The first patch is the fix patch of CVE. The second patch is the fix patch of the first one.
NeilBrown (2): [Backport] nfsd: fix RELEASE_LOCKOWNER [Backport] nfsd: don't take fi_lock in nfsd_break_deleg_cb()
fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++----------------- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
From: NeilBrown neilb@suse.de
mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.8-rc2 commit edcf9725150e42beeca42d085149f4c88fa97afd category: bugfix bugzilla: 189682 CVE: CVE-2024-26629
Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?i...
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The test on so_count in nfsd4_release_lockowner() is nonsense and harmful. Revert to using check_for_locks(), changing that to not sleep.
First: harmful. As is documented in the kdoc comment for nfsd4_release_lockowner(), the test on so_count can transiently return a false positive resulting in a return of NFS4ERR_LOCKS_HELD when in fact no locks are held. This is clearly a protocol violation and with the Linux NFS client it can cause incorrect behaviour.
If RELEASE_LOCKOWNER is sent while some other thread is still processing a LOCK request which failed because, at the time that request was received, the given owner held a conflicting lock, then the nfsd thread processing that LOCK request can hold a reference (conflock) to the lock owner that causes nfsd4_release_lockowner() to return an incorrect error.
The Linux NFS client ignores that NFS4ERR_LOCKS_HELD error because it never sends NFS4_RELEASE_LOCKOWNER without first releasing any locks, so it knows that the error is impossible. It assumes the lock owner was in fact released so it feels free to use the same lock owner identifier in some later locking request.
When it does reuse a lock owner identifier for which a previous RELEASE failed, it will naturally use a lock_seqid of zero. However the server, which didn't release the lock owner, will expect a larger lock_seqid and so will respond with NFS4ERR_BAD_SEQID.
So clearly it is harmful to allow a false positive, which testing so_count allows.
The test is nonsense because ... well... it doesn't mean anything.
so_count is the sum of three different counts. 1/ the set of states listed on so_stateids 2/ the set of active vfs locks owned by any of those states 3/ various transient counts such as for conflicting locks.
When it is tested against '2' it is clear that one of these is the transient reference obtained by find_lockowner_str_locked(). It is not clear what the other one is expected to be.
In practice, the count is often 2 because there is precisely one state on so_stateids. If there were more, this would fail.
In my testing I see two circumstances when RELEASE_LOCKOWNER is called. In one case, CLOSE is called before RELEASE_LOCKOWNER. That results in all the lock states being removed, and so the lockowner being discarded (it is removed when there are no more references which usually happens when the lock state is discarded). When nfsd4_release_lockowner() finds that the lock owner doesn't exist, it returns success.
The other case shows an so_count of '2' and precisely one state listed in so_stateid. It appears that the Linux client uses a separate lock owner for each file resulting in one lock state per lock owner, so this test on '2' is safe. For another client it might not be safe.
So this patch changes check_for_locks() to use the (newish) find_any_file_locked() so that it doesn't take a reference on the nfs4_file and so never calls nfsd_file_put(), and so never sleeps. With this check is it safe to restore the use of check_for_locks() rather than testing so_count against the mysterious '2'.
Fixes: ce3c4ad7f4ce ("NFSD: Fix possible sleep during nfsd4_release_lockowner()") Signed-off-by: NeilBrown neilb@suse.de Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton jlayton@kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.2+ Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever chuck.lever@oracle.com
Conflict: fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c Commit c65454a94726("fs: remove locks_inode") replace locks_inode by file_inode. Signed-off-by: Li Lingfeng lilingfeng3@huawei.com --- fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c | 26 +++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c index b6480be7b5e6..16b073c63798 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c @@ -7080,14 +7080,16 @@ check_for_locks(struct nfs4_file *fp, struct nfs4_lockowner *lowner) { struct file_lock *fl; int status = false; - struct nfsd_file *nf = find_any_file(fp); + struct nfsd_file *nf; struct inode *inode; struct file_lock_context *flctx;
+ spin_lock(&fp->fi_lock); + nf = find_any_file_locked(fp); if (!nf) { /* Any valid lock stateid should have some sort of access */ WARN_ON_ONCE(1); - return status; + goto out; }
inode = locks_inode(nf->nf_file); @@ -7103,7 +7105,8 @@ check_for_locks(struct nfs4_file *fp, struct nfs4_lockowner *lowner) } spin_unlock(&flctx->flc_lock); } - nfsd_file_put(nf); +out: + spin_unlock(&fp->fi_lock); return status; }
@@ -7113,10 +7116,8 @@ check_for_locks(struct nfs4_file *fp, struct nfs4_lockowner *lowner) * @cstate: NFSv4 COMPOUND state * @u: RELEASE_LOCKOWNER arguments * - * The lockowner's so_count is bumped when a lock record is added - * or when copying a conflicting lock. The latter case is brief, - * but can lead to fleeting false positives when looking for - * locks-in-use. + * Check if theree are any locks still held and if not - free the lockowner + * and any lock state that is owned. * * Return values: * %nfs_ok: lockowner released or not found @@ -7152,10 +7153,13 @@ nfsd4_release_lockowner(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, spin_unlock(&clp->cl_lock); return nfs_ok; } - if (atomic_read(&lo->lo_owner.so_count) != 2) { - spin_unlock(&clp->cl_lock); - nfs4_put_stateowner(&lo->lo_owner); - return nfserr_locks_held; + + list_for_each_entry(stp, &lo->lo_owner.so_stateids, st_perstateowner) { + if (check_for_locks(stp->st_stid.sc_file, lo)) { + spin_unlock(&clp->cl_lock); + nfs4_put_stateowner(&lo->lo_owner); + return nfserr_locks_held; + } } unhash_lockowner_locked(lo); while (!list_empty(&lo->lo_owner.so_stateids)) {
From: NeilBrown neilb@suse.de
mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.8-rc4 commit 5ea9a7c5fe4149f165f0e3b624fe08df02b6c301 category: bugfix bugzilla: 189682 CVE: CVE-2024-26629
Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?i...
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A recent change to check_for_locks() changed it to take ->flc_lock while holding ->fi_lock. This creates a lock inversion (reported by lockdep) because there is a case where ->fi_lock is taken while holding ->flc_lock.
->flc_lock is held across ->fl_lmops callbacks, and nfsd_break_deleg_cb() is one of those and does take ->fi_lock. However it doesn't need to.
Prior to v4.17-rc1~110^2~22 ("nfsd: create a separate lease for each delegation") nfsd_break_deleg_cb() would walk the ->fi_delegations list and so needed the lock. Since then it doesn't walk the list and doesn't need the lock.
Two actions are performed under the lock. One is to call nfsd_break_one_deleg which calls nfsd4_run_cb(). These doesn't act on the nfs4_file at all, so don't need the lock.
The other is to set ->fi_had_conflict which is in the nfs4_file. This field is only ever set here (except when initialised to false) so there is no possible problem will multiple threads racing when setting it.
The field is tested twice in nfs4_set_delegation(). The first test does not hold a lock and is documented as an opportunistic optimisation, so it doesn't impose any need to hold ->fi_lock while setting ->fi_had_conflict.
The second test in nfs4_set_delegation() *is* make under ->fi_lock, so removing the locking when ->fi_had_conflict is set could make a change. The change could only be interesting if ->fi_had_conflict tested as false even though nfsd_break_one_deleg() ran before ->fi_lock was unlocked. i.e. while hash_delegation_locked() was running. As hash_delegation_lock() doesn't interact in any way with nfs4_run_cb() there can be no importance to this interaction.
So this patch removes the locking from nfsd_break_one_deleg() and moves the final test on ->fi_had_conflict out of the locked region to make it clear that locking isn't important to the test. It is still tested *after* vfs_setlease() has succeeded. This might be significant and as vfs_setlease() takes ->flc_lock, and nfsd_break_one_deleg() is called under ->flc_lock this "after" is a true ordering provided by a spinlock.
Fixes: edcf9725150e ("nfsd: fix RELEASE_LOCKOWNER") Signed-off-by: NeilBrown neilb@suse.de Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton jlayton@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever chuck.lever@oracle.com
Conflict: fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c Commit b95239ca4954("nfsd: make nfsd4_run_cb a bool return function") return "false" instead of "ret"; Commit 826b67e6376c("nfsd: don't hand out delegation on setuid files being opened for write") add call of nfsd4_verify_setuid_write and check it's return. Signed-off-by: Li Lingfeng lilingfeng3@huawei.com --- fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c | 11 +++++------ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c index 16b073c63798..7ff1f85f1dd9 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c @@ -4617,10 +4617,8 @@ nfsd_break_deleg_cb(struct file_lock *fl) */ fl->fl_break_time = 0;
- spin_lock(&fp->fi_lock); fp->fi_had_conflict = true; nfsd_break_one_deleg(dp); - spin_unlock(&fp->fi_lock); return ret; }
@@ -5049,12 +5047,13 @@ nfs4_set_delegation(struct nfs4_client *clp, struct svc_fh *fh, if (status) goto out_clnt_odstate;
+ status = -EAGAIN; + if (fp->fi_had_conflict) + goto out_unlock; + spin_lock(&state_lock); spin_lock(&fp->fi_lock); - if (fp->fi_had_conflict) - status = -EAGAIN; - else - status = hash_delegation_locked(dp, fp); + status = hash_delegation_locked(dp, fp); spin_unlock(&fp->fi_lock); spin_unlock(&state_lock);
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