2 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index 58dda23aee1b..d4eae71b2ab7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -408,6 +408,10 @@ extern void srso_alias_untrain_ret(void); extern void entry_untrain_ret(void); extern void write_ibpb(void); +#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_JIT +extern void bpf_arch_ibpb(void); +#endif + #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 extern void clear_bhb_loop(void); #endif diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 212408f6de11..e53ea50132e7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ #include <linux/sched/smt.h> #include <linux/pgtable.h> #include <linux/bpf.h> +#include <linux/filter.h> #include <asm/spec-ctrl.h> #include <asm/cmdline.h> @@ -1312,8 +1313,21 @@ static inline const char *spectre_v2_module_string(void) { return spectre_v2_bad_module ? " - vulnerable module loaded" : ""; } + +/* + * The "retpoline sequence" is the "call;mov;ret" sequence that + * replaces normal indirect branch instructions. Differentiate + * *the* retpoline sequence from the LFENCE-prefixed indirect + * branches that simply use the retpoline infrastructure. + */ +static inline bool retpoline_seq_enabled(void) +{ + return boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE); +} + #else static inline const char *spectre_v2_module_string(void) { return ""; } +static inline bool retpoline_seq_enabled(void) { return false; } #endif #define SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE_MSG "WARNING: LFENCE mitigation is not recommended for this CPU, data leaks possible!\n" @@ -1787,8 +1801,7 @@ static void __init bhi_select_mitigation(void) return; /* Retpoline mitigates against BHI unless the CPU has RRSBA behavior */ - if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) && - !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE)) { + if (retpoline_seq_enabled()) { spec_ctrl_disable_kernel_rrsba(); if (rrsba_disabled) return; @@ -1810,6 +1823,27 @@ static void __init bhi_select_mitigation(void) pr_info("Spectre BHI mitigation: SW BHB clearing on syscall\n"); } +#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_JIT +static void __bpf_arch_ibpb(void *unused) +{ + entry_ibpb(); +} + +void bpf_arch_ibpb(void) +{ + on_each_cpu(__bpf_arch_ibpb, NULL, 1); +} + +static bool __init cpu_wants_ibpb_bpf(void) +{ + /* A genuine retpoline already neutralizes ring0 indirect predictions */ + if (retpoline_seq_enabled()) + return false; + + return boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB); +} +#endif + static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) { enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(); @@ -1955,6 +1989,14 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) pr_info("Enabling Restricted Speculation for firmware calls\n"); } +#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_JIT + if (cpu_wants_ibpb_bpf()) { + static_call_update(bpf_arch_pred_flush, bpf_arch_ibpb); + static_branch_enable(&bpf_pred_flush_enabled); + pr_info("Enabling IBPB for BPF\n"); + } +#endif + /* Set up IBPB and STIBP depending on the general spectre V2 command */ spectre_v2_cmd = cmd; } @@ -3113,9 +3155,7 @@ static const char *spectre_bhi_state(void) return "; BHI: BHI_DIS_S"; else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP)) return "; BHI: SW loop, KVM: SW loop"; - else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) && - !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE) && - rrsba_disabled) + else if (retpoline_seq_enabled() && rrsba_disabled) return "; BHI: Retpoline"; else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT)) return "; BHI: Vulnerable, KVM: SW loop"; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/3] CVE-2026-53120
by Ziming Du 06 Aug '26

06 Aug '26

CVE-2026-53120 Danilo Krummrich (1): PCI: use generic driver_override infrastructure Samiullah Khawaja (1): PCI: Initialize temporary device in new_id_store() Ziming Du (1): PCI: fix kabi breakage due to driver_override removal drivers/pci/pci-driver.c | 20 +++++++++++++++----- drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c | 28 ---------------------------- drivers/pci/probe.c | 1 - drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_core.c | 4 ++-- drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pci_stub.c | 6 ++++-- include/linux/pci.h | 7 +------ 6 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-) -- 2.43.0

2 4

[PATCH OLK-5.10] PCI: Fix pci_slot_trylock() error handling
by Ziming Du 06 Aug '26

06 Aug '26

From: Jinhui Guo <guojinhui.liam(a)bytedance.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.252 commit ebb27b7399ab8b9eb1f792b329aa5f6250c590d4 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14757 CVE: CVE-2026-43211 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 9368d1ee62829b08aa31836b3ca003803caf0b72 ] Commit a4e772898f8b ("PCI: Add missing bridge lock to pci_bus_lock()") delegates the bridge device's pci_dev_trylock() to pci_bus_trylock() in pci_slot_trylock(), but it forgets to remove the corresponding pci_dev_unlock() when pci_bus_trylock() fails. Before a4e772898f8b, the code did: if (!pci_dev_trylock(dev)) /* <- lock bridge device */ goto unlock; if (dev->subordinate) { if (!pci_bus_trylock(dev->subordinate)) { pci_dev_unlock(dev); /* <- unlock bridge device */ goto unlock; } } After a4e772898f8b the bridge-device lock is no longer taken, but the pci_dev_unlock(dev) on the failure path was left in place, leading to the bug. This yields one of two errors: 1. A warning that the lock is being unlocked when no one holds it. 2. An incorrect unlock of a lock that belongs to another thread. Fix it by removing the now-redundant pci_dev_unlock(dev) on the failure path. [Same patch later posted by Keith at https://patch.msgid.link/20260116184150.3013258-1-kbusch@meta.com] Fixes: a4e772898f8b ("PCI: Add missing bridge lock to pci_bus_lock()") Signed-off-by: Jinhui Guo <guojinhui.liam(a)bytedance.com> Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas(a)google.com> Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251212145528.2555-1-guojinhui.liam@bytedance.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ziming Du <duziming2(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/pci/pci.c | 4 +--- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/pci/pci.c b/drivers/pci/pci.c index 450228913544c..109b245210222 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/pci.c +++ b/drivers/pci/pci.c @@ -5391,10 +5391,8 @@ static int pci_slot_trylock(struct pci_slot *slot) if (!dev->slot || dev->slot != slot) continue; if (dev->subordinate) { - if (!pci_bus_trylock(dev->subordinate)) { - pci_dev_unlock(dev); + if (!pci_bus_trylock(dev->subordinate)) goto unlock; - } } else if (!pci_dev_trylock(dev)) goto unlock; } -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/5] CVE-2026-53120
by Ziming Du 06 Aug '26

06 Aug '26

patches for CVE-2026-53120 Danilo Krummrich (1): PCI: use generic driver_override infrastructure Samiullah Khawaja (1): PCI: Initialize temporary device in new_id_store() Zhenzhong Duan (2): PCI: Move pci_match_device() ahead of new_id_store() PCI: Avoid duplicate IDs in driver dynamic IDs list Ziming Du (1): [Huawei] PCI: fix kabi breakage due to driver_override removal drivers/pci/pci-driver.c | 161 +++++++++++++++-------------- drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c | 48 --------- drivers/pci/probe.c | 1 - drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.c | 4 +- drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pci_stub.c | 6 +- include/linux/pci.h | 2 +- 6 files changed, 93 insertions(+), 129 deletions(-) -- 2.43.0

2 6

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/4] CVE-2026-64405 fixes
by Hui Tang 06 Aug '26

06 Aug '26

CVE-2026-64405 fixes Luiz Augusto von Dentz (2): [Backport] Bluetooth: hci_core: Remove check of BDADDR_ANY in hci_conn_hash_lookup_big_state [Backport] Bluetooth: hci_sync: Fix attempting to send HCI_Disconnect to BIS handle Pauli Virtanen (1): [Backport] Bluetooth: separate CIS_LINK and BIS_LINK link types Siwei Zhang (1): [Backport] Bluetooth: hci_conn: Fix null ptr deref in hci_abort_conn() include/net/bluetooth/hci.h | 3 +- include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h | 38 ++++---- net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c | 56 +++++------- net/bluetooth/hci_core.c | 21 +++-- net/bluetooth/hci_event.c | 25 +++--- net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c | 149 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- net/bluetooth/iso.c | 4 +- net/bluetooth/mgmt.c | 3 +- 8 files changed, 206 insertions(+), 93 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

1 4

[PATCH OLK-6.6 1/4] [Backport] Bluetooth: separate CIS_LINK and BIS_LINK link types
by Hui Tang 06 Aug '26

06 Aug '26

From: Pauli Virtanen <pav(a)iki.fi> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.145 commit 436b54dfa0fb7c3e4e194beea5d635da88c4a311 category: bugfix bugzilla: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 23205562ffc8de20f57afdd984858cab29e77968 ] Use separate link type id for unicast and broadcast ISO connections. These connection types are handled with separate HCI commands, socket API is different, and hci_conn has union fields that are different in the two cases, so they shall not be mixed up. Currently in most places it is attempted to distinguish ucast by bacmp(&c->dst, BDADDR_ANY) but it is wrong as dst is set for bcast sink hci_conn in iso_conn_ready(). Additionally checking sync_handle might be OK, but depends on details of bcast conn configuration flow. To avoid complicating it, use separate link types. Fixes: f764a6c2c1e4 ("Bluetooth: ISO: Add broadcast support") Signed-off-by: Pauli Virtanen <pav(a)iki.fi> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz(a)intel.com> Stable-dep-of: 12917f591cea ("Bluetooth: hci_conn: Fix null ptr deref in hci_abort_conn()") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Conflicts: net/bluetooth/hci_event.c net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c [Context differences.] Signed-off-by: Hui Tang <tanghui20(a)huawei.com> --- include/net/bluetooth/hci.h | 3 ++- include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h | 38 ++++++++++++++++++-------------- net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++------------ net/bluetooth/hci_core.c | 21 +++++++++++------- net/bluetooth/hci_event.c | 25 +++++++++++---------- net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c | 14 +++++++----- net/bluetooth/iso.c | 4 ++-- net/bluetooth/mgmt.c | 3 ++- 8 files changed, 83 insertions(+), 60 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/bluetooth/hci.h b/include/net/bluetooth/hci.h index 0439600a04da..649ed9632880 100644 --- a/include/net/bluetooth/hci.h +++ b/include/net/bluetooth/hci.h @@ -543,7 +543,8 @@ enum { #define ESCO_LINK 0x02 /* Low Energy links do not have defined link type. Use invented one */ #define LE_LINK 0x80 -#define ISO_LINK 0x82 +#define CIS_LINK 0x82 +#define BIS_LINK 0x83 #define INVALID_LINK 0xff /* LMP features */ diff --git a/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h b/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h index 4726fb144ee9..1d678fb8cc42 100644 --- a/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h +++ b/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h @@ -1003,7 +1003,8 @@ static inline void hci_conn_hash_add(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct hci_conn *c) case ESCO_LINK: h->sco_num++; break; - case ISO_LINK: + case CIS_LINK: + case BIS_LINK: h->iso_num++; break; } @@ -1029,7 +1030,8 @@ static inline void hci_conn_hash_del(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct hci_conn *c) case ESCO_LINK: h->sco_num--; break; - case ISO_LINK: + case CIS_LINK: + case BIS_LINK: h->iso_num--; break; } @@ -1046,7 +1048,8 @@ static inline unsigned int hci_conn_num(struct hci_dev *hdev, __u8 type) case SCO_LINK: case ESCO_LINK: return h->sco_num; - case ISO_LINK: + case CIS_LINK: + case BIS_LINK: return h->iso_num; default: return 0; @@ -1107,7 +1110,7 @@ static inline struct hci_conn *hci_conn_hash_lookup_bis(struct hci_dev *hdev, rcu_read_lock(); list_for_each_entry_rcu(c, &h->list, list) { - if (bacmp(&c->dst, ba) || c->type != ISO_LINK) + if (bacmp(&c->dst, ba) || c->type != BIS_LINK) continue; if (c->iso_qos.bcast.bis == bis) { @@ -1131,8 +1134,8 @@ hci_conn_hash_lookup_per_adv_bis(struct hci_dev *hdev, rcu_read_lock(); list_for_each_entry_rcu(c, &h->list, list) { - if (bacmp(&c->dst, ba) || c->type != ISO_LINK || - !test_bit(HCI_CONN_PER_ADV, &c->flags)) + if (bacmp(&c->dst, ba) || c->type != BIS_LINK || + !test_bit(HCI_CONN_PER_ADV, &c->flags)) continue; if (c->iso_qos.bcast.big == big && @@ -1242,7 +1245,7 @@ static inline struct hci_conn *hci_conn_hash_lookup_cis(struct hci_dev *hdev, rcu_read_lock(); list_for_each_entry_rcu(c, &h->list, list) { - if (c->type != ISO_LINK || !bacmp(&c->dst, BDADDR_ANY)) + if (c->type != CIS_LINK) continue; /* Match CIG ID if set */ @@ -1274,7 +1277,7 @@ static inline struct hci_conn *hci_conn_hash_lookup_cig(struct hci_dev *hdev, rcu_read_lock(); list_for_each_entry_rcu(c, &h->list, list) { - if (c->type != ISO_LINK || !bacmp(&c->dst, BDADDR_ANY)) + if (c->type != CIS_LINK) continue; if (handle == c->iso_qos.ucast.cig) { @@ -1297,7 +1300,7 @@ static inline struct hci_conn *hci_conn_hash_lookup_big(struct hci_dev *hdev, rcu_read_lock(); list_for_each_entry_rcu(c, &h->list, list) { - if (bacmp(&c->dst, BDADDR_ANY) || c->type != ISO_LINK) + if (bacmp(&c->dst, BDADDR_ANY) || c->type != BIS_LINK) continue; if (handle == c->iso_qos.bcast.big) { @@ -1320,7 +1323,7 @@ static inline struct hci_conn *hci_conn_hash_lookup_big_any_dst(struct hci_dev * rcu_read_lock(); list_for_each_entry_rcu(c, &h->list, list) { - if (c->type != ISO_LINK) + if (c->type != BIS_LINK) continue; if (handle != BT_ISO_QOS_BIG_UNSET && handle == c->iso_qos.bcast.big) { @@ -1343,8 +1346,8 @@ hci_conn_hash_lookup_big_state(struct hci_dev *hdev, __u8 handle, __u16 state) rcu_read_lock(); list_for_each_entry_rcu(c, &h->list, list) { - if (bacmp(&c->dst, BDADDR_ANY) || c->type != ISO_LINK || - c->state != state) + if (c->type != BIS_LINK || bacmp(&c->dst, BDADDR_ANY) || + c->state != state) continue; if (handle == c->iso_qos.bcast.big) { @@ -1367,8 +1370,8 @@ hci_conn_hash_lookup_pa_sync_big_handle(struct hci_dev *hdev, __u8 big) rcu_read_lock(); list_for_each_entry_rcu(c, &h->list, list) { - if (c->type != ISO_LINK || - !test_bit(HCI_CONN_PA_SYNC, &c->flags)) + if (c->type != BIS_LINK || + !test_bit(HCI_CONN_PA_SYNC, &c->flags)) continue; if (c->iso_qos.bcast.big == big) { @@ -1390,8 +1393,8 @@ hci_conn_hash_lookup_pa_sync_handle(struct hci_dev *hdev, __u16 sync_handle) rcu_read_lock(); list_for_each_entry_rcu(c, &h->list, list) { - if (c->type != ISO_LINK || - !test_bit(HCI_CONN_PA_SYNC, &c->flags)) + if (c->type != BIS_LINK || + !test_bit(HCI_CONN_PA_SYNC, &c->flags)) continue; if (c->sync_handle == sync_handle) { @@ -1972,7 +1975,8 @@ static inline int hci_proto_connect_ind(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, case ESCO_LINK: return sco_connect_ind(hdev, bdaddr, flags); - case ISO_LINK: + case CIS_LINK: + case BIS_LINK: return iso_connect_ind(hdev, bdaddr, flags); default: diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c index ee3e842404d1..09b03686f913 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c @@ -870,9 +870,11 @@ static void cis_cleanup(struct hci_conn *conn) /* Check if ISO connection is a CIS and remove CIG if there are * no other connections using it. */ - hci_conn_hash_list_state(hdev, find_cis, ISO_LINK, BT_BOUND, &d); - hci_conn_hash_list_state(hdev, find_cis, ISO_LINK, BT_CONNECT, &d); - hci_conn_hash_list_state(hdev, find_cis, ISO_LINK, BT_CONNECTED, &d); + hci_conn_hash_list_state(hdev, find_cis, CIS_LINK, BT_BOUND, &d); + hci_conn_hash_list_state(hdev, find_cis, CIS_LINK, BT_CONNECT, + &d); + hci_conn_hash_list_state(hdev, find_cis, CIS_LINK, BT_CONNECTED, + &d); if (d.count) return; @@ -895,7 +897,8 @@ static struct hci_conn *__hci_conn_add(struct hci_dev *hdev, int type, bdaddr_t if (!hdev->acl_mtu) return ERR_PTR(-ECONNREFUSED); break; - case ISO_LINK: + case CIS_LINK: + case BIS_LINK: if (hdev->iso_mtu) /* Dedicated ISO Buffer exists */ break; @@ -959,7 +962,8 @@ static struct hci_conn *__hci_conn_add(struct hci_dev *hdev, int type, bdaddr_t hci_copy_identity_address(hdev, &conn->src, &conn->src_type); conn->mtu = hdev->le_mtu ? hdev->le_mtu : hdev->acl_mtu; break; - case ISO_LINK: + case CIS_LINK: + case BIS_LINK: /* conn->src should reflect the local identity address */ hci_copy_identity_address(hdev, &conn->src, &conn->src_type); @@ -1079,7 +1083,8 @@ static void hci_conn_cleanup_child(struct hci_conn *conn, u8 reason) if (HCI_CONN_HANDLE_UNSET(conn->handle)) hci_conn_failed(conn, reason); break; - case ISO_LINK: + case CIS_LINK: + case BIS_LINK: if ((conn->state != BT_CONNECTED && !test_bit(HCI_CONN_CREATE_CIS, &conn->flags)) || test_bit(HCI_CONN_BIG_CREATED, &conn->flags)) @@ -1154,7 +1159,8 @@ void hci_conn_del(struct hci_conn *conn) hdev->acl_cnt += conn->sent; } else { /* Unacked ISO frames */ - if (conn->type == ISO_LINK) { + if (conn->type == CIS_LINK || + conn->type == BIS_LINK) { if (hdev->iso_pkts) hdev->iso_cnt += conn->sent; else if (hdev->le_pkts) @@ -1525,7 +1531,7 @@ static struct hci_conn *hci_add_bis(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *dst, memcmp(conn->le_per_adv_data, base, base_len))) return ERR_PTR(-EADDRINUSE); - conn = hci_conn_add_unset(hdev, ISO_LINK, dst, HCI_ROLE_MASTER); + conn = hci_conn_add_unset(hdev, BIS_LINK, dst, HCI_ROLE_MASTER); if (IS_ERR(conn)) return conn; @@ -1731,7 +1737,7 @@ static int hci_le_create_big(struct hci_conn *conn, struct bt_iso_qos *qos) data.count = 0; /* Create a BIS for each bound connection */ - hci_conn_hash_list_state(hdev, bis_list, ISO_LINK, + hci_conn_hash_list_state(hdev, bis_list, BIS_LINK, BT_BOUND, &data); cp.handle = qos->bcast.big; @@ -1827,12 +1833,12 @@ static bool hci_le_set_cig_params(struct hci_conn *conn, struct bt_iso_qos *qos) for (data.cig = 0x00; data.cig < 0xf0; data.cig++) { data.count = 0; - hci_conn_hash_list_state(hdev, find_cis, ISO_LINK, + hci_conn_hash_list_state(hdev, find_cis, CIS_LINK, BT_CONNECT, &data); if (data.count) continue; - hci_conn_hash_list_state(hdev, find_cis, ISO_LINK, + hci_conn_hash_list_state(hdev, find_cis, CIS_LINK, BT_CONNECTED, &data); if (!data.count) break; @@ -1882,7 +1888,8 @@ struct hci_conn *hci_bind_cis(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *dst, cis = hci_conn_hash_lookup_cis(hdev, dst, dst_type, qos->ucast.cig, qos->ucast.cis); if (!cis) { - cis = hci_conn_add_unset(hdev, ISO_LINK, dst, HCI_ROLE_MASTER); + cis = hci_conn_add_unset(hdev, CIS_LINK, dst, + HCI_ROLE_MASTER); if (IS_ERR(cis)) return cis; cis->cleanup = cis_cleanup; @@ -1974,7 +1981,7 @@ bool hci_iso_setup_path(struct hci_conn *conn) int hci_conn_check_create_cis(struct hci_conn *conn) { - if (conn->type != ISO_LINK || !bacmp(&conn->dst, BDADDR_ANY)) + if (conn->type != CIS_LINK) return -EINVAL; if (!conn->parent || conn->parent->state != BT_CONNECTED || @@ -2272,7 +2279,7 @@ struct hci_conn *hci_connect_bis(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *dst, * the start periodic advertising and create BIG commands have * been queued */ - hci_conn_hash_list_state(hdev, bis_mark_per_adv, ISO_LINK, + hci_conn_hash_list_state(hdev, bis_mark_per_adv, BIS_LINK, BT_BOUND, &data); /* Queue start periodic advertising and create BIG */ diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c index eb9a37ec587b..ae0c4bd4fa5d 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c @@ -2913,12 +2913,13 @@ int hci_recv_frame(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb) break; case HCI_ACLDATA_PKT: /* Detect if ISO packet has been sent as ACL */ - if (hci_conn_num(hdev, ISO_LINK)) { + if (hci_conn_num(hdev, CIS_LINK) || + hci_conn_num(hdev, BIS_LINK)) { __u16 handle = __le16_to_cpu(hci_acl_hdr(skb)->handle); __u8 type; type = hci_conn_lookup_type(hdev, hci_handle(handle)); - if (type == ISO_LINK) + if (type == CIS_LINK || type == BIS_LINK) hci_skb_pkt_type(skb) = HCI_ISODATA_PKT; } break; @@ -3353,7 +3354,8 @@ static inline void hci_quote_sent(struct hci_conn *conn, int num, int *quote) case LE_LINK: cnt = hdev->le_mtu ? hdev->le_cnt : hdev->acl_cnt; break; - case ISO_LINK: + case CIS_LINK: + case BIS_LINK: cnt = hdev->iso_mtu ? hdev->iso_cnt : hdev->le_mtu ? hdev->le_cnt : hdev->acl_cnt; break; @@ -3367,7 +3369,7 @@ static inline void hci_quote_sent(struct hci_conn *conn, int num, int *quote) } static struct hci_conn *hci_low_sent(struct hci_dev *hdev, __u8 type, - int *quote) + __u8 type2, int *quote) { struct hci_conn_hash *h = &hdev->conn_hash; struct hci_conn *conn = NULL, *c; @@ -3379,7 +3381,8 @@ static struct hci_conn *hci_low_sent(struct hci_dev *hdev, __u8 type, rcu_read_lock(); list_for_each_entry_rcu(c, &h->list, list) { - if (c->type != type || skb_queue_empty(&c->data_q)) + if ((c->type != type && c->type != type2) || + skb_queue_empty(&c->data_q)) continue; if (c->state != BT_CONNECTED && c->state != BT_CONFIG) @@ -3582,7 +3585,7 @@ static void hci_sched_sco(struct hci_dev *hdev, __u8 type) else cnt = &hdev->sco_cnt; - while (*cnt && (conn = hci_low_sent(hdev, type, &quote))) { + while (*cnt && (conn = hci_low_sent(hdev, type, type, &quote))) { while (quote-- && (skb = skb_dequeue(&conn->data_q))) { BT_DBG("skb %p len %d", skb, skb->len); hci_send_frame(hdev, skb); @@ -3710,12 +3713,14 @@ static void hci_sched_iso(struct hci_dev *hdev) BT_DBG("%s", hdev->name); - if (!hci_conn_num(hdev, ISO_LINK)) + if (!hci_conn_num(hdev, CIS_LINK) && + !hci_conn_num(hdev, BIS_LINK)) return; cnt = hdev->iso_pkts ? &hdev->iso_cnt : hdev->le_pkts ? &hdev->le_cnt : &hdev->acl_cnt; - while (*cnt && (conn = hci_low_sent(hdev, ISO_LINK, &quote))) { + while (*cnt && (conn = hci_low_sent(hdev, CIS_LINK, BIS_LINK, + &quote))) { while (quote-- && (skb = skb_dequeue(&conn->data_q))) { BT_DBG("skb %p len %d", skb, skb->len); hci_send_frame(hdev, skb); diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c index 190b5debc0da..b14cf8d6b1f2 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c @@ -3797,7 +3797,7 @@ static void hci_unbound_cis_failed(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 cig, u8 status) lockdep_assert_held(&hdev->lock); list_for_each_entry_safe(conn, tmp, &hdev->conn_hash.list, list) { - if (conn->type != ISO_LINK || !bacmp(&conn->dst, BDADDR_ANY) || + if (conn->type != CIS_LINK || conn->state == BT_OPEN || conn->iso_qos.ucast.cig != cig) continue; @@ -4473,7 +4473,8 @@ static void hci_num_comp_pkts_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data, break; - case ISO_LINK: + case CIS_LINK: + case BIS_LINK: if (hdev->iso_pkts) { hdev->iso_cnt += count; if (hdev->iso_cnt > hdev->iso_pkts) @@ -6412,7 +6413,7 @@ static void hci_le_pa_sync_estabilished_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data, hci_dev_clear_flag(hdev, HCI_PA_SYNC); - mask |= hci_proto_connect_ind(hdev, &ev->bdaddr, ISO_LINK, &flags); + mask |= hci_proto_connect_ind(hdev, &ev->bdaddr, BIS_LINK, &flags); if (!(mask & HCI_LM_ACCEPT)) { hci_le_pa_term_sync(hdev, ev->handle); goto unlock; @@ -6423,7 +6424,7 @@ static void hci_le_pa_sync_estabilished_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data, if (ev->status) { /* Add connection to indicate the failed PA sync event */ - pa_sync = hci_conn_add_unset(hdev, ISO_LINK, BDADDR_ANY, + pa_sync = hci_conn_add_unset(hdev, BIS_LINK, BDADDR_ANY, HCI_ROLE_SLAVE); if (!pa_sync) @@ -6450,7 +6451,7 @@ static void hci_le_per_adv_report_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data, hci_dev_lock(hdev); - mask |= hci_proto_connect_ind(hdev, BDADDR_ANY, ISO_LINK, &flags); + mask |= hci_proto_connect_ind(hdev, BDADDR_ANY, BIS_LINK, &flags); if (!(mask & HCI_LM_ACCEPT)) hci_le_pa_term_sync(hdev, ev->sync_handle); @@ -6723,7 +6724,7 @@ static void hci_le_cis_estabilished_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data, goto unlock; } - if (conn->type != ISO_LINK) { + if (conn->type != CIS_LINK) { bt_dev_err(hdev, "Invalid connection link type handle 0x%4.4x", handle); @@ -6841,7 +6842,7 @@ static void hci_le_cis_req_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data, if (!acl) goto unlock; - mask = hci_proto_connect_ind(hdev, &acl->dst, ISO_LINK, &flags); + mask = hci_proto_connect_ind(hdev, &acl->dst, CIS_LINK, &flags); if (!(mask & HCI_LM_ACCEPT)) { hci_le_reject_cis(hdev, ev->cis_handle); goto unlock; @@ -6849,8 +6850,8 @@ static void hci_le_cis_req_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data, cis = hci_conn_hash_lookup_handle(hdev, cis_handle); if (!cis) { - cis = hci_conn_add(hdev, ISO_LINK, &acl->dst, HCI_ROLE_SLAVE, - cis_handle); + cis = hci_conn_add(hdev, CIS_LINK, &acl->dst, + HCI_ROLE_SLAVE, cis_handle); if (IS_ERR(cis)) { hci_le_reject_cis(hdev, ev->cis_handle); goto unlock; @@ -6984,7 +6985,7 @@ static void hci_le_big_sync_established_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data, bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "ignore too large handle %u", handle); continue; } - bis = hci_conn_add(hdev, ISO_LINK, BDADDR_ANY, + bis = hci_conn_add(hdev, BIS_LINK, BDADDR_ANY, HCI_ROLE_SLAVE, handle); if (IS_ERR(bis)) continue; @@ -7041,7 +7042,7 @@ static void hci_le_big_info_adv_report_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data, hci_dev_lock(hdev); - mask |= hci_proto_connect_ind(hdev, BDADDR_ANY, ISO_LINK, &flags); + mask |= hci_proto_connect_ind(hdev, BDADDR_ANY, BIS_LINK, &flags); if (!(mask & HCI_LM_ACCEPT)) { hci_le_pa_term_sync(hdev, ev->sync_handle); goto unlock; @@ -7058,7 +7059,7 @@ static void hci_le_big_info_adv_report_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data, goto unlock; /* Add connection to indicate the PA sync event */ - pa_sync = hci_conn_add_unset(hdev, ISO_LINK, BDADDR_ANY, + pa_sync = hci_conn_add_unset(hdev, BIS_LINK, BDADDR_ANY, HCI_ROLE_SLAVE); if (IS_ERR(pa_sync)) diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c index 0fdadf4c4d21..2a5555978110 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c @@ -2972,7 +2972,7 @@ static int hci_le_set_ext_scan_param_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 type, if (sent) { struct hci_conn *conn; - conn = hci_conn_hash_lookup_ba(hdev, ISO_LINK, + conn = hci_conn_hash_lookup_ba(hdev, BIS_LINK, &sent->bdaddr); if (conn) { struct bt_iso_qos *qos = &conn->iso_qos; @@ -5605,7 +5605,7 @@ static int hci_connect_cancel_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct hci_conn *conn, if (conn->type == LE_LINK) return hci_le_connect_cancel_sync(hdev, conn, reason); - if (conn->type == ISO_LINK) { + if (conn->type == CIS_LINK) { /* BLUETOOTH CORE SPECIFICATION Version 5.3 | Vol 4, Part E * page 1857: * @@ -5618,9 +5618,10 @@ static int hci_connect_cancel_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct hci_conn *conn, return hci_disconnect_sync(hdev, conn, reason); /* CIS with no Create CIS sent have nothing to cancel */ - if (bacmp(&conn->dst, BDADDR_ANY)) - return HCI_ERROR_LOCAL_HOST_TERM; + return HCI_ERROR_LOCAL_HOST_TERM; + } + if (conn->type == BIS_LINK) { /* There is no way to cancel a BIS without terminating the BIG * which is done later on connection cleanup. */ @@ -5682,9 +5683,12 @@ static int hci_reject_conn_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct hci_conn *conn, { struct hci_cp_reject_conn_req cp; - if (conn->type == ISO_LINK) + if (conn->type == CIS_LINK) return hci_le_reject_cis_sync(hdev, conn, reason); + if (conn->type == BIS_LINK) + return -EINVAL; + if (conn->type == SCO_LINK || conn->type == ESCO_LINK) return hci_reject_sco_sync(hdev, conn, reason); diff --git a/net/bluetooth/iso.c b/net/bluetooth/iso.c index 22b0bc30219f..860b2aacd9af 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/iso.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/iso.c @@ -2019,7 +2019,7 @@ int iso_connect_ind(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, __u8 *flags) static void iso_connect_cfm(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 status) { - if (hcon->type != ISO_LINK) { + if (hcon->type != CIS_LINK && hcon->type != BIS_LINK) { if (hcon->type != LE_LINK) return; @@ -2060,7 +2060,7 @@ static void iso_connect_cfm(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 status) static void iso_disconn_cfm(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 reason) { - if (hcon->type != ISO_LINK) + if (hcon->type != CIS_LINK && hcon->type != BIS_LINK) return; BT_DBG("hcon %p reason %d", hcon, reason); diff --git a/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c b/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c index 43d027dd11bf..772dfb0c0850 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c @@ -3233,7 +3233,8 @@ static int disconnect(struct sock *sk, struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data, static u8 link_to_bdaddr(u8 link_type, u8 addr_type) { switch (link_type) { - case ISO_LINK: + case CIS_LINK: + case BIS_LINK: case LE_LINK: switch (addr_type) { case ADDR_LE_DEV_PUBLIC: -- 2.34.1

1 3

[PATCH OLK-6.6] crypto: qat - remove unused character device and IOCTLs
by Lu Jialin 06 Aug '26

06 Aug '26

From: Giovanni Cabiddu <giovanni.cabiddu(a)intel.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.2-rc1 commit d237230728c567297f2f98b425d63156ab2ed17f category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/16795 CVE: CVE-2026-64529 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- The QAT driver exposes a character device (qat_adf_ctl) with IOCTLs for device configuration, start, stop, status query and enumeration. These IOCTLs are not part of any public uAPI header and have no known in-tree or out-of-tree users. Device lifecycle is already managed via sysfs. The ioctl interface also increases the attack surface and is the subject of a number of bug reports. Remove the character device, the IOCTL definitions, and the related data structures (adf_dev_status_info, adf_user_cfg_key_val, adf_user_cfg_section, adf_user_cfg_ctl_data). Drop the now-unused adf_cfg_user.h header and strip adf_ctl_drv.c down to the minimal module_init/module_exit hooks for workqueue, AER, and crypto/compression algorithm registration. Clean up leftover dead code that was only reachable from the removed IOCTL paths: adf_cfg_del_all(), adf_devmgr_verify_id(), adf_devmgr_get_num_dev(), adf_devmgr_get_dev_by_id(), adf_get_vf_real_id() and the unused ADF_CFG macros. Additionally, drop the entry associated to QAT IOCTLs in ioctl-number.rst. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: d8cba25d2c68 ("crypto: qat - Intel(R) QAT driver framework") Reported-by: Zhi Wang <wangzhi(a)stu.xidian.edu.cn> Reported-by: Bin Yu <byu(a)xidian.edu.cn> Reported-by: MingYu Wang <w15303746062(a)163.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/61d6d499.ab89.19b9b7f3186.Coremail.wangzhi_xd@s… Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260508034841.256794-1-w15303746062@163.com/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260508023542.256299-1-w15303746062@163.com/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260504025120.98242-1-w15303746062@163.com/ Signed-off-by: Giovanni Cabiddu <giovanni.cabiddu(a)intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ahsan Atta <ahsan.atta(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au> Conflicts: Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_cfg_common.h [Context conflicts] Signed-off-by: Lu Jialin <lujialin4(a)huawei.com> --- .../userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst | 1 - drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_cfg.c | 10 - drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_cfg.h | 1 - .../intel/qat/qat_common/adf_cfg_common.h | 32 -- .../intel/qat/qat_common/adf_cfg_user.h | 38 -- .../intel/qat/qat_common/adf_common_drv.h | 3 - .../crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c | 404 +----------------- .../crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_dev_mgr.c | 70 --- 8 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 558 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_cfg_user.h diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst index 66ad52639a28..75d4cd911fb0 100644 --- a/Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst +++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst @@ -219,7 +219,6 @@ Code Seq# Include File Comments <mailto:gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 'a' all linux/atm*.h, linux/sonet.h ATM on linux <http://lrcwww.epfl.ch/> -'a' 00-0F drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_cfg_common.h conflict! qat driver 'b' 00-FF conflict! bit3 vme host bridge <mailto:natalia@nikhefk.nikhef.nl> 'b' 00-0F linux/dma-buf.h conflict! diff --git a/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_cfg.c b/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_cfg.c index b0fc453fa3fb..97273da40b43 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_cfg.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_cfg.c @@ -103,16 +103,6 @@ static void adf_cfg_section_del_all(struct list_head *head); static void adf_cfg_section_del_all_except(struct list_head *head, const char *section_name); -void adf_cfg_del_all(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev) -{ - struct adf_cfg_device_data *dev_cfg_data = accel_dev->cfg; - - down_write(&dev_cfg_data->lock); - adf_cfg_section_del_all(&dev_cfg_data->sec_list); - up_write(&dev_cfg_data->lock); - clear_bit(ADF_STATUS_CONFIGURED, &accel_dev->status); -} - void adf_cfg_del_all_except(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev, const char *section_name) { diff --git a/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_cfg.h b/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_cfg.h index 2afa6f0d15c5..108032b39242 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_cfg.h +++ b/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_cfg.h @@ -34,7 +34,6 @@ void adf_cfg_dev_remove(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev); void adf_cfg_dev_dbgfs_add(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev); void adf_cfg_dev_dbgfs_rm(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev); int adf_cfg_section_add(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev, const char *name); -void adf_cfg_del_all(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev); void adf_cfg_del_all_except(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev, const char *section_name); int adf_cfg_add_key_value_param(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev, diff --git a/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_cfg_common.h b/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_cfg_common.h index 89df3888d7ea..e642438b381d 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_cfg_common.h +++ b/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_cfg_common.h @@ -4,18 +4,11 @@ #define ADF_CFG_COMMON_H_ #include <linux/types.h> -#include <linux/ioctl.h> #define ADF_CFG_MAX_STR_LEN 64 #define ADF_CFG_MAX_KEY_LEN_IN_BYTES ADF_CFG_MAX_STR_LEN #define ADF_CFG_MAX_VAL_LEN_IN_BYTES ADF_CFG_MAX_STR_LEN #define ADF_CFG_MAX_SECTION_LEN_IN_BYTES ADF_CFG_MAX_STR_LEN -#define ADF_CFG_BASE_DEC 10 -#define ADF_CFG_BASE_HEX 16 -#define ADF_CFG_ALL_DEVICES 0xFE -#define ADF_CFG_NO_DEVICE 0xFF -#define ADF_CFG_AFFINITY_WHATEVER 0xFF -#define MAX_DEVICE_NAME_SIZE 32 #define ADF_MAX_DEVICES (32 * 32) #define ADF_DEVS_ARRAY_SIZE BITS_TO_LONGS(ADF_MAX_DEVICES) @@ -49,29 +42,4 @@ enum adf_device_type { DEV_4XXX, DEV_420XX, }; - -struct adf_dev_status_info { - enum adf_device_type type; - __u32 accel_id; - __u32 instance_id; - __u8 num_ae; - __u8 num_accel; - __u8 num_logical_accel; - __u8 banks_per_accel; - __u8 state; - __u8 bus; - __u8 dev; - __u8 fun; - char name[MAX_DEVICE_NAME_SIZE]; -}; - -#define ADF_CTL_IOC_MAGIC 'a' -#define IOCTL_CONFIG_SYS_RESOURCE_PARAMETERS _IOW(ADF_CTL_IOC_MAGIC, 0, \ - struct adf_user_cfg_ctl_data) -#define IOCTL_STOP_ACCEL_DEV _IOW(ADF_CTL_IOC_MAGIC, 1, \ - struct adf_user_cfg_ctl_data) -#define IOCTL_START_ACCEL_DEV _IOW(ADF_CTL_IOC_MAGIC, 2, \ - struct adf_user_cfg_ctl_data) -#define IOCTL_STATUS_ACCEL_DEV _IOW(ADF_CTL_IOC_MAGIC, 3, __u32) -#define IOCTL_GET_NUM_DEVICES _IOW(ADF_CTL_IOC_MAGIC, 4, __s32) #endif diff --git a/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_cfg_user.h b/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_cfg_user.h deleted file mode 100644 index 421f4fb8b4dd..000000000000 --- a/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_cfg_user.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,38 +0,0 @@ -/* SPDX-License-Identifier: (BSD-3-Clause OR GPL-2.0-only) */ -/* Copyright(c) 2014 - 2020 Intel Corporation */ -#ifndef ADF_CFG_USER_H_ -#define ADF_CFG_USER_H_ - -#include "adf_cfg_common.h" -#include "adf_cfg_strings.h" - -struct adf_user_cfg_key_val { - char key[ADF_CFG_MAX_KEY_LEN_IN_BYTES]; - char val[ADF_CFG_MAX_VAL_LEN_IN_BYTES]; - union { - struct adf_user_cfg_key_val *next; - __u64 padding3; - }; - enum adf_cfg_val_type type; -} __packed; - -struct adf_user_cfg_section { - char name[ADF_CFG_MAX_SECTION_LEN_IN_BYTES]; - union { - struct adf_user_cfg_key_val *params; - __u64 padding1; - }; - union { - struct adf_user_cfg_section *next; - __u64 padding3; - }; -} __packed; - -struct adf_user_cfg_ctl_data { - union { - struct adf_user_cfg_section *config_section; - __u64 padding; - }; - __u8 device_id; -} __packed; -#endif diff --git a/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_common_drv.h b/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_common_drv.h index 8f725950727b..69026143a8d2 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_common_drv.h +++ b/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_common_drv.h @@ -68,10 +68,7 @@ int adf_devmgr_add_dev(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev, void adf_devmgr_rm_dev(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev, struct adf_accel_dev *pf); struct list_head *adf_devmgr_get_head(void); -struct adf_accel_dev *adf_devmgr_get_dev_by_id(u32 id); struct adf_accel_dev *adf_devmgr_pci_to_accel_dev(struct pci_dev *pci_dev); -int adf_devmgr_verify_id(u32 id); -void adf_devmgr_get_num_dev(u32 *num); int adf_devmgr_in_reset(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev); int adf_dev_started(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev); int adf_dev_restarting_notify(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev); diff --git a/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c b/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c index 36bbf808db3e..36d5ebb3efab 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c @@ -2,410 +2,13 @@ /* Copyright(c) 2014 - 2020 Intel Corporation */ #include <crypto/algapi.h> +#include <linux/errno.h> #include <linux/module.h> -#include <linux/mutex.h> -#include <linux/slab.h> -#include <linux/fs.h> -#include <linux/bitops.h> -#include <linux/pci.h> -#include <linux/cdev.h> -#include <linux/uaccess.h> -#include "adf_accel_devices.h" #include "adf_common_drv.h" -#include "adf_cfg.h" -#include "adf_cfg_common.h" -#include "adf_cfg_user.h" - -#define ADF_CFG_MAX_SECTION 512 -#define ADF_CFG_MAX_KEY_VAL 256 - -#define DEVICE_NAME "qat_adf_ctl" - -static DEFINE_MUTEX(adf_ctl_lock); -static long adf_ctl_ioctl(struct file *fp, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg); - -static const struct file_operations adf_ctl_ops = { - .owner = THIS_MODULE, - .unlocked_ioctl = adf_ctl_ioctl, - .compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl, -}; - -static const struct class adf_ctl_class = { - .name = DEVICE_NAME, -}; - -struct adf_ctl_drv_info { - unsigned int major; - struct cdev drv_cdev; -}; - -static struct adf_ctl_drv_info adf_ctl_drv; - -static void adf_chr_drv_destroy(void) -{ - device_destroy(&adf_ctl_class, MKDEV(adf_ctl_drv.major, 0)); - cdev_del(&adf_ctl_drv.drv_cdev); - class_unregister(&adf_ctl_class); - unregister_chrdev_region(MKDEV(adf_ctl_drv.major, 0), 1); -} - -static int adf_chr_drv_create(void) -{ - dev_t dev_id; - struct device *drv_device; - int ret; - - if (alloc_chrdev_region(&dev_id, 0, 1, DEVICE_NAME)) { - pr_err("QAT: unable to allocate chrdev region\n"); - return -EFAULT; - } - - ret = class_register(&adf_ctl_class); - if (ret) - goto err_chrdev_unreg; - - adf_ctl_drv.major = MAJOR(dev_id); - cdev_init(&adf_ctl_drv.drv_cdev, &adf_ctl_ops); - if (cdev_add(&adf_ctl_drv.drv_cdev, dev_id, 1)) { - pr_err("QAT: cdev add failed\n"); - goto err_class_destr; - } - - drv_device = device_create(&adf_ctl_class, NULL, - MKDEV(adf_ctl_drv.major, 0), - NULL, DEVICE_NAME); - if (IS_ERR(drv_device)) { - pr_err("QAT: failed to create device\n"); - goto err_cdev_del; - } - return 0; -err_cdev_del: - cdev_del(&adf_ctl_drv.drv_cdev); -err_class_destr: - class_unregister(&adf_ctl_class); -err_chrdev_unreg: - unregister_chrdev_region(dev_id, 1); - return -EFAULT; -} - -static struct adf_user_cfg_ctl_data *adf_ctl_alloc_resources(unsigned long arg) -{ - struct adf_user_cfg_ctl_data *cfg_data; - - cfg_data = memdup_user((void __user *)arg, sizeof(*cfg_data)); - if (IS_ERR(cfg_data)) - pr_err("QAT: failed to copy from user cfg_data.\n"); - return cfg_data; -} - -static int adf_add_key_value_data(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev, - const char *section, - const struct adf_user_cfg_key_val *key_val) -{ - if (key_val->type == ADF_HEX) { - long *ptr = (long *)key_val->val; - long val = *ptr; - - if (adf_cfg_add_key_value_param(accel_dev, section, - key_val->key, (void *)val, - key_val->type)) { - dev_err(&GET_DEV(accel_dev), - "failed to add hex keyvalue.\n"); - return -EFAULT; - } - } else { - if (adf_cfg_add_key_value_param(accel_dev, section, - key_val->key, key_val->val, - key_val->type)) { - dev_err(&GET_DEV(accel_dev), - "failed to add keyvalue.\n"); - return -EFAULT; - } - } - return 0; -} - -static int adf_copy_key_value_data(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev, - struct adf_user_cfg_ctl_data *ctl_data) -{ - struct adf_user_cfg_key_val key_val; - struct adf_user_cfg_key_val *params_head; - struct adf_user_cfg_section section, *section_head; - int i, j; - - section_head = ctl_data->config_section; - - for (i = 0; section_head && i < ADF_CFG_MAX_SECTION; i++) { - if (copy_from_user(&section, (void __user *)section_head, - sizeof(*section_head))) { - dev_err(&GET_DEV(accel_dev), - "failed to copy section info\n"); - goto out_err; - } - - if (adf_cfg_section_add(accel_dev, section.name)) { - dev_err(&GET_DEV(accel_dev), - "failed to add section.\n"); - goto out_err; - } - - params_head = section.params; - - for (j = 0; params_head && j < ADF_CFG_MAX_KEY_VAL; j++) { - if (copy_from_user(&key_val, (void __user *)params_head, - sizeof(key_val))) { - dev_err(&GET_DEV(accel_dev), - "Failed to copy keyvalue.\n"); - goto out_err; - } - if (adf_add_key_value_data(accel_dev, section.name, - &key_val)) { - goto out_err; - } - params_head = key_val.next; - } - section_head = section.next; - } - return 0; -out_err: - adf_cfg_del_all(accel_dev); - return -EFAULT; -} - -static int adf_ctl_ioctl_dev_config(struct file *fp, unsigned int cmd, - unsigned long arg) -{ - struct adf_user_cfg_ctl_data *ctl_data; - struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev; - int ret = 0; - - ctl_data = adf_ctl_alloc_resources(arg); - if (IS_ERR(ctl_data)) - return PTR_ERR(ctl_data); - - accel_dev = adf_devmgr_get_dev_by_id(ctl_data->device_id); - if (!accel_dev) { - ret = -EFAULT; - goto out; - } - - if (adf_dev_started(accel_dev)) { - ret = -EFAULT; - goto out; - } - - if (adf_copy_key_value_data(accel_dev, ctl_data)) { - ret = -EFAULT; - goto out; - } - set_bit(ADF_STATUS_CONFIGURED, &accel_dev->status); -out: - kfree(ctl_data); - return ret; -} - -static int adf_ctl_is_device_in_use(int id) -{ - struct adf_accel_dev *dev; - - list_for_each_entry(dev, adf_devmgr_get_head(), list) { - if (id == dev->accel_id || id == ADF_CFG_ALL_DEVICES) { - if (adf_devmgr_in_reset(dev) || adf_dev_in_use(dev)) { - dev_info(&GET_DEV(dev), - "device qat_dev%d is busy\n", - dev->accel_id); - return -EBUSY; - } - } - } - return 0; -} - -static void adf_ctl_stop_devices(u32 id) -{ - struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev; - - list_for_each_entry(accel_dev, adf_devmgr_get_head(), list) { - if (id == accel_dev->accel_id || id == ADF_CFG_ALL_DEVICES) { - if (!adf_dev_started(accel_dev)) - continue; - - /* First stop all VFs */ - if (!accel_dev->is_vf) - continue; - - adf_dev_down(accel_dev); - } - } - - list_for_each_entry(accel_dev, adf_devmgr_get_head(), list) { - if (id == accel_dev->accel_id || id == ADF_CFG_ALL_DEVICES) { - if (!adf_dev_started(accel_dev)) - continue; - - adf_dev_down(accel_dev); - } - } -} - -static int adf_ctl_ioctl_dev_stop(struct file *fp, unsigned int cmd, - unsigned long arg) -{ - int ret; - struct adf_user_cfg_ctl_data *ctl_data; - - ctl_data = adf_ctl_alloc_resources(arg); - if (IS_ERR(ctl_data)) - return PTR_ERR(ctl_data); - - if (adf_devmgr_verify_id(ctl_data->device_id)) { - pr_err("QAT: Device %d not found\n", ctl_data->device_id); - ret = -ENODEV; - goto out; - } - - ret = adf_ctl_is_device_in_use(ctl_data->device_id); - if (ret) - goto out; - - if (ctl_data->device_id == ADF_CFG_ALL_DEVICES) - pr_info("QAT: Stopping all acceleration devices.\n"); - else - pr_info("QAT: Stopping acceleration device qat_dev%d.\n", - ctl_data->device_id); - - adf_ctl_stop_devices(ctl_data->device_id); - -out: - kfree(ctl_data); - return ret; -} - -static int adf_ctl_ioctl_dev_start(struct file *fp, unsigned int cmd, - unsigned long arg) -{ - int ret; - struct adf_user_cfg_ctl_data *ctl_data; - struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev; - - ctl_data = adf_ctl_alloc_resources(arg); - if (IS_ERR(ctl_data)) - return PTR_ERR(ctl_data); - - ret = -ENODEV; - accel_dev = adf_devmgr_get_dev_by_id(ctl_data->device_id); - if (!accel_dev) - goto out; - - dev_info(&GET_DEV(accel_dev), - "Starting acceleration device qat_dev%d.\n", - ctl_data->device_id); - - ret = adf_dev_up(accel_dev, false); - - if (ret) { - dev_err(&GET_DEV(accel_dev), "Failed to start qat_dev%d\n", - ctl_data->device_id); - adf_dev_down(accel_dev); - } -out: - kfree(ctl_data); - return ret; -} - -static int adf_ctl_ioctl_get_num_devices(struct file *fp, unsigned int cmd, - unsigned long arg) -{ - u32 num_devices = 0; - - adf_devmgr_get_num_dev(&num_devices); - if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg, &num_devices, sizeof(num_devices))) - return -EFAULT; - - return 0; -} - -static int adf_ctl_ioctl_get_status(struct file *fp, unsigned int cmd, - unsigned long arg) -{ - struct adf_hw_device_data *hw_data; - struct adf_dev_status_info dev_info; - struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev; - - if (copy_from_user(&dev_info, (void __user *)arg, - sizeof(struct adf_dev_status_info))) { - pr_err("QAT: failed to copy from user.\n"); - return -EFAULT; - } - - accel_dev = adf_devmgr_get_dev_by_id(dev_info.accel_id); - if (!accel_dev) - return -ENODEV; - - hw_data = accel_dev->hw_device; - dev_info.state = adf_dev_started(accel_dev) ? DEV_UP : DEV_DOWN; - dev_info.num_ae = hw_data->get_num_aes(hw_data); - dev_info.num_accel = hw_data->get_num_accels(hw_data); - dev_info.num_logical_accel = hw_data->num_logical_accel; - dev_info.banks_per_accel = hw_data->num_banks - / hw_data->num_logical_accel; - strscpy(dev_info.name, hw_data->dev_class->name, sizeof(dev_info.name)); - dev_info.instance_id = hw_data->instance_id; - dev_info.type = hw_data->dev_class->type; - dev_info.bus = accel_to_pci_dev(accel_dev)->bus->number; - dev_info.dev = PCI_SLOT(accel_to_pci_dev(accel_dev)->devfn); - dev_info.fun = PCI_FUNC(accel_to_pci_dev(accel_dev)->devfn); - - if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg, &dev_info, - sizeof(struct adf_dev_status_info))) { - dev_err(&GET_DEV(accel_dev), "failed to copy status.\n"); - return -EFAULT; - } - return 0; -} - -static long adf_ctl_ioctl(struct file *fp, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) -{ - int ret; - - if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&adf_ctl_lock)) - return -EFAULT; - - switch (cmd) { - case IOCTL_CONFIG_SYS_RESOURCE_PARAMETERS: - ret = adf_ctl_ioctl_dev_config(fp, cmd, arg); - break; - - case IOCTL_STOP_ACCEL_DEV: - ret = adf_ctl_ioctl_dev_stop(fp, cmd, arg); - break; - - case IOCTL_START_ACCEL_DEV: - ret = adf_ctl_ioctl_dev_start(fp, cmd, arg); - break; - - case IOCTL_GET_NUM_DEVICES: - ret = adf_ctl_ioctl_get_num_devices(fp, cmd, arg); - break; - - case IOCTL_STATUS_ACCEL_DEV: - ret = adf_ctl_ioctl_get_status(fp, cmd, arg); - break; - default: - pr_err_ratelimited("QAT: Invalid ioctl %d\n", cmd); - ret = -EFAULT; - break; - } - mutex_unlock(&adf_ctl_lock); - return ret; -} static int __init adf_register_ctl_device_driver(void) { - if (adf_chr_drv_create()) - goto err_chr_dev; - if (adf_init_misc_wq()) goto err_misc_wq; @@ -437,15 +40,11 @@ static int __init adf_register_ctl_device_driver(void) err_aer: adf_exit_misc_wq(); err_misc_wq: - adf_chr_drv_destroy(); -err_chr_dev: - mutex_destroy(&adf_ctl_lock); return -EFAULT; } static void __exit adf_unregister_ctl_device_driver(void) { - adf_chr_drv_destroy(); adf_exit_misc_wq(); adf_exit_aer(); adf_exit_vf_wq(); @@ -453,7 +52,6 @@ static void __exit adf_unregister_ctl_device_driver(void) qat_crypto_unregister(); qat_compression_unregister(); adf_clean_vf_map(false); - mutex_destroy(&adf_ctl_lock); } module_init(adf_register_ctl_device_driver); diff --git a/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_dev_mgr.c b/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_dev_mgr.c index 34b9f7731c78..81dd22d2083f 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_dev_mgr.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_dev_mgr.c @@ -45,19 +45,6 @@ static struct vf_id_map *adf_find_vf(u32 bdf) return NULL; } -static int adf_get_vf_real_id(u32 fake) -{ - struct list_head *itr; - - list_for_each(itr, &vfs_table) { - struct vf_id_map *ptr = - list_entry(itr, struct vf_id_map, list); - if (ptr->fake_id == fake) - return ptr->id; - } - return -1; -} - /** * adf_clean_vf_map() - Cleans VF id mappings * @vf: flag indicating whether mappings is cleaned @@ -304,63 +291,6 @@ struct adf_accel_dev *adf_devmgr_pci_to_accel_dev(struct pci_dev *pci_dev) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(adf_devmgr_pci_to_accel_dev); -struct adf_accel_dev *adf_devmgr_get_dev_by_id(u32 id) -{ - struct list_head *itr; - int real_id; - - mutex_lock(&table_lock); - real_id = adf_get_vf_real_id(id); - if (real_id < 0) - goto unlock; - - id = real_id; - - list_for_each(itr, &accel_table) { - struct adf_accel_dev *ptr = - list_entry(itr, struct adf_accel_dev, list); - if (ptr->accel_id == id) { - mutex_unlock(&table_lock); - return ptr; - } - } -unlock: - mutex_unlock(&table_lock); - return NULL; -} - -int adf_devmgr_verify_id(u32 id) -{ - if (id == ADF_CFG_ALL_DEVICES) - return 0; - - if (adf_devmgr_get_dev_by_id(id)) - return 0; - - return -ENODEV; -} - -static int adf_get_num_dettached_vfs(void) -{ - struct list_head *itr; - int vfs = 0; - - mutex_lock(&table_lock); - list_for_each(itr, &vfs_table) { - struct vf_id_map *ptr = - list_entry(itr, struct vf_id_map, list); - if (ptr->bdf != ~0 && !ptr->attached) - vfs++; - } - mutex_unlock(&table_lock); - return vfs; -} - -void adf_devmgr_get_num_dev(u32 *num) -{ - *num = num_devices - adf_get_num_dettached_vfs(); -} - /** * adf_dev_in_use() - Check whether accel_dev is currently in use * @accel_dev: Pointer to acceleration device. -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] fuse: re-lock request before returning from fuse_ref_folio()
by Ran Hongyun 06 Aug '26

06 Aug '26

mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.2-rc1 commit b5befa80fdbe287a98480effed9564712924add5 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/16564 CVE: CVE-2026-64266 Reference: https://web.git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/comm… -------------------------------- fuse_ref_folio() unlocks the request but does not re-lock it before returning. fuse_chan_abort() can end the request and the async end callback (eg fuse_writepage_free()) can free the args while the subsequent copy chain logic after fuse_ref_folio() accesses them, leading to use-after-free issues. Fix this by locking the request in fuse_ref_folio() before returning. Fixes: c3021629a0d8 ("fuse: support splice() reading from fuse device") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Joanne Koong <joannelkoong(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi(a)redhat.com> Conflicts: fs/fuse/dev.c [394244b24fdd ("fuse: support copying large folios") not merged.] Signed-off-by: Ran Hongyun <ranhongyun1(a)huawei.com> --- fs/fuse/dev.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/fuse/dev.c b/fs/fuse/dev.c index 1a12515fd8ea..2a7e48b3ba8a 100644 --- a/fs/fuse/dev.c +++ b/fs/fuse/dev.c @@ -1261,7 +1261,7 @@ static int fuse_ref_page(struct fuse_copy_state *cs, struct page *page, cs->nr_segs++; cs->len = 0; - return 0; + return lock_request(cs->req); } /* -- 2.52.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] sched: Add the qos schduler's cgroup v2 interface
by Chen Jinghuang 06 Aug '26

06 Aug '26

Offering: HULK hulk inclusion category: feature bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I8MF4R -------------------------------- Add the qos schduler's cgroup v2 interface. Cgroup v2 use the qos scheduler, as follows: offline group: echo -1 > /sys/fs/cgroup/xxxx/offline/cpu.qos_level online group: /sys/fs/cgroup/xxxx/online/cpu.qos_level Signed-off-by: Chen Jinghuang <chenjinghuang2(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/sched/core.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/kernel/sched/core.c b/kernel/sched/core.c index cdc931c14930..fd8fdaaf7cbb 100644 --- a/kernel/sched/core.c +++ b/kernel/sched/core.c @@ -10660,6 +10660,14 @@ static struct cftype cpu_files[] = { .write = cpu_uclamp_max_write, }, #endif +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_QOS_SCHED + { + .name = "qos_level", + .flags = CFTYPE_NOT_ON_ROOT, + .read_s64 = cpu_qos_read, + .write_s64 = cpu_qos_write, + }, #ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_SOFT_DOMAIN { .name = "soft_domain", -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] KVM: SEV: Ignore Port I/O requests of length '0'
by Zhang Kunbo 06 Aug '26

06 Aug '26

From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com> commit 3988bd2723de407ae90fa7a6f6029b4e60238c58 upstream. Explicitly ignore Port I/O requests of length '0' (or count '0'), so that setting up the software scratch area (and other code) doesn't have to worry about underflowing the length, and to allow for WARNing on trying to configure the scratch area with len==0. Fixes: 291bd20d5d88 ("KVM: SVM: Add initial support for a VMGEXIT VMEXIT") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com> Message-ID: <20260501202250.2115252-5-seanjc(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jack Wang <jinpu.wang(a)ionos.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> --- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c index c711a6369c13..79ebbe8cf0b4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c @@ -2791,6 +2791,11 @@ int sev_handle_vmgexit(struct vcpu_svm *svm) "vmgexit: unsupported event - exit_info_1=%#llx, exit_info_2=%#llx\n", control->exit_info_1, control->exit_info_2); break; + case SVM_EXIT_IOIO: + if (!((control->exit_info_1 & SVM_IOIO_SIZE_MASK) >> SVM_IOIO_SIZE_SHIFT)) + return 1; + + fallthrough; default: ret = svm_invoke_exit_handler(svm, exit_code); } @@ -2810,6 +2815,9 @@ int sev_es_string_io(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int size, unsigned int port, int in) if (unlikely(check_mul_overflow(count, size, &bytes))) return -EINVAL; + if (!bytes) + return 1; + if (!setup_vmgexit_scratch(svm, in, bytes)) return -EINVAL; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] fix amdgpu_hmm_range_get_pages
by Jiacheng Yu 06 Aug '26

06 Aug '26

fix amdgpu_hmm_range_get_pages Christian König (1): drm/amdgpu: fix amdgpu_hmm_range_get_pages Honglei Huang (1): drm/amdgpu: drop retry loop in amdgpu_hmm_range_get_pages drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_hmm.c | 30 +++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 3

[PATCH OLK-6.6] KVM: SEV: Ignore Port I/O requests of length '0'
by Zhang Kunbo 06 Aug '26

06 Aug '26

From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.12.95 commit 3b6035bc6bff20e89752ce4358bc4c9a9d5883f2 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/16267 CVE: CVE-2026-63940 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 3988bd2723de407ae90fa7a6f6029b4e60238c58 upstream. Explicitly ignore Port I/O requests of length '0' (or count '0'), so that setting up the software scratch area (and other code) doesn't have to worry about underflowing the length, and to allow for WARNing on trying to configure the scratch area with len==0. Fixes: 291bd20d5d88 ("KVM: SVM: Add initial support for a VMGEXIT VMEXIT") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com> Message-ID: <20260501202250.2115252-5-seanjc(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jack Wang <jinpu.wang(a)ionos.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Zhang Kunbo <zhangkunbo(a)huawei.com> --- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c index 8b6c12d6e48d..6fb67a3b7cbe 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c @@ -4606,6 +4606,11 @@ int sev_handle_vmgexit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) control->exit_info_1, control->exit_info_2); ret = -EINVAL; break; + case SVM_EXIT_IOIO: + if (!((control->exit_info_1 & SVM_IOIO_SIZE_MASK) >> SVM_IOIO_SIZE_SHIFT)) + return 1; + + fallthrough; default: ret = svm_invoke_exit_handler(vcpu, exit_code); } @@ -4626,6 +4631,9 @@ int sev_es_string_io(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int size, unsigned int port, int in) if (unlikely(check_mul_overflow(count, size, &bytes))) return -EINVAL; + if (!bytes) + return 1; + r = setup_vmgexit_scratch(svm, in, bytes); if (r) return r; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix use-after-free in l2cap_sock_new_connection_cb()
by Chen Jinghuang 06 Aug '26

06 Aug '26

From: Siwei Zhang <oss(a)fourdim.xyz> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.2-rc3 commit 6fef032af0092ed5ccb767239a9ac1bc38c08a40 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/16859 CVE: CVE-2026-64557 Reference: https://web.git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/comm… -------------------------------- l2cap_sock_new_connection_cb() returned l2cap_pi(sk)->chan after release_sock(parent). Once the parent lock is dropped the newly enqueued child socket sk is reachable via the accept queue, so another task can accept and free it before the callback dereferences sk, resulting in a use-after-free. Rework the ->new_connection() op so the core, rather than the callback, owns the child channel's lifetime. The op now receives a pre-allocated new_chan and returns an errno instead of allocating and returning a channel. l2cap_new_connection() allocates the child channel and links it into the conn list via __l2cap_chan_add() before invoking the callback, so the conn-list reference keeps the channel alive once release_sock(parent) exposes the socket to other tasks. Channel configuration that was duplicated in l2cap_sock_init() and the various new_connection callbacks is consolidated into l2cap_chan_set_defaults(), which now inherits from the parent channel when one is supplied. Fixes: 8ffb929098a5 ("Bluetooth: Remove parent socket usage from l2cap_core.c") Cc: stable(a)kernel.org Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8 Signed-off-by: Siwei Zhang <oss(a)fourdim.xyz> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz(a)intel.com> Conflicts: include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h net/bluetooth/6lowpan.c net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c [context conflicts, not merged 0a120d961663("Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix null-ptr-deref in l2cap_sock_new_connection_cb()")] Signed-off-by: Chen Jinghuang <chenjinghuang2(a)huawei.com> --- include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h | 10 ++-- net/bluetooth/6lowpan.c | 18 +----- net/bluetooth/a2mp.c | 2 +- net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c | 78 ++++++++++++++++++++----- net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c | 103 ++++++++++++++++------------------ net/bluetooth/smp.c | 27 ++------- 6 files changed, 127 insertions(+), 111 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h b/include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h index 678394d95321..541c3c5c6079 100644 --- a/include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h +++ b/include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h @@ -650,7 +650,8 @@ struct l2cap_chan { struct l2cap_ops { char *name; - struct l2cap_chan *(*new_connection) (struct l2cap_chan *chan); + int (*new_connection)(struct l2cap_chan *chan, + struct l2cap_chan *new_chan); int (*recv) (struct l2cap_chan * chan, struct sk_buff *skb); void (*teardown) (struct l2cap_chan *chan, int err); @@ -909,9 +910,10 @@ static inline __u16 __next_seq(struct l2cap_chan *chan, __u16 seq) return (seq + 1) % (chan->tx_win_max + 1); } -static inline struct l2cap_chan *l2cap_chan_no_new_connection(struct l2cap_chan *chan) +static inline int l2cap_chan_no_new_connection(struct l2cap_chan *chan, + struct l2cap_chan *new_chan) { - return NULL; + return -EOPNOTSUPP; } static inline int l2cap_chan_no_recv(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb) @@ -986,7 +988,7 @@ int l2cap_chan_reconfigure(struct l2cap_chan *chan, __u16 mtu); int l2cap_chan_send(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len); void l2cap_chan_busy(struct l2cap_chan *chan, int busy); int l2cap_chan_check_security(struct l2cap_chan *chan, bool initiator); -void l2cap_chan_set_defaults(struct l2cap_chan *chan); +void l2cap_chan_set_defaults(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct l2cap_chan *pchan); int l2cap_ertm_init(struct l2cap_chan *chan); void l2cap_chan_add(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct l2cap_chan *chan); void __l2cap_chan_add(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct l2cap_chan *chan); diff --git a/net/bluetooth/6lowpan.c b/net/bluetooth/6lowpan.c index 7601ce9143c1..6ee874654794 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/6lowpan.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/6lowpan.c @@ -650,7 +650,7 @@ static struct l2cap_chan *chan_create(void) if (!chan) return NULL; - l2cap_chan_set_defaults(chan); + l2cap_chan_set_defaults(chan, NULL); chan->chan_type = L2CAP_CHAN_CONN_ORIENTED; chan->mode = L2CAP_MODE_LE_FLOWCTL; @@ -762,21 +762,6 @@ static inline void chan_ready_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan) ifup(dev->netdev); } -static inline struct l2cap_chan *chan_new_conn_cb(struct l2cap_chan *pchan) -{ - struct l2cap_chan *chan; - - chan = chan_create(); - if (!chan) - return NULL; - - chan->ops = pchan->ops; - - BT_DBG("chan %p pchan %p", chan, pchan); - - return chan; -} - static void delete_netdev(struct work_struct *work) { struct lowpan_btle_dev *entry = container_of(work, @@ -895,7 +880,6 @@ static long chan_get_sndtimeo_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan) static const struct l2cap_ops bt_6lowpan_chan_ops = { .name = "L2CAP 6LoWPAN channel", - .new_connection = chan_new_conn_cb, .recv = chan_recv_cb, .close = chan_close_cb, .state_change = chan_state_change_cb, diff --git a/net/bluetooth/a2mp.c b/net/bluetooth/a2mp.c index 463bad58478b..28445a3f1636 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/a2mp.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/a2mp.c @@ -783,7 +783,7 @@ static struct l2cap_chan *a2mp_chan_open(struct l2cap_conn *conn, bool locked) chan->ops = &a2mp_chan_ops; - l2cap_chan_set_defaults(chan); + l2cap_chan_set_defaults(chan, NULL); chan->remote_max_tx = chan->max_tx; chan->remote_tx_win = chan->tx_win; diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c index 3b6e354551c1..b7b4e24f78e1 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c @@ -537,7 +537,10 @@ void l2cap_chan_put(struct l2cap_chan *c) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(l2cap_chan_put); -void l2cap_chan_set_defaults(struct l2cap_chan *chan) +/* Initialise @chan with default values, inheriting from the parent channel + * @pchan when it is given. + */ +void l2cap_chan_set_defaults(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct l2cap_chan *pchan) { chan->fcs = L2CAP_FCS_CRC16; chan->max_tx = L2CAP_DEFAULT_MAX_TX; @@ -551,6 +554,31 @@ void l2cap_chan_set_defaults(struct l2cap_chan *chan) chan->retrans_timeout = L2CAP_DEFAULT_RETRANS_TO; chan->monitor_timeout = L2CAP_DEFAULT_MONITOR_TO; + if (pchan) { + BT_DBG("chan %p pchan %p", chan, pchan); + + chan->chan_type = pchan->chan_type; + chan->imtu = pchan->imtu; + chan->omtu = pchan->omtu; + chan->mode = pchan->mode; + chan->fcs = pchan->fcs; + chan->max_tx = pchan->max_tx; + chan->tx_win = pchan->tx_win; + chan->tx_win_max = pchan->tx_win_max; + chan->sec_level = pchan->sec_level; + chan->conf_state = pchan->conf_state; + chan->flags = pchan->flags; + chan->tx_credits = pchan->tx_credits; + chan->rx_credits = pchan->rx_credits; + + if (chan->chan_type == L2CAP_CHAN_FIXED) { + chan->scid = pchan->scid; + chan->dcid = pchan->scid; + } + + return; + } + chan->conf_state = 0; set_bit(CONF_NOT_COMPLETE, &chan->conf_state); @@ -4126,6 +4154,38 @@ static inline int l2cap_command_rej(struct l2cap_conn *conn, return 0; } +/* Allocate and initialise a channel for an incoming connection. + * + * The channel inherits its configuration from @pchan and is linked into @conn + * before ->new_connection() runs, so the conn list reference keeps it alive if + * the callback exposes it (e.g. via the socket accept queue) before this + * returns. The l2cap_chan_create() reference is taken over by the subsystem on + * success and dropped here on failure. + */ +static struct l2cap_chan *l2cap_new_connection(struct l2cap_conn *conn, + struct l2cap_chan *pchan) +{ + struct l2cap_chan *chan; + + chan = l2cap_chan_create(); + if (!chan) + return NULL; + + l2cap_chan_set_defaults(chan, pchan); + chan->ops = pchan->ops; + + __l2cap_chan_add(conn, chan); + + if (pchan->ops->new_connection && + pchan->ops->new_connection(pchan, chan) < 0) { + l2cap_chan_del(chan, 0); + l2cap_chan_put(chan); + return NULL; + } + + return chan; +} + static struct l2cap_chan *l2cap_connect(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct l2cap_cmd_hdr *cmd, u8 *data, u8 rsp_code, u8 amp_id) @@ -4173,7 +4233,7 @@ static struct l2cap_chan *l2cap_connect(struct l2cap_conn *conn, goto response; } - chan = pchan->ops->new_connection(pchan); + chan = l2cap_new_connection(conn, pchan); if (!chan) goto response; @@ -4192,8 +4252,6 @@ static struct l2cap_chan *l2cap_connect(struct l2cap_conn *conn, chan->dcid = scid; chan->local_amp_id = amp_id; - __l2cap_chan_add(conn, chan); - dcid = chan->scid; __set_chan_timer(chan, chan->ops->get_sndtimeo(chan)); @@ -5881,7 +5939,7 @@ static int l2cap_le_connect_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, goto response_unlock; } - chan = pchan->ops->new_connection(pchan); + chan = l2cap_new_connection(conn, pchan); if (!chan) { result = L2CAP_CR_LE_NO_MEM; goto response_unlock; @@ -5896,8 +5954,6 @@ static int l2cap_le_connect_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, chan->omtu = mtu; chan->remote_mps = mps; - __l2cap_chan_add(conn, chan); - l2cap_le_flowctl_init(chan, __le16_to_cpu(req->credits)); dcid = chan->scid; @@ -6099,7 +6155,7 @@ static inline int l2cap_ecred_conn_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, continue; } - chan = pchan->ops->new_connection(pchan); + chan = l2cap_new_connection(conn, pchan); if (!chan) { result = L2CAP_CR_LE_NO_MEM; continue; @@ -6114,8 +6170,6 @@ static inline int l2cap_ecred_conn_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, chan->omtu = mtu; chan->remote_mps = mps; - __l2cap_chan_add(conn, chan); - l2cap_ecred_init(chan, __le16_to_cpu(req->credits)); /* Init response */ @@ -8352,14 +8406,12 @@ static void l2cap_connect_cfm(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 status) goto next; l2cap_chan_lock(pchan); - chan = pchan->ops->new_connection(pchan); + chan = l2cap_new_connection(conn, pchan); if (chan) { bacpy(&chan->src, &hcon->src); bacpy(&chan->dst, &hcon->dst); chan->src_type = bdaddr_src_type(hcon); chan->dst_type = dst_type; - - __l2cap_chan_add(conn, chan); } l2cap_chan_unlock(pchan); diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c index 644ec4bf06f0..cc06be98f3c0 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c @@ -44,7 +44,8 @@ static struct bt_sock_list l2cap_sk_list = { static const struct proto_ops l2cap_sock_ops; static void l2cap_sock_init(struct sock *sk, struct sock *parent); static struct sock *l2cap_sock_alloc(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, - int proto, gfp_t prio, int kern); + int proto, gfp_t prio, int kern, + struct l2cap_chan *chan); static void l2cap_sock_cleanup_listen(struct sock *parent); bool l2cap_is_socket(struct socket *sock) @@ -1215,6 +1216,23 @@ static int l2cap_sock_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, return err; } +/* Release the sock's ref on chan and clear the pointer so that the ref is + * dropped exactly once even if both l2cap_sock_kill() and + * l2cap_sock_destruct() run. Setting chan->data to NULL first stops any other + * task from dereferencing the now-dead sock pointer. + */ +static void l2cap_sock_put_chan(struct sock *sk) +{ + struct l2cap_chan *chan = l2cap_pi(sk)->chan; + + if (!chan) + return; + + chan->data = NULL; + l2cap_pi(sk)->chan = NULL; + l2cap_chan_put(chan); +} + /* Kill socket (only if zapped and orphan) * Must be called on unlocked socket, with l2cap channel lock. */ @@ -1225,13 +1243,9 @@ static void l2cap_sock_kill(struct sock *sk) BT_DBG("sk %p state %s", sk, state_to_string(sk->sk_state)); - /* Sock is dead, so set chan data to NULL, avoid other task use invalid - * sock pointer. - */ - l2cap_pi(sk)->chan->data = NULL; - /* Kill poor orphan */ + l2cap_sock_put_chan(sk); - l2cap_chan_put(l2cap_pi(sk)->chan); + /* Kill poor orphan */ sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD); sock_put(sk); } @@ -1473,7 +1487,8 @@ static void l2cap_sock_cleanup_listen(struct sock *parent) } } -static struct l2cap_chan *l2cap_sock_new_connection_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan) +static int l2cap_sock_new_connection_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, + struct l2cap_chan *new_chan) { struct sock *sk, *parent = chan->data; @@ -1483,25 +1498,28 @@ static struct l2cap_chan *l2cap_sock_new_connection_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan) if (sk_acceptq_is_full(parent)) { BT_DBG("backlog full %d", parent->sk_ack_backlog); release_sock(parent); - return NULL; + return -ENOBUFS; } sk = l2cap_sock_alloc(sock_net(parent), NULL, BTPROTO_L2CAP, - GFP_ATOMIC, 0); + GFP_ATOMIC, 0, new_chan); if (!sk) { release_sock(parent); - return NULL; - } + return -ENOMEM; + } bt_sock_reclassify_lock(sk, BTPROTO_L2CAP); l2cap_sock_init(sk, parent); + /* The conn list reference taken by l2cap_new_connection() keeps new_chan + * alive once release_sock() lets another task free this socket. + */ bt_accept_enqueue(parent, sk, false); release_sock(parent); - return l2cap_pi(sk)->chan; + return 0; } static int l2cap_sock_recv_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb) @@ -1770,10 +1788,7 @@ static void l2cap_sock_destruct(struct sock *sk) { BT_DBG("sk %p", sk); - if (l2cap_pi(sk)->chan) { - l2cap_pi(sk)->chan->data = NULL; - l2cap_chan_put(l2cap_pi(sk)->chan); - } + l2cap_sock_put_chan(sk); if (l2cap_pi(sk)->rx_busy_skb) { kfree_skb(l2cap_pi(sk)->rx_busy_skb); @@ -1804,30 +1819,12 @@ static void l2cap_sock_init(struct sock *sk, struct sock *parent) BT_DBG("sk %p", sk); if (parent) { - struct l2cap_chan *pchan = l2cap_pi(parent)->chan; - sk->sk_type = parent->sk_type; bt_sk(sk)->flags = bt_sk(parent)->flags; - chan->chan_type = pchan->chan_type; - chan->imtu = pchan->imtu; - chan->omtu = pchan->omtu; - chan->conf_state = pchan->conf_state; - chan->mode = pchan->mode; - chan->fcs = pchan->fcs; - chan->max_tx = pchan->max_tx; - chan->tx_win = pchan->tx_win; - chan->tx_win_max = pchan->tx_win_max; - chan->sec_level = pchan->sec_level; - chan->flags = pchan->flags; - chan->tx_credits = pchan->tx_credits; - chan->rx_credits = pchan->rx_credits; - - if (chan->chan_type == L2CAP_CHAN_FIXED) { - chan->scid = pchan->scid; - chan->dcid = pchan->scid; - } - + /* Channel configuration is inherited from the parent by + * l2cap_new_connection(). + */ security_sk_clone(parent, sk); } else { switch (sk->sk_type) { @@ -1853,7 +1850,7 @@ static void l2cap_sock_init(struct sock *sk, struct sock *parent) chan->mode = L2CAP_MODE_BASIC; } - l2cap_chan_set_defaults(chan); + l2cap_chan_set_defaults(chan, NULL); } /* Default config options */ @@ -1870,10 +1867,10 @@ static struct proto l2cap_proto = { }; static struct sock *l2cap_sock_alloc(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, - int proto, gfp_t prio, int kern) + int proto, gfp_t prio, int kern, + struct l2cap_chan *chan) { struct sock *sk; - struct l2cap_chan *chan; sk = bt_sock_alloc(net, sock, &l2cap_proto, proto, prio, kern); if (!sk) @@ -1882,18 +1879,7 @@ static struct sock *l2cap_sock_alloc(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, sk->sk_destruct = l2cap_sock_destruct; sk->sk_sndtimeo = L2CAP_CONN_TIMEOUT; - chan = l2cap_chan_create(); - if (!chan) { - sk_free(sk); - if (sock) - sock->sk = NULL; - return NULL; - } - - l2cap_chan_hold(chan); - - l2cap_pi(sk)->chan = chan; - + /* The sock takes ownership of the caller's reference on chan. */ return sk; } @@ -1901,6 +1887,7 @@ static int l2cap_sock_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol, int kern) { struct sock *sk; + struct l2cap_chan *chan; BT_DBG("sock %p", sock); @@ -1915,10 +1902,16 @@ static int l2cap_sock_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol, sock->ops = &l2cap_sock_ops; - sk = l2cap_sock_alloc(net, sock, protocol, GFP_ATOMIC, kern); - if (!sk) + chan = l2cap_chan_create(); + if (!chan) return -ENOMEM; + sk = l2cap_sock_alloc(net, sock, protocol, GFP_ATOMIC, kern, chan); + if (!sk) { + l2cap_chan_put(chan); + return -ENOMEM; + } + l2cap_sock_init(sk, NULL); bt_sock_link(&l2cap_sk_list, sk); return 0; diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c index 081b08c3a6bc..e556550eb139 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c @@ -3236,34 +3236,19 @@ static const struct l2cap_ops smp_chan_ops = { .get_sndtimeo = l2cap_chan_no_get_sndtimeo, }; -static inline struct l2cap_chan *smp_new_conn_cb(struct l2cap_chan *pchan) +static inline int smp_new_conn_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, + struct l2cap_chan *new_chan) { - struct l2cap_chan *chan; - - BT_DBG("pchan %p", pchan); - - chan = l2cap_chan_create(); - if (!chan) - return NULL; - - chan->chan_type = pchan->chan_type; - chan->ops = &smp_chan_ops; - chan->scid = pchan->scid; - chan->dcid = chan->scid; - chan->imtu = pchan->imtu; - chan->omtu = pchan->omtu; - chan->mode = pchan->mode; + new_chan->ops = &smp_chan_ops; /* Other L2CAP channels may request SMP routines in order to * change the security level. This means that the SMP channel * lock must be considered in its own category to avoid lockdep * warnings. */ - atomic_set(&chan->nesting, L2CAP_NESTING_SMP); - - BT_DBG("created chan %p", chan); + atomic_set(&new_chan->nesting, L2CAP_NESTING_SMP); - return chan; + return 0; } static const struct l2cap_ops smp_root_chan_ops = { @@ -3334,7 +3319,7 @@ static struct l2cap_chan *smp_add_cid(struct hci_dev *hdev, u16 cid) l2cap_add_scid(chan, cid); - l2cap_chan_set_defaults(chan); + l2cap_chan_set_defaults(chan, NULL); if (cid == L2CAP_CID_SMP) { u8 bdaddr_type; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] thunderbolt: property: Cap recursion depth in __tb_property_parse_dir()
by Ze Zuo 06 Aug '26

06 Aug '26

From: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.259 commit 2b5f47a710172c962ef42d1b732b04d2ad0dce21 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/16219 CVE: CVE-2026-63891 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 928abe19fbf0127003abcb1ea69cabc1c897d0ab ] A DIRECTORY entry's value field is used as the dir_offset for a recursive call into __tb_property_parse_dir() with no depth counter. A crafted peer that chains DIRECTORY entries into a back-reference loop drives the parser until the kernel stack is exhausted and the guard page fires. Any untrusted XDomain peer (cable, dock, in-line inspector, adjacent host) that reaches the PROPERTIES_REQUEST control-plane exchange can trigger this without authentication. Thread a depth counter through tb_property_parse() and __tb_property_parse_dir(), and reject blocks that exceed TB_PROPERTY_MAX_DEPTH = 8. That is comfortably larger than any observed legitimate XDomain layout. Operators who do not need XDomain host-to-host discovery can disable the path entirely with thunderbolt.xdomain=0 on the kernel command line. Fixes: cdae7c07e3e3 ("thunderbolt: Add support for XDomain properties") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-6 Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5-4 Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg(a)linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Ze Zuo <zuoze1(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/thunderbolt/property.c | 18 ++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/thunderbolt/property.c b/drivers/thunderbolt/property.c index d5b0cdb8f0b1..2e50468a3b76 100644 --- a/drivers/thunderbolt/property.c +++ b/drivers/thunderbolt/property.c @@ -34,10 +34,11 @@ struct tb_property_dir_entry { }; #define TB_PROPERTY_ROOTDIR_MAGIC 0x55584401 +#define TB_PROPERTY_MAX_DEPTH 8 static struct tb_property_dir *__tb_property_parse_dir(const u32 *block, size_t block_len, unsigned int dir_offset, size_t dir_len, - bool is_root); + bool is_root, unsigned int depth); static inline void parse_dwdata(void *dst, const void *src, size_t dwords) { @@ -93,7 +94,8 @@ tb_property_alloc(const char *key, enum tb_property_type type) } static struct tb_property *tb_property_parse(const u32 *block, size_t block_len, - const struct tb_property_entry *entry) + const struct tb_property_entry *entry, + unsigned int depth) { char key[TB_PROPERTY_KEY_SIZE + 1]; struct tb_property *property; @@ -114,7 +116,7 @@ static struct tb_property *tb_property_parse(const u32 *block, size_t block_len, switch (property->type) { case TB_PROPERTY_TYPE_DIRECTORY: dir = __tb_property_parse_dir(block, block_len, entry->value, - entry->length, false); + entry->length, false, depth + 1); if (!dir) { kfree(property); return NULL; @@ -159,13 +161,17 @@ static struct tb_property *tb_property_parse(const u32 *block, size_t block_len, } static struct tb_property_dir *__tb_property_parse_dir(const u32 *block, - size_t block_len, unsigned int dir_offset, size_t dir_len, bool is_root) + size_t block_len, unsigned int dir_offset, size_t dir_len, bool is_root, + unsigned int depth) { const struct tb_property_entry *entries; size_t i, content_len, nentries; unsigned int content_offset; struct tb_property_dir *dir; + if (depth > TB_PROPERTY_MAX_DEPTH) + return NULL; + dir = kzalloc(sizeof(*dir), GFP_KERNEL); if (!dir) return NULL; @@ -192,7 +198,7 @@ static struct tb_property_dir *__tb_property_parse_dir(const u32 *block, for (i = 0; i < nentries; i++) { struct tb_property *property; - property = tb_property_parse(block, block_len, &entries[i]); + property = tb_property_parse(block, block_len, &entries[i], depth); if (!property) { tb_property_free_dir(dir); return NULL; @@ -229,7 +235,7 @@ struct tb_property_dir *tb_property_parse_dir(const u32 *block, return NULL; return __tb_property_parse_dir(block, block_len, 0, rootdir->length, - true); + true, 0); } /** -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] batman-adv: tt: fix negative last_changeset_len
by Ze Zuo 06 Aug '26

06 Aug '26

From: Sven Eckelmann <sven(a)narfation.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.258 commit 6314089acf0ddf64376fdc0b1420695504c73f52 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/16427 CVE: CVE-2026-64089 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit fc92cdfcb295cefa4344d71a527d61b638b7bfc4 upstream. batadv_piv_tt::last_changeset_len len was declared as s16, but the field is never intended to hold a negative value. When a value greater than 32767 is assigned, it wraps to a negative signed integer. In batadv_send_my_tt_response(), last_changeset_len is temporarily widened to s32. The incorrectly negative s16 value propagates into the s32, causing batadv_tt_prepare_tvlv_local_data() to allocate a full sized buffer but populates only a small portion of it with the collected changeset. All remaining bits are kept uninitialized. Using an u16 avoids this type confusion and ensures that no (negative) sign extension is performed in batadv_send_my_tt_response(). Cc: stable(a)kernel.org Fixes: a73105b8d4c7 ("batman-adv: improved client announcement mechanism") Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven(a)narfation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Ze Zuo <zuoze1(a)huawei.com> --- net/batman-adv/types.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/batman-adv/types.h b/net/batman-adv/types.h index cc3334afbdd0..bf9b1ee568b9 100644 --- a/net/batman-adv/types.h +++ b/net/batman-adv/types.h @@ -1003,7 +1003,7 @@ struct batadv_priv_tt { * @last_changeset_len: length of last tt changeset this host has * generated */ - s16 last_changeset_len; + u16 last_changeset_len; /** * @last_changeset_lock: lock protecting last_changeset & -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/2] Fix CVE-2026-64095
by Ze Zuo 06 Aug '26

06 Aug '26

Fix CVE-2026-64095. Sven Eckelmann (2): batman-adv: bla: fix report_work leak on backbone_gw purge batman-adv: bla: avoid double decrement of bla.num_requests net/batman-adv/bridge_loop_avoidance.c | 103 +++++++++++++++++-------- net/batman-adv/soft-interface.c | 1 + net/batman-adv/types.h | 39 ++++++++-- 3 files changed, 101 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-) -- 2.25.1

2 3

[PATCH OLK-5.10] sctp: fix uninit-value in __sctp_rcv_asconf_lookup()
by Ze Zuo 06 Aug '26

06 Aug '26

From: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.259 commit 446e0ecd845abc394b24ae2030a883572bec9d16 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15911 CVE: CVE-2026-53225 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit f8373d7090b745728de66308deeecc67e8d319ce ] __sctp_rcv_asconf_lookup() in net/sctp/input.c only checks that the ASCONF chunk can hold the ADDIP header and a parameter header, then calls af->from_addr_param(), which reads the full address (16 bytes for IPv6) trusting the parameter's declared length. An unauthenticated peer can send a truncated trailing ASCONF chunk that declares an IPv6 address parameter but stops after the 4-byte parameter header; reached from the no-association lookup path, from_addr_param() then reads uninitialized bytes past the parameter. Impact: an unauthenticated SCTP peer makes the receive path read up to 16 bytes of uninitialized memory past a truncated ASCONF address parameter. The sibling __sctp_rcv_init_lookup() bounds parameters with sctp_walk_params(); this path open-codes the fetch and omits the bound. Verify the whole address parameter lies within the chunk before from_addr_param() reads it, the same class of fix as commit 51e5ad549c43 ("net: sctp: fix KMSAN uninit-value in sctp_inq_pop"). Fixes: df2185771439 ("[SCTP]: Update association lookup to look at ASCONF chunks as well") Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito(a)gmail.com> Acked-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin(a)gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260608122234.459098-1-michael.bommarito@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ze Zuo <zuoze1(a)huawei.com> --- net/sctp/input.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/sctp/input.c b/net/sctp/input.c index 079b1bfc7d31..3c7761199f20 100644 --- a/net/sctp/input.c +++ b/net/sctp/input.c @@ -1172,6 +1172,14 @@ static struct sctp_association *__sctp_rcv_asconf_lookup( /* Skip over the ADDIP header and find the Address parameter */ param = (union sctp_addr_param *)(asconf + 1); + /* The whole address parameter must lie within the chunk before + * af->from_addr_param() reads the variable-length address; otherwise a + * truncated trailing ASCONF chunk lets it read uninitialized bytes past + * the parameter. + */ + if (sizeof(*asconf) + ntohs(param->p.length) > ntohs(ch->length)) + return NULL; + af = sctp_get_af_specific(param_type2af(param->p.type)); if (unlikely(!af)) return NULL; -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] sctp: fix uninit-value in __sctp_rcv_asconf_lookup()
by Ze Zuo 06 Aug '26

06 Aug '26

From: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.259 commit 446e0ecd845abc394b24ae2030a883572bec9d16 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15911 CVE: CVE-2026-53225 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit f8373d7090b745728de66308deeecc67e8d319ce ] __sctp_rcv_asconf_lookup() in net/sctp/input.c only checks that the ASCONF chunk can hold the ADDIP header and a parameter header, then calls af->from_addr_param(), which reads the full address (16 bytes for IPv6) trusting the parameter's declared length. An unauthenticated peer can send a truncated trailing ASCONF chunk that declares an IPv6 address parameter but stops after the 4-byte parameter header; reached from the no-association lookup path, from_addr_param() then reads uninitialized bytes past the parameter. Impact: an unauthenticated SCTP peer makes the receive path read up to 16 bytes of uninitialized memory past a truncated ASCONF address parameter. The sibling __sctp_rcv_init_lookup() bounds parameters with sctp_walk_params(); this path open-codes the fetch and omits the bound. Verify the whole address parameter lies within the chunk before from_addr_param() reads it, the same class of fix as commit 51e5ad549c43 ("net: sctp: fix KMSAN uninit-value in sctp_inq_pop"). Fixes: df2185771439 ("[SCTP]: Update association lookup to look at ASCONF chunks as well") Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito(a)gmail.com> Acked-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin(a)gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260608122234.459098-1-michael.bommarito@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ze Zuo <zuoze1(a)huawei.com> --- net/sctp/input.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/sctp/input.c b/net/sctp/input.c index 354a2eb84e14..269b8f0aec60 100644 --- a/net/sctp/input.c +++ b/net/sctp/input.c @@ -1131,6 +1131,14 @@ static struct sctp_association *__sctp_rcv_asconf_lookup( /* Skip over the ADDIP header and find the Address parameter */ param = (union sctp_addr_param *)(asconf + 1); + /* The whole address parameter must lie within the chunk before + * af->from_addr_param() reads the variable-length address; otherwise a + * truncated trailing ASCONF chunk lets it read uninitialized bytes past + * the parameter. + */ + if (sizeof(*asconf) + ntohs(param->p.length) > ntohs(ch->length)) + return NULL; + af = sctp_get_af_specific(param_type2af(param->p.type)); if (unlikely(!af)) return NULL; -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] hv_netvsc: use kmap_local_page in netvsc_copy_to_send_buf
by Ze Zuo 06 Aug '26

06 Aug '26

From: Anton Leontev <leontyevantony(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.259 commit 16514afeb7d3d121072ba9a0b640d6c1c5507db0 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15885 CVE: CVE-2026-53199 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 004e9ecfe6c5384f9e0b2f6f6389d42ec22789af ] netvsc_copy_to_send_buf() copies page buffer entries into the VMBus send buffer using phys_to_virt() on the entry PFN. Entries for the RNDIS header and the skb linear data come from kmalloc'd memory and are always in the kernel direct map, but entries for skb fragments reference page cache or user pages, which on 32-bit x86 with CONFIG_HIGHMEM=y can live above the LOWMEM boundary. For such a page phys_to_virt() returns an address outside the direct map and the subsequent memcpy() faults on the transmit softirq path, which is fatal. Map the pages with kmap_local_page() instead, handling two properties of the page buffer entries: - pb[i].pfn is a Hyper-V PFN at HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE (4K) granularity, not a native PFN. Reconstruct the physical address first and derive the native page from it, so the mapping stays correct where PAGE_SIZE > HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE (e.g. arm64 with 64K pages). - Since commit 41a6328b2c55 ("hv_netvsc: Preserve contiguous PFN grouping in the page buffer array"), an entry describes a full physically contiguous fragment and pb[i].len can exceed PAGE_SIZE, while kmap_local_page() maps a single page. Copy page by page, splitting at native page boundaries. The copy path only handles packets smaller than the send section size (6144 bytes by default); larger packets take the cp_partial path where only the RNDIS header is copied. So entries here are bounded by the section size and a copy is split at most once on 4K-page systems. On !CONFIG_HIGHMEM configs kmap_local_page() folds to page_address() and no mapping work is added. Fixes: c25aaf814a63 ("hyperv: Enable sendbuf mechanism on the send path") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Anton Leontev <leontyevantony(a)gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260604165938.32033-1-leontyevantony@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Ze Zuo <zuoze1(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc.c | 19 +++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc.c b/drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc.c index 03333a4136bf..6972601820e4 100644 --- a/drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc.c +++ b/drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc.c @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ #include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/wait.h> #include <linux/mm.h> +#include <linux/highmem.h> #include <linux/delay.h> #include <linux/io.h> #include <linux/slab.h> @@ -889,12 +890,22 @@ static void netvsc_copy_to_send_buf(struct netvsc_device *net_device, } for (i = 0; i < page_count; i++) { - char *src = phys_to_virt(pb[i].pfn << HV_HYP_PAGE_SHIFT); - u32 offset = pb[i].offset; + phys_addr_t paddr = (pb[i].pfn << HV_HYP_PAGE_SHIFT) + + pb[i].offset; u32 len = pb[i].len; - memcpy(dest, (src + offset), len); - dest += len; + while (len) { + struct page *page = pfn_to_page(PHYS_PFN(paddr)); + u32 off = offset_in_page(paddr); + u32 chunk = min_t(u32, len, PAGE_SIZE - off); + char *src = kmap_atomic(page); + + memcpy(dest, src + off, chunk); + kunmap_atomic(src); + dest += chunk; + paddr += chunk; + len -= chunk; + } } if (padding) -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] libceph: Fix potential out-of-bounds access in crush_decode()
by Ze Zuo 06 Aug '26

06 Aug '26

From: Raphael Zimmer <raphael.zimmer(a)tu-ilmenau.de> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.258 commit 6e70ef53e818c53eab28d7b0026b7fd03dddaba5 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15657 CVE: CVE-2026-52955 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- A message of type CEPH_MSG_OSD_MAP containing a crush map with at least one bucket has two fields holding the bucket algorithm. If the values in these two fields differ, an out-of-bounds access can occur. This is the case because the first algorithm field (alg) is used to allocate the correct amount of memory for a bucket of this type, while the second algorithm field inside the bucket (b->alg) is used in the subsequent processing. This patch fixes the issue by adding a check that compares alg and b->alg and aborts the processing in case they differ. Furthermore, b->alg is set to 0 in this case, because the destruction of the crush map also uses this field to determine the bucket type, which can again result in an out-of-bounds access when trying to free the memory pointed to by the fields of the bucket. To correctly free the memory allocated for the bucket in such a case, the corresponding call to kfree is moved from the algorithm-specific crush_destroy_bucket functions to the generic crush_destroy_bucket(). Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Raphael Zimmer <raphael.zimmer(a)tu-ilmenau.de> Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Ze Zuo <zuoze1(a)huawei.com> --- net/ceph/crush/crush.c | 6 +----- net/ceph/osdmap.c | 4 ++++ 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ceph/crush/crush.c b/net/ceph/crush/crush.c index 3d70244bc1b6..2673fae9c339 100644 --- a/net/ceph/crush/crush.c +++ b/net/ceph/crush/crush.c @@ -48,7 +48,6 @@ int crush_get_bucket_item_weight(const struct crush_bucket *b, int p) void crush_destroy_bucket_uniform(struct crush_bucket_uniform *b) { kfree(b->h.items); - kfree(b); } void crush_destroy_bucket_list(struct crush_bucket_list *b) @@ -56,14 +55,12 @@ void crush_destroy_bucket_list(struct crush_bucket_list *b) kfree(b->item_weights); kfree(b->sum_weights); kfree(b->h.items); - kfree(b); } void crush_destroy_bucket_tree(struct crush_bucket_tree *b) { kfree(b->h.items); kfree(b->node_weights); - kfree(b); } void crush_destroy_bucket_straw(struct crush_bucket_straw *b) @@ -71,14 +68,12 @@ void crush_destroy_bucket_straw(struct crush_bucket_straw *b) kfree(b->straws); kfree(b->item_weights); kfree(b->h.items); - kfree(b); } void crush_destroy_bucket_straw2(struct crush_bucket_straw2 *b) { kfree(b->item_weights); kfree(b->h.items); - kfree(b); } void crush_destroy_bucket(struct crush_bucket *b) @@ -100,6 +95,7 @@ void crush_destroy_bucket(struct crush_bucket *b) crush_destroy_bucket_straw2((struct crush_bucket_straw2 *)b); break; } + kfree(b); } /** diff --git a/net/ceph/osdmap.c b/net/ceph/osdmap.c index 7cb6025fe092..9a4a9aa187f7 100644 --- a/net/ceph/osdmap.c +++ b/net/ceph/osdmap.c @@ -422,6 +422,10 @@ static struct crush_map *crush_decode(void *pbyval, void *end) b->id = ceph_decode_32(p); b->type = ceph_decode_16(p); b->alg = ceph_decode_8(p); + if (b->alg != alg) { + b->alg = 0; + goto bad; + } b->hash = ceph_decode_8(p); b->weight = ceph_decode_32(p); b->size = ceph_decode_32(p); -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] libceph: Fix potential out-of-bounds access in crush_decode()
by Ze Zuo 06 Aug '26

06 Aug '26

From: Raphael Zimmer <raphael.zimmer(a)tu-ilmenau.de> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.258 commit 6e70ef53e818c53eab28d7b0026b7fd03dddaba5 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15657 CVE: CVE-2026-52955 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 4c79fc2d598694bda845b46229c9d48b65042970 upstream. A message of type CEPH_MSG_OSD_MAP containing a crush map with at least one bucket has two fields holding the bucket algorithm. If the values in these two fields differ, an out-of-bounds access can occur. This is the case because the first algorithm field (alg) is used to allocate the correct amount of memory for a bucket of this type, while the second algorithm field inside the bucket (b->alg) is used in the subsequent processing. This patch fixes the issue by adding a check that compares alg and b->alg and aborts the processing in case they differ. Furthermore, b->alg is set to 0 in this case, because the destruction of the crush map also uses this field to determine the bucket type, which can again result in an out-of-bounds access when trying to free the memory pointed to by the fields of the bucket. To correctly free the memory allocated for the bucket in such a case, the corresponding call to kfree is moved from the algorithm-specific crush_destroy_bucket functions to the generic crush_destroy_bucket(). Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Raphael Zimmer <raphael.zimmer(a)tu-ilmenau.de> Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Ze Zuo <zuoze1(a)huawei.com> --- net/ceph/crush/crush.c | 6 +----- net/ceph/osdmap.c | 4 ++++ 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ceph/crush/crush.c b/net/ceph/crush/crush.c index 254ded0b05f6..521aec1d5fc0 100644 --- a/net/ceph/crush/crush.c +++ b/net/ceph/crush/crush.c @@ -47,7 +47,6 @@ int crush_get_bucket_item_weight(const struct crush_bucket *b, int p) void crush_destroy_bucket_uniform(struct crush_bucket_uniform *b) { kfree(b->h.items); - kfree(b); } void crush_destroy_bucket_list(struct crush_bucket_list *b) @@ -55,14 +54,12 @@ void crush_destroy_bucket_list(struct crush_bucket_list *b) kfree(b->item_weights); kfree(b->sum_weights); kfree(b->h.items); - kfree(b); } void crush_destroy_bucket_tree(struct crush_bucket_tree *b) { kfree(b->h.items); kfree(b->node_weights); - kfree(b); } void crush_destroy_bucket_straw(struct crush_bucket_straw *b) @@ -70,14 +67,12 @@ void crush_destroy_bucket_straw(struct crush_bucket_straw *b) kfree(b->straws); kfree(b->item_weights); kfree(b->h.items); - kfree(b); } void crush_destroy_bucket_straw2(struct crush_bucket_straw2 *b) { kfree(b->item_weights); kfree(b->h.items); - kfree(b); } void crush_destroy_bucket(struct crush_bucket *b) @@ -99,6 +94,7 @@ void crush_destroy_bucket(struct crush_bucket *b) crush_destroy_bucket_straw2((struct crush_bucket_straw2 *)b); break; } + kfree(b); } /** diff --git a/net/ceph/osdmap.c b/net/ceph/osdmap.c index fe796775e3e9..62cfeb337b8a 100644 --- a/net/ceph/osdmap.c +++ b/net/ceph/osdmap.c @@ -497,6 +497,10 @@ static struct crush_map *crush_decode(void *pbyval, void *end) b->id = ceph_decode_32(p); b->type = ceph_decode_16(p); b->alg = ceph_decode_8(p); + if (b->alg != alg) { + b->alg = 0; + goto bad; + } b->hash = ceph_decode_8(p); b->weight = ceph_decode_32(p); b->size = ceph_decode_32(p); -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/4] Fix CVE-2026-52917
by Ze Zuo 06 Aug '26

06 Aug '26

Fix CVE-2026-52917. Stefan Wiehler (1): sctp: Hold sock lock while iterating over address list Xin Long (1): sctp: hold endpoint before calling cb in sctp_transport_lookup_process Yajun Deng (1): net: Use nlmsg_unicast() instead of netlink_unicast() Zhao Zhang (1): sctp: diag: reject stale associations in dump_one path include/net/sctp/sctp.h | 3 +- net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c | 2 +- net/ipv4/inet_diag.c | 5 +--- net/ipv4/raw_diag.c | 7 ++--- net/ipv4/udp_diag.c | 6 ++-- net/mptcp/mptcp_diag.c | 6 ++-- net/netlink/af_netlink.c | 2 +- net/sctp/diag.c | 65 ++++++++++++++++++++-------------------- net/sctp/socket.c | 22 +++++++++----- net/unix/diag.c | 6 ++-- 10 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 65 deletions(-) -- 2.25.1

2 5

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] i2c: core: fix adapter registration race
by Zhang Yuwei 06 Aug '26

06 Aug '26

From: Johan Hovold <johan(a)kernel.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.2-rc1 commit ba14d7cf2fe7284610a29854bdff22b2537d3ce6 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/16120 CVE: CVE-2026-64279 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Adapters can be looked up by their id using i2c_get_adapter() which takes a reference to the embedded struct device. Remove the adapter from the IDR before tearing it down during deregistration (and on registration failure) to make sure its resources are not accessed after having been freed (e.g. the device name). Fixes: 35fc37f81881 ("i2c: Limit core locking to the necessary sections") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 2.6.31 Cc: Jean Delvare <khali(a)linux-fr.org> Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa+renesas(a)sang-engineering.com> Conflicts: drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c [contxt conflict] Signed-off-by: Zhang Yuwei <zhangyuwei20(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c | 9 +++++++-- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c b/drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c index 366bd86285d6..88c925c449f7 100644 --- a/drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c +++ b/drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c @@ -1281,6 +1281,11 @@ static int i2c_register_adapter(struct i2c_adapter *adap) dev_set_name(&adap->dev, "i2c-%d", adap->nr); adap->dev.bus = &i2c_bus_type; adap->dev.type = &i2c_adapter_type; + + mutex_lock(&core_lock); + idr_replace(&i2c_adapter_idr, adap, adap->nr); + mutex_unlock(&core_lock); + res = device_register(&adap->dev); if (res) { pr_err("adapter '%s': can't register device (%d)\n", adap->name, res); @@ -1345,7 +1350,7 @@ static int __i2c_add_numbered_adapter(struct i2c_adapter *adap) int id; mutex_lock(&core_lock); - id = idr_alloc(&i2c_adapter_idr, adap, adap->nr, adap->nr + 1, GFP_KERNEL); + id = idr_alloc(&i2c_adapter_idr, NULL, adap->nr, adap->nr + 1, GFP_KERNEL); mutex_unlock(&core_lock); if (WARN(id < 0, "couldn't get idr")) return id == -ENOSPC ? -EBUSY : id; @@ -1381,7 +1386,7 @@ int i2c_add_adapter(struct i2c_adapter *adapter) } mutex_lock(&core_lock); - id = idr_alloc(&i2c_adapter_idr, adapter, + id = idr_alloc(&i2c_adapter_idr, NULL, __i2c_first_dynamic_bus_num, 0, GFP_KERNEL); mutex_unlock(&core_lock); if (WARN(id < 0, "couldn't get idr")) -- 2.22.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] Bluetooth: hci_conn: Fix null ptr deref in hci_abort_conn()
by Hui Tang 05 Aug '26

05 Aug '26

From: Siwei Zhang <oss(a)fourdim.xyz> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.2-rc3 commit 12917f591cea1af36087dba5b9ec888652f0b42a category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/16696 CVE: CVE-2026-64405 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- hci_abort_conn() read hci_skb_event(hdev->sent_cmd) when a connection was pending, but hdev->sent_cmd can be NULL while req_status is still HCI_REQ_PEND, leading to a NULL pointer dereference and a general protection fault from the hci_rx_work() receive path. Instead of inspecting hdev->sent_cmd, track the in-flight create connection command with a new per-connection HCI_CONN_CREATE flag and route all cancellation through hci_cancel_connect_sync(), which dispatches to a dedicated per-type cancel function. The create command is in exactly one of two states: still queued, or in flight. The cancel function holds cmd_sync_work_lock across the whole decision: the worker takes this lock to dequeue every entry, so while it is held a queued command cannot start running and an in-flight command cannot complete and let the next command become pending. This keeps the flag test and hci_cmd_sync_cancel() atomic with respect to the worker, so a queued command is simply dequeued, and an in-flight command owned by this connection is cancelled without the risk of cancelling an unrelated command that became pending in the meantime. CIS uses the same flag mechanism via HCI_CONN_CREATE_CIS but cannot be dequeued per-connection. hci_acl_create_conn_sync() and hci_le_create_conn_sync() clear HCI_CONN_CREATE after the create command completes, but the command status handler can free conn via hci_conn_del() (for example when the controller rejects the connection) while the worker is still blocked on the connection complete event. Hold a reference on conn across the create command so the flag can be cleared without a use-after-free. Fixes: a13f316e90fd ("Bluetooth: hci_conn: Consolidate code for aborting connections") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Suggested-by: XIAO WU <xiaowu.417(a)qq.com> Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8 Signed-off-by: Siwei Zhang <oss(a)fourdim.xyz> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Hui Tang <tanghui20(a)huawei.com> --- include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h | 1 + net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c | 21 +---- net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c | 133 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 3 files changed, 123 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h b/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h index 4726fb144ee9..26b5af2e670d 100644 --- a/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h +++ b/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h @@ -965,6 +965,7 @@ enum { HCI_CONN_AUTH_FAILURE, HCI_CONN_PER_ADV, HCI_CONN_BIG_CREATED, + HCI_CONN_CREATE, HCI_CONN_CREATE_CIS, HCI_CONN_BIG_SYNC, HCI_CONN_BIG_SYNC_FAILED, diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c index ee3e842404d1..4ead957d7c4c 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c @@ -2927,26 +2927,11 @@ int hci_abort_conn(struct hci_conn *conn, u8 reason) conn->abort_reason = reason; - /* If the connection is pending check the command opcode since that - * might be blocking on hci_cmd_sync_work while waiting its respective - * event so we need to hci_cmd_sync_cancel to cancel it. - * - * hci_connect_le serializes the connection attempts so only one - * connection can be in BT_CONNECT at time. + /* Cancel the connect attempt. A return of 0 means the create command + * was still queued and got dequeued, so there is nothing to disconnect. */ - if (conn->state == BT_CONNECT && READ_ONCE(hdev->req_status) == HCI_REQ_PEND) { - switch (hci_skb_event(hdev->sent_cmd)) { - case HCI_EV_CONN_COMPLETE: - case HCI_EV_LE_CONN_COMPLETE: - case HCI_EV_LE_ENHANCED_CONN_COMPLETE: - case HCI_EVT_LE_CIS_ESTABLISHED: - hci_cmd_sync_cancel(hdev, ECANCELED); - break; - } - /* Cancel connect attempt if still queued/pending */ - } else if (!hci_cancel_connect_sync(hdev, conn)) { + if (!hci_cancel_connect_sync(hdev, conn)) return 0; - } /* Run immediately if on cmd_sync_work since this may be called * as a result to MGMT_OP_DISCONNECT/MGMT_OP_UNPAIR which does diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c index 0fdadf4c4d21..9da7d17dda88 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c @@ -6576,6 +6576,11 @@ static int hci_le_create_conn_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data) bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "conn %p", conn); + /* Hold a reference so conn stays valid for the HCI_CONN_CREATE + * clear_bit() at done. + */ + hci_conn_get(conn); + clear_bit(HCI_CONN_SCANNING, &conn->flags); conn->state = BT_CONNECT; @@ -6588,6 +6593,7 @@ static int hci_le_create_conn_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data) hdev->le_scan_type == LE_SCAN_ACTIVE && !hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_LE_SIMULTANEOUS_ROLES)) { hci_conn_del(conn); + hci_conn_put(conn); return -EBUSY; } @@ -6633,6 +6639,12 @@ static int hci_le_create_conn_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data) &own_addr_type); if (err) goto done; + + /* Mark create connection in flight so hci_cancel_connect_sync() can + * cancel it while blocking on the connection complete event. + */ + set_bit(HCI_CONN_CREATE, &conn->flags); + /* Send command LE Extended Create Connection if supported */ if (use_ext_conn(hdev)) { err = hci_le_ext_create_conn_sync(hdev, conn, own_addr_type); @@ -6668,11 +6680,14 @@ static int hci_le_create_conn_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data) conn->conn_timeout, NULL); done: + clear_bit(HCI_CONN_CREATE, &conn->flags); + if (err == -ETIMEDOUT) hci_le_connect_cancel_sync(hdev, conn, 0x00); /* Re-enable advertising after the connection attempt is finished. */ hci_resume_advertising_sync(hdev); + hci_conn_put(conn); return err; } @@ -6951,10 +6966,25 @@ static int hci_acl_create_conn_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data) else cp.role_switch = 0x00; - return __hci_cmd_sync_status_sk(hdev, HCI_OP_CREATE_CONN, - sizeof(cp), &cp, - HCI_EV_CONN_COMPLETE, - conn->conn_timeout, NULL); + /* Hold a reference so conn stays valid for the HCI_CONN_CREATE + * clear_bit() below. + */ + hci_conn_get(conn); + + /* Mark create connection in flight so hci_cancel_connect_sync() can + * cancel it while blocking on the connection complete event. + */ + set_bit(HCI_CONN_CREATE, &conn->flags); + + err = __hci_cmd_sync_status_sk(hdev, HCI_OP_CREATE_CONN, + sizeof(cp), &cp, + HCI_EV_CONN_COMPLETE, + conn->conn_timeout, NULL); + + clear_bit(HCI_CONN_CREATE, &conn->flags); + hci_conn_put(conn); + + return err; } int hci_connect_acl_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct hci_conn *conn) @@ -7006,20 +7036,95 @@ int hci_connect_le_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct hci_conn *conn) return (err == -EEXIST) ? 0 : err; } -int hci_cancel_connect_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct hci_conn *conn) +static int hci_acl_cancel_create_conn_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev, + struct hci_conn *conn) { - if (conn->state != BT_OPEN) - return -EINVAL; + struct hci_cmd_sync_work_entry *entry; + int err = -EBUSY; + + /* cmd_sync_work_lock makes the HCI_CONN_CREATE test and the cancel + * atomic against the worker, which takes this lock to dequeue every + * entry: while it is held no other command can become pending, so + * hci_cmd_sync_cancel() cannot cancel an unrelated command. + */ + mutex_lock(&hdev->cmd_sync_work_lock); + + /* In flight: this connection owns the pending request, cancel it. */ + if (test_bit(HCI_CONN_CREATE, &conn->flags)) { + hci_cmd_sync_cancel(hdev, ECANCELED); + goto unlock; + } + + /* Still queued: a successful dequeue means it never started, so there + * is nothing to disconnect. + */ + entry = _hci_cmd_sync_lookup_entry(hdev, hci_acl_create_conn_sync, conn, + NULL); + if (entry) { + _hci_cmd_sync_cancel_entry(hdev, entry, -ECANCELED); + err = 0; + } + +unlock: + mutex_unlock(&hdev->cmd_sync_work_lock); + return err; +} + +static int hci_le_cancel_create_conn_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev, + struct hci_conn *conn) +{ + struct hci_cmd_sync_work_entry *entry; + int err = -EBUSY; + /* cmd_sync_work_lock keeps the HCI_CONN_CREATE test and the cancel + * atomic against the cmd_sync worker. + */ + mutex_lock(&hdev->cmd_sync_work_lock); + + if (test_bit(HCI_CONN_CREATE, &conn->flags)) { + hci_cmd_sync_cancel(hdev, ECANCELED); + goto unlock; + } + + entry = _hci_cmd_sync_lookup_entry(hdev, hci_le_create_conn_sync, conn, + create_le_conn_complete); + if (entry) { + _hci_cmd_sync_cancel_entry(hdev, entry, -ECANCELED); + err = 0; + } + +unlock: + mutex_unlock(&hdev->cmd_sync_work_lock); + return err; +} + +static int hci_cis_cancel_create_conn_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev, + struct hci_conn *conn) +{ + /* LE Create CIS is shared by the whole CIG and cannot be dequeued + * per-connection, so only an in-flight command can be cancelled. + * cmd_sync_work_lock keeps the test and the cancel atomic against the + * cmd_sync worker. + */ + mutex_lock(&hdev->cmd_sync_work_lock); + + if (test_bit(HCI_CONN_CREATE_CIS, &conn->flags)) + hci_cmd_sync_cancel(hdev, ECANCELED); + + mutex_unlock(&hdev->cmd_sync_work_lock); + return -EBUSY; +} + +int hci_cancel_connect_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct hci_conn *conn) +{ switch (conn->type) { case ACL_LINK: - return !hci_cmd_sync_dequeue_once(hdev, - hci_acl_create_conn_sync, - conn, NULL); + return hci_acl_cancel_create_conn_sync(hdev, conn); case LE_LINK: - return !hci_cmd_sync_dequeue_once(hdev, hci_le_create_conn_sync, - conn, create_le_conn_complete); + return hci_le_cancel_create_conn_sync(hdev, conn); + case CIS_LINK: + return hci_cis_cancel_create_conn_sync(hdev, conn); + default: + return -ENOENT; } - - return -ENOENT; } -- 2.34.1

1 0

[PATCH OLK-6.6] Bluetooth: ISO: Fix data-race on iso_pi fields in hci_get_route calls
by Hui Tang 05 Aug '26

05 Aug '26

From: SeungJu Cheon <suunj1331(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.1-rc2 commit 9ca7053d6215d89c33f28893bfd1625a32919d3f category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/16200 CVE: CVE-2026-63871 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- iso_connect_bis(), iso_connect_cis(), iso_listen_bis(), and iso_conn_big_sync() call hci_get_route() using iso_pi(sk)->dst, iso_pi(sk)->src, and iso_pi(sk)->src_type without holding lock_sock(). These fields may be modified concurrently by connect() or setsockopt() on the same socket, resulting in data-races reported by KCSAN. Fix this by snapshotting the required fields under lock_sock() before calling hci_get_route(). BUG: KCSAN: data-race in memcmp+0x45/0xb0 race at unknown origin, with read to 0xffff8880122135cf of 1 bytes by task 333 on cpu 1: memcmp+0x45/0xb0 hci_get_route+0x27e/0x490 iso_connect_cis+0x4c/0xa10 iso_sock_connect+0x60e/0xb30 __sys_connect_file+0xbd/0xe0 __sys_connect+0xe0/0x110 __x64_sys_connect+0x40/0x50 x64_sys_call+0xcad/0x1c60 do_syscall_64+0x133/0x590 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Fixes: 241f51931c35 ("Bluetooth: ISO: Avoid circular locking dependency") Signed-off-by: SeungJu Cheon <suunj1331(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz(a)intel.com> Conflicts: net/bluetooth/iso.c [Context conflicts due to backport] Signed-off-by: Hui Tang <tanghui20(a)huawei.com> --- net/bluetooth/iso.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/bluetooth/iso.c b/net/bluetooth/iso.c index 22b0bc30219f..5425ab7f5801 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/iso.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/iso.c @@ -365,12 +365,19 @@ static int iso_connect_bis(struct sock *sk) struct iso_conn *conn; struct hci_conn *hcon; struct hci_dev *hdev; + bdaddr_t src, dst; + u8 src_type; int err; - BT_DBG("%pMR", &iso_pi(sk)->src); + lock_sock(sk); + bacpy(&src, &iso_pi(sk)->src); + bacpy(&dst, &iso_pi(sk)->dst); + src_type = iso_pi(sk)->src_type; + release_sock(sk); - hdev = hci_get_route(&iso_pi(sk)->dst, &iso_pi(sk)->src, - iso_pi(sk)->src_type); + BT_DBG("%pMR", &src); + + hdev = hci_get_route(&dst, &src, src_type); if (!hdev) return -EHOSTUNREACH; @@ -456,12 +463,19 @@ static int iso_connect_cis(struct sock *sk) struct iso_conn *conn; struct hci_conn *hcon; struct hci_dev *hdev; + bdaddr_t src, dst; + u8 src_type; int err; - BT_DBG("%pMR -> %pMR", &iso_pi(sk)->src, &iso_pi(sk)->dst); + lock_sock(sk); + bacpy(&src, &iso_pi(sk)->src); + bacpy(&dst, &iso_pi(sk)->dst); + src_type = iso_pi(sk)->src_type; + release_sock(sk); - hdev = hci_get_route(&iso_pi(sk)->dst, &iso_pi(sk)->src, - iso_pi(sk)->src_type); + BT_DBG("%pMR -> %pMR", &src, &dst); + + hdev = hci_get_route(&dst, &src, src_type); if (!hdev) return -EHOSTUNREACH; -- 2.34.1

1 0

[PATCH OLK-6.6] bpf: Copy per-CPU map value padding in copy_map_value_long()
by Pu Lehui 05 Aug '26

05 Aug '26

From: Leon Hwang <leon.hwang(a)linux.dev> maillist inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/9693 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- In kernel, per-CPU map elements are stored with round_up(map->value_size, 8) bytes. On UAPI lookup paths, it copies the rounded size for each CPU into a temporary buffer. However, copy_map_value_long() passes 'map->value_size' to bpf_obj_memcpy(). When the map has special fields, bpf_obj_memcpy() copies around those fields with memcpy(), and does not copy the tail padding between 'map->value_size' and round_up(map->value_size, 8). The temporary UAPI lookup buffers are allocated without __GFP_ZERO. As a result, when the per-CPU map's value size is not equal to round_up(map->value_size, 8), UAPI LOOKUP_ELEM and its variants can return stale heap contents from that padding to user space. The same issue applies to bpf_iter for per-CPU maps. Pass round_up(map->value_size, 8) to bpf_obj_memcpy() from copy_map_value_long(), so per-CPU maps both with and without special fields copy the entire per-CPU slot. Remove the now redundant round_up() from bpf_obj_memcpy()'s long_memcpy path. Fixes: 448325199f57 ("bpf: Add copy_map_value_long to copy to remote percpu memory") Signed-off-by: Leon Hwang <leon.hwang(a)linux.dev> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii(a)kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260624155115.85196-2-leon.hwang@linux.dev Conflicts: include/linux/bpf.h [ctx conflicts] Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui <pulehui(a)huawei.com> --- include/linux/bpf.h | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/bpf.h b/include/linux/bpf.h index c337836a6c89..cc2a0cc4b411 100644 --- a/include/linux/bpf.h +++ b/include/linux/bpf.h @@ -500,7 +500,7 @@ static inline void bpf_obj_memcpy(struct btf_record *rec, if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(rec)) { if (long_memcpy) - bpf_long_memcpy(dst, src, round_up(size, 8)); + bpf_long_memcpy(dst, src, size); else memcpy(dst, src, size); return; @@ -523,7 +523,7 @@ static inline void copy_map_value(struct bpf_map *map, void *dst, void *src) static inline void copy_map_value_long(struct bpf_map *map, void *dst, void *src) { - bpf_obj_memcpy(map->record, dst, src, map->value_size, true); + bpf_obj_memcpy(map->record, dst, src, round_up(map->value_size, 8), true); } static inline void bpf_obj_memzero(struct btf_record *rec, void *dst, u32 size) -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] l2tp: use refcount_inc_not_zero in l2tp_session_get_by_ifname
by Cui GaoSheng 05 Aug '26

05 Aug '26

From: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.12.93 commit ee80455feffb9cb62b5b58715cabeff495e666b2 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/16246 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 05f95729ca844704d15e49ce14868af4b403b32b upstream. A reader in l2tp_session_get_by_ifname() can return a pointer to a session whose refcount has reached zero. The getter takes its reference with plain refcount_inc(), but every other session getter in the same file (l2tp_v2_session_get, l2tp_v3_session_get, and the corresponding _get_next variants) uses refcount_inc_not_zero() because the IDR/RCU lookup can race with refcount_dec_and_test() -> l2tp_session_free() -> kfree_rcu(). The ifname getter is the only outlier; the inconsistency was raised on-list after 979c017803c4 ("l2tp: use list_del_rcu in l2tp_session_unhash"). A reader inside rcu_read_lock_bh() that matches session->ifname can be preempted between the strcmp() and the refcount_inc(). If the last reference drops on another CPU in that window, the reader's refcount_inc() runs on a counter that has reached zero. refcount_t catches the addition-on-zero, prints "refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free", saturates the counter, and returns the saturated pointer to the caller. Session memory is held live by the in-flight RCU read section, but the kfree_rcu() callback queued from l2tp_session_free() will free it once the grace period closes; a caller that dereferences the returned session past that point hits a slab-use-after-free. On PREEMPT_RT local_bh_disable() is a per-CPU sleeping lock and the preemption window is real; on stock PREEMPT kernels local_bh_disable() is a preempt_count increment that closes the cross-CPU race in practice (see below). Use refcount_inc_not_zero() and continue the list walk on failure, matching the other session getters in the file. The ifname getter is the only session getter in net/l2tp/ that still uses the bare refcount_inc() pattern; this change restores file-internal consistency. The success path is unchanged. Fixes: abe7a1a7d0b6 ("l2tp: improve tunnel/session refcount helpers") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: James Chapman <jchapman(a)katalix.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms(a)kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260523023423.2568972-1-michael.bommarito@gmail.c… Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Conflicts: net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c [conflicts due to not mergered prerequisites, commit abe7a1a7d0b6 ("l2tp: improve tunnel/session refcount helpers") and commit 1f4c3dce9112 ("l2tp: use get_next APIs for management requests and procfs/debugfs") and commit 8c6245af4fc5 ("l2tp: drop the now unused l2tp_tunnel_get_session") has not been merged, fixed the same issue in older versions.] Signed-off-by: Gaosheng Cui <cuigaosheng1(a)huawei.com> --- net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c | 23 ++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c b/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c index c94051239670..0a6369c70ff4 100644 --- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c +++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c @@ -256,9 +256,9 @@ struct l2tp_session *l2tp_tunnel_get_session(struct l2tp_tunnel *tunnel, rcu_read_lock_bh(); hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(session, session_list, hlist) if (session->session_id == session_id) { - l2tp_session_inc_refcount(session); + if (!refcount_inc_not_zero(&session->ref_count)) + continue; rcu_read_unlock_bh(); - return session; } rcu_read_unlock_bh(); @@ -277,9 +277,9 @@ struct l2tp_session *l2tp_session_get(const struct net *net, u32 session_id) rcu_read_lock_bh(); hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(session, session_list, global_hlist) if (session->session_id == session_id) { - l2tp_session_inc_refcount(session); + if (!refcount_inc_not_zero(&session->ref_count)) + continue; rcu_read_unlock_bh(); - return session; } rcu_read_unlock_bh(); @@ -298,7 +298,8 @@ struct l2tp_session *l2tp_session_get_nth(struct l2tp_tunnel *tunnel, int nth) for (hash = 0; hash < L2TP_HASH_SIZE; hash++) { hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(session, &tunnel->session_hlist[hash], hlist) { if (++count > nth) { - l2tp_session_inc_refcount(session); + if (!refcount_inc_not_zero(&session->ref_count)) + continue; rcu_read_unlock_bh(); return session; } @@ -324,12 +325,12 @@ struct l2tp_session *l2tp_session_get_by_ifname(const struct net *net, rcu_read_lock_bh(); for (hash = 0; hash < L2TP_HASH_SIZE_2; hash++) { hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(session, &pn->l2tp_session_hlist[hash], global_hlist) { - if (!strcmp(session->ifname, ifname)) { - l2tp_session_inc_refcount(session); - rcu_read_unlock_bh(); - - return session; - } + if (strcmp(session->ifname, ifname)) + continue; + if (!refcount_inc_not_zero(&session->ref_count)) + continue; + rcu_read_unlock_bh(); + return session; } } -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] net/mlx5e: xsk: Fix unlocked writing to ICOSQ
by Yi Yang 05 Aug '26

05 Aug '26

From: Dragos Tatulea <dtatulea(a)nvidia.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.1-rc5 commit c326f9c68921e2f14dfcecb2f6b4216313d50248 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/16531 CVE: CVE-2026-64210 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- During napi poll, when the affinity changes and there's still XSK work to be done, we trigger an ICOSQ interrupt on the new CPU. However, this triggering on the ICOSQ is done unprotected. There are 2 such races: A) mlx5e_trigger_irq() is called while mlx5e_xsk_alloc_rx_mpwqe() is running from a different CPU due to affinity change. This can happen because IRQ triggering is done after napi_complete_done(). At this point the NAPI can be scheduled on a different CPU. Like this: CPU A (old affinity, NAPI tail) CPU B (new affinity, fresh NAPI) ------------------------------- -------------------------------- napi_complete_done() clears SCHED mlx5e_cq_arm(...) napi_schedule_prep() sets SCHED mlx5e_napi_poll() mlx5e_xsk_alloc_rx_mpwqe() mlx5e_icosq_sync_lock() // noop memcpy 640 B UMR body advance sq->pc by 10 mlx5e_trigger_irq(&c->icosq) wqe_info[pi] = {NOP, 1} mlx5e_post_nop() advances sq->pc B) mlx5e_trigger_irq() is called on the ICOSQ when mlx5e_trigger_napi_icosq() is running. The obvious fix would be to lock the ICOSQ. But ICOSQ has an optimized locking scheme that doesn't work for this scenario. Kick the async ICOSQ instead which is always locked. This issue was noticed in the wild with the following splat: netdevice: ge-0-0-1: Bad OP in ICOSQ CQE: 0xd WARNING: drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_rx.c:826 [...] [...] Call Trace: <IRQ> mlx5e_napi_poll+0x11d/0x7f0 [mlx5_core] __napi_poll+0x30/0x200 ? skb_defer_free_flush+0x9c/0xc0 net_rx_action+0x2fe/0x3f0 handle_softirqs+0xd8/0x340 __irq_exit_rcu+0xbc/0xe0 common_interrupt+0x85/0xa0 </IRQ> <TASK> asm_common_interrupt+0x26/0x40 [...] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- mlx5_core 0000:08:00.0 ge-0-0-1: Error cqe on cqn 0x548, ci 0x2022, qn 0x8f4, opcode 0xd, syndrome 0x2, vendor syndrome 0x68 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00000010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00000020: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00000030: 00 00 00 00 01 00 68 02 01 00 08 f4 de 14 59 d2 WQE DUMP: WQ size 16384 WQ cur size 0, WQE index 0x1e14, len: 64 00000000: 00 00 00 01 d9 ed 80 02 00 00 00 01 d9 ed 90 02 00000010: 00 00 00 01 d9 ed a0 02 00 00 00 01 d9 ed b0 02 00000020: 00 00 00 01 d9 ed c0 02 00 00 00 01 d9 ed d0 02 00000030: 00 00 00 01 d9 ed e0 02 00 00 00 01 d9 ed f0 02 mlx5_core 0000:08:00.0 ge-0-0-1: Error cqe on cqn 0x548, ci 0x2023, qn 0x8f4, opcode 0xd, syndrome 0x5, vendor syndrome 0xf9 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00000010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00000020: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00000030: 00 00 00 00 01 00 f9 05 01 00 08 f4 de 15 cf d2 Fixes: db05815b36cb ("net/mlx5e: Add XSK zero-copy support") Reported-by: Paul Saab <ps(a)mu.org> Signed-off-by: Dragos Tatulea <dtatulea(a)nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt(a)nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms(a)kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260513064613.334602-1-tariqt@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_txrx.c [Commit 0da1dba72616 ("net/mlx5e: XSK, Fix unintended ICOSQ change") was not merged. The function mlx5e_trigger_napi_async_icosq was not introduced.] Signed-off-by: Yi Yang <yiyang13(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_txrx.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_txrx.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_txrx.c index a7d9b7cb4297..1affcf149f37 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_txrx.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_txrx.c @@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ int mlx5e_napi_poll(struct napi_struct *napi, int budget) } if (unlikely(aff_change && busy_xsk)) { - mlx5e_trigger_irq(&c->icosq); + mlx5e_trigger_napi_icosq(c); ch_stats->force_irq++; } -- 2.25.1

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[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] i2c: core: fix adapter registration race
by Zhang Yuwei 05 Aug '26

05 Aug '26

From: Johan Hovold <johan(a)kernel.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.2-rc1 commit ba14d7cf2fe7284610a29854bdff22b2537d3ce6 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/16120 CVE: CVE-2026-64279 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Adapters can be looked up by their id using i2c_get_adapter() which takes a reference to the embedded struct device. Remove the adapter from the IDR before tearing it down during deregistration (and on registration failure) to make sure its resources are not accessed after having been freed (e.g. the device name). Fixes: 35fc37f81881 ("i2c: Limit core locking to the necessary sections") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 2.6.31 Cc: Jean Delvare <khali(a)linux-fr.org> Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa+renesas(a)sang-engineering.com> Conflicts: drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c [contxt conflict] Signed-off-by: Zhang Yuwei <zhangyuwei20(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c | 10 ++++++++-- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c b/drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c index 366bd86285d6..4740119d6188 100644 --- a/drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c +++ b/drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c @@ -1284,6 +1284,9 @@ static int i2c_register_adapter(struct i2c_adapter *adap) res = device_register(&adap->dev); if (res) { pr_err("adapter '%s': can't register device (%d)\n", adap->name, res); + mutex_lock(&core_lock); + idr_replace(&i2c_adapter_idr, NULL, adap->nr); + mutex_unlock(&core_lock); goto out_list; } @@ -1323,6 +1326,9 @@ static int i2c_register_adapter(struct i2c_adapter *adap) return 0; out_reg: + mutex_lock(&core_lock); + idr_replace(&i2c_adapter_idr, NULL, adap->nr); + mutex_unlock(&core_lock); init_completion(&adap->dev_released); device_unregister(&adap->dev); wait_for_completion(&adap->dev_released); @@ -1345,7 +1351,7 @@ static int __i2c_add_numbered_adapter(struct i2c_adapter *adap) int id; mutex_lock(&core_lock); - id = idr_alloc(&i2c_adapter_idr, adap, adap->nr, adap->nr + 1, GFP_KERNEL); + id = idr_alloc(&i2c_adapter_idr, NULL, adap->nr, adap->nr + 1, GFP_KERNEL); mutex_unlock(&core_lock); if (WARN(id < 0, "couldn't get idr")) return id == -ENOSPC ? -EBUSY : id; @@ -1381,7 +1387,7 @@ int i2c_add_adapter(struct i2c_adapter *adapter) } mutex_lock(&core_lock); - id = idr_alloc(&i2c_adapter_idr, adapter, + id = idr_alloc(&i2c_adapter_idr, NULL, __i2c_first_dynamic_bus_num, 0, GFP_KERNEL); mutex_unlock(&core_lock); if (WARN(id < 0, "couldn't get idr")) -- 2.22.0

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[PATCH OLK-5.10] crypto: qat - protect service table iterations with service_lock
by Cai Xinchen 05 Aug '26

05 Aug '26

From: Ahsan Atta <ahsan.atta(a)intel.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.2-rc1 commit 5c6f845e77ec35f9b7b047cc8f9789bf397cdd3e category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/16601 CVE: CVE-2026-64305 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- The service_table list is protected by service_lock when entries are added or removed (in adf_service_add() and adf_service_remove()), but several functions iterate over the list without holding this lock. A concurrent adf_service_register() or adf_service_unregister() call could modify the list during traversal, leading to list corruption or a use-after-free. Fix this by holding service_lock across all list_for_each_entry() iterations of service_table in adf_dev_init(), adf_dev_start(), adf_dev_stop(), adf_dev_shutdown(), adf_dev_restarting_notify(), adf_dev_restarted_notify(), and adf_error_notifier(). The lock ordering is safe: callers of the static helpers (adf_dev_up() and adf_dev_down()) acquire state_lock before service_lock, and no event_hld callback or service_lock holder ever acquires state_lock in the reverse order. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: d8cba25d2c68 ("crypto: qat - Intel(R) QAT driver framework") Signed-off-by: Ahsan Atta <ahsan.atta(a)intel.com> Co-developed-by: Maksim Lukoshkov <maksim.lukoshkov(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Maksim Lukoshkov <maksim.lukoshkov(a)intel.com> Reviewed-by: Giovanni Cabiddu <giovanni.cabiddu(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au> Conflicts: drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_init.c [There is no adf_error_notifier in 5.10 and file is drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_init.c instead of drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_init.c] Signed-off-by: Cai Xinchen <caixinchen1(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_init.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_init.c b/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_init.c index 5c78433d19d4..59dfde7f761b 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_init.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_init.c @@ -116,16 +116,19 @@ int adf_dev_init(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev) * This is to facilitate any ordering dependencies between services * prior to starting any of the accelerators. */ + mutex_lock(&service_lock); list_for_each(list_itr, &service_table) { service = list_entry(list_itr, struct service_hndl, list); if (service->event_hld(accel_dev, ADF_EVENT_INIT)) { dev_err(&GET_DEV(accel_dev), "Failed to initialise service %s\n", service->name); + mutex_unlock(&service_lock); return -EFAULT; } set_bit(accel_dev->accel_id, service->init_status); } + mutex_unlock(&service_lock); hw_data->enable_error_correction(accel_dev); ret = hw_data->enable_vf2pf_comms(accel_dev); @@ -163,16 +166,19 @@ int adf_dev_start(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev) return -EFAULT; } + mutex_lock(&service_lock); list_for_each(list_itr, &service_table) { service = list_entry(list_itr, struct service_hndl, list); if (service->event_hld(accel_dev, ADF_EVENT_START)) { dev_err(&GET_DEV(accel_dev), "Failed to start service %s\n", service->name); + mutex_unlock(&service_lock); return -EFAULT; } set_bit(accel_dev->accel_id, service->start_status); } + mutex_unlock(&service_lock); clear_bit(ADF_STATUS_STARTING, &accel_dev->status); set_bit(ADF_STATUS_STARTED, &accel_dev->status); @@ -218,6 +224,7 @@ void adf_dev_stop(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev) qat_asym_algs_unregister(); } + mutex_lock(&service_lock); list_for_each(list_itr, &service_table) { service = list_entry(list_itr, struct service_hndl, list); if (!test_bit(accel_dev->accel_id, service->start_status)) @@ -230,6 +237,7 @@ void adf_dev_stop(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev) clear_bit(accel_dev->accel_id, service->start_status); } } + mutex_unlock(&service_lock); if (wait) msleep(100); @@ -276,6 +284,7 @@ void adf_dev_shutdown(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev) &accel_dev->status); } + mutex_lock(&service_lock); list_for_each(list_itr, &service_table) { service = list_entry(list_itr, struct service_hndl, list); if (!test_bit(accel_dev->accel_id, service->init_status)) @@ -287,6 +296,7 @@ void adf_dev_shutdown(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev) else clear_bit(accel_dev->accel_id, service->init_status); } + mutex_unlock(&service_lock); hw_data->disable_iov(accel_dev); @@ -315,6 +325,7 @@ int adf_dev_restarting_notify(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev) struct service_hndl *service; struct list_head *list_itr; + mutex_lock(&service_lock); list_for_each(list_itr, &service_table) { service = list_entry(list_itr, struct service_hndl, list); if (service->event_hld(accel_dev, ADF_EVENT_RESTARTING)) @@ -322,6 +333,7 @@ int adf_dev_restarting_notify(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev) "Failed to restart service %s.\n", service->name); } + mutex_unlock(&service_lock); return 0; } @@ -330,6 +342,7 @@ int adf_dev_restarted_notify(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev) struct service_hndl *service; struct list_head *list_itr; + mutex_lock(&service_lock); list_for_each(list_itr, &service_table) { service = list_entry(list_itr, struct service_hndl, list); if (service->event_hld(accel_dev, ADF_EVENT_RESTARTED)) @@ -337,5 +350,6 @@ int adf_dev_restarted_notify(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev) "Failed to restart service %s.\n", service->name); } + mutex_unlock(&service_lock); return 0; } -- 2.18.0.huawei.25

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[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] fix amdgpu_hmm_range_get_pages
by Jiacheng Yu 05 Aug '26

05 Aug '26

fix amdgpu_hmm_range_get_pages Christian König (1): drm/amdgpu: fix amdgpu_hmm_range_get_pages Honglei Huang (1): drm/amdgpu: drop retry loop in amdgpu_hmm_range_get_pages drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_hmm.c | 30 +++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH OLK-6.6] apparmor: advertise the tcp fast open fix is applied
by Lu Jialin 05 Aug '26

05 Aug '26

From: John Johansen <john.johansen(a)canonical.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.145 commit 42726c616d958ca379cb47f97c63e76c2dc5b739 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/16157 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 2f6701a5ce6257ae7a64ddc6d89d0a08d2a034f8 ] The fix for tcp-fast-open ensures that the connect permission is being mediated correctly but it didn't add an artifact to the feature set to advertise the fix is available. Add an artifact so that the test suite can identify if the fix has not been properly applied or a new unexpected regression has occurred. Fixes: 4d587cd8a7215 ("apparmor: mediate the implicit connect of TCP fast open sendmsg") Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen(a)canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lu Jialin <lujialin4(a)huawei.com> --- security/apparmor/net.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/security/apparmor/net.c b/security/apparmor/net.c index 814e8319d43e..d1ded97612c6 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/net.c +++ b/security/apparmor/net.c @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_network[] = { AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("af_mask", AA_SFS_AF_MASK), + AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("tcp-fast-open", 1), { } }; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] nbd: skip the capacity-change printk on device bringup and release
by Yang Erkun 05 Aug '26

05 Aug '26

hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/9724 ---------------------------------------- Before commit 2ebcabf3dba5 ("nbd: use set_capacity_and_notify"), nbd setup called nbd_set_size() to update the size and did not print "detected capacity change". On the release path nbd_config_put() calls invalidate_disk(), which calls set_capacity(), and that path did not print either. For a genuine size change like size1 -> size2 this printk should remain, but for nbd setup or release it should not be printed, especially since it adds latency to the setup path. Skip set_capacity_and_notify() and use the silent set_capacity() when either side of the change is 0, i.e. on bringup (0 -> size) . Runtime resizes keep set_capacity_and_notify() for the message and uevent, and the explicit kobject_uevent() preserves a uevent on every call as blktests expects. Fixes: 2ebcabf3dba5 ("nbd: use set_capacity_and_notify") Signed-off-by: Yang Erkun <yangerkun(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/block/nbd.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/block/nbd.c b/drivers/block/nbd.c index f9b51b09730a..be2191f7c4c1 100644 --- a/drivers/block/nbd.c +++ b/drivers/block/nbd.c @@ -355,7 +355,11 @@ static int nbd_set_size(struct nbd_device *nbd, loff_t bytesize, if (max_part) set_bit(GD_NEED_PART_SCAN, &nbd->disk->state); - if (!set_capacity_and_notify(nbd->disk, bytesize >> 9)) + /* Avoid the capacity-change printk on probe (0 -> size) */ + if (!get_capacity(nbd->disk)) { + set_capacity(nbd->disk, bytesize >> 9); + kobject_uevent(&nbd_to_dev(nbd)->kobj, KOBJ_CHANGE); + } else if (!set_capacity_and_notify(nbd->disk, bytesize >> 9)) kobject_uevent(&nbd_to_dev(nbd)->kobj, KOBJ_CHANGE); return 0; } -- 2.52.0

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[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] *** CVE-2026-64513 ***
by Zhang Kunbo 05 Aug '26

05 Aug '26

*** BLURB HERE *** Carlos López (1): KVM: x86: Unconditionally recompute CR8 intercept on PPR update Sean Christopherson (1): KVM: x86: Move update_cr8_intercept() to lapic.c arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/lapic.h | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 35 ++--------------------------------- 3 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

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