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[PATCH OLK-5.10] audit: avoid dropping live tree ref on fsnotify rule autoremove
by Yi Yang 22 Sep '26

22 Sep '26

From: Jérémy Jean <Jeremy.Jean(a)oss.cyber.gouv.fr> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.270 commit 9cac21f8eb82675ed19fb955b8bbb9dd14cc3d58 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/18926 CVE: CVE-2026-89643 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 783f0f0974c156aca630f4ffff248671082a098d upstream. audit_del_rule() is used for both netlink deletion templates and internal fsnotify autoremove. The former passes a parsed template which owns a temporary tree reference; the latter passes the installed entry itself. The unconditional audit_put_tree() at the end of audit_del_rule() assumes the template case. For mixed AUDIT_DIR plus AUDIT_EXE rules, an fsnotify autoremove event therefore drops the installed rule's live tree reference. Repeating this across rules sharing the same tree can free the tree while another rule still references it, and a later autoremove dereferences the freed pathname while comparing rules. Move the temporary-tree put to audit_rule_change(), the caller that owns deletion templates. Keep it in the AUDIT_DEL_RULE cleanup so both successful deletion and -ENOENT still release the parser-owned tree. Cc: stable(a)kernel.org Fixes: 34d99af52ad4 ("audit: implement audit by executable") Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5 Signed-off-by: Jérémy Jean <Jeremy.Jean(a)oss.cyber.gouv.fr> Reviewed-by: Ricardo Robaina <rrobaina(a)redhat.com> Tested-by: Ricardo Robaina <rrobaina(a)redhat.com> [PM: dropped unnecessary comment for line length reasons] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Yi Yang <yiyang13(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/auditfilter.c | 6 ++---- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c index a5b43f25609e..decdc01351cb 100644 --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c @@ -1014,7 +1014,6 @@ static inline int audit_add_rule(struct audit_entry *entry) int audit_del_rule(struct audit_entry *entry) { struct audit_entry *e; - struct audit_tree *tree = entry->rule.tree; struct list_head *list; int ret = 0; #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL @@ -1060,9 +1059,6 @@ int audit_del_rule(struct audit_entry *entry) out: mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex); - if (tree) - audit_put_tree(tree); /* that's the temporary one */ - return ret; } @@ -1147,6 +1143,8 @@ int audit_rule_change(int type, int seq, void *data, size_t datasz) } if (err || type == AUDIT_DEL_RULE) { + if (type == AUDIT_DEL_RULE && entry->rule.tree) + audit_put_tree(entry->rule.tree); if (entry->rule.exe) audit_remove_mark(entry->rule.exe); audit_free_rule(entry); -- 2.25.1

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[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] audit: avoid dropping live tree ref on fsnotify rule autoremove
by Yi Yang 21 Sep '26

21 Sep '26

From: Jérémy Jean <Jeremy.Jean(a)oss.cyber.gouv.fr> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.3-rc1 commit 783f0f0974c156aca630f4ffff248671082a098d category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/18926 CVE: CVE-2026-89643 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- audit_del_rule() is used for both netlink deletion templates and internal fsnotify autoremove. The former passes a parsed template which owns a temporary tree reference; the latter passes the installed entry itself. The unconditional audit_put_tree() at the end of audit_del_rule() assumes the template case. For mixed AUDIT_DIR plus AUDIT_EXE rules, an fsnotify autoremove event therefore drops the installed rule's live tree reference. Repeating this across rules sharing the same tree can free the tree while another rule still references it, and a later autoremove dereferences the freed pathname while comparing rules. Move the temporary-tree put to audit_rule_change(), the caller that owns deletion templates. Keep it in the AUDIT_DEL_RULE cleanup so both successful deletion and -ENOENT still release the parser-owned tree. Cc: stable(a)kernel.org Fixes: 34d99af52ad4 ("audit: implement audit by executable") Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5 Signed-off-by: Jérémy Jean <Jeremy.Jean(a)oss.cyber.gouv.fr> Reviewed-by: Ricardo Robaina <rrobaina(a)redhat.com> Tested-by: Ricardo Robaina <rrobaina(a)redhat.com> [PM: dropped unnecessary comment for line length reasons] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Yi Yang <yiyang13(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/auditfilter.c | 6 ++---- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c index b2cc63ca0068..93b0d459db59 100644 --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c @@ -1009,7 +1009,6 @@ static inline int audit_add_rule(struct audit_entry *entry) int audit_del_rule(struct audit_entry *entry) { struct audit_entry *e; - struct audit_tree *tree = entry->rule.tree; struct list_head *list; int ret = 0; #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL @@ -1055,9 +1054,6 @@ int audit_del_rule(struct audit_entry *entry) out: mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex); - if (tree) - audit_put_tree(tree); /* that's the temporary one */ - return ret; } @@ -1142,6 +1138,8 @@ int audit_rule_change(int type, int seq, void *data, size_t datasz) } if (err || type == AUDIT_DEL_RULE) { + if (type == AUDIT_DEL_RULE && entry->rule.tree) + audit_put_tree(entry->rule.tree); if (entry->rule.exe) audit_remove_mark(entry->rule.exe); audit_free_rule(entry); -- 2.25.1

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[PATCH OLK-5.10] apparmor: fix out-of-bounds write when null terminating a label vec
by Yi Yang 21 Sep '26

21 Sep '26

From: Hyunwoo Kim <imv4bel(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.3-rc1 commit 9f1e40193eef7f047e6b77cfb4b4cafdecd7a123 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/18781 CVE: CVE-2026-89761 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- aa_vec_unique() null terminates at vec[n - dups] when VEC_FLAG_TERMINATE is passed. If the components are all distinct no duplicates are dropped, dups is 0 and the terminator goes to vec[n], so the caller has to provide room for n + 1 entries. aa_label_strn_parse() sets up its vector with vec_setup(profile, vec, len, gfp) and then calls aa_vec_unique(vec, len, VEC_FLAG_TERMINATE), but vec_setup() does not reserve the terminator entry. Up to LOCAL_VEC_ENTRIES it uses the local array of LOCAL_VEC_ENTRIES pointers, above that it allocates exactly len pointers. The terminator therefore lands one entry past the end of the local array when len is LOCAL_VEC_ENTRIES, and one entry past the end of the allocation when len is larger. len comes from the number of "//&" separated components in the label name and label_count_strn_entries() does not bound it. An unprivileged task reaches the parse by writing to /proc/self/attr/apparmor/current or through lsm_set_self_attr(2), both of which go through do_setattr(), and the name is parsed before the change_profile permission is checked. The query_label() path behind the securityfs .access file, which is mode 0666, performs no permission check at all. Every component has to resolve to a loaded profile, so a system with policy loaded is required. The other two VEC_FLAG_TERMINATE users work on a label vec that aa_label_alloc() has already sized with "+ 1 for null terminator entry on vec". Reserve the same entry in vec_setup() and DEFINE_VEC(). Passing len + 1 from the caller instead would move len == LOCAL_VEC_ENTRIES out of the local array and into kzalloc(). Fixes: f1bd904175e8 ("apparmor: add the base fns() for domain labels") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Hyunwoo Kim <imv4bel(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen(a)canonical.com> Conflicts: security/apparmor/include/label.h [Commit 9f1e40193eef uses kzalloc_objs() for the terminator-sized allocation; that helper does not exist in this tree, so use the equivalent kcalloc().] Signed-off-by: Yi Yang <yiyang13(a)huawei.com> --- security/apparmor/include/label.h | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/label.h b/security/apparmor/include/label.h index 55986388dfae..ab223efadd83 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/label.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/label.h @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ struct aa_ns; #define LOCAL_VEC_ENTRIES 8 #define DEFINE_VEC(T, V) \ - struct aa_ ## T *(_ ## V ## _localtmp)[LOCAL_VEC_ENTRIES]; \ + struct aa_ ## T *(_ ## V ## _localtmp)[LOCAL_VEC_ENTRIES + 1]; \ struct aa_ ## T **(V) #define vec_setup(T, V, N, GFP) \ @@ -30,10 +30,10 @@ struct aa_ns; if ((N) <= LOCAL_VEC_ENTRIES) { \ typeof(N) i; \ (V) = (_ ## V ## _localtmp); \ - for (i = 0; i < (N); i++) \ + for (i = 0; i <= (N); i++) \ (V)[i] = NULL; \ } else \ - (V) = kzalloc(sizeof(struct aa_ ## T *) * (N), (GFP)); \ + (V) = kcalloc((N) + 1, sizeof(struct aa_ ## T *), (GFP));\ (V) ? 0 : -ENOMEM; \ }) -- 2.25.1

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[PATCH OLK-5.10] mm: memcg: stop reclaim when a limit update is superseded
by Yi Yang 21 Sep '26

21 Sep '26

From: Guopeng Zhang <zhangguopeng(a)kylinos.cn> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.270 commit ebf762a393630d1582645be3f0fc22a674eb9122 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/18797 CVE: CVE-2026-89752 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 9477820c63cbf4d97114238f3d1ff10dfd6bee3f upstream. kernfs serializes file operations only per open file, so separate open files can update the same memory.high or memory.max file concurrently. Both handlers store the new limit before synchronous reclaim, but continue to use the writer's local target in the reclaim loop. If another writer raises or removes the limit, the first writer can continue reclaiming toward a stale target. For memory.max, this can leave the writer looping indefinitely once reclaim retries are exhausted. The OOM path sees sufficient margin under the current limit and returns true without killing, while the writer still compares usage against its stale target and records another OOM event. Check the current limit at the start of each reclaim iteration and stop if it no longer matches the writer's target. Reproducer: Populate a cgroup with anonymous memory and disable swapping. Lower memory.max from one open file, then restore it to "max" through another open file after the new limit becomes visible. Without the patch, the first writer remains blocked and repeatedly increments the OOM event counter. With the patch, it returns normally. This was not motivated by a reported production workload. We found it through automated randomized testing for our cgroup observability work and reduced it to the reproducer above. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260724021805.1234583-1-guopeng.zhang@linux.dev Fixes: 8c8c383c04f6 ("mm: memcontrol: try harder to set a new memory.high") Fixes: b6e6edcfa405 ("mm: memcontrol: reclaim and OOM kill when shrinking memory.max below usage") Signed-off-by: Guopeng Zhang <zhangguopeng(a)kylinos.cn> Acked-by: Tao Cui <cuitao(a)kylinos.cn> Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes(a)cmpxchg.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko(a)kernel.org> Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song(a)linux.dev> Cc: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin(a)linux.dev> Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeel.butt(a)linux.dev> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Yi Yang <yiyang13(a)huawei.com> --- mm/memcontrol.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/mm/memcontrol.c b/mm/memcontrol.c index fc7f211bcdc7..eeaa0cd57927 100644 --- a/mm/memcontrol.c +++ b/mm/memcontrol.c @@ -5643,6 +5643,9 @@ static ssize_t memory_high_write(struct kernfs_open_file *of, unsigned long nr_pages = page_counter_read(&memcg->memory); unsigned long reclaimed; + if (high != READ_ONCE(memcg->memory.high)) + break; + if (nr_pages <= high) break; @@ -7544,6 +7547,9 @@ static ssize_t memory_max_write(struct kernfs_open_file *of, for (;;) { unsigned long nr_pages = page_counter_read(&memcg->memory); + if (max != READ_ONCE(memcg->memory.max)) + break; + if (nr_pages <= max) break; -- 2.25.1

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[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] CVE-2026-90036 and CVE-2026-90037
by Yifan Qiao 21 Sep '26

21 Sep '26

Chuck Lever (2): NFSD: Prevent client use-after-free during blocked-lock reaping NFSD: Prevent client use-after-free during close_lru reaping fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c | 52 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 49 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) -- 2.52.0

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[PATCH OLK-6.6] LoongArch: Avoid preempt count underflow without probe
by Tengda Wu 21 Sep '26

21 Sep '26

From: Jérémy Jean <Jeremy.Jean(a)oss.cyber.gouv.fr> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.157 commit ff40e597d5d98c0c45a4d09df8177202fac9520e category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitcode.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/19585 CVE: CVE-2026-89902 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 72ce4b24676e8b3b75376c4c559dd81c1ac52d5a upstream. LoongArch uses break 11 for the breakpoint placed after an instruction that Kprobes executes out of line. Since userspace can issue the same break instruction, do_bp() can reach kprobe_singlestep_handler() when there is no current probe. The handler actually returns false in this case, but it first calls preempt_enable_no_resched(). The corresponding preempt_disable() is done by kprobe_breakpoint_handler() on a real Kprobe hit, so it has not run here. As a result, an ordinary userspace breakpoint (code 11) underflows the current task's preempt count. This also makes in_interrupt() return true until the task schedules. One visible consequence is the socket cgroup attribution: cgroup_sk_alloc() treats the allocation as interrupt context and assigns the socket to the root cgroup. A socket opened from the SIGTRAP handler can then avoid a BPF_CGROUP_INET_SOCK_CREATE policy attached to the task's own cgroup. Return as soon as kprobe_running() reports no active probe. The same check has appeared in [PATCH v10 2/4] of the original LoongArch Kprobes series, but was dropped before the feature reached mainline. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 6d4cc40fb5f5 ("LoongArch: Add kprobes support") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/loongarch/1670575981-14389-3-git-send-email-yangtie… Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5 Signed-off-by: Jérémy Jean <Jeremy.Jean(a)oss.cyber.gouv.fr> Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai(a)loongson.cn> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Tengda Wu <wutengda2(a)huawei.com> --- arch/loongarch/kernel/kprobes.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/loongarch/kernel/kprobes.c b/arch/loongarch/kernel/kprobes.c index ea98b6a3e201..3e87bd03f3f7 100644 --- a/arch/loongarch/kernel/kprobes.c +++ b/arch/loongarch/kernel/kprobes.c @@ -273,6 +273,9 @@ bool kprobe_singlestep_handler(struct pt_regs *regs) struct kprobe_ctlblk *kcb = get_kprobe_ctlblk(); unsigned long addr = instruction_pointer(regs); + if (!cur) + return false; + if (cur && (kcb->kprobe_status & (KPROBE_HIT_SS | KPROBE_REENTER)) && ((unsigned long)&cur->ainsn.insn[1] == addr)) { restore_local_irqflag(kcb, regs); -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH OLK-5.10] bpf: Fix vmlinux BTF prep race in bpf_get_btf_vmlinux
by Tengda Wu 21 Sep '26

21 Sep '26

From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.270 commit f32a4a40bc635be25d6816da4bd91e9e58c31bf3 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/19531 CVE: CVE-2026-93138 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 92863e678070f57c17c868e4bfa2441a5c61ad2b ] bpf_get_btf_vmlinux() lazily parses the vmlinux BTF under the bpf_verifier_lock, but publishes the result through a plain store and re-checks it through a plain lockless load. Nothing orders the stores initializing the struct btf inside btf_parse_vmlinux() against the store publishing the pointer: On a weakly ordered arch, a concurrent first-time caller taking the lockless fast path could in principle observe the pointer before the parsed contents are visible. The mutex_unlock() does not help such a reader given it only synchronizes with a later acquisition of the same lock. Thus, publish the pointer with smp_store_release() and read it on the fast path with smp_load_acquire(). Acquire semantics are needed rather than a dependency-ordered READ_ONCE(): btf_parse_vmlinux() also populates globals outside the returned object (e.g. bpf_ctx_convert.t). An address dependency would only order accesses performed through the pointer and not cover other globals. Fixes: 8580ac9404f6 ("bpf: Process in-kernel BTF") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260708211537.371874-2-daniel@iogearbox.net Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Tengda Wu <wutengda2(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 2fb5692fed7d..d75b3aa76dfc 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -12874,13 +12874,25 @@ static int check_attach_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) struct btf *bpf_get_btf_vmlinux(void) { - if (!btf_vmlinux && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF)) { + /* Pairs with the smp_store_release() on the parse path below. */ + struct btf *btf = smp_load_acquire(&btf_vmlinux); + + if (!btf && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF)) { mutex_lock(&bpf_verifier_lock); - if (!btf_vmlinux) - btf_vmlinux = btf_parse_vmlinux(); + btf = btf_vmlinux; + if (!btf) { + btf = btf_parse_vmlinux(); + /* + * Order the parsed BTF contents and the globals the + * parse populated (e.g. bpf_ctx_convert.t) before + * the pointer publication. Pairs with the acquire + * on the lockless fast path above. + */ + smp_store_release(&btf_vmlinux, btf); + } mutex_unlock(&bpf_verifier_lock); } - return btf_vmlinux; + return btf; } int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr, -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH OLK-5.10] hfsplus: validate thread record before delete key rebuild
by Tengda Wu 21 Sep '26

21 Sep '26

From: Kyle Zeng <kylebot(a)openai.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.270 commit 33cda0036bc683fc888c20b04a5fc030e3e8413b category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/19167 CVE: CVE-2026-93095 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit e2ea5cac61acfc11dad22f1d2d4bc71d56c52a20 ] hfsplus_delete_cat() is called with str == NULL when the last open reference to an unlinked HFS+ hardlink backing inode is closed. In that case, the function finds the catalog thread by CNID and rebuilds the catalog key from thread.nodeName. That reconstruction path reads thread.nodeName.length directly from the catalog B-tree into fd.search_key and then copies length * 2 bytes into fd.search_key->cat.name.unicode. It does not first check that the found record is a thread record or that its size matches the thread name. A corrupted image can therefore provide an oversized thread name length and make hfs_bnode_read() write past the catalog search-key allocation. Read the CNID record through hfsplus_brec_read_cat(), which bounds the record read to sizeof(hfsplus_cat_entry) and verifies that a thread record's size exactly matches nodeName.length. Together, these checks ensure an accepted thread name fits HFSPLUS_MAX_STRLEN. Reject non-thread records before building the delete key from the validated thread name. Share the thread-record-type helper between hfsplus_find_cat() and hfsplus_delete_cat(). Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.6 Signed-off-by: Kyle Zeng <kylebot(a)openai.com> Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava(a)dubeyko.com> Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava(a)dubeyko.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260709010203.49664-1-kylebot@openai.com Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava(a)dubeyko.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Tengda Wu <wutengda2(a)huawei.com> --- fs/hfsplus/catalog.c | 25 ++++++++++++------------- fs/hfsplus/hfsplus_fs.h | 6 ++++++ 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/hfsplus/catalog.c b/fs/hfsplus/catalog.c index 136aa1017af2..9a82bdf4caf2 100644 --- a/fs/hfsplus/catalog.c +++ b/fs/hfsplus/catalog.c @@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ int hfsplus_find_cat(struct super_block *sb, u32 cnid, return err; type = be16_to_cpu(tmp.type); - if (type != HFSPLUS_FOLDER_THREAD && type != HFSPLUS_FILE_THREAD) { + if (!is_hfs_thread_record_type(type)) { pr_err("found bad thread record in catalog\n"); return -EIO; } @@ -350,23 +350,22 @@ int hfsplus_delete_cat(u32 cnid, struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *str) goto out; if (!str) { - int len; + hfsplus_cat_entry entry = {0}; hfsplus_cat_build_key_with_cnid(sb, fd.search_key, cnid); - err = hfs_brec_find(&fd, hfs_find_rec_by_key); + err = hfsplus_brec_read_cat(&fd, &entry); if (err) goto out; - off = fd.entryoffset + - offsetof(struct hfsplus_cat_thread, nodeName); - fd.search_key->cat.parent = cpu_to_be32(dir->i_ino); - hfs_bnode_read(fd.bnode, - &fd.search_key->cat.name.length, off, 2); - len = be16_to_cpu(fd.search_key->cat.name.length) * 2; - hfs_bnode_read(fd.bnode, - &fd.search_key->cat.name.unicode, - off + 2, len); - fd.search_key->key_len = cpu_to_be16(6 + len); + type = be16_to_cpu(entry.type); + if (!is_hfs_thread_record_type(type)) { + pr_err("found bad thread record in catalog\n"); + err = -EIO; + goto out; + } + + hfsplus_cat_build_key_uni(fd.search_key, dir->i_ino, + &entry.thread.nodeName); } else { err = hfsplus_cat_build_key(sb, fd.search_key, dir->i_ino, str); if (unlikely(err)) diff --git a/fs/hfsplus/hfsplus_fs.h b/fs/hfsplus/hfsplus_fs.h index 239e8cfb0314..a572ea1869d6 100644 --- a/fs/hfsplus/hfsplus_fs.h +++ b/fs/hfsplus/hfsplus_fs.h @@ -547,6 +547,12 @@ static inline u32 hfsplus_cat_thread_size(const struct hfsplus_cat_thread *threa be16_to_cpu(thread->nodeName.length) * sizeof(hfsplus_unichr); } +static inline +bool is_hfs_thread_record_type(u16 type) +{ + return type == HFSPLUS_FOLDER_THREAD || type == HFSPLUS_FILE_THREAD; +} + int hfsplus_brec_read_cat(struct hfs_find_data *fd, hfsplus_cat_entry *entry); /* -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH OLK-6.6 00/14] backport cpufreq patches from linux mainline on September 21th.
by Lifeng Zheng 21 Sep '26

21 Sep '26

From: Hongye Lin <linhongye(a)h-partners.com> driver inclusion category: feature bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/9163 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- backport cpufreq patches from linux mainline on September 21th. Lifeng Zheng (14): ACPI: CPPC: Add IS_OPTIONAL_CPC_REG macro to judge if a cpc_reg is optional ACPI: CPPC: Optimize cppc_get_perf() ACPI: CPPC: Rename cppc_get_perf() to cppc_get_reg_val() ACPI: CPPC: Extract cppc_get_reg_val_in_pcc() ACPI: CPPC: Add cppc_set_reg_val() ACPI: CPPC: Refactor register value get and set ABIs ACPI: CPPC: Prepare cpc_register_resource for Package-type entries ACPI: CPPC: Refactor element parsing into parse_cpc_element() ACPI: CPPC: Refactor resource cleanup into free_reg_resource() ACPI: CPPC: Parse Resource Priority Register entries from _CPC package ACPI: CPPC: Store optional flag in cpc_register_resource ACPI: CPPC: Factor out cpc_read_reg() and cpc_write_reg() ACPI: CPPC: Add Resource Priority accessors cpufreq: cppc: Expose Resource Priority attributes via sysfs drivers/acpi/cppc_acpi.c | 894 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- drivers/cpufreq/cppc_cpufreq.c | 281 ++++++++++- include/acpi/cppc_acpi.h | 61 +++ 3 files changed, 1010 insertions(+), 226 deletions(-) -- 2.33.0

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[PATCH OLK-6.6] powerpc/kexec_file: Prevent kexec range truncation
by Tengda Wu 21 Sep '26

21 Sep '26

From: Jinjie Ruan <ruanjinjie(a)huawei.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.3-rc1 commit fa40f9dbdd4af53e7445d9135b5b207eb8adf372 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/19096 CVE: CVE-2026-89962 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Sashiko AI review pointed out the following issue. The __merge_memory_ranges() function incorrectly handles overlapping memory ranges when merging them. Although sort_memory_ranges() sorts all ranges by their start address in ascending order beforehand, the merge logic remains defective in two ways: 1. It compares the current range's start against the previous element (i-1) instead of the running target index (idx) 2. It unconditionally overwrites 'ranges[idx].end' with 'ranges[i].end'. This logic flaw leads to critical memory truncation when a larger memory range completely subsumes subsequent smaller ranges. For example, consider a sorted input array with three ranges: Range A (idx=0): [0x1000 - 0x9000] Range B (i=1): [0x2000 - 0x5000] (completely inside Range A) Range C (i=2): [0x6000 - 0x8000] (completely inside Range A) 1. When i=1 (Range B): ranges[1].start (0x2000) <= ranges[0].end + 1 (0x9001) is TRUE. The code executes: ranges[0].end = ranges[1].end, which erroneously shrinks Range A's end from 0x9000 down to 0x5000. 2. When i=2 (Range C): ranges[2].start (0x6000) <= ranges[1].end + 1 (0x5001) is FALSE. The code falls into the else block, creating a broken new range. As a result, valid memory fragments [0x5001 - 0x5fff] and [0x8001 - 0x9000] are completely lost from the kexec exclude lists, potentially allowing the crash kernel to overwrite active memory, causing data corruption or crashes. Fix this by ensuring the start of the current range is compared against the end of the active merged range (idx), and use max() to safely prevent the outer boundary from being truncated. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 180adfc532a8 ("powerpc/kexec_file: Add helper functions for getting memory ranges") Signed-off-by: Jinjie Ruan <ruanjinjie(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Sourabh Jain <sourabhjain(a)linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy(a)linux.ibm.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260729012948.2797865-4-ruanjinjie@huawei.com Conflicts: arch/powerpc/kexec/ranges.c [Context conflict] Signed-off-by: Tengda Wu <wutengda2(a)huawei.com> --- arch/powerpc/kexec/ranges.c | 12 +++++------- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kexec/ranges.c b/arch/powerpc/kexec/ranges.c index fb3e12f15214..ef025eea27e8 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kexec/ranges.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/kexec/ranges.c @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ #include <linux/kexec.h> #include <linux/of.h> #include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/minmax.h> #include <asm/sections.h> #include <asm/kexec_ranges.h> @@ -101,19 +102,16 @@ static void __merge_memory_ranges(struct crash_mem *mem_rngs) struct range *ranges; int i, idx; - if (!mem_rngs) + if (!mem_rngs || mem_rngs->nr_ranges <= 1) return; idx = 0; - ranges = &(mem_rngs->ranges[0]); + ranges = mem_rngs->ranges; for (i = 1; i < mem_rngs->nr_ranges; i++) { - if (ranges[i].start <= (ranges[i-1].end + 1)) - ranges[idx].end = ranges[i].end; + if (ranges[i].start <= (ranges[idx].end + 1)) + ranges[idx].end = max(ranges[idx].end, ranges[i].end); else { idx++; - if (i == idx) - continue; - ranges[idx] = ranges[i]; } } -- 2.34.1

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