Fix CVE-2024-40995.
David Ruth (1): net/sched: act_api: fix possible infinite loop in tcf_idr_check_alloc()
Pedro Tammela (1): net/sched: act_api: rely on rcu in tcf_idr_check_alloc
net/sched/act_api.c | 66 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 43 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
From: Pedro Tammela pctammela@mojatatu.com
stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.221 commit 66c7aa157a38d93947b32c0d309889369a27e8e2 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IACR2K CVE: CVE-2024-40995
Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=...
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[ Upstream commit 4b55e86736d5b492cf689125da2600f59c7d2c39 ]
Instead of relying only on the idrinfo->lock mutex for bind/alloc logic, rely on a combination of rcu + mutex + atomics to better scale the case where multiple rtnl-less filters are binding to the same action object.
Action binding happens when an action index is specified explicitly and an action exists which such index exists. Example: tc actions add action drop index 1 tc filter add ... matchall action drop index 1 tc filter add ... matchall action drop index 1 tc filter add ... matchall action drop index 1 tc filter ls ... filter protocol all pref 49150 matchall chain 0 filter protocol all pref 49150 matchall chain 0 handle 0x1 not_in_hw action order 1: gact action drop random type none pass val 0 index 1 ref 4 bind 3
filter protocol all pref 49151 matchall chain 0 filter protocol all pref 49151 matchall chain 0 handle 0x1 not_in_hw action order 1: gact action drop random type none pass val 0 index 1 ref 4 bind 3
filter protocol all pref 49152 matchall chain 0 filter protocol all pref 49152 matchall chain 0 handle 0x1 not_in_hw action order 1: gact action drop random type none pass val 0 index 1 ref 4 bind 3
When no index is specified, as before, grab the mutex and allocate in the idr the next available id. In this version, as opposed to before, it's simplified to store the -EBUSY pointer instead of the previous alloc + replace combination.
When an index is specified, rely on rcu to find if there's an object in such index. If there's none, fallback to the above, serializing on the mutex and reserving the specified id. If there's one, it can be an -EBUSY pointer, in which case we just try again until it's an action, or an action. Given the rcu guarantees, the action found could be dead and therefore we need to bump the refcount if it's not 0, handling the case it's in fact 0.
As bind and the action refcount are already atomics, these increments can happen without the mutex protection while many tcf_idr_check_alloc race to bind to the same action instance.
In case binding encounters a parallel delete or add, it will return -EAGAIN in order to try again. Both filter and action apis already have the retry machinery in-place. In case it's an unlocked filter it retries under the rtnl lock.
Signed-off-by: Pedro Tammela pctammela@mojatatu.com Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim jhs@mojatatu.com Reviewed-by: Vlad Buslov vladbu@nvidia.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231211181807.96028-2-pctammela@mojatatu.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski kuba@kernel.org Stable-dep-of: d864319871b0 ("net/sched: act_api: fix possible infinite loop in tcf_idr_check_alloc()") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao shaozhengchao@huawei.com --- net/sched/act_api.c | 65 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 43 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/sched/act_api.c b/net/sched/act_api.c index 4ab9c2a6f650..eb6bb90ddd33 100644 --- a/net/sched/act_api.c +++ b/net/sched/act_api.c @@ -507,6 +507,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcf_idr_cleanup); * its reference and bind counters, and return 1. Otherwise insert temporary * error pointer (to prevent concurrent users from inserting actions with same * index) and return 0. + * + * May return -EAGAIN for binding actions in case of a parallel add/delete on + * the requested index. */
int tcf_idr_check_alloc(struct tc_action_net *tn, u32 *index, @@ -515,43 +518,61 @@ int tcf_idr_check_alloc(struct tc_action_net *tn, u32 *index, struct tcf_idrinfo *idrinfo = tn->idrinfo; struct tc_action *p; int ret; + u32 max;
-again: - mutex_lock(&idrinfo->lock); if (*index) { +again: + rcu_read_lock(); p = idr_find(&idrinfo->action_idr, *index); + if (IS_ERR(p)) { /* This means that another process allocated * index but did not assign the pointer yet. */ - mutex_unlock(&idrinfo->lock); + rcu_read_unlock(); goto again; }
- if (p) { - refcount_inc(&p->tcfa_refcnt); - if (bind) - atomic_inc(&p->tcfa_bindcnt); - *a = p; - ret = 1; - } else { - *a = NULL; - ret = idr_alloc_u32(&idrinfo->action_idr, NULL, index, - *index, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!ret) - idr_replace(&idrinfo->action_idr, - ERR_PTR(-EBUSY), *index); + if (!p) { + /* Empty slot, try to allocate it */ + max = *index; + rcu_read_unlock(); + goto new; + } + + if (!refcount_inc_not_zero(&p->tcfa_refcnt)) { + /* Action was deleted in parallel */ + rcu_read_unlock(); + return -EAGAIN; } + + if (bind) + atomic_inc(&p->tcfa_bindcnt); + *a = p; + + rcu_read_unlock(); + + return 1; } else { + /* Find a slot */ *index = 1; - *a = NULL; - ret = idr_alloc_u32(&idrinfo->action_idr, NULL, index, - UINT_MAX, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!ret) - idr_replace(&idrinfo->action_idr, ERR_PTR(-EBUSY), - *index); + max = UINT_MAX; } + +new: + *a = NULL; + + mutex_lock(&idrinfo->lock); + ret = idr_alloc_u32(&idrinfo->action_idr, ERR_PTR(-EBUSY), index, max, + GFP_KERNEL); mutex_unlock(&idrinfo->lock); + + /* N binds raced for action allocation, + * retry for all the ones that failed. + */ + if (ret == -ENOSPC && *index == max) + ret = -EAGAIN; + return ret; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcf_idr_check_alloc);
From: David Ruth druth@chromium.org
stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.221 commit c6a7da65a296745535a964be1019ec7691b0cb90 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IACR2K CVE: CVE-2024-40995
Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=...
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[ Upstream commit d864319871b05fadd153e0aede4811ca7008f5d6 ]
syzbot found hanging tasks waiting on rtnl_lock [1]
A reproducer is available in the syzbot bug.
When a request to add multiple actions with the same index is sent, the second request will block forever on the first request. This holds rtnl_lock, and causes tasks to hang.
Return -EAGAIN to prevent infinite looping, while keeping documented behavior.
[1]
INFO: task kworker/1:0:5088 blocked for more than 143 seconds. Not tainted 6.9.0-rc4-syzkaller-00173-g3cdb45594619 #0 "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. task:kworker/1:0 state:D stack:23744 pid:5088 tgid:5088 ppid:2 flags:0x00004000 Workqueue: events_power_efficient reg_check_chans_work Call Trace: <TASK> context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:5409 [inline] __schedule+0xf15/0x5d00 kernel/sched/core.c:6746 __schedule_loop kernel/sched/core.c:6823 [inline] schedule+0xe7/0x350 kernel/sched/core.c:6838 schedule_preempt_disabled+0x13/0x30 kernel/sched/core.c:6895 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:684 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x5b8/0x9c0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:752 wiphy_lock include/net/cfg80211.h:5953 [inline] reg_leave_invalid_chans net/wireless/reg.c:2466 [inline] reg_check_chans_work+0x10a/0x10e0 net/wireless/reg.c:2481
Fixes: 0190c1d452a9 ("net: sched: atomically check-allocate action") Reported-by: syzbot+b87c222546179f4513a7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=b87c222546179f4513a7 Signed-off-by: David Ruth druth@chromium.org Reviewed-by: Jamal Hadi Salim jhs@mojatatu.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240614190326.1349786-1-druth@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni pabeni@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao shaozhengchao@huawei.com --- net/sched/act_api.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/sched/act_api.c b/net/sched/act_api.c index eb6bb90ddd33..bf98bb602a9d 100644 --- a/net/sched/act_api.c +++ b/net/sched/act_api.c @@ -521,7 +521,6 @@ int tcf_idr_check_alloc(struct tc_action_net *tn, u32 *index, u32 max;
if (*index) { -again: rcu_read_lock(); p = idr_find(&idrinfo->action_idr, *index);
@@ -530,7 +529,7 @@ int tcf_idr_check_alloc(struct tc_action_net *tn, u32 *index, * index but did not assign the pointer yet. */ rcu_read_unlock(); - goto again; + return -EAGAIN; }
if (!p) {
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