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[PATCH OLK-5.10] net/mlx5e: Fix use-after-free of encap entry in neigh update handler
by Zhang Changzhong 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: Vlad Buslov <vladbu(a)nvidia.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.13-rc7 commit fb1a3132ee1ac968316e45d21a48703a6db0b6c3 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9R4FV CVE: CVE-2021-47247 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Function mlx5e_rep_neigh_update() wasn't updated to accommodate rtnl lock removal from TC filter update path and properly handle concurrent encap entry insertion/deletion which can lead to following use-after-free: [23827.464923] ================================================================== [23827.469446] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in mlx5e_encap_take+0x72/0x140 [mlx5_core] [23827.470971] Read of size 4 at addr ffff8881d132228c by task kworker/u20:6/21635 [23827.472251] [23827.472615] CPU: 9 PID: 21635 Comm: kworker/u20:6 Not tainted 5.13.0-rc3+ #5 [23827.473788] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [23827.475639] Workqueue: mlx5e mlx5e_rep_neigh_update [mlx5_core] [23827.476731] Call Trace: [23827.477260] dump_stack+0xbb/0x107 [23827.477906] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x18/0x140 [23827.478896] ? mlx5e_encap_take+0x72/0x140 [mlx5_core] [23827.479879] ? mlx5e_encap_take+0x72/0x140 [mlx5_core] [23827.480905] kasan_report.cold+0x7c/0xd8 [23827.481701] ? mlx5e_encap_take+0x72/0x140 [mlx5_core] [23827.482744] kasan_check_range+0x145/0x1a0 [23827.493112] mlx5e_encap_take+0x72/0x140 [mlx5_core] [23827.494054] ? mlx5e_tc_tun_encap_info_equal_generic+0x140/0x140 [mlx5_core] [23827.495296] mlx5e_rep_neigh_update+0x41e/0x5e0 [mlx5_core] [23827.496338] ? mlx5e_rep_neigh_entry_release+0xb80/0xb80 [mlx5_core] [23827.497486] ? read_word_at_a_time+0xe/0x20 [23827.498250] ? strscpy+0xa0/0x2a0 [23827.498889] process_one_work+0x8ac/0x14e0 [23827.499638] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x400/0x400 [23827.500537] ? pwq_dec_nr_in_flight+0x2c0/0x2c0 [23827.501359] ? rwlock_bug.part.0+0x90/0x90 [23827.502116] worker_thread+0x53b/0x1220 [23827.502831] ? process_one_work+0x14e0/0x14e0 [23827.503627] kthread+0x328/0x3f0 [23827.504254] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x40 [23827.505065] ? __kthread_bind_mask+0x90/0x90 [23827.505912] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [23827.506621] [23827.506987] Allocated by task 28248: [23827.507694] kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40 [23827.508476] __kasan_kmalloc+0x7c/0x90 [23827.509197] mlx5e_attach_encap+0xde1/0x1d40 [mlx5_core] [23827.510194] mlx5e_tc_add_fdb_flow+0x397/0xc40 [mlx5_core] [23827.511218] __mlx5e_add_fdb_flow+0x519/0xb30 [mlx5_core] [23827.512234] mlx5e_configure_flower+0x191c/0x4870 [mlx5_core] [23827.513298] tc_setup_cb_add+0x1d5/0x420 [23827.514023] fl_hw_replace_filter+0x382/0x6a0 [cls_flower] [23827.514975] fl_change+0x2ceb/0x4a51 [cls_flower] [23827.515821] tc_new_tfilter+0x89a/0x2070 [23827.516548] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x644/0x8c0 [23827.517300] netlink_rcv_skb+0x11d/0x340 [23827.518021] netlink_unicast+0x42b/0x700 [23827.518742] netlink_sendmsg+0x743/0xc20 [23827.519467] sock_sendmsg+0xb2/0xe0 [23827.520131] ____sys_sendmsg+0x590/0x770 [23827.520851] ___sys_sendmsg+0xd8/0x160 [23827.521552] __sys_sendmsg+0xb7/0x140 [23827.522238] do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x70 [23827.522907] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [23827.523797] [23827.524163] Freed by task 25948: [23827.524780] kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40 [23827.525488] kasan_set_track+0x1c/0x30 [23827.526187] kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x30 [23827.526968] __kasan_slab_free+0xed/0x130 [23827.527709] slab_free_freelist_hook+0xcf/0x1d0 [23827.528528] kmem_cache_free_bulk+0x33a/0x6e0 [23827.529317] kfree_rcu_work+0x55f/0xb70 [23827.530024] process_one_work+0x8ac/0x14e0 [23827.530770] worker_thread+0x53b/0x1220 [23827.531480] kthread+0x328/0x3f0 [23827.532114] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [23827.532785] [23827.533147] Last potentially related work creation: [23827.534007] kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40 [23827.534710] kasan_record_aux_stack+0xab/0xc0 [23827.535492] kvfree_call_rcu+0x31/0x7b0 [23827.536206] mlx5e_tc_del_fdb_flow+0x577/0xef0 [mlx5_core] [23827.537305] mlx5e_flow_put+0x49/0x80 [mlx5_core] [23827.538290] mlx5e_delete_flower+0x6d1/0xe60 [mlx5_core] [23827.539300] tc_setup_cb_destroy+0x18e/0x2f0 [23827.540144] fl_hw_destroy_filter+0x1d2/0x310 [cls_flower] [23827.541148] __fl_delete+0x4dc/0x660 [cls_flower] [23827.541985] fl_delete+0x97/0x160 [cls_flower] [23827.542782] tc_del_tfilter+0x7ab/0x13d0 [23827.543503] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x644/0x8c0 [23827.544257] netlink_rcv_skb+0x11d/0x340 [23827.544981] netlink_unicast+0x42b/0x700 [23827.545700] netlink_sendmsg+0x743/0xc20 [23827.546424] sock_sendmsg+0xb2/0xe0 [23827.547084] ____sys_sendmsg+0x590/0x770 [23827.547850] ___sys_sendmsg+0xd8/0x160 [23827.548606] __sys_sendmsg+0xb7/0x140 [23827.549303] do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x70 [23827.549969] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [23827.550853] [23827.551217] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881d1322200 [23827.551217] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-256 of size 256 [23827.553341] The buggy address is located 140 bytes inside of [23827.553341] 256-byte region [ffff8881d1322200, ffff8881d1322300) [23827.555747] The buggy address belongs to the page: [23827.556847] page:00000000898762aa refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x1d1320 [23827.558651] head:00000000898762aa order:2 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0 [23827.559961] flags: 0x2ffff800010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1ffff) [23827.561243] raw: 002ffff800010200 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 ffff888100042b40 [23827.562653] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000200020 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 [23827.564112] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [23827.565439] [23827.565932] Memory state around the buggy address: [23827.566917] ffff8881d1322180: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [23827.568485] ffff8881d1322200: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [23827.569818] >ffff8881d1322280: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [23827.571143] ^ [23827.571879] ffff8881d1322300: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [23827.573283] ffff8881d1322380: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [23827.574654] ================================================================== Most of the necessary logic is already correctly implemented by mlx5e_get_next_valid_encap() helper that is used in neigh stats update handler. Make the handler generic by renaming it to mlx5e_get_next_matching_encap() and use callback to test whether flow is matching instead of hardcoded check for 'valid' flag value. Implement mlx5e_get_next_valid_encap() by calling mlx5e_get_next_matching_encap() with callback that tests encap MLX5_ENCAP_ENTRY_VALID flag. Implement new mlx5e_get_next_init_encap() helper by calling mlx5e_get_next_matching_encap() with callback that tests encap completion result to be non-error and use it in mlx5e_rep_neigh_update() to safely iterate over nhe->encap_list. Remove encap completion logic from mlx5e_rep_update_flows() since the encap entries passed to this function are already guaranteed to be properly initialized by similar code in mlx5e_get_next_init_encap(). Fixes: 2a1f1768fa17 ("net/mlx5e: Refactor neigh update for concurrent execution") Signed-off-by: Vlad Buslov <vladbu(a)nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Roi Dayan <roid(a)nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm(a)nvidia.com> Conflicts: drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/tc_tun_encap.c drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/rep/neigh.c drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tc.c drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tc.h [Adjust context because patchset 08cbabb77e90 ("Merge tag 'mlx5-updates-2021-02-04' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/saeed/linux") not merged] Signed-off-by: Zhang Changzhong <zhangchangzhong(a)huawei.com> --- .../net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/rep/neigh.c | 15 ++++------ .../net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/rep/tc.c | 6 +--- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tc.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++-- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tc.h | 3 ++ 4 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/rep/neigh.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/rep/neigh.c index 58e2703..bbc182e 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/rep/neigh.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/rep/neigh.c @@ -129,9 +129,8 @@ static void mlx5e_rep_neigh_update(struct work_struct *work) work); struct mlx5e_neigh_hash_entry *nhe = update_work->nhe; struct neighbour *n = update_work->n; - struct mlx5e_encap_entry *e; + struct mlx5e_encap_entry *e = NULL; unsigned char ha[ETH_ALEN]; - struct mlx5e_priv *priv; bool neigh_connected; u8 nud_state, dead; @@ -152,14 +151,12 @@ static void mlx5e_rep_neigh_update(struct work_struct *work) trace_mlx5e_rep_neigh_update(nhe, ha, neigh_connected); - list_for_each_entry(e, &nhe->encap_list, encap_list) { - if (!mlx5e_encap_take(e)) - continue; + /* mlx5e_get_next_init_encap() releases previous encap before returning + * the next one. + */ + while ((e = mlx5e_get_next_init_encap(nhe, e)) != NULL) + mlx5e_rep_update_flows(netdev_priv(e->out_dev), e, neigh_connected, ha); - priv = netdev_priv(e->out_dev); - mlx5e_rep_update_flows(priv, e, neigh_connected, ha); - mlx5e_encap_put(priv, e); - } rtnl_unlock(); mlx5e_release_neigh_update_work(update_work); } diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/rep/tc.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/rep/tc.c index 2fdea05..552c07e 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/rep/tc.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/rep/tc.c @@ -91,13 +91,9 @@ void mlx5e_rep_update_flows(struct mlx5e_priv *priv, ASSERT_RTNL(); - /* wait for encap to be fully initialized */ - wait_for_completion(&e->res_ready); - mutex_lock(&esw->offloads.encap_tbl_lock); encap_connected = !!(e->flags & MLX5_ENCAP_ENTRY_VALID); - if (e->compl_result < 0 || (encap_connected == neigh_connected && - ether_addr_equal(e->h_dest, ha))) + if (encap_connected == neigh_connected && ether_addr_equal(e->h_dest, ha)) goto unlock; mlx5e_take_all_encap_flows(e, &flow_list); diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tc.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tc.c index f7ccca7..5ca5c3d 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tc.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tc.c @@ -1653,9 +1653,12 @@ void mlx5e_put_encap_flow_list(struct mlx5e_priv *priv, struct list_head *flow_l mlx5e_flow_put(priv, flow); } +typedef bool (match_cb)(struct mlx5e_encap_entry *); + static struct mlx5e_encap_entry * -mlx5e_get_next_valid_encap(struct mlx5e_neigh_hash_entry *nhe, - struct mlx5e_encap_entry *e) +mlx5e_get_next_matching_encap(struct mlx5e_neigh_hash_entry *nhe, + struct mlx5e_encap_entry *e, + match_cb match) { struct mlx5e_encap_entry *next = NULL; @@ -1690,7 +1693,7 @@ mlx5e_get_next_valid_encap(struct mlx5e_neigh_hash_entry *nhe, /* wait for encap to be fully initialized */ wait_for_completion(&next->res_ready); /* continue searching if encap entry is not in valid state after completion */ - if (!(next->flags & MLX5_ENCAP_ENTRY_VALID)) { + if (!match(next)) { e = next; goto retry; } @@ -1698,6 +1701,30 @@ mlx5e_get_next_valid_encap(struct mlx5e_neigh_hash_entry *nhe, return next; } +static bool mlx5e_encap_valid(struct mlx5e_encap_entry *e) +{ + return e->flags & MLX5_ENCAP_ENTRY_VALID; +} + +static struct mlx5e_encap_entry * +mlx5e_get_next_valid_encap(struct mlx5e_neigh_hash_entry *nhe, + struct mlx5e_encap_entry *e) +{ + return mlx5e_get_next_matching_encap(nhe, e, mlx5e_encap_valid); +} + +static bool mlx5e_encap_initialized(struct mlx5e_encap_entry *e) +{ + return e->compl_result >= 0; +} + +struct mlx5e_encap_entry * +mlx5e_get_next_init_encap(struct mlx5e_neigh_hash_entry *nhe, + struct mlx5e_encap_entry *e) +{ + return mlx5e_get_next_matching_encap(nhe, e, mlx5e_encap_initialized); +} + void mlx5e_tc_update_neigh_used_value(struct mlx5e_neigh_hash_entry *nhe) { struct mlx5e_neigh *m_neigh = &nhe->m_neigh; diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tc.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tc.h index 4a2ce24..e7e5f0c 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tc.h +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tc.h @@ -161,6 +161,9 @@ void mlx5e_take_all_encap_flows(struct mlx5e_encap_entry *e, struct list_head *f void mlx5e_put_encap_flow_list(struct mlx5e_priv *priv, struct list_head *flow_list); struct mlx5e_neigh_hash_entry; +struct mlx5e_encap_entry * +mlx5e_get_next_init_encap(struct mlx5e_neigh_hash_entry *nhe, + struct mlx5e_encap_entry *e); void mlx5e_tc_update_neigh_used_value(struct mlx5e_neigh_hash_entry *nhe); void mlx5e_tc_reoffload_flows_work(struct work_struct *work); -- 2.9.5

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] ALSA: scarlett2: Add missing error checks to *_ctl_get()
by Yu Liao 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: "Geoffrey D. Bennett" <g(a)b4.vu> stable inclusion from stable-v5.15.148 commit 3a09488f4f67f7ade59b8ac62a6c7fb29439cf51 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9Q9F0 CVE: CVE-2023-52680 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 50603a67daef161c78c814580d57f7f0be57167e ] The *_ctl_get() functions which call scarlett2_update_*() were not checking the return value. Fix to check the return value and pass to the caller. Signed-off-by: Geoffrey D. Bennett <g(a)b4.vu> Fixes: 9e4d5c1be21f ("ALSA: usb-audio: Scarlett Gen 2 mixer interface") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/32a5fdc83b05fa74e0fcdd672fbf71d75c5f0a6d.17030010… Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai(a)suse.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: sound/usb/mixer_scarlett_gen2.c [Follow the patch logic and adapt the patch.] Signed-off-by: Yu Liao <liaoyu15(a)huawei.com> --- sound/usb/mixer_scarlett_gen2.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/usb/mixer_scarlett_gen2.c b/sound/usb/mixer_scarlett_gen2.c index 6b7c8b8d7111..d1c0d2bf4b6f 100644 --- a/sound/usb/mixer_scarlett_gen2.c +++ b/sound/usb/mixer_scarlett_gen2.c @@ -1032,14 +1032,20 @@ static int scarlett2_master_volume_ctl_get(struct snd_kcontrol *kctl, struct usb_mixer_elem_info *elem = kctl->private_data; struct usb_mixer_interface *mixer = elem->head.mixer; struct scarlett2_mixer_data *private = mixer->private_data; + int err = 0; mutex_lock(&private->data_mutex); - if (private->vol_updated) - scarlett2_update_volumes(mixer); - mutex_unlock(&private->data_mutex); + if (private->vol_updated) { + err = scarlett2_update_volumes(mixer); + if (err < 0) + goto unlock; + } ucontrol->value.integer.value[0] = private->master_vol; - return 0; + +unlock: + mutex_unlock(&private->data_mutex); + return err; } static int scarlett2_volume_ctl_get(struct snd_kcontrol *kctl, @@ -1049,14 +1055,19 @@ static int scarlett2_volume_ctl_get(struct snd_kcontrol *kctl, struct usb_mixer_interface *mixer = elem->head.mixer; struct scarlett2_mixer_data *private = mixer->private_data; int index = elem->control; + int err = 0; mutex_lock(&private->data_mutex); - if (private->vol_updated) - scarlett2_update_volumes(mixer); - mutex_unlock(&private->data_mutex); - + if (private->vol_updated) { + err = scarlett2_update_volumes(mixer); + if (err < 0) + goto unlock; + } ucontrol->value.integer.value[0] = private->vol[index]; - return 0; + +unlock: + mutex_unlock(&private->data_mutex); + return err; } static int scarlett2_volume_ctl_put(struct snd_kcontrol *kctl, @@ -1322,14 +1333,20 @@ static int scarlett2_button_ctl_get(struct snd_kcontrol *kctl, struct usb_mixer_elem_info *elem = kctl->private_data; struct usb_mixer_interface *mixer = elem->head.mixer; struct scarlett2_mixer_data *private = mixer->private_data; + int err = 0; mutex_lock(&private->data_mutex); - if (private->vol_updated) - scarlett2_update_volumes(mixer); - mutex_unlock(&private->data_mutex); + if (private->vol_updated) { + err = scarlett2_update_volumes(mixer); + if (err < 0) + goto unlock; + } ucontrol->value.enumerated.item[0] = private->buttons[elem->control]; - return 0; + +unlock: + mutex_unlock(&private->data_mutex); + return err; } static int scarlett2_button_ctl_put(struct snd_kcontrol *kctl, -- 2.33.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] ALSA: scarlett2: Add missing error checks to *_ctl_get()
by Yu Liao 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: "Geoffrey D. Bennett" <g(a)b4.vu> stable inclusion from stable-v5.15.148 commit 3a09488f4f67f7ade59b8ac62a6c7fb29439cf51 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9Q9F0 CVE: CVE-2023-52680 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 50603a67daef161c78c814580d57f7f0be57167e ] The *_ctl_get() functions which call scarlett2_update_*() were not checking the return value. Fix to check the return value and pass to the caller. Signed-off-by: Geoffrey D. Bennett <g(a)b4.vu> Fixes: 9e4d5c1be21f ("ALSA: usb-audio: Scarlett Gen 2 mixer interface") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/32a5fdc83b05fa74e0fcdd672fbf71d75c5f0a6d.17030010… Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai(a)suse.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: sound/usb/mixer_scarlett_gen2.c [Follow the patch logic and adapt the patch.] Signed-off-by: Yu Liao <liaoyu15(a)huawei.com> --- sound/usb/mixer_scarlett_gen2.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/usb/mixer_scarlett_gen2.c b/sound/usb/mixer_scarlett_gen2.c index 6b7c8b8d7111..d1c0d2bf4b6f 100644 --- a/sound/usb/mixer_scarlett_gen2.c +++ b/sound/usb/mixer_scarlett_gen2.c @@ -1032,14 +1032,20 @@ static int scarlett2_master_volume_ctl_get(struct snd_kcontrol *kctl, struct usb_mixer_elem_info *elem = kctl->private_data; struct usb_mixer_interface *mixer = elem->head.mixer; struct scarlett2_mixer_data *private = mixer->private_data; + int err = 0; mutex_lock(&private->data_mutex); - if (private->vol_updated) - scarlett2_update_volumes(mixer); - mutex_unlock(&private->data_mutex); + if (private->vol_updated) { + err = scarlett2_update_volumes(mixer); + if (err < 0) + goto unlock; + } ucontrol->value.integer.value[0] = private->master_vol; - return 0; + +unlock: + mutex_unlock(&private->data_mutex); + return err; } static int scarlett2_volume_ctl_get(struct snd_kcontrol *kctl, @@ -1049,14 +1055,19 @@ static int scarlett2_volume_ctl_get(struct snd_kcontrol *kctl, struct usb_mixer_interface *mixer = elem->head.mixer; struct scarlett2_mixer_data *private = mixer->private_data; int index = elem->control; + int err = 0; mutex_lock(&private->data_mutex); - if (private->vol_updated) - scarlett2_update_volumes(mixer); - mutex_unlock(&private->data_mutex); - + if (private->vol_updated) { + err = scarlett2_update_volumes(mixer); + if (err < 0) + goto unlock; + } ucontrol->value.integer.value[0] = private->vol[index]; - return 0; + +unlock: + mutex_unlock(&private->data_mutex); + return err; } static int scarlett2_volume_ctl_put(struct snd_kcontrol *kctl, @@ -1322,14 +1333,20 @@ static int scarlett2_button_ctl_get(struct snd_kcontrol *kctl, struct usb_mixer_elem_info *elem = kctl->private_data; struct usb_mixer_interface *mixer = elem->head.mixer; struct scarlett2_mixer_data *private = mixer->private_data; + int err = 0; mutex_lock(&private->data_mutex); - if (private->vol_updated) - scarlett2_update_volumes(mixer); - mutex_unlock(&private->data_mutex); + if (private->vol_updated) { + err = scarlett2_update_volumes(mixer); + if (err < 0) + goto unlock; + } ucontrol->value.enumerated.item[0] = private->buttons[elem->control]; - return 0; + +unlock: + mutex_unlock(&private->data_mutex); + return err; } static int scarlett2_button_ctl_put(struct snd_kcontrol *kctl, -- 2.33.0

2 1

[OLK-5.10 PATCH] ALSA: scarlett2: Add missing error checks to *_ctl_get()
by Yu Liao 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: "Geoffrey D. Bennett" <g(a)b4.vu> stable inclusion from stable-v5.15.148 commit 3a09488f4f67f7ade59b8ac62a6c7fb29439cf51 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9Q9F0 CVE: CVE-2023-52680 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 50603a67daef161c78c814580d57f7f0be57167e ] The *_ctl_get() functions which call scarlett2_update_*() were not checking the return value. Fix to check the return value and pass to the caller. Signed-off-by: Geoffrey D. Bennett <g(a)b4.vu> Fixes: 9e4d5c1be21f ("ALSA: usb-audio: Scarlett Gen 2 mixer interface") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/32a5fdc83b05fa74e0fcdd672fbf71d75c5f0a6d.17030010… Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai(a)suse.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: sound/usb/mixer_scarlett_gen2.c [Follow the patch logic and adapt the patch.] Signed-off-by: Yu Liao <liaoyu15(a)huawei.com> --- sound/usb/mixer_scarlett_gen2.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/usb/mixer_scarlett_gen2.c b/sound/usb/mixer_scarlett_gen2.c index 6b7c8b8d7111..d1c0d2bf4b6f 100644 --- a/sound/usb/mixer_scarlett_gen2.c +++ b/sound/usb/mixer_scarlett_gen2.c @@ -1032,14 +1032,20 @@ static int scarlett2_master_volume_ctl_get(struct snd_kcontrol *kctl, struct usb_mixer_elem_info *elem = kctl->private_data; struct usb_mixer_interface *mixer = elem->head.mixer; struct scarlett2_mixer_data *private = mixer->private_data; + int err = 0; mutex_lock(&private->data_mutex); - if (private->vol_updated) - scarlett2_update_volumes(mixer); - mutex_unlock(&private->data_mutex); + if (private->vol_updated) { + err = scarlett2_update_volumes(mixer); + if (err < 0) + goto unlock; + } ucontrol->value.integer.value[0] = private->master_vol; - return 0; + +unlock: + mutex_unlock(&private->data_mutex); + return err; } static int scarlett2_volume_ctl_get(struct snd_kcontrol *kctl, @@ -1049,14 +1055,19 @@ static int scarlett2_volume_ctl_get(struct snd_kcontrol *kctl, struct usb_mixer_interface *mixer = elem->head.mixer; struct scarlett2_mixer_data *private = mixer->private_data; int index = elem->control; + int err = 0; mutex_lock(&private->data_mutex); - if (private->vol_updated) - scarlett2_update_volumes(mixer); - mutex_unlock(&private->data_mutex); - + if (private->vol_updated) { + err = scarlett2_update_volumes(mixer); + if (err < 0) + goto unlock; + } ucontrol->value.integer.value[0] = private->vol[index]; - return 0; + +unlock: + mutex_unlock(&private->data_mutex); + return err; } static int scarlett2_volume_ctl_put(struct snd_kcontrol *kctl, @@ -1322,14 +1333,20 @@ static int scarlett2_button_ctl_get(struct snd_kcontrol *kctl, struct usb_mixer_elem_info *elem = kctl->private_data; struct usb_mixer_interface *mixer = elem->head.mixer; struct scarlett2_mixer_data *private = mixer->private_data; + int err = 0; mutex_lock(&private->data_mutex); - if (private->vol_updated) - scarlett2_update_volumes(mixer); - mutex_unlock(&private->data_mutex); + if (private->vol_updated) { + err = scarlett2_update_volumes(mixer); + if (err < 0) + goto unlock; + } ucontrol->value.enumerated.item[0] = private->buttons[elem->control]; - return 0; + +unlock: + mutex_unlock(&private->data_mutex); + return err; } static int scarlett2_button_ctl_put(struct snd_kcontrol *kctl, -- 2.33.0

1 0

[openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1 PATCH] ALSA: scarlett2: Add missing error checks to *_ctl_get()
by Yu Liao 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: "Geoffrey D. Bennett" <g(a)b4.vu> stable inclusion from stable-v5.15.148 commit 3a09488f4f67f7ade59b8ac62a6c7fb29439cf51 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9Q9F0 CVE: CVE-2023-52680 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 50603a67daef161c78c814580d57f7f0be57167e ] The *_ctl_get() functions which call scarlett2_update_*() were not checking the return value. Fix to check the return value and pass to the caller. Signed-off-by: Geoffrey D. Bennett <g(a)b4.vu> Fixes: 9e4d5c1be21f ("ALSA: usb-audio: Scarlett Gen 2 mixer interface") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/32a5fdc83b05fa74e0fcdd672fbf71d75c5f0a6d.17030010… Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai(a)suse.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: sound/usb/mixer_scarlett_gen2.c [Follow the patch logic and adapt the patch.] Signed-off-by: Yu Liao <liaoyu15(a)huawei.com> --- sound/usb/mixer_scarlett_gen2.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/usb/mixer_scarlett_gen2.c b/sound/usb/mixer_scarlett_gen2.c index 6b7c8b8d7111..d1c0d2bf4b6f 100644 --- a/sound/usb/mixer_scarlett_gen2.c +++ b/sound/usb/mixer_scarlett_gen2.c @@ -1032,14 +1032,20 @@ static int scarlett2_master_volume_ctl_get(struct snd_kcontrol *kctl, struct usb_mixer_elem_info *elem = kctl->private_data; struct usb_mixer_interface *mixer = elem->head.mixer; struct scarlett2_mixer_data *private = mixer->private_data; + int err = 0; mutex_lock(&private->data_mutex); - if (private->vol_updated) - scarlett2_update_volumes(mixer); - mutex_unlock(&private->data_mutex); + if (private->vol_updated) { + err = scarlett2_update_volumes(mixer); + if (err < 0) + goto unlock; + } ucontrol->value.integer.value[0] = private->master_vol; - return 0; + +unlock: + mutex_unlock(&private->data_mutex); + return err; } static int scarlett2_volume_ctl_get(struct snd_kcontrol *kctl, @@ -1049,14 +1055,19 @@ static int scarlett2_volume_ctl_get(struct snd_kcontrol *kctl, struct usb_mixer_interface *mixer = elem->head.mixer; struct scarlett2_mixer_data *private = mixer->private_data; int index = elem->control; + int err = 0; mutex_lock(&private->data_mutex); - if (private->vol_updated) - scarlett2_update_volumes(mixer); - mutex_unlock(&private->data_mutex); - + if (private->vol_updated) { + err = scarlett2_update_volumes(mixer); + if (err < 0) + goto unlock; + } ucontrol->value.integer.value[0] = private->vol[index]; - return 0; + +unlock: + mutex_unlock(&private->data_mutex); + return err; } static int scarlett2_volume_ctl_put(struct snd_kcontrol *kctl, @@ -1322,14 +1333,20 @@ static int scarlett2_button_ctl_get(struct snd_kcontrol *kctl, struct usb_mixer_elem_info *elem = kctl->private_data; struct usb_mixer_interface *mixer = elem->head.mixer; struct scarlett2_mixer_data *private = mixer->private_data; + int err = 0; mutex_lock(&private->data_mutex); - if (private->vol_updated) - scarlett2_update_volumes(mixer); - mutex_unlock(&private->data_mutex); + if (private->vol_updated) { + err = scarlett2_update_volumes(mixer); + if (err < 0) + goto unlock; + } ucontrol->value.enumerated.item[0] = private->buttons[elem->control]; - return 0; + +unlock: + mutex_unlock(&private->data_mutex); + return err; } static int scarlett2_button_ctl_put(struct snd_kcontrol *kctl, -- 2.33.0

1 0

[PATCH OLK-5.10] cvm_tsi: Fix security issue for Confidential cVM TSI
by Shengjie Li 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

virtcca inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/IA45I1 -------------------------------- Fix security issue for Confidential cVM TSI: 1. Init TSI driver when config cvm_guest. 2. Modify the token structure to reduce the variables that are exposed to the user state. 3. Add a lock for obtaining the remote attestation report. Fixes: 31071f4b2a0b ("cvm_tsi: add cvm tsi interface") Signed-off-by: Shengjie Li <lishengjie12(a)huawei.com> --- arch/arm64/include/asm/cvm_smc.h | 22 +++---- arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/cvm_tsi.h | 11 ++-- arch/arm64/kernel/cvm_tsi.c | 89 ++++++++++++++------------- 3 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 58 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cvm_smc.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cvm_smc.h index c4d56333e3..91688bc169 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cvm_smc.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cvm_smc.h @@ -124,30 +124,30 @@ static inline unsigned long tsi_measurement_read(struct cvm_measurement *cvm_mea return res.a0; } -static inline unsigned long tsi_attestation_token_init(struct cvm_attestation_cmd *attest_cmd) +static inline unsigned long tsi_attestation_token_init(unsigned char *challenge) { struct arm_smccc_res res; - unsigned char *challenge; + unsigned char *buf; - challenge = kmalloc(CHALLENGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!challenge) + buf = kmalloc(CHALLENGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!buf) return -ENOMEM; - memcpy(challenge, attest_cmd->challenge, CHALLENGE_SIZE); + memcpy(buf, challenge, CHALLENGE_SIZE); - arm_smccc_1_1_smc(SMC_TSI_ATTESTATION_TOKEN_INIT, virt_to_phys(challenge), &res); - kfree(challenge); + arm_smccc_1_1_smc(SMC_TSI_ATTESTATION_TOKEN_INIT, virt_to_phys(buf), &res); + kfree(buf); return res.a0; } -static inline unsigned long tsi_attestation_token_continue(struct cvm_attestation_cmd *attest_cmd) +static inline unsigned long tsi_attestation_token_continue(struct cvm_token_granule *token_granule) { struct arm_smccc_res res; - arm_smccc_1_1_smc(SMC_TSI_ATTESTATION_TOKEN_CONTINUE, virt_to_phys(attest_cmd->granule_ipa), - attest_cmd->offset, attest_cmd->size, &res); + arm_smccc_1_1_smc(SMC_TSI_ATTESTATION_TOKEN_CONTINUE, virt_to_phys(token_granule->ipa), + token_granule->offset, token_granule->size, &res); - attest_cmd->num_wr_bytes = res.a1; + token_granule->num_wr_bytes = res.a1; return res.a0; } diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/cvm_tsi.h b/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/cvm_tsi.h index 43e17a0da0..1ed4386db2 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/cvm_tsi.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/cvm_tsi.h @@ -55,10 +55,13 @@ struct cvm_measurement_extend { struct cvm_attestation_cmd { unsigned char challenge[CHALLENGE_SIZE]; /* input: challenge value */ - unsigned long token_size; /* return: challenge value */ - void *granule_head; - void *granule_ipa; /* IPA of the Granule to which the token will be written */ - unsigned long granule_count; + unsigned long token_size; /* return: token size */ +}; + +struct cvm_token_granule { + void *head; + void *ipa; /* IPA of the Granule to which the token will be written */ + unsigned long count; unsigned long offset; /* Offset within Granule to start of buffer in bytes */ unsigned long size; /* Size of buffer in bytes */ unsigned long num_wr_bytes; /* Number of bytes written to buffer */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cvm_tsi.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cvm_tsi.c index b48e5b17f4..252fe5352a 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cvm_tsi.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cvm_tsi.c @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/miscdevice.h> #include <linux/preempt.h> +#include <asm/cvm_guest.h> #include <asm/cvm_smc.h> #include <asm/cvm_tsi.h> @@ -16,20 +17,19 @@ struct attestation_token { static struct attestation_token token; +static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(lock); + static long tmm_tsi_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg); -static int tmm_tsi_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file); static ssize_t tmm_token_read(struct file *file, char __user *user_buffer, size_t size, loff_t *offset); static int tmm_get_tsi_version(struct cvm_tsi_version __user *arg); -static int tmm_get_attestation_token(struct cvm_attestation_cmd __user *arg, - struct attestation_token *attest_token); +static int tmm_get_attestation_token(struct cvm_attestation_cmd __user *arg); static int tmm_get_device_cert(struct cca_device_cert __user *arg); static const struct file_operations tmm_tsi_fops = { .owner = THIS_MODULE, .read = tmm_token_read, - .release = tmm_tsi_release, .unlocked_ioctl = tmm_tsi_ioctl }; @@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ static int __init tmm_tsi_init(void) unsigned long ver; int ret; + if (!is_cvm_world()) + return -EIO; + ver = tsi_get_version(); if (ver == SMCCC_RET_NOT_SUPPORTED) { pr_err("tmm_tsi: SMC return not supported!\n"); @@ -56,6 +59,11 @@ static int __init tmm_tsi_init(void) return ret; } + /* Allocate a large memory */ + token.buf = kmalloc(GRANULE_SIZE * MAX_TOKEN_GRANULE_PAGE, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!token.buf) + return -ENOMEM; + pr_warn("tmm_tsi: module loaded (version %lu.%lu).\n", TSI_ABI_VERSION_GET_MAJOR(ver), TSI_ABI_VERSION_GET_MINOR(ver)); @@ -65,8 +73,10 @@ static int __init tmm_tsi_init(void) static void __exit tmm_tsi_exit(void) { - if (token.buf != NULL) + if (token.buf != NULL) { + memset(token.buf, 0, GRANULE_SIZE * MAX_TOKEN_GRANULE_PAGE); kfree(token.buf); + } misc_deregister(&ioctl_dev); pr_warn("tmm_tsi: module unloaded.\n"); } @@ -80,7 +90,7 @@ static long tmm_tsi_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg ret = tmm_get_tsi_version((struct cvm_tsi_version *)arg); break; case TMM_GET_ATTESTATION_TOKEN: - ret = tmm_get_attestation_token((struct cvm_attestation_cmd *)arg, &token); + ret = tmm_get_attestation_token((struct cvm_attestation_cmd *)arg); break; case TMM_GET_DEVICE_CERT: ret = tmm_get_device_cert((struct cca_device_cert *)arg); @@ -99,28 +109,25 @@ static ssize_t tmm_token_read(struct file *file, char __user *user_buffer, int ret; int to_copy; - if (*offset >= token.size) + spin_lock(&lock); + if (*offset >= token.size) { + spin_unlock(&lock); return 0; + } to_copy = min((int)size, (int)(token.size - *offset)); ret = copy_to_user(user_buffer, token.buf + *offset, to_copy); if (ret) { pr_err("tmm_tsi: copy token to user failed (%d)!\n", ret); + spin_unlock(&lock); return -1; } *offset += to_copy; + spin_unlock(&lock); return to_copy; } -static int tmm_tsi_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) -{ - if (token.buf != NULL) { - memset(token.buf, 0, GRANULE_SIZE * MAX_TOKEN_GRANULE_PAGE); - kfree(token.buf); - } - return 0; -} static int tmm_get_tsi_version(struct cvm_tsi_version __user *arg) { @@ -141,65 +148,61 @@ static int tmm_get_tsi_version(struct cvm_tsi_version __user *arg) return 0; } -static int tmm_get_attestation_token(struct cvm_attestation_cmd __user *arg, - struct attestation_token *attest_token) +static int tmm_get_attestation_token(struct cvm_attestation_cmd __user *arg) { unsigned long ret; - struct cvm_attestation_cmd cmd = {0}; + struct cvm_token_granule token_granule = {0}; + unsigned char challenge[CHALLENGE_SIZE]; - ret = copy_from_user(&(cmd.challenge), &(arg->challenge), sizeof(cmd.challenge)); + ret = copy_from_user(challenge, &(arg->challenge), CHALLENGE_SIZE); if (ret) { pr_err("tmm_tsi: copy data from user failed (%lu)!\n", ret); return -EFAULT; } - /* Allocate a large memory */ - attest_token->buf = kmalloc(GRANULE_SIZE * MAX_TOKEN_GRANULE_PAGE, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!attest_token->buf) - return -ENOMEM; - cmd.granule_head = attest_token->buf; - cmd.granule_ipa = cmd.granule_head; + spin_lock(&lock); + token_granule.head = token.buf; + token_granule.ipa = token_granule.head; - /* preempt_disable(); */ - - ret = tsi_attestation_token_init(&cmd); + ret = tsi_attestation_token_init(challenge); if (ret) { pr_err("tmm_tsi: tsi call tsi_attestation_token_init failed (%lu)!\n", ret); + spin_unlock(&lock); return -EIO; } do { /* Retrieve one Granule of data per loop iteration */ - cmd.granule_ipa = cmd.granule_head + - (unsigned long)(cmd.granule_count * GRANULE_SIZE); - cmd.offset = 0; + token_granule.ipa = token_granule.head + + (unsigned long)(token_granule.count * GRANULE_SIZE); + token_granule.offset = 0; do { /* Retrieve sub-Granule chunk of data per loop iteration */ - cmd.size = GRANULE_SIZE - cmd.offset; - ret = tsi_attestation_token_continue(&cmd); - cmd.offset += cmd.num_wr_bytes; - } while (ret == TSI_INCOMPLETE && cmd.offset < GRANULE_SIZE); + token_granule.size = GRANULE_SIZE - token_granule.offset; + ret = tsi_attestation_token_continue(&token_granule); + token_granule.offset += token_granule.num_wr_bytes; + } while (ret == TSI_INCOMPLETE && token_granule.offset < GRANULE_SIZE); - cmd.granule_count += 1; - if (cmd.granule_count >= MAX_TOKEN_GRANULE_PAGE && ret == TSI_INCOMPLETE) { + token_granule.count += 1; + if (token_granule.count >= MAX_TOKEN_GRANULE_PAGE && ret == TSI_INCOMPLETE) { pr_err("tmm_tsi: macro MAX_TOKEN_GRANULE_PAGE (%d) is too small!\n", MAX_TOKEN_GRANULE_PAGE); + spin_unlock(&lock); return -ENOMEM; } } while (ret == TSI_INCOMPLETE); - /* preempt_enable(); */ - /* Send to user space the total size of the token */ - cmd.granule_count = cmd.granule_count - 1; - cmd.token_size = (unsigned long)(GRANULE_SIZE * cmd.granule_count) + cmd.offset; - attest_token->size = cmd.token_size; + token_granule.count = token_granule.count - 1; + token.size = (unsigned long)(GRANULE_SIZE * token_granule.count) + token_granule.offset; - ret = copy_to_user(&(arg->token_size), &(cmd.token_size), sizeof(cmd.token_size)); + ret = copy_to_user(&(arg->token_size), &(token.size), sizeof(token.size)); if (ret) { pr_err("tmm_tsi: copy data to user failed (%lu)!\n", ret); + spin_unlock(&lock); return -EFAULT; } + spin_unlock(&lock); return 0; } -- 2.37.2.windows.2

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] block: fix module reference leakage from bdev_open_by_dev error path
by Li Lingfeng 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: Yu Kuai <yukuai3(a)huawei.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.9-rc6 commit 9617cd6f24b294552a817f80f5225431ef67b540 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9Q9I0 CVE: CVE-2024-35859 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- At the time bdev_may_open() is called, module reference is grabbed already, hence module reference should be released if bdev_may_open() failed. This problem is found by code review. Fixes: ed5cc702d311 ("block: Add config option to not allow writing to mounted devices") Signed-off-by: Yu Kuai <yukuai3(a)huawei.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240406090930.2252838-22-yukuai1@huaweicloud.com Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Li Lingfeng <lilingfeng3(a)huawei.com> --- block/bdev.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/block/bdev.c b/block/bdev.c index b555deef0d76..07e8e3686aea 100644 --- a/block/bdev.c +++ b/block/bdev.c @@ -946,7 +946,7 @@ struct bdev_handle *bdev_open_by_dev(dev_t dev, blk_mode_t mode, void *holder, goto abort_claiming; ret = -EBUSY; if (!bdev_may_open(bdev, mode)) - goto abort_claiming; + goto put_module; if (bdev_is_partition(bdev)) ret = blkdev_get_part(bdev, mode); else -- 2.31.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] tipc: fix a possible memleak in tipc_buf_append
by Zhengchao Shao 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: Xin Long <lucien.xin(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.31 commit 614c5a5ae45a921595952117b2e2bd4d4bf9b574 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9US4T CVE: CVE-2024-36954 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 97bf6f81b29a8efaf5d0983251a7450e5794370d ] __skb_linearize() doesn't free the skb when it fails, so move '*buf = NULL' after __skb_linearize(), so that the skb can be freed on the err path. Fixes: b7df21cf1b79 ("tipc: skb_linearize the head skb when reassembling msgs") Reported-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Tung Nguyen <tung.q.nguyen(a)dektech.com.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/90710748c29a1521efac4f75ea01b3b7e61414cf.17144858… Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao(a)huawei.com> --- net/tipc/msg.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/tipc/msg.c b/net/tipc/msg.c index 5c9fd4791c4b..c52ab423082c 100644 --- a/net/tipc/msg.c +++ b/net/tipc/msg.c @@ -142,9 +142,9 @@ int tipc_buf_append(struct sk_buff **headbuf, struct sk_buff **buf) if (fragid == FIRST_FRAGMENT) { if (unlikely(head)) goto err; - *buf = NULL; if (skb_has_frag_list(frag) && __skb_linearize(frag)) goto err; + *buf = NULL; frag = skb_unshare(frag, GFP_ATOMIC); if (unlikely(!frag)) goto err; -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH] tipc: fix a possible memleak in tipc_buf_append
by Zhengchao Shao 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: Xin Long <lucien.xin(a)gmail.com> [ Upstream commit 97bf6f81b29a8efaf5d0983251a7450e5794370d ] __skb_linearize() doesn't free the skb when it fails, so move '*buf = NULL' after __skb_linearize(), so that the skb can be freed on the err path. Fixes: b7df21cf1b79 ("tipc: skb_linearize the head skb when reassembling msgs") Reported-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Tung Nguyen <tung.q.nguyen(a)dektech.com.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/90710748c29a1521efac4f75ea01b3b7e61414cf.17144858… Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> --- net/tipc/msg.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/tipc/msg.c b/net/tipc/msg.c index 5c9fd4791c4b..c52ab423082c 100644 --- a/net/tipc/msg.c +++ b/net/tipc/msg.c @@ -142,9 +142,9 @@ int tipc_buf_append(struct sk_buff **headbuf, struct sk_buff **buf) if (fragid == FIRST_FRAGMENT) { if (unlikely(head)) goto err; - *buf = NULL; if (skb_has_frag_list(frag) && __skb_linearize(frag)) goto err; + *buf = NULL; frag = skb_unshare(frag, GFP_ATOMIC); if (unlikely(!frag)) goto err; -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH OLK-6.6] gpiolib: cdev: Fix use after free in lineinfo_changed_notify
by Wupeng Ma 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: Zhongqiu Han <quic_zhonhan(a)quicinc.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.31 commit 95ca7c90eaf5ea8a8460536535101e3e81160e2a category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9UG5Z CVE: CVE-2024-36899 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 02f6b0e1ec7e0e7d059dddc893645816552039da ] The use-after-free issue occurs as follows: when the GPIO chip device file is being closed by invoking gpio_chrdev_release(), watched_lines is freed by bitmap_free(), but the unregistration of lineinfo_changed_nb notifier chain failed due to waiting write rwsem. Additionally, one of the GPIO chip's lines is also in the release process and holds the notifier chain's read rwsem. Consequently, a race condition leads to the use-after-free of watched_lines. Here is the typical stack when issue happened: [free] gpio_chrdev_release() --> bitmap_free(cdev->watched_lines) <-- freed --> blocking_notifier_chain_unregister() --> down_write(&nh->rwsem) <-- waiting rwsem --> __down_write_common() --> rwsem_down_write_slowpath() --> schedule_preempt_disabled() --> schedule() [use] st54spi_gpio_dev_release() --> gpio_free() --> gpiod_free() --> gpiod_free_commit() --> gpiod_line_state_notify() --> blocking_notifier_call_chain() --> down_read(&nh->rwsem); <-- held rwsem --> notifier_call_chain() --> lineinfo_changed_notify() --> test_bit(xxxx, cdev->watched_lines) <-- use after free The side effect of the use-after-free issue is that a GPIO line event is being generated for userspace where it shouldn't. However, since the chrdev is being closed, userspace won't have the chance to read that event anyway. To fix the issue, call the bitmap_free() function after the unregistration of lineinfo_changed_nb notifier chain. Fixes: 51c1064e82e7 ("gpiolib: add new ioctl() for monitoring changes in line info") Signed-off-by: Zhongqiu Han <quic_zhonhan(a)quicinc.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240505141156.2944912-1-quic_zhonhan@quicinc.com Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ma Wupeng <mawupeng1(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/gpio/gpiolib-cdev.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpio/gpiolib-cdev.c b/drivers/gpio/gpiolib-cdev.c index 84125e55de10..ebf5b8ef3b5d 100644 --- a/drivers/gpio/gpiolib-cdev.c +++ b/drivers/gpio/gpiolib-cdev.c @@ -2816,11 +2816,11 @@ static int gpio_chrdev_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) struct gpio_chardev_data *cdev = file->private_data; struct gpio_device *gdev = cdev->gdev; - bitmap_free(cdev->watched_lines); blocking_notifier_chain_unregister(&gdev->device_notifier, &cdev->device_unregistered_nb); blocking_notifier_chain_unregister(&gdev->line_state_notifier, &cdev->lineinfo_changed_nb); + bitmap_free(cdev->watched_lines); gpio_device_put(gdev); kfree(cdev); -- 2.25.1

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