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[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP2] bpf: Check rcu_read_lock_trace_held() before calling bpf map helpers
by Guo Mengqi 14 May '24

14 May '24
From: Hou Tao <houtao1(a)huawei.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.8-rc1 commit 169410eba271afc9f0fb476d996795aa26770c6d category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9BV4S CVE: CVE-2023-52621 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- These three bpf_map_{lookup,update,delete}_elem() helpers are also available for sleepable bpf program, so add the corresponding lock assertion for sleepable bpf program, otherwise the following warning will be reported when a sleepable bpf program manipulates bpf map under interpreter mode (aka bpf_jit_enable=0): WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 4985 at kernel/bpf/helpers.c:40 ...... CPU: 3 PID: 4985 Comm: test_progs Not tainted 6.6.0+ #2 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996) ...... RIP: 0010:bpf_map_lookup_elem+0x54/0x60 ...... Call Trace: <TASK> ? __warn+0xa5/0x240 ? bpf_map_lookup_elem+0x54/0x60 ? report_bug+0x1ba/0x1f0 ? handle_bug+0x40/0x80 ? exc_invalid_op+0x18/0x50 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1b/0x20 ? __pfx_bpf_map_lookup_elem+0x10/0x10 ? rcu_lockdep_current_cpu_online+0x65/0xb0 ? rcu_is_watching+0x23/0x50 ? bpf_map_lookup_elem+0x54/0x60 ? __pfx_bpf_map_lookup_elem+0x10/0x10 ___bpf_prog_run+0x513/0x3b70 __bpf_prog_run32+0x9d/0xd0 ? __bpf_prog_enter_sleepable_recur+0xad/0x120 ? __bpf_prog_enter_sleepable_recur+0x3e/0x120 bpf_trampoline_6442580665+0x4d/0x1000 __x64_sys_getpgid+0x5/0x30 ? do_syscall_64+0x36/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76 </TASK> Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1(a)huawei.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231204140425.1480317-2-houtao@huaweicloud.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: kernel/bpf/helpers.c Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui <pulehui(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/bpf/helpers.c | 11 ++++++----- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/helpers.c b/kernel/bpf/helpers.c index 6cbf82ca33f2..5836d1828ad7 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/helpers.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/helpers.c @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ #include <linux/pid_namespace.h> #include <linux/proc_ns.h> #include <linux/security.h> +#include <linux/rcupdate_trace.h> #include "../../lib/kstrtox.h" @@ -24,12 +25,12 @@ * * Different map implementations will rely on rcu in map methods * lookup/update/delete, therefore eBPF programs must run under rcu lock - * if program is allowed to access maps, so check rcu_read_lock_held in - * all three functions. + * if program is allowed to access maps, so check rcu_read_lock_held() or + * rcu_read_lock_trace_held() in all three functions. */ BPF_CALL_2(bpf_map_lookup_elem, struct bpf_map *, map, void *, key) { - WARN_ON_ONCE(!rcu_read_lock_held()); + WARN_ON_ONCE(!rcu_read_lock_held() && !rcu_read_lock_trace_held()); return (unsigned long) map->ops->map_lookup_elem(map, key); } @@ -45,7 +46,7 @@ const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_map_lookup_elem_proto = { BPF_CALL_4(bpf_map_update_elem, struct bpf_map *, map, void *, key, void *, value, u64, flags) { - WARN_ON_ONCE(!rcu_read_lock_held()); + WARN_ON_ONCE(!rcu_read_lock_held() && !rcu_read_lock_trace_held()); return map->ops->map_update_elem(map, key, value, flags); } @@ -62,7 +63,7 @@ const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_map_update_elem_proto = { BPF_CALL_2(bpf_map_delete_elem, struct bpf_map *, map, void *, key) { - WARN_ON_ONCE(!rcu_read_lock_held()); + WARN_ON_ONCE(!rcu_read_lock_held() && !rcu_read_lock_trace_held()); return map->ops->map_delete_elem(map, key); } -- 2.17.1
2 1
0 0
[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS] SUNRPC: Fix a suspicious RCU usage warning
by Guo Mengqi 14 May '24

14 May '24
From: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker(a)Netapp.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.210 commit c430e6bb43955c6bf573665fcebf31694925b9f7 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9BV4V Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 31b62908693c90d4d07db597e685d9f25a120073 ] I received the following warning while running cthon against an ontap server running pNFS: [ 57.202521] ============================= [ 57.202522] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage [ 57.202523] 6.7.0-rc3-g2cc14f52aeb7 #41492 Not tainted [ 57.202525] ----------------------------- [ 57.202525] net/sunrpc/xprtmultipath.c:349 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!! [ 57.202527] other info that might help us debug this: [ 57.202528] rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 [ 57.202529] no locks held by test5/3567. [ 57.202530] stack backtrace: [ 57.202532] CPU: 0 PID: 3567 Comm: test5 Not tainted 6.7.0-rc3-g2cc14f52aeb7 #41492 5b09971b4965c0aceba19f3eea324a4a806e227e [ 57.202534] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS unknown 2/2/2022 [ 57.202536] Call Trace: [ 57.202537] <TASK> [ 57.202540] dump_stack_lvl+0x77/0xb0 [ 57.202551] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x154/0x1a0 [ 57.202556] rpc_xprt_switch_has_addr+0x17c/0x190 [sunrpc ebe02571b9a8ceebf7d98e71675af20c19bdb1f6] [ 57.202596] rpc_clnt_setup_test_and_add_xprt+0x50/0x180 [sunrpc ebe02571b9a8ceebf7d98e71675af20c19bdb1f6] [ 57.202621] ? rpc_clnt_add_xprt+0x254/0x300 [sunrpc ebe02571b9a8ceebf7d98e71675af20c19bdb1f6] [ 57.202646] rpc_clnt_add_xprt+0x27a/0x300 [sunrpc ebe02571b9a8ceebf7d98e71675af20c19bdb1f6] [ 57.202671] ? __pfx_rpc_clnt_setup_test_and_add_xprt+0x10/0x10 [sunrpc ebe02571b9a8ceebf7d98e71675af20c19bdb1f6] [ 57.202696] nfs4_pnfs_ds_connect+0x345/0x760 [nfsv4 c716d88496ded0ea6d289bbea684fa996f9b57a9] [ 57.202728] ? __pfx_nfs4_test_session_trunk+0x10/0x10 [nfsv4 c716d88496ded0ea6d289bbea684fa996f9b57a9] [ 57.202754] nfs4_fl_prepare_ds+0x75/0xc0 [nfs_layout_nfsv41_files e3a4187f18ae8a27b630f9feae6831b584a9360a] [ 57.202760] filelayout_write_pagelist+0x4a/0x200 [nfs_layout_nfsv41_files e3a4187f18ae8a27b630f9feae6831b584a9360a] [ 57.202765] pnfs_generic_pg_writepages+0xbe/0x230 [nfsv4 c716d88496ded0ea6d289bbea684fa996f9b57a9] [ 57.202788] __nfs_pageio_add_request+0x3fd/0x520 [nfs 6c976fa593a7c2976f5a0aeb4965514a828e6902] [ 57.202813] nfs_pageio_add_request+0x18b/0x390 [nfs 6c976fa593a7c2976f5a0aeb4965514a828e6902] [ 57.202831] nfs_do_writepage+0x116/0x1e0 [nfs 6c976fa593a7c2976f5a0aeb4965514a828e6902] [ 57.202849] nfs_writepages_callback+0x13/0x30 [nfs 6c976fa593a7c2976f5a0aeb4965514a828e6902] [ 57.202866] write_cache_pages+0x265/0x450 [ 57.202870] ? __pfx_nfs_writepages_callback+0x10/0x10 [nfs 6c976fa593a7c2976f5a0aeb4965514a828e6902] [ 57.202891] nfs_writepages+0x141/0x230 [nfs 6c976fa593a7c2976f5a0aeb4965514a828e6902] [ 57.202913] do_writepages+0xd2/0x230 [ 57.202917] ? filemap_fdatawrite_wbc+0x5c/0x80 [ 57.202921] filemap_fdatawrite_wbc+0x67/0x80 [ 57.202924] filemap_write_and_wait_range+0xd9/0x170 [ 57.202930] nfs_wb_all+0x49/0x180 [nfs 6c976fa593a7c2976f5a0aeb4965514a828e6902] [ 57.202947] nfs4_file_flush+0x72/0xb0 [nfsv4 c716d88496ded0ea6d289bbea684fa996f9b57a9] [ 57.202969] __se_sys_close+0x46/0xd0 [ 57.202972] do_syscall_64+0x68/0x100 [ 57.202975] ? do_syscall_64+0x77/0x100 [ 57.202976] ? do_syscall_64+0x77/0x100 [ 57.202979] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76 [ 57.202982] RIP: 0033:0x7fe2b12e4a94 [ 57.202985] Code: 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d d5 18 0e 00 00 74 13 b8 03 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 44 c3 0f 1f 00 48 83 ec 18 89 7c 24 0c e8 c3 [ 57.202987] RSP: 002b:00007ffe857ddb38 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000003 [ 57.202989] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffe857dfd68 RCX: 00007fe2b12e4a94 [ 57.202991] RDX: 0000000000002000 RSI: 00007ffe857ddc40 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 57.202992] RBP: 00007ffe857dfc50 R08: 7fffffffffffffff R09: 0000000065650f49 [ 57.202993] R10: 00007fe2b11f8300 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 57.202994] R13: 00007ffe857dfd80 R14: 00007fe2b1445000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 57.202999] </TASK> The problem seems to be that two out of three callers aren't taking the rcu_read_lock() before calling the list_for_each_entry_rcu() function in rpc_xprt_switch_has_addr(). I fix this by having rpc_xprt_switch_has_addr() unconditionaly take the rcu_read_lock(), which is okay to do recursively in the case that the lock has already been taken by a caller. Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker(a)Netapp.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Wang Hai <wanghai38(a)huawei.com> --- net/sunrpc/xprtmultipath.c | 17 +++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/sunrpc/xprtmultipath.c b/net/sunrpc/xprtmultipath.c index 78c075a68c04..a11e80d17830 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/xprtmultipath.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/xprtmultipath.c @@ -253,8 +253,9 @@ struct rpc_xprt *xprt_iter_current_entry(struct rpc_xprt_iter *xpi) return xprt_switch_find_current_entry(head, xpi->xpi_cursor); } -bool rpc_xprt_switch_has_addr(struct rpc_xprt_switch *xps, - const struct sockaddr *sap) +static +bool __rpc_xprt_switch_has_addr(struct rpc_xprt_switch *xps, + const struct sockaddr *sap) { struct list_head *head; struct rpc_xprt *pos; @@ -273,6 +274,18 @@ bool rpc_xprt_switch_has_addr(struct rpc_xprt_switch *xps, return false; } +bool rpc_xprt_switch_has_addr(struct rpc_xprt_switch *xps, + const struct sockaddr *sap) +{ + bool res; + + rcu_read_lock(); + res = __rpc_xprt_switch_has_addr(xps, sap); + rcu_read_unlock(); + + return res; +} + static struct rpc_xprt *xprt_switch_find_next_entry(struct list_head *head, const struct rpc_xprt *cur) -- 2.17.1
2 1
0 0
[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS] iio: adc: ad7091r: Allow users to configure device events
by Guo Mengqi 14 May '24

14 May '24
From: Marcelo Schmitt <marcelo.schmitt(a)analog.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.210 commit 1eba6f7ffa295a0eec098c107043074be7cc4ec5 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9BV4R Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 020e71c7ffc25dfe29ed9be6c2d39af7bd7f661f ] AD7091R-5 devices are supported by the ad7091r-5 driver together with the ad7091r-base driver. Those drivers declared iio events for notifying user space when ADC readings fall bellow the thresholds of low limit registers or above the values set in high limit registers. However, to configure iio events and their thresholds, a set of callback functions must be implemented and those were not present until now. The consequence of trying to configure ad7091r-5 events without the proper callback functions was a null pointer dereference in the kernel because the pointers to the callback functions were not set. Implement event configuration callbacks allowing users to read/write event thresholds and enable/disable event generation. Since the event spec structs are generic to AD7091R devices, also move those from the ad7091r-5 driver the base driver so they can be reused when support for ad7091r-2/-4/-8 be added. Fixes: ca69300173b6 ("iio: adc: Add support for AD7091R5 ADC") Suggested-by: David Lechner <dlechner(a)baylibre.com> Signed-off-by: Marcelo Schmitt <marcelo.schmitt(a)analog.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/59552d3548dabd56adc3107b7b4869afee2b0c3c.17030133… Cc: <Stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Wang Hai <wanghai38(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/iio/adc/ad7091r-base.c | 156 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/iio/adc/ad7091r-base.h | 6 ++ drivers/iio/adc/ad7091r5.c | 28 +----- 3 files changed, 166 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/iio/adc/ad7091r-base.c b/drivers/iio/adc/ad7091r-base.c index 63b4d6ea4566..827971d458a5 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/adc/ad7091r-base.c +++ b/drivers/iio/adc/ad7091r-base.c @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ */ #include <linux/bitops.h> +#include <linux/bitfield.h> #include <linux/iio/events.h> #include <linux/iio/iio.h> #include <linux/interrupt.h> @@ -49,6 +50,27 @@ struct ad7091r_state { struct mutex lock; /*lock to prevent concurent reads */ }; +const struct iio_event_spec ad7091r_events[] = { + { + .type = IIO_EV_TYPE_THRESH, + .dir = IIO_EV_DIR_RISING, + .mask_separate = BIT(IIO_EV_INFO_VALUE) | + BIT(IIO_EV_INFO_ENABLE), + }, + { + .type = IIO_EV_TYPE_THRESH, + .dir = IIO_EV_DIR_FALLING, + .mask_separate = BIT(IIO_EV_INFO_VALUE) | + BIT(IIO_EV_INFO_ENABLE), + }, + { + .type = IIO_EV_TYPE_THRESH, + .dir = IIO_EV_DIR_EITHER, + .mask_separate = BIT(IIO_EV_INFO_HYSTERESIS), + }, +}; +EXPORT_SYMBOL_NS_GPL(ad7091r_events, IIO_AD7091R); + static int ad7091r_set_mode(struct ad7091r_state *st, enum ad7091r_mode mode) { int ret, conf; @@ -168,8 +190,142 @@ static int ad7091r_read_raw(struct iio_dev *iio_dev, return ret; } +static int ad7091r_read_event_config(struct iio_dev *indio_dev, + const struct iio_chan_spec *chan, + enum iio_event_type type, + enum iio_event_direction dir) +{ + struct ad7091r_state *st = iio_priv(indio_dev); + int val, ret; + + switch (dir) { + case IIO_EV_DIR_RISING: + ret = regmap_read(st->map, + AD7091R_REG_CH_HIGH_LIMIT(chan->channel), + &val); + if (ret) + return ret; + return val != AD7091R_HIGH_LIMIT; + case IIO_EV_DIR_FALLING: + ret = regmap_read(st->map, + AD7091R_REG_CH_LOW_LIMIT(chan->channel), + &val); + if (ret) + return ret; + return val != AD7091R_LOW_LIMIT; + default: + return -EINVAL; + } +} + +static int ad7091r_write_event_config(struct iio_dev *indio_dev, + const struct iio_chan_spec *chan, + enum iio_event_type type, + enum iio_event_direction dir, int state) +{ + struct ad7091r_state *st = iio_priv(indio_dev); + + if (state) { + return regmap_set_bits(st->map, AD7091R_REG_CONF, + AD7091R_REG_CONF_ALERT_EN); + } else { + /* + * Set thresholds either to 0 or to 2^12 - 1 as appropriate to + * prevent alerts and thus disable event generation. + */ + switch (dir) { + case IIO_EV_DIR_RISING: + return regmap_write(st->map, + AD7091R_REG_CH_HIGH_LIMIT(chan->channel), + AD7091R_HIGH_LIMIT); + case IIO_EV_DIR_FALLING: + return regmap_write(st->map, + AD7091R_REG_CH_LOW_LIMIT(chan->channel), + AD7091R_LOW_LIMIT); + default: + return -EINVAL; + } + } +} + +static int ad7091r_read_event_value(struct iio_dev *indio_dev, + const struct iio_chan_spec *chan, + enum iio_event_type type, + enum iio_event_direction dir, + enum iio_event_info info, int *val, int *val2) +{ + struct ad7091r_state *st = iio_priv(indio_dev); + int ret; + + switch (info) { + case IIO_EV_INFO_VALUE: + switch (dir) { + case IIO_EV_DIR_RISING: + ret = regmap_read(st->map, + AD7091R_REG_CH_HIGH_LIMIT(chan->channel), + val); + if (ret) + return ret; + return IIO_VAL_INT; + case IIO_EV_DIR_FALLING: + ret = regmap_read(st->map, + AD7091R_REG_CH_LOW_LIMIT(chan->channel), + val); + if (ret) + return ret; + return IIO_VAL_INT; + default: + return -EINVAL; + } + case IIO_EV_INFO_HYSTERESIS: + ret = regmap_read(st->map, + AD7091R_REG_CH_HYSTERESIS(chan->channel), + val); + if (ret) + return ret; + return IIO_VAL_INT; + default: + return -EINVAL; + } +} + +static int ad7091r_write_event_value(struct iio_dev *indio_dev, + const struct iio_chan_spec *chan, + enum iio_event_type type, + enum iio_event_direction dir, + enum iio_event_info info, int val, int val2) +{ + struct ad7091r_state *st = iio_priv(indio_dev); + + switch (info) { + case IIO_EV_INFO_VALUE: + switch (dir) { + case IIO_EV_DIR_RISING: + return regmap_write(st->map, + AD7091R_REG_CH_HIGH_LIMIT(chan->channel), + val); + case IIO_EV_DIR_FALLING: + return regmap_write(st->map, + AD7091R_REG_CH_LOW_LIMIT(chan->channel), + val); + default: + return -EINVAL; + } + case IIO_EV_INFO_HYSTERESIS: + return regmap_write(st->map, + AD7091R_REG_CH_HYSTERESIS(chan->channel), + val); + default: + return -EINVAL; + } +} + static const struct iio_info ad7091r_info = { .read_raw = ad7091r_read_raw, + .read_event_config = &ad7091r_read_event_config, + .write_event_config = &ad7091r_write_event_config, + .read_event_value = &ad7091r_read_event_value, + .write_event_value = &ad7091r_write_event_value, }; static irqreturn_t ad7091r_event_handler(int irq, void *private) diff --git a/drivers/iio/adc/ad7091r-base.h b/drivers/iio/adc/ad7091r-base.h index 509748aef9b1..7a78976a2f80 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/adc/ad7091r-base.h +++ b/drivers/iio/adc/ad7091r-base.h @@ -8,6 +8,10 @@ #ifndef __DRIVERS_IIO_ADC_AD7091R_BASE_H__ #define __DRIVERS_IIO_ADC_AD7091R_BASE_H__ +/* AD7091R_REG_CH_LIMIT */ +#define AD7091R_HIGH_LIMIT 0xFFF +#define AD7091R_LOW_LIMIT 0x0 + struct device; struct ad7091r_state; @@ -17,6 +21,8 @@ struct ad7091r_chip_info { unsigned int vref_mV; }; +extern const struct iio_event_spec ad7091r_events[3]; + extern const struct regmap_config ad7091r_regmap_config; int ad7091r_probe(struct device *dev, const char *name, diff --git a/drivers/iio/adc/ad7091r5.c b/drivers/iio/adc/ad7091r5.c index 9665679c3ea6..e60511460786 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/adc/ad7091r5.c +++ b/drivers/iio/adc/ad7091r5.c @@ -12,26 +12,6 @@ #include "ad7091r-base.h" -static const struct iio_event_spec ad7091r5_events[] = { - { - .type = IIO_EV_TYPE_THRESH, - .dir = IIO_EV_DIR_RISING, - .mask_separate = BIT(IIO_EV_INFO_VALUE) | - BIT(IIO_EV_INFO_ENABLE), - }, - { - .type = IIO_EV_TYPE_THRESH, - .dir = IIO_EV_DIR_FALLING, - .mask_separate = BIT(IIO_EV_INFO_VALUE) | - BIT(IIO_EV_INFO_ENABLE), - }, - { - .type = IIO_EV_TYPE_THRESH, - .dir = IIO_EV_DIR_EITHER, - .mask_separate = BIT(IIO_EV_INFO_HYSTERESIS), - }, -}; - #define AD7091R_CHANNEL(idx, bits, ev, num_ev) { \ .type = IIO_VOLTAGE, \ .info_mask_separate = BIT(IIO_CHAN_INFO_RAW), \ @@ -44,10 +24,10 @@ static const struct iio_event_spec ad7091r5_events[] = { .scan_type.realbits = bits, \ } static const struct iio_chan_spec ad7091r5_channels_irq[] = { - AD7091R_CHANNEL(0, 12, ad7091r5_events, ARRAY_SIZE(ad7091r5_events)), - AD7091R_CHANNEL(1, 12, ad7091r5_events, ARRAY_SIZE(ad7091r5_events)), - AD7091R_CHANNEL(2, 12, ad7091r5_events, ARRAY_SIZE(ad7091r5_events)), - AD7091R_CHANNEL(3, 12, ad7091r5_events, ARRAY_SIZE(ad7091r5_events)), + AD7091R_CHANNEL(0, 12, ad7091r_events, ARRAY_SIZE(ad7091r_events)), + AD7091R_CHANNEL(1, 12, ad7091r_events, ARRAY_SIZE(ad7091r_events)), + AD7091R_CHANNEL(2, 12, ad7091r_events, ARRAY_SIZE(ad7091r_events)), + AD7091R_CHANNEL(3, 12, ad7091r_events, ARRAY_SIZE(ad7091r_events)), }; static const struct iio_chan_spec ad7091r5_channels_noirq[] = { -- 2.17.1
2 1
0 0
[PATCH OLK-5.10] bpf: Check rcu_read_lock_trace_held() before calling bpf map helpers
by Guo Mengqi 14 May '24

14 May '24
From: Hou Tao <houtao1(a)huawei.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.8-rc1 commit 169410eba271afc9f0fb476d996795aa26770c6d category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9BV4S CVE: CVE-2023-52621 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- These three bpf_map_{lookup,update,delete}_elem() helpers are also available for sleepable bpf program, so add the corresponding lock assertion for sleepable bpf program, otherwise the following warning will be reported when a sleepable bpf program manipulates bpf map under interpreter mode (aka bpf_jit_enable=0): WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 4985 at kernel/bpf/helpers.c:40 ...... CPU: 3 PID: 4985 Comm: test_progs Not tainted 6.6.0+ #2 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996) ...... RIP: 0010:bpf_map_lookup_elem+0x54/0x60 ...... Call Trace: <TASK> ? __warn+0xa5/0x240 ? bpf_map_lookup_elem+0x54/0x60 ? report_bug+0x1ba/0x1f0 ? handle_bug+0x40/0x80 ? exc_invalid_op+0x18/0x50 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1b/0x20 ? __pfx_bpf_map_lookup_elem+0x10/0x10 ? rcu_lockdep_current_cpu_online+0x65/0xb0 ? rcu_is_watching+0x23/0x50 ? bpf_map_lookup_elem+0x54/0x60 ? __pfx_bpf_map_lookup_elem+0x10/0x10 ___bpf_prog_run+0x513/0x3b70 __bpf_prog_run32+0x9d/0xd0 ? __bpf_prog_enter_sleepable_recur+0xad/0x120 ? __bpf_prog_enter_sleepable_recur+0x3e/0x120 bpf_trampoline_6442580665+0x4d/0x1000 __x64_sys_getpgid+0x5/0x30 ? do_syscall_64+0x36/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76 </TASK> Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1(a)huawei.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231204140425.1480317-2-houtao@huaweicloud.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: kernel/bpf/helpers.c Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui <pulehui(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/bpf/helpers.c | 11 ++++++----- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/helpers.c b/kernel/bpf/helpers.c index 6cbf82ca33f2..5836d1828ad7 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/helpers.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/helpers.c @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ #include <linux/pid_namespace.h> #include <linux/proc_ns.h> #include <linux/security.h> +#include <linux/rcupdate_trace.h> #include "../../lib/kstrtox.h" @@ -24,12 +25,12 @@ * * Different map implementations will rely on rcu in map methods * lookup/update/delete, therefore eBPF programs must run under rcu lock - * if program is allowed to access maps, so check rcu_read_lock_held in - * all three functions. + * if program is allowed to access maps, so check rcu_read_lock_held() or + * rcu_read_lock_trace_held() in all three functions. */ BPF_CALL_2(bpf_map_lookup_elem, struct bpf_map *, map, void *, key) { - WARN_ON_ONCE(!rcu_read_lock_held()); + WARN_ON_ONCE(!rcu_read_lock_held() && !rcu_read_lock_trace_held()); return (unsigned long) map->ops->map_lookup_elem(map, key); } @@ -45,7 +46,7 @@ const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_map_lookup_elem_proto = { BPF_CALL_4(bpf_map_update_elem, struct bpf_map *, map, void *, key, void *, value, u64, flags) { - WARN_ON_ONCE(!rcu_read_lock_held()); + WARN_ON_ONCE(!rcu_read_lock_held() && !rcu_read_lock_trace_held()); return map->ops->map_update_elem(map, key, value, flags); } @@ -62,7 +63,7 @@ const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_map_update_elem_proto = { BPF_CALL_2(bpf_map_delete_elem, struct bpf_map *, map, void *, key) { - WARN_ON_ONCE(!rcu_read_lock_held()); + WARN_ON_ONCE(!rcu_read_lock_held() && !rcu_read_lock_trace_held()); return map->ops->map_delete_elem(map, key); } -- 2.17.1
2 1
0 0
[PATCH OLK-5.10] SUNRPC: Fix a suspicious RCU usage warning
by Guo Mengqi 14 May '24

14 May '24
From: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker(a)Netapp.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.210 commit c430e6bb43955c6bf573665fcebf31694925b9f7 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9BV4V Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 31b62908693c90d4d07db597e685d9f25a120073 ] I received the following warning while running cthon against an ontap server running pNFS: [ 57.202521] ============================= [ 57.202522] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage [ 57.202523] 6.7.0-rc3-g2cc14f52aeb7 #41492 Not tainted [ 57.202525] ----------------------------- [ 57.202525] net/sunrpc/xprtmultipath.c:349 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!! [ 57.202527] other info that might help us debug this: [ 57.202528] rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 [ 57.202529] no locks held by test5/3567. [ 57.202530] stack backtrace: [ 57.202532] CPU: 0 PID: 3567 Comm: test5 Not tainted 6.7.0-rc3-g2cc14f52aeb7 #41492 5b09971b4965c0aceba19f3eea324a4a806e227e [ 57.202534] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS unknown 2/2/2022 [ 57.202536] Call Trace: [ 57.202537] <TASK> [ 57.202540] dump_stack_lvl+0x77/0xb0 [ 57.202551] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x154/0x1a0 [ 57.202556] rpc_xprt_switch_has_addr+0x17c/0x190 [sunrpc ebe02571b9a8ceebf7d98e71675af20c19bdb1f6] [ 57.202596] rpc_clnt_setup_test_and_add_xprt+0x50/0x180 [sunrpc ebe02571b9a8ceebf7d98e71675af20c19bdb1f6] [ 57.202621] ? rpc_clnt_add_xprt+0x254/0x300 [sunrpc ebe02571b9a8ceebf7d98e71675af20c19bdb1f6] [ 57.202646] rpc_clnt_add_xprt+0x27a/0x300 [sunrpc ebe02571b9a8ceebf7d98e71675af20c19bdb1f6] [ 57.202671] ? __pfx_rpc_clnt_setup_test_and_add_xprt+0x10/0x10 [sunrpc ebe02571b9a8ceebf7d98e71675af20c19bdb1f6] [ 57.202696] nfs4_pnfs_ds_connect+0x345/0x760 [nfsv4 c716d88496ded0ea6d289bbea684fa996f9b57a9] [ 57.202728] ? __pfx_nfs4_test_session_trunk+0x10/0x10 [nfsv4 c716d88496ded0ea6d289bbea684fa996f9b57a9] [ 57.202754] nfs4_fl_prepare_ds+0x75/0xc0 [nfs_layout_nfsv41_files e3a4187f18ae8a27b630f9feae6831b584a9360a] [ 57.202760] filelayout_write_pagelist+0x4a/0x200 [nfs_layout_nfsv41_files e3a4187f18ae8a27b630f9feae6831b584a9360a] [ 57.202765] pnfs_generic_pg_writepages+0xbe/0x230 [nfsv4 c716d88496ded0ea6d289bbea684fa996f9b57a9] [ 57.202788] __nfs_pageio_add_request+0x3fd/0x520 [nfs 6c976fa593a7c2976f5a0aeb4965514a828e6902] [ 57.202813] nfs_pageio_add_request+0x18b/0x390 [nfs 6c976fa593a7c2976f5a0aeb4965514a828e6902] [ 57.202831] nfs_do_writepage+0x116/0x1e0 [nfs 6c976fa593a7c2976f5a0aeb4965514a828e6902] [ 57.202849] nfs_writepages_callback+0x13/0x30 [nfs 6c976fa593a7c2976f5a0aeb4965514a828e6902] [ 57.202866] write_cache_pages+0x265/0x450 [ 57.202870] ? __pfx_nfs_writepages_callback+0x10/0x10 [nfs 6c976fa593a7c2976f5a0aeb4965514a828e6902] [ 57.202891] nfs_writepages+0x141/0x230 [nfs 6c976fa593a7c2976f5a0aeb4965514a828e6902] [ 57.202913] do_writepages+0xd2/0x230 [ 57.202917] ? filemap_fdatawrite_wbc+0x5c/0x80 [ 57.202921] filemap_fdatawrite_wbc+0x67/0x80 [ 57.202924] filemap_write_and_wait_range+0xd9/0x170 [ 57.202930] nfs_wb_all+0x49/0x180 [nfs 6c976fa593a7c2976f5a0aeb4965514a828e6902] [ 57.202947] nfs4_file_flush+0x72/0xb0 [nfsv4 c716d88496ded0ea6d289bbea684fa996f9b57a9] [ 57.202969] __se_sys_close+0x46/0xd0 [ 57.202972] do_syscall_64+0x68/0x100 [ 57.202975] ? do_syscall_64+0x77/0x100 [ 57.202976] ? do_syscall_64+0x77/0x100 [ 57.202979] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76 [ 57.202982] RIP: 0033:0x7fe2b12e4a94 [ 57.202985] Code: 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d d5 18 0e 00 00 74 13 b8 03 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 44 c3 0f 1f 00 48 83 ec 18 89 7c 24 0c e8 c3 [ 57.202987] RSP: 002b:00007ffe857ddb38 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000003 [ 57.202989] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffe857dfd68 RCX: 00007fe2b12e4a94 [ 57.202991] RDX: 0000000000002000 RSI: 00007ffe857ddc40 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 57.202992] RBP: 00007ffe857dfc50 R08: 7fffffffffffffff R09: 0000000065650f49 [ 57.202993] R10: 00007fe2b11f8300 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 57.202994] R13: 00007ffe857dfd80 R14: 00007fe2b1445000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 57.202999] </TASK> The problem seems to be that two out of three callers aren't taking the rcu_read_lock() before calling the list_for_each_entry_rcu() function in rpc_xprt_switch_has_addr(). I fix this by having rpc_xprt_switch_has_addr() unconditionaly take the rcu_read_lock(), which is okay to do recursively in the case that the lock has already been taken by a caller. Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker(a)Netapp.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Wang Hai <wanghai38(a)huawei.com> --- net/sunrpc/xprtmultipath.c | 17 +++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/sunrpc/xprtmultipath.c b/net/sunrpc/xprtmultipath.c index 78c075a68c04..a11e80d17830 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/xprtmultipath.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/xprtmultipath.c @@ -253,8 +253,9 @@ struct rpc_xprt *xprt_iter_current_entry(struct rpc_xprt_iter *xpi) return xprt_switch_find_current_entry(head, xpi->xpi_cursor); } -bool rpc_xprt_switch_has_addr(struct rpc_xprt_switch *xps, - const struct sockaddr *sap) +static +bool __rpc_xprt_switch_has_addr(struct rpc_xprt_switch *xps, + const struct sockaddr *sap) { struct list_head *head; struct rpc_xprt *pos; @@ -273,6 +274,18 @@ bool rpc_xprt_switch_has_addr(struct rpc_xprt_switch *xps, return false; } +bool rpc_xprt_switch_has_addr(struct rpc_xprt_switch *xps, + const struct sockaddr *sap) +{ + bool res; + + rcu_read_lock(); + res = __rpc_xprt_switch_has_addr(xps, sap); + rcu_read_unlock(); + + return res; +} + static struct rpc_xprt *xprt_switch_find_next_entry(struct list_head *head, const struct rpc_xprt *cur) -- 2.17.1
2 1
0 0
[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS] bpf: Check rcu_read_lock_trace_held() before calling bpf map helpers
by Guo Mengqi 14 May '24

14 May '24
From: Hou Tao <houtao1(a)huawei.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.8-rc1 commit 169410eba271afc9f0fb476d996795aa26770c6d category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9BV4S CVE: CVE-2023-52621 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- These three bpf_map_{lookup,update,delete}_elem() helpers are also available for sleepable bpf program, so add the corresponding lock assertion for sleepable bpf program, otherwise the following warning will be reported when a sleepable bpf program manipulates bpf map under interpreter mode (aka bpf_jit_enable=0): WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 4985 at kernel/bpf/helpers.c:40 ...... CPU: 3 PID: 4985 Comm: test_progs Not tainted 6.6.0+ #2 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996) ...... RIP: 0010:bpf_map_lookup_elem+0x54/0x60 ...... Call Trace: <TASK> ? __warn+0xa5/0x240 ? bpf_map_lookup_elem+0x54/0x60 ? report_bug+0x1ba/0x1f0 ? handle_bug+0x40/0x80 ? exc_invalid_op+0x18/0x50 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1b/0x20 ? __pfx_bpf_map_lookup_elem+0x10/0x10 ? rcu_lockdep_current_cpu_online+0x65/0xb0 ? rcu_is_watching+0x23/0x50 ? bpf_map_lookup_elem+0x54/0x60 ? __pfx_bpf_map_lookup_elem+0x10/0x10 ___bpf_prog_run+0x513/0x3b70 __bpf_prog_run32+0x9d/0xd0 ? __bpf_prog_enter_sleepable_recur+0xad/0x120 ? __bpf_prog_enter_sleepable_recur+0x3e/0x120 bpf_trampoline_6442580665+0x4d/0x1000 __x64_sys_getpgid+0x5/0x30 ? do_syscall_64+0x36/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76 </TASK> Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1(a)huawei.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231204140425.1480317-2-houtao@huaweicloud.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: kernel/bpf/helpers.c Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui <pulehui(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/bpf/helpers.c | 11 ++++++----- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/helpers.c b/kernel/bpf/helpers.c index 26f1a526321a..02ef4dee2611 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/helpers.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/helpers.c @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ #include <linux/pid_namespace.h> #include <linux/proc_ns.h> #include <linux/security.h> +#include <linux/rcupdate_trace.h> #include "../../lib/kstrtox.h" @@ -24,12 +25,12 @@ * * Different map implementations will rely on rcu in map methods * lookup/update/delete, therefore eBPF programs must run under rcu lock - * if program is allowed to access maps, so check rcu_read_lock_held in - * all three functions. + * if program is allowed to access maps, so check rcu_read_lock_held() or + * rcu_read_lock_trace_held() in all three functions. */ BPF_CALL_2(bpf_map_lookup_elem, struct bpf_map *, map, void *, key) { - WARN_ON_ONCE(!rcu_read_lock_held()); + WARN_ON_ONCE(!rcu_read_lock_held() && !rcu_read_lock_trace_held()); return (unsigned long) map->ops->map_lookup_elem(map, key); } @@ -45,7 +46,7 @@ const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_map_lookup_elem_proto = { BPF_CALL_4(bpf_map_update_elem, struct bpf_map *, map, void *, key, void *, value, u64, flags) { - WARN_ON_ONCE(!rcu_read_lock_held()); + WARN_ON_ONCE(!rcu_read_lock_held() && !rcu_read_lock_trace_held()); return map->ops->map_update_elem(map, key, value, flags); } @@ -62,7 +63,7 @@ const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_map_update_elem_proto = { BPF_CALL_2(bpf_map_delete_elem, struct bpf_map *, map, void *, key) { - WARN_ON_ONCE(!rcu_read_lock_held()); + WARN_ON_ONCE(!rcu_read_lock_held() && !rcu_read_lock_trace_held()); return map->ops->map_delete_elem(map, key); } -- 2.17.1
2 1
0 0
[PATCH OLK-5.10] s390/zcrypt: fix reference counting on zcrypt card objects
by felix 14 May '24

14 May '24
From: Harald Freudenberger <freude(a)linux.ibm.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.215 commit 6470078ab3d8f222115e11c4ec67351f3031b3dd category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9L4T8 CVE: CVE-2024-26957 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 50ed48c80fecbe17218afed4f8bed005c802976c ] Tests with hot-plugging crytpo cards on KVM guests with debug kernel build revealed an use after free for the load field of the struct zcrypt_card. The reason was an incorrect reference handling of the zcrypt card object which could lead to a free of the zcrypt card object while it was still in use. This is an example of the slab message: kernel: 0x00000000885a7512-0x00000000885a7513 @offset=1298. First byte 0x68 instead of 0x6b kernel: Allocated in zcrypt_card_alloc+0x36/0x70 [zcrypt] age=18046 cpu=3 pid=43 kernel: kmalloc_trace+0x3f2/0x470 kernel: zcrypt_card_alloc+0x36/0x70 [zcrypt] kernel: zcrypt_cex4_card_probe+0x26/0x380 [zcrypt_cex4] kernel: ap_device_probe+0x15c/0x290 kernel: really_probe+0xd2/0x468 kernel: driver_probe_device+0x40/0xf0 kernel: __device_attach_driver+0xc0/0x140 kernel: bus_for_each_drv+0x8c/0xd0 kernel: __device_attach+0x114/0x198 kernel: bus_probe_device+0xb4/0xc8 kernel: device_add+0x4d2/0x6e0 kernel: ap_scan_adapter+0x3d0/0x7c0 kernel: ap_scan_bus+0x5a/0x3b0 kernel: ap_scan_bus_wq_callback+0x40/0x60 kernel: process_one_work+0x26e/0x620 kernel: worker_thread+0x21c/0x440 kernel: Freed in zcrypt_card_put+0x54/0x80 [zcrypt] age=9024 cpu=3 pid=43 kernel: kfree+0x37e/0x418 kernel: zcrypt_card_put+0x54/0x80 [zcrypt] kernel: ap_device_remove+0x4c/0xe0 kernel: device_release_driver_internal+0x1c4/0x270 kernel: bus_remove_device+0x100/0x188 kernel: device_del+0x164/0x3c0 kernel: device_unregister+0x30/0x90 kernel: ap_scan_adapter+0xc8/0x7c0 kernel: ap_scan_bus+0x5a/0x3b0 kernel: ap_scan_bus_wq_callback+0x40/0x60 kernel: process_one_work+0x26e/0x620 kernel: worker_thread+0x21c/0x440 kernel: kthread+0x150/0x168 kernel: __ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x58 kernel: ret_from_fork+0xa/0x30 kernel: Slab 0x00000372022169c0 objects=20 used=18 fp=0x00000000885a7c88 flags=0x3ffff00000000a00(workingset|slab|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x1ffff) kernel: Object 0x00000000885a74b8 @offset=1208 fp=0x00000000885a7c88 kernel: Redzone 00000000885a74b0: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb ........ kernel: Object 00000000885a74b8: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk kernel: Object 00000000885a74c8: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk kernel: Object 00000000885a74d8: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk kernel: Object 00000000885a74e8: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk kernel: Object 00000000885a74f8: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk kernel: Object 00000000885a7508: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 68 4b 6b 6b 6b a5 kkkkkkkkkkhKkkk. kernel: Redzone 00000000885a7518: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb ........ kernel: Padding 00000000885a756c: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a ZZZZZZZZZZZZ kernel: CPU: 0 PID: 387 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 6.8.0-HF #2 kernel: Hardware name: IBM 3931 A01 704 (KVM/Linux) kernel: Call Trace: kernel: [<00000000ca5ab5b8>] dump_stack_lvl+0x90/0x120 kernel: [<00000000c99d78bc>] check_bytes_and_report+0x114/0x140 kernel: [<00000000c99d53cc>] check_object+0x334/0x3f8 kernel: [<00000000c99d820c>] alloc_debug_processing+0xc4/0x1f8 kernel: [<00000000c99d852e>] get_partial_node.part.0+0x1ee/0x3e0 kernel: [<00000000c99d94ec>] ___slab_alloc+0xaf4/0x13c8 kernel: [<00000000c99d9e38>] __slab_alloc.constprop.0+0x78/0xb8 kernel: [<00000000c99dc8dc>] __kmalloc+0x434/0x590 kernel: [<00000000c9b4c0ce>] ext4_htree_store_dirent+0x4e/0x1c0 kernel: [<00000000c9b908a2>] htree_dirblock_to_tree+0x17a/0x3f0 kernel: [<00000000c9b919dc>] ext4_htree_fill_tree+0x134/0x400 kernel: [<00000000c9b4b3d0>] ext4_dx_readdir+0x160/0x2f0 kernel: [<00000000c9b4bedc>] ext4_readdir+0x5f4/0x760 kernel: [<00000000c9a7efc4>] iterate_dir+0xb4/0x280 kernel: [<00000000c9a7f1ea>] __do_sys_getdents64+0x5a/0x120 kernel: [<00000000ca5d6946>] __do_syscall+0x256/0x310 kernel: [<00000000ca5eea10>] system_call+0x70/0x98 kernel: INFO: lockdep is turned off. kernel: FIX kmalloc-96: Restoring Poison 0x00000000885a7512-0x00000000885a7513=0x6b kernel: FIX kmalloc-96: Marking all objects used The fix is simple: Before use of the queue not only the queue object but also the card object needs to increase it's reference count with a call to zcrypt_card_get(). Similar after use of the queue not only the queue but also the card object's reference count is decreased with zcrypt_card_put(). Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude(a)linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Holger Dengler <dengler(a)linux.ibm.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca(a)linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Felix Fu <fuzhen5(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_api.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_api.c b/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_api.c index b518009715ee..dde10a5c7d50 100644 --- a/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_api.c +++ b/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_api.c @@ -576,6 +576,7 @@ static inline struct zcrypt_queue *zcrypt_pick_queue(struct zcrypt_card *zc, { if (!zq || !try_module_get(zq->queue->ap_dev.drv->driver.owner)) return NULL; + zcrypt_card_get(zc); zcrypt_queue_get(zq); get_device(&zq->queue->ap_dev.device); atomic_add(weight, &zc->load); @@ -595,6 +596,7 @@ static inline void zcrypt_drop_queue(struct zcrypt_card *zc, atomic_sub(weight, &zq->load); put_device(&zq->queue->ap_dev.device); zcrypt_queue_put(zq); + zcrypt_card_put(zc); module_put(mod); } -- 2.34.1
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[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] s390/zcrypt: fix reference counting on zcrypt card objects
by felix 14 May '24

14 May '24
From: Harald Freudenberger <freude(a)linux.ibm.com> stable inclusion from stable-v4.19.312 commit 7e500849fa558879a1cde43f80c7c048c2437058 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9L4T8 CVE: CVE-2024-26957 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 50ed48c80fecbe17218afed4f8bed005c802976c ] Tests with hot-plugging crytpo cards on KVM guests with debug kernel build revealed an use after free for the load field of the struct zcrypt_card. The reason was an incorrect reference handling of the zcrypt card object which could lead to a free of the zcrypt card object while it was still in use. This is an example of the slab message: kernel: 0x00000000885a7512-0x00000000885a7513 @offset=1298. First byte 0x68 instead of 0x6b kernel: Allocated in zcrypt_card_alloc+0x36/0x70 [zcrypt] age=18046 cpu=3 pid=43 kernel: kmalloc_trace+0x3f2/0x470 kernel: zcrypt_card_alloc+0x36/0x70 [zcrypt] kernel: zcrypt_cex4_card_probe+0x26/0x380 [zcrypt_cex4] kernel: ap_device_probe+0x15c/0x290 kernel: really_probe+0xd2/0x468 kernel: driver_probe_device+0x40/0xf0 kernel: __device_attach_driver+0xc0/0x140 kernel: bus_for_each_drv+0x8c/0xd0 kernel: __device_attach+0x114/0x198 kernel: bus_probe_device+0xb4/0xc8 kernel: device_add+0x4d2/0x6e0 kernel: ap_scan_adapter+0x3d0/0x7c0 kernel: ap_scan_bus+0x5a/0x3b0 kernel: ap_scan_bus_wq_callback+0x40/0x60 kernel: process_one_work+0x26e/0x620 kernel: worker_thread+0x21c/0x440 kernel: Freed in zcrypt_card_put+0x54/0x80 [zcrypt] age=9024 cpu=3 pid=43 kernel: kfree+0x37e/0x418 kernel: zcrypt_card_put+0x54/0x80 [zcrypt] kernel: ap_device_remove+0x4c/0xe0 kernel: device_release_driver_internal+0x1c4/0x270 kernel: bus_remove_device+0x100/0x188 kernel: device_del+0x164/0x3c0 kernel: device_unregister+0x30/0x90 kernel: ap_scan_adapter+0xc8/0x7c0 kernel: ap_scan_bus+0x5a/0x3b0 kernel: ap_scan_bus_wq_callback+0x40/0x60 kernel: process_one_work+0x26e/0x620 kernel: worker_thread+0x21c/0x440 kernel: kthread+0x150/0x168 kernel: __ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x58 kernel: ret_from_fork+0xa/0x30 kernel: Slab 0x00000372022169c0 objects=20 used=18 fp=0x00000000885a7c88 flags=0x3ffff00000000a00(workingset|slab|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x1ffff) kernel: Object 0x00000000885a74b8 @offset=1208 fp=0x00000000885a7c88 kernel: Redzone 00000000885a74b0: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb ........ kernel: Object 00000000885a74b8: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk kernel: Object 00000000885a74c8: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk kernel: Object 00000000885a74d8: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk kernel: Object 00000000885a74e8: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk kernel: Object 00000000885a74f8: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk kernel: Object 00000000885a7508: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 68 4b 6b 6b 6b a5 kkkkkkkkkkhKkkk. kernel: Redzone 00000000885a7518: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb ........ kernel: Padding 00000000885a756c: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a ZZZZZZZZZZZZ kernel: CPU: 0 PID: 387 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 6.8.0-HF #2 kernel: Hardware name: IBM 3931 A01 704 (KVM/Linux) kernel: Call Trace: kernel: [<00000000ca5ab5b8>] dump_stack_lvl+0x90/0x120 kernel: [<00000000c99d78bc>] check_bytes_and_report+0x114/0x140 kernel: [<00000000c99d53cc>] check_object+0x334/0x3f8 kernel: [<00000000c99d820c>] alloc_debug_processing+0xc4/0x1f8 kernel: [<00000000c99d852e>] get_partial_node.part.0+0x1ee/0x3e0 kernel: [<00000000c99d94ec>] ___slab_alloc+0xaf4/0x13c8 kernel: [<00000000c99d9e38>] __slab_alloc.constprop.0+0x78/0xb8 kernel: [<00000000c99dc8dc>] __kmalloc+0x434/0x590 kernel: [<00000000c9b4c0ce>] ext4_htree_store_dirent+0x4e/0x1c0 kernel: [<00000000c9b908a2>] htree_dirblock_to_tree+0x17a/0x3f0 kernel: [<00000000c9b919dc>] ext4_htree_fill_tree+0x134/0x400 kernel: [<00000000c9b4b3d0>] ext4_dx_readdir+0x160/0x2f0 kernel: [<00000000c9b4bedc>] ext4_readdir+0x5f4/0x760 kernel: [<00000000c9a7efc4>] iterate_dir+0xb4/0x280 kernel: [<00000000c9a7f1ea>] __do_sys_getdents64+0x5a/0x120 kernel: [<00000000ca5d6946>] __do_syscall+0x256/0x310 kernel: [<00000000ca5eea10>] system_call+0x70/0x98 kernel: INFO: lockdep is turned off. kernel: FIX kmalloc-96: Restoring Poison 0x00000000885a7512-0x00000000885a7513=0x6b kernel: FIX kmalloc-96: Marking all objects used The fix is simple: Before use of the queue not only the queue object but also the card object needs to increase it's reference count with a call to zcrypt_card_get(). Similar after use of the queue not only the queue but also the card object's reference count is decreased with zcrypt_card_put(). Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude(a)linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Holger Dengler <dengler(a)linux.ibm.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca(a)linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Felix Fu <fuzhen5(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_api.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_api.c b/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_api.c index b2737bfeb8bb..4881ee2053f9 100644 --- a/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_api.c +++ b/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_api.c @@ -158,6 +158,7 @@ static inline struct zcrypt_queue *zcrypt_pick_queue(struct zcrypt_card *zc, { if (!zq || !try_module_get(zq->queue->ap_dev.drv->driver.owner)) return NULL; + zcrypt_card_get(zc); zcrypt_queue_get(zq); get_device(&zq->queue->ap_dev.device); atomic_add(weight, &zc->load); @@ -177,6 +178,7 @@ static inline void zcrypt_drop_queue(struct zcrypt_card *zc, atomic_sub(weight, &zq->load); put_device(&zq->queue->ap_dev.device); zcrypt_queue_put(zq); + zcrypt_card_put(zc); module_put(mod); } -- 2.34.1
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[PATCH OLK-6.6] arm64: arm_pmuv3: Correctly extract and check the PMUVer
by Junhao He 14 May '24

14 May '24
From: Yicong Yang <yangyicong(a)hisilicon.com> maillist inclusion category: bugifx bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I9J01A CVE: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/will/linux.git/commit/?h=fo… ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Currently we're using "sbfx" to extract the PMUVer from ID_AA64DFR0_EL1 and skip the init/reset if no PMU present when the extracted PMUVer is negative or is zero. However for PMUv3p8 the PMUVer will be 0b1000 and PMUVer extracted by "sbfx" will always be negative and we'll skip the init/reset in __init_el2_debug/reset_pmuserenr_el0 unexpectedly. So this patch use "ubfx" instead of "sbfx" to extract the PMUVer. If the PMUVer is implementation defined (0b1111) or not implemented(0b0000) then skip the reset/init. Previously we'll also skip the init/reset if the PMUVer is higher than the version we known (currently PMUv3p9), with this patch we'll only skip if the PMU is not implemented or implementation defined. This keeps consistence with how we probe the PMU in the driver with pmuv3_implemented(). Signed-off-by: Yicong Yang <yangyicong(a)hisilicon.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240411123030.7201-1-yangyicong@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Junhao He <hejunhao3(a)huawei.com> --- arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h | 7 ++++--- arch/arm64/include/asm/el2_setup.h | 9 +++++---- 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h index c738877b8c72..38b23786aeb4 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h @@ -516,9 +516,10 @@ alternative_endif */ .macro reset_pmuserenr_el0, tmpreg mrs \tmpreg, id_aa64dfr0_el1 - sbfx \tmpreg, \tmpreg, #ID_AA64DFR0_EL1_PMUVer_SHIFT, #4 - cmp \tmpreg, #1 // Skip if no PMU present - b.lt 9000f + ubfx \tmpreg, \tmpreg, #ID_AA64DFR0_EL1_PMUVer_SHIFT, #4 + cmp \tmpreg, #ID_AA64DFR0_EL1_PMUVer_NI + ccmp \tmpreg, #ID_AA64DFR0_EL1_PMUVer_IMP_DEF, #4, ne + b.eq 9000f // Skip if no PMU present or IMP_DEF msr pmuserenr_el0, xzr // Disable PMU access from EL0 9000: .endm diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/el2_setup.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/el2_setup.h index 1e2181820a0a..3dc7c58d55b6 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/el2_setup.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/el2_setup.h @@ -59,13 +59,14 @@ .macro __init_el2_debug mrs x1, id_aa64dfr0_el1 - sbfx x0, x1, #ID_AA64DFR0_EL1_PMUVer_SHIFT, #4 - cmp x0, #1 - b.lt .Lskip_pmu_\@ // Skip if no PMU present + ubfx x0, x1, #ID_AA64DFR0_EL1_PMUVer_SHIFT, #4 + cmp x0, #ID_AA64DFR0_EL1_PMUVer_NI + ccmp x0, #ID_AA64DFR0_EL1_PMUVer_IMP_DEF, #4, ne + b.eq .Lskip_pmu_\@ // Skip if no PMU present or IMP_DEF mrs x0, pmcr_el0 // Disable debug access traps ubfx x0, x0, #11, #5 // to EL2 and allow access to .Lskip_pmu_\@: - csel x2, xzr, x0, lt // all PMU counters from EL1 + csel x2, xzr, x0, eq // all PMU counters from EL1 /* Statistical profiling */ ubfx x0, x1, #ID_AA64DFR0_EL1_PMSVer_SHIFT, #4 -- 2.33.0
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[PATCH OLK-5.10] x86/fpu: Invalidate FPU state correctly on exec()
by Yang Yingliang 14 May '24

14 May '24
From: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe(a)intel.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.5-rc7 commit 1f69383b203e28cf8a4ca9570e572da1699f76cd category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I9NZ3E Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- The thread flag TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD indicates that the FPU saved state is valid and should be reloaded when returning to userspace. However, the kernel will skip doing this if the FPU registers are already valid as determined by fpregs_state_valid(). The logic embedded there considers the state valid if two cases are both true: 1: fpu_fpregs_owner_ctx points to the current tasks FPU state 2: the last CPU the registers were live in was the current CPU. This is usually correct logic. A CPU’s fpu_fpregs_owner_ctx is set to the current FPU during the fpregs_restore_userregs() operation, so it indicates that the registers have been restored on this CPU. But this alone doesn’t preclude that the task hasn’t been rescheduled to a different CPU, where the registers were modified, and then back to the current CPU. To verify that this was not the case the logic relies on the second condition. So the assumption is that if the registers have been restored, AND they haven’t had the chance to be modified (by being loaded on another CPU), then they MUST be valid on the current CPU. Besides the lazy FPU optimizations, the other cases where the FPU registers might not be valid are when the kernel modifies the FPU register state or the FPU saved buffer. In this case the operation modifying the FPU state needs to let the kernel know the correspondence has been broken. The comment in “arch/x86/kernel/fpu/context.h” has: /* ... * If the FPU register state is valid, the kernel can skip restoring the * FPU state from memory. * * Any code that clobbers the FPU registers or updates the in-memory * FPU state for a task MUST let the rest of the kernel know that the * FPU registers are no longer valid for this task. * * Either one of these invalidation functions is enough. Invalidate * a resource you control: CPU if using the CPU for something else * (with preemption disabled), FPU for the current task, or a task that * is prevented from running by the current task. */ However, this is not completely true. When the kernel modifies the registers or saved FPU state, it can only rely on __fpu_invalidate_fpregs_state(), which wipes the FPU’s last_cpu tracking. The exec path instead relies on fpregs_deactivate(), which sets the CPU’s FPU context to NULL. This was observed to fail to restore the reset FPU state to the registers when returning to userspace in the following scenario: 1. A task is executing in userspace on CPU0 - CPU0’s FPU context points to tasks - fpu->last_cpu=CPU0 2. The task exec()’s 3. While in the kernel the task is preempted - CPU0 gets a thread executing in the kernel (such that no other FPU context is activated) - Scheduler sets task’s fpu->last_cpu=CPU0 when scheduling out 4. Task is migrated to CPU1 5. Continuing the exec(), the task gets to fpu_flush_thread()->fpu_reset_fpregs() - Sets CPU1’s fpu context to NULL - Copies the init state to the task’s FPU buffer - Sets TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD on the task 6. The task reschedules back to CPU0 before completing the exec() and returning to userspace - During the reschedule, scheduler finds TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD is set - Skips saving the registers and updating task’s fpu→last_cpu, because TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD is the canonical source. 7. Now CPU0’s FPU context is still pointing to the task’s, and fpu->last_cpu is still CPU0. So fpregs_state_valid() returns true even though the reset FPU state has not been restored. So the root cause is that exec() is doing the wrong kind of invalidate. It should reset fpu->last_cpu via __fpu_invalidate_fpregs_state(). Further, fpu__drop() doesn't really seem appropriate as the task (and FPU) are not going away, they are just getting reset as part of an exec. So switch to __fpu_invalidate_fpregs_state(). Also, delete the misleading comment that says that either kind of invalidate will be enough, because it’s not always the case. Fixes: 33344368cb08 ("x86/fpu: Clean up the fpu__clear() variants") Reported-by: Lei Wang <lei4.wang(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Tested-by: Lijun Pan <lijun.pan(a)intel.com> Reviewed-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta(a)intel.com> Acked-by: Lijun Pan <lijun.pan(a)intel.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230818170305.502891-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang(a)huawei.com> --- arch/x86/kernel/fpu/context.h | 3 +-- arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/context.h b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/context.h index 958accf2ccf0..0adef4bb0859 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/context.h +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/context.h @@ -19,8 +19,7 @@ * FPU state for a task MUST let the rest of the kernel know that the * FPU registers are no longer valid for this task. * - * Either one of these invalidation functions is enough. Invalidate - * a resource you control: CPU if using the CPU for something else + * Invalidate a resource you control: CPU if using the CPU for something else * (with preemption disabled), FPU for the current task, or a task that * is prevented from running by the current task. */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c index 114e87e8de86..49a56bac0d16 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c @@ -659,7 +659,7 @@ static void fpu_reset_fpregs(void) struct fpu *fpu = &current->thread.fpu; fpregs_lock(); - fpu__drop(fpu); + __fpu_invalidate_fpregs_state(fpu); /* * This does not change the actual hardware registers. It just * resets the memory image and sets TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD so a -- 2.25.1
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