From: Wander Lairson Costa wander@redhat.com

stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.195 commit 780f60dde29692c42091602fee9c25e9e391f3dc category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I86MTP CVE: CVE-2023-39189

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=...

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[ Upstream commit f4f8a7803119005e87b716874bec07c751efafec ]

The opt_num field is controlled by user mode and is not currently validated inside the kernel. An attacker can take advantage of this to trigger an OOB read and potentially leak information.

BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nf_osf_match_one+0xbed/0xd10 net/netfilter/nfnetlink_osf.c:88 Read of size 2 at addr ffff88804bc64272 by task poc/6431

CPU: 1 PID: 6431 Comm: poc Not tainted 6.0.0-rc4 #1 Call Trace: nf_osf_match_one+0xbed/0xd10 net/netfilter/nfnetlink_osf.c:88 nf_osf_find+0x186/0x2f0 net/netfilter/nfnetlink_osf.c:281 nft_osf_eval+0x37f/0x590 net/netfilter/nft_osf.c:47 expr_call_ops_eval net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c:214 nft_do_chain+0x2b0/0x1490 net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c:264 nft_do_chain_ipv4+0x17c/0x1f0 net/netfilter/nft_chain_filter.c:23 [..]

Also add validation to genre, subtype and version fields.

Fixes: 11eeef41d5f6 ("netfilter: passive OS fingerprint xtables match") Reported-by: Lucas Leong wmliang@infosec.exchange Signed-off-by: Wander Lairson Costa wander@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal fw@strlen.de Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Liu Jian liujian56@huawei.com --- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_osf.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)

diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_osf.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_osf.c index 51e3953b414c..260a655def34 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_osf.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_osf.c @@ -316,6 +316,14 @@ static int nfnl_osf_add_callback(struct net *net, struct sock *ctnl,

f = nla_data(osf_attrs[OSF_ATTR_FINGER]);

+ if (f->opt_num > ARRAY_SIZE(f->opt)) + return -EINVAL; + + if (!memchr(f->genre, 0, MAXGENRELEN) || + !memchr(f->subtype, 0, MAXGENRELEN) || + !memchr(f->version, 0, MAXGENRELEN)) + return -EINVAL; + kf = kmalloc(sizeof(struct nf_osf_finger), GFP_KERNEL); if (!kf) return -ENOMEM;