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[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS 1/4] mm/sharepool: Fix using uninitialized sp_flag
by Yongqiang Liu 01 Jul '22

01 Jul '22

From: Wang Wensheng <wangwensheng4(a)huawei.com> hulk inclusion category: feature bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I578LV CVE: NA ------------------------------------------------- Add the missing initialization for kc.sp_flag in sp_make_share_kva_to_spg(). Or a random value would be used in sp_remap_kva_to_vma(). Fixes: da51b55eeff9 ("mm/share_pool: Support read-only memory allocation") Signed-off-by: Wang Wensheng <wangwensheng4(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Weilong Chen <chenweilong(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Yongqiang Liu <liuyongqiang13(a)huawei.com> --- mm/share_pool.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/mm/share_pool.c b/mm/share_pool.c index ec889155b0ff..893e5352bf01 100644 --- a/mm/share_pool.c +++ b/mm/share_pool.c @@ -3023,7 +3023,7 @@ static void *sp_make_share_kva_to_spg(unsigned long kva, unsigned long size, } spa->kva = kva; - + kc.sp_flags = sp_flags; list_for_each_entry(spg_node, &spg->procs, proc_node) { mm = spg_node->master->mm; kc.state = K2U_NORMAL; -- 2.25.1

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[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS 1/4] alinux: sched: Defend cfs and rt bandwidth against overflow
by liuzhengyuan＠kylinos.cn 30 Jun '22

30 Jun '22

From: Huaixin Chang <changhuaixin(a)linux.alibaba.com> anolis inclusion from anolis_master commit 9d168f216486333f24aa1b33706eddf3b13d7228 category: performance bugzilla: NA CVE: NA --------------------------- Kernel limitation on cpu.cfs_quota_us is insufficient. Some large numbers might cause overflow in to_ratio() calculation and produce unexpected results. For example, if we make two cpu cgroups and then write a reasonable value and a large value into child's and parent's cpu.cfs_quota_us. This will cause a write error. cd /sys/fs/cgroup/cpu mkdir parent; mkdir parent/child echo 8000 > parent/child/cpu.cfs_quota_us # 17592186044416 is (1UL << 44) echo 17592186044416 > parent/cpu.cfs_quota_us In this case, quota will overflow and thus fail the __cfs_schedulable check. Similar overflow also affects rt bandwidth. Burstable CFS bandwidth controller will also benefit from limiting quota. Change-Id: I0f89d1f26b168c5cfa041e886395c7f3068114ae Reviewed-by: Shanpei Chen <shanpeic(a)linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Huaixin Chang <changhuaixin(a)linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Zhengyuan Liu <liuzhengyuan(a)kylinos.cn> --- kernel/sched/core.c | 8 ++++++++ kernel/sched/rt.c | 9 +++++++++ kernel/sched/sched.h | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 19 insertions(+) diff --git a/kernel/sched/core.c b/kernel/sched/core.c index 36d7422da0ac..51fdd30f188a 100644 --- a/kernel/sched/core.c +++ b/kernel/sched/core.c @@ -6679,6 +6679,8 @@ static DEFINE_MUTEX(cfs_constraints_mutex); const u64 max_cfs_quota_period = 1 * NSEC_PER_SEC; /* 1s */ const u64 min_cfs_quota_period = 1 * NSEC_PER_MSEC; /* 1ms */ +/* More than 203 days if BW_SHIFT equals 20. */ +const u64 max_cfs_runtime = MAX_BW_USEC * NSEC_PER_USEC; static int __cfs_schedulable(struct task_group *tg, u64 period, u64 runtime); @@ -6706,6 +6708,12 @@ static int tg_set_cfs_bandwidth(struct task_group *tg, u64 period, u64 quota) if (period > max_cfs_quota_period) return -EINVAL; + /* + * Bound quota to defend quota against overflow during bandwidth shift. + */ + if (quota != RUNTIME_INF && quota > max_cfs_runtime) + return -EINVAL; + /* * Prevent race between setting of cfs_rq->runtime_enabled and * unthrottle_offline_cfs_rqs(). diff --git a/kernel/sched/rt.c b/kernel/sched/rt.c index 301ba04d9130..f31e0aaf1f43 100644 --- a/kernel/sched/rt.c +++ b/kernel/sched/rt.c @@ -2518,6 +2518,9 @@ static int __rt_schedulable(struct task_group *tg, u64 period, u64 runtime) return ret; } +/* More than 203 days if BW_SHIFT equals 20. */ +static const u64 max_rt_runtime = MAX_BW_USEC * NSEC_PER_USEC; + static int tg_set_rt_bandwidth(struct task_group *tg, u64 rt_period, u64 rt_runtime) { @@ -2534,6 +2537,12 @@ static int tg_set_rt_bandwidth(struct task_group *tg, if (rt_period == 0) return -EINVAL; + /* + * Bound quota to defend quota against overflow during bandwidth shift. + */ + if (rt_runtime != RUNTIME_INF && rt_runtime > max_rt_runtime) + return -EINVAL; + mutex_lock(&rt_constraints_mutex); read_lock(&tasklist_lock); err = __rt_schedulable(tg, rt_period, rt_runtime); diff --git a/kernel/sched/sched.h b/kernel/sched/sched.h index ae3068153093..f3808a49ce48 100644 --- a/kernel/sched/sched.h +++ b/kernel/sched/sched.h @@ -1732,6 +1732,8 @@ extern void init_dl_rq_bw_ratio(struct dl_rq *dl_rq); #define BW_SHIFT 20 #define BW_UNIT (1 << BW_SHIFT) #define RATIO_SHIFT 8 +#define MAX_BW_BITS (64 - BW_SHIFT) +#define MAX_BW_USEC ((1UL << MAX_BW_BITS) - 1) unsigned long to_ratio(u64 period, u64 runtime); extern void init_entity_runnable_average(struct sched_entity *se); -- 2.25.1

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[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS 01/14] mm/sharepool: Delete single-group mode
by Yongqiang Liu 29 Jun '22

29 Jun '22

From: Zhou Guanghui <zhouguanghui1(a)huawei.com> hulk inclusion category: feature bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5EORS CVE: NA -------------------------------- The single-group mode has no application scenario. Therefore, the related branch is deleted. The boot option "enable_sp_multi_group_mode" does not take effect. Signed-off-by: Zhou Guanghui <zhouguanghui1(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Weilong Chen <chenweilong(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Yongqiang Liu <liuyongqiang13(a)huawei.com> --- mm/share_pool.c | 137 +++++++++--------------------------------------- 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 112 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/share_pool.c b/mm/share_pool.c index 5ba353ddfabd..48e309e3ddd3 100644 --- a/mm/share_pool.c +++ b/mm/share_pool.c @@ -65,9 +65,6 @@ #define byte2mb(size) ((size) >> 20) #define page2kb(page_num) ((page_num) << (PAGE_SHIFT - 10)) -#define SINGLE_GROUP_MODE 1 -#define MULTI_GROUP_MODE 2 - #define MAX_GROUP_FOR_SYSTEM 50000 #define MAX_GROUP_FOR_TASK 3000 #define MAX_PROC_PER_GROUP 1024 @@ -98,8 +95,6 @@ int sysctl_sp_perf_alloc; int sysctl_sp_perf_k2u; -static int share_pool_group_mode = SINGLE_GROUP_MODE; - static int system_group_count; static unsigned int sp_device_number; @@ -1088,12 +1083,6 @@ static int mm_add_group_init(struct mm_struct *mm, struct sp_group *spg) struct sp_group_master *master = mm->sp_group_master; bool exist = false; - if (share_pool_group_mode == SINGLE_GROUP_MODE && master && - master->count == 1) { - pr_err_ratelimited("at most one sp group for a task is allowed in single mode\n"); - return -EEXIST; - } - master = sp_init_group_master_locked(mm, &exist); if (IS_ERR(master)) return PTR_ERR(master); @@ -2235,72 +2224,30 @@ static int sp_alloc_prepare(unsigned long size, unsigned long sp_flags, if (sp_flags & SP_HUGEPAGE_ONLY) sp_flags |= SP_HUGEPAGE; - if (share_pool_group_mode == SINGLE_GROUP_MODE) { - spg = __sp_find_spg(current->pid, SPG_ID_DEFAULT); - if (spg) { - if (spg_id != SPG_ID_DEFAULT && spg->id != spg_id) { - sp_group_drop(spg); - return -ENODEV; - } - - /* up_read will be at the end of sp_alloc */ - down_read(&spg->rw_lock); - if (!spg_valid(spg)) { - up_read(&spg->rw_lock); - sp_group_drop(spg); - pr_err_ratelimited("allocation failed, spg is dead\n"); - return -ENODEV; - } - } else { /* alocation pass through scene */ - if (enable_mdc_default_group) { - int ret = 0; - - ret = sp_group_add_task(current->tgid, spg_id); - if (ret < 0) { - pr_err_ratelimited("add group failed in pass through\n"); - return ret; - } - - spg = __sp_find_spg(current->pid, SPG_ID_DEFAULT); - - /* up_read will be at the end of sp_alloc */ - down_read(&spg->rw_lock); - if (!spg_valid(spg)) { - up_read(&spg->rw_lock); - sp_group_drop(spg); - pr_err_ratelimited("pass through allocation failed, spg is dead\n"); - return -ENODEV; - } - } else { - spg = spg_none; - } + if (spg_id != SPG_ID_DEFAULT) { + spg = __sp_find_spg(current->pid, spg_id); + if (!spg) { + pr_err_ratelimited("allocation failed, can't find group\n"); + return -ENODEV; } - } else { - if (spg_id != SPG_ID_DEFAULT) { - spg = __sp_find_spg(current->pid, spg_id); - if (!spg) { - pr_err_ratelimited("allocation failed, can't find group\n"); - return -ENODEV; - } - /* up_read will be at the end of sp_alloc */ - down_read(&spg->rw_lock); - if (!spg_valid(spg)) { - up_read(&spg->rw_lock); - sp_group_drop(spg); - pr_err_ratelimited("allocation failed, spg is dead\n"); - return -ENODEV; - } + /* up_read will be at the end of sp_alloc */ + down_read(&spg->rw_lock); + if (!spg_valid(spg)) { + up_read(&spg->rw_lock); + sp_group_drop(spg); + pr_err_ratelimited("allocation failed, spg is dead\n"); + return -ENODEV; + } - if (!is_process_in_group(spg, current->mm)) { - up_read(&spg->rw_lock); - sp_group_drop(spg); - pr_err_ratelimited("allocation failed, task not in group\n"); - return -ENODEV; - } - } else { /* alocation pass through scene */ - spg = spg_none; + if (!is_process_in_group(spg, current->mm)) { + up_read(&spg->rw_lock); + sp_group_drop(spg); + pr_err_ratelimited("allocation failed, task not in group\n"); + return -ENODEV; } + } else { /* alocation pass through scene */ + spg = spg_none; } if (sp_flags & SP_HUGEPAGE) { @@ -2914,33 +2861,12 @@ static int sp_k2u_prepare(unsigned long kva, unsigned long size, kc->size_aligned = size_aligned; kc->sp_flags = sp_flags; kc->spg_id = spg_id; - kc->to_task = false; - return 0; -} - -static int sp_check_k2task(struct sp_k2u_context *kc) -{ - int ret = 0; - int spg_id = kc->spg_id; - - if (share_pool_group_mode == SINGLE_GROUP_MODE) { - struct sp_group *spg = get_first_group(current->mm); + if (spg_id == SPG_ID_DEFAULT || spg_id == SPG_ID_NONE) + kc->to_task = true; + else + kc->to_task = false; - if (!spg) { - if (spg_id != SPG_ID_NONE && spg_id != SPG_ID_DEFAULT) - ret = -EINVAL; - else - kc->to_task = true; - } else { - if (spg_id != SPG_ID_DEFAULT && spg_id != spg->id) - ret = -EINVAL; - sp_group_drop(spg); - } - } else { - if (spg_id == SPG_ID_DEFAULT || spg_id == SPG_ID_NONE) - kc->to_task = true; - } - return ret; + return 0; } static void *sp_k2u_finish(void *uva, struct sp_k2u_context *kc) @@ -2985,12 +2911,6 @@ void *sp_make_share_k2u(unsigned long kva, unsigned long size, if (ret) return ERR_PTR(ret); - ret = sp_check_k2task(&kc); - if (ret) { - uva = ERR_PTR(ret); - goto out; - } - if (kc.to_task) uva = sp_make_share_kva_to_task(kc.kva_aligned, kc.size_aligned, kc.sp_flags); else { @@ -3738,13 +3658,6 @@ static int __init enable_share_k2u_to_group(char *s) } __setup("enable_sp_share_k2u_spg", enable_share_k2u_to_group); -static int __init enable_sp_multi_group_mode(char *s) -{ - share_pool_group_mode = MULTI_GROUP_MODE; - return 1; -} -__setup("enable_sp_multi_group_mode", enable_sp_multi_group_mode); - /*** Statistical and maintenance functions ***/ static void free_process_spg_proc_stat(struct sp_proc_stat *proc_stat) -- 2.25.1

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[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS 1/2] ipmi/watchdog: replace atomic_add() and atomic_sub()
by Miaohe Lin 29 Jun '22

29 Jun '22

From: Yejune Deng <yejune.deng(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from v5.11-rc1 commit a01a89b1db1066a6af23ae08b9a0c345b7966f0b category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5DVR9 CVE: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- atomic_inc() and atomic_dec() looks better Signed-off-by: Yejune Deng <yejune.deng(a)gmail.com> Message-Id: <1605511807-7135-1-git-send-email-yejune.deng(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard(a)mvista.com> Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_watchdog.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_watchdog.c b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_watchdog.c index f78156d93c3f..32c334e34d55 100644 --- a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_watchdog.c +++ b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_watchdog.c @@ -495,7 +495,7 @@ static void panic_halt_ipmi_heartbeat(void) msg.cmd = IPMI_WDOG_RESET_TIMER; msg.data = NULL; msg.data_len = 0; - atomic_add(1, &panic_done_count); + atomic_inc(&panic_done_count); rv = ipmi_request_supply_msgs(watchdog_user, (struct ipmi_addr *) &addr, 0, @@ -505,7 +505,7 @@ static void panic_halt_ipmi_heartbeat(void) &panic_halt_heartbeat_recv_msg, 1); if (rv) - atomic_sub(1, &panic_done_count); + atomic_dec(&panic_done_count); } static struct ipmi_smi_msg panic_halt_smi_msg = { @@ -529,12 +529,12 @@ static void panic_halt_ipmi_set_timeout(void) /* Wait for the messages to be free. */ while (atomic_read(&panic_done_count) != 0) ipmi_poll_interface(watchdog_user); - atomic_add(1, &panic_done_count); + atomic_inc(&panic_done_count); rv = __ipmi_set_timeout(&panic_halt_smi_msg, &panic_halt_recv_msg, &send_heartbeat_now); if (rv) { - atomic_sub(1, &panic_done_count); + atomic_dec(&panic_done_count); pr_warn("Unable to extend the watchdog timeout\n"); } else { if (send_heartbeat_now) -- 2.23.0

1 1

[PATCH openEuler-5.10-LTS 1/8] net: hns3: set port base vlan tbl_sta to false before removing old vlan
by Zheng Zengkai 28 Jun '22

28 Jun '22

From: Guangbin Huang <huangguangbin2(a)huawei.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.19-rc1 commit 9eda7d8bcbdb category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5DGNU CVE: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… ---------------------------------------------------------------------- When modify port base vlan, the port base vlan tbl_sta needs to set to false before removing old vlan, to indicate this operation is not finish. Fixes: c0f46de30c96 ("net: hns3: fix port base vlan add fail when concurrent with reset") Signed-off-by: Guangbin Huang <huangguangbin2(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Jiantao Xiao <xiaojiantao1(a)h-partners.com> Reviewed-by: Jian Shen <shenjian15(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Yue Haibing <yuehaibing(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns3/hns3pf/hclge_main.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns3/hns3pf/hclge_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns3/hns3pf/hclge_main.c index 3e0d8388ad3f..57aaa2f1536f 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns3/hns3pf/hclge_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns3/hns3pf/hclge_main.c @@ -10117,6 +10117,7 @@ static int hclge_modify_port_base_vlan_tag(struct hclge_vport *vport, if (ret) return ret; + vport->port_base_vlan_cfg.tbl_sta = false; /* remove old VLAN tag */ if (old_info->vlan_tag == 0) ret = hclge_set_vf_vlan_common(hdev, vport->vport_id, -- 2.20.1

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[PATCH OLK-5.10 v3 1/2] ipmi/watchdog: replace atomic_add() and atomic_sub()
by Miaohe Lin 28 Jun '22

28 Jun '22

From: Yejune Deng <yejune.deng(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from v5.11-rc1 commit a01a89b1db1066a6af23ae08b9a0c345b7966f0b category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5DVR9 CVE: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- atomic_inc() and atomic_dec() looks better Signed-off-by: Yejune Deng <yejune.deng(a)gmail.com> Message-Id: <1605511807-7135-1-git-send-email-yejune.deng(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard(a)mvista.com> Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_watchdog.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_watchdog.c b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_watchdog.c index f78156d93c3f..32c334e34d55 100644 --- a/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_watchdog.c +++ b/drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_watchdog.c @@ -495,7 +495,7 @@ static void panic_halt_ipmi_heartbeat(void) msg.cmd = IPMI_WDOG_RESET_TIMER; msg.data = NULL; msg.data_len = 0; - atomic_add(1, &panic_done_count); + atomic_inc(&panic_done_count); rv = ipmi_request_supply_msgs(watchdog_user, (struct ipmi_addr *) &addr, 0, @@ -505,7 +505,7 @@ static void panic_halt_ipmi_heartbeat(void) &panic_halt_heartbeat_recv_msg, 1); if (rv) - atomic_sub(1, &panic_done_count); + atomic_dec(&panic_done_count); } static struct ipmi_smi_msg panic_halt_smi_msg = { @@ -529,12 +529,12 @@ static void panic_halt_ipmi_set_timeout(void) /* Wait for the messages to be free. */ while (atomic_read(&panic_done_count) != 0) ipmi_poll_interface(watchdog_user); - atomic_add(1, &panic_done_count); + atomic_inc(&panic_done_count); rv = __ipmi_set_timeout(&panic_halt_smi_msg, &panic_halt_recv_msg, &send_heartbeat_now); if (rv) { - atomic_sub(1, &panic_done_count); + atomic_dec(&panic_done_count); pr_warn("Unable to extend the watchdog timeout\n"); } else { if (send_heartbeat_now) -- 2.23.0

1 1

[PATCH openEuler-5.10 1/5] lockdown: also lock down previous kgdb use
by Zheng Zengkai 28 Jun '22

28 Jun '22

From: Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson(a)linaro.org> from stable-v5.10.119 commit a8f4d63142f947cd22fa615b8b3b8921cdaf4991 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I5A5YP CVE: CVE-2022-21499 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… commit eadb2f47a3ced5c64b23b90fd2a3463f63726066 upstream. KGDB and KDB allow read and write access to kernel memory, and thus should be restricted during lockdown. An attacker with access to a serial port (for example, via a hypervisor console, which some cloud vendors provide over the network) could trigger the debugger so it is important that the debugger respect the lockdown mode when/if it is triggered. Fix this by integrating lockdown into kdb's existing permissions mechanism. Unfortunately kgdb does not have any permissions mechanism (although it certainly could be added later) so, for now, kgdb is simply and brutally disabled by immediately exiting the gdb stub without taking any action. For lockdowns established early in the boot (e.g. the normal case) then this should be fine but on systems where kgdb has set breakpoints before the lockdown is enacted than "bad things" will happen. CVE: CVE-2022-21499 Co-developed-by: Stephen Brennan <stephen.s.brennan(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Brennan <stephen.s.brennan(a)oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders(a)chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Zheng Yejian <zhengyejian1(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai(a)huawei.com> --- include/linux/security.h | 2 ++ kernel/debug/debug_core.c | 24 ++++++++++++++ kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_main.c | 62 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- security/security.c | 2 ++ 4 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 35355429648e..330029ef7e89 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -121,10 +121,12 @@ enum lockdown_reason { LOCKDOWN_DEBUGFS, LOCKDOWN_XMON_WR, LOCKDOWN_BPF_WRITE_USER, + LOCKDOWN_DBG_WRITE_KERNEL, LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX, LOCKDOWN_KCORE, LOCKDOWN_KPROBES, LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ, + LOCKDOWN_DBG_READ_KERNEL, LOCKDOWN_PERF, LOCKDOWN_TRACEFS, LOCKDOWN_XMON_RW, diff --git a/kernel/debug/debug_core.c b/kernel/debug/debug_core.c index be5b6b97adbf..363f781b56ca 100644 --- a/kernel/debug/debug_core.c +++ b/kernel/debug/debug_core.c @@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ #include <linux/vmacache.h> #include <linux/rcupdate.h> #include <linux/irq.h> +#include <linux/security.h> #include <asm/cacheflush.h> #include <asm/byteorder.h> @@ -762,6 +763,29 @@ static int kgdb_cpu_enter(struct kgdb_state *ks, struct pt_regs *regs, continue; kgdb_connected = 0; } else { + /* + * This is a brutal way to interfere with the debugger + * and prevent gdb being used to poke at kernel memory. + * This could cause trouble if lockdown is applied when + * there is already an active gdb session. For now the + * answer is simply "don't do that". Typically lockdown + * *will* be applied before the debug core gets started + * so only developers using kgdb for fairly advanced + * early kernel debug can be biten by this. Hopefully + * they are sophisticated enough to take care of + * themselves, especially with help from the lockdown + * message printed on the console! + */ + if (security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_DBG_WRITE_KERNEL)) { + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KGDB_KDB)) { + /* Switch back to kdb if possible... */ + dbg_kdb_mode = 1; + continue; + } else { + /* ... otherwise just bail */ + break; + } + } error = gdb_serial_stub(ks); } diff --git a/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_main.c b/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_main.c index 930ac1b25ec7..4e09fab52faf 100644 --- a/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_main.c +++ b/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_main.c @@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ #include <linux/proc_fs.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h> #include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/security.h> #include "kdb_private.h" #undef MODULE_PARAM_PREFIX @@ -197,10 +198,62 @@ struct task_struct *kdb_curr_task(int cpu) } /* - * Check whether the flags of the current command and the permissions - * of the kdb console has allow a command to be run. + * Update the permissions flags (kdb_cmd_enabled) to match the + * current lockdown state. + * + * Within this function the calls to security_locked_down() are "lazy". We + * avoid calling them if the current value of kdb_cmd_enabled already excludes + * flags that might be subject to lockdown. Additionally we deliberately check + * the lockdown flags independently (even though read lockdown implies write + * lockdown) since that results in both simpler code and clearer messages to + * the user on first-time debugger entry. + * + * The permission masks during a read+write lockdown permits the following + * flags: INSPECT, SIGNAL, REBOOT (and ALWAYS_SAFE). + * + * The INSPECT commands are not blocked during lockdown because they are + * not arbitrary memory reads. INSPECT covers the backtrace family (sometimes + * forcing them to have no arguments) and lsmod. These commands do expose + * some kernel state but do not allow the developer seated at the console to + * choose what state is reported. SIGNAL and REBOOT should not be controversial, + * given these are allowed for root during lockdown already. + */ +static void kdb_check_for_lockdown(void) +{ + const int write_flags = KDB_ENABLE_MEM_WRITE | + KDB_ENABLE_REG_WRITE | + KDB_ENABLE_FLOW_CTRL; + const int read_flags = KDB_ENABLE_MEM_READ | + KDB_ENABLE_REG_READ; + + bool need_to_lockdown_write = false; + bool need_to_lockdown_read = false; + + if (kdb_cmd_enabled & (KDB_ENABLE_ALL | write_flags)) + need_to_lockdown_write = + security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_DBG_WRITE_KERNEL); + + if (kdb_cmd_enabled & (KDB_ENABLE_ALL | read_flags)) + need_to_lockdown_read = + security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_DBG_READ_KERNEL); + + /* De-compose KDB_ENABLE_ALL if required */ + if (need_to_lockdown_write || need_to_lockdown_read) + if (kdb_cmd_enabled & KDB_ENABLE_ALL) + kdb_cmd_enabled = KDB_ENABLE_MASK & ~KDB_ENABLE_ALL; + + if (need_to_lockdown_write) + kdb_cmd_enabled &= ~write_flags; + + if (need_to_lockdown_read) + kdb_cmd_enabled &= ~read_flags; +} + +/* + * Check whether the flags of the current command, the permissions of the kdb + * console and the lockdown state allow a command to be run. */ -static inline bool kdb_check_flags(kdb_cmdflags_t flags, int permissions, +static bool kdb_check_flags(kdb_cmdflags_t flags, int permissions, bool no_args) { /* permissions comes from userspace so needs massaging slightly */ @@ -1194,6 +1247,9 @@ static int kdb_local(kdb_reason_t reason, int error, struct pt_regs *regs, kdb_curr_task(raw_smp_processor_id()); KDB_DEBUG_STATE("kdb_local 1", reason); + + kdb_check_for_lockdown(); + kdb_go_count = 0; if (reason == KDB_REASON_DEBUG) { /* special case below */ diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 4fb58543eeb9..2fc40217d49d 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -59,10 +59,12 @@ const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = { [LOCKDOWN_DEBUGFS] = "debugfs access", [LOCKDOWN_XMON_WR] = "xmon write access", [LOCKDOWN_BPF_WRITE_USER] = "use of bpf to write user RAM", + [LOCKDOWN_DBG_WRITE_KERNEL] = "use of kgdb/kdb to write kernel RAM", [LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity", [LOCKDOWN_KCORE] = "/proc/kcore access", [LOCKDOWN_KPROBES] = "use of kprobes", [LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ] = "use of bpf to read kernel RAM", + [LOCKDOWN_DBG_READ_KERNEL] = "use of kgdb/kdb to read kernel RAM", [LOCKDOWN_PERF] = "unsafe use of perf", [LOCKDOWN_TRACEFS] = "use of tracefs", [LOCKDOWN_XMON_RW] = "xmon read and write access", -- 2.20.1

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[PATCH openEuler-5.10 00/31] Backport 5.10.109 LTS
by Zheng Zengkai 28 Jun '22

28 Jun '22

Backport 5.10.109 LTS patches from upstream nds32: fix access_ok() checks in get/put_user wcn36xx: Differentiate wcn3660 from wcn3620 tpm: use try_get_ops() in tpm-space.c mac80211: fix potential double free on mesh join rcu: Don't deboost before reporting expedited quiescent state Revert "ath: add support for special 0x0 regulatory domain" crypto: qat - disable registration of algorithms ACPI: video: Force backlight native for Clevo NL5xRU and NL5xNU ACPI: battery: Add device HID and quirk for Microsoft Surface Go 3 ACPI / x86: Work around broken XSDT on Advantech DAC-BJ01 board drivers: net: xgene: Fix regression in CRC stripping ALSA: pci: fix reading of swapped values from pcmreg in AC97 codec ALSA: cmipci: Restore aux vol on suspend/resume ALSA: usb-audio: Add mute TLV for playback volumes on RODE NT-USB ALSA: pcm: Add stream lock during PCM reset ioctl operations ALSA: pcm: Fix races among concurrent prealloc proc writes ALSA: pcm: Fix races among concurrent prepare and hw_params/hw_free calls ALSA: pcm: Fix races among concurrent read/write and buffer changes ALSA: pcm: Fix races among concurrent hw_params and hw_free calls ALSA: hda/realtek: Add quirk for ASUS GA402 ALSA: hda/realtek - Fix headset mic problem for a HP machine with alc671 ALSA: hda/realtek: Add quirk for Clevo NP50PNJ ALSA: hda/realtek: Add quirk for Clevo NP70PNJ ALSA: usb-audio: add mapping for new Corsair Virtuoso SE ALSA: oss: Fix PCM OSS buffer allocation overflow ASoC: sti: Fix deadlock via snd_pcm_stop_xrun() call staging: fbtft: fb_st7789v: reset display before initialization tpm: Fix error handling in async work cgroup-v1: Correct privileges check in release_agent writes exfat: avoid incorrectly releasing for root inode net: ipv6: fix skb_over_panic in __ip6_append_data Already merged: llc: only change llc->dev when bind() succeeds netfilter: nf_tables: initialize registers in nft_do_chain() llc: fix netdevice reference leaks in llc_ui_bind() cgroup: Use open-time cgroup namespace for process migration perm checks cgroup: Allocate cgroup_file_ctx for kernfs_open_file->priv nfc: st21nfca: Fix potential buffer overflows in EVT_TRANSACTION Total patches: 37 - 6 = 31 Arnd Bergmann (1): nds32: fix access_ok() checks in get/put_user Brian Norris (1): Revert "ath: add support for special 0x0 regulatory domain" Bryan O'Donoghue (1): wcn36xx: Differentiate wcn3660 from wcn3620 Chen Li (1): exfat: avoid incorrectly releasing for root inode Giacomo Guiduzzi (1): ALSA: pci: fix reading of swapped values from pcmreg in AC97 codec Giovanni Cabiddu (1): crypto: qat - disable registration of algorithms James Bottomley (1): tpm: use try_get_ops() in tpm-space.c Jason Zheng (1): ALSA: hda/realtek: Add quirk for ASUS GA402 Jonathan Teh (1): ALSA: cmipci: Restore aux vol on suspend/resume Lars-Peter Clausen (1): ALSA: usb-audio: Add mute TLV for playback volumes on RODE NT-USB Linus Lüssing (1): mac80211: fix potential double free on mesh join Mark Cilissen (1): ACPI / x86: Work around broken XSDT on Advantech DAC-BJ01 board Maximilian Luz (1): ACPI: battery: Add device HID and quirk for Microsoft Surface Go 3 Michal Koutný (1): cgroup-v1: Correct privileges check in release_agent writes Oliver Graute (1): staging: fbtft: fb_st7789v: reset display before initialization Paul E. McKenney (1): rcu: Don't deboost before reporting expedited quiescent state Reza Jahanbakhshi (1): ALSA: usb-audio: add mapping for new Corsair Virtuoso SE Stephane Graber (1): drivers: net: xgene: Fix regression in CRC stripping Tadeusz Struk (2): net: ipv6: fix skb_over_panic in __ip6_append_data tpm: Fix error handling in async work Takashi Iwai (7): ASoC: sti: Fix deadlock via snd_pcm_stop_xrun() call ALSA: oss: Fix PCM OSS buffer allocation overflow ALSA: pcm: Fix races among concurrent hw_params and hw_free calls ALSA: pcm: Fix races among concurrent read/write and buffer changes ALSA: pcm: Fix races among concurrent prepare and hw_params/hw_free calls ALSA: pcm: Fix races among concurrent prealloc proc writes ALSA: pcm: Add stream lock during PCM reset ioctl operations Tim Crawford (2): ALSA: hda/realtek: Add quirk for Clevo NP70PNJ ALSA: hda/realtek: Add quirk for Clevo NP50PNJ Werner Sembach (1): ACPI: video: Force backlight native for Clevo NL5xRU and NL5xNU huangwenhui (1): ALSA: hda/realtek - Fix headset mic problem for a HP machine with alc671 arch/nds32/include/asm/uaccess.h | 22 ++++- arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c | 24 +++++ drivers/acpi/battery.c | 12 +++ drivers/acpi/video_detect.c | 75 ++++++++++++++ drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c | 8 +- drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c | 8 +- drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/qat_crypto.c | 8 ++ .../net/ethernet/apm/xgene/xgene_enet_main.c | 12 ++- drivers/net/wireless/ath/regd.c | 10 +- drivers/net/wireless/ath/wcn36xx/main.c | 3 + drivers/net/wireless/ath/wcn36xx/wcn36xx.h | 1 + drivers/staging/fbtft/fb_st7789v.c | 2 + fs/exfat/super.c | 2 +- include/sound/pcm.h | 1 + kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c | 6 +- kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h | 9 +- net/ipv6/ip6_output.c | 4 +- net/mac80211/cfg.c | 3 - sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c | 12 ++- sound/core/oss/pcm_plugin.c | 5 +- sound/core/pcm.c | 2 + sound/core/pcm_lib.c | 4 + sound/core/pcm_memory.c | 11 ++- sound/core/pcm_native.c | 97 ++++++++++++------- sound/pci/ac97/ac97_codec.c | 4 +- sound/pci/cmipci.c | 3 +- sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c | 4 + sound/soc/sti/uniperif_player.c | 6 +- sound/soc/sti/uniperif_reader.c | 2 +- sound/usb/mixer_maps.c | 10 ++ sound/usb/mixer_quirks.c | 7 +- 31 files changed, 289 insertions(+), 88 deletions(-) -- 2.20.1

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[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] io_uring: io_close: Set owner as current->files if req->work.files uninitialized
by Yongqiang Liu 28 Jun '22

28 Jun '22

From: Zhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1(a)huawei.com> hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: 186543, https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5BGFA CVE: NA -------------------------------- Following process will trigger an use-after-free problem: 1. open /proc/sysvipc/msg and lock it by file lock fcntl_setlk do_lock_file_wait vfs_lock_file posix_lock_file locks_insert_lock_ctx locks_insert_global_locks // Added to lock list 2. Close /proc/sysvipc/msg by io_uring filp_close(close->put_file, req->work.files) // req->work.files equals NULL，io_grab_files() initialize it, non-async operations won't invokes the function. locks_remove_posix(filp, NULL) lock.fl_owner = NULL vfs_lock_file posix_lock_file posix_same_owner // Return false according to fl_owner. locks_delete_lock_ctx(fl, &dispose) and locks_dispose_list won't be executed, flock is not removed from lock list fput(filp) // release filp 3. Read /proc/locks seq_read locks_start // Get flock from lock list locks_show lock_get_status file_inode(f->file) // Access released file, UAF occurs! Fix it by passing current->files when req->work.files is uninitialized, because io-sq thread shares same files with uring_fd task, so it still works in SQPOLL mode. Signed-off-by: Zhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Yongqiang Liu <liuyongqiang13(a)huawei.com> --- fs/io_uring.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/io_uring.c b/fs/io_uring.c index c104425b2557..7ae8ba98e73b 100644 --- a/fs/io_uring.c +++ b/fs/io_uring.c @@ -3903,7 +3903,7 @@ static int io_close(struct io_kiocb *req, bool force_nonblock, } /* No ->flush() or already async, safely close from here */ - ret = filp_close(close->put_file, req->work.files); + ret = filp_close(close->put_file, req->work.files ? : current->files); if (ret < 0) req_set_fail_links(req); fput(close->put_file); -- 2.25.1

1 0

[PATCH openEuler-5.10-LTS 1/5] lockdown: also lock down previous kgdb use
by Zheng Zengkai 27 Jun '22

27 Jun '22

From: Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson(a)linaro.org> from stable-v5.10.119 commit a8f4d63142f947cd22fa615b8b3b8921cdaf4991 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I5A5YP CVE: CVE-2022-21499 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… commit eadb2f47a3ced5c64b23b90fd2a3463f63726066 upstream. KGDB and KDB allow read and write access to kernel memory, and thus should be restricted during lockdown. An attacker with access to a serial port (for example, via a hypervisor console, which some cloud vendors provide over the network) could trigger the debugger so it is important that the debugger respect the lockdown mode when/if it is triggered. Fix this by integrating lockdown into kdb's existing permissions mechanism. Unfortunately kgdb does not have any permissions mechanism (although it certainly could be added later) so, for now, kgdb is simply and brutally disabled by immediately exiting the gdb stub without taking any action. For lockdowns established early in the boot (e.g. the normal case) then this should be fine but on systems where kgdb has set breakpoints before the lockdown is enacted than "bad things" will happen. CVE: CVE-2022-21499 Co-developed-by: Stephen Brennan <stephen.s.brennan(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Brennan <stephen.s.brennan(a)oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders(a)chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Zheng Yejian <zhengyejian1(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai(a)huawei.com> --- include/linux/security.h | 2 ++ kernel/debug/debug_core.c | 24 ++++++++++++++ kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_main.c | 62 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- security/security.c | 2 ++ 4 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 35355429648e..330029ef7e89 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -121,10 +121,12 @@ enum lockdown_reason { LOCKDOWN_DEBUGFS, LOCKDOWN_XMON_WR, LOCKDOWN_BPF_WRITE_USER, + LOCKDOWN_DBG_WRITE_KERNEL, LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX, LOCKDOWN_KCORE, LOCKDOWN_KPROBES, LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ, + LOCKDOWN_DBG_READ_KERNEL, LOCKDOWN_PERF, LOCKDOWN_TRACEFS, LOCKDOWN_XMON_RW, diff --git a/kernel/debug/debug_core.c b/kernel/debug/debug_core.c index be5b6b97adbf..363f781b56ca 100644 --- a/kernel/debug/debug_core.c +++ b/kernel/debug/debug_core.c @@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ #include <linux/vmacache.h> #include <linux/rcupdate.h> #include <linux/irq.h> +#include <linux/security.h> #include <asm/cacheflush.h> #include <asm/byteorder.h> @@ -762,6 +763,29 @@ static int kgdb_cpu_enter(struct kgdb_state *ks, struct pt_regs *regs, continue; kgdb_connected = 0; } else { + /* + * This is a brutal way to interfere with the debugger + * and prevent gdb being used to poke at kernel memory. + * This could cause trouble if lockdown is applied when + * there is already an active gdb session. For now the + * answer is simply "don't do that". Typically lockdown + * *will* be applied before the debug core gets started + * so only developers using kgdb for fairly advanced + * early kernel debug can be biten by this. Hopefully + * they are sophisticated enough to take care of + * themselves, especially with help from the lockdown + * message printed on the console! + */ + if (security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_DBG_WRITE_KERNEL)) { + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KGDB_KDB)) { + /* Switch back to kdb if possible... */ + dbg_kdb_mode = 1; + continue; + } else { + /* ... otherwise just bail */ + break; + } + } error = gdb_serial_stub(ks); } diff --git a/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_main.c b/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_main.c index 930ac1b25ec7..4e09fab52faf 100644 --- a/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_main.c +++ b/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_main.c @@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ #include <linux/proc_fs.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h> #include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/security.h> #include "kdb_private.h" #undef MODULE_PARAM_PREFIX @@ -197,10 +198,62 @@ struct task_struct *kdb_curr_task(int cpu) } /* - * Check whether the flags of the current command and the permissions - * of the kdb console has allow a command to be run. + * Update the permissions flags (kdb_cmd_enabled) to match the + * current lockdown state. + * + * Within this function the calls to security_locked_down() are "lazy". We + * avoid calling them if the current value of kdb_cmd_enabled already excludes + * flags that might be subject to lockdown. Additionally we deliberately check + * the lockdown flags independently (even though read lockdown implies write + * lockdown) since that results in both simpler code and clearer messages to + * the user on first-time debugger entry. + * + * The permission masks during a read+write lockdown permits the following + * flags: INSPECT, SIGNAL, REBOOT (and ALWAYS_SAFE). + * + * The INSPECT commands are not blocked during lockdown because they are + * not arbitrary memory reads. INSPECT covers the backtrace family (sometimes + * forcing them to have no arguments) and lsmod. These commands do expose + * some kernel state but do not allow the developer seated at the console to + * choose what state is reported. SIGNAL and REBOOT should not be controversial, + * given these are allowed for root during lockdown already. + */ +static void kdb_check_for_lockdown(void) +{ + const int write_flags = KDB_ENABLE_MEM_WRITE | + KDB_ENABLE_REG_WRITE | + KDB_ENABLE_FLOW_CTRL; + const int read_flags = KDB_ENABLE_MEM_READ | + KDB_ENABLE_REG_READ; + + bool need_to_lockdown_write = false; + bool need_to_lockdown_read = false; + + if (kdb_cmd_enabled & (KDB_ENABLE_ALL | write_flags)) + need_to_lockdown_write = + security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_DBG_WRITE_KERNEL); + + if (kdb_cmd_enabled & (KDB_ENABLE_ALL | read_flags)) + need_to_lockdown_read = + security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_DBG_READ_KERNEL); + + /* De-compose KDB_ENABLE_ALL if required */ + if (need_to_lockdown_write || need_to_lockdown_read) + if (kdb_cmd_enabled & KDB_ENABLE_ALL) + kdb_cmd_enabled = KDB_ENABLE_MASK & ~KDB_ENABLE_ALL; + + if (need_to_lockdown_write) + kdb_cmd_enabled &= ~write_flags; + + if (need_to_lockdown_read) + kdb_cmd_enabled &= ~read_flags; +} + +/* + * Check whether the flags of the current command, the permissions of the kdb + * console and the lockdown state allow a command to be run. */ -static inline bool kdb_check_flags(kdb_cmdflags_t flags, int permissions, +static bool kdb_check_flags(kdb_cmdflags_t flags, int permissions, bool no_args) { /* permissions comes from userspace so needs massaging slightly */ @@ -1194,6 +1247,9 @@ static int kdb_local(kdb_reason_t reason, int error, struct pt_regs *regs, kdb_curr_task(raw_smp_processor_id()); KDB_DEBUG_STATE("kdb_local 1", reason); + + kdb_check_for_lockdown(); + kdb_go_count = 0; if (reason == KDB_REASON_DEBUG) { /* special case below */ diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 4fb58543eeb9..2fc40217d49d 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -59,10 +59,12 @@ const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = { [LOCKDOWN_DEBUGFS] = "debugfs access", [LOCKDOWN_XMON_WR] = "xmon write access", [LOCKDOWN_BPF_WRITE_USER] = "use of bpf to write user RAM", + [LOCKDOWN_DBG_WRITE_KERNEL] = "use of kgdb/kdb to write kernel RAM", [LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity", [LOCKDOWN_KCORE] = "/proc/kcore access", [LOCKDOWN_KPROBES] = "use of kprobes", [LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ] = "use of bpf to read kernel RAM", + [LOCKDOWN_DBG_READ_KERNEL] = "use of kgdb/kdb to read kernel RAM", [LOCKDOWN_PERF] = "unsafe use of perf", [LOCKDOWN_TRACEFS] = "use of tracefs", [LOCKDOWN_XMON_RW] = "xmon read and write access", -- 2.20.1

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